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210. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, November 29, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Top Secret; Exdis. Several representatives of the American Friends Service Committee called this morning on Mr. Unger to recount a conversation which one of them, Mr. Lewis Schneider, had on November 16/2/ in Paris with Mai Van Bo, DRV commercial representative. This conversation suggested that the North Vietnamese position is considerably more flexible than we have heretofore been led to believe; it is of course difficult to evaluate how much was being said for the benefit of an American group which does not support the war in Viet Nam and how much represents approved DRV policy. /2/NB--Two days before last XYZ--BHR" [Footnote in the source text in Read's hand. Regarding the November 18 conversation with Mai Van Bo, see Document 185.] The following are the principal points made by Mai Van Bo in the Paris conversation (a full account is in course of preparation):/3/ /3/See Document 211. 1. Mai Van Bo accepted that the United States for reasons of face could not accept North Viet-Nam's four points and said that all that would be required to open the way to negotiations would be a clear statement by the United States in support of the principles of the Geneva Accords of 1954. 2. The withdrawal of American forces is not a prerequisite to negotiations; all that is required is a U.S. statement accepting the principle of withdrawal of US forces, presumably eventually. 3. The DRV will not agree to a ceasefire. Mr. Schneider also did not remember any reference to a cessation of the U.S. bombing of the North./4/ /4/Mai Van Bo also mentioned the possibility, instead of a ceasefire, of a mutual de-escalation of military actions but did not indicate how this might be brought about." [Footnote in the source text.] 4. Mai Van Bo said the DRV was prepared to make an important concession in that it was ready to accept the existence of two separate Viet-Nams, with South Viet-Nam as an independent country. 5. The DRV is prepared to talk with the U.S. but not with the Government in Saigon. On the other hand there are acceptable individuals outside the NLF (and possibly including some people presently in the Government) who could constitute a group which could be represented in the negotiations. Interestingly, Mai Van Bo stated that the DRV would have been prepared to negotiate with the Diem Government but it does not recognize its successors as governments. 6. Mai Van Bo said nothing about next steps. In answer to Mr. Unger's question, the Friends left open the possibility of their carrying the dialogue farther forward, although this point was not pursued. The AFSC called on Mai Van Bo for the purpose of asking whether North Viet Nam would permit the Friends to carry on humanitarian, civilian relief activities there. Mai Van Bo's answer on this is being awaited. The Friends realize of course that there would be questions about licensing goods to go to North Viet Nam and validation of passports for any American Friends who would wish to participate.
211. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 29, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Lake and approved by Herbert Thompson of S/S on December 22. The source text is labeled "Part II of II." The following note is typed at the top of the source text: "As indicated in the attached letter to Mr. Schneider from Mr. Unger, subsequent accounts of the conversation with Bo by Messrs. Mendel and Wood presented a less optimistic picture of the possibility of the DRV's agreeing to talks." The letter, dated December 5, is ibid. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS 1. Mr. Schneider said that Mai van Bo had made the following comments to him during the course of a conversation on November 16 in Paris on the possibility of the American Friends Service Committee's giving assistance to the people of North Viet-Nam: (a) It might be difficult for the US to accept Pham van Dong's four points as a basis for negotiations as it would entail a loss of face. Bo suggested that a U.S. declaration of agreement with the principles of the Geneva Accords would be satisfactory to the DRV Government as a basis for negotiations. In response to Mr. Schneider's question, Bo said that the DRV would not demand the withdrawal of American forces as a precondition to negotiations but would require that the US declare its agreement in principle to their eventual withdrawal. (b) Schneider raised the question of a ceasefire. Bo said that the DRV would not agree to a ceasefire before negotiations began but gave the impression that the DRV would agree to some sort of de-escalation. (c) Bo said that the DRV would not negotiate with the present Saigon regime, although it would have negotiated with the Diem Government. The successors to the Diem Government were not representative. However, there were many good people in South Viet-Nam, within and outside the National Liberation Front, from whom a group could be formed with which the DRV would negotiate. It was Mr. Schneider's impression that Bo might even have been suggesting that the US form such a group. (In response to Mr. Unger's question, Mr. Schneider said Bo mentioned no names but did mention some categories, including the Buddhists. He would check on what the other categories were.) (d) Bo said that the DRV was prepared to accept the existence of an independent South Viet-Nam, although they knew that this would not be in accordance with the Geneva Accords. (e) Mr. Schneider raised the question of an international body to guarantee a settlement. Bo volunteered the thought that the best international supervisory body might be a revitalized International Control Commission. (f) Bo said that the North Vietnamese were fighting for their independence. They knew what colonialism was like, as they had been fighting against it for a thousand years. Bo made no specific mention of either the USSR or the CPR. 2. In response to Mr. Unger's questions, Mr. Schneider stated that he thought that Bo was anxious to pass these thoughts on to an American and believed that Schneider would forward them to the USG. Bo said nothing, however, about what steps could be taken by the US to follow up on these statements, beyond his proposal that we declare our agreement with the principles of the Geneva Accords and our acceptance of eventual withdrawal of American forces. In response to Mr. Unger's specific question on whether the Friends would carry the dialogue further with Bo, Dr. White said that the Friends would try to be of assistance in any humanitarian way possible. They would prefer not to allow their involvement in political questions prejudice the success of their non-political, strictly humanitarian efforts, however. In response to further questions, Mr. Schneider said that Bo did not mention how de-escalation could be achieved, any connection between US bombing of North Viet-Nam and negotiations, or how the DRV assesses the protest movement in the United States (beyond his remarks on Norman Morrison). Mr. Schneider thought Bo understood well the fact that the AFSC was appealing to the DRV as well as to the US to find a solution to the conflict. 3. Mr. Unger thanked Mr. Schneider for passing on this information, remarking that some of it represented a change from previous DRV statements we had heard.
212. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 30, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2EE, Primarily McNamara's Recommendations re Strategic Actions. Top Secret. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum. This is a supplement to my memorandum to you dated November 3./2/ This memorandum incorporates the implications of events since then and information gained on General Wheeler's and my visit with Ambassador Lodge, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland in Vietnam on November 28-29./3/ /2/Document 189. /3/This visit lasted 1-1/2 days. A copy of the extensive briefing paper by MACV for the Secretary of Defense and General Wheeler, November 28, is in the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-324-69. 1. Introductory comments. Before giving my assessment of the situation and recommendations, I want to report that United States personnel in Vietnam are performing admirably. The massive Cam Ranh Bay complex has sprung into operation since our last visit in July; the troops that we visited (the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 1st Cavalry Division) have fought and are fighting well and their morale is high; and the team in Saigon is working harmoniously. 2. The situation. There has been no substantial change since my November 3 memorandum in the economic, political or pacification situation. There is a serious threat of inflation because of the mixture of US force build-up and GVN deficit on the one hand and the tightly stretched Vietnamese economy on the other; the Ky "government of generals" is surviving, but not acquiring wide support or generating actions; pacification is thoroughly stalled, with no guarantee that security anywhere is permanent and no indications that able and willing leadership will emerge in the absence of that permanent security. (Prime Minister Ky estimates his government controls only 25% of the population today and reports that his pacification chief hopes to increase that to 50% two years from now.) The dramatic recent changes in the situation are on the military side. They are the increased infiltration from the North and the increased willingness of the Communist forces to stand and fight, even in large-scale engagements. The Ia Drang River Campaign of early November is an example. The Communists appear to have decided to increase their forces in South Vietnam both by heavy recruitment in the South (especially in the Delta) and by infiltration of regular North Vietnamese forces from the North. Nine regular North Vietnamese regiments (27 infantry battalions) have been infiltrated in the past year, joining the estimated 83 VC battalions in the South. The rate of infiltration has increased from three battalion equivalents a month in late 1964 to a high of 9 or 12 during one month this past fall. General Westmoreland estimates that through 1966 North Vietnam will have the capability to expand its armed forces in order to infiltrate three regiments (nine battalion equivalents, or 4500 men) a month, and that the VC in South Vietnam can train seven new battalion equivalents a month--together adding 16 battalion equivalents a month to the enemy forces. Communist casualties and desertions can be expected to go up if my recommendations for increased US, South Vietnamese and third country forces are accepted. Nevertheless, the enemy can be expected to enlarge his present strength of 110 battalion equivalents to more than 150 battalion equivalents by the end of calendar 1966, when hopefully his losses can be made to equal his input. As for the Communist ability to supply this force, it is estimated that, even taking account of interdiction of routes by air and sea, more than 200 tons of supplies a day can be infiltrated--more than enough, allowing for the extent to which the enemy lives off the land, to support the likely PAVN/VC force at the likely level of operations. To meet this possible--and in my view likely--Communist build-up, the presently contemplated Phase I forces will not be enough. Phase I forces, almost all in place by the end of this year, involve 130 South Vietnamese, 9 Korean, 1 Australian and 34 US combat battalions (approximately 220,000 Americans). Bearing in mind the nature of the war, the expected weighted combat force ratio of less than 2-to-1 will not be good enough. Nor will the originally contemplated Phase II addition of 28 more US battalions (112,000 men) be enough; the combat force ratio, even with 32 new South Vietnamese battalions, would still be little better than 2-to-1 at the end of 1966. The initiative which we have held since August would pass to the enemy; we would fall far short of what we expected to achieve in terms of population control and disruption of enemy bases and lines of communications. Indeed, it is estimated that, with the contemplated Phase II addition of 28 US battalions, we would be able only to hold our present geographical positions. 3. Military options and recommendations. We have but two options, it seems to me. One is to go now for a compromise solution (something substantially less than the "favorable outcome" I described in my memorandum of November 3), and hold further deployments to a minimum. The other is to stick with our stated objectives and with the war, and provide what it takes in men and materiel. If it is decided not to move now toward a compromise, I recommend that the United States both send a substantial number of additional troops and very gradually intensify the bombing of North Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland concur in this pronged course of action, although General Wheeler and Admiral Sharp would intensify the bombing of the North more quickly. a. Troop deployments. With respect to additional forces in South Vietnam to maintain the initiative against the growing Communist forces, I recommend: 1. That the Republic of Korea be requested to increase their present deployment of nine combat battalions to 18 combat battalions (the addition of one division) before July 1966 and to 21 combat battalions (the addition of another brigade) before October 1966. 2. That the Government of Australia be requested to increase their present deployment of one combat battalion to two combat battalions before October 1966. 3. That the deployment of US ground troops be increased by the end of 1966 from 34 combat battalions to 74 combat battalions. 4. That the FY '67 Budget for the Defense Department and the January Supplement to the FY '66 Budget be revised to reflect the expansion of US forces required to support the additional deployments. The 74 US battalions--together with increases in air squadrons, naval units, air defense, combat support, construction units and miscellaneous logistic support and advisory personnel which I also recommend--would bring the total US personnel in Vietnam to approximately 400,000 by the end of 1966. And it should be understood that further deployments (perhaps exceeding 200,000) may be needed in 1967. b. Bombing of North Vietnam. With respect to the program of bombing North Vietnam, I recommend that we maintain present levels of activity in the three quadrants west and south of Hanoi, but that over a period of the next six months we gradually enlarge the target system in the northeast (Hanoi-Haiphong) quadrant until, at the end of the period, it includes "controlled" armed reconnaissance of lines of communication throughout the area, bombing of petroleum storage facilities and power plants, and mining of the harbors. (Left unstruck would be population targets, industrial plants, locks and dams.) 4. Pause in bombing North Vietnam. It is my belief that there should be a three- or four-week pause in the program of bombing the North before we either greatly increase our troop deployments to Vietnam or intensify our strikes against the North./4/ The reasons for this belief are, first, that we must lay a foundation in the mind of the American public and in world opinion for such an enlarged phase of the war and, second, we should give North Vietnam a face-saving chance to stop the aggression. I am not seriously concerned about the risk of alienating the South Vietnamese, misleading Hanoi, or being "trapped" in a pause; if we take reasonable precautions, we can avoid these pitfalls. I am seriously concerned about embarking on a markedly higher level of war in Vietnam without having tried, through a pause, to end the war or at least having made it clear to our people that we did our best to end it. /4/My recommendation for a "pause" is not concurred in by Ambassador Lodge, General Wheeler, or Admiral Sharp. [Footnote in the source text.] 5. Evaluation. We should be aware that deployments of the kind I have recommended will not guarantee success. US killed-in-action can be expected to reach 1000 a month, and the odds are even that we will be faced in early 1967 with a "no-decision" at an even higher level. My overall evaluation, nevertheless, is that the best chance of achieving our stated objectives lies in a pause followed, if it fails, by the deployments mentioned above. Robert S. McNamara
213. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/ Washington, December 2, 1965, 8:34 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Cables. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Flash. Also from Califano and Moyers. CAP 65799. We have been talking about Vietnam deployment recommendations for an hour this afternoon, and think the following preliminary thoughts are worth reporting. We accept for planning that Westmoreland's deployment recommendations should be approved and that in all probability these deployments will take place in 1966. We do not see any good way of second-guessing Westmoreland and McNamara, although we can have a whack if you ask us to. On this assumption, the December decisions seem to fall in four categories: 1. Proving that we have done everything that we could to move toward peace; 2. Preparing a solid base for the chosen level of later military action; 3. Building advance consensus for the probable budgetary consequences; 4. Balancing the size and energy of Westmoreland's effort by action to the limit on the political, social and economic front in Vietnam. Our preliminary thoughts on each of these follow: 1. Efforts for peace. We see four broad general possibilities here. (1) First and most narrowly, we could make a high-level official gesture to Hanoi proposing unconditional discussions at any one of a number of fixed times and dates and places. One way of doing this would be to send Harriman to Paris to speak to Bo, since Bo is the most visible representative of Hanoi in the West, and Harriman is your most distinguished envoy of peace. We think this should probably be done privately for later surfacing. But it could also be publicly announced if that seemed better. Even if Hanoi unyielding, you will have made specific dramatic effort before Congress returns. Other simultaneous messages to appropriate capitals should be going on during this effort. (2) You can have a pause in bombing the north. Califano and Moyers think any such pause should probably be very brief, while Bundy shares McNamara's feeling that if we do, it should have a length of 3-4 weeks for international reasons. We all agree that such a pause should be quite hard-nosed. We would make it very clear that we were doing it to see whether there would be a response, and that in the absence of a response we would keep a fully free hand. One strong argument for a pause is that we all expect that it will be necessary to intensify the bombing substantially in 1966, and we will need to have shown that this is the fault of others. (3) We are in the Christmas season, and it is possible that you could declare a Christmas armistice or ceasefire on a still wider basis, both in the north and in the south. Such a moment of peace could be as short as Christmas day, or as long as three weeks, depending on the balance of advantages and disadvantages. There are real difficulties with this course in South Vietnam, but it has a certain Johnsonian scale. During such a pause our men would of course be free to defend themselves and to reply sharply to any particular attack. (4) Our diplomatic position on the Geneva Accords and free elections and the eventual future of Vietnam still lacks sharpness and punch. We think you should insist on a wholly new level of directness and definition in our peace aims for your State of the Union message. 2. Preparations for next military courses. (1) Our principal preliminary thought here is that you might call Westmoreland back to consult with you. The deepest domestic danger we see is from those who will charge us with a no-win policy, and our best protection is that you and the responsible commander are on all fours. Moreover, we all feel that reading Westmoreland through other men's eyes--even the eyes of McNamara--is not good enough for a Commander-in-Chief facing the decisions that are now before you. Understanding between you and Westmoreland will also help in insuring that the Chiefs stay with us. Only Wheeler himself among them is as broad gauged as Westmoreland. (2) December should also include contingent decisions to make Westmoreland's deployments and probably to intensify bombing in the north in 1966, unless peace breaks out. Such preliminary decisions would help keep the Chiefs and other military on board during any pause or ceasefire or diplomatic peace offensive. (3) We would side strongly with McNamara--and might even go beyond him--in avoiding any reserve call-up or other action not immediately required to meet Westmoreland's needs. In other words, we would carry forward the principle of minimum necessary action which you laid down in July. 3. Preparing the country for the FY-66 supplemental and the FY-67 budget. (1) During this month, the military budget, as well as the civilian one, must be pushed down as far as is consistent with both your basic programs and your ability to withstand charges of concealment. In this connection we are exploring the manner in which the Korean war was financed by Truman. (2) As your budgetary decisions become clearer, more of the advance background notices of the kind Moyers gave last week could be released to selected elements of the press. (3) We should get the Business Council to support your budget and any related actions we take as noninflationary, and we should get the top labor leaders to keep the labor movement within economic guidelines. (4) Before you make any dramatic decisions related to tax increases or even more drastic anti-inflationary steps, people like Heller should be consulted, as well as your principal economic advisers. Peace steps, military preparations and overall budgetary/economic planning will require most careful orchestration and a gradually growing process of public comment which we should turn our way just as far as possible. It occurs to us that someone like David Ginsburg might be called in to give full time to this problem, so that we get the speeches and statements of support which we want all across the spectrum of opinion from Tom Dewey to Walter Reuther. These are just our preliminary thoughts. You will clearly need close consultation with Rusk and McNamara before these bridges are crossed, and we think you may also need a chance to talk with more detached advisers like Clifford and Fortas. And as you approach final decisions, you will also want to consult Eisenhower and the Congressional leadership.
214. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/ Washington, December 3, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Cables. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The date-time-group on the source text is illegible. An earlier draft indicates that the telegram was sent on December 3. (Ibid.) CAP 65810. 1. In two meetings today,/2/ Rusk and McNamara have made significant progress in clarifying their own thinking on Vietnam. So far they have concentrated mainly on the actual course of war and diplomacy, and have not yet got deeply into the critical questions of political management which Joe and Bill and I opened in our message to you last night./3/ But I cannot disagree with their judgment that it is important to sort out the military and diplomatic priorities. /2/According to Rusk's Appointment Book, the Secretary met with McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and U. Alexis Johnson from 12:30 to approximately 3 p.m. Rusk also met with McNamara, Vance, Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, and McGeorge Bundy from 6:03 p.m. to 7:52 p.m. This telegram was apparently sent during the evening of December 3. (Ibid.) /3/Document 213. 2. Today's discussions confirm the judgment that we shall almost surely wish to proceed energetically on Westmoreland's course in South Vietnam. Thus all of us believe that we should accept for planning purposes additional deployments averaging fifteen thousand a month over the next year. It does not follow that we should announce a large lump sum increase anytime soon. Indeed our preliminary judgment is that steady increase of pressure on the ground should be as undramatic as possible--and of course should have as many third country battalions as we can get (separate paper from McNaughton on this will be in tomorrow's pouch)./4/ /4/Dated December 4. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Memos (A)) 3. At the same time the two Secretaries do share increasing concern about possible Chinese involvement. There will be a special briefing tomorrow morning/5/ at which they will hear what Max Frankel has already been told. I continue to share Alex Johnson's view that Chinese Communists will not fight for South Vietnam but only for what they regard as survival of North Vietnam. /5/Hughes and Whiting of INR briefed Rusk, Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, Thompson, McNamara, Vance, McNaughton, and McGeorge Bundy beginning at 9:35 a.m. on December 4 at the Department of State. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book) No other record of the briefing has been found. 4. The open question is the pause. The day's discussions here have increased support for some form of pause. I will send a memo tomorrow developing pros and cons further,/6/ but the long and short of it is that we think the international advantages outweigh the international traps. We also think that firm and steady action in the south, together with public awareness of Chinese Communist danger, should keep most Americans in line with any decision you take on this matter. /6/Document 215. 5. We have agreed to make assignments for detailed planning documents in all relevant fields in a further meeting tomorrow morning,/7/ and it is our current intention to have all papers ready for discussion with you by the end of Monday,/8/ so that we could fly to you on Tuesday if you wish. The controlling item in urgency here is the pause, because it will require intensive diplomatic preparation in more than one capital if it is to have minimum danger and maximum benefit. /7/These assignments were probably made at the briefing by Hughes and Whiting described in footnote 5 above. /8/December 6. 6. Meetings today have shown the Secretary of State at his best in the leadership of a complex discussion with a small group he knows well. At the direct request of the two Secretaries, Califano and Moyers have not been included in these meetings, but I have told the Secretaries that I think it important to keep them both fully informed of the course of discussion separately, and both Secretaries have agreed. Both Joe and Bill have a deep and penetrating understanding of your immediate interest, and together the three of us will try to keep in touch with all aspects of the matter from your point of view. But the Secretary of State feels that he has a direct instruction from you to operate this review and my judgment, in which Moyers concurs, is he should run it his way unless you have other instructions.
215. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 4, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. There is an indication on the source text that this memorandum was received at the LBJ Ranch in Texas at 11 a.m. on December 4, and that the President saw it. 1. I promised you yesterday a memorandum by this pouch on the pros and cons of the pause as it now looks. This memorandum is a personal assessment for your interim consideration. There should be a further paper with fairly general support within the Administration by the end of the day on Monday./2/ /2/December 6; see Document 220. 2. The opinion in favor of a pause continues to grow here. This morning there seems to be a favorable consensus among Rusk, McNamara, Vance, Ball, McNaughton, the Bundy brothers, and Tommy Thompson. We think this is the best single way of keeping it clear that Johnson is for peace, while Ho is for war. This has great advantages in balancing the further military deployments and the big military budget. It has advantages with all third countries, and perhaps particularly with the Soviet Union. Thompson points out that a pause would greatly strengthen the Russian resolve to stand clear of our fighting in Vietnam. 3. The pause also has an important political advantage which has only recently emerged in our discussions. If a pause should lead to the conference table, it would mean that Hanoi had given up one of its current conditions--which is the acceptance of the program of the NLF (the Viet Cong). Thus such a move by Hanoi would drive a sharp wedge between Hanoi and the Communists in South Vietnam. We know that it is just this kind of sell-out that the southern Communists fear. Thus, a pause which led to negotiations could be strongly defended in Saigon and with hard-liners at home as a very powerful instrument of attack on Viet Cong morale--since all of our mounting pressures in the South would still continue. Moreover, we are increasingly persuaded that there is no trap we cannot manage in deciding when and how to end the pause. We would make it clear at every stage that the continuation of the pause and its ending would both be governed by our judgment on the continuing aggression from the North against the South. (To put it another way, while a pause might lead to negotiations, we would never commit ourselves to a permanent end of the bombing merely in return for a conference.) Thus either the infiltration would stop, or we would have a perfectly legitimate and internationally defensible reason for renewed bombing at a time of our choice. 4. We are not agreed here on the timing of a pause. Most of us have thought that it probably ought to happen in December and early January, so that you could end it or not--as you chose--around the time of the State of the Union message. But we now think that perhaps it could come later--and might even be a balancing element in your military announcements for the effort in South Vietnam in January. This needs more thought. 5. The weaknesses of the pause are two--one international and one domestic: The international danger is that it would simply shift the propaganda of soft-liners from the bombing to the need to recognize the NLF. Our current line on this is fairly good--that Hanoi can bring anyone it wants. But the pressure would grow to give some more explicit recognition to people who "control one-half the country." This is exactly what we must not do if we do not wish to lose the whole game in South Vietnam. But sooner or later we are going to have to face this music, and perhaps it is not so bad to face it now during a pause. The domestic problem is more severe. The Joint Chiefs are now pressing very hard for escalation of the bombing, and the whole American Right is likely to be tempted by the argument that just at the moment of trial we are weakening in our support for our men in Vietnam. McNamara can make a very convincing argument that the bombing in the North is only marginally related to the fighting in the South--whether or not we escalate. But it is hard to get certified military agreement to this proposition. Against this, of course, we have the pronouncement of the National Council of Churches, but it is far from clear that they really represent their congregations./3/ /3/On December 3, the general board of the National Council of Churches in Madison, Wisconsin, released a policy statement that noted with approval the Johnson administration's commitment to unconditional discussions with North Vietnam and its policy of not bombing population centers. It also urged the President to take new initiatives in seeking peace in Vietnam. 6. This is only a preliminary paper, but I think it does contain the central elements of what will be the most urgent question before us when we meet with you. McG. B.
216. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 4, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Memos (A). Secret. Dear Mr. President: I have today had a long conversation with Dean Rusk and George Ball regarding the situation in Vietnam./2/ I know that you will be faced with some further difficult decisions in the coming days ahead in light of the report made to you by Bob McNamara on his recent trip. Dean and George will convey my views in detail to you at your meeting on Tuesday./3/ However, I would like you to know that I strongly favor an early pause in the bombing of North Vietnam, perhaps for 3 or 4 weeks, with a new indication of our willingness to negotiate. I come to this conclusion even though I realize that there is risk that if a pause leads to negotiation it would be difficult to resume bombing North Vietnam as long as those negotiations continued. /2/According to Rusk's Appointment Book, Rusk left the briefing by Hughes and Whiting at 11:08 a.m. (see footnote 5, Document 214) for discussions with Goldberg and Sisco, which lasted until 11:31 a.m. Rusk rejoined Goldberg, Sisco, and Ball from 12:30 to 12:55 p.m. (Johnson Library) /3/December 7; see Document 223. My reasons are as follows: 1. If further escalation is in prospect, such a move would help tremendously in carrying world opinion with us. 2. From my talks with the Secretary General and with many UN delegations, I am convinced that such action would be welcomed and strongly supported all over the world as further confirmation of the earnestness and sincerity of the United States' determination to leave no stone unturned in trying to move the Vietnam problem from the battlefield to the conference table. A pause would be a concrete act adding immense reality and weight to your statements calling for unconditional discussions. Such a decision, despite no positive signals from the other side, would be viewed as an undisputed act of statesmanship, an act only a great and strong nation could take. 3. The same is true as regards American domestic opinion. The recent statement of the National Council of Churches is only one sign of mounting concern among responsible citizens as a result of our increased commitment of manpower and the additional American casualties being incurred. A pause would increase the confidence and assurance of the preponderant majority of the American people that while we intend to honor our commitments in Vietnam, you will exhaust every means to make our willingness to negotiate unmistakably clear. 4. Such a proposal would put the Communists further to the test and would intensify pressure on them to negotiate. 5. It would make it less difficult for the Soviets to abandon their present passive attitude and actively to seek to bring Hanoi to the conference table, even in the face of continued opposition from Peking. At least it would offer hope of a more fruitful Soviet-American dialogue on this subject. 6. It would place Hanoi and Peiping in a defensive position in relation to the non-aligned world; it would reassure our friends and supporters and reinforce their domestic position; it would restore the initiative in this matter where it properly belongs, to the leader of the greatest power in the world, the US. The impact of such an announced pause would be enhanced if coupled with a strong personal reaffirmation on your part of our willingness to go anywhere, at any time, at any level, to negotiate. You might well link this with a restatement of our peace aims in Vietnam. If you approve this course of action, I would strongly urge you to make such an announcement in the UN General Assembly, before the Assembly closes on December 21. This would have the maximum dramatic effect and would be consistent with your desire to use the UN to the utmost. I have set forth these views of mine which I strongly hold in rather brief and summary fashion, but I shall be very glad to elaborate upon them if you so desire. Respectfully submitted, Arthur J. Goldberg/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
217. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 6, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:41 a.m. 2024. Eyes only for Bundy. 1. Archbishop Palmas, the Apostolic Delegate, "bumped into" me at the garden party last Sunday night celebrating the King of Thailand's birthday and immediately brought up the matter of the Viet Cong wanting to see me with regard to ending the war./2/ He said: /2/See Document 191. 2. Just as he and I had surmised, it has taken them one month to consult with each other. The "former Minister" had called on Palmas last Wednesday or Thursday/3/ and had said: /3/December 1 or 2. 3. The leaders of the VC with whom he is in touch had had a long discussion on just what their terms for ending the war should be, and they have decided on three things: 4. First, the United States presence should remain in South Viet-Nam. 5. Second, the United States would guarantee the sovereignty of South Viet-Nam. 6. Third, there would be no negotiations with North Viet-Nam. 7. They also would send a man with "Ambassadorial" rank to see me who would have the necessary letter of credentials. 8. Palmas added that his "former Minister" wept while talking about the sufferings of the Viet Cong, and stressed the urgency of ending the war. He also said there was great alarm among the VC about the entrance of the North Vietnamese troops into South Viet-Nam. He implied that the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam have the same feelings about Hanoi that Hanoi has about Peking. 9. The "former Minister" also said, according to Palmas, that those who say he and his friends are pro-French "should remember that it is we who killed the French Vice Consul Bion." 10. Palmas asked what I wanted to do when the "former Minister" came again and asked whether I would receive him. I said I would like to know what his name was before I could answer such a question, but that I would certainly "make some arrangement." 11. He asked me whether I would receive the representative of the Viet Cong. I said that if he was of high rank--a true envoy plenipotentiary--that I would talk with him but that I did not want to have them send a subordinate official to talk with me. Palmas said that he had been assured that they would send a man "with ambassadorial rank." 12. Comment: This is a surprising development. I suspect this is a splinter group who will not be able to end the war. But it may presage a real split within the VC. If they could end the war, then we could not possibly ask for better terms. If I am in any doubt as to whether the so-called representative is really senior or not, I will have an Embassy official talk to him to verify that point. I am sure, however, that there is no use in any American here other than me talking peace terms. Both my Residence and that of the Apostolic Delegate are constantly watched, but I think I can find a place which is not watched and where I can meet this man. Lodge
218. Personal Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, December 6, 1965, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of McGeorge Bundy, Notes for December 6, 1965. No classification marking. These notes were handwritten by Bundy for his personal use. The meeting was held in Rusk's conference room at the Department of State. PARTICIPANTS Rusk and McNamara state the current military program. Chiefs concur. A. Scenario A. Political and Social Action Program Clifford wonders where the Hell we are going--further & further in with no prospect of a return. Kind of war Mao Tse-tung would fight. But we must do the job--he is sure of that. Can't we use Air Power & hold in defensive positions on ground. Without 600,000 ground troops in jungle war. Clifford remembers Korea. Can we get to the same limited goal by less costly means. DR: retrospectively perhaps we should have done much more in 1961--maybe 200,000 men to cool 'em off quick. Wheeler: We have got a real initiative. No one ever won anything by remaining on defensive. We already are pouring air on in SVN--a quantum jump in air power. DR: US people will do what has to be done if they are sure that everything possible is being done. Increasing non-military actions. 1. model provinces Sargent Shriver to be deputy for Peace [of a] Southeast Asia Peace Agency. Clifford's negative argument: 1. admit you're wrong. 2. they put you in a box if you ever resume. Wheeler: any substantial pause will allow them to repair & move. We've paid price once in planes & pilots; we'll have to pay it again; violent reaction is possible in our own public; the other side will get the wrong signal. Once you stop it's hard to start again & you could shake GVN to its toenails. If we increase the bombing in the North, we could argue for it now. The world is happier because of it. Clifford: try & get the benefit of Pause without Pausing. This is the time to negotiate: an all out effort with some indication that it is a last minute effort.
219. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, December 6, 1965, 6:10 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk and cleared by William Bundy. 1576. Literally eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. I was much interested in your Nodis 2024./2/ While one must be skeptical for a lot of reasons, the possibility of any significant defection from the liberation front has great potential importance. I would suggest that you follow up along the lines of your telegram. /2/Document 217. It may be that such a group is only a splinter. There would be great advantage, however, if such a splinter had any territorial base which opens up the possibility of a rapid peace in even two or three provinces. Amnesty arrangements might be made and through full cooperation with intelligence, police activities, etc., North Vietnamese elements could be prevented from punishing the splinter group. Depending upon the circumstances, some tacit understanding might even be thinkable which would leave the splinter group certain privileges in a particular area provided the writ of the government ran on other matters. I have in mind the arrangements worked out with the two sects in the Southwest. You would have to be a little careful about a commitment not to negotiate with Hanoi unless the dimensions of the breakaway are far greater than you and we presently believe. In view of the public position of the President, a commitment on negotiations would need checking with us. I leave to your judgment the complex question as to when and whether General Ky ought to be informed very privately of such a contact./3/ I should think that he would be tempted by the possibility of a major defection and there is always the possibility that he would learn about a contact through channels other than your own. /3/In telegram 2037 from Saigon, December 7, Lodge agreed fully about avoiding any commitment to negotiate with Hanoi and said he would "agree to nothing" at any meeting with an "Ambassador" from the National Liberation Front. Lodge wanted to tell Tran Van Do, rather than Ky, after the meeting took place. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) We are not allowing our hopes to rise on this matter but a significant split within the Viet Cong would be a most welcome Christmas present. With warm regards. Rusk [Next documents]
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