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120. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/ Paris, August 13, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ. Top Secret; Nodis; XYZ. The source text is a copy that was enclosed in a letter from Springsteen to McBride, November 3, together with copies of telegrams reporting on Gullion's ("X") meetings with Mai Van Bo ("Rupert") on August 18 and September 1. The copies do not include telegram numbers or times of transmission or receipt. Springsteen transmitted these copies and other documents to McBride at the request of Sturm ("Y") so that they would be available to Sturm in Paris. In United States-Vietnam Relations, the meeting described in this telegram is incorrectly dated August 15. (Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 100) Literally eyes only for Ball. In one and one-half hour conversation with X this afternoon Rupert was rigid, even retrograde, in comparison with first meeting. This possibly tactics and possibly connected with appearance Ho Chi Minh interview. X considers it useful to hold third talk if only for purposes of record and to allow for any changes of position which may yet occur in interval. However, if more flexibility is not then manifested X believes his mission should be suspended. 1. X began by reading from Paris papers/2/ and Reston's recent columns certain references to growing pressures upon President for drastic and conclusive military action. Rupert replied mildly that his government understood "lobbies and pressure groups" in America but it was not these which would decide the issue of war. /2/Not further identified. 2. X asked if Rupert had developed any thoughts since last meeting, particularly with respect to X's version of four points/3/ which were undoubtedly pretty close to position of U.S. Government leaders. Rupert had indeed reflected and wished to know "what U.S. thought of Pham van Dong's four points". X said he thought this had been covered but he reviewed position, as per earlier report. Rupert then stated that X's version did not constitute the basis for a correct solution. /3/See Document 113. For text, see Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 97. 3. At this point (and at least three times thereafter) X tried to pin Rupert down on whether Hanoi's points had to be accepted in toto before conference could be convened. Rupert was more negative than at previous meeting. He assured X that his principals understood point U.S. trying to clarify but that Hanoi's four points had to be taken as "base." Despite this statement Rupert could not be brought to say categorically one thing or the other with respect to whether or to what extent substance of Hanoi's points had to be stipulated or accepted in advance of the meeting. 4. Rupert said his government believed a "conference of the Geneva type" should be held; whether it should be convened sooner or later depended upon the Americans. X replied that his friends also thought a conference of the Geneva type was desirable if it could be held without pre-conditions. Such a conference he said might deal with Vietnam or with a general examination of conditions under the Geneva and subsequent accords, or with Laos, or with Cambodia. Impression in U.S. was that Cambodian conference project/4/ aborted because of Hanoi/Peking insistence on FNL as representative of South Vietnam. Rupert asserted Hanoi had not taken this position but had merely gone along with Prince Sihanouk's insistence on FNL. X urged Rupert to check record and said his recollection was that Sihanouk had altered his attitude ending with willingness to see SVN represented by Saigon or by FNL or both and in a variety of combinations. Anyway, X continued, if the Cambodian setting created difficulty conference could be related to other subjects. Rupert had no reply to this but switched to question of FNL. /4/Reference is to the March 15 Cambodian proposal to reconvene the Geneva Conference of 1954 to consider the question of the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 715-716. 5. Hanoi had noted President Johnson's reference to some formula for meeting with FNL/5/ but it was up to U.S. to give concrete details. FNL, Rupert said, bore brunt of struggle, controlled four-fifths of the territory, was suffering "massacres and destruction" while whole world knew Saigon Government represented nothing. X observed that Saigon also had carried on fight for twenty years, its soldiers now fighting and dying, and hundred of thousands of refugees were fleeing Hanoi-controlled regions. Discussion on this point, however, said X, was sterile. Rupert and he should set themselves task of exploring possibility of convening useful meeting. What for example, were obstacles which Rupert saw to such a meeting? /5/In his July 28 press conference, President Johnson stated that the Viet Cong "would have no difficulty being represented" in negotiations "if Hanoi for a moment decides she wants to cease aggression." See Document 97. 6. Rupert again signally failed to cite U.S. bombing as an obstacle; he did say that U.S. must leave Vietnam alone to work out its destiny without interference; claimed that President Johnson recently said U.S. must remain in Vietnam and could never leave it, which X vigorously denied. In response Rupert's query what U.S. objectives in Vietnam were, X emphasized again that they were those stipulated in Geneva Accords. He also cited his version of Hanoi's four points, particularly numbers three and four, to stress U.S. desire to see self-determination and unification of Vietnam; he emphasized that if there were no North Vietnamese troops or arms in Hanoi U.S. ready to put its policies to the test (i.e., self-determination by Vietnamese and possible non-alignment), and would be ready to begin withdrawals. He said these would have to be phased and balanced with pullback of North Vietnamese. Rupert indicated agreement with idea of balance and verification. He asked if this was what X had meant by "redeploiement" in his version of four points. He then claimed that "these accusations" of North Vietnamese activity in Vietnam were only recent whereas U.S. had begun to sabotage the situation as far back as '54 with the Ngo Dinh Diem operation and sending advisers. X replied that there were other forms of interference, including intimidation, subversion, terrorism, Chinese influence. To latter Rupert countered that Vietnam had defended its independence for thousands of years and X need not worry. 7. At this point X remarked discussion so far provided little prospect for constructive work. He reviewed his understanding of Rupert's position, which he said was apparently more negative than previously. He reiterated that his friends in U.S. would be ready for Geneva-type conference which would certainly take Pham van Dong's program as point of departure; provided this conference were without pre-condition or ultimata. After all we were not in position of French after Dien Bien Phu and in fact possessed fantastic strength we hoped not to use. Hanoi surely could not expect U.S. to accept a conference which stipulated prior acceptance of its points, or which was to be preceded by U.S. troop withdrawals or which obliged us to desert our allies by setting up FNL as sole negotiator. X thought his version of four points if picked up by U.S., as it well might be, represented a very forthcoming effort. He asked again whether Rupert had carefully noted these and whether they had been under study (mis a l'etude). Rupert confirmed that they had. 8. At this point Rupert meaningfully asked whether X had seen declaration by Ho Chi Minh in today's Le Monde in response to written questions from Philippe Devillers./6/ (X had not and it would have been hardly possible for him to have done so since paper was only just reaching subscribers at time of interview. It is possibly significant that X had seen Devillers shortly before leaving U.S.) Ho Chi Minh's declaration, said Rupert, represented his government's position and my answer to X. (Timing and Rupert's manner implied possible connection between release of Ho Chi Minh's statement at this time and conversations between Rupert and X.) /6/Ho Chi Minh's responses to Devillers' questions appeared in an issue of Le Monde apparently distributed on the afternoon of August 13. In its August 14 issue, The New York Times carried an article datelined Paris, August 13, stating that the interview was published "today in Le Monde." The text of the interview was broadcast in English over Hanoi radio on August 15. Ho Chi Minh stated that the "U.S. Government must give tangible proofs that it accepts the four-point stand of the Government of the DRV." For text, see Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 99. 9. X asked if it might not be possible for Rupert and him to come to grips with semantics and problem of agenda by envisioning terms in which an initiative on conference might be announced, e.g., ". . . in order to secure and preserve fundamental right of Vietnamese people, etc., as affirmed in Geneva Accords a meeting of Geneva conferees to be held which would take up Pham van Dong's four points and other propositions." Rupert nodded agreement to first part of phrase, disagreement to its ending. 10. Finally, X professed himself discouraged and puzzled at Rupert's greater rigidity. He hoped history would not record that he and Rupert had failed in their duty to seize present opportunity. Said he was not offering any threats but begged Rupert to reflect on devastation which might be unleashed if war escalated. No one who had not seen U.S. power could imagine its full potential. To avert this his friends in U.S. earnestly desired to move the confrontation from the battlefield to the diplomatic table. 11. X said he must now begin to doubt utility of continuing conversations but probably should be one more contact before he obliged to return home. In one of very few positive developments Rupert was eager to have a further meeting in case he said there should be "some change in the points of confrontation". X said he must return home Tuesday or Wednesday./7/ Rupert is moving out of his flat but said he would inform X where next meeting should be held. /7/August 17 or 18. 12. General impressions and recommendations: (a) Despite negative atmosphere, it could be that stiffening of Rupert's attitude was the obvious thing for him to do tactically. Also whole meeting was held under shadow of Ho Chi Minh's declaration. (b) X believes he went about as far as it is possible to go, without giving impression of U.S. weakness, in exhibiting U.S. readiness to negotiate under various formulae and in various combinations. He established beyond doubt that the alternate version of Hanoi's four points had been studied and rejected by Hanoi. It is still too early to say, however, that this rejection is final. (c) Points on which there seem to be some flexibility on part of Hanoi are with respect to troop withdrawals and FNL representation. (X believes Rupert himself would envision ancillary negotiating role for FNL; he inquired how U.S. had dealt with Red China at international conferences.) Less flexibility than before shown on agenda for conference but this may reflect impact of Ho Chi Minh's declaration. (d) Before next meeting may be desirable to have: (1) statement of X's friends' position on Ho's declaration, especially in relation to Rupert talks; (2) any further version of four points; (3) a brief formulation X might use as his suggestion along lines of 9 above. This would have virtue of eliminating semantic confusion as source of division, smoking out Viets and making the record of U.S. attitude unmistakable./8/ /8/The source text bears no signature.
121. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 17, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:06 a.m. 505. For the President. 1. Probably the most important political development of the week was an interview with Buddhist bonze, Tri Quang, in a Hong Kong paper denouncing the Directory government in general and General Thieu in particular. On the military front, the most notable development was that the MACV estimate of VC losses (1,330 killed in action) was the highest since the war began here. 2. The Hong Kong Far Eastern Economic Review interview with Tri Quang quoted him as having said "the people" were against the government and he was also against the government, as well as saying that he hoped the war could be stopped as soon as possible by a cease fire or "by any negotiations which would have the peoples' support". He was also quoted as saying that a small country like Vietnam could rely only on itself and "certainly on no outsider". Tri Quang may claim to have been misquoted as he did following an earlier interview with the same correspondent, but the sentiments attributed to him with respect to the government are consistent with what he has recently been telling Embassy officers. It is harder to interpret his enigmatic remarks with respect to the war. Not many weeks ago, he was privately telling visitors that we should pursue the war more vigorously, bombing the north harder and even taking on the Chinese Communists. Thus, I do not think that we should conclude that he is swinging toward "neutralism", that is, negotiations with the Liberation Front for a coalition government. It is also too early to say what form his opposition to the government may take. A few days ago, he told us that he had discouraged the forming of demonstrations in Hue having anti-government character. 3. Ky and his party took off for Taipei early Sunday morning,/2/ will be going directly from there to Bangkok, and returning here next Saturday or Sunday. I had a good talk with him before he left, both on his trip and some other matters including the "Chieu Hoi" program, treatment of prisoners taken in combat and land reform. I do not feel that the substance of what he does in Taipei will cause us any problem but, given his propensity for flamboyant statements, I will not make the same prediction for what he says publicly. /2/August 15. 4. Our people in the field feel that there has been some improvement in popular attitudes as a result of the recent military successes and that popular aversion to the VC continues somewhat to increase although this does not necessarily translate itself into active commitment to or support for the GVN. 5. On the military side, not only were the VC losses highest ever but the ratio to friendly troops killed (214) was a little better than six to one. The other indicators were also good with more VC and VC weapons captured than government troops missing in action and government weapons lost. The VC also continued to avoid initiating any actions by major units although they kept up their heavy harassment of villages and outposts. The government made a little progress in clearing lines of communication. 6. On the economic side, negotiations with the government on the US currency "black mart" problem made good progress, and we hope that we can have this tied up in the next few days. The rice imports from Thailand appear to have met our immediate needs and should hold the situation until the arrival of additional PL-480 rice./3/ /3/On a copy of this telegram retyped for President Johnson, the President wrote: "Mc--Let's rush him plenty of rice now." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXIX, Memos) Johnson
122. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/ Paris, August 18, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ. Top Secret; Nodis; XYZ. The source text is a copy that does not bear a telegram number or a time of transmission or receipt. For additional information, see the source note, Document 120. Literally eyes only for Ball. Today's two hour session with Rupert most positive so far. In principal developments Rupert (a) revealed possible Viet fall back positions from recent Ho Chi Minh declaration;/2/ (b) pinpointed halt of U.S. bombing as principal "tangible evidence" of acceptance in principle of Hanoi's four points; (c) queried meaning (i.e., chiefly editorial and translation) of X's four points,/3/ indication serious consideration; (d) stressed desirability further meeting. X believes necessary he return at this time to inventory talks in relation to developments and other indices Hanoi attitudes and discuss next steps. /2/See footnote 6, Document 120. /3/See Document 113. For text, see Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 97. 1. Rupert telephoned yesterday to fix today's meeting. At previous session he had indicated utility of talks and said that even if X were to leave now but "should pass again through Paris" it would be useful to consult. 2. He opened by asking whether X had studied Ho Chi Minh's declaration. X desired clarification on number of points. First was date of Ho/Devillers interview which he assumed was on basis written questions. Rupert confirmed and said date was to be taken as that of appearance in Le Monde (i.e., August 14) and that answers "had only arrived from Hanoi evening before". (X believes his friends correct in assuming interview was planted answer to him, which also implies indeterminate amount of French help in stage managing.) X said he discouraged by negative tone of statements and Rupert jested that X always seemed discouraged. 3. X noted that neither questions nor replies had made any reference to statement accompanying original four points re "most correct basis for political solution"./4/ With uneasiness Rupert asserted Hanoi position still the same. He then linked "recognition of this basis" to "tangible proofs" required by Ho Chi Minh in latest declaration. These, he said, included in the first instance a suspension of bombing but he also referred to withdrawal of troops and halting U.S. "aggression". (Re latter term X indicated that it would be better in these discussions if terms like "enemy", "aggression", etc., were abjured.) Rupert expatiated at some length on the bombing and worldwide condemnation of it. (X got some impression VC and DRV being hurt.) Promising to return to this point, X/5/ proceeded to review Ho declaration from beginning. /4/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 852-853. /5/On the source text the word "Rupert" is crossed out and "X" written above it. 4. Re point number one, Rupert was less categoric than Ho. He claimed that "realistically" only FLN, which was carrying on fight, was suited to speak for South. Whole world knew it was representative but Saigon was not. X disagreed and said it was "not realistic" to expect the most powerful nation in the world to go into negotiations at price of abandoning allies, accepting Hanoi fiat on agenda, and pulling all its troops out. In subsequent discussion X got strong impression Rupert and even Hanoi ready to accept some other formula for SVN representation but wishes to prod U.S. into putting it forward. Rupert alleged France had finally been obliged to accept FLN as sole negotiating agent in Algeria. He did not knock down idea that agreement on formula for representation could be accepted if other obstacles were removed. He did ask just what formula U.S. would imagine. Rupert referred to previous statements of U.S. Government leaders. 5. Re second question of Ho declaration, X judges significant Rupert's confirmation that unification could wait quite some time. X insisted this depended on will of the people and asked what Ho meant by mention of program of front in this connection. Rupert said FLN recognized that unification would come "by stages" and on basis of popular consultation. Hanoi agreed. Rupert insisted on word "stages". He even said that "there might be people in the south" (or just people) "who might not want unification" and in this case "Hanoi prepared to wait" until they did! Re mechanism for controlling elections, supervision, etc., Rupert made no substantive objection to hypothetical projections made by X. 6. Re point three, X asked what Rupert considered "proofs" to be. When latter again came forth with cessation of bombing Rupert/6/ replied in preconceived terms that such a gesture had been made once before with no result or counterpart. It was conceivable that such a gesture might be repeated but it was not conceivable that it could be unilateral. Surely Rupert could not expect the U.S. in Saigon or the Saigon Government to negotiate under terrorism and while 325th Division roamed the country. Terrorist acts only weakened Hanoi's case with those who might be disposed to sympathize. Since X said he and Rupert agreed to place their discussions under "sign of realism" it surely was "unrealistic" to pretend that Hanoi did not have units in the country. (Whereat Rupert laughed heartily.) Rupert then became very serious, appeared on the point of making a reply but decided to withhold it. It was entirely obvious that suspension of bombing has now re-emerged as key objective of Viets (as also confirmed in Para 10 infra). Rupert showed X an extract with a Washington byline from a French press digest7 to effect that Department of State spokesman had said that contacts with Hanoi had turned up nothing significant and then referring to an Aide-Memoire Department was supposed to have circulated to a number of governments explaining terms on which U.S. would again suspend bombing./7/ Rupert asked if X knew of such a memorandum. X said he had heard something along lines of first part of release but not informed of any memo. Hazarded guess that if indeed it existed, which he questioned, it might be along lines he, X, had employed. /6/"?X" is written in hand before "Rupert." /7/Not further identified. 7. X asked whether it was correct to understand that Ho was calling for prior withdrawal of U.S. troops in same time scale as suspension of bombing and as prerequisite to discussions. Rupert again laughed, said that was not "realistic" and that of course he recognized that withdrawals would have to be phased. It should, however, be stipulated that final settlement should see withdrawals completed. X indicated that they should also be balanced, i.e., against pullback of DRV troops (whose presence in South Vietnam Rupert no longer denies). Rupert insisted in his interpretation of Hanoi policy despite fact X pointed out it seemed at variance with Ho interview. 8. X took occasion presented by Rupert's insistence on "poor show" by South Vietnamese troops again to stress futility of Hanoi's hope to force a decision; he remarked on differences between French military posture and that of U.S., said all DRV might achieve would be escalation of war, which could only be to its disadvantage, involving foreign influence in north and south, devastation of North Vietnam, and undesirable hatred between Americans and Vietnamese. Rupert said that in war it was necessary to envision the worst and that the consequences of escalation, including external intervention, had been foreseen and prepared for. (X's purpose was to draw out Rupert on possible evolution of conflict and again to impress him that U.S. not speaking from weakness.) 9. X asked Rupert what he preferred or suggested as channel of contact with Hanoi. Rupert said all the same provided responsible people speak, whether it was in "Paris, Peking, Moscow, or Hanoi". Then said that since X had obtained clarification Hanoi position he now wished clarifications from X. Latter recalled that in Rupert's own words Rupert represented his government, X only the opinion of some of his friends in government. 10. Rupert then took up X's earlier suggested four points with striking total recall (?) of verbal presentation. His most important observation was on point one: The basic rights of Vietnamese people to peace, etc., are recognized as set forth in the Geneva Accords, etc. Rupert verified French translation of this sentence and then said that point now was to give "tangible proof" that these rights were recognized. Such proof he said might be a cessation of bombardments. 11. Some other points of translation raised were: Line four (X's text, not given to Rupert), "compliance" to which Rupert preferred "acceptance" and "execution" to "acquiescement". Line nine, what was "quasi-military" and did it apply to personnel or weapons or both? X assumed this meant persons carrying out military functions, suppletifs and partisans, not necessarily regulars. Presumably a truck or aircraft could also be quasi-military. Line 13, "regrouping and redeployment". X said these almost the same thing, one word perhaps more static than the other. Separation of combatants at some stage should be envisaged. In reply Rupert's question re "indigenous" and "foreign personnel", X assumed indigenous would mean all types of Vietnamese forces. This might include tribal groups as well as Vietnamese. What then was meant by "foreign personnel"? Just what it said, replied X. Of course if DRV had performed miracles in training indigenous forces to operate missiles they might not be involved in pullback. Rupert thought this a great joke and said "you mean if they were Soviets they should leave"? Yes, said X, and Chinese, etc. X convinced foregoing had sufficient substance and implication to warrant further contacts. He convinced, however, he should at this point return home to touch base, make sure he does not get out of line, assess possible follow-up, and to discuss means of improving security, contacts, communications, etc. Also desirable to let Rupert marinate. X told Rupert he leaving over weekend and would give him date of departure. Also exchanged addresses, telephone numbers, and means of contact. X set up possibility of return in case he had to "confer further concerning his university connection in Geneva". New address of Rupert is: 3 Square de Trocadero, Paris 16e., Telephone 727-38-74./8/ /8/The source text bears no signature.
123. Memorandum of Meeting/1/ Washington, August 19, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US/Johnson. Confidential. Drafted by William Bundy on August 26. SUBJECT /2/The senior Departmental officials included Rusk, Ball, Harriman, Goldberg, William Bundy, Thomas Mann, Jack Vaughn, G. Mennen Williams, Joseph Sisco, Harlan Cleveland, Phillips Talbot, and John Leddy. Lloyd Hand and Jack Valenti of the White House staff were also present. The meeting lasted from 1:48 to 4:05 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) 1. The President laid great stress on the importance of intelligence in South Viet-Nam. Mr. Bundy commented that this was in part a matter of specific actions, but also heavily related to the general improvement in popular morale and cohesion which was the objective of Ambassador Lodge and of the Lansdale group. 2. The President commented at some length on the state of public opinion in the United States concerning the Viet-Nam problem. He hoped that all officers of the Department could be as active as possible in getting the Administration point of view fully expressed in public forums, and also in dealing with critical segments of the press such as the New York Times and, occasionally, the "Kennedy columnists." The President expressed the general view that public support for Administration policies was generally satisfactory at present, but that this would become more doubtful if the conflict were prolonged another year or more. For this reason, but above all for the overriding reason of its own importance he stressed over and over again that the Department was the agency responsible for finding a proper way to peace. He had several exchanges with the Secretary and with Ambassador Goldberg on the UN and other efforts in progress, and made abundantly clear his whole-hearted support for these efforts. 3. In connection with the Viet-Nam problem, but also more broadly, the President also laid great stress on the importance of relationships with Congress. He particularly underlined the vital necessity of advance consultation with Congressional leaders and interested committees on all actions being contemplated by the Department.
124. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 23, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 2:23 a.m. Ambassador Lodge arrived in Saigon on August 20 and presented his credentials on August 25. 581. Reference: Department telegram 509, repeated USUN 289./2/ Following are some comments on the general subject of diplomatic negotiations: /2/Telegram 509 to Saigon, August 21, transmitted a copy of the draft reply to U Thant's initiative on August 12, and asked for Embassy comments. (Ibid.) The reply, which incorporated changes in response to Lodge's comments, was approved and sent to Thant on August 27; see Document 129. 1. Although the U Thant proposal is as unfair as one would expect, there is advantage in handling it very carefully--not because it will lead to an end to the aggression in Vietnam, but because news of it will leak and the U.S. Government must appear in a good light in the minds of those who think that peace can be promoted in this manner. 2. Convincing these people that the U.S. Government is leaving no stone unturned has undoubtedly been a big factor in the remarkable education of U.S. opinion in the last six months under the President's leadership. Today, practically every American of good will understands why Vietnam is important and therefore why we must be here. 3. This is of the greatest importance in our effort to ward off the aggression here. In fact, a unified and determined U.S. opinion is the decisive ingredient. It also creates favorable opinion abroad. 4. But there is another aspect which gives me pause. I believe we are approaching the point when further public eagerness by US for "negotiations" will harden Hanoi and Peking's resolve and convince them that we are weak internally (however strong we may be at Chu Lai) thus making things harder for our soldiers, tending to prolong the conflict, and sapping the will to win of the GVN and RVNAF. 5. The President's bombing decision stopped the argument in Saigon as to whether to continue the war and it started the discussion on how best to win it. The President's decision on troops has brought a conviction that the U.S. is not clock-watching and is determined to see this thing through. In Vietnamese minds, this makes a successful outcome inevitable. These are precious assets which must be conserved and cherished and certainly not diluted or destroyed. 6. The above in no way means that we should not work hard for peace, but what is needed for peace at this moment is a conviction in the minds of the enemy that its aggression is doomed to failure. 7. It would be helpful here and would have a constructive effect on U.S. and foreign opinion, and ultimately in the UN, if we gave great prominence to the fact that our effort in Vietnam is being undertaken in the letter and spirit of UN Charter which states in Article I that the member states shall "take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for suppression of acts of aggression. . . ." This is precisely what we are doing. Our effort is thus noble, respectable and legal in the highest sense. It should be made to appear so and not look like a unilateral American adventure. I have only seen one excellent statement by the President at a press conference concerning the aggression aspect. Could not more be done along this line? 8. It is for this reason that I question the wisdom of paragraph 8 of the proposed aide-memoire (reftel). To talk about "a cessation of all hostile military activity by all concerned" implies that we and the South Vietnamese on the one hand are in the same moral position as Hanoi and Peking on the other. This is not the case. Hanoi and Peking wish to dominate South Vietnam. South Vietnam and the U.S. do not wish to dominate North Vietnam. Hanoi and Peking are the aggressors. South Vietnam is the aggrieved party. We must not give the impression that it is "six of one and a half-dozen of the other". 9. I also fear the effect when paragraph 9 becomes public. 10. And the words "cease fire" make many hairs stand on end in Saigon and could give rise to widespread feeling that the "Americans are negotiating behind our backs and therefore why should we fight any more?" 11. I recognize the difficulty of these decisions and that there is much to be said for a sympathetic attitude toward U Thant's proposals. I also recognize the commitment which we have already made for the record. But there are other factors and a constructive contribution could be made to public thinking by reminding members of the UN and public opinion generally of Article I of the Charter. Lodge
125. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/ Honolulu, August 23, 1965, 2:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. The source text is a copy sent to the Department of State. 2400302Z. Increasing pressure against DRV (C). A. CINCPAC 220043Z./2/ /2/Not found. 1. We believe a main element of Communist strength in North and South Vietnam has been their complete confidence in ultimate victory according to their strategic plan. VC morale in SVN depends in large measure upon things going as planned. Superiority of the VC over the RVNAF and sure victory is the backbone of troop indoctrination. 2. Indications are that when Hanoi saw in early 1964 that the U.S. had decided to step up assistance to SVN, decision was made to move more rapidly toward victory through increased organized military action in SVN. With SVN political system in disarray, the RVNAF remained the hard core upon which the U.S. could build. Disintegration of the armed forces through multiple large-scale assaults could remove the last stumbling block to decisive control of the country. The rapid build up of the VC with organized PAVN units and augmentation of support activities and political cadres began. 3. Hanoi has received two strategic surprises since initiating what was intended as the final phase. First, the U.S. has introduced, and is continuing to build up, air and ground forces in SVN on a scale that Hanoi must never have anticipated. The second surprise was the air campaign against NVN. 4. The impact of U.S. forces in SVN has upset VC timing. Obvious intentions to embark upon a campaign of large scale attacks materialized in Feb. In their efforts to make 1965 a year of decision, the VC have made some limited gains but at a high price. Since March 1965 they have suffered heavy losses in virtually all of their major military efforts. This trend has been particularly pronounced since May when Viet Cong initiated large-scale operations such as those fought at Song Be, Dong Xoai, and Duc Co which cost the VC very heavy and probably unanticipated casualties. The introduction of expanded U.S. air and ground forces and naval support have further compounded the Viet Cong problem as illustrated by the dramatic U.S. operation on the Van Tuong peninsula, south of Chu Lai, where U.S. Marines destroyed the 1st VC regiment. Employment of U.S. forces in the highlands hear Pleiku can and will disrupt VC plans for seizure and control of that strategic area. Following Chu Lai more ground forces will be introduced when the 1st Cavalry Division lands. Hanoi knows that the ROK division and other U.S. forces will soon be introduced. Employment of B-52's and scheduled deployment of additional U.S. air squadrons will further emphasize U.S. intent. More prisoners are being taken now. More defections are occurring. These rates will rise when augmented U.S. air and ground forces are brought more fully to bear in harassment, attrition, and search and destroy missions. 5. The evidence is now overwhelming that the Communist forces in both Vietnams are all under the command of Hanoi, and the battlefield in North Vietnam can be regarded as the support area or zone of interior. After the first surprise of air attack in NVN, against what must have been regarded as a sanctuary, Hanoi probably expected world opinion to cause the U.S. to limit operations to sporadic, punitive attacks if not stop them completely. We have just reviewed our program, Ref A, we are now at a point where we can move toward the effective disruption of the current RT area. This will make it extremely difficult for Hanoi to continue support to forces in Laos and SVN. But the important thing now is to keep the Communists psychologically off balance. We believe the process is well underway in the SVN portion of the battlefield. In the north we must concentrate upon the same objective. Communist belief in victory must be destroyed. They are now taking comfort from greater air defense capability and there are some indications that use of the IL-28's and MIG's may be contemplated. We may expect some dramatic effort as their need for a morale boost grows. We must not allow their developing capabilities to generate hope of turning the tide. 6. Recommend that hard on the heels of the landing of the 1st elements of the 1st Cavalry Division in SVN that we attack the POL at Hanoi (JCS 49) and at Haiphong (JCS 48). A large percentage of the population in the delta area would see the fires and all would know of the attacks. Grossly exaggerated Hanoi air defense propaganda would begin to ring hollow. These two actions would have a tremendous psychological impact upon NVN.
126. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 24, 1965, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII. No classification marking. SUBJECT /2/On August 24, the Republican leadership of the House of Representatives issued a 33-page report on Vietnam, styled a "White Paper," which charged President Johnson with confusing public opinion and inviting Communist miscalculations. The report was prepared by the House Republican Committee on Planning and Research, under the direction of Representatives Gerald R. Ford, Charles E. Goodell, and Melvin R. Laird. (Washington Post, August 25, 1965) 1. I have read the White Paper and discussed it with McNamara, Ball, Moyers, and my brother Bill. I also got some free advice from Phil Potter, who called on another subject. Our unanimous view is that it is a pretty feeble effort and that it does not deserve top-level reply. So I would be inclined to go right past it in the press conference tomorrow and to say simply that we maintain the closest touch with Republican leaders like President Eisenhower/3/ and Senator Dirksen (who has dissociated himself from the report already), and that there has never been a Republican or Democratic policy toward Southeast Asia in the last 15 years./4/ /3/See Document 118. /4/Johnson dismissed the Republican report as misleading during a press conference on August 25. He said that the Vietnamese Communists should not entertain the illusion that the people of the United States were are not united behind the Vietnamese Government. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 922-923) 2. If you want to hit harder, it is interesting that this report omits the name of Ambassador Lodge in its discussion of the last months of Diem. It misstates your own position on Southeast Asia in 1961, in that your farsighted report/5/ specifically warned that we might need to make a commitment of troops if circumstances should change. The document also conveys a false impression of your views on Laos. In Bob McNamara's judgment, it totally distorts his own record on Vietnam. /5/See United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 159-166, and Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, pp. 149-151. 3. In sum, this document imports into the discussion of foreign affairs the very spirit of narrow partisanship which you have been trying to exclude. We are confident that the American people prefer the attitudes of Republicans like Eisenhower, Dirksen, Lodge, and McNamara, just as it has traditionally expected a spirit that rises above party from Democratic leadership both in Congress and in the White House. 4. I attach a copy of a memorandum done by my brother Bill/6/ which gives a still more detailed and comprehensive set of criticisms which could be made if one wanted to make them. /6/Attached but not printed. McG.B.
127. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 26, 1965, 12:41 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. 624. 1. There is given below the text of an "Estimate of Viet Cong Situation" drafted by the Mission Intelligence Committee and concurred in by Ambassador Johnson and General Westmoreland which I have found of value and believe will be of interest to concerned Washington agencies: 2. Hanoi appears to have made the decision last year to intensify the war in South Vietnam. Whether the Communists actually expected to gain complete victory this year, or merely to accelerate the transition to their vaunted general counter-offensive, they had reason to hope that an early victory was possible. The build-up of Viet Cong main force and guerrilla units had made substantial progress, and the insurgents had evolved tactics for meeting the improving RVNAF air and ground capabilities. Viet Cong successes in countering the GVN's pacification program had given the Communists control over wide areas which had previously been dominated by the GVN; their food situation had improved, and they had access to a substantial manpower base. Infiltration of both men and material from the north was essentially unchecked. RVNAF morale clearly was sagging, and its desertion rate mounting. Political instability in Saigon appeared to be heightened with each change of government, and further violent clashes involving Catholic, Buddhist and student elements seemed likely. 3. Given these conditions, it must have appeared to Hanoi that a modest escalation of Viet Cong military capabilities might permit the insurgents to end the war relatively quickly. They may have calculated that a successful military campaign would cause RVNAF and civilian morale to collapse, produce an impression of the inevitability of Communist victory, exacerbate political instability in Saigon, and create conditions favorable for a general uprising through which the Communists could seize power. Since the overthrow of the Diem government, Hanoi and the Liberation Front had increasingly put such an uprising forward as a feasible, quick alternative to the traditional protracted resistance struggle. Even if their broader hopes were not realized, the Communists probably believed that a successful offensive campaign by the reinforced Viet Cong would permit them to attain the initiative and pave the way for even greater offensive operations later this year. The Communists may have calculated that they would have a reasonable chance of achieving their aims without provoking increased U.S. intervention because of the seeming reluctance--last fall--of the U.S. to commit its military forces to operations in Vietnam. Even if the U.S. were to react, the Communists may have felt they could attain their objectives before U.S. intervention became effective. 4. To assure success, Hanoi evidently concluded that the military capabilities of both the Viet Cong and DRV would have to be further strengthened. Although the Viet Cong build-up was progressing favorably, their forces were clearly incapable of mounting an offensive of the scale desired. Hence, one of the goals established for 1964 was the accelerated expansion of Viet Cong forces to the extent required to establish that equilibrium with the GVN's forces which is deemed essential by the Communists for the shift to a general counteroffensive. Toward this end, the Viet Cong intensified their recruiting and conscription programs, creating a number of new main force battalions in the southern delta, some of which were transferred to the area north of Saigon. The flow of weapons and equipment from the DRV was stepped up last fall to permit the rearming of some existing units with more modern and effective small arms, and heavy weapons, and to so equip some newly formed units. To add further to Viet Cong capabilities, Hanoi took the calculated risk of escalation by infiltrating regular units of the North Vietnamese Army (PAVN). All three infantry regiments of the PAVN 325th Division evidently have been deployed to South Vietnam, and it is possible that other units have been deployed without identification. To strengthen the DRV's capabilities against the contingency of U.S. air attacks, Hanoi arranged with the Soviets in February for a reinforcement of its air defense resources, to include the introduction of surface-to-air missiles and the augmentation of the nascent DRV air force. 5. The military campaign planned by the Communists appears to be centered on the highlands. While the Viet Cong regard the densely populated and rice-rich Mekong Delta as the prize in South Vietnam, they consider the highlands as the major battleground, since the difficult terrain, dense vegetation, and limited lines of communication tend to minimize RVNAF ground and air superiorities. Their concept of operations envisaged a series of major (regimental-size) attacks against isolated outposts, aimed at destroying ARVN garrisons and drawing ARVN general reserve units into ambushes under conditions favoring Viet Cong success. These larger actions were to be supported by intensified, widespread guerrilla activity in order to consolidate their hold on the people. The principal objectives of the campaign were to destroy RVNAF units, enlarge the liberated zones, and constrict GVN control to isolated district towns and provincial capitals. In the highlands, it appears that they hope to eliminate the GVN strongpoints north of Kontum and create a large liberated area extending over most of Kontum, Pleiku, Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces. This area, adjoining the Laos infiltration corridor and offering motorable line of communications with North Vietnam, could be developed into an extensive redoubt area from which subsequent major operations could be mounted against the coastal plain or into the southern highlands. In the area northeast of Saigon, the Viet Cong concept was similar, based in this instance on the enlargement of Zone D by extending the liberated area into Phuoc Long, Long Khanh, Phuoc Tuy and Lam Dong Provinces. From this redoubt, the Viet Cong would be in position to mount operations to link up with the northern highlands redoubt, westward to join Zone D with Zone C in northern Tay Ninh, or southwestward against Saigon itself. 6. Although they enjoyed some initial successes, the Viet Cong campaign has been frustrated by a series of fortuitous RVNAF tactical moves coupled with the effective use of increased US-GVN air support. In the prelude to their offensive, the Viet Cong inflicted heavy losses on ARVN units at Binh Gia (Phuoc Tuy Province) in December 1964 and in Binh Dinh Province in February 1965. They suffered a setback in their attack on Song Be, the Phuoc Long Province capital, in early May, but scored their most significant success at Ba Gia in Quang Ngai Province later that month. On 1 June, after overrunning Le Thanh district headquarters in western Pleiku, the Viet Cong placed the CIDG camp at Duc Co in a state of siege, which was to last over two months. The Viet Cong suffered a setback in their attack on the district town of Dong Xoai in Phuoc Long Province; although they inflicted heavy losses on ARVN forces, they were unsuccessful in their attempt to occupy the town and suffered estimated losses in excess of 700 KIA. In Phu Bon Province, the Viet Cong have effectively blocked Route 7 and made gains in outlying areas, but they failed in their attempt to destroy the garrison at Thuan Man (Phu Bon Province) and suffered heavily in an engagement with ARVN airborne units. The "Geneva armistice" anniversary attack on the CIDG post Bu Dop (Phuoc Long Province) was a costly failure, although the Viet Cong profited indirectly when another camp was abandoned to permit reinforcement of the Bu Dop garrison. In the area north of Kontum, their first major gain was the district town of Tuomoroung which fell on 25 July 1965. In mid-August, the Viet Cong intensified their efforts to dislodge the garrison at Duc Co (Pleiku Province) and suffered heavy losses when a joint ARVN/US operation broke the 68-day siege. On 18 August the Viet Cong furthered their gains in the area north of Kontum when they successfully attacked and overran the district town and CIDG post at Dak Sut. They have not yet dislodged or destroyed the GVN garrison at Tan Canh, near Dak To, and Dak Pek near the Laos border, although they have the capability to do so at any time. The Viet Cong have suffered a series of setbacks in fighting along Route 19, and have been unable to deny to RVNAF the use of any road when the latter made a determined effort to use them. 7. Thus, the Viet Cong have made some significant territorial gains during their summer offensive. They also put six RVNAF battalions out of action in the early stages of our campaign, but they were unable to sustain their pattern of success when ARVN altered its normal reaction pattern and, in several instances, spoiled Viet Cong preparations by mounting anticipatory operations. The Viet Cong did succeed in disrupting lines of communication, effectively isolating the highlands from the coast, and interdicting communications between most of the coastal provincial capitals. In the Mekong Delta area, aggressive operations by ARVN's IV Corps appear to have frustrated Viet Cong plans for some major operations and have kept their main force units off balance. RVNAF morale has not collapsed, and may have recovered somewhat from its initial sag last spring. The political situation in Saigon, although still precarious, is not as unstable as the Communists hoped, and conditions are not ripe for a general uprising. Effective police action in the cities, a by-product of draft enforcement activities, and in part a result of improved counter-terror measures, has resulted in the apprehension of a number of Viet Cong cadres and probably has kept their subversive apparatus off-balance. Resources control operations in the Hop Tac area have also resulted in the seizure of explosives destined for Viet Cong terrorists in Saigon. 8. Not only has their campaign failed to achieve the optimum results envisaged by Hanoi, but since its inception the strategic balance has altered unfavorably for them. Preparations for the Viet Cong campaign were underway before the U.S. began its air attacks on North Vietnam and deployed its ground forces to South Vietnam--the bulk of the PAVN 325th Division had entered the south by February. Although US ground forces have not yet played a major role on the main battlefields, the Viet Cong are almost certainly becoming aware of the potential deriving from their presence. Sounder minds in Hanoi must appreciate that the opportunity for an early military victory has passed, and that the forces now available to the Viet Cong are incapable of dislodging the US forces from South Vietnam. Hanoi is therefore faced with the need to reappraise the situation and reassess its alternatives. 9. Courses of action open to Hanoi include the following: A. Massive reinforcement of the Viet Cong, in the form of an overt invasion, in an attempt to regain their offensive momentum and perhaps defeat US forces before they are firmly established. B. Limited covert reinforcement by infiltrating one or two additional PAVN divisions in order to restore the balance which has now swung in favor of the US-GVN forces and permit the continuation of recent levels of offensive activity. C. Modest retrenchment of activity, reducing the number of major attacks and placing greater emphasis on local guerrilla activity and on consolidating their political base in preparation for a protracted guerrilla struggle. D. Substantial reduction of activity aimed at creating the impression of a collapsing insurgency to lull the US into relaxing pressure on both the north and the south. E. In combination with any of the above, initiating diplomatic moves designed to bring about negotiations for a settlement. 10. Massive reinforcement, either by PAVN alone or with Chinese Communist participation, would require assurance of logistic support on a scale which is probably beyond the capacity of the disrupted lines of communication in the southern DRV. Moreover, both Hanoi and Peking probably would estimate that such action might provoke more extensive US air strikes against the DRV and possibly even Communist China if the latter were directly involved. The same limitations would apply to the use of massive numbers of bloc volunteers. This course of action cannot be ruled out entirely as an irrational, desperation move to prevent the defeat of the Viet Cong or to provide a temporary strengthening of the Communist position as a prelude to negotiations. Because of the risks involved, however, the Communists probably would be inclined initially to pursue more limited aims which would be attained with limited means. The Chinese are also capable of participating in the defense of North Vietnam against air attacks, but have thus far shown an inclination to avoid involvement except when US aircraft approach the Chinese border. 11. Limited covert reinforcement, on the order of one or two PAVN divisions committed in the same fashion as the 325th, is more within their capabilities. Such a move would permit the Communists to restore some semblance of a balance of forces without serious risk of escalation beyond North Vietnam. The principal disadvantage of this course would be the uncertainty of adequate logistical support pending the development of a motorable supply route through the Laos panhandle. Any substantial increase in the number of troops in the highlands area would also further strain the already difficult food situation confronting Viet Cong forces in that region. The Communists cannot be sure that they will be able to deliver sufficient quantities of ammunition by sea in view of increasing US efforts to interdict this line of supply. Some reinforcement is obviously necessary to prevent the Viet Cong from losing the initiative to the expanding US-GVN forces, but, if the movement of the 325th Division is any gauge, the deployment of further reinforcements would require two to four months from the date of decision. Both Hanoi and Liberation Front radio broadcasts appear to be laying the groundwork for some reinforcement through their reference to organizing the "regrouped southerners" in preparation for their return to the south. On the other hand, it must now be apparent to Hanoi that growing US-GVN air and ground capabilities pose serious risks to large concentrations of insurgent forces, thereby placing a premium on smaller scale guerrilla actions of a type for which the capabilities of "foreign" PAVN units are not best suited. 12. A modest retrenchment of activity, similar to that which occurred in 1962 after the initial US intervention, would permit the Viet Cong to conserve the offensive potential of their main force units while studying the impact of current US deployments and operations and evolving a new strategic approach. Widespread guerrilla activity would be continued to counter GVN pacification operations while consolidating the Communist hold on "liberated areas" and developing the Viet Cong subversive apparatus in areas largely under GVN influence. Hanoi could continue the infiltration of key cadre elements and weapons and ammunition to permit the expansion of local guerrilla forces. A major portion of the Viet Cong main force units could be dispersed to support the guerrilla campaign. The principal disadvantage of this course of action would be its adverse impact on Viet Cong morale. Political cadres would face a difficult task in re-educating even the main forces in terms of a prolongation of the struggle. Conscription in Communist areas brought a substantial number of relatively unindoctrinated youths into Viet Cong units of all types, even into the main forces. These inexperienced youngsters have already shown symptoms of an unwillingness to fight, as reflected in the rising numbers of defectors and ralliers from the Viet Cong. If US and GVN forces succeed in inflicting a number of significant defeats on the Viet Cong and continue air actions at the current level, this morale problem will mount despite Viet Cong indoctrination efforts. Although a temporary retrenchment would not decisively impair Viet Cong morale, a prolonged retrenchment might pose insurmountable problems. 13. A substantial reduction of activity, coupled with a voluntary curtailment of support from the DRV, might be attempted in an effort to lull the US into relaxing its pressure. This course would, in effect, produce a limited disengagement. By giving the appearance of a collapsing insurgency and avoiding major actions, the Viet Cong might hope that the US would be inclined to reduce its forces and discontinue its bombing attacks on the DRV. The disadvantages of this course are similar to those enumerated in the preceding paragraph. The adverse psychological impact on the Viet Cong would be even greater, however, since the absence of support from the north would tend to discourage even some hard-core insurgents. If it were explained as a ruse, the Viet Cong could not be assured that word of this would not reach US and GVN authorities, thereby negating the effectiveness of this course. Hanoi might be tempted to adopt this course however, taking the calculated risk that enough of the Communist structure could be held together to permit a renewal of insurgent activity when conditions were more favorable. 14. The Communists could, at any time, embark on diplomatic moves aimed at bringing about negotiations for a settlement. They are not likely to undertake this course until convinced that they cannot achieve success by violent means in the south. DRV leaders continue to give the impression of confidence in the ultimate success of the insurgency, and so far have conveyed no hint that they are prepared to relax their conditions for the initiation of negotiations or for a settlement. Should the Communists agree to negotiations, they will probably first attempt some form of major military action designed to strengthen their position. They can be expected also to demand concessions on our part which would relax US military pressure during the period of negotiations. 15. There are indications that the Communists have already laid down the guidelines for their autumn-winter campaign. Agent reports suggest these are similar--for the Delta area--to those of the summer campaign. Both Hanoi and Liberation Front broadcasts reflect continued determination to press the war, and indicate preparations are underway for the introduction of additional troops from the north. On the other hand, they now speak in terms of a prolongation of the struggle for up to twenty to twenty-five years, suggesting that they see scant prospect for the short-cut solution they were touting as possible only a few months ago. Appeals to the urban populace to prepare for the violent overthrow of the government have similarly lost their urgency. There are no indications that the Communists are preparing for a massive reinsurgement. Continuation of the insurgency at the present level or retrenchment of activity poses serious problems with respect to surrendering the initiative to the reinforced US-GVN forces and sustaining Viet Cong morale. Only limited overt reinforcement--provided the logistical problem is overcome--offers some prospects for negating the impact of the US build-up and sustaining the morale of the Viet Cong. 16. In conclusion, lack of complete success of their summer campaign has frustrated Viet Cong aims for 1965. If they have not done so thus far, the Communists must soon acknowledge their inability either to achieve an early victory or to dislodge the growing military strength of the US forces in the south. Massive intervention is probably beyond their capability to support, and would carry with it the risk of a substantial widening of the war. While retrenchment might permit them to conserve their capabilities, it would pose serious morale problems, and would surrender the initiative to the US and GVN forces, which would gradually be able to resume pacification programs and regain control over populated areas recently acquired by the Communists. Only limited reinforcement offers prospects for sustaining the insurgency on a scale and at a level that provides reasonable expectation of successfully testing and perhaps eroding US determination to continue the war. Diplomatic moves to open negotiations would appear unlikely until the Communists are convinced that US determination to continue the war cannot be eroded and that defeat of the Viet Cong is probable. Lodge
128. Memorandum for President Johnson/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXIX, Memos. Secret; Limdis. There is no drafting information on the source text, which indicates that the President saw the memorandum. Following is the text of a cable from Ambassador Lodge (Saigon 626):/2/ /2/Telegram 626 from Saigon, transmitted at 3:25 p.m., was received at 8:04 a.m. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) 1. I had a meeting yesterday afternoon alone with General Ky which lasted almost an hour, with him doing almost all the talking in deliberate, grammatical English, sometimes interspersed with French. I began by saying that I wished to help in every possible way and that he could count on me to respect a confidence. 2. Ky covered many subjects, but his chief contention was that the people insisted on a revolution, that it was impossible to compete with the Communists without treating the peasant, the poor man, the laborer, and the soldier properly. Neither Minh, Khanh nor Quat had really understood what a revolution is all about. 3. It was impossible for a civilian government to carry out a revolution with the military standing on the sidelines complaining. The military had the power in Vietnam and they had to meet their responsibility. 4. For the future, he wanted the Americans to hold the "strategic points" so that the Vietnamese could concentrate on pacification operations. He was disgusted with the Chieu Hoi program and the way it had been run and said that much American money had been wasted. There were 30,000 cadres in various government departments which he was going to regroup and retrain, and send them to the 235 districts in the country. He would have a paper on this for me to read very soon. 5. I agreed that a Communist offer of a revolution, even though it was in brutality and slavery, could only be beaten by an offer of a revolution for a new life in freedom. We Americans agreed completely and stood ready to help. There were some things which we could not do, but there were many which we could do. If he and his associates could stay in power for a reasonable period of time, then it could be done. But another coup would really be bad. Could we be helpful in this regard. 6. Ky smiled at this, and it seemed to me that he didn't take the possibility of a coup very seriously. He said he had been at Dalat for the last two days and had met with all division and corps commanders, and that they had all been in agreement. He said there had been discussion about my arrival signifying that something new was being brought into the Vietnamese problems. They did not know whether this was true, but they all agreed that I was against Communism. 7. Comment: If this is true, it is good that I am not taken for granted. My main hope at the meeting with Ky was not to settle any specific problem, but to develop a good atmosphere. I feel that this was done to some extent. He was rather tense when I arrived but he had a big smile on his face and was much more relaxed when I left. 8. Other remarks by Ky were as follows: A. The Communists gave the peasant what in effect is a license to kill the landlord and then take the land themselves. "We can do better than that," said Ky. I assured him of our desire to help, having in mind the report that landlords are heavily represented among generals. B. Ky said he was aware of the importance of having able Ambassadors and that he would make a number of appointments soon. Lodge.
129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/ Washington, August 27, 1965, 1:41 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and David H. Popper of IO on August 26 and cleared by Sisco of IO and Ruth Bacon of FE. Repeated to Saigon, London, Ottawa, Canberra, and Bangkok. At 2:55 p.m. on August 27, McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this cable to the President, noting in a covering memorandum that the response to Thant had been coordinated with the South Vietnamese Government by Ambassador Lodge, and had been prepared in close collaboration with Goldberg. Bundy added: "Dean Rusk and I consider that this entire paper represents no modification of our position, but only a careful and diplomatically skillful statement of it for U Thant's eyes." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII) 313. Following is text of US aide-memoire for SYG on Viet Nam. Deliver at earliest opportunity on receipt final authorization. Begin Text. AIDE-MEMOIRE 1. The United States believes that your memorandum of August 12/2/ contains a number of highly constructive suggestions. It is our earnest hope that the memorandum will be useful in initiating discussions which can provide a basis for the settlement of the Viet Nam conflict. The views expressed below are designed to contribute to this important objective. /2/See Document 119. 2. We agree with your observation that the objective of a Viet Nam settlement should be "a return to the essentials of the 1954 Geneva Agreements." 3. We concur in the principle you have set forth that neither zone in Viet Nam should adhere to a military alliance or furnish military bases to others, and that foreign troops should be withdrawn from both zones. You have already cited President Johnson's statement of April 7/3/ to this effect on military alliances and military bases. On troop withdrawal, the United States stated on April 8 in reply to the 17-nation declaration on Viet Nam ". . . when conditions have been created in which the people of South Viet Nam can determine their own future free from external interference, the United States will be ready and eager to withdraw its forces from South Viet Nam."/4/ /3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 245. /4/For complete text of this statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 853-854. 4. Equally basic is the principle of the Geneva Agreements that neither zone of Viet Nam should interfere in the affairs of the other zone. This principle was incorporated in numerous provisions of the Agreements, including Articles 19 and 24 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam/5/ and in the provision of Article 5 of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference,/6/ providing that the respective zones "shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy." It is the violation of this principle by the DRV which has led to the conflict in Viet Nam and to the presence of American forces in the Republic of Viet Nam. These forces, like the forces of other states assisting the Republic of Viet Nam, have as their sole purpose its protection against aggression, consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. /5/For text of the agreement, signed on July 20, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XVI, pp. 1505-1520. /6/For text of the declaration, signed on July 21, 1954, see ibid., pp. 1540-1542. 5. It is therefore essential that provisions be made in any settlement of the problem of Viet Nam for the withdrawal from South Viet Nam of the troops and cadres infiltrated from North Viet Nam into the South. The modalities and timing of withdrawal of American and other forces assisting the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam can, of course, only be worked out in the light of similar dispositions regarding the tens of thousands of regrouped Southerners and Northerners infiltrated by North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam over the past several years. 6. A third basic principle of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 was to ensure that the people of Viet Nam have the right of free choice. That purpose still guides our actions in two fundamental respects related to the Geneva Agreements: a. We maintain that the people of South Viet Nam should have the right to shape their own destiny by peaceful, democratic means and without interference from an aggressive neighbor to the north. b. We believe that the people of both South Viet Nam and North Viet Nam should have the right of free choice regarding the reunification of Viet Nam. As called for in the Geneva Agreements, any elections held for this purpose should be truly free and secret, with effective international supervision. It was in this sense that President Johnson on July 28 referred to "free elections . . . throughout all Viet Nam under international supervision."/7/ /7/See Document 97. 7. With respect to the political problems of South Viet Nam, we do not consider that the provisions of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 are directly applicable to the resolution of the internal problems of either North or South Viet Nam separately, pending procedures for reunification as discussed above. In this connection, the United States Government notes that the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Viet Nam, on June 22, made clear the view of the Republic of Viet Nam that South Viet Nam should be free to shape its own destiny "in conformity with established democratic processes without any intervention of whatever form and whatever source."/8/ As Secretary Rusk noted on June 23, the United States Government fully supports this principle,/9/ and it was in this sense also that President Johnson referred on July 28 to "free elections in the South." North Viet Nam appears to have expressed a different point of view. We would welcome any appropriate efforts by the Secretary-General to determine whether these divergencies are in fact as profound as they now appear. /8/For an excerpt from Foreign Minister Tran Van Do's address, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 883. /9/For text of Rusk's remarks, see ibid., pp. 884-886. 8. We concur in the Secretary-General's suggestion that a cessation of military activity might be subject to a variety of formulae, and that it might initially be a matter for de facto action--by both sides--rather than for a more formal arrangement. In any unconditional discussions, or in a conference, conditions for the cessation of hostilities might well be the first order of business. 9. Finally, with respect to the role of the so-called National Liberation Front, we agree that issues of this type need not and should not obstruct the way to a settlement. On July 28 President Johnson referred to negotiation taking place with governments (for example, if there should be a Geneva Conference, those governments which participated in the Geneva Conference of 1954), and indicated that the Viet Cong would have no difficulty being represented and having their views represented if Hanoi desired a peaceful settlement. This should not be an insurmountable problem and could be worked out. This position does not, of course, prejudice the United States Government's view that the so-called National Liberation Front is not in fact an independent party inasmuch as it has been established and is controlled by Hanoi. 10. We remain prepared to engage in unconditional discussions looking toward a peaceful settlement whenever the other side is ready. This can be done, for example, through reconvening the 1954 Geneva Conference or by other means, including discussions through your good offices. We shall give serious consideration to any proposals of this character. End Text. Prior to delivery, inform GVN observer, pursuant to last para Deptel 310 (sent to Saigon as 564)./10/ /10/Telegram 310 to USUN, August 26, dealt with coordination of a reply to U Thant's initiative. The final paragraph reads: "We now plan to give our reply to UN SYG some time early next week, and shall consult re timing in advance." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 541 from USUN, August 27, Goldberg reported that he had delivered the aide-memoire to Thant that evening. In reply to a question from Goldberg, Thant said that he did not know yet whether the Chinese, North Vietnamese, or Viet Cong had accepted the copies of the proposal, which he had sent to them through a "second channel." (Ibid.) Rusk [Next documents]
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