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200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, November 12, 1965, 9:23 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET. Secret. Drafted by Schwartz; cleared by Unger, Meeker, Sieverts, and Robert H. Miller, Director of the Vietnam Working Group; and approved by Rusk. 1315. Exdis for Ambassador from Secretary. I am deeply concerned about limited degree of GVN compliance with Geneva Conventions on treatment of prisoners. As you know, US is responsible under GC for treatment of prisoners transferred from US to GVN custody. Matter is urgent for sake of GVN and US image abroad and as it affects plight of US prisoners held by DRV and VC. We have an obligation to our soldiers and citizens to take every action not detrimental to security that increases likelihood American prisoners will receive satisfactory treatment. Leverage we can bring to bear on DRV and VC through ICRC and other international efforts depends to considerable extent on degree to which US and GVN standards of prisoner treatment meet requirements of Geneva Conventions. I believe that substantial compliance by GVN and USG with Convention and publicity given such compliance constitute one of best available protections against further mistreatment American prisoners. Accordingly request you raise matter personally on urgent basis with Prime Minister and other GVN officials where it will have most effect, impressing on them in strongest terms need for concrete, visible actions to implement GC. Most urgent requirement is for compliance with ICRC request for lists of prisoners and unaccompanied visits to POW's. This is essential first step, should not cause serious difficulties, and would have high potential for reciprocal benefits for American prisoners and for favorable publicity. Detailed discussion in septel./2/ Rusk /2/Telegram 1314 to Saigon, November 12. (Ibid.) In telegram 1725 from Saigon, November 15, Lodge responded that he was preparing an approach to Ky on this issue, but would discuss it with South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry officials to lay the groundwork in advance. (Ibid.)
201. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, November 17, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:21 a.m. McGeorge Bundy sent President Johnson a retyped copy of this telegram under cover of a November 17 memorandum that reads: "Here is Lodge's weekly telegram. He lays proper emphasis on the fact that this week it is the military developments that are the most interesting, but paragraph 4 on rural construction is of equal long-run importance." There is an indication on the copy of the telegram that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVI) 1760. For the President. Herewith my weekly telegram: 1. Military The most interesting event of the week was the appearance of military units in South Viet-Nam consisting entirely of North Vietnamese personnel. In addition to the three regiments of the North Vietnamese 325th Division already carried, General Westmoreland has evidence of the presence of the equivalent of one other division and possibly more. The North Vietnamese appear to be giving considerable attention to the improvement of the line of communications through the Laos panhandle. Earthmoving equipment had been observed. This would permit greater support to the Viet Cong. This adds a third facet to the war. We have hitherto had to cope with (1) the main force Viet Cong units, containing about 35 percent of Viet Cong strength and (2) the guerrilla terrorists containing some 65 percent--all directed by Hanoi. Now come units which are all from the north. The U.S. First Cavalry heavily engaged elements of four regular North Vietnamese regiments west of Pleiku near the Cambodian border for three days at the beginning of this week inflicting heavy casualties in what may turn out to be the biggest U.S. battle in the war to date. Prime Minister Ky told me at Tay Ninh today that he believes there are two NVN divisions in SVN and that "they will keep on sending divisions down until the line of communication is cut". 2. Basic political Today I went to Tay Ninh where Prime Minister Ky officially inaugurated a GVN program whereby about 700,000 acres of state-owned land goes to about 180,000 farmers. Communism took over China largely on the strength of the slogan "land to the tiller." In Tay Ninh I saw this slogan actually being carried out. I know of your long-standing interest in this and, as you know, the U.S. has helped a great deal. To me this is a concrete example of what we mean by "true revolution". The number of returnees under the Chieu Hoi program again increased over last week's figure. Analysis of police arrest figures for the first week of November showed a downward trend in the number of deserters and draft dodgers apprehended and an increase in the number of suspected VC and illegal residents rounded up. 3. Economic For the second successive week prices declined in Saigon, notably in pork, fish, charcoal and rice--the things the masses consume. Rice is actually below last year's level. This is in particular a vindication of our rice policy and in general none of the above would have been possible without U.S. help--and heroic measures in which many hardworking Washington officials can take pride. 4. Pacification--"Rural Construction" Minister Thang of "Rural Construction" traveled to I, II and IV Corps to meet new and provisional rural construction committees consisting of Corps and Divisional Commanders and Province Chief. He urged realistic planning, stimulation of local initiative, teamwork between military and civilians and, above all, response to the needs and aspirations of the people. He wants elections for executive leadership in the villages to be held as soon as there is freedom from intimidation. He shows marked enthusiasm and verve in all of this. Thang is also working on creating groups (cadre) which can go into the village and stay indefinitely, capable of self-defense. I now have learned that his two top priority objectives will be eight villages each in Quang Nam and Binh Dinh. The talk now is of a team of 60 men for each village of which the 40 man political action team will be the nucleus. These estimates and plans change all the time as they learn more about the realities, I report it as I learn about it. My feeling about pacification is two-fold: that we are certainly on the right track and all too often, that the train isn't moving. And then I think of the unfortunate results of going too fast and of striving for flashy effects as the Vietnamese are all too prone to do. I also recall that Minister Thang is not impulsive and is a careful, thorough, though energetic, man. And I conclude that maybe we can't go much faster at this stage. Lodge
202. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 17, 1965, 6:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6AA, High Level Comments re Bombing Pauses. No classification marking. I think you will want to look at this memorandum from George Ball/2/ on the subject you charged us to study in our meeting last week./3/ It may help you to decide whether you need a meeting on this subject tomorrow or Friday. /2/The Top Secret attachment was not seen by Johnson until November 28, after it was resubmitted by McGeorge Bundy on November 27; see Document 208. /3/See Document 198. As you will see on pages 8 and 9,/4/ the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State come out on opposite sides, and for very good reasons. The man who has to present next year's defense budget will want to have made a last full try. The man who has to cope with an effort by the Communists to embarrass us by ambiguous responses to a pause tends to be against it. (Schoenbrun's story today about the North Vietnamese feelers to the French is an example of what we could expect in spades in a new pause.) /4/Pages 8 and 9 of Tab A to Document 208 comprise Section IV. My own judgment is marginally against the pause, perhaps because I am more concerned with the diplomatic aspects than with the military budget. But I also have some feeling that if we pause, we may seem to admit that our bombing is the cause of the trouble, and this is simply not so. This is a matter which we can brood over without a meeting for another few days--if you wish--but it is of such importance that I feel an obligation to submit it to you now. McG.B./5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
203. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ Rio de Janeiro, November 18, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:13 a.m. Secto 16. Eyes only for the President and the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. I deeply regret that I am not in Washington to assist in handling press problems deriving from Sevareid story./2/ Here are my comments and suggestions as seen from here. You may wish to draft a suggested statement for me to make, taking into account issues which have been raised up there. /2/In the November 30 issue of Look magazine (on the newstands by November 16) Eric Sevareid wrote an account of a conversation with Adlai Stevenson, held just 2 days before Stevenson died. Sevareid's article, entitled "The Final Troubled Hours of Adlai Stevenson," claimed that U.N. Secretary-General Thant obtained agreement from North Vietnam in early autumn 1964 to send an emissary to Rangoon to discuss with U.S. representatives possible peace terms. According to the Sevareid article, "someone in Washington" insisted on postponing the meeting until after the Presidential election. When the matter was pursued after the election, Sevareid stated that Hanoi was still willing to talk, but McNamara was opposed to the idea. Thant supposedly offered to let Washington write the terms of a cease-fire, but McNamara turned him down and Rusk did not respond. 1. I am confident that Adlai Stevenson would not have written the Look article./3/ That is why he put his talk off the record. Nor am I confident that the article fairly represents the long conversation. I do not suggest we get into a pitched battle with Sevareid on veracity when the referee is dead. But I note that Sevareid did not report his conversation as a working reporter through his normal channel (television) but wrote a special article for which he probably received a very substantial fee. Under these circumstances, such an article is not likely to avoid the temptation of dramatic effect. But those of us who have spent long hours over a period of many years with Adlai know that one of his charms was a touch of Hamlet. On the subject of resigning, he and I had just had a long talk before his departure for Europe about his plans and arrangements and travel for the rest of the year and the handling of the General Assembly. He was reluctant to accept the job in December 1960 and every few months since then said something about perhaps staying through the "next General Assembly." /3/Ball discussed the Sevareid article on the telephone with Yost, Goldberg, Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy on the morning of November 17. Transcripts of Ball's telephone calls of 9:15 (with Yost), 10:45 (Goldberg), 11 (Rusk), 11 (Yost), and 11:15 a.m. (McGeorge Bundy) are in the Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Telephone Conversations, Vietnam. 2. On the Hanoi matter, my recollection is that there was some discussion of some such contact before November but I would have to check my own calendar for my own visits to New York and Adlai's visits to Washington to help my memory./4/ /4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, pp. 957-958. 3. At no time did Adlai Stevenson and I talk about this problem in connection with the US election. We discussed (a) the third-hand nature of the contact and U Thant's warning that Soviet official representatives in New York and Washington were not informed; (b) the absence of any indication as to substance; (c) the difficulties of contact in a relatively small country where diplomatic representatives are under many eyes; (d) the negative results of other contacts of which we were then aware. 4. You might consider, after checking with Paul Martin, surfacing the timing of the first Seaborn contact in Hanoi. The Canadians have already surfaced a part of them and the negative reactions which Seaborn encountered were a part of this problem. 5. Most compelling concern in my own mind was the possibility of a trap in the absence of any indication of a forthcoming attitude on any point of substance. I was concerned that bilateral contact in Rangoon would be made the basis for spreading the word among the South Vietnamese that the US was dickering for a settlement behind the backs of Saigon. Recalling the then situation in Saigon, this could well have been disastrous. 6. In diplomacy there is a difference between rejecting a proposal and not accepting it. This is illustrated by Stevenson's remark to Cleveland about "there may be a time--but not now." I did not think that we should use this particular channel at that time but, on the other hand, did not wish to foreclose that or any other channel for the future. This distinction was made to U Thant but was apparently lost on him. 7. Bob McNamara had nothing whatever to do with these particular conversations. Why Adlai Stevenson (or Sevareid) attributed a negative reaction to him is beyond my comprehension. 8. I recall that Stevenson and I together had a brief exchange with U Thant on this matter but I would have to check my calendar carefully to try to identify the date. In that conversation, I affirmed to U Thant our interest in a peaceful settlement and suggested to him that he use the same channel to probe the substance. He was very reluctant to do so and I do not wish to get into the problem of veracity with U Thant with Stevenson no longer here. 9. The President and I early this year discussed one aspect of this matter on which I believe an error was made and by me. U Thant, Stevenson and I were so concerned with secrecy that neither Stevenson nor I kept a written account of the conversations of last year. The President quite rightly suggested that anything in the nature of proposals coming from or through Stevenson be reduced to writing and that our response and reaction also be in writing in order to avoid misunderstanding. 10. U Thant's own recollections as reflected in Tosec 39/5/ seem to remove the idea that we on our side discussed this in relation to our elections although apparently he himself took such elections into account. /5/In Tosec 39, November 18, the Department of State reconstructed the Rusk-U Thant discussions from August 1964 to March 1965 on the Secretary-General's suggestion that the United States and the DRV meet in Rangoon to discuss peace in Vietnam. Ball told Rusk that the "highest authority" wanted Rusk's "best recollection of private talks with Stevenson on this subject," as well as any comments on modification of the reconstructed chronology. (Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Vietnam--U Thant) 11. I would have to say that neither U Thant nor Stevenson would lose the chance to believe that peace was about to break out and that they themselves had played an important part in it. But I would add that, at the time, Adlai did not express disagreement to me but seemed fully in accord with the idea that the possibility should be left open but that it should not be acted upon under the then existing circumstances. 12. It might be well to review the chronology of Hanoi's attitude beginning with their contempt for the Laos Agreements of 1962. It is ridiculous to suppose that Hanoi's attitude toward continuing or stopping the war turned upon whether one particular channel out of all of the channels which have been attempted was to be used. They have had literally dozens of opportunities to bring this matter to discussion or conference. Instead, they continue their infiltration, including regular army units, and have been resistant to suggestions for a peaceful settlement which have come to them even from within the Communist world. 13. Please let me know whether you think it is well for me to make a statement on this subject. I am appalled that Eric Sevareid would feel that the off-the-record nature of this discussion was canceled by Stevenson's death. But, I would have to say in his behalf that under the circumstances of off the record, Adlai could say things, as a scintillating conversationalist, which he himself would not say under conditions of complete context and responsibility. Rusk
204. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, November 19, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 41-Pt. Program in Non-Military Sphere in SVN. Secret. SUBJECT Attached is our status report for non-military programs covering roughly the past five weeks./2/ It may provide the President with a useful feel for what we've been doing. /2/Not printed. Bundy sent the report to the President under cover of a note that reads: "If you have time for it, this report on the non-military program in Vietnam is worth your attention--this continues to be our toughest long-range set of problems, in spite of all the headlines." There is an indication on the covering memorandum that the President saw it. (Ibid.) The very nature of the non-military struggle in Vietnam is such that we cannot realistically expect dramatic progress from one month to the next. During the past month there have been some concrete results and advances. Both our own efforts and those of the Vietnamese have been impressive, but these efforts must be measured against a backdrop of enormous economic, social, political and security problems. Much is being done. Much more has yet to be done. At the national level, the most encouraging sign continues to be the growing responsiveness of the GVN leadership to the requirements in this field and its willingness to take new initiatives. This constructive attitude is particularly evident in the areas of pacification program planning, rural reconstruction, labor relations, land reform. But this is but a first step. New programs must be implemented, enlarged, and sustained over the long run. The capabilites of the GVN to perform well here have yet to be proven. Its appeal and ties with the people, especially the peasantry, remain tenuous. At the GVN working level, the picture continues to be a dismal one of too much corruption, too little motivation. At the grass-roots level there continues to be decreasing effectiveness of local government. However, the GVN, supported by Ky personally, is giving renewed attention to this critical problem. Moreover, USAID efforts to improve the flow of funds to rural construction operations appear to be having positive results. It is the Mission intention, of course, to see that this attitude and trend continue and improve. The most critical immediate problem is the inflation which could undo the good effects of all our programs. This is being tackled vigorously not only on the monetary front, but by increasing the supplies of essential goods to areas outside of Saigon. Another critical problem, one that does not come through a program-by-program report, is the growing scarcity of manpower and materials in Vietnam. This is a matter calling for a comprehensive program review both here in Washington and in Saigon. You will be hearing more on this subject shortly. C
205. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 24, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Top Secret. Drafted by William Bundy and described on the source text as "Final Draft." The President was at the LBJ Ranch in Texas November 19-December 12. We have now done a careful official translation of the letter which Fanfani addressed to you through Ambassador Goldberg, on which Goldberg informed Valenti. Text is as follows: Begin text New York, November 20, 1965. The President of the General Assembly Mr. President: In the interview which you graciously accorded me at the end of May you repeated anew your firm intention to seek assiduously a negotiated solution for the conflict in Vietnam. In the hope of being able to assist in the realization of this noble purpose, I bring to your attention the following: On Thursday, November 11, in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh and the President of the Council, Van Dong, expressed to two persons (known to me) the strong desire to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Vietnam and, in summary, stated--according to what they wrote me--that "in order for the peace negotiations to come about, there will be necessary (a) a cease-fire (by air, by sea, by land) in the entire territory of Vietnam (north and south); the cessation, that is, of all belligerent operations (including therefore also the cessation of debarkation of further American troops); (b) a declaration according to which the Geneva Agreements of 1954 will be taken as the basis for the negotiations--a declaration made up of the four points formulated by Hanoi, points that are in reality the explanation of the Geneva text and which, therefore, can be reduced to a single point: application in other words, of the Geneva Accords." The text of the communication which I have received adds that "the Government in Hanoi is prepared to initiate negotiations without first requiring actual withdrawal of the American troops." To the same interlocutors Ho Chi Minh said: "I am prepared to go anywhere; to meet anyone." These are the essential points that one of the two interlocutors of Ho Chi Minh and Van Dong sent me in writing last night and which, in this letter of mine--confided to Mr. A. Goldberg, the US representative to the UN, so that he can deliver it promptly and confidentially--I bring word for word to your attention. You surely have other elements by which to judge the importance of the above. As President of the 20th Assembly, as a high official of Italy, as a sincere friend of the United States and of yourself, I hope that this contribution to the sought-for peaceful solution, always more necessary and more urgent, may be a useful one. And I am at your disposition for any step that you consider opportune in the matter. With sincere pleasure at your recovery and with best wishes for your high mission, I send my respectful greetings. Yours, (Signed) Amintore Fanfani The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States Washington End text As we read the message, it represents a simple restatement of the familiar Hanoi position. Although worded in the most palatable form possible, the second of the stated requirements for peace negotiations amounts simply to our accepting in principle the familiar Hanoi four points, the third of which required the establishment, under the NLF program, of an immediate coalition government in Saigon in which the NLF would play a leading and probably dominant role. We have never accepted this as a basis for negotiations, and never could without surrendering the most crucial of our objectives. The language about a "cease-fire" has never been expressed in quite this way before, but would amount to an immediate ban on our air operations in the North and on our continuing ground reinforcements, without any compensating act by Hanoi whatever in the form of stopping infiltration, reducing activity in the South, and withdrawing at least regular units. As you know, we have repeatedly told Hanoi through third parties that we cannot consider even stopping the bombing without compensating action in these three areas, and we have in effect said the same thing publicly in more general form. Accordingly, the message in substance adds up to a reiteration of a firm and inflexible Hanoi position consistent with all our other readings. It corresponds closely with what several third parties have told us of the position asserted by Ho and Pham Van Dong, and also with Hanoi's most recent public statements. The only possible glimmer of light is that Hanoi would not insist on prior withdrawal of US forces--but this too we have long believed they would not press for in the last analysis, and a similar statement was conveyed to us explicitly when the North Vietnamese approached the French just at the end of the pause last May./2/ /2/See vol. II, Document 313. I have consulted with Bob McNamara and Mac Bundy, and it is our recommendation that you approve an instruction to Ambassador Goldberg to discuss the matter promptly and fully with Fanfani along the following lines: a. Thank him profusely for his helpful effort. b. Explain carefully the generally familiar nature of the message and its unacceptable elements. c. Make clear that we would be most interested in pursuing the matter, in any appropriate way, if Fanfani's sources should be in a position to indicate, on the basis of a report which Fanfani might make to them, that there is some new light or some change in the unacceptable elements, which in effect amount to a reiteration of preconditions for any useful discussion. So that the record would be left in no doubt whatever, we have worked out with Ambassador Goldberg an informal written aide-memoire/3/ that would be left with Fanfani to supplement Ambassador Goldberg's oral presentation and to provide a complete record, for future reference both to Fanfani and to ourselves. /3/The aide-memoire was approved by Rusk on November 29 in the form of a letter from Rusk to Fanfani, December 4. (Memorandum from David H. Popper (IO) to Rusk; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The letter is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 918-919. William Bundy prepared a draft aide-memoire for Fanfani, November 22. (Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Vietnam Negotiations, Fanfani) Goldberg prepared a revised version on November 24. (Ibid.)
206. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Acting Secretary of State Ball and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, November 23, 1965, 10:10 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Telephone Conversations, Vietnam. No classification marking. McN said he had talked to the President about one aspect without consulting B because McN felt he knew how B stood. The Chiefs have been coming to a boiling point on bombing Haiphong. McN felt it would be wise to insure that Chiefs' views got to the President if Wheeler saw the President. Wheeler saw the President the day before the [he?] left. Wheeler got the impression from the President he favored bombing (POL?) and asked that Wheeler and McN come forward with a joint recommendation. McN said that he had briefly warned the President not to do it at this time. However, because of this feeling, McN thought he had better talk to the President himself. McN told the President on his own long-run program it would be some time in February and didn't see any objection in bringing it forward at the present time. He told him he knew State felt strongly opposed; that he thought McG leaned against it; and that he (McN) was not prepared to recommend it at this time. He didn't feel strongly about changing it from February to December. Said he would be willing to wait until Rusk's return, at which time they would discuss it. McN said that he did not tell the President his own recommendation--an installation of four to six weeks, with several bridges (7-9) and let them hit four of them, plus the surface-to-air missile support facilities. B replied that he would look at this with Bill. McN continued we have to decide what to do in Phase II. He believes we should put the troop strength and financial requirements into our budget; and, assuming the President does not want to make a firm commitment to the end of Phase II, we should begin shipping the troops in the battalion against that schedule in January, without commitment to go beyond a month--unless the President wants to make a stronger recommendation. B replied that this was his interpretation. McN said on this basis, he would be stopping in Saigon on his way back from Paris./2/ He had spoken briefly to the Secretary on this before he left. He was in favor; and the President is in favor of it. McN said he didn't know when we wanted to get Lodge back; since we face the decision to make it would be helpful to sit down with Westmoreland. The President doesn't want a Honolulu meeting or Lodge and Westmoreland both in Washington at the same time. For this reason, the best substitute would be for McN to visit Saigon on the way home. He would plan to be there 24 hours. This raises the problem of transportation. Does B want him to send a plane to pick him up in Paris? B replied that he would plan to go to Paris with McN (from London) and from there come back to Washington commercially. /2/McNamara was in Paris for the November 27 meeting of the Special Committee of NATO Defense Ministers. He was in Saigon November 28-29. For McNamara's recommendations to the President after his trip to Saigon, see Document 212. McN asked if B wanted to meet tomorrow or Thursday to talk about our approach to Wilson. B replied this could perhaps be done on the plane going over. However, he is available should McN wish to do it before that. McN replied they could decide this tomorrow. McN said he would draft a cable to Lodge telling him of his plans; would let B see it before it is sent./3/ /3/Not further identified.
207. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/ Washington, November 24, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Vietnam Negotiations, Fanfani. Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson and William Bundy. SUBJECT Goldberg saw Fanfani this afternoon (November 24) and informed him that we are actively working on a response to his letter and that our answer would come soon. Fanfani confirmed that one of his sources is Lapira. There are two other points of interest which Fanfani mentioned to Goldberg. Fanfani said that one of the sources reported to him orally that Ho Chi Minh said that he is so eager to get this settled that he would be willing even to go to Washington. Fanfani also told Goldberg that both sources had told him orally that their impression is that there is very deep suspicion in Hanoi of Peking. Today's conversation between Goldberg and Fanfani is being reported to us more fully by letter overnight./2/ /2/Letter from Yost to Sisco, November 25, attached to a memorandum from Sisco to Rusk, November 26. (Ibid.) IO--Joseph J. Sisco/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
The Bombing Pause and the Diplomatic Peace Initiative. November 17-December 31
208. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 27, 1965, 12:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6AA, High Level Comments re Bomb Pauses. Top Secret; Sensitive. A note on the source text states that this memorandum was received at the LBJ Ranch in Texas at 8:30 p.m. on November 28, and there is an indication that the President saw it. SUBJECT This is such an important question that I think you may want to look at it once again. Bob McNamara and I have the impression that your mind is settling against a pause, but we both believe that the matter is too important to be decided without making sure that the question has been explored to your satisfaction. I have mentioned our concern to Dean Rusk and while he is still against a pause at present, he has encouraged me to raise the matter with you once more. On November 17 I sent forward a memorandum from George Ball to you/2/ which outlined a scenario for a pause, and gave the pros and cons. The scenario is out of date, but the pros and cons are still pretty solid, and I attach them at Tab A, together with the conclusions and recommendations then reached by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. /2/For the covering memorandum, see Document 202. In the last ten days, one or two additional considerations have developed. First, the Sevareid episode,/3/ rightly or wrongly, has strengthened the impression among critics at home that we have not gone the full distance in seeking negotiations. There is now increased value in proving our good faith by a new pause. /3/See footnote 2, Document 203. Second, Westmoreland's recommendations for 1966 deployments have increased, and the fighting in the Plei Me area shows that we may have to look forward to a pretty grim year./4/ This again strengthens the argument for one further demonstration that our determination to seek peace is equal to our determination on the battlefield. /4/On October 19, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces attacked a Special Forces camp at Plei Me, 25 miles southwest of Pleiku, beginning a month-long campaign that pitted U.S. and ARVN troops against VC/NVN forces. On November 14, the campaign culminated in a battle in the Ia Drang Valley when elements of the U.S. First Cavalry Division engaged VC/NVN troops in more than division strength in the fiercest fighting of the war to date. On November 22, Westmoreland informed CINCPAC that because of the influx of North Vietnamese forces into South Vietnam, he would require a minimum of 13 additional battalions and probably twice that amount. (COMUSMACV telegram 210122Z to CINCPAC, repeated to the White House; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Cables) Third, McNamara's budget shows that the alarming figure he mentioned at the Ranch may turn out to be an understatement. Thus the argument for preceding that budget request by one or more peaceful effort is strengthened. Fourth, there is growing evidence that we can count on quiet but strong Soviet diplomatic support in pushing Hanoi toward the conference table during another pause. At the minimum, a pause will certainly intensify dissension between Peking and Moscow, with Hanoi in the middle. Moreover Dobrynin said to me that they were thinking of a pause of only 12-21 days./5/ /5/The last sentence of the paragraph is in Bundy's handwriting. He is referring to a conversation with Dobrynin on November 24. In a November 24 memorandum to the President, Bundy described the conversation as "the most candid and cordial conversation of our three-year acquaintance." Bundy related that Dobrynin "expressed again the well-known Soviet view that a renewed and longer pause would be helpful." Dobrynin suggested a pause of 12 to 20 days to allow for intense diplomatic effort, but offered no advance assurances of the results of such discussions. Dobrynin repeated the observation that it was impossible for North Vietnam to negotiate while under U.S. bombardment. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Memos of Conversation, 1964-1966) Finally, it is clear from the McNamara/Ball discussions in London/6/ that Prime Minister Wilson has some new Vietnam gambit up his sleeve which he means to discuss with you on December 17./7/ (He has not said what it is.) We will spike his guns and those of everyone else like him if we have a pause in effect at the time of his visit. /6/No records of these conversation have been found. /7/See Document 231. Thus, both the domestic and the international arguments for a pause seem to me substantially stronger than they were two weeks ago, and on balance my own judgment has shifted over toward McNamara. I think that any pause should be very hard-nosed, and we should expect that it will not lead to negotiations, but it will strengthen your hand both at home and abroad as a determined man of peace facing a very tough course in 1966. It is quite true, as I have argued before, that the bombing is not what started the trouble, but it is also true that we have a great interest in proving our own good faith as peace lovers. I also think that the diplomatic risks can be minimized by firmness and clarity about what we are doing, and that hardline criticism at home can be answered by what is done after the pause ends. Do you want further work from Rusk and McNamara on this?/8/ /8/The source text does not indicate the President's decision on this question. McG. B.
Tab A/9/ /9/Top Secret. As Bundy noted in the covering memorandum, this attachment comprises sections III and IV of a November 17 memorandum from Ball to the President. Section I was entitled "Basic Elements of a Second Pause," and section II was "Possible Date-Time Scenario of a Second Pause." Section III, printed here, was entitled "Pros and Cons of a Second Pause." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII) III. PROS AND CONS Pros The principal arguments for a pause are: 1. A pause could lead to either successful negotiations or a tapering off of military action in South Viet-Nam. Although the odds of this happening at this time may be long, the stake is high enough to justify the risks involved. It seems quite clear that the other side does not believe it can agree to negotiations or a cessation of military action while the bombing continues and we cannot know whether or not they desire a settlement until we try them out by a pause. Even if this pause does not bring about the desired result, it can set the stage for a later pause which may bring the desired result. 2. The President's offer of unconditional negotiations greatly strengthened our position throughout the world. A pause can have a similar effect by taking away from the other side the one valid argument they have against negotiations. 3. American casualties are mounting and further involvement appears likely. A pause can demonstrate that the President has taken every possible means to find a peaceful solution and obtain domestic support for the further actions that we will have to take. 4. There are already signs of dissension between Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and the Viet Cong. The pause is certain to stimulate further dissension on the other side and add to the strains in the Communist camp as they argue about how to deal with it. 5. A pause could reduce the likelihood of further Soviet involvement. It would not only help to convince Moscow that we genuinely desire a settlement but would also decrease the ability of Hanoi or Peking to bring pressure upon the Soviet Union for escalating their support. 6. Judging by experience during the last war, the resumption of bombing after a pause would be even more painful to the population of North Viet-Nam than a fairly steady rate of bombing. 7. The resumption of bombing after a pause, combined with increased United States deployments in the South, would remove any doubts the other side may have about U.S. determination to stay the course and finish the job. Cons The principal arguments against a pause are: 1. Although Hanoi has repeatedly stated that it cannot "negotiate" as long as the bombing goes on, there is no indication whatever from Hanoi that a pause would lead to meaningful negotiations or actions. Hanoi's continued military reinforcement of the South, plus what Hanoi undoubtedly considers a still weak security and political situation in the South, add up to what appears to be a very small chance that a pause would produce a constructive response. 2. Hanoi's objective with respect to the bombing is not a "pause," but rather a complete cessation. They could be expected to do all in their power to exploit a pause, not to move toward an acceptable settlement, but to prevent our resumption of bombing and cause us to lose the one card that we have which offers any hope of a settlement that does more than reflect the balance of forces on the ground in the South. 3. Regardless of any resolve we have made beforehand, a unilateral pause at this time would give Hanoi an excellent chance to interpose obstacles to our resumption of bombing and to demoralize South Viet-Nam by indefinitely dangling before us (and the world) the prospect of negotiations with no intent of reaching an acceptable settlement. For example, they could offer to enter into negotiations on condition that the bombing not be resumed and that the Viet Cong be seated at the conference on a basis of full equality with the Government of Viet-Nam. As it would not be possible to accept this latter condition, they could place us in the position of having resumed the bombing over a "procedural" question with respect to a conference. Thus, in the absence of any expression of interest or intent on their part to move toward a settlement that we would find satisfactory, the other side could at this time use a pause to reverse the present international situation, which is very favorable to us. 4. There is danger that, in spite of any steps we may take to offset it, Hanoi may misread a pause at this time as indicating that we are giving way to international and domestic pressures to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam and that our resolve with respect to South Viet-Nam is thus weakening. 5. Resumption of the bombing following a pause of considerable duration would assume a much more dramatic character than otherwise and could present the Soviets with those difficult choices that we have heretofore been successful in avoiding presenting to them. 6. Apart from the foregoing considerations, it will at this time be very difficult to obtain GVN acquiescence to a pause and could adversely affect the tenuous stability of the present government. Any overturn of the present government in South Viet-Nam could set us back very severely. Even if we obtained the acquiescence of the GVN, it would be very difficult to obtain their continued cooperation, particularly in public statements, throughout the duration of the pause. IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Secretary of Defense believes that a pause, with the associated obvious efforts to bring the DRV to a settlement, should be carried out. His main reason is (1) to lay a foundation, especially in the minds of the American people and of our allies, for the increased U.S. deployments, casualties, costs and risks that are in prospect. He believes also (2) that a pause now has a bare chance of starting a chain reaction toward a settlement. He thinks that, before intensifying the military confrontation and risks in Viet-Nam, the United States should make every effort to back the DRV/VC down by other means. Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense believes (3) that, even if a pause does not produce the full result this time, it would contribute toward a settlement later--that the "tacit bargaining" process with the Communists will probably involve several stages before the DRV/VC sights are brought down to a "settlement level" and that a pause now, even if the bombing must be resumed, will contribute to that end. The Secretary of State feels the balance of arguments is against undertaking a pause at the present time and that a pause should be considered only at such times as the chances appear to be greater than they now seem that it would lead in the direction of a peaceful settlement acceptable to us. The Secretary of State thus recommends that we continue our discussions with the other side through all possible channels, particularly exploring "what would happen" if there is a pause in the bombing. If such probes at any time give firm indications of a response by specific and acceptable actions on the part of Hanoi, a pause should then be undertaken. This is also entirely consistent with our public position and maintains what he feels is our present favorable international posture. George W. Ball
209. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the President's Special Assistant (Valenti)/1/ November 28, 1965, 2:05 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Secretary Rusk was in Washington; Valenti was in Texas. TELEPHONE CALL TO VALENTI (AT THE RANCH) Sec. said he couldn't reach McGeorge Bundy; wanted to find out whether a copy of the memorandum of conversation between B. and Dobrynin/2/ had reached the President. V. said it was on the President's desk now. Sec. said to tell the President that he thinks references in there to a pause are very important and that it seems to him that it would be useful to have McNamara bring Amb. Lodge back with him so we can go into this matter a bit;/3/ a time problem involved because McNamara might be leaving Saigon tonight. Sec. asked that the President him [give] him a ring or the Sec. will check in with him in an hour or two. /2/See footnote 5, Document 208. /3/According to telegram 1484 to Saigon for McNamara, November 28, the President did not wish Lodge to return with McNamara after the latter's trip to Saigon November 28-29. This did not preclude the possibility of Lodge returning to Washington in the near future. (Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 OSD) [Next documents]
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