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109. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, August 5, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVIII, Memos (B), 8/1-12/65. Top Secret. SUBJECT This is not an argument for or against contacts with the NLF (although I can't resist the opportunity to cast an affirmative vote). Rather it is an attempt to explore how best to make such contacts, on the assumption that a decision is taken to do so. There are four key questions: Where should the contact be maintained? Whom should the USG rely on to undertake such contacts? How and to what extent should the GVN be cut in? How can we insure that the contact is legitimate rather than a Communist propaganda ploy? The Front Abroad The Front maintains representatives in Cuba, the UAR, Algeria, Czechoslovakia, Indonesia, East Germany, China and the USSR. In addition, there appears to be a floating delegation of uncertain stature in France and some slightly irregular and clandestine representation in Cambodia. None of the places where the Front maintains an office seems ideal for discreet contacts, and some of them are patently undesirable. To complicate the matter further, we know very little about the calibre, status and personality of any of the individuals in place. It is likely, however, that once we decide on a locus of contact and once the Front is convinced we are ready for serious talk, the NLF will see to it that their man is suitable at least from their point of view. There are several reasons why Algiers, at this moment at least, seems to be the best place for contact: The NLF man now in place, Huynh Van Tam, is personally known to some Americans (see the attached account of Gottlieb's recent conversation with him)./2/ /2/Attached but not printed. Of all the places where the Front now has representation, Algiers is probably the "loosest". Willy, nilly, we may find ourselves (hopefully unofficially) in contact with Their Man in Algiers. We are still awaiting some word on how (or even if) the VC and the Algerians want to deliver Hertz. It is clear from my talks with the Algerian Ambassador that whatever the precise details may be, the essence of the plan will be to exploit the exchange for at least a propaganda U.S.-VC contact and hopefully for a more substantive relationship. The Means of Contact I assume that whatever direct contact we may wish to maintain should be unofficial, very low key, and deniable. This obviously eliminates our Embassy and, in my view, the press. It still leaves three kinds of people: Academic types, Responsible Professional Peaceniks, and just plain Private Citizens. I will, if you desire, shake up some possible candidates in the first two categories (Lucien Pye comes immediately to mind in the Academic field, possibly Gottlieb in the Peacenik area). But I have an inspiration within the 3rd category: Burke Hertz--who, if we can deliver his brother, on the Algiers track, will have ostensibly good reasons for an occasional chat; he is an able bright lawyer, a liberal Democrat, and by now fairly sophisticated in the care and feeding of the Viet Cong. He will need an interpreter since he doesn't speak French, but I think Bill Colby can find one. Obviously, whoever is chosen, he will have to be someone who the VC thinks has an official ear, if not an official voice. The GVN Problem It would be prudent to cut the GVN, at least the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, in on the fact that some American is talking to a Front man (the consequences of it being leaked to them would be more difficult and delicate to handle than a frank admission at the outset). We have a tricky path ahead in our relations with Saigon, and we should tie them to us as we take each step. This is not to say that we have to admit much official interest or direction to the contacts. The Propaganda Trap This is the most difficult aspect of the problem. As far as the Front is concerned, its purposes may be well served by publicizing the fact of the contact and distorting the substance of the talks. Perhaps our only protection here is to insure that we can make a credible case for denying any official sanction or character to the talks. This means that both the instrument and his channel to U.S. policy makers will have to be ready to be the patsies. Chester L. Cooper/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
110. Summary Notes of the 554th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/ Washington, August 5, 1965, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. Vietnam Secretary Rusk: Reported to the President on his recent meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee. For the present, there is good support in the committee. Secretary McNamara: In both the Senate and the House Committees, there is broad support, but this support is thin. There is a feeling of uneasiness and frustration. There is criticism of our allies for not helping more in Vietnam. A minority of committee members believes we are not bombing targets of value. The Republicans are making political capital by overstating the effect on the U.S. economy of the cost of the Vietnam war. General Taylor: The increase in U.S. forces gave a lift to the South Vietnamese. We do agree with Vietnam on war aims, even though General Ky may state, for domestic consumption, that he wants to invade the North. The Saigon Government accepts the principles of the Geneva Accords and is not going to march North. Viet Cong attacks are slowing down. Saigon does not object to our contacts with the other side, but it would worry if we stopped our military pressure on Hanoi during any talks. General Ky is a young man, but he is better than one would imagine. He may mature. General Thieu is a stabilizing force. He prefers to sit in the background, consequently, he will not take the post of Prime Minister. The present Saigon Government framework is solid but the members of the new government are not yet well-known to us. General Ky is no administrator but he has a strong social conscience. The present military situation is serious but not desperate. No one knows how much Viet Cong resilience is still left. The arrival of additional U.S. forces must have convinced Hanoi that their chance of winning the war is lessening. No problem has yet arisen as to the U.S.-South Vietnamese command structure. We are not raising the issue, but are dealing with it on a case-by-case basis. By the end of 1965, the North Vietnamese offensive will be bloodied and defeated without having achieved major gains. Hanoi may then decide to change its policy. 1966 could be a decisive year. We should seek to increase the South Vietnamese military forces and limit the size of U.S. forces. Political fragility continues in South Vietnam. We hope that the political situation is at last settling down. Based on recent local elections, a national election held now would not go to Ho Chi Minh. The military side of the war in South Vietnam is not overstressed as some allege. Security must come before a satisfactory political situation can develop. At the time our combat forces arrived, the morale in South Vietnam was uncertain but their confidence grew when we began our bombing. This bombing is effective in that it reminds Hanoi of the increasing cost of the war to them. As to the effect of the bombing pause, on balance it was neutral--not all good and not all bad. As to the press, thanks to the press attache, Barry Zorthian, relations with the correspondents are much better than two years ago. There continue to be a few irresponsible correspondents who cause trouble and have a desire to express things in the negative. The President: We are getting only bad things from the press. Mr. Zorthian: A minority of the correspondents cause trouble. Unfortunately, they get more coverage because they work for some of the wire services and some TV networks. Many foreigners represent U.S. press agencies in Saigon. There is a certain amount of advocacy and many of the young correspondents have chips on their shoulders. We should demand that news editors in the United States present a balanced picture in their news reports. AP reporter Arnett is extremely critical of the entire war effort. Ambassador Harriman: reported on his recent conversations with Kosygin and Tito: Mr. Kosygin, who speaks for his government, does not want to get the UN involved in the Vietnam problem. He says U.S. bombing will not succeed. As to Soviet influence on Hanoi, he says the Viet Cong are as independent as they say they are. The Soviets are anxious to avoid war. Their real battle is with the Chinese. They want to maintain the status quo in Europe and in their relations with us. Tito believes the Chinese are the danger--not because they are Communists but because they are nationalists and imperialists. On Vietnam, he offered no proposals as to how to end the war. Bromley Smith
111. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 6, 1965, 4:45-5 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII. Confidential. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy on August 11. PRESENT 1. The President greeted the Foreign Minister warmly, and took him and the Ambassador into his small office. He opened the conversation by a friendly reference to the Ambassador's recent trip to Lake Jackson in Texas. The Ambassador reported that he had enjoyed the trip very much and that he looked forward to an opportunity to show this same work on desalinization to the Minister of his Government mainly concerned with these matters. The President told the Foreign Minister that the Ambassador was going to be regarded as a citizen of Texas, and then turned to the Foreign Minister attentively and expectantly. 2. The Foreign Minister said that he brought the President the very warm greetings of President Nkrumah, and a letter./2/ He handed the letter to the President. The President joked about the large number of red seals on the letter, produced a pocketknife, opened it carefully, and read it aloud. /2/In this August 4 letter, Nkrumah stated that Ho Chi Minh had informed him that he would not be able to guarantee Nkrumah's safety if he visited Hanoi because of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. Nkrumah asked for a pause in the bombing to enable him to travel to Hanoi to pursue "this fine opportunity directed towards the achievement of a peaceful settlement in Vietnam." (Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 277, Ghanaian Mission 1965) 3. As soon as he had finished reading the letter, the President gave the Foreign Minister a categorical assurance that no U.S. military operations would interfere with any visit to Hanoi by President Nkrumah. The President said (1) we are not bombing Hanoi, (2) we have not intensified our bombing of North Vietnam, (3) the President will be in no danger, and (4) who is he kidding? (probably referring to Ho, not Nkrumah). The President continued that a peaceful settlement would never be blocked because of any action of the United States. If the aggression ceases, our resistance ceases. Nobody wanted peace more than the United States, and if the efforts of Ghana could get the aggressors to stop, we would stop resistance to the aggression. The President repeated that no one needed to be worried about getting hurt in Hanoi--there was no danger in a visit to Hanoi in search of peace. 4. The President told the Ghanaians that they knew what he thought--that he thought all nations should be happy together--that the world should look forward to a time of peace and progress. The President noted that this had been a great day for progress in the United States, with the signing of the voting rights bill, and his guests enthusiastically agreed, saying that they had seen the ceremony on television and been greatly moved by it. 5. The Foreign Minister said that the reason for the letter was the report of the Ghanaian mission to Hanoi which had experienced some difficulties. It had been given military escort from Peking to Hanoi in a flight which gave rise to some concern. It had heard the sounds of guns on many occasions in Hanoi, and it had advised President Nkrumah not to go to Hanoi at this time. But President Nkrumah wanted very much to go, and he therefore asked whether bombings could not cease for three or four days. Then perhaps he could work for a cessation of all hostilities during peace talks. President Nkrumah felt that he must do all he could for a cease-fire, and this was the explanation for what the Foreign Minister had come to call "the fever-heat diplomacy" of his sudden visit to Washington. 6. The President replied that he was happy to see the Foreign Minister and repeated that the Foreign Minister should return to his President and say (1) that we have not bombed Hanoi and that he need not be frightened, and (2) that if he can get the aggression stopped, there will be peace overnight. 7. The President repeated again that no one wanted peace more than the United States, but he said that no one would be allowed to gobble up little countries. We would stay there and ensure the right of self-determination. We would not run out of there. But the President said once again that President Nkrumah need not be concerned by the bombs that had never fallen on Hanoi. 8. The Foreign Minister raised very gently the question whether the President would wish to receive President Nkrumah either before or after his visit to Hanoi. The President said he thought we should wait until after President Nkrumah got back from Hanoi, and then we would see. So far, visitors in Hanoi had produced no hope from the other side. This matter was left entirely open, but it was made quite plain by omission that the President did not expect to see President Nkrumah before his visit to Hanoi. 9. The President, in closing, made it very clear that he himself thought the North Vietnamese suggestion that President Nkrumah would be in danger was a fraud, and the friendly chuckles of his guests made it appear that they personally did not disagree. It was agreed that the meeting would not be discussed in detail, but that the Press Secretary would give a brief summary of the contents of President Nkrumah's message and of the oral reply which the President had given. The President would send a written reply promptly,/3/ and it was tentatively agreed that the two letters would be released after the Foreign Minister had carried the reply back and delivered it to President Nkrumah. /3/On August 6, Johnson sent a letter to Nkrumah, through the Ghanaian Embassy, which summarized the points he had made in his conversation with Quaison-Sackey. (Ibid.) 10. With exchanges of further best wishes and expressions of regard and satisfaction, the meeting ended. The two visitors had clearly been both impressed and pleased by their reception./4/ /4/On August 12, Nkrumah sent another letter to Johnson in which he explained that his Foreign Minister had not been privy to all the information that he had received from Hanoi. The information had encouraged him to feel that there was a good possibility that he could broker a negotiated settlement of the conflict. He reviewed the North Vietnamese position, as he understood it, and suggested that he come to Washington to discuss it with Johnson. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII) Johnson replied on August 13 in a letter in which he encouraged Nkrumah again to undertake his mission to Hanoi. He stated, however, that he felt a meeting in Washington was unnecessary until it developed that a firm basis for negotiations had been established. (Ibid.) McG.B./5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
112. Editorial Note On August 6, 1965, the United States established direct contact with North Vietnam through the North Vietnamese representative in Paris, Mai Van Bo. In response to suggestions from Mai Van Bo, passed through the French Government in May (see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume II, Document 313) and through Urah Arkas-Duntov of the Dreyfus Fund in July (see Document 98), an authorized but unofficial U.S. representative was dispatched to Paris to explore with Bo the possibility of negotiations with North Vietnam. The U.S. representative was retired Ambassador Edmund Gullion, former Deputy Chief of Mission in Saigon. The decision to pursue the negotiating track was very tightly held, and for reasons of security Gullion was referred to in documents relating to the Paris contacts as X, and Mai Van Bo was referred to as Rupert. For records of the four meetings between Gullion and Mai Van Bo, which took place between August 6 and September 1, see Documents 113, 120, 122, and 133. Summaries of this and other documentation on the Paris contacts are in the unpublished portion of United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 and are printed in George C. Herring (ed.), The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers, pages 77-107. Initial talking points and overall objectives, as summarized in United States-Vietnam Relations, were outlined for Gullion before he established contact with Mai Van Bo: "Initial talking points for X: "1. These were to be simple and vague, but to set limits in which talks can safely take place. "2. X was to show desire for peace, and a free, independent, and unified Vietnam. "3. X was to say that the prolongation of conflict is bound to lead to progressively larger US pressures and long-term China control in NVN. "4. X was to insist that nothing can force the US out. Indeed, X was to say that pressures in the US to a wider war were growing and that it would be increasingly harder to exercise restraint. "5. If R[upert] does not seem receptive to a second meeting, then proceed as follows: "Theme: US is flexible to some degree. See, for example, the President's press conference of 28 July. "a. US ready to discuss the four points. "b. People of SVN have a right to peace and to determine their own destiny in free elections in SVN or throughout Vietnam under international supervision. "c. The four points, in some measure, parallel our own. Are we right in assuming these points are not stated as the only basis for starting talks and that other points can be discussed? "d. The four points mention withdrawal of forces. The US says it will do so once SVN 'is secure from outside aggression.' "e. We did not ask SVN to be our ally or to keep US bases there -- although a 'sovereign government should have the right to call for help if necessary in its own self-defense.' "f. US is not opposed to unification 'at some future time under democratic processes.' "Purpose of X's mission: "Primary--To ascertain whether any serious purpose to negotiate exists and, if so, on what basis? Secondary--R as possible contact? Third--clarify the four points (prerequisite or best basis, timing on unification and elections, a settlement in accord with NLF program, timing on withdrawal). Fourth--Collateral intelligence (DRV attitude on the Indian proposal, UN, China, NLF, and the possible use of Laos and Cambodia as a gambit for talks)." (Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, page 97) Regarding the President's press conference of July 28, see Document 98. For text of the four points outlined on April 8 by Pham Van Dong as a basis for a peace settlement, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume II, Document 245; excerpts from his address before the United National Assembly, during which he set forth the four points, are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pages 852-853. The Indian and Yugoslav initiative calling for an international conference to resolve the conflict in Vietnam was advanced in a joint communique on August 1; see Document 102.
113. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/ Paris, August 6, 1965, 8:50 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; XYZ. Drafted by Gullion and cleared by Bohlen. See Document 112 for background information on the "XYZ" contacts. 718. Literally eyes only for Ball from Ambassador. X made contact with Rupert/2/ without intermediaries and had two hour preliminary conversation with him this afternoon with no others present. Following are principal points: /2/"X" refers to Edmund Gullion and "Rupert" to Mai Van Bo. 1. Rupert took line similar to that he has used with previous interlocutors. This interesting to degree that he was aware on basis Rupert's introduction that report would probably go straight to official quarters. X believes that Rupert's comments to him were made on instructions. 2. X adhered to script, points 1 through 15,/3/ at which point Rupert obviously ready to say little until other shoe dropped. Confirmed that situation was as X described it but problem was what to do about it. His country wanted only peace, had been obliged to fight against foreign domination for twenty years and had maintained its independence for thousands of years with only slight interruptions. He did not agree or disagree with X's direr predictions but appeared depressed by prospects. /3/Presumably a reference to Gullion's instructions; see Document 112. 3. Before continuing per script and discussing conceivable variants Dong's four points X asked whether Hanoi ready to consider discussions or negotiations touching not only on these but also on other points; whether withdrawal of forces was pre-condition of negotiations or discussions (in which case X judged no chance); what modalities Rupert could envisage for re-unification; whether and when the UN could be accepted as "interlocuteur valable"; and if not who would be acceptable. X noted that the "four points" referred several times to the "zones" of Vietnam, seeming to envisage separation for longer or shorter time. X also claimed that Peking originally broadcast four points without the conjoint declaration and always gave Hanoi's position a harder line aspect than Hanoi did. X did not raise question of representation of Liberation Front. 4. Rupert seemed to see this as getting down to cases, appeared slightly agitated, went to his office and brought back notes from which he spoke (from instructions?). Re troop withdrawal he stressed that any "solution" must of course include it, but confirmed that there would be "modalities" including staging and timing. Even convening of discussions should stipulate withdrawal as one of objects. 5. As to UN, Rupert said Conference of Geneva was "a valid international instance" and the accords "a valid base". The Geneva mechanism brought together the interested countries, which was absolutely necessary to a settlement. Rupert said categorically that his country rejected any intervention of the UN despite X's suggestion that U Thant or member states might limit their activities to good offices. 6. With respect to unification Rupert said Geneva Accords themselves provided for "zones" but accords also recognized Vietnam as constituted by a single people. Rupert contemplated short or considerably longer interval before reunification but stressed latter could only be on basis of free decision and consultation between Vietnamese people; charged that Ngo Dinh Diem backed by U.S. had blocked elections. This couldn't be allowed to happen again, said Rupert, but he gave no sign that elections had to occur soon. Pending reunification Rupert said they wanted freer movement between zones, more trade, etc. (X infers that there are differences possibly existing between north and south which might influence attitude of north, which would not however drop its insistence on long term unification and would be confident of achieving it.) 7. Rupert raised question of representation of national front, declared it solely qualified to represent the south. X merely cited public statements this point by Secretary and President. 8. Re Pham Van Dong's four points, Rupert betrayed interest in X's allegations concerning Chinese treatment of them. (Documentation on this would be useful; Rupert also nodded head once or twice in response to references by X to China in his opening discourse.) He was, however, much less clear on relation of four points as a package to convening of a possible conference than he was on other points cited above. (X believes there may be semantic confusion in Rupert's mind or between Paris and Hanoi, or perhaps more substantive disagreement between factions of Hanoi Government on this point.) Rupert said that principles incorporated in the four points "must be recognized as creating the possibilities for a solution." However, he also called them the only "right base for a correct solution". X pointed out that Rupert had referred to Geneva Accords and Geneva Conference as "a" possible machinery or basis, but that he seemed to be stipulating acceptance of the four points as "the" (i.e., exclusive) base. Rupert finally said there was a difference between what was required for a discussion (or negotiation) and what was required for a settlement. There couldn't be a settlement without recognition of the principles within the four points. 9. Re "interlocuteur valable", Rupert refused to pick up references to either Ghana or France; or the Commonwealth; he referred solely to Geneva machinery; he also claimed to be confused by President Johnson's total of fifteen efforts to negotiate and the interest of some "forty" countries in a settlement./4/ X took occasion review many of these orally. He observed that Rupert seemed slightly discomfited by particular reference to abortive Cambodian and Laotian conferences. /4/In his July 28 press conference, President Johnson stated: "Fifteen efforts have been made to start these discussions with the help of 40 nations throughout the world, but there has been no answer." See Document 98. 10. At this point, and speaking from a handwritten text,/5/ Rupert said he wished to ask X, "who seemed to be in position to know U.S. Government thinking", what its reaction would be to whole series of questions. X judged best to reply by citing possible variation on four points which he said had been written only by him but on basis his appreciation of what might be in minds of his friends in Department; he again stressed this not official but might help to clarify. Rupert took note of many of these points but X left no text./6/ /5/Not further identified. /6/For text of Sturm's version of the four points, see Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 97. 12. In conclusion, Rupert said his views were those of "Vietnamese Government" taking occasion to point out X's not necessarily those of U.S. Government. Rupert said his policy to try to insure understanding his government's views and indicated contacts with X "could" be continued. When X replied he going out of town Rupert asked when he would return and suggested Wednesday or Thursday/7/ for possible next contact. He advised meeting be arranged by leaving note rather than through telephone or intermediaries. /7/August 11 or 12. 13. General impression: Rupert is serious and appears professionally reliable contact. He aware that follow-up might be pursued by persons other than X. Latter believes discussions could be moved or would be moved to negotiating level, if that is desired, in degree that variations on four points are introduced with increasing degree of official standing. 14. Time of next meeting with Rupert could be advanced but it will probably take him several days to hear from his principals./8/ /8/The source text bears no signature. See Document 120 for the record of the next meeting.
114. Telegram From the National Security Council Executive Secretary (Smith) to President Johnson, at Camp David, Maryland/1/ Washington, August 7, 1965, 12:43 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVIII, Cables. Secret. Received at 3:55 p.m. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the telegram. CAP 65479. Goldberg's report on his talk in New York yesterday with U.N. Security Council members: Goldberg, Plimpton and Yost met for one hour this afternoon with non-permanent Security Council members Ramani (Malaysia), Velazquez (Uruguay), Aka (Ivory Coast), Quarles (Netherlands), Scott-Murga (Bolivia), Rifai (Jordan). Ramani opened meeting by stating US letter to Security Council/2/ placed obligation for action on members. Vietnam is new subject not on Security Council agenda and letter cannot simply be filed. Those present therefore would appreciate clarification as to US intentions and objectives. /2/See footnote 8, Document 99. Goldberg explained at some length rationale for President's letter to Secretary-General2 and his letter to Security Council, emphasizing our central objective is to bring issue out of battlefield to negotiating table, welcoming any initiatives by Security Council members, collectively or individually, but expressing agreement with Secretary-General's view that Security Council meeting at this time would not be productive. He also stressed that our letter was seriously meant, was in no sense intended as propaganda maneuver, was in fulfillment our Charter obligation to keep Security Council informed, was certainly not designed to put Security Council members on the spot but rather to elicit from them any initiatives or assistance which may lead to negotiations. We welcome all efforts, he said, to find way to negotiations and honorable settlement, including those by Quaison-Sackey, Tito, Shastri, Nasser and other Africans. Most of all we count on Secretary-General and hope Security Council members will assist him, as well as taking any independent steps toward mediation and conciliation they may feel would be constructive. Rifai was only non-permanent member who commented at some length. He recognized sincerity of US appeal to Security Council and welcomed it, pointing out he had favored bringing question to Security Council in April but had gotten no positive reaction then. He mentioned he is meeting with Secretary-General today. He would not fear polemical debate in Security Council if something constructive came out of it. He would not, however, wish to go into Security Council meeting without prior understanding where we would come out. There is, moreover, no point in Security Council adopting decision if that decision would not be accepted by interested parties not present in Security Council. If these parties would not come to Security Council, he believed effort should be made to obtain their prior acquiescence to action Security Council would take. He hoped to have further discussion among those present and with others as to what should come out of a Security Council meeting, such as conditions of settlement, organ that carries out settlement, etc. Without disregarding outside efforts he would much prefer that the UN, and in particular, the Security Council find solution in order to strengthen future peacekeeping. He was aware US appeal to Security Council had aroused interest not only of this group but of other Security Council and UN members. He closed by saying he would like to discuss more details later. Both Velazquez and Quarles asked, if no Security Council meeting were held, what other action could Security Council take. Goldberg replied that there is nothing in Charter which limits Security Council action to meeting and voting. Conciliation and mediation are not excluded from Security Council jurisdiction. In commenting on Rifai's statement Goldberg said US would of course welcome Security Council playing important role in solution and that is why appeal to it had been made. Velazquez inquired whether US, having in mind Security Council should not meet on this issue, intends to bring it before General Assembly. Goldberg replied that we still have some time before General Assembly meets in which to consider that possibility but that, since Security Council is organ primarily dealing with peace and security it should not be downgraded by having matter prematurely taken out of its hands. Aka agreed with Goldberg that it is most desirable to give Secretary-General time and help in finding solution before resorting to Security Council meeting. Ramani closed meeting by saying he wished later to discuss other aspects of problem with Goldberg, having in mind special Malaysian interests because of geographic proximity. All members expressed appreciation for meeting and for Goldberg's frankness. It is our impression that these expressions were genuine and that meeting was very useful even though no concrete proposals emerged.
115. Editorial Note On August 9, 1965, McGeorge Bundy sent a memorandum to President Johnson outlining strategy for Gullion's (X) next meeting in Paris with Mai Van Bo (R), which was scheduled for August 15. The memorandum, which has not been located in the holdings of the Johnson Library, is summarized in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: "Talking points for next X meeting with R: "1. Let R do the talking this time and see if there is any give in his position. "2. Make clear U.S. interest in 'unconditional Geneva Conference.' "3. Instructions: "a. Purpose--set stage for formal negotiations if possible. "b. Seek a no preconditions Geneva Conference and timing thereof. "c. On NLF--Throw ball in R's court. What would he suggest, recognizing the U.S. view on negotiations between governments? "d. Stress that the sole reason for the U.S. presence in SVN is North Vietnamese infiltration of men and supplies. If infiltration stops, the U.S. will go home. This is a matter for Hanoi and no one else. Withdrawal of all forces must be the product of negotiations, not the preliminary. "e. If R brings up bombing, say that U.S. must view 'suspension or cessation in the context of adequate reciprocal actions.' "f. Would R want conference on Vietnam alone, or Vietnam plus Laos and Cambodia? How would he want the conference convened--by invitation from the co-chairmen, privately, publicly, or by direct US-Vietnamese means? "g. U.S. envisages no NLF role as a right in SVN. Is this really a precondition of the DRV? "h. Pick up R's suggestion about greater contacts between the zones." (Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, page 98)
116. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson/1/ New York, August 9, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXIII, Cables. Secret. Goldberg sent this memorandum to the President on August 9, under cover of a letter in which he represented it as describing "how I believe a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam might be utilized in support of a mediation effort to determine whether we can get Hanoi to start unconditional discussions." He noted that he had also sent copies of the memorandum to Rusk and McNamara, and he offered to discuss it with the President at his convenience. (Ibid.) PAUSE IN U.S. BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM The question of another, more extended suspension of US aerial attacks against North Vietnam deserves urgent consideration. The drawbacks are obvious but the advantages have perhaps not been fully explored. If, contrary to present indications, Hanoi should, in response to some of the mediation efforts now getting under way, indicate a general interest in beginning negotiations in the near future, another temporary suspension of US bombing might greatly facilitate the effort to get negotiations started by arming one of the many possible mediators at hand with convincing proof that the US desire for negotiations is sincere. The best course would probably be a decision by the United States, in conjunction with a meaningful mediation effort, along the following lines: To pause in further air attacks against targets in North Vietnam for the reasonable limited period of time required to support a reasonable mediation effort to determine whether the North Vietnamese authorities are prepared to enter into unconditional negotiations for a peaceful settlement. If there were no appreciable progress within a limited time, we would resume bombing. We would, of course, exclude an open-ended commitment to halt bombing indefinitely, as long as negotiations continued; we must avoid repeating our experience in Korea in this regard. 1. Action in Response to an Appeal. We could make a declaration of this character in response to an appeal by one of the world leaders now considering Viet Nam initiatives (e.g., the Secretary General, Tito, Shastri or, less desirably, Nasser or Nkrumah). The action taken would be separate and distinct from a possible briefer pause in bombing during a four-day visit to Hanoi by Nkrumah; Quaison-Sackey mentioned the four-day period to me on Saturday morning./2/ /2/August 7. If we are to share the credit with anyone (i.e., by responding to an appeal), the best choice would be the Secretary General. He has urged on us previously an appeal for a cessation of hostilities; by responding to an appeal from him, we would thereby reaffirm our support of the UN and tend to keep it in the picture. It would be a logical follow up to your letter of July 28 asking the SYG to play a role./3/ It would arm him with the means to probe the other side. This would facilitate a subsequent move on our part to involve the UN in the role of supervising or policing a negotiated settlement. Rejection by Hanoi of an appeal from the Secretary General would do more damage to the Communists' international position than would their rejection of a unilateral US declaration. /3/See footnote 8, Document 99. 2. Private Message. An alternative to responding to an outside appeal would be a private message to Hanoi indicating that we would stop bombing for a reasonable period if it is prepared to enter into unconditional negotiations for a peaceful settlement. While a private message would deprive us at the outset of public credit for an important peace initiative, our initiative would ultimately become public knowledge, whether or not it had succeeded. Hanoi might find it easier to respond affirmatively to such a private message than to an appeal from, say, the Secretary General. It would not require Hanoi to respond publicly--and any public response would entail Hanoi's eating a certain amount of crow in the eyes of its domestic and foreign audiences; rather, it could respond through private, concrete actions which would demonstrate its desire to move toward negotiations. Whether it is decided to implement a limited pause in air strikes through a third-party intermediary or a direct private message to Hanoi, it will be necessary to emphasize the following points: That the pause is a genuine effort to facilitate negotiations and reduce the dangers of escalation; That a response must come from Hanoi within a reasonable time; That we are ready to discuss a general cease-fire involving mutual concessions as a first item in the negotiations; But that we are serious in our intention to resume the aerial attacks if there is no forthcoming response from Hanoi.
117. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 10, 1965, 5:30-6:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Public Affairs Policy Committee. Confidential. The meeting was held in Moyers' office. The source text bears no drafting information. PARTICIPANTS White House-- Defense-- USIA-- State-- Mr. Moyers opened the discussion by reviewing previous meetings on Viet-Nam information problems./2/ He said the President gives this subject very high priority and wants to do what is right. He noted that Barry Zorthian will be given a new position in the Embassy with responsibility for press and information matters, thus removing USIA from the direct line of authority over military news in Viet-Nam./3/ He was looking for ideas of other specific, practical things that could be done to improve public understanding of events in Southeast Asia. /2/See Document 105. /3/In a telephone conversation with Rusk on August 9, Califano indicated that the President wanted to make Zorthian the Ambassador's Special Assistant for Public Affairs, and bring under him anyone dealing with public affairs in Vietnam. The President's idea was to have Zorthian put out all the news. He felt that this would increase Zorthian's prestige with the public and the press, and make him the Bill Moyers of Saigon. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) Mr. Greenfield said that the news reports of U.S. soldiers setting fire to Vietnamese villages and related incidents are causing very serious problems here and abroad. We have to recognize that there exists a double standard, that such incidents are considered more serious if Americans, rather than South Vietnamese, are responsible. In view of the extensive press and media coverage in Viet-Nam stories and pictures like these will continue to appear as long as the incidents occur. Alleged maltreatment of Vietnamese civilians and civilian facilities is a moral and humanitarian concern for many Americans. We must recognize this as a serious, long-run problem. Mr. Chancellor referred to previous meetings in which the importance of making the American people aware of the changing character of war was stressed. The new kind of "twilight" war we are fighting in Viet-Nam requires more maturity, sophistication, and patience from the American people than previous wars. He said we need to find ways to build the necessary understanding of our involvement in Viet-Nam, an involvement that may well be repeated elsewhere in the years to come. Simple aggressive patriotism wasn't enough. You can't just "kill Japs" in a war like this one. We should work on editors and other opinion-influencers to show them that the habits of mind left over from World War II and Korea are not adequate for understanding this war. Mr. Sylvester stressed the problem of unfriendly correspondents in Viet-Nam, particularly foreigners, including some who work for U.S. news agencies and media. Some of these individuals are known to be less than fully sympathetic with our efforts and appear to miss no chance to embarrass us. The present concern about the village burned near Da Nang arose largely out of a CBS-TV film made and narrated by Morley Safer, a Canadian subject. The incident depicted in the film was not typical, so even if it was not staged (a possibility he did not rule out) it was a distortion since it conveyed an inaccurate impression. He noted that some reporters fail to tell the full story when they depict U.S. forces in action. They don't give equal time to the facts of Viet Cong atrocities, and they fail to point out that villages burned are Viet Cong strongholds, and that "civilians" who appear to be maltreated are Viet Cong personnel who may have killed U.S. or GVN forces. Mr. Sylvester also said he thought it was important to take steps to inform our personnel of the press problem stemming from such pictures and stories, so that they don't lend themselves to this kind of coverage in the course of carrying out their missions. He said there was a need to provide better information officers in Viet-Nam. As one step in that direction he was considering sending his Special Assistant for Viet-Nam Col. Rodger Bankson as over-all coordinator of military information, with rank of Brigadier General. Mr. Greenfield said we couldn't pull a curtain on the problem. There were too many reporters covering this war. It isn't just a problem of a few bad apples. We have to get used to fighting in the open. This is a new kind of war, a war in which the basic goal is people, not territory. You can't win the people in Viet-Nam by burning their villages. This may have worked at Iwo Jima, but it won't work in Viet-Nam. We have to take steps to prevent these things from happening, not just to make sure reporters don't see them. Mr. Meeker said the International Committee of the Red Cross was about to enter the picture. The Secretary of State and the Vietnamese Government were about to send letters indicating that the United States and South Viet-Nam would cooperate with the ICRC. The ICRC will want to take an active role in Viet-Nam. Therefore we should: 1. Instruct our troops in the field to conduct themselves in conformity with the Geneva convention and accepted standards of warfare (without hampering their efforts to prosecute the war); and 2. Publicly demonstrate our concern that the rules of war be observed in Viet-Nam. This should be accomplished by publicizing our willingness to cooperate with the Red Cross, and the Viet Cong-North Viet-Nam unwillingness to do likewise. We should call on the other side to mark their hospitals, permit inspection of prison camps, etc. We should also publicize directives and guidelines given to our troops in the field. Mr. Cooper said we were dealing with a deeply important problem that goes beyond public relations. At issue here is how the war should be fought. We should examine carefully the usefulness of such actions as bombing raids by the VNAF and our own planes against Vietnamese villages. Our object is not so much to destroy an enemy as to win a people. We must make sure our military operations are in fact productive. If burning a village provides the VC with a hundred additional recruits then that action is counterproductive in basic military terms. He agreed that this is a difficult war to fight, but that is no reason not to deal with these incidents as a problem in and of themselves. Mr. Cooper also asked about the Vietnamese interpreters who assist U.S. and foreign correspondents. Is there any way of checking to make sure they aren't slanting their advice in favor of the Viet Cong. Could the Ministry of Information run careful checks on these interpreters? Mr. Zorthian said the interpreters were accredited by MACV after a check by the GVN, but such procedures don't mean much in Saigon. Mr. Moyers said he was considering meeting with the heads of the major wire services, to discuss the nature of the war and ask for a balanced view of it. We would suggest that they assign better, more mature reporters, preferably U.S. nationals. Such an approach had obvious risks but was worth considering. It might also be worth approaching editors and columnists in a similar vein. He hoped the series of backgrounders for editors and top media people Ambassador Taylor was undertaking in major cities at the President's request would help. Mr. Zorthian said better military information personnel were essential. He hoped the marines would get a good one not just someone who saw his job as promoting the leatherneck image. As for the village burning problem, it might be best to have orders issued that no villages should be attacked except under very exceptional circumstances. Also, better Vietnamese liaison personnel should be attached to U.S. units in the field. Mr. Zorthian raised the question of censorship. The present system of voluntary cooperation is working fairly well. But some high officials favor full field censorship. Mr. Greenfield pointed out that no system of censorship would prevent stories like the village burning or the CBS-TV film. Censorship dealt with questions of military security, not public relations. He suspected some of those who favor censorship saw it as a way to prevent these inconvenient stories. But it would not work that way. Mr. Moyers asked that memoranda be prepared for the President setting forth what should be done in Saigon and in Washington that we are not now doing to deal with these problems. They should be completed by COB Friday.
118. Memorandum From the Ambassador-Designate to Vietnam (Lodge) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 11, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, President Eisenhower. Confidential. There is an indication on the source text that Johnson saw the memorandum. 1. Spent one-half hour with General Eisenhower as you requested. 2. He opposes "dribbling" forces into Viet Nam little by little and favors using adequate forces at once to do the job. He opposes American troops "living in the jungle" saying "we don't know how to live there". He approves development of strong points along the coast. He wants no formal announcements of total U.S. troop strength. Such announcements give the Viet Cong a pretext to raise their demands on Hanoi, Peking and Moscow. I understand all the above has been conveyed to you already by General Goodpaster./2/ /2/See Document 104. 3. He stressed the overriding importance of Viet Nam wanting to be free. We should do everything to inculcate such a desire. They must have "heart" or, after we have achieved a successful outcome, they will slump right back. It would be tragic if a successful outcome were followed by an election in which the people voted for the Viet Cong. I told him our plans regarding Lansdale were aimed precisely at such a contingency. He suggested a scheme whereby there would be immediate delivery, "using old C-47's", to small communities of rice, fish, medicines, or other morale boosting goods to be flown in promptly for distribution by local chiefs. I told him we had this in mind and that I believed AID was set to make such local distribution./3/ /3/Goodpaster briefed Eisenhower again on August 20, at President Johnson's request. Goodpaster reviewed military developments in Vietnam and stressed the continuity of Vietnam policy from the Eisenhower to Johnson administration. (Memorandum for the record, August 20; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Eisenhower Briefing) H.C. Lodge
119. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/ New York, August 12, 1965, 5:22 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. 342. For the Secretary from Ambassador Goldberg. Vietnam. I believe we should respond in a forthcoming and constructive way to the SYG's proposals contained in memo on Vietnam he handed me today./2/ /2/The text of this memorandum, which was also conveyed to the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, India, Poland, China, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam, was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 340 from USUN, August 12. (Ibid.) Memo states objective as a settlement based on a "return to the essentials of the 1954 Geneva Agreements". Within this framework SYG suggests two propositions as a basis for settlement: (1) military neutralization of Vietnam involving withdrawal of all foreign troops; and (2) elections under international supervision as established in the Geneva Agreements (we assume this means ICC machinery which would hardly be an effective instrumentality) as a basis for possible reunification at a later stage. SYG suggests we conduct private explorations "on his personal responsibility" (this is the same distinction Hammarskjold made between his position as SYG and he as a person when he undertook his trip to Peking to free the American fliers)/3/ in order to probe detailed positions of respective parties. He envisages these private dialogues as a preliminary step toward convening a Geneva conf, at which point Saigon and reps of the NLF would participate. /3/For documentation on Hammarskjold's mission to Peking, January 5-10, 1955, see Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Vol. II, Dag Hammarskjold, 1953-1956, pp. 415-459. He also proposes a cessation of all military operations by all sides, as an undertaking prior to the formal convening of the Geneva conf. He suggests that either a public appeal by himself or private probes by himself or others might be a way to determine whether a cease-fire could be achieved. While SYG's memo will have to be studied in Dept with great care, it offers us opportunity to respond positively, consistent with the Pres's call for unconditional discussion, and to encourage SYG to continue his informal explorations./4/ It will be further evidence of our willingness to seriously engage the UN in the Vietnam matter. While Hanoi and Peking may continue to react negatively to the SYG's involvement, memo might at least provide handle for Sovs to become more active in dialogue with us through the SYG as well as with Hanoi and Peking. /4/Goldberg telephoned Rusk at 1:34 p.m. on August 12. He summarized Thant's memorandum and told Rusk that U.S. allies at the United Nations felt that the U.S. appeal for Security Council action held out better prospects for success. He added that he was returning to Washington that evening and would brief Rusk at greater length on the initiative on the following day. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) I hope therefore Dept can arm me with short letter or memo to give to SYG promptly which makes whatever limited reservations we feel we need to make on certain substantive points, but placing primary emphasis on getting SYG to press informally for clarification from the other side on what the component elements of the de facto cease-fire would include./5/ /5/In telegram 250 to USUN, August 13, 10:53 p.m., Rusk sent a copy of a message sent to the President at the LBJ Ranch summarizing Thant's initiative. In the message to the President, the Department proposed returning a generally encouraging reply to the Secretary-General and stating that "we believe it would be highly desirable for you to send a personal message to the Secretary-General--purely procedural in nature--encouraging him to continue his private explorations and assuring him of US cooperation." (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Goldberg [Next documents]
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