NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
180. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 22, 1965, 3:20 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, President Eisenhower. Top Secret. President Johnson wrote the following note on the source text: "See me on this. L" 1. Because it reports General Eisenhower's view, I think you will want to see the attached memorandum from Andy Goodpaster./2/ In essence, Eisenhower is asking why we do not close off shipping to Hanoi. He suggests a declaration that a state of war exists and some undefined reinforcing naval action. But he seems to think the declaration itself might do the trick. /2/Attached but not printed. 2. Goodpaster has promised Eisenhower additional information on this problem, and McNamara wants you to know that it is one of the issues which is being carefully reviewed as we consider where we go in Vietnam next year. Bob does not think it is a matter which needs urgent attention and decision at your level, and I agree with him. McG. B.
181. Paper by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, October 23, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLI, Memos (A). Top Secret. According to a note attached to another copy of this paper, William Bundy sent it "Strictly Eyes Only" to Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and Thompson on October 26. (Department of State, Bundy Papers: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) POLICY CHOICES AND DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES Based on the Depuy briefing,/2/ the draft pause scenario,/3/ and Lodge's 1377,/4/ we confront major policy decisions in the next month or six weeks. This memorandum is a very rough attempt to frame the substance of the choices, and to identify some of the related problems we face. /2/On October 21, MACV J-3, General Deputy briefed Rusk, McNamara, the JCS, Taylor, and others on COMUSMACV's Phase II program for deployment of U.S. forces to Vietnam. He stated that, with the exception of a few elite units, ARVN forces would be mainly employed in pacification activities behind a fighting screen of U.S. forces. The U.S. troops would carry the battle to the war zones and wherever VC main forces were found. The GVN favored the concept. (JCS telegram 4827 to CINCPAC, October 22; Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) /3/Document 178. /4/Document 176. I. Elements of the Problem A. MACV (through Depuy) makes a strong case that we cannot keep up adequate pressure on the VC without additional deployments totalling about 115,000 men during the course of 1966, raising our total to 325,000 by the end of the year. While the Depuy presentation may be unduly pessimistic in assuming that VC morale will stay up and that they will be able to obtain adequate equipment and even reinforcements, it is also possible (though I think less so) that it errs in the other direction by not assuming a really major DRV effort to increase forces in the South. At the very least, Depuy seems realistic in stating that we shall probably have to make a major additional commitment to attain our basic objectives, and that even with a second phase we cannot say with anything like absolute assurance that we are going to get there. Somewhere along the line the VC will probably weaken, and this may be well short of filling in Depuy's bar charts in blue and green. But we have to have the worst case constantly in mind, and the realistic median view would be that we do have to do a great deal more. B. If both the American public and international opinion are to accept our doing a great deal more, even on the ground in the South without an expansion of bombing of the DRV, we have to worry about whether we have a convincing case that we have exhausted all avenues to negotiation. We are currently in a fairly easy position on this because of universal reading that the DRV's September statements/5/ add up to a rejection of negotiations. For the moment, there is no favorable negotiating effort going on on any front, with the SYG effort being known privately to us (and we would suspect to other key countries) to have elicited no response from Hanoi. At the same time, the strength of our position of willingness to negotiate is being slightly eroded by the interpretation put out by Senator Mansfield and others and the apparent diplomatic reading in Washington that we have hardened and are really set to fight the thing through to the end, even including the erroneous exaggerated interpretation that we intend a total military victory over the VC for its own sake, as opposed to whatever degree of pressure will induce the VC and Hanoi to lay off and turn to a political line, which is what we still really intend. The noises out of Saigon, both from the GVN and from our Embassy's dealings with the press, have also tended to confuse matters and to confound the perhaps legitimate point that the GVN needs time to get its house in order with the illegitimate conclusion that they and we could not live with negotiations and that we really are both opposed to it whatever we say in public. In sum, our posture cannot be considered firm and wholly tenable if we look ahead 3-6 months without further moves. /5/See footnote 2, Document 152. C. On the other hand, any demonstrable move toward a peaceful solution, such as a pause in the next three months, raises the most serious questions of creating misunderstanding in Hanoi and/or interrupting the slow effort we are making to build some real political structure in Saigon. Lodge's 1377 makes it perfectly clear how he would react initially to a pause, and one cannot dismiss his reading of the internal political situation as simply due to his own personal rather superficial view of things. At the very best, we have a major tactical job to do to bring Lodge and the GVN aboard if we are to make a major move such as a pause. D. The Depuy briefing was somewhat reassuring as to the degree of US casualties we may expect (N.B. it would help to see a projection of this in terms of casualties per committed battalion per month accepting Depuy's judgment that the present rate can be maintained). Nonetheless, we are faced with the pressures from various quarters, symbolized by General LeMay and the Ford/Adair line, to hit the North substantially harder. The degree to which this will rise during the next 3-6 months will depend heavily on actual casualty experience and also on the proportion of apparent successes to apparent reverses (any really adverse engagement could really set the pressures off). E. The Soviets have been reserved in their private comment, but there may well be substance to the report from Matseev, the Isvestia correspondent, to Robert Kleiman to the effect that the Soviets would like to see a pause of at least three weeks to get diplomatic pressures started that might bring Hanoi onto a negotiating track./6/ In other words, the vital Soviet factor argues strongly for a pause. Equally, it almost certainly argues against any real step-up in the bombing, and was a major factor in the Thompson Group conclusion that this was not wise, for this reason as well as because it would probably not have a favorable effect on Hanoi in the absence of greater progress than we have yet achieved in the South./7/ /6/Thompson's account of this meeting as related to him by Kleiman on October 22 is in Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam--October 1965. /7/See Document 164. II. Broad Policy Choices A. A serious pause for a month, followed--if it fails--by decisions on Phase II deployment and possibly by some step-up in the bombing of the North. On the objective international factors, this has a great deal to commend it. It would clear the decks in a convincing fashion and probably tend to reduce the dangers of escalation even after we had resumed, at least as to the Soviets. On the other hand, as noted above, bringing the GVN (and Lodge) aboard would be terribly difficult just in itself, and we must have serious doubts whether it would have an adverse effect on GVN solidity. Any major falling out between the GVN and the US, or any overturn in the GVN political structure, could at this stage set us back enormously, if not fatally. Another contrary argument is that it might at least confuse our message to Hanoi and justify their tendency to think that, despite all our actions, we are really looking for an easy way out. We could offset this to some degree by the kind of message we get through to them and by our continued actions in the South, but there would still be some chance that the hard-liners in Hanoi would read it the other way notwithstanding. In other words, it could conceivably be a step away from getting Hanoi to seeking a peaceful solution. Still a third element would be the US domestic reaction. There would be a lot of rumbling below decks and among the harder-action school of critics. This might be kept under control during the pause, but it could also mean that the pressures would be enormous thereafter to "really clobber" the DRV. B. Finish up Phase I deployments and proceed to Phase II decisions and actions without any major action such as a pause, or any appreciable change in the bombing pattern against the DRV. In terms of effect on Hanoi and Saigon, this might quite well be the best course. It would indicate steadiness and firmness, as well as patience, and it can be strongly argued that this will bring Hanoi to a peaceful solution more surely and perhaps even sooner than any other course. The major adverse argument is that the President would have to go through another round of major decision-making in which our soft-line critics, both here and abroad, would raise a great deal of noise that we were not leaving the door sufficiently open to negotiation and that we were really moving inexorably to a wider war. It is hard to say just how serious these pressures would be, but at the very least we should give thought to some less dramatic alternative to a pause--such as another third country mediation effort--that would somewhat dampen these pressures without the adverse effects we might see in a pause in terms of Hanoi and Saigon reaction. It is far from easy to see just what such a "pause alternative" might be, and one cannot identify off-hand any effective or persuasive mediator who would be willing to act in the absence of a pause. C. Complete Phase I deployments and stop at that point for perhaps three months before going further, while continuing the present bombing pace against the North. This course, too, can be argued persuasively. It will be January before the weight of our full Phase I effort really comes into play, and, despite the gaps identified in the Depuy analysis (notably the total absence of effort in the IV Corps), we might see at least a significant adverse morale trend in the VC that would indicate we were getting somewhere. Moreover, it may be useful to give ourselves time to digest the impact of 200,000 men in terms of their effect on the Vietnamese psychology and economy. This is a factor that some reports, notably a recent cable from Saigon on inflationary and labor/diversion problems,/8/ suggest may be becoming very serious, even to the point of being a real limiting factor on our basic effectiveness in appealing to the people. /8/Not further identified. Thirdly, the GVN would have additional time, hopefully without serious frictions with us, to get on with its part of the job and to build up a GVN contribution that would not be dwarfed by the US role, a present tendency sharply highlighted by Depuy's presentation. On the drawback side, deferring additional US deployments--particularly in the face of military recommendations that would almost certainly become known--raises extremely grave problems in our domestic situation. This is not solely a question of the war dragging on--which it can be argued it would be likely to do even with Phase II deployments--but rather, a question of our confronting the 1966 Congressional elections without having clearly done all that our military thought was wise just on the ground alone (leaving aside the problem of extended bombing of the DRV). It would be still more serious, of course, if the rate of progress slowed down, as is certainly a significant possibility.
As noted above, Course B needs the best possible "pause alternative." Course C, just by the passage of time, has somewhat the same problem but far less acutely. Both courses, in addition, raise questions on the policy of bombing the North. The Soviet and international argument against expanding our bombing will remain very cogent. But we have always agreed that they might be outweighed by the arguments in favor of a final "coup de grace" when Hanoi and the VC really find the going in the South extremely difficult. On balance, the objective case would seem to favor not expanding the bombing except as a "coup de grace" or conceivably on a one-shot reprisal basis for some really serious VC outrage for which we could find some parallel target. In one respect, the continuation and growth of US domestic pressures is an asset to us, in that they will keep alive Hanoi's fears that "hawk" views would ultimately prevail in the USG. III. Knowledge Gaps and Variables There are a number of factors that could vary the situation, which we should follow closely, and on some of which we simply are not adequately informed. These include: A. What is really happening with respect to DRV infiltration. We probably need to stress the bombings of Laos very heavily, and may wish to divert some part of our DRV air effort to this end. We also need a much better intelligence picture than now exists of how much equipment and reinforcement is really coming down, and how. If we become convinced that individual targets such as Phu Quoc Island are really heavily contributing to infiltration, might we not conduct a specific amphibious operation against these? B. We need to follow extremely closely what the ChiComs and Soviets are doing in the DRV. This may well increase, and could suggest at any point that we were nearing some kind of flash signal. C. South Vietnamese popular reactions to the process will have to continue to be followed extremely closely. We are reasonably satisfied with our current reading that we have not triggered significant adverse reactions either by our presence or by our military tactics, including air attacks on villages. But we surely need to have an acute watch on this and perhaps--as MACV is looking into--tighter control on the use of air. D. The extent of civilian damage resulting from our DRV attacks also needs a great deal of watching and possibly a review of what we are doing. The recent compilation of photographs of Nam Dinh casts grave doubt on any claim that we can hit urban areas in any surgical fashion. Another cause for concern is the number of unspecified "buildings" being hit by our armed recce. Apart from humanitarian considerations, the degree of civilian damage in the North probably tends to stiffen DRV toughness, and may increasingly give the DRV a propaganda weapon against us, which it now seems they are making a considerable effort to mount. E. In addition to the civilian damage element, our DRV bombing pattern is being looked at from the standpoint of simple effectiveness. It is disturbing to get reports that bridges have been re-built in the southern areas of the DRV and then not struck again. Are we focussing enough, as a primary and irreducible objective, on keeping key LOC out of action? F. Even the possibility of a pause, or a "pause alternative," means that we must look hard again at our over-all negotiating position. Ambassador Unger's special group has done some further work on this, but our thoughts are not nearly as clear as they should be, nor--perhaps above all--have they thoroughly been shared with Saigon, as Lodge's 1377 highlights. It may be that Alexis Johnson would be the man to pull this together into a much more definitive script than we now have. I do not myself see any major change or "give" that we should now display. This, too, needs a hard look in addition to the question of tactical arguments and handling. IV. Decision-Making Procedures The pause scenario has suggested that the best time for such action, if taken, might be late November. This means bringing Ambassador Lodge aboard in the middle of November, and it may well be that this could only be done at Presidential level. Another factor is the absence of Secretary Rusk from November 13 till November 25, roughly. How and where are we to consult with Lodge, and how are we to get through to him a somewhat different outlook on the whole subject, even if we should eventually decide not to do the pause itself? Washington seems indicated, but we must decide very soon. Obviously, a major factor is the degree of visibility of our decision-making. With the President in Texas, major and prolonged gatherings are much more difficult to conceal.
182. Memorandum From the Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (Schwartz) to Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff/1/ Washington, October 25, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLI, Memos (A). Secret. Also sent to McNaughton, William Bundy, Unger, Meeker, and Assist-ant Secretary of State for Public Affairs James L. Greenfield. Drafted by Frank A. Sieverts, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. SUBJECT This report reviews the main points on Viet-Nam matters emerging from my talks with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and others in Vienna and Geneva. Most of the topics were reported in telegrams to the Department. However this report may be useful as a summary and as an indication of possible actions. 1. Compliance by GVN with Geneva Conventions. This subject is rapidly approaching a critical state. In a letter to President Gonard of the ICRC sent August 10 Secretary Rusk stated "In regard to the hostilities in Viet-Nam the U.S. Government is applying the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and we expect the other parties to the conflict to do likewise."/2/ In a subsequent letter the Secretary told M. Gonard that, "In view of the fact that prisoners taken by United States forces are transferred promptly to the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, we think it is more appropriate for that Government to supply such lists and to arrange for such visits by International Committee representatives, and we have every reason to believe that it will do so. You will recall that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam informed your representatives on August 11 that it will fulfill its obligations in this regard under the Geneva Conventions of 1949."/3/ /2/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 13, 1965, p. 447. /3/ found. Up to the present the GVN has failed to comply with the Conventions in a number of important ways. It has not furnished the ICRC with lists of prisoners. It has refused to permit the ICRC delegate in Saigon to make the kind of unescorted visits to prisoner camps that he believes are his responsibility under the Conventions. As far as I know it has taken no steps to transmit prisoner mail to relatives. Nor has it established a central office for collecting names of prisoners as required by the Conventions. In addition, the GVN thesis that all but a handful of the thousands of prisoners in custody are refugees or criminals subject to trial under domestic law is unlikely to convince the ICRC. The matter is acute for several reasons: (a)The ICRC may publicly criticize the GVN for failure to comply with the conventions. This would reduce the GVN's already precarious standing in the eyes of many other countries. (b) As long as GVN compliance is incomplete U.S. military forces in Viet-Nam are obligated not to turn over prisoners they take to GVN custody. (c) GVN non-compliance inhibits our ability to take public or private actions to obtain better treatment for American military personnel held by the Viet Cong and the DRV. The GVN attitude on this subject, while understandable in light of what their country has endured at the hands of the Viet Cong, and conceivably explainable to someone on the spot who can see at first hand the character of this ugly war, is however virtually certain to be unacceptable as a permanent answer to the ICRC's repeated entreaties on this subject. This will be all the more so if the DRV, which already is substantially complying with important parts of the prisoners Convention by furnishing in some instances at least names, photographs, statements, and mail, takes specific public steps to comply formally with the Conventions. It is by no means out of the question that the DRV will do this. From their own point of view there is little reason (beyond their own fanaticism) why they should not. Nor is there any valid reason why the GVN should not comply. The steps outlined in Deptel 863 of September 25/4/ should be fully acceptable and could serve to enhance the GVN's reputation with its own population. A change in definitions so that the bulk of prisoners taken in military operations be classified in the first instance as subject to the protection of the Conventions should not cause serious inconvenience. Since education or indoctrination programs free of duress are not proscribed by the Conventions the Chieu Hoi program could continue. Individual terrorists convicted of specific acts could still be charged as criminals and handled outside the Conventions. Refugees who are rehabilitated could of course be freed to return to their villages. /4/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET) It is worth noting that the narrowness of the GVN category of prisoners undermines our thesis that this is more than a civil war. Our critics can be expected to fasten on to the fact that only 74 of the thousands of prisoners captured or in custody represent an external force and use this as further evidence of DRV non-involvement. By altering the language of the definition large numbers of detainees could be classified as affiliated with Viet Cong-DRV armed forces fighting in South Viet-Nam against the GVN. This would not only have important legal and propaganda advantages, it would also square with the facts as we know them. If the ICRC delegates in Saigon are not satisfied with the degree of GVN compliance very soon the US Government must examine its own position very carefully. For one thing, our mission should take care not to place itself between the ICRC and the GVN, explaining the one to the other and, ultimately, satisfying neither. The ICRC should go direct to the GVN, the Ministries of Defense and Interior as well as the Foreign Office, to explain their obligations under the Conventions and in turn to hear from the Vietnamese themselves what they are doing to comply. The U.S. position must be squarely on the side of the Conventions. If the ICRC delegates aren't able to make their case with sufficient force to the GVN Ministries of Interior and Defense, the U.S. mission should be instructed to approach the Saigon Government at the highest level to explain the importance of full and prompt compliance. In the meanwhile, consideration should be given to having U.S. forces keep prisoners they actually capture. The present policy set forth in the Joint State-Defense message of September 24 (Deptel 858 to Saigon)/5/ provides that lists be kept of prisoners turned over to the GVN. The additional step of holding at least some prisoners would not only keep us in compliance with the Conventions during the time that the GVN is in the process of working itself up to this, it would also provide us with a small amount of additional leverage for use in connection with a possible exchange of prisoners with the DRV or even, conceivably, with the Viet Cong. /5/Not printed. (Ibid.) 2. Prisoner exchanges. The ICRC is aware of our interest in this subject. They also understand the problems. The fact that we hold no prisoners, and that the GVN so far has not asked their assistance in this regard, does not help matters. The ICRC understand the special nature of the Hertz case, though the argument that he as a bona fide civilian held by the Viet Cong is unique is beginning to wear a bit thin now that Dodd, the civilian construction firm employee, has been captured, to say nothing of the three other civilians believed held by the VC. 3. Blockade of medical supplies. This is obviously a most difficult and delicate matter, which was raised several times by the ICRC, both in conference and in private conversations. Without seeking to examine the pro's and con's of the policy, let me just note that the legal argument justifying it will be subject to the ICRC's critical scrutiny. The moral question depends to some extent at least on how the policy is carried out and what consequences it has both for the Viet Cong wounded and for civilians in Viet Cong-held areas. To be sure, to some extent it depends on how the policy is stated. The ICRC is less likely to object if emphasis is put on the fact that captured medical supplies are not marked with a Red Cross and are comingled with military supplies, in contravention of the Conventions. But the policy cannot be phrased that way just for the benefit of the ICRC. This is not a subject on which it would be wise to try to delude or mislead the ICRC, for short as well as long run reasons. However, a policy carried out on such terms could very likely lead to the interdiction of virtually as many medical supplies as are presently blockaded. 4. ICRC donations to DRV and Viet Cong. Using its own funds the ICRC has donated 50,000 Swiss francs ($11,500) each to the Red Cross of the DRV and GVN. This gift to the DRV was deposited in a DRV bank account in London and the DRV acknowledged receipt. The gift to the GVN is in the form of supplies. As a result of a communication sent to National Red Cross Societies on August 11 concerning relief action on behalf of victims of the war in Viet-Nam, the ICRC had received by September 20 donations in cash and in kind of a total of about 600,000 Swiss francs ($140,000). These donations came from National Red Cross Societies of: Australia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway and Switzerland; and from the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland as well as from the Viet-Nam Relief Committee in Finland and the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief in Britain. Many of the donors requested that the goods in kind or funds be made available to "all three sides", apparently not including the U.S. as a party to the war. From these gifts the ICRC sent a consignment consisting mainly of medical supplies to the Viet Cong through the NLF representative in Moscow. It has not yet received any acknowledgment. If an acknowledgment is received, it may well be the opening of a channel of communication to the Viet Cong. Several members of the ICRC pointed out to me that they are hopeful that gifts to the Viet Cong may help gain the confidence of the Viet Cong--an essential precondition for any useful actions by the Red Cross with regard to prisoners or other aspects of the Conventions. 5. Cambodia. I was informed that the Cambodians feel that if they act as a channel to send packages to U.S. prisoners held by the Viet Cong, and even more if they help send medical supplies to the Viet Cong, the U.S. will view this as confirming evidence of our charges, which they deny, that their country serves as a pipeline for supplies going to the Viet Cong. Whether or not any of this is accurate, either as a statement of the facts or as a characterization of their views, it might well be useful, and could do no harm, to have an intermediary act on our behalf to assure Sihanouk that, far from criticizing efforts by his Red Cross to get packages to our prisoners, we would be most grateful, and that we would not be publicly critical if bona fide medical supplies went to the Viet Cong at the same time, if in fact that is our view. 6. ICRC initiatives. The ICRC and its delegates are using a number of means to establish contact and establish a relationship of confidence with the DRV and the Viet Cong. They have sought out the DRV and NLF representatives in Moscow, Prague, Budapest, Paris, and Phnom Penh. They used a forum like the Vienna conference to make additional contacts. They have enlisted the Red Cross leadership of the USSR, Cambodia, Indonesia, France, Britain, and other countries for this purpose. They have applied for a visa to Hanoi in Warsaw and elsewhere. While they remain wholly realistic and thus non-optimistic about these efforts the possibility remains that one or more may at any time bear fruit. Most likely would be an invitation from Hanoi for an ICRC visit, possibly accompanied by a request for supplies, conceivably accepting our proposal that the ICRC inspect their allegations of hospital and leprosarium bombings. If such a visit occurred the ICRC would seek to visit prisoners (including Americans) held by the DRV, and would attempt to take them packages and mail. It would also discuss conditions of prisoners and related matters with the DRV. It is not too soon to consider additional matters we might wish the ICRC to explore if such a visit were to take place. (Note: while the visa application is in the name of an ICRC delegate (Maunoir, I believe) my understanding is that if the visa is granted President Gonard might himself seek to make the trip, accompanied by staff and possibly by other members of the Committee.) 7. Character and Role of ICRC. It hardly needs saying that the ICRC as a private Swiss organization with unique legal and international responsibilities acts independently on the basis of its own judgment consistent with its well known principles. What may be less obvious is that constituted this way and behaving this way the ICRC is almost certain to serve our own interests. Plainly, this is a point to be made quietly. Any prospects for success the ICRC may have in the delicate undertakings that it is broaching in connection with the Viet-Nam conflict would be shattered if the other side were given public cause to doubt its independence. But the fact remains that individually and collectively the ICRC is, in the most basic sense, on our side. This is very specifically true of the President, Samuel Gonard, formerly the commanding general of the Swiss armed forces, and of his leading associate of the Committee, Vice President Jacques Freymond, Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. (Freymond's views on wars of national liberation, and the urgent need for the countries of Europe to find ways to get together on a united policy for the West to fight them, as expressed in a paper he wrote for a recent Ford-sponsored conference, are wholly congenial to U.S. policy--and somewhat unusual coming from a European intellectual.) In light of this I believe that the ICRC does not at present need additional specific proposals. A suggestion like that in Deptel 651 to Geneva,/6/ besides being overtaken by the ICRC's own initiative in sending medical supplies to the Viet Cong, might well sound a wrong note among the more conservative members of the ICRC, who in the reductive tradition of European intellectualism might well conclude the proposal was a deal partial to U.S. interests and thus not for them to implement. Our present relationship with the ICRC is such that it can best be served by maintaining an open channel of discussion with them, with occasional nudges from us to point them in directions we consider fruitful and/or essential. And by getting the GVN to comply with the Conventions. /6/Not printed. (Ibid.) 8. Publicity. As a corollary to the previous point, publicity now for our efforts to work with and through the ICRC might well interfere with their efforts to gain the confidence of the other side and thus obtain better treatment for our prisoners. The argument that maximum publicity will help get better treatment for U.S. prisoners and will make it harder for the DRV to conduct mock war crimes trials and carry out executions, even if valid, does not contravene this view, since such publicity could be sought without reference to the ICRC. The domestic U.S. problem is more serious. The families obviously want to know what we're doing to help the boys, as do the military services. Congressional interest is building up. To a point this can be handled by quiet off-the-record briefings. But that point will soon be reached. I discussed this problem with members and staff of the ICRC. They themselves are becoming more public relations conscious than has been their tradition. They are interested in our own methods of backgrounding and news dissemination. At the right time I believe they will release on their own initiative, or can be gotten to release some information on what they are doing for the benefit of U.S. prisoners. By coordinating in advance we could then give their release our own emphasis here. I am convinced this would be more satisfactory for the present than for us to attempt to background here. 9. Strengthening South Viet-Nam's Red Cross. Without going into details of present shortcomings, suffice it to say that a lot can be done to beef up the South Vietnamese Red Cross. And at relatively little cost or difficulty (with respect to the Conventions, for example) to the GVN. The areas of need are obvious: refugees, direct material aid, children, separated families, etc. Putting the South Vietnamese Red Cross more into the picture would assist efforts being made by other private groups, would enhance the RVN's image abroad, and would deflect attention from shortcomings of the GVN in other areas. Both the ICRC and the American Red Cross would do much more with the Vietnamese Red Cross. But the requests should come from them. A specific project within their competence would be to set up a tracing service to reunite families, both now and when the fighting ends. The ICRC could provide technical assistance for this. 10. Protecting Power. ICRC experts on this subject see no reason not to explore this possibility. They suggest we consider asking an Eastern European country (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania) to take on the job. They have no illusions that any such arrangement will be accepted by the DRV or do much good if it were. 11. Mail, clearing house, official Bureau for Prisoners. Noting that letters from U.S. prisoners have reached their families in a variety of ways, the ICRC thinks it would be useful if a more comprehensive and efficient effort were made to keep track of the mail flow. I am exploring this with the American Red Cross and DOD. The ICRC is seeking to find out what kind of "infractions" regarding mail the DRV is citing as reason for halting the mail flow. The ICRC also recommends that an official Bureau for Prisoners as provided in the GC be established here and in Saigon. While this would be a formality on our part, it would be an additional argument for the ICRC to use when it tries to get compliance by Hanoi.
183. Draft Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, October 26, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLI, Memos (A). Secret. There is no indication on the source text that this message was sent. Joint State-Defense-White House message. For Ambassador and Westmoreland only. 1. As we prepare for later discussions with the President on future policy in Vietnam, we are all eager for your personal comments on some of the major problems. Since there is no immediate prospect of meeting with you, we would like to use this channel for informational exchanges in the next few weeks. We count on you to reply in whatever way is convenient to you, and we are not seeking formal Embassy or MACV positions so much as the benefit of your own thinking in whatever form you wish to present it. 2. Last week we listened with great interest to De Puy/2/ in his preliminary presentation of Phase II plans. While we are impressed by the high quality of the thinking behind this plan, a number of questions have occurred to different ones of us on which we would value your early comment. /2/See footnote 2, Document 181. 3. As presented, these plans focus sharply upon a dominant fighting role for U.S. ground forces. They appear to imply that aggressive operations will be conducted almost exclusively by U.S. forces. We recognize that for planners it is vastly easier to plan in terms of the deployment and use of U.S. forces under direct U.S. command. But some of us are greatly concerned by the possibility that what began as a Vietnamese war with U.S. assistance may end as a U.S. war with only passive Vietnamese cooperation. We doubt if this is your plan, but we fear that the momentum of U.S. military planning and deployment may force us all in this direction if we do not take very strong action to insure maximum use of Vietnamese forces in all forms of combat. It may be that De Puy briefing has misled us because of its natural focus upon the role of additional U.S. troops suggested for Phase II. But in reaching conclusions on Phase II and related problems, we would all be helped if we could have a clearer picture of the efforts you currently envisage for strengthening the Vietnamese armed forces at all levels and for all purposes. 4. Some of us also wonder whether we adequately understand what is now happening in Vietnam. GVN losses are still running several times higher than those of U.S. forces, and we believe, on the basis of estimates here, that most Viet Cong casualties still come from engagements in which the ground forces on our side are mainly Vietnamese. Thus there appears to be a substantial difference between the war as it now is and the war as the Phase II briefing suggests that it may be next year. Your comments on this apparent discrepancy would be welcome. 5. De Puy's briefing relates to the situation on the ground in South Vietnam, and did not directly treat the question of air operations either in the South or in the North. There is an evident requirement on us for correlation of all military action in the theater, and we would be glad to know of your thinking about the relation between ground and air action in the South, and the relation of both to the various possible rates at which the Rolling Thunder campaign might be carried forward. 6. Finally, we face major political decisions in connection with any additional deployments, and it may well be that we would wish to precede any Phase II deployments by another pause in bombing the North. Our preliminary estimate is that any such pause would be unlikely to produce a satisfactory response from Hanoi and would simply demonstrate again that root of problem of war and peace is in Hanoi. Here again we would value your thinking on ways and means of executing such a political preliminary to a further buildup. 7. Very existence of this message series will be held extremely closely here. You can speak as freely on this channel as if you were at the Cabinet table in a carefully restricted meeting. We will do the same.
184. Intelligence Memorandum/1/ No. 2391/65 Washington, October 27, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLI, Memos (A). Secret; No Foreign Dissem [text not declassified]. Disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence. AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM/2/ /2/This memorandum is CIA's issuance of a joint CIA-DIA study prepared monthly for the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Footnote in the source text.] Effects on the DRV Economy 1. The cumulative economic losses caused by air strikes in North Vietnam are still small in relation to total economic activity because the targets attacked thus far have not been located in areas of major economic activity. However, there are now considerably more indications of localized strains upon the economy, most notably in food supply and distribution. The bombings of the railway lines leading from Hanoi to the northwest and northeast are probably having a greater adverse effect on the economy than any targets attacked to date. With the interdiction of three important land lines of communication, domestic production, distribution, and reconstruction are being curtailed and exports and imports are being reduced. Another serious effect is the diversion of scarce resources from productive uses to the repair of damaged facilities and development and the use of alternate means of transportation. This diversion has almost certainly retarded, if not stopped, work on a number of high-priority economic construction projects. The capabilities of North Vietnam's armed forces have not been affected significantly by attacks on economic facilities, but the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies is being hampered by damaged transportation facilities. The armed forces place little direct reliance on the North Vietnamese economy for materiel. 2. Damage to economic facilities and equipment is now estimated at between $15 and 16 million. Measurable indirect economic losses amount to more than $8 million--mainly reductions in foreign trade and agricultural output. The direct economic losses that can be measured have fallen most heavily on the transport sector of the economy. The cost of permanent reconstruction of rail/highway bridges would be on the order of $7 to 8 million and the replacement or repair of destroyed or damaged transport equipment would cost an additional $3.3 million. Reconstruction of the damaged electric power plants would cost about $4.5 million. Repair costs for the petroleum storage facilities are estimated at about $500 thousand. The growing loss of foreign export earnings--now totaling almost $5 million--is appreciable, though not yet serious. In addition there have been losses from lowered production. Most losses cannot be quantified, but it is estimated that the potential reduction in rice crops this year resulting from shortages of power for irrigation will amount to roughly $3.5 million. The cost of reconstruction, replacement, and repair of damaged facilities, if attempted, would represent over 7 percent of total annual investment in the economy and about 15 percent of annual investment in industry. 3. The official North Vietnam press has tacitly admitted failure to carry out simultaneously all the necessary defense, reconstruction, and production tasks. Party leaders have called for a major reorganization of the Communist Party apparatus in order to strengthen the provincial and district committees of the party. These officials have primary responsibility for directing defense mobilization and production in their respective regions. Thus problems in organization are compounding the chronic shortages of skilled manpower which have become even more apparent during the period of the air strikes. Large numbers of workers have been sent south to repair the damage. Their effectiveness has been impaired, however, by severe local shortages of food and construction materials caused by poor distribution and problems in transportation. Some of the effects of the shortage of skilled manpower may be avoided, however, by the arrival of additional Soviet and Chinese technical personnel. North Vietnam is now receiving increasing numbers of technical advisers to assist in reconstruction as well as quantities of structural components and materials, not only from China, but also from other Communist countries. The transfer of a considerable portion of North Vietnam's limited resources of skilled labor and construction materials to repair and reconstruct the bombed facilities constitutes an appreciable drain in amounts available for the planned investment program and has required a reordering of investment priorities. If orderly economic development is to be continued, there must be a more rapid increase in aid from other Communist countries than has been observed to date. 4. The most significant air strikes against transportation in North Vietnam have been the bombing of two bridges on the Dong Dang-Hanoi railroad line. The Dong Dang-Hanoi line is the principal means by which North Vietnam has received imports of military equipment and economic goods from China by land. The organization of alternative road and sea transportation to compensate for the loss of through rail traffic will take some time. In the meantime, the North Vietnamese will resort to temporary expedients to try to keep military and high-priority economic traffic moving past and interdicted bridges. Continued interdiction of the line will have serious consequences in maintaining production of the two blast furnaces at Thai Nguyen, North Vietnam's only iron and steel complex, which has been receiving about 500 tons of coking coal from China by rail each day. 5. North Vietnam has made little progress in repairing damaged electrical power facilities. Damage to five power plants has reduced the total generating capacity by 13.5 percent, and has caused minor curtailment of mining and industrial operations and loss of power for an irrigation system. Destroyed petroleum storage facilities reduced total capacity by 16.7 percent. Since total national capacity is large in relation to normal consumption, the loss of these facilities has had only a localized impact in the southern part of the country. Dislocations in telecommunications have necessitated the use of priorities and alternate means of communication, and the effectiveness of postal service has declined. Food rations in an area south of Hanoi reportedly have been cut, and food shortages are reported to be particularly serious in the southern provinces. The bombings of the electric power network in Thanh Hoa and Nghe An provinces have interrupted normal irrigation services which, if not restored, will cause a reduction in the fall rice harvests in these areas. The volume of seaborne exports continues to decline and the loss of foreign exchange earnings has been intensified. North Vietnamese Political and Public Reactions 6. There continues to be no basic change in Hanoi's attitude toward the war. Hanoi continues to assert its determination to press on with the war in South Vietnam despite the continuing attrition of the air war and the increase of US troops in the south. This determination was evident in regime propaganda which placed special emphasis on assertions that the US is not prepared to conduct a prolonged war in Vietnam, but that the Vietnamese insurgents are prepared to do so and have the necessary resources. 7. On the subject of negotiations, Hanoi was unusually vocal. Coverage of this issue centered on a Foreign Ministry memorandum broadcast on 23 September. This and other statements offered no policy departure from the "four-point stand" of 8 April. Rather, by phrasing, emphasis and omission, these statements tend to convey the impression that Hanoi is endeavoring to clarify its position on settling the war and to avoid locking itself into an inflexible position on negotiations. 8. There are no indications that the Hanoi regime's attitude toward the war is being influenced to any greater extent than in the past by the reaction of the DRV populace to the air strikes. The morale of the populace seems to be standing up fairly well, although signs of deterioration in some quarters continue. For the first time in many weeks the regime did evidence some concern over the effect that the air strikes were having on the populace. A broadcast directed to the populace of one region of the country chided them for failing to comply with the planned civil defense measures when strikes occur. The broadcast implied that the local people had little regard for the government's plans and took their own measures to protect themselves. Effects on Military Targets 9. Air strikes against North Vietnam have further eroded national capacities in measurable areas (see annex),/3/ while far-ranging armed reconnaissance has disrupted movement along lines of communication and North Vietnamese attempts at reconstruction. Further reduction in national capacities in certain categories will be inhibited to some extent by the heavy concentration of targets in the sanctuary areas. About 51 percent of maritime ports, and about 60 percent of POL, power plant, and railroad yard capacities are within the restricted areas. However, only 10 percent of barracks, 14 percent of supply, and 15 percent of ammunition storage capacities are located in these areas. The continued absence of restoration of barracks and supply and ammunition depots confirms earlier assessments that a large-scale dispersal of men and materials to less vulnerable facilities has occurred. No indications of shortages of ammunition have been detected, and the movement of such materiel is given top priority on the disrupted transportation nets. /3/Attached but not printed. 10. The four damaged airfields at Vinh, Dong Hoi, Na San, and Dien Bien Phu remain unserviceable. The North Vietnamese appear to be discarding these facilities and concentrating on improving and reactivating airfields in and north of the Hanoi area. 11. Armed reconnaissance sorties passed 11,000 with an attendant increase in destruction of surface vessels, vehicles and railroad rolling stock. While these losses have disrupted North Vietnamese operations, particularly in Military Region IV, they are being offset in part by increased aid from the Communist countries. Similarly, although our air operations have restricted North Vietnam's freedom of movement, especially in the southern provinces, infiltration of materiel to the Viet Cong continues. 12. Increased pressure has been placed on Hanoi by the sustained air attacks on the more sensitive lines of communication and on their supply base. While these operations have not significantly reduced North Vietnamese capabilities to conduct current levels of defense operations, they have substantially curtailed the PAVN's capability to invade South Vietnam. Quick reaction paid dividends last week when an air strike was launched against an occupied SA-2 site near Kep Ha within 48 hours of the site's detection. The attack surprised the North Vietnamese and resulted in destruction of missiles, radar vans, and missile transporters, marking the first successful attack on such a site. The losses incurred constitute a sharp setback to North Vietnamese plans for augmenting SA-2 firing elements northeast of Hanoi. Nevertheless, North Vietnam is steadily increasing its AAA and SA-2 sites, primarily in the Yen Bai and Lang Son areas, and SA-2 firing elements are now in operation to the south, east, and north of Hanoi. The mission of the armed forces of the DRV is unchanged and includes: defending the homeland, training their own and infiltration forces for South Vietnam and Laos, and providing logistics support for their forces and those Communist forces presently deployed in South Vietnam and Laos. To the present, the capability of North Vietnam's armed forces to perform their mission at current levels of activity, while hampered, has not been diminished to an appreciable degree.
185. Editorial Note On November 1, 1965, retired Foreign Service officer Paul Sturm (Y) replaced Edmund Gullion as Mai Van Bo's contact. The unpublished portion of United States-Vietnam Relations summarizes Sturm's instructions as follows: "November 1, 1965--X introduces Y by letter to R "Instructions for Y: "1. Stress building pressures in the U.S. for escalation--not a threat but a fact. "2. Take an anti-Chinese tack. "3. Develop theme of Asian economic development and aid. "4. DRV Aide-Memoire, September 23, 1965: "a. Asserts U.S. insists on keeping forces in SVN. With respect to this, pursue the idea of stages. "b. Asserts U.S. insists on separate Vietnams forever. "c. Seeming change on point three--now NLF 'must have decisive say.' "d. What is meant by 'solemnly declaring acceptance of four points--stopping all action, withdrawal or agreement to withdraw, bombing cessation?' "e. Rules out any DRV response to a bombing cessation." (United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, Part VI, C, 1, page 21) The Democratic Republic of Vietnam's aide-memoire, September 23, is printed ibid., Book 12, Part VI, B, pages 160-163. On November 18, when Sturm and Bo met, their discussion was unproductive with Bo expressing puzzlement that Sturm had no new knowledge to convey. (Ibid., Book 12, Part VI, C, 1, page 21)
186. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, November 2, 1965, 7:40 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. 1532. 1. Ky government is just over four months old. While certain strengths are apparent certain stresses within and outside the government also exist. Trouble spots have appeared although the overall situation in Viet-Nam is better today than it was in the early part of 1965. Behind the shield of American power a greater measure of security has been established but the political and administrative fabric has not yet developed the necessary strength. This report is designed to outline some of the problems which Ky now confronts as he seeks to retain unity among the leadership and develop effective government. 2. Ky is well aware of his problems. He recognizes the need for actions and persuasive leadership if he is to survive the pressures threatening a government massively engaged in fighting a bitter war that reaches into almost every corner of the land and affects every facet of Vietnamese life. 3. Government is faced with complex and potentially dangerous economic problem in form of shortages certain commodities, sharply rising living costs, and inflation. Important as these are intrinsically, they take on greater importance because they have become magnified in the public mind and provide political enemies of government a "safe" weapon for attack. Too timorous to launch a head-on campaign against military government, these elements consider themselves quite safe in associating with spontaneous complaint against inflation and food shortages. 4. Situation has also produced internal stresses within Ky Cabinet. Minister National Economy Ton was under such heavy fire that he was talking of resigning. Although Ky and Directorate colleagues considered his replacement it appears that Ton has survived for the time being. Merits of case aside, there is always powerful impulse to fire a minister when his area of responsibility presents politically difficult problem. 5. Pressures for change exist elsewhere within government. The Minister of Interior is unsure of his job. Minister of Public Works and Minister of Social Welfare have been drawing criticism because of alleged failures of their Ministries to function effectively. (Friday Ky told Ambassador he had dismissed Minister of Public Works because of his inefficiency, but this has not yet been made known publicly.) 6. There continues to be grumbling within the military establishment. DepPriMin Nguyen Huu Co is apparently still unhappy at being relieved from post of Chief, Joint General Staff. He has criticized Ky sharply before American and Vietnamese auditors on a number of occasions and word of his remarks has circulated widely in civilian and military circles (and must certainly have been carried back to Ky). In a recent conversation with General Westmoreland, Co wondered out loud whether anything could be done to deflate Ky's arrogance and force his nose to the grindstone. This is probably an unfair attack on Ky but illustrates the lengths to which Co is now going in his criticism. We have also been hearing of milder criticism of Ky from other senior military quarters. 7. There is a rash of coup rumors, although none are worthy of my trying to react in any way. Before his departure for Hue, Bonze Thich Tri Quang called to warn EmbOff that at least three sudiste groups he knows of are plotting. Adherents to General "Big" Minh and Major General Duong Van Duc, September 13-14 coup leader, are allegedly involved. Story is given substance by fact that Duc was forcibly removed from Ba Xuyen Province last week by military security service and returned to Saigon (where he was set free) presumably at request of Province Chief who objected to his activities. Re "Big" Minh, town has been full of stories of his imminent return for last two weeks. As we have seen in past, Saigon rumor mills need little raw material in order to operate at full blast. We have also noted that VC are quick to pick up and broadcast stories of disunity within GVN. We can assume that they are not idle now. While coup reports so far appear to have no firm basis, their currency is a manifestation of the difficulties within the government. They have become so common that Ky has seen fit to denounce the possibility of a coup. Most recently he told press no one could organize a coup at the present time. 8. On Catholic side of ledger there has been rumor that Generals Nguyen Chanh Thi and Nguyen Huu Co were plotting to become Chief of State and Prime Minister respectively with Unified Buddhist Association concurrence and support. Central Buddhists headed by Tri Quang remain highly critical of government effectiveness and of General Thieu in particular, while old political circles continue to grumble on the sidelines. Catholic circles have been remaining quiet and not agitating against the government but they are basically uncommitted in support of the Ky government. 9. Much of foregoing would be irrelevant and unimportant if Ky government could generate momentum and successfully come to grips with more important problems confronting it. However, on basis past experience, rumors and facts of this sort can have insidious effect on minds of many Vietnamese. As the government steels into its tasks for a longer haul the "out-politicians" launch what have often been irresponsible attacks against government. Members of government are more fully aware of the enormity of tasks confronting them and are forced to come to grips with the hard task of maintaining unity and getting on with the work of government. Some of them, it appears, would rather think of sudden change as a solution. 10. Ky does not give any obvious outward sign of running out of steam. He remains self-assured and has declared his determination remain as Prime Minister regardless number and magnitude problems confronting him. He is being responsive to the Ambassador's advice to calm his opponents, seek out his critics, and maintain his authority by persuasion as well as action. He appears more and more as a reflective man. He retains control of the air force and his potential rivals seem to show a healthy respect for U.S. power and some consideration for the desirability of maintaining unity in government. Although Ky has not been receiving the credit due his successes, he has had a few. More than anything, favorable trends in military solution over past few months have strengthened government's position and dampened earlier fears for security which fostered irrational changes and inspired adventures in leadership. 11. Important to recall that Directorate unity remains key to political stability in present situation. As long as ten Generals who comprise this body remain in essential accord on this point, coups which bring about fundamental changes in GVN's organization or direction can probably be avoided. However, pressures such as those outlined above are putting their unity to an important test. Lodge
187. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, November 3, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 5:34 a.m. McGeorge Bundy sent a retyped copy of this telegram to the President with the observation that it was "more cheerful than usual." There is an indication on the White House copy that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVI) 1544. For the President. Herewith my weekly telegram. 1. American popularity--You would have been proud of the U.S. troops at the Vietnam National Day celebration on last Monday, November 1. They looked lean and hard--and tall coming after the Vietnamese. The white and Negro soldiers were inter-mingled--a powerful psychological stroke to a crowd conservatively estimated of non-whites. What particularly impressed me was that when, with their massed flags, they appeared, they were the only troops which drew a great roar of applause from the public. Other formations had drawn applause from the reviewing stand but the crowd of rank and file people on the sidewalk applauded only the United States. When I attended this same celebration two years ago, the public was nowhere to be seen and was not allowed to be present. Today was the first time everyone was allowed to see the parade. The government's self-assurance was justified, for there was no terrorism. In the afternoon I attended the National Day ceremony at the Buddhist Institute. Mine was the only vehicle, either diplomatic or Vietnamese, which, with its flag, received warm and grinning applause from the crowd outside the pagoda. We Americans are definitely not considered colonial. They think they know us and our non-imperialistic record in the Philippines and Korea and elsewhere. They know that our soldiers are helpful and friendly. Unfortunately the Army of Vietnam still makes enemies. 2. Economic--Happily, retail rice prices continued their slow downward trend despite a continued decline in rice stocks on hand and despite the fact that prices normally rise at this season. Saigon's needs in rice, which are largely met from private stocks, should be provided for at a reasonable price. The cost of other local and imported products continued to rise, however, and the retail price index was up 3 percent over last week. American and Vietnamese representatives agreed on a number of measures to speed up cargo handling and reduce congestion in the port of Saigon. 3. Military--For the third week in a row the pace of the war quickened with the Viet Cong attacking in regimental strength in Phu Yen Province and in battalion strength in Hau Nghia Province and against the U.S. Marines' perimeter outside Danang. Heavy fighting mostly in a battle zone stretching from Phu Yen Province north to Thua Thien Province led to increased casualties on both sides. The total number of Viet Cong incidents decreased slightly reflecting a decline in the number of anti-aircraft fire and propaganda incidents but the number of Viet Cong attacks went up and terrorism and sabotage increased slightly. 4. Basic political--The number of Viet Cong military or political cadres who came over to the government side during October increased slightly over the September figure continuing a slight but steady upward trend since June. 5. Psychological--Press comment reflected optimism and hopefulness that traditional differences among South Vietnamese religious minorities were diminishing. Press attitudes toward the GVN were generally favorable although complaints continued concerning rising and fluctuating prices and the preference for an elected government. 6. Pacification--Minister Thang of Rural Construction (Pacification) is in the final phase of organizing his Ministry so that he will be free for field supervision of the pacification program in Quang Nam and Binh Dinh starting November 5. After considerable neglect of the program these past two years, and the resignation of most of the Ministry's civilian staff after the death of Minister Ung, Thang has worked hard to get a competent staff, a doctrine designed to win the voluntary support of villagers, with democratic elections in villages as one major goal, and to make some order out of the many types of cadres assigned to this work by past governments. He got GVN approval for his selection of Colonels Lac, Chau, and Anh to be his chief assistants. All three are highly regarded by Americans for their experience and competency in pacification; the latter two have been outstanding province chiefs. The political action team training center at Vung Tau, started, funded, and guided by CIA, will be made into a national training center for what the Vietnamese call rural construction and which is truthfully translated as community building. I have visited this center and was favorably impressed. Now the Vietnamese want it to play a key role in building a political structure in this country from the ground up. Also, 73 selected graduates of the National Institute for Administration (NIA) are being given a special course in pacification. Thang, who has been participating in this training of selected civil service civilians, will assign the top third in the class to be assistant district chiefs (or district chief, if this is required) in areas selected for priority attention; the middle third of the class will be used at Vung Tau to strengthen the instructor staff; the last third will be used in the Ministry. 7. Medical program--With a party of journalists, I visited USOM aided hospital at Can Tho where major surgery cases went from 86 in 1963 to 170 in 1965 and minor surgery from 30 to 623 in the same period. Outpatient cases went from some 3,300 in 1964 to some 6,600 in 1965. I also used the opportunity to have a long private talk with the Corps Commander (one of four political satraps in this country) about the importance of national unity and of everyone pulling together. Lodge
188. Letter From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to President Johnson/1/ Saigon, November 3, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVI. Secret. McGeorge Bundy sent this letter to the President under cover of a November 8 memorandum that reads as follows: "Here is a letter which has just come in from Cabot Lodge for you. I have taken the liberty of giving copies to Rusk and McNamara only, because Lodge's views are deeply relevant to the discussions now going forward. I have not sent a copy to Arthur Goldberg because I am afraid it would only stir him to a very strong reaction. On the other hand, it may be useful for Arthur to know Saigon's thinking. Which do you prefer? "The memorandum, which has an indication that Johnson saw it, did not show the President's preference. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Memos (B)) Dear Mr. President: Herewith is my best attempt to peer into the future: 1. We are beginning to master the technique of thwarting and eventually overcoming the Viet Cong main force units and military redoubts. The process will be long and difficult, but we know what is required to accomplish it. 2. The next step must be to eliminate Viet Cong terrorism and to smash Viet Cong organization in the villages. The GVN, with our help, is just beginning this process. 3. If governmental stability is maintained, I believe that the GVN, with our help, can succeed. But the process is, if anything, more complex than the military one because it involves braiding so many programs together. If the pacification program moves ahead as we intend, I would expect that, within six months, about 300 additional villages of the 2,685 in the country for a total of about 1,100 will have been pacified in the three different areas which are the initial objectives. From then on, it will be straightforward, if slow, plowing ahead with the light at the end of the tunnel growing brighter all the time. 4. No assurance can be given that the government will stay in power. But I try to leave nothing undone to prevent a sudden change. Everyone in the U.S. Mission is alerted to let me know of any rumor that they hear, and whenever I hear one worthy of attention, I will certainly try to do something effective. 5. Let us assume that the government stays in power and that the Viet Cong decide that we and the Vietnamese are able to overcome the terrorists as individuals and in small groups. I expect them then to accept our offer for unconditional discussions and to do so at the time and in the way most embarrassing to us. I do not expect to hear through intelligence ahead of time. Mao Tse-tung's manual says, "Fight, Fight. Talk, Talk." When the fighting goes against them, they will try to win by talking, by politics, by propaganda, by public opinion. They go to an international discussion not to end the war but to win it. 6. The three most embarrassing things which I can think of now are: 1. a cease-fire; 2. an end to the bombing of the North; and 3. recognition of the Viet Cong (self-styled National Liberation Front) in some form. Let me submit my views on each of these issues. Cease-Fire 7. As things stand now, if we were to accept a cease-fire (without supervision and without withdrawal of troops), the Government of Viet-Nam would be seriously threatened and could even fall, and the fighting spirit would go out of the Vietnamese military--beyond reasonable hope of being pumped up again. The Viet Cong would thus win in one diplomatic stroke what they had not been able to win by fighting. 8. Moreover, since civilian pacification still lags behind the military program, a premature cease-fire would confirm Viet Cong control in a large portion of the country, enable them to terrorize the population in much of the remainder and would do so in an artful way without seeming to do so. 9. An offer of cease-fire has a superficially attractive appearance and yet at the U.N. an offer of cease-fire was not generally considered worthy of respect unless it was accompanied at the same time by an offer by the aggressor to withdraw troops, together with a practical scheme to supervise the withdrawal. 10. One answer to a cease-fire proposal, therefore, could be a.) a cease-fire must be accompanied by the aggressor's withdrawal of troops and by machinery to supervise and verify; and b.) these are obviously things to be discussed at the meeting and should go on the agenda. 11. But I stress the communist tactic of inscribing as an agenda item the substantive result which they wish finally to achieve at a conference. We think of an agenda as a list of things to discuss; they think of it as an opportunity to win the conference before it has even started. 12. We should thus insist that the first item on the agenda should be machinery to supervise and to verify whatever agreement is ultimately reached. 13. We should also hold that the GVN has a sovereign right to move anywhere in its territory and to suppress armed terrorists where it finds them. This is an exercise of the domestic police power which no sovereign state should be asked to abdicate. Bombing 14. An end of bombing of the North with no other quid pro quo than the opening of negotiations would load the dice in favor of the communists and demoralize the GVN. It would in effect leave the communists free to devastate the South with impunity while we tie our hands in the North./2/ /2/President Johnson quoted this paragraph in The Vantage Point, p. 234. 15. We might agree to end the bombing of the North for a limited period--say thirty days--if the following conditions are met: a. A withdrawal of NVN units through international checkpoints to the North. b. Unimpeded access of the GVN to any part of its territory. c. A significant reduction of incidents. d. Cessation of infiltration of men and materiel. e. If enforcement of all these measures is the first item of any agenda. 16. Your advisers might study the merits of making a new discussion offer in which you said in effect that on April 8/3/ you offered unconditional discussions and were rebuffed; that this offer had stood from April 8 to the present time; that it was not, however, an offer to last through all eternity; and that, therefore, you were revising it along the lines of paragraph 15. Such an initiative might relieve you of the embarrassment of a communist cease-fire proposal by making in effect a cease-fire proposal of your own. /3/Reference is to Johnson's April 7 speech at Johns Hopkins University; see vol. II, Document 245. 17. Such a public announcement, like all public announcements, should be coordinated in advance with the GVN. Recognition of Viet Cong 18. Any form of recognition of the Viet Cong--other than as individual members of a Hanoi delegation--will lead to a collapse of the GVN. It would be taken in the countryside--and so represented by the still potent communist underground--as the beginning of a communist takeover. This would, I believe, lead to a rapid disintegration of all we have sacrificed so much to create. 19. I would therefore suggest that our attitude on this be that the Viet Cong will not be recognized, though Hanoi is free to include in its delegation any individual it chooses. 20. I would hate to see you in a position where you had to choose between flying in the face of overwhelming U.S. public opinion on the one hand or losing everything you have gained with so much struggle and sacrifice in Viet-Nam on the other. 21. I believe it will be possible to reconcile U.S. and Vietnamese positions with regard to the holding of discussions with Hanoi, but American opinion must be prepared to give a little ground inasmuch as the Vietnamese have a very different viewpoint, due to their being so close to the conflict and so small and weak a nation, which has suffered so much. Also they take themselves seriously as a sovereign nation--and thus cannot accept a cease-fire for their own troops in their own country in the exercise of their own police power. With warm and respectful regards, Faithfully yours, Cabot L.
189. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 3, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, South Vietnam, Statements and Supporting Papers. Top Secret. Designated as "1st rough draft." McNamara wrote the following note on the source text: "A copy of this was sent to the Pres. by courier through Mac's office on 11/7 and discussed with him by me, Dean, George, and Mac on 11/7. RMcN" According to the President's Daily Diary, the President's meeting with McNamara, Rusk, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy was held at the LBJ Ranch in Texas on November 11, not November 7. See Document 189 regarding the meeting. The President was at the LBJ Ranch October 23-November 14, recovering from surgery. (Johnson Library) The copy of this memorandum in the Johnson Library has a covering memorandum by McNaughton, who hand-delivered it to McGeorge Bundy on November 4. McNaughton informed Bundy that Rusk and Ball were also getting copies and related McNamara's desire that Bundy not show this memorandum to anyone else without telephoning McNamara first. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Memos (B)) In The Vantage Point (pp. 233-234), Johnson describes this memorandum and recalls that his "first reaction" to it was "one of deep skepticism." SUBJECT We confront major policy decisions with respect to our course of action in Vietnam. This memorandum attempts to frame the substance of the choices and to identify some of the problems we face. 1. US strategy. The February decision to bomb North Vietnam and the July approval of Phase I deployments make sense only if they are in support of a long-run United States policy to contain Communist China. China--like Germany in 1917, like Germany in the West and Japan in the East in the late 30's, and like the USSR in 1947--looms as a major power threatening to undercut our importance and effectiveness in the world and, more remotely but more menacingly, to organize all of Asia against us. The long-run US policy is based upon an instinctive understanding in our country that the peoples and resources of Asia could be effectively mobilized against us by China or by a Chinese coalition and that the potential weight of such a coalition could throw us on the defensive and threaten our security. This understanding of a straightforward security threat is interwoven with another perception--namely, that we have our view of the way the US should be moving and of the need for the majority of the rest of the world to be moving in the same direction if we are to achieve our national objective. We would move toward economic well-being, toward open societies, and toward cooperation between nations; the role we have inherited and have chosen for ourselves for the future is to extend our influence and power to thwart ideologies that are hostile to these aims and to move the world, as best we can, in the direction we prefer. Our ends cannot be achieved and our leadership role cannot be played if some powerful and virulent nation--whether Germany, Japan, Russia or China--is allowed to organize their part of the world according to a philosophy contrary to ours. There are three fronts to a long-run effort to contain China (realizing that the USSR "contains" China on the north and northwest): (a) the Japan-Korea front; (b) the India-Pakistan front; and (c) the Southeast Asia front. Decisions to make great investments today in men, money and national honor in South Vietnam makes sense only in conjunction with continuing efforts of equivalent effectiveness in the rest of Southeast Asia and on the other two principal fronts. The trends in Asia are running in both directions--for as well as against our interests; there is no reason to be unduly pessimistic about our ability over the next decade or two to fashion alliances and combinations (involving especially Japan and India) which will keep China from achieving her objectives until her zeal wanes. The job, however--even if we can shift some responsibilities to some Asian countries--will continue to require American attention, money, and, from time to time unfortunately, lives. Any decision to continue the program of bombing North Vietnam and any decision to deploy Phase II forces--involving as they do substantial loss of American lives, risks of further escalation, and greater investment of US prestige--must be predicated on these premises as to our long-run interests in Asia. 2. Estimate of the situation in South Vietnam. The massive infusions of US ideas, aid and manpower have frustrated any Communist design to move into their conventional-warfare "Stage 3," but the guerrilla war continues at a high pace, the economy of South Vietnam is deteriorating, and there are no convincing indications that the South Vietnamese body-politic is reviving. a. Military. The large US deployments have thwarted the VC monsoon offensive that was threatening a serious military defeat for the GVN forces at the time of my July memorandum./2/ These "Phase I" deployments, 160,000 of whom are already in place, have enabled the GVN forces to begin restoration of their strength, morale and tactical integrity, which is essential if they are to retain their fighting capability in the months ahead. The US forces have also substantially secured their own bases and the areas immediately adjacent to the bases. (see Map I, attached)/3/ US ground combat elements deployed offensively have moved rapidly--in conjunction with tactical air support and often following up B-52 strikes--to probe into VC base sanctuaries that had long been untouched. The US forces have also proved to be an effective quick-reaction reserve for GVN forces that has turned potential defeat in several battles into VC retreat or at least a stand-off. /2/Document 67. /3/Attached but not printed. But the pace of the war remains high, with VC last week attacking in regimental strength in Phu Yen province and in battalion strength in Hau Nghia province and against the Marine perimeter outside Danang. There are increased casualties on both sides. VC attacks, terrorism and sabotage show no sign of abating. Desertions from Government Forces remain high, but recruitment has improved, permitting a gradual increase in force levels. Defections from the VC are running at 1000 a month and are increasing slowly. The present assessment is that our Phase I deployments (bringing the US total to about 210,000 to 225,000 men) when completed will achieve the limit of their military potential between December 1965 and March 1966. As can be seen on Map I, the estimate is that Phase I forces, working with the Vietnamese, will result in "control" of 40 per cent of the population and 5-10 per cent of the area; it will keep open 20-25 per cent of the critical lines of communications; it will permit 10-20 per cent disruption of the VC bases and military logistics infrastructure, and 5 per cent disruption of the VC political/security infrastructure. We will then be in a position where a few enclaves, including perhaps 5,500,000 of South Vietnam's 15,000,000 people (of which only some 1,000,000 are in the Delta) are under US or GVN "control"--and even these will of course be subject to sporadic VC mortar and suicide satchel-charge attacks of the October 27 kind./4/ Security conditions within the enclaves will be suitable for reconstruction of political infrastructure, but it is probable that the enclaves will be too small and the per cent of population controlled too little to give any hope that such pacification will be rapid or that it will tend to snowball beyond the enclaves. /4/Apparent reference to an October 27 Viet Cong attack on a GVN ranger battalion, 10 miles west of Saigon. (Memorandum for the President by the White House Situation Room briefing officer, November 2; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Memos (A)) The capabilities and intentions of the VC and of North Vietnam are troublesome unknowns complicating our estimate of the situation at this time. There are signs that VC morale is sagging. But, even when confronted by the US force-build-up and by our program of actions against North Vietnam and with increasing casualties and weapons losses, the VC have demonstrated an ability to continue the build-up and supply of their forces in the South, both from in-country sources and by infiltration over improved roads in Laos, by sea and via Cambodia. The indications are that the VC are not reverting to a lesser level of insurgency, but are still striving to build up for the transition to conventional warfare--that they are continuing both to upgrade guerrilla units in the Delta and to infiltrate additional regular army elements from the North in order to restore the balance temporarily upset by US deployments. The VC forces are now estimated at 71,300 VC "main force and logistics," 40,000 political cadre, and 110,000 guerrillas--an increase in the estimate since early last summer of some 6,000 (9%), 10,000 (33-1/3%) and 18,200 (20%) in the three categories respectively. In addition, although as of last month there were estimated to be three regiments of North Vietnamese regular forces in the South, early this month two additional North Vietnamese regiments were confirmed and three others were estimated as possible. In total, therefore, the NVN/VC forces are now believed to number about 230,000 men, and there is reason to believe that they will continue to increase. b. Political. In Saigon, the Ky "government of generals" has survived, but accomplished little more during the period since last summer. The government, while recognizing many of its problems and working willingly with the US Mission, still lacks any broad, or even developing, base of support among the various political factions. No major faction (e.g., Buddhists, Catholics) is in open opposition, and all appear to be continuing their "wait and see" attitude. This lack of support probably will not be important over the short-run, so long as the generals in power remain united; over the longer term, however, some base of political support must be developed if the non-Communist elements in SVN are to become prepared to develop a viable society as security in the countryside is expanded and after hostilities cease. In the countryside, the government's political situation is even worse than in Saigon and other urban centers. The VC have savagely and thoroughly destroyed the political structure of the rural areas. The potential leaders who could form the nucleus of counter-VC efforts in each locale have been killed, intimidated or driven out, leaving the old, weak and incompetent behind. Even most of the war veterans are afraid to live in the rural areas and gather in the cities. Absent security (and where there is security, absent willing and able leadership), rural reconstruction (pacification) continues to make little, if any, progress. The very difficult problem of getting pacification moving has not been solved. c. Economic. SVN's economic situation today is grave for two reasons: (1) The Communist strategy has been to use some of Vietnam's economy to support the VC's own operations and to withhold the remainder from the Government and from those of the people who support it. Thus, in large part as a consequence of VC operations, Vietnam has become a food-import area, commodities cannot move freely within the country (e.g., rice from the Delta to Saigon), and the VC are in a position to derive much of their own needs (e.g., construction material, food, medical supplies) from the GVN. (2) The rapid and large US/GVN force build-up has introduced a new and strenuous competition for Vietnam's human and material resources. When added to the VC economic warfare efforts, the US/GVN build-up has resulted in a growing inflation in the Vietnamese economy. 3. Objectives in Vietnam. In my July 20 memorandum to you, I stated that in my view a "favorable outcome" for Vietnam has nine fundamental elements: (a) VC stop attacks and drastically reduce incidents of terror and sabotage. (b) DRV reduces infiltration to a trickle, with some reasonably reliable method of our obtaining confirmation of this fact. (c) US/GVN stop bombing of North Vietnam. (d) GVN stays independent (hopefully pro-US, but possibly genuinely neutral). (e) GVN exercises governmental functions over substantially all of South Vietnam. (f) Communists remain quiescent in Laos and Thailand. (g) DRV withdraws PAVN forces and other North Vietnamese infiltrators (not regroupees) from South Vietnam. (h) VC/NLF transform from a military to a purely political organization. (i) US combat forces (not advisors or AID) withdraw. I added that a "favorable outcome" could include also arrangements regarding elections, relations between North and South Vietnam, participation in peace-keeping by international forces, membership for North and South Vietnam in the UN, and so on. It was, and is, my belief that the nine fundamental elements can evolve with or without an express agreement and, except for what might be negotiated incidental to a cease-fire, are more likely to evolve without an express agreement than with one. Ambassador Lodge has set down his settlement terms (in Saigon 1377):/5/ /5/Document 176. (a) The area around Saigon and all of the Delta (55 to 60 per cent of the population of South Vietnam), the thickly populated northeastern strip along the coast (25 per cent of the population), and all cities and provincial capitals would be pacified; and all principal roads would be open to the Vietnamese military day and night. ("Pacified" is defined as the existence of a state of mind among the people that they have a stake in the government as shown by the holding of local elections; it also means a proper local police force. A "pacified" area is economically, socially and politically a part of the Republic of Vietnam.) (b) Those areas not pacified would not be safehavens for the VC, but would be contested by energetic offensive forays to prevent consolidation of a Communist base. (c) The VC would disarm, and their weapons and explosives would be removed from their hands. Their main force units would be broken up. Hardcore VC to go to North Vietnam. Chieu Hoi ("Open Arms") rehabilitation would be extended to individual VC who are suitable, with plans to resettle them. (d) North Vietnam would stop its infiltration and direction of the war. (e) The Government of South Vietnam would approve. Ambassador Lodge added that "this means that we would not be insisting on the complete elimination of the Viet Cong from all corners of the country although no land or safehaven would be allotted to them. It would mean that we and the GVN would control 80 to 85 per cent of the population and that the Viet Cong would be limited to the jungle and mountainous areas where they would go on as bandits, much as their counterparts do today in Malaya and in Luzon--and where the GVN would have the right to pursue them and try to destroy them." The question whether we should be prepared ultimately to settle for a "compromise outcome"--for something less than the terms indicated above--may have to be faced soon. The areas where there may be pressure to ease our terms are these: (a) Safehavens. The degree to which the VC are permitted to hold safehavens tacitly allotted to them; the extent to which the VC are permitted to tax in "their" areas and to retain a military organization for "defensive" purposes. (b) Force withdrawals. The extent to which hardcore VC on the one hand and US forces on the other must withdraw from South Vietnam. (c) Role of NLF. The extent to which the National Liberation Front is permitted to play a role in the political life of the republic--at local, provincial and national level. Easing of terms in any of these three areas--especially in giving the NLF status in the Saigon government--runs large risks of putting South Vietnam on the skids toward a Communist-controlled government, probably not "Titoist" but rather subservient to China. Furthermore, because of the attitudes of the present Saigon government and because of the importance of the GVN in any compromise gambit, a "compromise outcome" would be very difficult to manage. The GVN would probably support the "favorable outcomes" described above; but the GVN almost certainly would not support any "compromise outcome"--especially one which appears to "cede" territory or political recognition to the NLF. Our tactical concern in moving toward any compromise settlement, therefore, is the high probability that the Government of South Vietnam will shake apart in the process. That is, so far as tactics are concerned, we seem to have the problem that if we lower our sights to a "compromise outcome," we lose the support of the GVN, making the compromise impossible. (It follows that an essential part of any scenario to compromise would be the creation of a Saigon government not hostile to the compromise course.) On the substantive side of the compromise issue: It should be noted that the decisions that have already been taken this year, and the ones proposed here, are consistent with the strategy stated in paragraph 1 and with a striving for a "favorable outcome," and are probably inconsistent with any lesser objectives or other strategy. Specifically, we may already have passed the "Y" in the road: Our course of action has been and is increasingly becoming inconsistent with any design to settle, through negotiations or otherwise, for a compromise solution--especially one involving Communists in the Saigon government and the consequent high risk of quick Communist take-over. 4. Tools available. We have four tools available to us in working toward a solution to the problem in South Vietnam: (a) Military power in South Vietnam, Laos and in the adjacent waters; (b) military interdiction in and pressure on North Vietnam; (c) non-military effort in South Vietnam; and (d) efforts to negotiate. 5. Military variables. The military variables are (a) a Pause, (b) Rolling Thunder, and (c) Phase II deployments: a. Pause. An interruption in the program of bombing North Vietnam. The Pause would stand down all strikes and armed reconnaissance in North Vietnam for approximately four weeks unless its futility became apparent earlier. It would not involve stoppage of other reconnaissance or intelligence operations in North Vietnam or of any operations elsewhere. Particularly, ground and air operations in South Vietnam would continue. The Pause would be publicly acknowledged, but a serious effort would be made to avoid advertising it as an ultimatum to the DRV. Third countries would be encouraged to help produce meaningful negotiations and substantial reductions in DRV/VC activity. With respect to termination of the Pause, our state of mind could be (1) "hard-line" or (2) "soft-line": (1) "Hard-line" Pause. Under a "hard-line" Pause, we would be firmly resolved to resume bombing unless the Communists were clearly moving toward what is described above as a "favorable outcome." Special care would be taken to avoid being trapped in a status-quo cease-fire or in negotiations which, though unaccompanied by real concessions by the VC, made it politically costly for us to terminate the Pause. (2) "Soft-line" Pause. Under a "soft-line" Pause, we would be willing to feel our way with respect to termination of the Pause, with less insistence on concrete concessions by the Communists. (This kind of Pause makes sense only if we are working toward a possible "compromise outcome.") b. Rolling Thunder. The program of bombing North Vietnam (1) could be intensified abruptly by a sharp, heavy blow, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or (2) could continue to evolve at the present pace (the possibility of reducing the program is omitted): (1) JCS "sharp blow." The JCS would initiate immediately, and carry out in a few days, a program of air strikes against --Phuc Yen, Hanoi/Gia Lam, Hanoi/Bac Mai, Haiphong/Cat Bi, and Haiphong/Kien An airfields, including the aircraft thereon (Phuc Yen to be struck by B-52s). --Rail, highway and waterway routes and traffic between Hanoi and Haiphong and between Hanoi-Haiphong and South China. --POL storage facilities at Haiphong (or four thermal power plants generating approximately 50 per cent of North Vietnam's thermal power). --SAM installations and other AA defenses which pose a threat to the above air operations. The JCS would permit normal armed reconnaissance in all of North Vietnam, and would order follow-on strikes as necessary to keep the targets destroyed. They would conduct naval surface force operations against targets near the coast and against North Vietnamese shipping at sea. They would mine the harbors. Every effort would be made to minimize destruction of non-military installations; and the civilian populations, as such, would not be targeted. (2) Present evolving RT. At the present time, we are carrying out 600 armed reconnaissance sorties a week in the "three quadrants" and striking 2 fixed LOC targets a week in the "northeast quadrant" (but not against targets in the "China strip," the "Hanoi circle," or the "Haiphong circle"). Natural evolution of the program over a five-month period would maintain activity in the three quadrants at the present level, and would evolve in the "northeast quadrant" as follows: --1st month. Include Hanoi-Haiphong lines-of-communications targets (outside the Hanoi and Haiphong circles), with 2 fixed LOC targets in the quadrant each week. --2nd and 3rd months. No fixed targets in the quadrant, but "controlled armed reconnaissance" of selected routes at selected times and at the rate of 100 sorties a week. --4th month. EXTEND "controlled armed reconnaissance" to LOCs within the Hanoi and Haiphong circles and ADD strikes on 3 key POL targets a month. --5th month. In the first two weeks, ADD mining of Haiphong harbor; thereafter, change the armed reconnaissance in the northeast quadrant to the kind carried out in the other three quadrants and with no geographical limit except the strip next to China. (Left unstruck would be population targets, power plants, and locks and dams.) c. Phase II Deployments. US force deployments (1) could stop at the Phase I 225,000+/- or (2) could continue by deployment of a Phase II 125,000+/-. (1) Stop at Phase I. Limit US forces to Phase I deployments. Added expenditures attributable to Phase I, through FY 1967, are estimated to be $13 billion. (2) Deploy Phase II forces. Deploy 28 additional combat battalions and 4 additional tactical air squadrons and associated support forces (125,000 additional men), bringing the totals to 62 US combat battalions (plus 10 third-country battalions) and 26 US tactical air squadrons, or approximately 350,000 Americans, in South Vietnam. These deployments would be essentially completed by the end of 1966. They could be accomplished without calling up the Reserves or extending tours of duty, but, in that case, they would lead to further reductions in the strength of our strategic reserve to meet contingencies elsewhere. (An alternative would be to call up Reserves--not only replenishing the strategic reserves, but also giving a clear demonstration of US power and purposes.) Expenditures attributable to Phase II for its first 18 months are estimated very roughly to total $3 billion. It is estimated--as can be seen on Map II/6/--that, by the time Phase II forces are making their full impact in the Spring of 1967, the US/GVN would have "control" of 65 per cent of the population and 20-30 per cent of the land; 60-65 per cent of the critical lines of communications would be kept open; 40-50 per cent of the VC bases and military logistical infrastructure would be subject to disruption; and 30 per cent of the VC political/security infrastructure would be disrupted. /6/Attached but not printed. It should be noted that the MACV-proposed Phase II does not allocate any forces to the Delta. To handle the Delta properly, Phase II would have to be augmented by one or two additional divisions--30-60,000 additional men--bringing the Phase II total to 155,000 to 185,000 men. 6. Illustrative scenarios. Here are three illustrative courses of action for the future. It is my recommendation that we follow Course C. Course A: "Soft-line" Pause, then feel way re RT and force levels toward a "compromise outcome." This is a compromise course, aimed at reduced objectives described in paragraph 3 above. It would be extremely difficult to gain public acceptance of this course, in view of the size of the US investment already on the line; and it is very doubtful that a scenario for this course can now be written that would support the strategy in paragraph 1. The scenario probably would end up in disintegration in Vietnam, in political humiliation for the US, and in impaired US political effectiveness on the world scene. It also could lead to more costly confrontations with the Chinese later on. Course B: No Pause, with evolving RT, with no Phase II. This is a continuation of the present evolving course of action. This course of action can be supported in this way: (1) It will be January before the weight of our full Phase I effort really comes into play. By then we might see at least a significant adverse morale trend in the VC that would indicate we were getting somewhere. (2) It may be useful to give ourselves time to digest the impact of 225,000 men in terms of their effect on the Vietnamese psychology and economy. This is a factor that some reports, notably a recent cable from Saigon on inflationary and labor division problems,/7/ suggest may be becoming very serious, even to the point of being a limiting factor on our basic effectiveness in appealing to the people. (3) It would give the GVN additional time, hopefully without serious frictions with us, to get on with its part of the job and to build up a GVN contribution that would not be dwarfed by the US role, a present tendency in Vietnam. /7/Not found. On the drawback side are two factors: (1) Deferring additional US deployments--particularly in the face of continuing increases in VC strength--raises grave problems in our domestic situation. This is not solely a question of the war dragging on--which it can be argued it would be likely to do even with Phase II deployments--but rather, a question of not having clearly done all on the ground in Vietnam that appears wise. It would be still more serious, of course, if the rate of progress slowed down, as is likely to be the case. (2) The second drawback is that, by delaying the added deployments, we shall lose momentum in Vietnam--a momentum displaying a determination and confidence that is crucial to the psychology of the confrontation if we are to emerge with an acceptable solution. That is, the product of this course of action is virtually certain to be a stalemate by March 1966 under the unsatisfactory conditions described in paragraph 2 above. Course C: "Hard-line" Pause, then evolving RT with Phase II. This course involves all three controversial ingredients--(a) a Pause, (b) an evolving Rolling Thunder, and (c) Phase II deployments. a. Pause. The arguments for the Pause are four: (1) It would offer the DRV and VC a chance to move toward a solution if they should be so inclined--and we continue to receive hints that such may be the state of their minds. (2) It would demonstrate to domestic and international critics that our efforts to settle the war are genuine. (3) It would probably tend to reduce the dangers of escalation after we had resumed the bombing, at least in so far as the Soviets were concerned. And (4) it would set the stage for another Pause, perhaps in late 1966, which might produce a settlement. Arguments against the Pause are not so much that the North Vietnamese might profit from the respite to repair the damage or to increase infiltration. The arguments are related to Saigon, Hanoi and US hard-liner reactions: (1) In Saigon, bringing the GVN aboard would be difficult just in itself, and it could adversely affect GVN solidity. Any major falling out between the GVN and the US, or any overturn in the GVN political structure, could at this stage set us back enormously. (2) In Hanoi, a Pause might at least confuse our message and justify their tendency to think that, despite all our actions, we are really looking for an easy way out. We could offset this to some degree at the time by the kind of message we get through to them and by our continued actions then and later in the South, but there would still be some chance that the hard-liners in Hanoi would read it the other way notwithstanding. In other words, it could conceivably be a step away from getting Hanoi to seek a peaceful solution. (3) In the US, there would be rumbling among the harder-action school of critics. This might be kept under control during the Pause, but it could also mean that the pressures would increase thereafter to hit the DRV harder. b. Rolling Thunder. Intensification of the Rolling Thunder program, following the Pause, on an "evolving" (not "sharp blow") basis as described in paragraph 5(b)(2) above, is designed to accomplish the three fundamentals underlying the bombing program. Those are: --To promote a settlement. The program was designed (1) to influence the DRV to negotiate (explicitly or otherwise), and (2) to provide us with a bargaining counter within negotiations. --To interdict infiltration. The program was calculated to reduce the flow of men and supplies from the North to the South--at the least, to put a ceiling on the size of war that the enemy could wage in the South. --To demonstrate US commitment. The program was intended to demonstrate to South Vietnam, North Vietnam and the world the US commitment to see this thing through. While the gradual intensification runs some risk of "flashing" China or the USSR into some form of escalation, the risks of this are not great, especially after a Pause, and should be taken in order to keep pressure on the North to stop the aggression in the South. c. Phase II deployments. The predicted results of Phase II deployments are discussed in paragraph 5(c)(2) above. Note: There are two variants of Course C: (1) Delete the Pause, and carry out the evolving Rolling Thunder at the same time as (in parallel with) an early Phase II; (2) Postpone Phase II, putting Phase II after (in tandem with) a several-month's evolution of Rolling Thunder. 7. South Vietnamese reaction to Course C. The GVN will enthusiastically support the evolving Rolling Thunder portion of Course C; the people of South Vietnam, so long as we avoid population targets per se, will likewise support the program. Ambassador Lodge has advised that the GVN will react well to our Phase II deployments, performing better as a consequence (he states that the South Vietnamese, knowing our good record in the Philippines, Korea and elsewhere, are more afraid of our leaving than of our becoming entrenched as a "colonial" power);/8/ I agree with that assessment, provided we take appropriate action especially on the economic side to offset the shortages and inflation caused by the added US and GVN (and VC) efforts. The GVN, as indicated in the discussion of Course C in paragraph 6 above, may misconstrue the Pause--thinking that we are on Course A, looking for an easy way out; but this fear we should be able to handle. Absent Course C--or a course similar to it--we are very likely to find ourselves in a stalemate by Spring of next year. The odds are less than even that South Vietnam could hang on for long in that condition; centrifugal forces in the government and society, on which the VC have always counted to make up for their inferiority in numbers, would be likely to take over causing an eventual collapse and disintegration of the nation we have been supporting. While a similar stalemate could follow even Course C, it is considerably less likely and would certainly come later if it happened. The people of South Vietnam will, I believe, support our moves even though our numbers and functions by that time will be approaching those of an occupation force. /8/See Documents 170 and 188. 8. Communist reactions to Course C. The Soviets would probably seize upon the Pause as an occasion both to persuade the DRV to negotiate (and perhaps to dampen activities in the South) and to maneuver us into a position so that we could not resume the bombing of the North. With respect to the other aspects of Course C, the USSR can be expected only to throw propaganda barbs and to continue material assistance to North Vietnam. The Chinese have already sent non-combat personnel into North Vietnam to do construction and repair work. This could be expected to continue at an even higher scale. But they would probably not send regular combat forces or aircraft into the war unless we invaded North Vietnam or struck China. As in the case of the USSR, China might react against our ships at sea if she lost a ship to a mine at Haiphong. The DRV, like the Soviets, would try during the Pause to maneuver us into a position so that we could not resume the bombing. Later on, under the pressure of the bombing and blockade by us (and fearing the influx of men and influence from China) would probably, over time, look more favorably on a settlement in South Vietnam. At the same time, the DRV can be expected to send into Laos and South Vietnam up to several divisions of regular forces to help the VC. As stated in paragraph 2 above, there are indications that this is already under way. They could, by such deployments, match our deployments on a 1-for-3 or 1-for-4 basis, thus effectively canceling the likelihood that our Phase I and Phase II forces will be able to provide security to areas beyond the enclaves shown on the attached maps. If the DRV does this, we could find ourselves in a position where the pressures were great to invade or to bomb the cities in the North--actions which are likely to lead to open war with China if not with the Soviet Union. The VC can be expected to continue their "Phase II" sabotage, murder and guerrilla activities, while continuing to strive to build up a conventional military capability. They will depend more and more on regular PAVN forces; they will draw harder on the men and material in the areas they control, including the Delta; and they can be expected to try to bring the economy of South Vietnam to a grinding halt. The question, of course, is whether the pressure on the North and the added forces in the South can frustrate these VC designs. 9. Other actions in South Vietnam. The military moves recommended in this memorandum are essential to success in Vietnam, but they are not sufficient. The heart of South Vietnam will begin to beat and the body to breathe only when GVN militia, police, intelligence and administrative personnel have been introduced in sufficient strength to saturate the area, destroy the VC infrastructure and reestablish the agencies of Government. We are repeatedly told that the GVN is "just now starting" to revitalize this program. We must work hard with the government in Saigon, we must bolster the economy (inflation must be brought under control promptly and boldly), we must press on with our psychological warfare campaign, and we should be prepared to take a more active role in administration of the provinces and districts--even though it will have some attributes of a "military occupation." Ambassador Lodge is driving hard in these most difficult areas. 10. Actions in Laos. The pattern of infiltration and VC force augmentation strongly implies that Laos is being heavily used both as a channel and as a staging base for operations in South Vietnam. We may soon have to expand our air actions in Laos and to initiate large-scale ground operations there. Furthermore, as a part of any Phase III, if the tide of the war has not begun to turn, the time may come to attempt to seal off South Vietnam by land and sea. Contingency plans should therefore be available for the creation of a 175-mile-long anti-infiltration "barrier" to run near the 17th Parallel from the sea to Thailand. Any such barrier would of course have to be complemented by effective measures countering infiltration by sea and from Cambodia. To minimize political costs, Laotian FAR and Thai forces should probably be used at the west end, and Vietnamese and US forces at the east end of the barrier; and Souvanna's approval should of course be obtained if possible. (In the long term, taking into account the unstable nature of any likely settlement in Vietnam, such a barrier, perhaps manned ultimately by an international force, seems to be an essential.) 11. Political moves. Whatever military actions are taken, the US should continue to keep our lines of communication open with friends and enemies alike and should continue to keep our objectives well understood. Specifically, (a) we should continue the dialogue with Moscow, and should keep our ears open for signals from Hanoi or the VC, and (b) we should keep our allies and neutrals informed--at best, bestirring them to help toward a solution and, at worst, keeping their opposition within manageable proportions. 12. Appraisal. In view of the stagnation, and therefore the beginnings of disintegration, that is otherwise likely to occur in South Vietnam in early to mid-1966, we seem to have only two major courses open to us. One is to start immediately and carefully to plot a course toward cutting our losses (as listed under Course A in paragraph 6 above); the other is to increase our investment (via Rolling Thunder, Phase II, or both). The former course, as I indicated earlier, is inconsistent both with our strategy for Asia (see paragraph 1) and with our objectives in Vietnam (see paragraph 3). I therefore have recommended that we increase our investment in an effort to make further progress in Vietnam. Further progress inside Vietnam, beyond that predicted for Spring 1966 in paragraph 2 above, will have to be based on one or more of the following developments: --Snowballing support by the people of South Vietnam. --Increases in, and better, South Vietnamese forces. --Additional US or Free World forces. Popular support can be expected to snowball only after there is "hard" security; such security for most of South Vietnam is beyond the immediate horizons. GVN force increases and improvements are under way; but they will be slow and insufficient. We are left therefore with the need to deploy additional US or Free World forces. An acceptable and early end to the war, however, turns not only on proving that the VC cannot win in the South. It turns also on continuing pressure on the North. Both elements are required. The situation therefore clearly requires the Phase II deployments and probably requires continued evolution of the Rolling Thunder program. The best timing of these actions is debatable--whether they should proceed together or one before the other, and whether action should be postponed by way of a Pause. Taking into account all considerations--likelihood of success, risk of escalation, South Vietnamese reaction, domestic support, etc.--I favor the tandem, one-after-the-other scenario: Pause, then evolving RT, and then Phase II. I favor this sequence because I believe that there is a finite chance that a Pause will lead to a reduction in DRV infiltration and in VC activity (and possibly to profitable negotiations), and because I believe that a Pause is a prerequisite to US public and international acceptance of the stern actions implicit in the evolving Rolling Thunder and Phase II. I favor "evolution" of Rolling Thunder before Phase II deployments because, here too, I believe that there is a finite chance that added pressure on the North, without Phase II deployments, may be enough to bring the DRV/VC to terms; further, US public acceptance of Phase II deployments will be greater if such a Rolling Thunder program has been given a fair run first. It must be remembered, however, that none of these actions assures success. There is a small but meaningful risk that the course I have recommended--especially the harbor-mining aspect of Rolling Thunder--will lead the Chinese or Russians to escalate the war. US killed-in-action can be expected to increase to 500-800 a month. And the odds are even that the DRV/VC will hang on doggedly, effectively matching us man-for-man (taking into account the lop-sided guerrilla war ratio advantage), while our efforts may not push the South Vietnamese over the crest of the hill, so that the snowball begins to roll our way. That is, the odds are even that, despite our efforts, we will be faced in early 1967 with stagnation at a higher level and with a need to decide whether to deploy Phase III forces, probably in Laos as well as in South Vietnam. And even if my recommended course of action is successful in moving Vietnam toward a "favorable outcome," it will be difficult to disengage our forces. Any negotiated agreement would, as was the case in Laos, be little better than a reflection of the power situation on the ground. Unless an international force of some kind can be substituted, large numbers of US forces may be required to stay in Vietnam for some time. My overall evaluation is that the best chance of achieving our objectives, and of avoiding a costly national political defeat, lies in the combination of political, economic and military steps described in this memorandum. If carried out vigorously, they stand the best chance of achieving an acceptable resolution of the problem within a reasonable time. Robert S. McNamara/9/ /9/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. [Next documents]
|
