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160. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/19 New York, October 7, 1965, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Emmett B. Ford, Jr., of the Office of German Affairs on October 8 and approved in S on October 13. The meeting was held at USUN. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION
OF New York, September-October 1965 SUBJECT /2/Part II is unrelated to Vietnam. PARTICIPANTS U.S. Hungary Peter asked the Secretary his views on the situation in Viet Nam. He asked if the Secretary could see any way out. The Secretary said that this would depend on what Hanoi is willing to do with respect to its own actions in South Viet Nam. The United States is in South Viet Nam solely because of the infiltration from North Viet Nam to South Viet Nam of armed men and munitions. If this infiltration would stop, we could go home. But we want to be sure that South Viet Nam can solve its problems without armed pressure from the North. The Secretary went on to say that he had received the impression that differing and sometimes contradictory attitudes had become apparent in Hanoi of late. We think Moscow would be prepared to take part in a conference if Hanoi would assent. It is Peiping which says no. Hanoi is somewhere between the two but currently leaning toward Peiping. Peter said that, in his opinion, as long as the United States continues to bomb North Viet Nam, no discussion could take place./3/ It is difficult to see what advantage can be gained from the continuance of these air attacks. /3/Secto 39 from USUN, repeated to Saigon as telegram 50, October 7, summarized this conversation. The cable also noted that after the discussion, Peter was interviewed by the press at some length and he repeated his belief that a cessation of the bombing was an indispensable first step to creating an atmosphere necessary for negotiations. (Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 1, Vol. 1) The Secretary recalled that large-scale infiltration South of the 17th parallel began in 1959 and 1960; we have waited four years before beginning the bombing of North Viet Nam. Peter made the point that there had been no advance warning of these bombings and no opportunity for negotiations. The Secretary said that the United States had tried every means before the bombings began--all of this is a matter of record. At any rate, the United States has learned since that holding off does not produce a peaceful settlement. In various ways we have tried to ask the question, "What will happen if we stop the bombing; what will this lead to?" The Secretary pointed out that we have asked Hanoi what will happen and get no answer. Gromyko says to wait and see. But the bombing and killing goes on every day in South Viet Nam. What is the difference whether explosives are carried by a man on foot or delivered in planes from the air? If we stop the bombing, will the North Viet Namese troops go home? Will the Communists come to the conference table? Peter expressed his conviction that, if the DRV answered such questions as to their intent while the bombing continues or the threat of bombing is still present, it would be regarded by the world as an indication of their weakness. The DRV does not want to look weak. The Secretary observed that, by the same logic, the reverse would be true if we stopped bombing before we received any indication of intent from the DRV. Peter said nobody could seriously believe that the United States would stop the bombings out of weakness. The Secretary saw a difference in opinion on this point. Peiping is continually preaching that the United States is a "paper tiger". Chen Yi enjoins the Soviet Union not to take such a gloomy view of war. We take a very gloomy view of war, indeed. The Secretary was of the opinion that there should be some way to avoid the impression of weakness. We don't think that there can really be any misjudgment on this score. If "face" or public posture is involved, surely some private arrangement can be made. We are prepared to stop bombing if we can be assured that this is a step toward peace. Peter said that it certainly would be a step toward peace. It would create the atmosphere which is necessary to bring all the factors for peaceful negotiation into play. In the present situation, however, Hungary is not able to propose negotiations to its friends in North Viet Nam. The Soviets are in the same position. The Secretary remarked that part of the answer lies in Peiping. What will Hanoi do if Peiping says no? Peter said that the Hungarians have some direct contacts with Hanoi. He mentioned that a Hungarian delegation is scheduled to arrive in Hanoi today. Peter's firm conviction was that the DRV is ready to negotiate but that certain conditions must be met. Yet, while North Viet Nam is being bombed or under the threat of bombing, any talks are impossible. The Secretary pointed out that this works both ways. There is also bombing in South Viet Nam. Peter said that this situation will continue as long as there is no improvement in the attitude of the United States. The United States should show its goodwill in this matter. The halt in the bombing last summer was not effective because the DRV was still under the threat of renewed attack. The Secretary observed that Hanoi had not shown any indication of a desire to talk at that time. In fact, they just sent our message back and stuck it under our door. Three days later Gromyko termed our suspension of bombing "an insult". We have indicated our willingness to settle this problem not only to the other side, but to our own people. The Secretary said he had repeatedly indicated his willingness to depart "tomorrow" if any one wanted to talk. We have said that we will come to the conference table, we will agree to a cease-fire in the event that a conference is imminent, or that we will come home if the DRV stops its aggression. We have repeatedly said that we want no bases in South Viet Nam and that when the fighting in Viet Nam could be stopped we will join in an economic development project for Southeast Asia./4/ /4/The next paragraph began with the sentence: "We are not rabbits to be frightened by a snake." It was apparently erased in the Secretary's office, but remains legible on the source text. If the DRV continues its aggression, the war will continue. It is that simple. How do we deal with that situation? Peter said that a decrease of military action would be a start. There is no other way to decrease military action but to halt the bombing of North Viet Nam. Otherwise escalation will continue with all its dangers. The Secretary said that escalation is the tragedy. If the war continues to escalate, North Viet Nam will be destroyed. Why do we have to go down that road? Peter replied that the key to the matter is in United States hands. If bombing is halted, conditions will improve, and negotiations leading to peace will be possible. The Secretary said that we would get nowhere if such unilateral action meant our acceptance of a program of the "liberation movement". Peter reiterated that the conditions necessary to negotiations would arise if the United States stopped its bombing. It would be impossible to get any guarantee from the DRV until after the cessation of bombing. The Secretary remarked that we cannot move very long on a unilateral basis. Peter said that before the United States started its air attacks there had been no real proposal for negotiations on the situation in South Viet Nam. The air attacks began without notification thus, if the United States stops its bombing, it is not purely a unilateral concession, but a new start to try to find a solution. The Secretary asked how long Peter felt it would take for the other side to enter negotiations after the proposed halting of air attacks. Peter replied certainly a few weeks, provided the attacks were stopped without the threat of renewal. The United States would not lose anything by it and the rest of the world would surely gain. The Secretary remarked that there are traditional ways and means of coming to an understanding on such matters as this. In the past history of such disputes, there have been means of making clear the possibilities for peaceful settlement which existed. Peter remarked that, while the bombings continue, any prior indication on the part of the DRV that it is willing to negotiate would be a sign of weakness. They would think that the United States had gotten what it wanted, namely negotiations, through military action. The Secretary said that it is, indeed, very difficult to get the idea of reciprocity across this ideological gulf. If Hanoi thought it could succeed in achieving its objectives in this way, would the DRV come to the conference table? Peter said that it may be a long way to the conference table. The Secretary feared that Hanoi takes an exaggerated view of the force of international opinion. We have consulted with most governments on the problem of North Viet Nam and we know what they think. Hanoi may well believe that, if we stop, the force of world opinion may prevent us from resuming the air attacks. Thus the DRV believes they will have an advantage if we stop. Peter said that this would not be a unilateral advantage. The United States would gain much more in the way of international support if the air attacks were stopped. The Secretary said he supposed there was always universal support for the idea of a peaceful settlement, except in Hanoi and Peiping. Some countries, however, feel themselves unable to express their support until Hanoi assents to negotiations. The Secretary then recalled the manner in which Peiping had torpedoed the conference on Laos and Cambodia. He said that we understand the difficulties currently present in the Socialist world. But it does seem to us that Hanoi has the key. The Secretary said that, if Hanoi comes to the conference table with the United States and the Soviet Union, Peiping would hesitate to interfere, at least with force. Therefore, Hanoi holds the key. It simply doesn't appear that Hanoi is ready to make any effort toward a peaceful solution. If they wish to do so, there are ways and means of letting us know. Peter said that as long as the present situation continues, there can be no change in the attitude of Hanoi. The bombing must cease. The Secretary asked what, besides the bombing, would cease. There must be some reciprocal action on the part of the DRV. Peter was certain that reciprocal action would come, perhaps on the ground as well. It is impossible to get both sides to move at once. The Secretary asked why, at a very private level and in the most sophisticated manner, is it necessary for one party to move in advance of the other. This is not the traditional way to negotiate. Peter didn't agree. The Secretary then reminded him that, as an example, we had contacts with the Soviet Union while Berlin was still under blockade. Peter termed such contacts as of a special nature and well-established. The Secretary then explained that the United States has no national ambitions in Southeast Asia. South Viet Nam can be non-aligned, if it is left alone. We want no military bases in Viet Nam. But we do feel strongly about a small nation being overrun by force. Thus, there is an enormous gap between our attitude and that of Peiping. Peter said that, if the United States has no ambitions in that area, the points of agreement between the two sides are much closer than they seem. The main thing now is to stop the bombing. For Hungary, as a Socialist country, it is impossible to talk to friends in the DRV about negotiations while the bombing goes on. Peter went on to point out that the air attacks are different from the ground fighting in South Viet Nam. The Secretary said he found it difficult to accept a distinction between the bombing and the fighting in South Viet Nam. Peter repeated his certainty that the key is in the hands of the United States. The Secretary remarked that, in conflict, surely the key is in the hands of both sides. Peter said that the United States is the major power in this case. The Secretary said that other elements entered into the picture. When campaigning for re-election, President Johnson had told the American people that we did not wish a larger war in Viet Nam. After the President had won the election, Hanoi evidently misunderstood the meaning of the President's victory. They thought that they could expand the war without danger of response from the United States. Peter said that, if the United States were to stop the bombing, it could still maintain "all the present possibilities" if Hanoi acted in bad faith. He then asked the Secretary whether he had anything favorable to say on this whole matter. The Secretary remarked that he had been very interested in hearing Peter's views. He couldn't say more than he had already said. The whole matter needs further exploration. The greatest difficulty is the absence of any reciprocal intent on the part of the DRV. Peter told the Secretary that reciprocity would come. The Secretary said he did not want to mislead Peter. We have thought very hard about this problem and we want peace very much. It is too late in history for war; no one understands this better than we. Most of the great powers understand the dangers of war, with the signal exception of Peiping. This creates problems in the Socialist world as well as in the West. Suppose that we stop the bombing and the Chinese calculate that they can intervene in safety? Peter thought that this was an extremely unlikely possibility. The Secretary felt that, nevertheless, we would have heavy responsibility if such should be the result. Peter said that there could not be any danger in stopping. It would change the whole atmosphere. The Secretary recalled one of the deepest disappointments the United States has ever experienced--the failure of President Kennedy's fresh approach on Laos. The DRV never did reduce its forces in Laos more than a few thousand men and continued to use Laos as a base to infiltrate South Viet Nam. Everyone was ready for a peaceful settlement but it didn't work. Peter remarked that if one binds one's hands as a result of bad experiences one will never get out of a bad situation. In return, the Secretary quoted an old saying of American horse traders: "If someone cheats me once it is his fault; if he cheats me twice it is my fault." Peter said that the United States would have many good friends supporting it if there was a cessation of bombing. This would include the Soviet Union. The Secretary said that, since both he and Peter were Calvinists, we will continue to give the entire matter "our prayerful Presbyterian consideration." He wanted to make it clear that he had not made any promise or commitment to Peter. He expressed his appreciation for the opportunity for talking with Peter./5/ /5/This last paragraph was typed on a different typewriter and was probably added in the Secretary's office when the memorandum was approved.
161. Editorial Note On October 7, 1965, from 12:45 to 1:50 p.m., President Johnson met with Secretary of Defense McNamara, Acting Secretary of State Ball, and McGeorge Bundy. Bundy left the meeting at 1:20 and Ball left at 1:30 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found, except an agenda that lists Vietnam as one of four items to be discussed. Under Vietnam are three sub-topics: "1. Rolling Thunder, 2. New voluntary organization, 3. Domestic debate." (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV) According to a memorandum from William Bundy to Ball, October 7, the Department of Defense informed the Department of State that Rolling Thunder was not to be a topic for discussion at the October 7 meeting with the President. (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder--1965) The reference to a new voluntary organization is apparently to efforts by Dr. Howard Rusk to extend voluntary medical services and personnel to South Vietnam's war victims and veterans. An October 6 memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, describing Howard Rusk's recommendations and containing a note that it was to be "Put on the Pres's desk," is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. In an October 7 memorandum to Chester Cooper, William Jorden previewed the upcoming demonstrations of October 15-16 in the United States and abroad against the Vietnam war and discussed the composition of the protest movement within the United States. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Memos (A))
162. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, October 8, 1965, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to USUN, Moscow, and Budapest. 1216. Ref: USUN's 50./2/ /2/See footnote 3, Document 160. 1. Cables from USUN indicating systematic campaign to bring US pause in bombing and disturbing implications of Vienna's dispatch [sic] well recognized by Deptel 975/3/ embolden me to make following comments: /3/Reference is to telegram 512 to Vienna for Abba Schwartz, repeated as 975 to Saigon, October 7. Schwartz was in Vienna to explore with the International Committee of the Red Cross a possible exchange of prisoners in Vietnam. The Department of State informed him in the telegram that he should not make contact with DRV or NLF representatives who might be in Vienna, but rather work through the Red Cross representative. Schwartz should also "downplay the idea" that DRV/NLF willingness to exchange prisoners "might signal the beginning of something more important." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET) 2. Mr. Peter's assertion that "US has nothing to lose by cessation of bombing" is manifestly untrue. Bombing is our strongest current weapon against Viet Cong aggression and to cease it, in the way in which Mr. Peter suggests, would be a very serious blow both to our effort in Vietnam and to that of the Vietnamese. 3. Believe the Secretary was absolutely right to reaffirm US position. 4. It is extraordinary to one who worked eight years at the UN to find such apparently widespread indifference to the concept of aggression the prevention of which is, after all, one of the prime aims of the Charter. Yet, if the press is any guide, it is seldom mentioned. President Johnson is right in all that he has said about suppressing aggression. The UN rests on the principle that it is wrong to use force except in self-defense. If the UN does violence to that principle it will cease to deserve respect. Our actions in Vietnam are in full accord with purposes of the UN Charter, rooted in Article I, "Measures for the . . . Suppression of Acts of Aggression." 5. One of the most effective things which we can do to ward off aggression and promote peace is our bombing in the north. There should be no pause from us without a pause from them. If we stop cutting roads and blowing up bridges in the north, let them stop doing the same thing in the south, or stop destroying the railroad. A proposition whereby their side is allowed to do with impunity the things which we are not to be allowed to do is manifestly unacceptable. 6. The agitation for a pause should not be taken at face value. When it comes from one of the so called non-aligned countries, it often represents a response to an organized minority more than it represents what the government really thinks. 7. We must avoid steps which: will cause the Hanoi regime to think we are weak and near defeat; of being believed in South Vietnam to be about to negotiate in a UN to which SVN does not belong and behind their backs; of thus lowering morale and destroying an important quantity of Vietnamese fighting power which our own fighting men will have to pay for; or in general, of giving up something and really getting nothing back. Lodge
163. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, October 9, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLI, Memos (A). Confidential. SUBJECT The Refugee Situation There is no accurate estimate of the current number of refugees in Vietnam. Best guesses hover around 600,000 and more (possibly as much as 400,000 more) by December. Although there are refugees in virtually every provincial capital, the major concentrations are in I and II Corps. Refugees have flowed in from a variety of causes: floods, VC repression, rice shortages, and the destruction of villages by military (VC and U.S.-GVN) action. If one can generalize at all, the refugees are largely apolitical; the vast majority are children, women and elderly folk with no special skills. Conditions in the refugee camps are probably not too bad from the physical point of view when compared to the general standards of the country as a whole, which is not to say that there aren't serious problems of food and shelter. But it is the political-psychological aspect of the problem which needs careful attention; the refugees represent a potential source of disaffection and unrest exploitable by the Viet Cong. The GVN Approach Despite the enormity of the problem and the prodding of the U.S. Mission, there is a lack of interest, planning and action at the top levels of the GVN. This is reflected in uncertainty and confusion at the province level. The Commanders of I and II Corps regard the refugee problem as a tactical one and take the view that additional refugees should be turned away from the existing centers and that resettlement of those in the centers should be undertaken immediately. In a country where poverty and misery are so widespread and where social welfare resources are spread so thin, it is not unnatural that refugees are regarded as an unnecessary burden by the government. Moreover, there are many instances where refugees in well-run and well-supplied centers are much better off than non-refugees nearby. The Government is justifiably concerned that "model" centers will simply attract "rice refugees". The GVN's Ministry of Social Welfare is the executive agency for the care of refugees and in terms of its resources and capabilities, is doing what it can. But it is not big enough for the job. Enter the U.S. The U.S. Program The U.S. Mission has been concerned with the refugee problem since the major floods of last April. With the increase of Viet Cong activity in II Corps and the stepped-up military activity of late spring and summer the refugee rolls began to swell and U.S. AID and private efforts expanded. During the summer USOM established a Refugee Task Force and a coordinator for refugee matters was appointed until AID could recruit a refugee expert. Several Task Force teams were dispatched to the principal refugee centers. In September a Refugee Relief Division was established in USOM and a Vietnam relief coordinator was appointed in Washington. Sixteen specialists in relief and refugee problems have been recruited for the Relief Division and most are already in place. The Chief of this Division (Ed Marks) and I have had two useful sessions; he will leave this weekend for Saigon. At least as important, is an overall policy and program which was developed in consultation with the Ministry of Social Welfare. (It is hoped that General Ky will soon announce his Government's interest in and policy toward the refugee problem.) The operative concept for USOM is to "advise and recommend", but also to be ready to compensate for gaps in GVN capabilities. We must, however, make sure that this is basically and conspicuously a GVN program. The Voluntary Agencies The principal agencies now operating in Vietnam are CARE, the Church World Service (primarily Mennonites), the Catholic Relief Service, and the Friends. Each of these agencies, with our urging and encouragement, are expanding their activities and some agencies not now active in Vietnam (notably the Lutherans) may soon undertake programs there. Most of these agencies intend to intensify their fund-raising activities (CARE has already launched theirs) to finance these expanded programs. In my own contacts with them, in their testimony to the Kennedy Subcommittee, and in discussions with AID officials, the voluntary agencies have revealed a great sensitivity to coordination by a new "umbrella" group and infringement of their sovereignty in fund raising. They are taking steps to increase their coordination effort (which the more candid admit has been thus far unsatisfactory) through their trade association, the American Council of Voluntary Agencies. Representatives of about 7 key Voluntary Agencies will leave for Vietnam in about a week for a five-day investigation. They are scheduled to return to Washington before Senator Kennedy arrives in Vietnam in late October. The Kennedy Subcommittee This group, a non-legislative subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, became interested in the Vietnam problem in late June. It has held a large number of hearings, but transcripts are hard to come by (I have obtained several involving the Voluntary Agencies). According to Committee staff members, the Report will be prepared around mid-November following the Senator's return from Vietnam. I suggest we get a reading on Senator Kennedy's thinking before he leaves and before we get too deeply into our Foundation. Should I endeavor to do this? (Yes__ No__)/2/ /2/A note on the source text in McGeorge Bundy's hand reads: "I want to call Ted Kennedy on this on Monday [October 11]. McGB." No record of the Kennedy-Bundy telephone conversation has been found. Problems Ahead --Any programs undertaken in the refugee field by the Foundation should clearly be of the kind the Voluntary Agencies are not doing and cannot do. Examples: Statistical data; large-scale medical assistance; family tracing service; orphan care and adoption services (Cherne is ready to fold in his program); assistance in resettlement and training. --Whatever the USG or American voluntary agencies do it must appear, as much as possible, to be a Vietnamese effort. This will become increasingly difficult as American efforts expand. --The GVN must be encouraged to take a greater role and especially to proceed with political orientation, training and sound resettlement programs. --The U.S. military logistics capability must be geared closely into U.S. and GVN relief efforts; this is the only way the increased quantities of relief goods can reach refugee centers in timely and adequate fashion. --Coordination, especially in Saigon, of U.S. voluntary efforts must be strengthened. C
164. Paper by the Ambassador at Large (Thompson)/1/ Washington, October 11, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XVI, Memos (A). Secret. Thompson sent this paper to Bundy under cover of a memorandum that reads: "The attached report was largely prepared in State and was reviewed by General Taylor, Mr. McNaughton, Mr. William Bundy, Mr. Unger and myself. "McNamara also received a copy, which indicated that he saw it on October 26. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Vietnam 381) CONCLUSIONS/2/ /2/This is part VII of a nine-part study, of which only the conclusions were distributed to the White House and Secretary of Defense. The other parts were: I. Historical Background, undated; II. Aims and Interests of the Communist Countries Involved, October 8; III. Aims and Interests of the U.S., October 9; IV. Alternatives to be Considered, undated; V. Communist Reactions, undated; VI. Discussion (not found); VII (a). General Taylor's Views 10/11/65; and Annexes, undated. (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Thompson Study, 1965) The increased military power we are bringing to bear in South Viet-Nam must have made the Viet Cong realize that we are going to make a determined and serious effort to destroy their capability. As this power makes itself felt, they will probably decide in the near future to break up most of their large units and to move toward one or the other of two strategies: They may change their tactics in the direction of small acts of terror and sabotage; or less likely, they could adopt an even more passive strategy of apparently "fading into the woodwork." The purpose of the latter strategy would be to cause a cessation in United States pressures, north and south, until a more propitious moment. This would not be easy for the Viet Cong to accomplish; they would have problems of morale, organization, etc. But if it were attempted it would face us with a critical point of decision with regard to bombing of the north. Two sharply divergent theses could be argued. On the one hand it could be argued that a step-up in bombing of the north would be justified in this circumstance since we could not permit the VC to turn the pressure on and off at their convenience. Stepped up bombing would be designed to force the issue. On the other hand, it could be argued, probably more convincingly, that the bombing should be reduced, perhaps in proportion to the reduction in military activity in the south. This would assume that the pacification program could be pursued successfully and that the United States could persevere in its political and military commitments recognizing that to effectuate the pacification program will take a long period, perhaps years. Though we do not believe we are yet at the preceding point of decision, we do believe that it should be anticipated and the groundwork laid for reaching the necessary policy decisions when and if required. It is unlikely, however, that our actions in the south have made them ready to switch from a military to a political strategy, and they are unlikely to do so for a matter of months at best. They will in all likelihood recede from "Stage 3" and pursue a strategy of active guerrilla hit-and-run strikes, terror and sabotage. They will continue to oppose negotiations except upon their own terms until such time as it becomes clear to them that we will stay the course and successfully, if gradually, push them back into the woodwork and begin a discernible trend toward pacification of most of the country. The more immediate question, therefore, is what our policy should be with regard to bombing the north in the interim, that is, during the period when the intensity of our own effort in the south is growing, when the VC are pursuing a "1963-4" or "Stage 2" strategy, and when the question whether the VC will recede to "Stage 1" is still unclear. It is now obvious that we shall probably be faced with the prospect of a continuation of our present courses of action, including the bombing of North Viet-Nam, for many months more. The present rate of escalation of our bombing, however, is bringing us to a point where in a few months further escalation will be possible only by attacking sensitive targets which may pose, in acute form for the other side, the issue of greater Chinese and/or Soviet involvement. We are beginning to attack the last remaining geographic area apart from the area around Hanoi and Haiphong. We may be able to recognize the optimum time for exerting further pressure by increasing the level of our bombing but an increase in our bombing of the North at the present time may bring matters to a head too soon. It does not appear to us necessary that there be a pronounced escalation in our bombing at the present time since our present activities, while not destroying the military and economic capacity of North Viet-Nam, are causing great strain as indicated in the letters quoted in Annex B./3/ (As noted below, Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Bundy would interpret the permissible continuing level of bombing somewhat more narrowly than would General Taylor and Mr. McNaughton.) Moreover, the effects of our present attacks are to some extent cumulative and are bringing a steady increase of pressure on Hanoi. The impressive reports of the growing number of targets destroyed or damaged in the daily armed reconnaissance reports illustrate this. We therefore believe we should more or less level off at about the present rate of bombing in the North. For the present, we should not attack the most sensitive targets, large dams, Phuc Yen and the Hanoi/Haiphong area before January 1, 1966. Though we would not initially recommend hitting such targets as thermal power plants, as we begin to exhaust profitable targets, we might begin very gradually to nibble at some of the industrial targets. /3/Not found. The northeast quadrant presents a special problem. Mr. McNaughton would favor maintaining approximately the present level of attacks; i.e. about four or five missions every two weeks against major LOC targets, to assure destruction of the railroad. These missions should include specific armed recce to prevent daylight movement on the roads. General Taylor would prefer a slight increase from the present level. Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Bundy feel that the present level of activity might well tempt the North Viet-Namese to throw their MIGs into the equation and that this, aside from its intrinsic disadvantages, could lead to a succession of events broadening hostilities still further. Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Bundy would favor a reduction to approximately one attack on the railroad every two weeks and no armed recce except in very special cases and limited to specific targets. We also conclude that serious consideration should be given to employment of a pause. Though it would have to be carefully managed, its objective would be to provide an opportunity for the north to give concrete evidence of a willingness to come to terms, an evidence which it is difficult, in a political and psychological sense, for it to give while under the pressure of our bombing. We would have to exercise great care that a mere willingness to initiate negotiations would not in and of itself qualify for an indefinite moratorium on the bombing. We would have to convey our intent to reinstitute bombing if the North Viet-Namese refused to negotiate or if their willingness to negotiate is not accompanied by a manifest reduction of VC aggression in the south. If it is necessary to reinstitute bombing, we should be prepared to consider increasing the pressure, e.g. through striking industrial targets, to make clear to Hanoi our continuing, firm resolve. In summation, we conclude that: 1. the present escalation in the bombing of the north is likely to become increasingly out of phase with the progress of our military operations in the south. It would thus run the risk of forcing the other side prematurely to face the issue of negotiations or greater Chinese and Soviet involvement. 2. we should therefore level off our bombing of the north (with some variance of views among us as to permissible levels in the northeast quadrant, see above) for the interim. 3. we may well be faced with the prospect of altered Viet Cong strategy in the south which will require a reevaluation of our policy on bombing of the north and that this problem should be anticipated and study of its implications begun at once and finally, 4. that a pause in the bombing should be considered, recognizing that it may be a prerequisite to establishing the political and psychological framework for initiating negotiations, but recognizing also that unless carefully managed it contains dangerous pitfalls.
165. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, October 13, 1965, 1:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Confidential. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. 1269. Subject: Vietnamese attitudes. 1. Completion of Ky government's first hundred days seems an appropriate moment to review Vietnamese attitudes toward the government. In general, on the basis of contacts with opinion molders within key groups, one is forced to the conclusion that the Vietnamese continue to be fence-sitters. There is no evidence of any rise in public acceptance of Ky government, and the various key groups appear to be awaiting some demonstration of performance on the part of the government, although there is little clarity as to what form such performance might take. It seems noteworthy that there was little editorial reaction to Ky's hundred day speech in vernacular press and what comment there was seemed perfunctory and unenthusiastic. One can only deduce that the editors chose not to react to the speech because they were aware that critical commentary would be censored. Press, in general, continues to be somewhat unsympathetic toward the Ky government. This unhappiness has, in part, a selfish base, stemming from government's attempts to control the number of newspapers and their opinions. 2. Within individual groups, general attitude seems to be as follows: A. Catholics. Ky government is for the moment acceptable to some Catholic groups but there is no great enthusiasm for it. Northern refugees and southerners alike are still devoted to idea of civilian government. They are prepared to give Ky a further grace period but they will be watching every move the government makes and will be prepared to criticize when they feel their interests are in danger. Catholic daily Xay Dung continues to display friendly attitude toward Ky but paper is the personal vehicle of Father Nguyen Quang Lam, a friend of Ky's, and no great importance should be attached to it. B. Buddhists. Tri Quang continues to indicate his displeasure with present government. However, he has not shown any inclination to mount a full-scale campaign to bring it down. He has taken line that it will, in time, collapse of its own weight. Fact of matter probably is that Quang has not been able to find an issue with which he might rally a significant following in an anti-government campaign. Quang probably found instructive the failure of the student campaign in Hue in August to achieve much backing. Tam Chau continues to talk on what is apparently a friendly and frequent basis with Prime Minister Ky. Chau has told Ambassador Lodge that he believes Viet-Nam needs a government that can stay in place at least two years, thus signalling his intention not to oppose the GVN. The GVN is extending substantial support to the UBA (e.g., Van Hanh University) which undoubtedly makes it easier for Chau to support it. There seems to be a parallel between the current state of play within the UBA vis-a-vis the GVN and that which existed during the early days of the Khanh government. At that time, Chau was able to assure that the UBA would not oppose the GVN. This equilibrium proved fragile then and could prove equally fragile now, especially since preparations are now underway for the biennial meeting of the Unified Buddhist Association (UBA) in December at which Chau will be re-elected or a successor will be chosen. C. Sudistes. There is no great affection for Ky government amongst southern politicians or southerners in general. Ky is regarded as a brash young man from the north and despite the presence of certain southerners in the Cabinet, his government is not considered representative of the southerners. As has so often been the case in the past, the southerners lack the organization and energy to make their displeasure known in any concerted fashion. Nevertheless, their attitude prevents Ky from being able to rally support within mass of the Vietnamese people, ten million of whom are, after all, Cochin-Chinese. D. Military. In wake of the September 11 Armed Forces Convention at Saigon, the army continues to give the impression of being unified. Directorate members also provide a public impression of unity. In August and September, General Nguyen Chanh Thi supported GVN against agitators in Hue, and this display of Directorate unity undoubtedly contributed to easing the situation. Lately, however, we have heard rumblings that command changes announced by Ky at his October 1 press conference were not well received in some quarters (e.g., certain southern officers view appointments of Generals Nguyen Bao Tri and Nguyen Duc Thang as further evidence that northerners are gradually taking over all key positions within the military). All this demonstrates that Directorate unity is a fragile thing, constantly subjected to divisive forces. It will require frequent reaffirmation. E. Student-intellectuals. Student-intellectual group has recorded its unhappiness with the Ky government. Hue student newspaper is continuing to publish despite general Thi's open expression of displeasure and has not restricted its criticism of the military regime. Intellectuals, after their late August seminar in Hue, have not as yet organized a promised follow-up meeting in Saigon. Individually, however, they continue to voice their dislike of the military and wish for a civilian government. This group, despite its articulateness, has little power unless it can draw on the Buddhist mass. F. Labor. Tran Quoc Buu's CVT raised threat of general strike at the beginning of September. Immediate cause for CVT grievance was rigid enforcement by government of a Diem era decree prescribing 48-hour advance notice before trade union meetings could be scheduled. CVT felt this procedure unduly restrictive if applied to public meetings held in union offices. Behind this issue, however, were other grievances: workers' dissatisfaction with regime's failure to cope with rising cost of living and to provide solutions to accumulated specific labor problems, denial of exit visas to permit attendance at international meetings, and GVN refusal to discuss grievances. 3. By and large, Vietnamese populace seems convinced that the VC will not now be able to achieve a military victory. Thus, this fear no longer preoccupies their attention. Neither is there any longer any doubt about US intention. Main preoccupations of the Vietnamese now are their concern over the damage being inflicted on VN as the war intensifies and their concern over their economic problems. Cost of living has risen sharply in last year, particularly in period since Ky government came to power. Costs of basic commodities have increased an average of 33 percent since this time last year. Significant fraction of that increase has been registered since June 19, when Ky government was formed and great build-up of American forces became apparent. In the minds of the city dwellers and those Vietnamese in regions where the American buildup has been most obvious, an unfortunate equation of American presence with rising prices has asserted itself. Editorials have begun to appear in certain Saigon dailies (notably the Buddhist Institute organ Chanh Dao) which, though they do not directly criticize the American presence, nevertheless take line that the sharp increase in the number of foreigners in Viet-Nam endangers Vietnamese culture and national way of life. Hanoi and the VC can be counted upon to encourage public dissatisfaction, building upon daily irritations and complaints about the cost of living, in order to develop an active hostility to the American presence, something which has not previously been a factor here. Lodge
166. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, October 13, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:40 a.m. Bundy sent the President a retyped copy of this telegram on October 14 under cover of a memorandum that reads: "We are puzzled by his conversation with Thieu--in the sense that we see no reason why the Viet Cong should be able to win politically in a fair fight if they are as unpopular as we all believe. I am having a further analysis made on this point. Otherwise, an interesting report. "Bundy also noted that there had been progress on the rice shortage, at least for the short term. The White House copy of this telegram has an indication that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV) 1273. For the President. Herewith my weekly telegram: First and foremost my warmest respectful congratulations on your recovery and best wishes for good health./2/ /2/On October 8, President Johnson was operated on for removal of his gall bladder. 1. Trend of the war A. General Thieu, Chief of State, during a call by me to present CIA visitors, made a rather sweeping review of the whole situation, during the course of which he said: B. He would not be surprised if the Viet Cong eventually accepted an offer to negotiate--as soon as they were convinced that they could not achieve a military victory with main force units, as guerrilla doctrine prescribes. The purpose of accepting the offer to negotiate would be to end or suspend U.S. military activities, presumably in the expectation that the effect on public opinion in the U.S. would be such that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for us to continue operations. C. He believed that for the last three months, the Viet Cong had been training political cadres to go into the communities in Vietnam and win the war politically which they had been unable to win militarily. He thought there might be as many as 150,000 such cadres. It would mean 5 Viet Cong political cadremen where now there was one. He spoke of a VC demobilization following an armistice, with the demobilized men returning to their villages to become active Communist political subversive workers. They were already taking credit for the U.S. and GVN economic and social programs. GVN was wholly unready for such a political contest. I reported the same from Foreign Minister Tran Van Do in my wire to you of 30 Sept./3/ /3/Document 157. D. There was no doubt in Thieu's mind that they "could beat us politically now", not because of their appeal, but because of their superior organization. Evidence available to me indicates only about 15 per cent "sympathize" with the VC and that an aversion to Communist methods, particularly to ChiCom domination, continues strong. But these are no substitute for terrorism and poor GVN operations. Incidentally, a recent survey indicates 97 percent of the people know the U.S. is helping, with good opinions of Americans prevailing over bad, and 81 percent believing that Americans are here mainly to prevent Communism. Thieu recognized that his view about negotiation was frankly a guess but he seemed absolutely certain that as soon as the Viet Cong were convinced that they could not win militarily, they would switch their effort to gain a political victory, with or without diplomatic negotiations. E. It is not a fair criticism of the Vietnamese to say that they cannot defeat the Viet Cong politically because they are tired and weak and this implication is a major fallacy in Lippmann's recent article, "The Stalemate in Vietnam."/4/ The truth is they have not had the chance to do so. When the chance to win over the people was missed some years ago, a situation came into being in which it was indispensable for the Viet Cong large units to be defeated before true community building, with its mixture of political and security measures, would be possible. Otherwise, the Viet Cong battalions, emerging from untouchable sanctuaries, would destroy whatever community building had painstakingly been achieved. /4/The Washington Post, September 30, 1965. F. Now it looks as though we can surely overcome the Viet Cong main force units. Furthermore, it looks as though the Viet Cong knows this and has already begun to act on this knowledge, transforming themselves into small units, into individual terrorists, and into subversive political operators. General Westmoreland reports an intensification of Viet Cong "incidents" from 605 to 701 in the last week, including a sharp rise in acts of terrorism. This is the highest weekly total since September 1964. There is also a downward total in actions by large units. In fact, no major battles occurred during the week. This transformation to terrorism is emphatically not "de-escalation" as one American "expert" recently said. But it is a change, and a change which we have been anticipating. G. It cannot be said that since we began defeating main force units the GVN have let the grass grow under their feet. When the Minister of Rural Construction (i.e. community building), Mr. Ung, was killed in a plane crash, the GVN developed a new governmental organization which I discussed in my 1190 to you of 6 Oct,/5/ and which is as well thought out as one can expect. Lansdale's committee is in close and constant touch. This week they called a meeting, which I attended, of all province chiefs plus elected provincial councillors to enthuse them and give them a clear idea of what they had to do. Vietnam is indeed much further ahead militarily than it is politically for the simple reason they could not really get going politically until the Viet Cong battalions were put out of business. /5/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) H. I believe the U.S. Mission is doing everything that it can to help prepare this country for a political struggle. But I am eager for new ideas and would very much appreciate any ideas or guidance which Washington can give me so that if a major political offensive were to be undertaken by the Viet Cong, we could gain time until we could score a real political victory. When we win such a victory, we can feel that we have accomplished something durable and truly worthy of our sacrifice. 2. Coup rumors A. It is disagreeable to have to report a few coup rumors, the first which have occurred since my arrival. Although they do not look serious today, they are a preoccupation to me, and I am putting out the word in every way available that we do not want a coup, that this is the time to subordinate petty individualistic jealousies and ambitions, and also, that it behooves those who are in government to try to act like real political leaders, by reasoning with the people who are disaffected, by involving them in the new projects, and by arranging matters so that others get some of the credit. This is not normal procedure for Orientals, particularly those who have had a long dose of the egoism of French politicos, but we are trying it. B. I am also planning to visit the III Corps headquarters which I have not yet visited, to have some frank and, I hope, helpful talks with Generals who, although theoretically military, are actually the heads of civil and political activity and a serious potential threat. 3. Economic A. The general price trend for the grade of rice used by the working classes continued slow increase as for more than a month. The end of November stock levels are expected to be low but not dangerously so, as a result of delayed PL-480 arrivals. The early rice crop from the Delta area has begun moving into the milling centers. USOM's index of food prices last week rose by 4 percent to a level 6 percent higher than a month ago and 34 percent higher than a year ago. Non-food consumer prices went up 3 percent to a level 6 percent over last and 18 percent over last year. The Vietnamese piaster continued to weaken in terms of hard currencies and gold. 4. Psychological A. Vietnamese popular attitudes during the week reflected continuing feeling that the war was going badly for the Viet Cong and increasing concern over economic matters. Lodge
167. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, October 13, 1965, 8:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET. Secret; Exdis. 1015. Ref: Embtel 1109./2/ /2/In telegram 1109 from Saigon, September 30, the Embassy suggested that the Viet Cong executions of American prisoners were an effort to spare or save the lives of Viet Cong agents and terrorists convicted and sentenced to death by South Vietnam. The Embassy outlined three possible courses of action: 1) tacit submission, by convincing South Vietnam to declare a de facto moratorium on executions of Viet Cong agents and terrorists; 2) taking indirect action against Viet Cong reprisal executions by mobilizing world opinion against them; and 3) retaliation at a level of violence calculated to induce the Viet Cong to become reluctant to employ executions. The Embassy favored the third option. (Ibid.) 1. Greatly appreciate your most thoughtful message on VC reprisal executions of American prisoners and DRV threats to treat their US prisoners as war criminals. We agree that we can neither submit tacitly to these actions or threatened actions, nor can we ignore them. However, problem is to find ways and means of bringing effective pressure against DRV and VC to move them to treat prisoners in accordance with 1949 Geneva Convention. At same time, GVN must be free to go on treating VC terrorists in accordance with Vietnamese law (but ensuring that punishment is commensurate with crime) and we must continue to do everything possible to reaffirm and emphasize to world clear distinction between such terrorists and prisoners of war. 2. Your proposals reftel are under active consideration here. In meantime, hope shortly to get cable to you and other posts concerned on possibility of naming Protecting Power to assume responsibilities for US prisoners in Communist hands as provided for under Geneva Convention. We also are planning diplomatic approaches following up Vienna Conference and designed to stimulate international pressure on DRV/VC to abide by DRV's obligation under Geneva Convention. Rusk
168. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 14, 1965, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Lisle and approved in S on November 26. The source text is labeled "Part I of III." The meeting was held in the James Madison Room of the Department of State. SECRETARY'S DINNER FOR RUMANIAN SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. Rumanian The Secretary said there is no lack of means for communicating with Hanoi, Peiping or Moscow, but we have no evidence yet that they are prepared to talk. We have the impression that Hanoi might be willing to talk, and that Moscow would like to see talks take place, but that Peiping is the real obstacle. Nevertheless, there has been some progress. Hanoi no longer denies the existence of infiltration into South Vietnam from the North, and they no longer insist upon a complete withdrawal of US forces as a precondition for discussions. They still insist, however, that any settlement must be on terms imposed by the NLF--a condition which the US can never accept. The Rumanians, according to Manescu, have some contacts with Hanoi. Since Hanoi is no longer insisting on withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam as a prerequisite to negotiations, it is unfortunate that the United States apparently cannot consider the cessation of bombings. The Secretary said we very definitely can think of stopping the bombing. The Government has promised its own people--and this should be convincing--that American troops will be withdrawn as soon as North Vietnam ceases its attempt to impose its system on the people of South Vietnam by force. But Hanoi still insists on acceptance of the NLF program as a prerequisite to negotiations. We cannot accept the imposition of the NLF on South Vietnam--whether by Hanoi, a combination of Hanoi and Peiping, or of Hanoi and Moscow. The Secretary said he was prepared to go to Geneva tomorrow if Hanoi would agree to negotiate without preconditions. There is hope that we may see moves toward peace in Vietnam early next year. It appears that there are divided counsels in Hanoi. The Foreign Minister said he hoped the Secretary was not being too optimistic. The US may be taking external signs as indications of division in Hanoi. The US has sufficient contact with Hanoi and with Peiping, according to the Secretary. Apart from our own regular contacts, there are many people who are constantly offering their services. At critical moments, however, when there seems to be possibility for agreement, Peiping moves to get in the way of a settlement. Mr. Manescu asked whether the four points made by NVN are unacceptable. The Secretary replied that three of the four points are negotiable. One is entirely unacceptable--imposing the NLF program on the people of South Vietnam. The Foreign Minister said that one of his colleagues had suggested that, in view of Rumania's relations with Hanoi, it should try to do something. Mr. Manescu had replied that in his view a solution could be reached only by direct talks and that Rumania could not act as a mediator. The Secretary said that we have our own contacts with Hanoi and he was not asking Mr. Manescu to act as a mediator. One could never tell, however, what channel, direct or indirect, might be used. If Rumania should pick up a signal he would only ask Mr. Manescu to make sure that the signal was not blocked. The Foreign Minister replied that he would inform his Government of this request. Rumania wants its relations with the US to be better than "normal". The present situation in Southeast Asia could create very great problems. The Foreign Minister said that so far as Vietnam is concerned, he would be saying too little if he said only that we were in disagreement. Rumania cannot understand the US position. The dangers of escalation are always high and the ladder of escalation is one which is very difficult to descend. In the Rumanian view a military solution is impossible; the problem of Vietnam can be solved only by the Vietnamese. The Secretary pointed out that we had suffered a great disappointment in Southeast Asia. President Kennedy had come into office and taken a new look at Laos and concluded that if the Laotians were left alone they would not be interested in killing each other. Both the President and Khrushchev had agreed at Vienna that everyone should leave the Laotians to themselves. Thus the Geneva Conference of 1962. We had withdrawn our military, but Hanoi had never accepted the agreement, and had never had less than 6,000 troops in Laos. Nor has NVN stopped using Laos as an infiltration route into South Vietnam. We do not hold Moscow guilty of bad faith, but it is a disappointment to us, since we had hoped it would be the first step to peace in Southeast Asia. The Foreign Minister asked, "How do you think that the US will emerge from this mixed-up and venturous program in Southeast Asia?" The Secretary replied that he did not know. The choice is between peace, which is possible if North Vietnam leaves South Vietnam alone, or war. This is the agonizing problem. The US would not object if South Vietnam should decide by free and peaceful means to join with North Vietnam. We cannot permit North Vietnam to impose this unity by force, however. We will remain only so long as Hanoi persists in seeking to impose its solution by force. If North Vietnam continues to use force for 20 years, we also will be there for 20 years. If North Vietnam thinks it can wait until the US loses interest and withdraws its forces, it is wrong. Moscow understands that we cannot accept a forceful change in the status quo, just as Moscow itself would not accept a change in the status quo by force. But Hanoi does not understand this. The Foreign Minister suggested that perhaps the US should look at the opinions of other countries, to which the Secretary replied that we had done so and are doing so. The 17 unaligned nations have urged negotiations without conditions; we have agreed, but Hanoi has said no. The British Commonwealth had tried to send a group to Peiping, but China had responded by calling the British Prime Minister a nit-wit. Hanoi had sent a delegation to Moscow, but Peiping had moved to block all possibility of agreement. The Foreign Minister remarked that Cambodia had put forward a sound proposal some years ago, but the US had rejected it. The Secretary pointed out that we had thought that before there was a general conference there should first be bilateral discussions between Cambodia and Thailand, and Cambodia and South Vietnam. We had used our influence to that end, but Prince Sihanouk had been unwilling to discuss any problems with his neighbors. At any rate, that was three years ago. The Laotian settlement of 1962 had been a critical moment in the move toward peace, but Hanoi had rejected it. In response to a remark that in the long run everyone might say that the Chinese were right, the Secretary said that China is being rejected by one country after another--even Indonesia. The Chinese doctrine of military conquest has not been accepted either by the Socialist world or by the Free World. China is headed either to a basic change of policy or to catastrophe. Fortunately many of the Chinese leaders are practical men who are more prudent in actions than in words. The US is not looking for a pretext to attack China. After all, Chinese nuclear capability within the foreseeable future will always be trivial as compared to that of the US. We are not seeking an opportunity for a preventive strike--all that we want is that smaller nations within the range of China be allowed to live in peace. The Rumanians have a stake in this--it is important to establish that the presence of a great power does not mean that small powers in the area must lose their independence or security. We cannot forget that Hitler moved into the Rhineland and into the Sudetenland without opposition, as Japan moved into Manchuria. These developments led to World War II, for which we were partly responsible. We are not going to make the same mistake again. There is one important element which might bring the opposing parties together in Southeast Asia. Peiping and Hanoi continue to talk of the 1954 agreement, as do we. Both parties have also referred to the 1962 Laos agreement. There is some reason to think that these agreements can be the basis for peace in Southeast Asia. If there are disputes, let them be solved by peaceful means. This is basically the position of Moscow, although it cannot fail to support North Vietnam because of its own dispute with Peiping.
169. Editorial Note On October 18, 1965, at 10:26 a.m., McGeorge Bundy telephoned Secretary Rusk to inform him that Secretary of Defense McNamara would like to arrange for them to meet with George Ball and William Bundy to discuss the "Vietnam bombing problem." Rusk suggested to McNamara possible times for the meeting, including 6 p.m. on that day. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) According to Rusk's Appointment Book, the Secretary met with McNamara, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy at 6:06 p.m. on October 18. (Johnson Library) William Bundy did not attend this meeting. On October 19 at 11:15 a.m., William Bundy called Rusk and stated that he had learned from Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton "that there had been some decision between McNamara, Bundy and Sec re looking at pause question." Rusk replied that "Ball would follow up on that" and asked Bundy to come up to his office. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) No other record of the meeting has been found. [Next documents]
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