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140. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, September 13, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, President's Appointment File, September 13, 1965. Top Secret. Prepared by Califano. SUBJECT /2/The meeting lasted from 1:16 to 2:20 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) The agenda of the meeting is ibid., National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Luncheons with the President, Vol. I. McNamara informed the President that the JCS had recommended the bombing of SAM sites, airfields having IL-28s and other targets in areas previously restricted around Hanoi and Haiphong and close to the Chinese border. McNamara said he considered this a significant escalation of war against North Viet Nam and believed that it was premature for the President to consider or act upon any such recommendation until we had a better feel for the likelihood of North Vietnamese use of IL-28s and the North Vietnamese and Chicom reaction to any such action. Rusk agreed with McNamara. McNamara also recommended that certain other targets be hit. Rusk was worried about hitting two bridges between Hanoi and the Communist Chinese border indiscriminately and recommended that the action with respect to each of those bridges be limited to one day. McNamara agreed with Rusk and the President approved this decision. McNamara said that he would be back to the President, after study by Adm. Raborn, with a more fully considered view of the recommendations of the JCS. [Here follow an extensive discussion of South Asia and a short report by Ball on a trip to Europe.] JA Califano, Jr.
141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, September 14, 1965, 7:44 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, approved in draft by McGeorge Bundy and McNamara, and approved by Ball. A September 12 draft of this telegram with handwritten revisions by McGeorge Bundy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Memos. The substantive changes by McGeorge Bundy are indicated in footnotes below. 753. Eyes only Ambassador. 1. Informal high-level review over weekend of Vietnam situation leaves us with feeling situation has more major uncertainties, variables, and possibly occasions for changes in our actions than for some time past. Purpose this message is to give you feel of our thinking and of questions we see becoming acute. 2. Seems likely increasing US ground strength is driving Hanoi/VC to avoid major unit actions and in effect revert to pattern of placing primary emphasis on small-scale actions. Quite possibly we may be faced with VC tactics of prolonged small-scale struggle in which they will rely on international pressures and their doubtless exaggerated view of our internal political opposition to bring about eventual reduction in our effort, while they also hope and work for adverse internal political developments in GVN. In combating such prolonged tactics we need to consider just how we propose to use our greatly increased ground and air strength, especially the degree to which it can and should be employed in any wider countryside efforts beyond necessarily slow securing efforts close to our base areas./2/ (We also question whether and how we can move from patrolling to real pacification in these areas--can ARVN and GVN police take advantage of our nearby strength for this purpose in these areas?) There is even a residual question whether further increases in strength at presently planned pace are wise, or whether we should in some small degree defer further increases. Obviously one crucial element in this is GVN and SVN popular reaction to more extensive US ground operations, and on this subject we would welcome your over-all and up-to-date assessment. In short, if we move rapidly up in force strength, question is bound to arise of effective employment these forces and exactly what concept and strategy we should follow against VC lie-low tactics. /2/In the September 12 draft, McGeorge Bundy changed the phrase "extending perhaps eventually up to 30-50 miles from our base areas" to read as it does at this point. He also added the subsequent sentence in the parentheses. 3. Related question concerns scale and effective employment and continuing evaluation of results of presently planned massive further increase in air strike capacity. On this we have noted Westmoreland's excellent directive concerning civilian implications of operations,/3/ but still feel there is need for better over-all analysis of operations and for some mechanism to evaluate operations currently from all standpoints. One possibility would be to find civilian and military people akin to those who did operations analysis in World War II to act as survey group either on one-shot or continuing basis. Obviously, this too is matter you have under continuing close study, and we need to know your thoughts./4/ /3/On September 7, Westmoreland issued MACV Directive 525-3 prescribing guidelines designed to minimize non-combatant battle casualties. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL) /4/In the draft, the phrase originally read: "exchange our thoughts." 4. As to pacification/reconstruction effort, we wonder whether time is not fast approaching, or already here, when GVN forces freed by US deployments could put far more steam into Hop Tac and perhaps other key pacification areas where efforts have been pretty much stalled because of force shortage and general security situation. This might involve selecting provinces for really planned and systematic extension of GVN control with firm allotment of necessary military forces, plus police and all other elements of effort. In this connection, we would like for you to develop specific plan for our joint consideration involving concentration of GVN forces on pacification and reliance on US forces to handle large VC actions. What areas would be chosen for pacification; when could the plan be started and what objectives would be set; how many GVN forces would be required, where and when; how many US forces would be required, where and when; etc?/5/ /5/Not marked as excised in the September 12 draft, but excised by McGeorge Bundy from the final text of the telegram, was the following paragraph 4: "Content of bombing program against DRV is next military question. Our inclination is to extend strike program very gradually into area northeast of Hanoi, stressing key targets on northeast rail line and limited number other valid military targets. This would be without stepping up over-all number of strikes per week, but might be accompanied by some intensification armed recce particularly designed to keep key transportation links out of action in area roughly up to 20th parallel. We are still inclined not to hit Hanoi/Haiphong targets or to take actions that would have major chance altering ChiCom posture." 5. Still further possibility, which we know you have thoroughly in mind, would be extended GVN application of key elements in Acheson plan/6/ (land reform, Chieu Hoi, etc.) on over-all basis. Moreover, we wonder if it may not become possible to select one or more areas (perhaps in IV Corps area) for application of all elements Acheson plan including local electoral process. /6/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 287. 6. On negotiating front we share your view that there is no need to stress our basic position further and that additional stress runs considerable risk misunderstanding in both Hanoi and Saigon. Believe we have taken it far enough to make abundantly clear in all reasonable quarters that it is Hanoi, and especially Peiping, who are the obstacles to peace. Obviously, we shall have to reiterate our position in UN debate, and may have to respond to further third country initiatives, although the field is happily fairly clear at the moment. But we agree we do not need to add to the record or to state our position further except in response to clear need. 7. GVN internal political progress naturally remains basic to any lasting solution whether by negotiation or by course of events without any "settlement". We have impression Ky Government settling down somewhat and generally acting wisely, with your advice, to deal with possible threats from various quarters. We have no particular suggestions in this area, but look forward to your continuing reports especially directed to the prospects for generating younger, more energetic, and more cohesive leadership group, and winning more positive popular support./7/ /7/McGeorge Bundy added the last phrase to this sentence. 8. Above are general thoughts on which we would welcome your comment. Some of these areas require continuing decisions and action, but we are inclined to think also that over-all complexity of situation may make it desirable to set up conference--perhaps in Honolulu and perhaps in late October for intensive discussion all these problems. By that time Porter should be in harness and time right for such stock-taking./8/ /8/McGeorge Bundy suggested deleting the last two sentences of paragraph 8 for the time being. In telegram 1062 from Saigon, September 27, Lodge stated that the Embassy would prefer a Honolulu meeting after November 9 because it wanted time to get pacification and refugee programs started in areas of small guerrilla concentrations and because of the number of official visitors to South Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 9. Although we have slugged this message for your eyes only, you may of course discuss it with your top people if and to the degree you see fit. Rusk
142. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/ Washington, September 15, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381. Top Secret. SUBJECT We have considered the Joint Chiefs of Staff's proposed Rolling Thunder 32/33 program for 17-30 September. That program would implement immediately a major, concentrated effort of air strikes against North Vietnam's Phuc Yen and four other Hanoi/Haiphong airfields, against rail and highway routes and traffic between Hanoi and Haiphong, against rail and highway arteries and traffic between Hanoi/Haiphong and China, against four thermal power plants generating nearly 50% of the DRV's thermal power, and against SAM installations which defend the above areas. At this date I am not persuaded by the reasoning of JCSM 670-65/2/ that the military advantages the Joint Chiefs of Staff state would flow from the proposed strike effort outweigh the military and political risks involved in implementing the proposal. /2/In this September 2 memorandum, the Joint Chiefs recommended the program summarized in the preceding paragraph. (Ibid.) Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance's comments on JCSM 670-65, September 4, are contained in a memorandum to the JCS. (Ibid.) There is doubt whether the proposed program will mean a net advantage to US/GVN operations within South Vietnam. For example, while the LOC targets proposed in northeast North Vietnam all relate to interdiction of war materials into North Vietnam and therefore add to our efforts to interdict the flow of materials out of North Vietnam into South Vietnam, the intelligence estimates have been that such US strikes may well lead to a more vigorous effort by the DRV in support of the VC in South Vietnam. And the estimates have been that strikes of the kind proposed by the Joint Chiefs would not at this time significantly injure the VC ability to persevere in the South or persuade the Hanoi Government that the price of persisting was unacceptably high. More important is the risk of a US-Chinese confrontation, which could well be increased by a program of the kind proposed. I am acutely aware that it is possible that US/GVN forces at Da Nang may be subjected to air attack by North Vietnam's eight IL-28s (and perhaps MIG 15/17s). The intelligence judgment, however, has been that such an attack is unlikely, largely because of the fear of widespread and large-scale retaliation on North Vietnam by the United States. The judgment has been that such a DRV attempt to strike in the South might be triggered by a US/GVN strike against the Hanoi/Haiphong area, and that there is a substantial risk that a strike program of the weight recommended would induce the Chinese Communists to intervene in the air from Chinese bases. It has been decided therefore that: 1. The Rolling Thunder program proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the period 17-30 September will not be approved at this time. 2. A new up-to-date Special National Intelligence Estimate will be obtained to determine the likely DRV, Chinese and Soviet military reactions to a program of the magnitude, timing, and scope recommended by the Joint Chiefs./3/ This SNIE also should evaluate the effect of the strike program on the effort within South Vietnam and should take into account any new element introduced into the equation since earlier SNIEs were prepared, such as the Pakistan-India war. /3/SNIE 10-11-65, September 22, "Probable Communist Reaction to a US Course of Action," concluded that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would probably be more susceptible to a U.S. program of bombing attacks on certain new targets than it had been in the past. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State dissented fundamentally from this estimate, and its dissent is included in the SNIE. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, SNIE 10-11-65) 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should make recommendations with respect to any further intensification of air defense and early warning capability required to properly defend South Vietnam and our forces there. Robert S. McNamara/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
143. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, September 15, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:36 a.m. Lodge sent this unnumbered telegram to the Department of State with instructions to pass it to the White House, but a note on the source text indicates that it was not. Unnumbered. For the President. 1. Refugees--an opportunity. Am developing program on crash basis to make refugee situation an opportunity for spearheading a national political revolution against Communist-subversion/terrorism instead of treating it as a social and economic liability. New approach now being studied prior to my discussing with GVN. Program envisages providing adequate care, temporary housing to refugees who will be immediately organized into self-governing units (essentially their own former village organization) and trained in processes of democracy while undergoing rehabilitation. Men of military age will receive paramilitary training for village defense with maximum effort through Chieu Hoi surrenderee program to secure return of those men (often the majority of those villages in refugee areas) still under Viet Cong control. Military civic action personnel expected play important role in all aspects of refugee program in zones of American influence. Objective of program (in coordination with military progress) is to send village groups, like pilgrim fathers, well trained and organized, back to their original villages wherever economically desirable, inspired and equipped to build new lives, and able and willing to defend themselves against Communist marauders in same way Texas pioneers fought Comanches and Apaches. Proposal should not be released prior to coordination here with GVN. 2. U.S. troops. I made my first visit to US ground troops--the Third Marine Division at Danang and the First Cavalry Division at Qui Nhon./2/ I wish I could describe the feelings of confidence which they inspire--both as to the understanding of the mixed political and military nature of their mission and as to the confidence which they create among Vietnamese. /2/Lodge's full report on his visit is in telegram 888 from Saigon, September 14. (Ibid.) 3. Political. The Convention of the Armed Forces met in a day-long closed session in a Saigon movie theater on September 11, with more than 1600 officers from all services. They adopted resolutions rejecting any negotiations with or coalition with North Viet-Nam and denunciation of maneuvers tending to create disorder and division. Purpose of the meeting was to put pressure on the students, the intellectuals and the provincial councils by presenting an image of monolithic solidarity within the armed [forces]. 4. Military. The lull in large-scale Viet Cong activity continued with the Viet Cong apparently going through a period of realignment of their units and re-evaluation of their plans. 5. Economic. End of the month rice stores in both Saigon and the Delta dipped to lower levels and the previous favorable decline in Saigon rice price was arrested. Since recent rice arrivals have been delivered to Danang, the supply situation in Saigon remains a matter of concern. Expected rice shipment in the next fortnight should relieve the situation. 6. Psychological. Editorials in the Vietnamese language press were marked by optimism on the course of the war. 7. Negotiations. (1)Ambassador Goldberg is quoted by the Associated Press under a September 12 dateline as saying that an honorable peace "can only be achieved by negotiation premised on the principles of self-determination". (2) If Ambassador Goldberg is correctly quoted, then I would like respectfully to disagree for reasons set forth in my letter to you of August 31./3/ I am positive that negotiation is certainly not the "only way", and I believe that under certain circumstances it may not be the best way. /3/Document 131. (3) To the points of my letter of August 31, let me add the following thoughts which have occurred to me upon further reflection: (A) To maintain that the purpose of our military operations is to bring about "unconditional negotiations" puts a floor under the risks which the Communists run. If they know that they can always get to the conference table they have the initiative in setting the time and the terms for negotiations and thus they will have every incentive to continue military operations. (B) When considering the word "negotiations", one must never forget that the Communists will not enter negotiations with any intention of "settling" anything, but with the aim of winning at the conference table the prize which eluded them on the battlefield. One thing is absolutely certain: there can be no hope of negotiating them out of anything that they hold on the ground. They will strive not for stability, but for victory, and by then the contest will be largely psychological. (C) I am, of course, not opposed to negotiations in principle, provided we have a clear and sagacious program, but we must recognize that negotiations begin a new phase of the struggle rather than mark the end of the old phase. Stakes remain extremely high and the conduct of affairs grows more complicated, because it depends on so many intangibles. Negotiations, therefore, require as careful and thoughtful preparation as do our military campaigns. Lodge
144. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, September 18, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:08 a.m. 953. Ref: Deptel 753./2/ Following comments keyed to numbered paragraphs reftel: /2/Document 141. Para 1 Agree with your feeling situation has more imponderables than usual. While US military presence appears to have blunted VC offensive, improved Vietnamese morale and given us great opportunity, exploiting this opportunity depends upon climate of mutual trust and confidence with young, inexperienced and highly sensitive government facing complicated political problems. Para 2 A. Agree with you that increasing US ground strength may be driving VC to avoid major unit actions and to place primary emphasis on small scale actions. These must be dealt with successfully by the Vietnamese themselves making the main effort in conducting a combined politico-military campaign. The presence of American troops does provide the opportunity for thorough pacification of the areas in which they are stationed and full advantage should be taken of this opportunity. It is a very big dividend from our investment of men and money. For example, the Third Marine Division has scored impressive successes north, south and west of Danang, while the police in the city of Danang itself were doing a mediocre job. As I reported in another telegram,/3/ I directed that the USOM police advisor concentrate entirely on the city of Danang. /3/Not identified. B. In this connection, consider the case of 1st Lt. Paul Ek, USMC, who commands a joint action company consisting of 60 Americans and 150 Vietnamese in Phu Bai. They are causing somewhat of a sensation in cleaning out the Viet Cong and, by their able political conduct, increasing the intelligence "take". If our American troops can emulate this performance (and many are doing so now) in the ratio of 60 to 150, ought to get a tremendous amount of small unit nighttime effective pacification, and we would be neglecting an opportunity not to use American troops for this purpose, thereby pacifying the country and transforming the ARVN, making it into a much more vital and effective element of Vietnamese society, able at some not too remote date to carry on by themselves without outside help. C. General Westmoreland has had under continuous study how he would use the increased ground and air strength; in fact, the determination of his Phase I troop request was based on a detailed analysis. The strategy and tactics that he contemplates employing have been discussed in detail with the Vietnamese JGS and a MACV concept paper is published for the guidance of US commanders. This policy publication is being forwarded by MACV through military channels./4/ Westmoreland feels strongly that the full Phase I troop list should be deployed in accordance with the schedule worked out in Honolulu in August. It is noted that the 1st Division has been alerted but no public announcement has been made for its deployment. We believe this division should be deployed on schedule. In close coordination with the Vietnamese High Command, General Westmoreland proposes to follow the following broad strategy: /4/The MACV Concept Paper, August 30, is in CINCPAC Command History, 1965, Annex A, MACV, pp. 141-153. 1. Halt the VC offensive--stem the tide. 2. Resume the offensive--destroy VC units where they can be found and pacify selected high priority areas. 3. Restore progressively the entire country to GVN control. 4. Support "rural construction" with comprehensive attention to the pacification process as regards regional and popular force units, the police, and the relationship therein between US and GVN regular forces. Emphasis should be accorded the role of civic action of which a police precinct program is a necessary prerequisite. Appreciation and support of political and psychological requirements would be stressed. 5. It is assumed that the air campaign will continue against the DRV and infiltration routes in Laos. D. We need sufficient strength to insure the success of our strategy and tactics. As we succeed it becomes more difficult for the Viet Cong to marshal main-force units and the pressure will be on them to withdraw such units to more remote areas and/or to transform themselves into small units. This is a considerable triumph for us, because it means that the US presence has in effect fragmented the main force, prevented it from coming into being, or at least has forced it to play a lesser role. We will have kept the main force from becoming more akin to a regular army with which the enemy hoped to conquer the country militarily and without which he surely cannot do so. We will have to keep up the pressure on the main force whenever and wherever it appears to prevent its resurgence on a large scale. E. General Westmoreland and I are intensively studying the question of "what concept and strategy we should follow against VC lie-low tactics". With our bases secure and aggressive action against VC concentrations keeping them under pressure and off-balance, the lie-low tactics that the VC may adopt become more a problem for police-and-social-action-type program. We would expect to urge Vietnamese to use the police in the cities, and police-type operation by military forces working out from thoroughly pacified centers to pacify the environs as the basic element in what the Vietnamese call "rural construction". We are already discussing with the Vietnamese the possibility of singling out areas that look like good prospects, that are potentially pretty much over on our side, and then pacifying them so as to get a little smell of across-the-board success in the air. F. I also think it is prudent to expect increased VC terrorism, attempts to overthrow the government and economic warfare. G. We have had no unfavorable GVN and SVN reactions of significance to more extensive US ground operations. Government leaders have made clear their support for our efforts and their desire that we continue. While personal, psychological and economic frictions can arise, there is no evidence that these negative factors now outweigh the positive factors. Our buildup and activity have convinced the Vietnamese that we do not intend to pull out, which has been a nagging fear. Our efforts have contributed to the belief that the VC cannot win and have raised national morale and confidence in the success of the anti-Communist struggle. There are many variables at work and it is hard to predict how long this favorable attitude will continue or whether CQ [VC?] may possibly diminish. In the near future we do not expect unfavorable attitudes of any great significance. We are keeping our collective ears to the ground. Para 3 We have under evaluation the use of the increased air strike capacity. Westmoreland recently appointed a board of officers to study this matter in depth so as to assure that this available firepower is used effectively, efficiently, and with discretion. This measure by Westmoreland is an extension of the policy directive concerning minimizing battlefield non-combatant casualties./5/ Westmoreland feels and I agree that an outsider survey group is not needed at this time. He believes that he is able to translate recent experience into improved methods. He has in his J-3 office a Requirements and Analysis Division which is manned with well qualified officers who devote their entire time to operational studies and analysis of force utilization and requirements. They consult with the civilian elements of the Mission. He will be quick to ask for help when he feels the need. /5/See footnote 3, Document 141. Para 4 A. I have directed the US Mission Liaison Group to grapple with needed actions in this whole area, which it is starting to do most actively. Also, fine early progress by the staff was made through informal liaison with Minister Ung, Secretary-General of the Council of Rural Construction (Pacification), with the Prime Minister's staff, and with key technicians in GVN Ministries participation in pacification. The unexpected death of Minister Ung in an Air Vietnam crash Thursday/6/ suddenly has imposed a whole new set of circumstances. Meanwhile, the improvement of Hop Tac operations is receiving priority attention now, including my discussing this with General Ky and making a personal visit to the Hop Tac area on Thursday morning./7/ /6/September 16. /7/September 23. B. I am not ready to say, "what areas would be chosen for pacification, when could the plan be started, what objectives would be set," but hope to be able to do so soon. I am now encouraging General Ky to concentrate GVN efforts and enthusiasm on pacification so that this can have sustained, wholehearted GVN participation. This will permit development of realistic requirements for our planning. C. On the military side of the questions raised in para 4, Westmoreland informs me that a campaign plan is being refined by his staff in coordination with the JCS. A first phase schedule of operations has been agreed to between himself and General Co. Further, a study by MACV and JGS is now in progress for the purpose of reviewing AB 139 of 25 December 1964/8/ (this concerns the roles and missions of the various elements of the RVNAF) and the Chien Thang plan (GVN pacification plan) to bring them in line with the campaign plan. I believe these efforts are responsive to what you have in mind; however this can be better determined after you are briefed on MACV's plans. In this connection, Westmoreland's J-3, Brigadier General Depuy, is going to CINCPAC for a conference the last week of this month and thence to Washington for two weeks leave. Westmoreland states that he will be available with appropriate charts and maps to brief the JCS if such is agreed to by CINCPAC following the Honolulu meeting. In this connection the main purpose of the Honolulu military meeting is to allow Westmoreland to present his Phase II troop deployment concept. The Mission Council is being briefed on this subject by MACV on Sept 21. /8/Not further identified. Para 5 Development of popular electoral processes from the rice roots up is part of all our current planning for counter subversion/terrorism in "rural construction" (pacification). For example, this has been taken into account in developing temporary refugee status within rural communities which have fled to safe zones pending their return home. I have also been talking with General Ky about making use of provincial councils elected last May 30 in their further election of delegates to Consultative National Council which also will be given further task of commencing draft of new Constitution. GVN has made progress on land reform and is giving increased emphasis to Chieu Hoi. But in this connection I cannot believe it would be prudent to call a halt to military operations anywhere. Para 6 Appreciate what you say about the "negotiating front". Para 7 On the internal political front, we have had a period of relative quiet ever since my arrival. I am studying extraordinary measures to protect ourselves from a coup and hope that with the passage of time and with our advice plus his own natural aptitude, General Ky can become a really effective political leader. The present leadership is sufficiently "young and energetic", but I agree that the problem is to maintain its cohesion and gain more positive popular support. Para 8 Hope you will keep Honolulu date open for a while, as it may be that late October would be bad from the standpoint of the work here and that mid-November would be better. Lodge
145. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, September 20, 1965. /1/Source: U.S. Military History Institute, Johnson Papers, Close Hold File No. 3. Top Secret. Drafted by Abrams on September 27. SUBJECT 1. This was the first of the regular Monday meetings in executive session with only the Chiefs present initiated by the Chairman for better communication between the Chiefs and SecDef. At the conclusion all the Chiefs felt it had been one of the most useful meetings. 2. The SecDef doubted that there was a need for more air power in Vietnam. He wondered if some of the air effort was not wasted. The Chairman indicated that Westmoreland had set up a group to study this. 3. The SecDef wondered what lies ahead for US troops. Based on the thesis that a moderately successful blunting of the VC Monsoon strategy has occurred, it would appear doubtful that the VC would make sustained attacks for the next three to six months. What strategy will VC use? Will they go to small-scale operations, and if so how do we combat it? The Marines favor an oil spot strategy, expanding their enclaves gradually to hook them together to keep the VC from getting the rice in the coastal plain, mingling with the population there; at the same time training Regional Forces and Popular Forces to take over. SecDef wonders how we hasten this process. It was pointed out that Westmoreland's concept for US forces would prevent main force concentrations; combination of US and RVN forces to attack main force sanctuaries that had been in existence for 25 years, move in and drive them out, then police by RVN. Do away with the sanctuaries. At the same time build up RVN forces. There should be a day when US forces should leave the country. By the end of October we need a plan, a strategy. The Chairman noted that Westmoreland has developed a strategy and a plan in conjunction with the senior Vietnam leadership and Ambassador Lodge. 4. The Secretary of Defense spoke with regard to the next Rolling Thunder, indicating some fixed targets have not been too useful, that fixed targets should be somewhat extended to interdiction in the northwest rail and road lines, increasing slowly with no dramatic impact. 5. The matter of air defense should be reviewed by the Army and Air Force. 6. The SecDef concluded with a talk about leaks on security. He pointed out the many times he had gone into this, including some investigations he had had, which really produced no substantial results, but he urged everyone to look into this again, maybe with a new group, to see what could be done. He pointed out that some leaks had probably resulted in increased casualties for the US and he wished it could be stopped. 7. In leaving he mentioned that he would like to have one of the Chiefs go to Vietnam about each quarter. It was pointed out that General McConnell is going in October and General Wheeler plans to be there at Christmastime. Creighton W. Abrams
146. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, September 22, 1965, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received at 3:37 a.m. and passed to the White House. There is an indication on another copy of this telegram that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Cables) 991. For the President. 1. Political-psychological A. The Govt of Vietnam has finished its twelfth week of stability--a rather astonishing fact which I attribute in large part to the conviction that the U.S. is truly committed to staying as long as is necessary and to doing whatever is necessary to ward off the Viet Cong aggression. This conviction is created by the U.S. combat presence on the ground. B. The above statement is impossible to prove, but some unusually well informed and sagacious persons believe it. In other words, your decision on troops is not only a great thing militarily, but is paying big dividends politically. C. Let us hope that this stability continues, and I try to leave no stone unturned to see that it does. I have made it clear in strategic places that a coup would be most unwelcome. I also am taking steps to make sure we are organized to hear about coup plotting in time to do something about it. D. The Viet Cong defection rate is still disappointing, and the level of VC activity remains high, disruptive and not effectively checked by the GVN. E. But there is encouragement in figures indicating an increase in the amount of information which Vietnamese citizens are giving to the govt concerning the Viet Cong. Surely this is a most significant index. In a very real sense, the citizen is not just expressing a Gallup Poll type preference; he is actually "voting with his life." If he decides to give information about the Viet Cong and then gets caught, he may very well get killed. This, therefore, represents a vital judgment. I am having the CIA look into it. F. I also hear that an order has gone out in some places to the Viet Cong not to congregate in groups of more than 100 men, or at any one place for more than 48 hours. If this becomes a general Viet Cong policy, it would be significant. Much of their strength has been because, in this medievally structured country, they, too, organized themselves in medieval fortresses which were totally impregnable on the ground, where they could stay in safety with plenty of rest for long periods, coming out only to make very well prepared attacks on what the govt had been doing in the countryside. This made the govt's job quite hopeless. Now we are destroying the fortresses. G. Americans in Vietnam report "cautious optimism"--based on belief in the GVN's ability to carry out its programs, in awareness of Viet Cong reverses, and in passive resistance to Viet Cong "taxes" on recruiting. H. Yet, all of the above is only the beginning of the impact of the American presence--an impact before the First Cavalry and before most of the First Infantry Division were here at all. Moreover, the U.S. troops which are here have by no means done everything they can do to organize the Vietnamese "regional" and "popular" forces for joint American/Vietnamese police type tactics and night patrolling. Thorough pacification has thus yet to be done even within the U.S. base areas. When this happens, the psychological effect should be marked. I. The proposed deployment of the First Infantry Division should allow successful operations against the oldest and most vital Viet Cong redoubt which is not only what has been threatening Saigon for so long, but which is the line of communication from the food source in the Delta to the Viet Cong north of Saigon. J. On another political front, PriMin Ky traveled to Ban Me Thuot and personally presided over the return of 483 Montagnard dissidents who had rallied to the govt. In two speeches, Ky stressed the need for national solidarity, freedom from discrimination, and for the complete merger of the Montagnard and lowland people. He also told me he had evidently taken my advice and had urged his local military commander to be gradual and tactful in his relationships with the Montagnards. Tension continues and tangible measures must be taken to relieve their inferior status. The U.S. stands ready to help. K. In Quang Nam Province of central Vietnam, govt forces broke up demonstrations protesting against govt air and artillery bombardments, demanding reimbursement for damages caused by military operations and calling for the release of husbands and sons from military service. These demonstrations apparently had nothing to do with the recent Hue struggle movement. They followed the pattern of disturbances which have occurred at widely separated points in the past, often as a result of Viet Cong agitation. 2. Military A. Combined forces (U.S., Vietnamese, Australian, and New Zealand) thrust into a Viet Cong base area in Binh Duong Province to upset Viet Cong plans to concentrate strong forces in the area. The 101st Airborne Brigade defeated a major Viet Cong unit north of An Khe in Binh Dinh Province. Meanwhile the Viet Cong mounted only one battalion-size attack, their main activity continuing to be interdiction of communication routes. 3. Pacification A. The death of Minister for Rural Construction Nguyen Tat Ung was a serious loss to the rural construction (pacification) effort. He was a forceful Minister and Lansdale had begun a relationship with him which promised to be fruitful. 4. Economic A. Wholesale rice prices began edging up, reflecting low rice stocks in Saigon, poor prospects for further deliveries from the Delta this season, and estimates that the 1966 crop will be 10 to 12 percent below the level of the 1965 crop. The GVN is now relying on PL-480 imports for immediate needs and for stockpile buildup. 5. General Ky A. I took the occasion during our most recent joint meeting with the Vietnamese to commend Ky's approach to the desertion problem. He is stressing the necessity of eliminating corruption among top officers, of improving the troops' understanding of the war, and of carrying out in practice the policy of equal sharing by officers of hardships and dangers. I also congratulated him for his imaginative attitude regarding the refugee problem. Lodge
147. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 22, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. Secret. General Westmoreland has requested a reaffirmation of his authority to use standard riot control munitions in certain specified combat situations in South Vietnam and Ambassador Lodge has supported his request. This authority would extend only to lacrimatory agents (tear gas) known as CS and CN. Use of nausea-producing agents DM and CN-DM would not be authorized. The agents would be used primarily to clear tunnels, caves, and underground shelters in cases where their use will lead to far fewer casualties and less loss of life than would the combat alternatives which involve high explosive or flame munitions. Of particular importance would be the reduction in casualties to civilians who are inevitably mingled with hostile military elements as the result of VC tactics. I agree with General Westmoreland that the use of these riot control agents far outweighs disadvantages that may accrue; in fact there is every indication that we may be in for censure if civilian casualties should accrue because we didn't use tear gas. The disadvantages to which I refer are the likelihood of some sharp international criticism, spurred by Communist propaganda, of the U.S. Government authorizing the employment of what will inevitably be called "poison gas". Unless you indicate otherwise I will reaffirm to General Wheeler the current national approval for the use of the riot control agents CS and CN under the combat conditions described above. Secretary Rusk concurs in this recommendation. If you approve, the Department of State will send a message to all posts informing them of the decision and providing public affairs guidance. Robert S. McNamara
148. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 10-11-65 Washington, September 22, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, SNIE 10-11-65. Top Secret; Sensitive. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and NSA participated in drafting the estimate. All members of the USIB concurred except the representatives of the AEC and FBI, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO A The Problem/2/ /2/The Director of INR, Department of State, dissents from this entire estimate. His reasons are set forth at the end of the estimate. [Footnote in the source text.] To estimate probable Communist reactions to a US program of air attacks on certain new targets in North Vietnam. Assumptions For the purposes of this estimate we assume air strikes against Phuc Yen and four other airfields near Hanoi and Haiphong; against rail and highway routes and traffic between Hanoi and Haiphong and between Hanoi-Haiphong and China; against four major thermal power plants; and against SAM installations defending these areas. We further assume that attacks on all these targets are begun within the next few weeks and in a roughly simultaneous fashion. We also assume restrikes as necessary and subsequent armed reconnaissance against the rail and highway targets. The Estimate 1. For many months our estimates have emphasized the crucial importance of the fact that the Communists, especially the DRV and China, believed they were winning the war in South Vietnam and needed only to maintain their momentum until the GVN collapsed and the US was forced to abandon the struggle. In this confidence Hanoi has been willing to endure bombings of the DRV, to accept the increasing US commitment, and to refuse any negotiations. Moreover, the Communists have counted on international and domestic pressures on the US, as well as on the growing capabilities of air defense around the critical Hanoi-Haiphong area, to deter further escalation. Finally, they probably have had strong doubts about US determination to face a protracted war, and these feelings have probably been strengthened by repeated US soundings and overtures for negotiations. 2. We think, however, that recently this general confidence has been weakened both by US/GVN military successes and by tangible evidence that the US is willing to increase its commitment. The situation has come to seem more dangerous and discouraging than they probably had expected, and victory must seem to them much further off than it did a few months ago. Thus, we think that the assumed US action would come at a time when DRV doubts may be growing. 3. Public Communist declarations and commitments to continue the struggle, however, remain as firm as ever. Recently, the DRV has once again vigorously rejected negotiations on any terms except its own, apparently in response to approaches from various intermediaries. The Chinese have been vehement in denouncing negotiations altogether; they have even warned the DRV more or less openly against them. Their warnings may indicate Chinese worry that the DRV is weakening; indeed, there are a few indications, private and tentative, that Hanoi may not be quite as adamant in its position as its public declarations assert. Immediate Reactions 4. The Communists, while they have hoped that the US would continue to exempt the Hanoi-Haiphong area from attack, probably have rated as fairly high the chances of the kind of US attacks assumed here. Their reactions, therefore, would probably not be greatly affected by shock or surprise. 5. The North Vietnamese would, of course, defend as best they could against the attacks. Beyond this, they might retaliate quickly. It is possible that the DRV has contingency plans for surviving aircraft to attack American bases in the South or US carriers. There is no evidence of training for this type of mission. They would probably expect such strikes to provoke wider and heavier US attacks. Thus, we think that the chances would be against such retaliation, though it cannot be ruled out. 6. A second immediate danger would be Chinese air intervention--either over the DRV or against South Vietnam or US carriers. It is possible that Hanoi and Peking already have an agreed plan for the Chinese to intervene from their own bases in response to the kind of US attack assumed in this estimate. We doubt this; the Chinese are not likely to have made a firm or unqualified commitment. They would wish to weigh the effectiveness of the initial US attack and to receive the DRV reaction before making any move likely to invite a US attack on South China. However, the danger of accidental encounters would be particularly high if US aircraft were operating close to the border. 7. Thus in the first few days, during and immediately following the onset of the US attacks, there would be a chance of an attack on US bases or ships and a chance of Chinese air intervention. But we think these unlikely. 8. Of course, there would also be a great hue and cry from the Communist side, and the usual stream of protests, threats and warnings. We would also expect new acts of terrorism and sabotage inside South Vietnam, particularly against US forces. Viet Cong capabilities in these fields are considerably greater than they have yet chosen to demonstrate. The principal Communist reactions however, would come in later weeks and months, and they would of necessity be greatly affected by the ongoing course of military and political events as well as by the US actions we consider in this estimate. Subsequent Reactions 9. China. The Chinese would strongly urge the DRV to continue the fight; to this end they would probably promise more equipment and personnel to build up air defenses, and particularly to defend and repair the interdicted lines of communication to South China. The Chinese might agree to send their own aircraft and pilots to the DRV, but on balance we think this unlikely in the wake of the demonstrated vulnerability of DRV airfields./3/ Almost certainly the Chinese would oppose negotiating, and they might warn the DRV not to count on Chinese support if it moved toward a cease-fire or a diplomatic settlement. We think Chinese views carry great weight in Hanoi, particularly if the DRV leaders were divided over future policy. /3/The Director, NSA, National Security Agency, considers the chances of the Chinese sending their own aircraft and pilots to the DRV despite the demonstrated vulnerability of its airfields as being about even. [Footnote in the source text.] 10. It may be that these US attacks would tip the balance and cause Chinese intervention. The Chinese might believe that the war had passed the point of no return and that a US-Chinese confrontation was the inevitable price of continuing the war in South Vietnam. The Chinese have made this war the test case for their doctrine of "peoples war" against the US; they have staked much prestige on it. We cannot be very confident that the Chinese would continue to refrain from intervening in the air from their own bases as the US continued attacks near the Chinese border and against a weakened DRV. But on balance we think it unlikely that they would so intervene./4/ With somewhat more confidence, we estimate that the US attacks would not provoke large-scale Chinese intervention with ground combat forces; Peking would almost certainly believe that this would run very high risks of war with the US. /4/The Director, NSA, National Security Agency, considers the chances that the Chinese will intervene in the air from their own bases as the US continues attacks near the Chinese border as being about even. [Footnote in the source text.] 11. The USSR. The Soviets would increase their efforts to halt the conflict. They would put pressure on the US and urge negotiations on Hanoi. There are some recent indications that the Soviets are now more willing to put some pressure on the DRV, perhaps because they believe their military assistance and the trend of the guerrilla war gives their view greater authority. The Soviets would almost certainly agree to DRV requests to replace air defense equipment, although they would do so more to retain their influence with the DRV than in the expectation that they could furnish an adequate defense against US operations. 12. The Soviets could try to relieve pressures on the DRV by moving against the US in Berlin. We continue to believe there are strong inhibitions against a double crisis. Carefully controlled harassments and occasionally provocative demonstrations of US vulnerabilities are always possible, however. A potentially unstable situation in the Soviet leadership adds an element of uncertainty to the Soviet positions. 13. The DRV. In Hanoi, reactions would probably develop along one of two conflicting lines: (a) Hanoi might believe that the new US attacks and the subsequent interdiction campaign did not alter the basic situation. The North Vietnamese might stick to their belief that the guerrilla war is, by definition, a prolonged struggle against heavy odds, that there will be setbacks and defeats, but that the ultimate gain is worth it. They might feel that damping down the war in the wake of US attacks would appear a capitulation. They might feel that if the war were interrupted the Viet Cong movement could not long maintain its morale and cohesion. Along this line of reasoning they might also conclude that the US escalation of bombings would still not do intolerable damage and would probably not be extended to attacks on urban population. They might decide that the US was desperate in the face of a long war involving US troops in the South, and that further struggle, perhaps involving the dispatch of PAVN units to the South on an increased scale, was the best course to crack the Saigon Government and US resolve. (b) On the other hand, the DRV might estimate the situation quite differently. The growing US commitment in the South might persuade them that the guerrilla war could not be prosecuted to final victory. Without such a promise of ultimate success they might believe Viet Cong morale could not be sustained. Moreover, the attacks on the DRV's air defenses and on a wider range of targets might convince them that the US intended to escalate the air war almost indefinitely, if necessary. Thus they might decide that, while their position in the South was still strong and the Viet Cong still intact, it would be more expedient to move toward negotiations or some tacit understanding in order to pursue their objectives through political means, and possibly at some future time to resume guerrilla warfare. 14. We believe that the US course of action assumed here would reinforce the thinking described in subparagraph (b) above. Even so, it is not likely that the North Vietnamese would move immediately to the conference table; they would probably feel that there was still time to test the effectiveness of the Viet Cong against US forces. They might still hope to strike a critical blow against US and GVN morale, perhaps by engaging US forces somewhere in the hinterland. Failing this, they might next revert to hit and run tactics for a time. And there is still the question of whether China could prevent a switch to political tactics. 15. In general, however, we think it unlikely that in the new situation created by the US attacks assumed here, the DRV would simply continue the war along present lines. We think that this US course of action would be more likely in time to move the North Vietnamese toward political and diplomatic initiatives than to cause them to escalate the war. 16. The Viet Cong. As noted above, Viet Cong morale is an important ingredient in DRV estimates of how to prosecute the war. We have little good evidence on the state of Viet Cong morale. And it is difficult to judge the impact of specific US moves, since their effectiveness is a gradual cumulative process. In the assumed instance, the new US air attacks on the DRV would be unlikely to affect Viet Cong capabilities or intentions in the short run. Over the longer term, however, if it became apparent that supply and reinforcement were more and more difficult, it is likely that VC morale would deteriorate, particularly if they suffered setbacks on the order of Chu Lai together with continuing pressure on the ground and from the air. 17. Other Considerations. A current factor which might play some role is the Indo-Pakistani conflict. The Communists might see the new US move in Vietnam as an attempt to take advantage of the diversion of world attention to the Indian subcontinent. The US attack might help to dissuade the Chinese from any major involvement there. Peking would almost certainly be increasingly reluctant to divert resources to support Pakistan in the face of new escalation in Vietnam, its primary area of concern. In general, however, we think that the course of the Indo-Pakistani conflict would not greatly affect Communist reactions to the US course of action considered in this estimate. The following is the position of the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State: 1. The Director, INR, Department of State, dissents fundamentally from the key estimates made above. He believes that the postulated air strikes against the DRV's SAM sites, airfields, thermal plants, and prime rail, road, and traffic targets would be seen by the Communists--as well as by most other observers--as marking a fundamental change in the character of our escalation of the Vietnam war. Separated strikes on these targets, carefully spaced over time, would help reduce adverse reactions, although these would be serious in any event. The composite program assumed here, however, would be regarded as a political and military watershed comparable to that of last February when our bombing of the DRV began. 2. Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow would all view the strikes as initiating--and in large part executing--the highest level of militarily significant escalation available in the DRV short of ground invasion. Even assuming precision bombing, the strikes would inextricably involve industrial and civilian losses beyond the objectives deliberately targeted, as well as almost certain Soviet and Chinese casualties. In operation the new program would appear to have exempted only deliberate attacks (of no military significance) on the population itself. Communists and non-Communists alike would consider that this sudden massive action contradicted the many prior official indications, public and private, that we intended to respect the special sensitivity of the Hanoi-Haiphong complex. They would regard these undifferentiated and simultaneous strikes as a gross departure from our past policy of graduated pressure. They would probably conclude that we had decided to forsake further efforts to project a judicious combination of political-military pressures against the infiltration network, and had chosen instead the blunt instrument of a broad military assault on the chief elements of the DRV economy and its self-defense capability. The credibility of our protestations of limited objectives would slump, and our actions would just as plausibly be seen to invite the capitulation of the DRV under pain of total destruction, raise the specter of an eventual invasion on the ground, and in any case appear to threaten the DRV's ability to survive. 3. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that Hanoi would choose to move toward negotiations or compromise; it is unlikely that Moscow could afford or would be willing to urge Hanoi to do so; and it is certain that Peking would press Hanoi to persevere. These positions would be mutually reinforcing. 4. The DRV leaders, as the estimate notes, have recently indicated that their terms for negotiation may not be as inflexible as they have sometimes seemed. The assumed attacks, however, would immediately deter Hanoi from any diplomatic overtures it may possibly have been contemplating. It would fear that any sign of compromise under such pressure would be read by friends and enemies as capitulation, would undermine all possible future bargaining positions, would irreparably damage Viet Cong morale, and would predispose the US to renew these pressures at any time and under any conditions it thought appropriate. Whatever hesitancies the DRV may have had would now be resolved in favor of militant prosecution of the war and of more insistent requests for, and far fewer qualms over, Chinese and Soviet aid. 5. Far from seeking a respite from the bombings, the DRV would attempt to retaliate by raising the tempo of the ground war. It would send additional ground forces to Laos and South Vietnam as rapidly as the infiltration routes permit. It probably would surface these efforts, at least to the extent of acknowledging the despatch of "regrouped southerners" and "volunteers," both to raise Viet Cong morale and to discourage the US and its supporters with the prospect of a long jungle war. 6. The DRV would certainly at once press Peking and Moscow vigorously for prompt aid in rebuilding its defenses against air attacks. Inhibitions about additional Soviet and Chinese presence in the DRV would diminish. Hanoi might well drop whatever reservations it may have had against the use of Soviet or Chinese pilots. It would be most impatient with Sino-Soviet disputes about transit rights, but would expect those past hurdles to be overcome in the new atmosphere. 7. Although Hanoi's reaction will continue to be of primary importance, the locus of decision making will shift perceptibly away from Hanoi to Peking and Moscow. Peking will have a major role in determining the overall Communist response to the assumed US actions. Given the preceding estimate of Hanoi's response, these reactions will be consistent. Hence the frustrating dilemma of the main estimate probably will not arise--Hanoi's switching to a negotiatory track despite giving China's contrary views "great weight." (Compare paragraphs 9 and 15 of the SNIE.) 8. It is almost certain that Hanoi and Peking have concerted their preparations and discussed plans for Chinese action in the event of US attacks such as the ones assumed here. The Chinese would strongly urge Hanoi to reject any thought of negotiations, and they will purposefully underwrite the DRV's will to persist. They would furnish the DRV with logistic assistance in prosecuting the war in the south and in making further US air attacks as costly as possible. They would give safe haven to any DRV planes which escaped our strikes and would permit them to operate from Chinese bases. They would probably provide Chinese planes and pilots to operate from the remaining DRV facilities if and when useable. 9. The Chinese would immediately increase their defensive air patrols along their frontier and perhaps over adjacent DRV territory in which their ground forces appear to be active. The danger of accidental encounters with US planes will be high and will increase as US planes approach the border. If the DRV airfields are successfully interdicted, there is a better than even chance that Chinese air will intervene from Chinese bases. 10. The Chinese would probably in any case increase their presence on the ground in North Vietnam, furnishing anti-aircraft, engineer, and supply units and, if asked, providing combat forces to defend against a possible US invasion of the north, thus freeing DRV forces to go southward. With the destruction of the rail line into China, the logistical problem of supplying the DRV would increase. To the degree that the US program is successful and South China must become the operational and infrastructure base for further air defense of the DRV, the Chinese will need Soviet support and protection. Greater Soviet involvement might reluctantly be desired to deter the US. This is an additional factor likely to promote a constructive resolution of previous Sino-Soviet frictions over the speed, scope, and method of aiding Hanoi and bolstering South China bases. 11. We do not believe that the Pakistan-India war is likely to place any limitation on Peking's willingness and ability to carry out the foregoing responses. Peking has prepared its forces and its population for some time to face the eventuality of the US actions assumed in this estimate. Its likely actions against India, outlined in SNIE 13-10-65, will probably not be deterred by such US actions, nor will the Indian theater require the diversion of Chinese air or ground forces available to support North Vietnam and to defend South China. 12. Indeed in addition to the general increase in pressures generated by the interacting nature of the two Asian theaters of war, Peking would be aware of certain comparative advantages in an escalatory response to the American move in North Vietnam. Peking knows that the Vietnam theater tends to bring the US into confrontation with both China and the USSR, while the Indian theater tends to bring the US into confrontation only with China. Therefore Peking would hope to breach US-USSR relations on the matter of Vietnam, reducing thereby the freedom of both the USSR and the US to respond against Chinese pressures in the Subcontinent. 13. The Soviets would be specifically affronted by the assumed US course of action in Vietnam. They would almost certainly interpret it as an assault on the viability of North Vietnam, whose security they have committed themselves to defend. They would be likely to regard the US action as a direct challenge to themselves, the more so since it would probably result in Soviet casualties. They would be unlikely to place any credence in assurances that US intentions were still limited (something they have been prepared to do thus far). The sensational nature of the American initiative and the obstinacy of the Chinese and DRV reaction to it would harden the Soviet response. 14. Under these circumstances Moscow would be less likely than ever to press Hanoi to negotiate, and it would redouble its effort to participate meaningfully in the defense of the DRV. Moscow would renew its earlier offers of additional aircraft and pilots and would attempt to increase the flow of SAMs and technicians to man them. The Soviets would renew their proposals of last spring for a cooperative effort with the Chinese to aid Hanoi. The Chinese, for their part, would find it more difficult than previously to refuse reasonable cooperation in expediting Soviet aid, especially in view of the assumed destruction of DRV-Chinese rail lines. Despite the continuing hostility between Chinese and Soviets, their respective stakes in the struggle are likely to lead to competition to see who can help Hanoi most effectively. 15. Unfortunately for them, Soviet problems in providing rapid and effective aid would be serious. DRV airfields and associated installations would be unusable, heavily damaged, or under continuing attack. Previously prepared SAM sites would likewise be difficult to replenish, and the US would presumably not abstain from attacking sites in preparation, as it did during the installation of the present Soviet-supplied SAM capability. Under these conditions, it is likely that the Soviets would make a strong attempt to mount an air defense effort from Chinese territory and we believe that, despite haggling, some arrangement to this end would be consummated. As a bargaining factor with Moscow, Peking will probably request--and Moscow provide--sophisticated Soviet air defense equipment (MIG 21s and SAMs) to protect bases and logistical lines in South China. 16. We believe that fundamentally the Soviets would nevertheless remain interested in an end to the conflict. While under the stepped up military assistance effort which we believe they would be bound to make the Soviets would be prepared to run the risk of direct engagements with US forces in Vietnam, we believe that they would not contemplate these risks with any equanimity and would still attempt to prevent escalation from running out of control. Accordingly, even in addition to its greater military involvement, Moscow can be expected to resort to various forms of political pressures to deter the US, including a further substantial worsening in bilateral relations.
149. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 22, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Memos (A). Top Secret. This memorandum outlines the basis for the increase in estimated US force requirements in South Vietnam from the 175,000 discussed in early July and mentioned in my July 20 recommendations/2/ to the 210,000 figure referred to in my September 1 memorandum to you./3/ /2/Document 67. /3/Document 132. You will recall that at your July 28 press conference/4/ you stated that you had ordered deployments which would raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately, that additional forces would be needed later, and that they would be sent as requested. /4/See Document 97. Prior to that date--specifically, on July 24--the Joint Staff, as a result of MACV requests, had revised their total for 1965 deployment, increasing it to a little more than 195,000. I mentioned this higher figure to you at the time. At the August 2-6 Honolulu Meeting of General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland, the 1965 "Phase I" requirements were refined to 210,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 23 therefore made specific deployment recommendations totaling approximately 210,000./5/ /5/See footnote 2, Document 132. Refinements continue to be made. For example, General Wheeler on September 4 listed an additional 3,000 for the 1965 Phase I (mainly three engineer construction/combat battalions); at the same time he indicated that approximately an equivalent number listed earlier (mainly helicopter personnel) will be arriving after the end of 1965. My prediction is that the final version of the 1965 Phase I requirement will end up exceeding 210,000 by a few thousand. The differences between the 175,000 figure first mentioned in July and the 210,000 number now being discussed are primarily attributable to additional (a) air lift to move supplies around the country for both civilian and military purposes, (b) air defense, (c) artillery to support offensive operations and to provide immediate response to calls for help by villages under attack, (d) strike aircraft and associated support, (e) engineers, primarily to construct additional air bases, and (f) fleshing out, according to General Westmoreland's requests, of existing operational units and advisory and support elements (refugee relief teams, intelligence teams, communications, and security units, etc.). You have authorized the deployment of 175,000 US personnel. I recommend that, at the present time, you authorize the movement of an additional 35,000 men, bringing the total to 210,000. These deployments are essential to our effort. The authority will cover our requirements as they now appear although, as we have discussed before, forces in addition to the 210,000 may be needed later. Robert S. McNamara [Next documents]
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