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230. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 15, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:09 a.m. 2147. For the President. Herewith my weekly telegram: 1. Course of the war The entrance of North Vietnamese troops in large numbers into South Viet-Nam is truly an escalation of the war, with all the serious connotations which attach to the word "escalation". For Hanoi, it means grave risks; for us it means the grimness of intensified effort. If it were not for the incursion from Hanoi we could be taking some satisfaction from the progress which has been made with regard to the rank and file Viet Cong. Porter recently was in a village surrounded by Viet Cong when one defector came into the village and said that he and his comrades simply could not stand the air and artillery attacks anymore, adding that if he was well treated many more of his comrades would come out. He appeared emaciated. Viet Cong defectors to the Chieu Hoi camps during November numbered 1,482, the highest monthly total on record, with air and artillery attacks also playing a big part. 22 members of a V.C. platoon surrendered a few days ago to the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade. This is believed to be one of the largest single groups ever to surrender voluntarily to U.S. forces. Mr. Goure, of the Rand Corporation, told me that his 14 selected Vietnamese investigators had interviewed about 180 Viet Cong prisoners and defectors between July and December of this year. They noted a change as between 1965 and 1964. In 1964, 65 percent believed in victory because they were convinced the Viet Cong had the support of the people. In 1965, only 20 percent believed in victory. This too is due in great part to the jets, the B-52s, artillery and helicopters. In particular, the B-52s had had a big impact with their destruction looming large in Viet Cong eyes because of the comparison of sizes of bomb craters with the sizes of their own dwellings. The air attacks had put the value of their passive defense measures in doubt and made them realize there was no survival by digging. They also had fear of detection and were obsessed with the idea that there were agents among them. The officers of one main force battalion made everybody strip off their clothes so as to look for hidden radios. Defoliation had been effective in enhancing detection. V.C. had adopted the practice of cooking in villages so that the smoke of their cooking would not be detected. If villages were not available, they cooked in special ovens so as to dispel the smoke. These are cumbersome. They also try to put out a fire when a plane appears. The result is that many units are down to one hot meal a day at 3 o'clock in the morning. The average food consumption is one can and a half of cold rice a day. There is much beri-beri. There is also a high rate of malaria in the army of North Viet-Nam. Other items are: The army of North Viet-Nam abandoned the dead at Plei Me. It is curious, he said, that there are no amputees, blind men, under-nourished veterans to be seen anywhere in the towns of North Viet-Nam. What happens to them? The V.C. believe that the refugees, by taking farmers away from the farm, are reducing the Viet Cong food supply. 70 percent of the recruits are said now to be deserting. The V.C. are transferring the civilian cadres to military work, many of whom, although loyal when in a civilian capacity, desert from the military. Shortage of thoroughly indoctrinated officers means that when an officer is criticized, he tends to leave. They are depressed by the reports of the bad condition of their family at home. The saying now is: The ocean in which we are supposed to swim is receding and drying up. We must depend on the people; but the people are leaving us. End Goure account. Keyes Beech, of the Chicago Daily News, who is, I believe, the senior American journalist as regards Viet-Nam, and a former combat correspondent in Korea, believes that success in Viet-Nam is now assured, provided U.S. opinion remains steadfast. He considers this to provide really the only chance for defeat. He believes that Hanoi intends to drag the conflict out until the 1968 Presidential election and is counting on the ending of the war being the issue which will cause an outcome in which the V.C. are still in power in the country-side. Incidentally, he added that there were more casualties after the peace talks began in Panmunjon than there had been in that period preceding the peace talks. 2. Economic and social After remaining steady for four weeks the piaster has moved up in terms of gold and the dollar. Retail food prices and the prices of imported goods eased slightly during the week. The cost of coastal trading between Danang and Saigon has gone down from 8,000 piasters per metric ton in July to 2,000 piasters in October to 1,200 today as result of measures USOM and the GVN have taken to supply more ships. The U.S. medical teams are being received with enthusiasm in the provinces. 3. Psychological There was much editorial comment about the recent terrorism attack against the U.S. enlisted billet./2/ The vein of this commentary was generally one of loathing and hatred for the Viet Cong for having perpetrated this attack which produced so many civilian casualties. /2/See footnote 3, Document 221. Lodge
231. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, December 17, 1965, 9:41 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, December 17 Meeting on Vietnam. Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. McGeorge Bundy sent the President a briefing memorandum for this meeting, which reads in part: "Rusk and McNamara both believe that the most important question before us is that of peaceful actions before January. When last heard from, they were both strongly in favor of the pause. Bob and I have been doing further work on the wider notion of a cease-fire in all Vietnam. I do not know his views, but I continue to think we are not ready for this one yet. "Another matter for discussion is Rusk's report on his European trip. Like Bob McNamara he has found the responses pretty thin on Vietnam. But it remains a good thing that he put our case as strongly as he did." (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, High Level Comments Re Bomb Pauses) PRESENT (The following is taken from notes by Jack Valenti.) The meeting opened with a discussion of the visit of Prime Minister Wilson./2/ Then the President turned to Secretary Rusk, who had just returned from NATO,/3/ and asked: /2/Harold Wilson arrived in New York on December 15 to address the U.N. General Assembly. On December 16, he traveled to Washington for a formal meeting at the White House in the late morning. In the late afternoon, Wilson and Johnson met privately for almost two hours. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Wilson described his meeting with the President in A Personal Record, pp. 186-188. On Vietnam, Wilson recalled that he pressed Johnson for a suspension of the bombing to test North Vietnamese sincerity. Wilson also recalled that he warned the President that if the United States bombed Hanoi and Haiphong, the United Kingdom would have to publicly disassociate itself from such action. /3/Rusk attended the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris December 14-16. Did you bring back any peace proposals: Rusk: No. After moving around in NATO, I find Wilson is a paragon of courage. The rest are doing nothing. I really can't see why the British can't put in men to support the Australians. President: Wilson is going to do nothing. He wants a DSC for fending off his enemies in Parliament. I think this man Cameron's articles are having a large effect on this country. I wish I could see to the end of the gun barrel in Viet-Nam. The Viet Cong atrocities never get publicized. Nothing is being written or published to make you hate the Viet Cong; all that is being written is to hate us. Ball: There is a racial element in what we do to the North. It's not there when the North hits the South. President: they do a far better propaganda job than we do. On NBC today it was all about what we are doing wrong. We've got to find some way to do another Baltimore speech./4/ Not desperate, but proper. Wilson says his line has been steady since the Baltimore speech. Wilson tells his opposition to bring the Viet Cong to a conference table and he'll produce the President. /4/Reference is to Johnson's address at the Johns Hopkins University on April 7. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 848-852. See also Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 245. I'm willing to take any gamble on stopping the bombing if I think I've got some hope of something happening. We must evaluate this very carefully. You have no idea how much I've talked to the Fulbrights and Lippmanns. They're not coming aboard. McNamara: We will increase bombing. It is inevitable. We must step up our attacks. President: (The President read an editorial by Norman Cousins.) Ball: I am holding an heretical view but I think the bombing in the North is having a negative effect./5/ /5/A different view prepared jointly by DIA and CIA is in a DIA Special Intelligence Supplement, "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam," December 12. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-311-69) McNamara: We just don't know if we are hurting the North Vietnamese or the Chinese. We may be able to hurt them enough without 400,000 men to make them behave differently. If we don't, what should we do? We shouldn't be doing anything that has a one-in-three chance. Perhaps a cease-fire in place. Bundy: Not now. It takes time. Rusk: It could cause the dissolution of South Viet-Nam. McNamara: Our military has a one-in-three success order. Bundy: I'm more optimistic. Our military is hurting them. Ball: No one can say. If we look hard at bombing in the North, it isn't producing a salutary effect. We started bombing: 1) to raise morale 2) to interdict supplies 3) to get Hanoi to change its mind The first is not needed any more. Bombing hasn't served the other two reasons. We can restrict supplies only to a critical level, no lower. Obviously we are not breaking the will of North Viet-Nam. They are digging in. A hardened line. I was in Charge of bombing surveys in World War II and bombing never wins a war. We are driving the North Vietnamese into a greater dependency on China--and boxing in the Soviets. We are also making plans for negotiation more difficult. I think the risks of escalation are very great--and the risk is in the North, not in the South. The one hope we have is to stop bombing and seize every opportunity not to resume. Meanwhile, (we should) conduct the war in the South with redoubled vigor. President: That has some appeal to me. The problem is the Chiefs go through the roof when we mention this pause. McNamara: I can take on the Chiefs. President: I don't think you can sell the American people on the merits of stopping the bombing. McNamara: The Navy and the Air Force are conducting 3,000 sorties in North Viet-Nam. There is no way to stop bombing in the North except as part of a political move. Rusk: On Ball's remarks, I don't think bombing has caused North Viet-Nam to escalate. They are determined to do so. We tell the Russians: you ask us to pause--we pause--now what would you do for us? McNamara: You need several of these moves. We had one pause; we need more. Bundy: Look at what would happen if there wasn't any bombing from the day before Christmas until the day after New Years. President: I have no objections. What are the objections? Rusk: The Russians need more time to get something on with the Chinese. McNamara: If the press asks us why no bombing, we answer we are increasing our effort in Laos and the South. Ball: Only 40 per cent of the missions are going on now. Concentrate in the South. President: Shouldn't we have someone moving throughout the world trying for peace? McNamara: All the time this is being done we will move toward increasing our forces in Viet-Nam. (President thinking--thoughtful, quiet, obviously concentrating deeply.) President: Is this what you want to explore with the Chiefs? McNamara: No, I need to know what you want. The Chiefs will be totally opposed. (Problem with Wheeler--he has eye trouble and needs to be operated on.) We decide what we want and impose it on them. They see this as a total military problem--nothing will change their views. They will answer: we are better off now with bombing than without it. President: We are there now because of the bombing. We wouldn't be there without it. McNamara: I know exactly what the arguments of the Chiefs are. Before you decide, I cannot deliver. After you decide, I can deliver. Rusk: Work on specific suggestions and get back to the President later. President: I am opposed to announcements of a pause. If you pick weather as an excuse and Christmas as a factor--the position of the allies also--take a poll where they say we are not doing enough to find peace. Take all this--try to sell our enemies that we want peace. We owe this to the American people. We can't do this if we are dropping bombs on the enemy. (Like Kosygin in Hanoi.) Anything with bombs is bad for the peace effort. Let's put off bombing until we can talk to others. Because of weather, receiving thousands more people, solidifying our position, we can have a pause. Let McNamara say to the Chiefs: we've got a heavy budget, tax bill, controls, danger of inflation, kill the great society. With all these things, we've got to make sure the diplomats can talk. They claim they can't talk with bombs dropping. Period: 22 December through 22 January. Sometime during this period have Westmoreland and Lodge come here to the U.S.--or the President go to Honolulu--and look at it--letting the people know what we're doing. Then on the 23rd of January, tell the people where we stand. Meanwhile, try to figure out how to cut losses. Don't believe that bombing will help us. They are right: the weakest chink in our armor is public opinion. Our people won't stand firm--and will bring down the Government. We're going to suffer political losses. Every President does in off years. But it is because of damn fool liberals who are crying about poverty (which funds I doubled in one year). But we need money for all these programs. How do you divide up this money? Every hangover Kennedy columnist is sniping about Johnson cutting off Great Society programs. The only man that helps me survive is Jim Webb. He is trying to reduce funds in his agency. Orville Freeman is a soldier--he's trying. Meeting ended at 11 a.m.
232. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 17, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis; Priority. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:04 a.m. 2172. Eyes only for Bundy. 1. I received word from Mission officer that a man purporting to be connected with the Viet Cong had said that a V.C. attempt to approach me had been unsuccessful because I was apparently not interested. 2. This was so much the reverse of the truth that I told Archbishop Palmas about it so that he would be in a position to clear up any misunderstanding. He vouched for the complete lack of basis for such an idea. On the contrary, he said I had always made it clear that I was interested. 3. In fact, Archbishop Palmas will tell his "former Minister" when he sees him that he feels that he had not been dealt with in a correct manner. 4. Palmas assumes that either his "former Minister" has been cheated and deceived by the V.C. or there has been an intervention from the north to quash separate peace making activities from among the Viet Cong. A sign of this can be found in the new Viet Cong flag which now contains the hammer and sickle. Lodge
233. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 18, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Senator Mansfield's Trip (Southeast Asia). No classification marking. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum. SUBJECT /2/Dated December 17. (Ibid.) Printed in part in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 738-740. If the objectives of our policy remain the same, the war in Viet Nam is just beginning for the United States. The ultimate needs cannot be estimated, either as to U.S. manpower, costs or time. Prudence requires, however, that we anticipate a doubling and redoubling of U.S. forces in the next year or two. The truth is that we are up against an open-ended military situation which can eventually spread to encompass Southeast Asia and even China. The war has, in fact, already spilled over into Laos and may be on the verge of involving Cambodia. The end of the road on the basis of present policy is not in sight either in the sense of a military solution or a solution by negotiations. The Communists give no signs of acquiescing in the basic requirement of our present policy which, in effect, is that North Viet Nam either agree to or be compelled "to leave its neighbors alone". That concept, in any event, is an oversimplified interpretation of the situation. The bulk of Communist manpower in South Vietnam is still South Vietnamese. South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese are all mixed together, on both sides, in this conflict. The disputants are not only "neighbors," they are also "relatives". Any immediate prospects of opening a Conference (and they are slim) are not likely to be realized on the "neighbor" concept but, if at all, on the basis of "cease fire and stand fast." That would appear to be a necessary preliminary to straightening out the complex Vietnamese relationships in general accord with the Geneva Agreements of 1954. A cease fire and stand fast now, as a practical matter, would leave the Viet Cong in control of most of the rural areas, and the government in control of the cities which probably contain in excess of 50% of the total population of South Viet Nam. It is not likely that third parties can be of much help in bringing about a Conference any more than they can be counted on for much real assistance in carrying on the war. Almost without exception, the principal concern other nations have, whether in Europe or in Asia, is staying clear of involvement themselves. The Russians, in particular, are unwilling to help bring about negotiations at this time. Indeed, it may well be that they do not find the present situation at all without benefits from their point of view. The fact is that their principal rivals in the world and in the Communist bloc (the United States and China respectively) are both deeply involved in Viet Nam. The Russians, as of now, are in the clear and have almost a free hand in promoting their position and interests both within the bloc and in the world in general. The most realistic hope (and it is not much) for a conference in the near future would appear to lie in a direct initiative with the Chinese and North Vietnamese and on the initial basis of "cease fire and stand fast." A possible approach was outlined to Secretary Rusk in a cable on December 10, 1965./3/ If a Conference on this basis could be achieved, the present state of the war in Viet Nam would obviously not give the Saigon government and the United States control of all South Viet Nam but we would still have a substantial position for negotiating purposes. /3/Text in Document 227. If a Conference cannot be brought off at this time, the decision which faces us resolves itself into this: Shall we plunge in further militarily, into depths which are unfathomable and could eventually involve war with China or can we hold a more limited position in South Viet Nam by more limited military means until the Communists come around to negotiations? Apart from the costs in lives and resources which have to be considered in this decision, there is the additional factor of the worldwide consequences of a deeper and more widespread U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. In my judgment, these consequences are likely to be very adverse to the position of the United States, particularly with respect to Europe and Japan which are, in fact, the only other two major power-seats in the non-Communist world. This is a conflict in which all the choices open to us are bad choices. We stand to lose in Viet Nam by restraint; but we stand to lose far more at home and throughout the world by the more extensive military pursuit of an elusive objective in Viet Nam.
234. Draft Papers/1/ Washington, December 18, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Memos (B). Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the papers. The following draft papers have been prepared for discussion at 11:45 AM, December 18:/2/ /2/For a record of the December 18 White House meeting, see Document 235. 1. An outline of the U.S. public position. (Tab 1) 2. A draft message to Ambassador Lodge (Tab 2) 3. A one-page scenario of initial diplomatic action (Tab 3) 4. A draft statement by Secretary Rusk or Ambassador Thompson to Ambassador Dobrynin (Tab 4) 5. A draft circular telegram to selected capitals. (Tab 5)
Tab 1/3/ /3/Top Secret; Sensitive. OUTLINE OF U.S. PUBLIC POSITION DURING A
SUSPENSION 1. Assumptions (1) Bombing would be suspended from December 22 and the U.S. must keep free to continue or end the suspension as the President determines. An internal planning assumption is that suspension might last through Vietnamese New Year, which comes on January 21, 22 and 23. (2) The U.S. will make absolute minimum of official public comment on the suspension of the bombing, as such. The U.S. instead will emphasize during the suspension the overriding need for unconditional peace talks and will make it clear that all of its actions at every level--political, military, and diplomatic--are directed at achieving a peaceful settlement. 2. Official Public Statements (1) Within the next few days, and not later than December 22, the Secretary of State makes a major statement on peace in Vietnam. He rehearses the full list of our efforts to start negotiations. He re-states and re-emphasizes our readiness for free elections and Geneva agreements and the other elements of our strong diplomatic position as last developed by the President on July 28. He rededicates the U.S. to this search for peace and hails the readiness of Prime Minister Wilson to do his best. He announces on behalf of the President that Vice President Humphrey and Governor Harriman will be proceeding to friendly and neutral capitals right after Christmas to explain in full the U.S. position and to enlist the help of all concerned in moving toward peace. (2) On December 22 bombing is suspended in the North, but without comment. This position of "no comment" is rigorously sustained at every official headquarters, and there is no comment on background either, until the President gives the word. (3) At a time determined by the President, the White House Press Secretary responds to questions on the suspension by saying that every action of the U.S. is related to two purposes: first, to turn back the aggressor in the South, and second, to open the way to peaceful settlements. This comment is echoed precisely by all U.S. officials. All officials continue to draw attention to the statement of the Secretary of State and to the diplomatic missions of the Vice President and Governor Harriman. 3. Background comments At times directed by the President, the following background comments will be made by officers of the appropriate departments: (1) Our military effort in the South is being sustained and intensified. The deployments continue and the aircraft not being used in the North are being redirected against Laos and South Vietnam where they have work to do. The South is where the contest will be decided. (Defense) (2) The fact that there is no bombing is directly related to the desire to create a favorable environment of response for the Secretary's speech and the Humphrey/Harriman missions. We do not wish to have this series of peace appeals punctuated by the sound of bombs exploding in the North. (State) (3) The suspension of the bombing carries no serious military risks because --the aircraft are doing their job elsewhere; --the weather is bad over North Vietnam this month anyway; --reconnaissance continues over North Vietnam; --if no progress is made toward peace, we can catch up later in the North (Defense). (4) the whole peace effort, including the suspension of the bombing, has two purposes: to open the way for peace if possible, and to prove to men of good will in every country the good faith of the U.S. in its commitment to a peaceful settlement. (State) (5) If this peace effort does not work, the prospect of more and heavier fighting is real, because the determination of the U.S. is unchanged. (every one) 4. Very deep background or off the record (1) This effort is the necessary peace punch to go with the military punch which is coming in January. We face a big budget, larger reinforcements, and possibly other drastic measures in the field of taxes and controls. The President cannot ask the American people to join in united support of these hard measures until we have given complete proof of our determination to move toward peace, if possible. (Defense) (2) This peace effort, including the suspension of bombing, is designed to give an opening for debate and pressure for a peace conference within the Communist world. We make no comment at all about what one Communist capital may be saying to another, but we do know that it has been hard for any of them to speak of peace while a Socialist country was being bombed. We hope they are making the most of the suspension. (State)
Tab 2 Draft Telegram/4/ /4/Top Secret; Nodis. Literally eyes only for Ambassador from President. 1. I am determined to leave no stone unturned in pursuit of a peaceful settlement of the war consistent with our objective of an independent and secure South Viet-Nam. But over the past few weeks we have been repeatedly told by the Soviet Union, representatives of various Eastern European countries, our Western Allies and various significant leaders of American opinion that effective steps toward peace are difficult if not impossible while North Viet-Nam is under air bombardment. 2. None of us has illusions that a suspension of bombing would be likely to lead to acceptable peace moves by Hanoi. But before taking the critical next steps that I now face, I must satisfy myself, the American people, and the world that every opportunity has been provided for peaceful initiatives. If it did nothing else we have reason to believe that a suspension could add to the strains and dissensions in the Communist camp and make it easier for Moscow to avoid deep involvement. 3. These next steps include budget increases of many billions of dollars which will become public in January, the deployment of large numbers of additional men during 1966 and the acceptance of stepped-up casualties associated with such increased deployments. 4. I am confident the American people will be prepared to do whatever is necessary to see the struggle to a successful conclusion and that our additional efforts will have the support of most of our friends around the world. But it appears to me that sustained support for these very difficult undertakings can be best assured by one further measure to satisfy the world that America is doing everything possible to create the conditions that will facilitate progress toward peace. 5. With these considerations in mind--and after an exhaustive balancing of all implications and consequences--I have decided to order the suspension of air attacks on NVN beginning December 22 in order to permit opportunity for both Communist and friendly countries to exercise all diplomatic initiatives they can and will undertake. For the moment no decision will be made as to precise duration of suspension. This will depend on progress of diplomatic efforts being undertaken by our friends and on both the words and the actions of Hanoi. We will, of course intensify our efforts in the South, and continue our actions against infiltration routes in Laos. We will also continue unarmed reconnaissance over DRV. 6. I do not contemplate any public announcement of suspension. At the beginning, the stand-down may hopefully be related to weather conditions. As attention becomes focused on continued suspension we shall publicly explain it as a step in the search for peace. At the same time the press can be informed on background basis that suspension is taking place during period when weather conditions in Viet-Nam limit effectiveness of bombing. Press will certainly draw its own conclusions about relation of suspension to the Christmas season. 7. But while there will be no public announcement we do plan quietly to inform various key governments, including certain Communist governments, which have indicated interest in some diplomatic initiative. Moreover I shall dispatch various emissaries to key capitals to explore possibilities of probing intentions and encouraging diplomatic initiatives. 8. I know of your own reservations regarding any suspension of bombing and am fully aware of possible costs and dangers. Nevertheless, I feel that this action is a necessary preparation for the difficult days that lie ahead. 9. I also recognize the delicate and complicated problem you will face in handling this matter with the GVN. This will draw on your best diplomatic resources. We must emphasize to the GVN that the American determination is unswerving but that before entering into a new and more costly phase of the conflict requiring a very much greater US effort we must satisfy our people and the world that all measures are being exhausted to bring about peace on a basis consistent with the objectives for which we are both fighting. Our stake is so large in this enterprise that we cannot permit the GVN to veto this essential measure. 10. I leave it to your best judgment how to approach GVN. I know you will bear in mind the serious problem of premature leaks. You carry a very high responsibility and I know I can trust you to do everything possible in bringing off this difficult but essential undertaking. Tab 3/5/ /5/Top Secret. SCENARIO
Tab 4/6/ /6/Top Secret. DRAFT STATEMENT TO DOBRYNIN I wish to inform you confidentially in advance that on December ___ we will suspend our bombing operations against North Vietnam. We are taking this step fully conscious of the risks involved. One of these is that the other side may take advantage of our action to step up the intervention in South Vietnam. We will, therefore, continue our reconnaissance of North Vietnam. Another risk is that the authorities in Hanoi and Peiping may interpret our action as a sign of weakness or lack of determination to carry out our commitment to the Government and people of South Vietnam. This risk is heightened by the fact that as always is the case in a society such as ours when controversial issues are under public discussion, a small minority has come out in opposition to our policy in Southeast Asia. I am sure that on the basis of reports from you and other sources your government can put these manifestations in their proper perspective. I am not so sure that this is the case in Hanoi and Peiping. The resistance to the North Vietnamese controlled and directed hostilities in South Vietnam will continue but can quickly be brought to an end either by formal negotiations or by the simple cessation of North Vietnamese intervention. I realize that we do not have a common view of the past history of this affair but I am hopeful that we do hold in common a desire to see peace restored in that unhappy land; to see the killing and the terrorism ended and the long-suffering people of this area given the opportunity to devote their lives to peaceful pursuits in which we stand ready to assist them. As we have repeatedly stated, we seek no military bases or other advantages in this area and we believe that the Geneva Accords of 1954 could furnish the basis for a settlement. I can assure you of our sincerity when I tell you that we are determined to live up to our commitments but that peace is our objective and that the action of which we are informing your Government has no other purpose. Tab 5/7/ /7/Top Secret. DRAFT CIRCULAR TELEGRAM TO U.S. AMBASSADORS IN SELECTED CAPITALS The President requests that you call on Chief of Government before the close of business on __________ to give him the following personal message from the President. "I want you to know that in pursuit of the objective set forth in my address at the UN, I have instructed the Secretary of State to conduct a renewed and intensive effort to move the problem of Vietnam to the peace table. I have asked the Secretary to coordinate a number of efforts of all sorts, public and private, to persuade the Government of North Vietnam of the importance of moving in this direction. "In order to insure the most favorable possible environment for this effort, I have agreed with the Government of Vietnam that there will be a suspension of the bombing in North Vietnam beginning on December ______. "In all its actions in Vietnam, my Government has aimed from the first for a peaceful settlement. These new actions are a part of this same policy and purpose. It is my hope that the climate that should result will make it possible for your Government to take initiatives of its own in furtherance of the objective of a peaceful settlement. I have asked my Ambassador to be available to you at any time for further discussion of these matters." For the Ambassador's information: Unarmed reconnaissance of North Vietnam will continue and we will be alert to and reserve full freedom of action to deal with any aggressive actions that the DRV may take which are clearly contrary to our objective of peaceful solutions. We also expect to maintain and even accelerate the pace of military action in South Vietnam. In your discretion you should insure that these elements of our policy are understood.
235. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, December 18, 1965, 12:35 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, December 18 Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisers on Vietnam. Secret. The source text does not indicate a drafter, but the notes were taken by Valenti. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. President Johnson describes this meeting in The Vantage Point (pp. 235-237), and quotes from this document. PRESENT SUBJECT President: Publicity seekers and amateurs cannot have a hand in our affairs with other nations (in regard to Fanfani affair). When Adlai (wrote) letter rebuking the Sevareid break, CBS only carried 30 seconds. The denial never catches up with the accusation. Stevenson had a martyr complex but he never was going to resign. Amateur excursions into diplomacy can cost you greatly. But having to reply to it, it destroyed its effectiveness. We can't conduct negotiations . . . (Guard these papers/2/ we are reading. We simply cannot allow this information to get out. I had a conversation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/3/--and I can understand what McNamara is living with--he gave me the reasons why the Chiefs are against a cease-fire and a pause--it almost makes it impossible to attack . . . /2/Document 234 and attachments. /3/No record of this conversation has been found. (I would treat missions without mentioning or pointing up. After the fact, it is alright but we cannot announce their schedule as a peace mission. It would get nowhere.) The military say a month's pause would undo all we've done. McNamara: That's baloney--and I can prove it. President: I don't think so. I disagree. I think it contains serious military risks. It is inaccurate to say suspension of bombing carries no military risk. Bundy and McNamara: We can resume bombing at any time. President: If we're confronted with 60-100,000 more men, and we didn't anticipate it, that's an error. If they fix all their bridges and transportation . . . (I thought we took this power plant out.) Rusk: I don't believe the suspension will last to January 27 unless we are well on the way toward peace. President: I agree. It could be of very short duration. Bundy: It would be better to start on the 23rd or 24th. McNamara: It would leak if we give Lodge longer than 23rd. Start Wednesday the 22nd. Bundy: Which is then Thursday, their time. If you go to the UN, the pause ought to come right after. Think carefully about if there is a turnaround on Lodge's part. The question is do we want to know more before we push the button. If he says the situation would collapse, you may want to know more. President: What does Max Taylor think? How would he vote? McNamara: On balance, "no". But he would vote with the Presidnt. Bundy: This is not what he considers his arena. McNamara: He thinks the military program and pacification is going better than it is. President: Why do it the 22nd? Why not the 7th or 8th? Bundy: Christmas time is a good time psychologically--also get it started before Congress comes back. President: If you wind up bombing during New Year, wouldn't it be better to do it during their New Year? Ball: Wouldn't it be better to do it before Congress comes back? President: Incidentally, do we want a personal State of the Union message? Clark, I want you to think about this. My inclination is not to speak in person. We wrote an 8-year program in our first State of the Union message. We've got all this the first year. McCormack thinks personal delivery will help elect the Congress. I don't agree. Rusk: I disagree. If you didn't, you would be giving up your leadership, here and abroad. I do have objection to a 9 p.m. appearance. McNamara: I don't think you have to go before Congress to assert leadership. You ought not to go unless (the message) has something to say. Clifford: I think it would be a serious mistake if you didn't go in person. Last year you laid out a domestic program. This time you report on the shape of the program. I think, after your illness, failure to appear would be injurious to world leadership. To break a long standing custom would be serious. Rusk: If we were at peace in Viet-Nam, it might be alright, but not now. President: I think there is a good deal to what Cliff says. Clifford: I would do it on the 11th or 12th. President: We could do it on Monday, the 10th, the first day. That's what we did last year. (Fortas, Rusk, Clifford all intensely in favor of personal delivery.) (After reading the position paper on a pause) It rankles me that we have to prove again to Congress we are striving for peace. We've done that again and again. Rusk: It's "What have you done for me lately?" President: Would we read about the suspension on the 23rd? Bundy: The British will probably leak it. President: Who will you tell about this? Rusk: The UK, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Canada, India, Japan, the Philippines. We need to tell them something within 36 hours. Alex Johnson: After the first Saigon briefing of no mention of an attack on the North, the press will be hounding us. President: You better move your dates back. I'm not ready to do anything yet. We have a lot of talking to do. Dean, tell me what you think will be achieved by execution of this recommendation of a pause? Rusk: First, there is the underlying question of the American people. They are isolationists at heart. (I am) convinced the people will do what has to be done in a war situation if they are convinced there is no alternative. You must think about the morale of the American people if the other side keeps pushing. We must be able to say that all has been done. President: Haven't we done this? Rusk: To my satisfaction, but perhaps not to that of the American people. Second, it's our deepest national purpose to achieve our goal by peace not war. If there is one chance in ten or twenty, a step of this sort could lead to a settlement on the Geneva agreements and 17th parallel I would take it. One chance in twenty is my guess. Try to create a heavy obligation on the Russians' part to settle. If we pause, they will owe us something. The Russians, Yugoslavs, Hungarians have all pressed this with me. There is a possibility of deception. President: They are pretty good at that, aren't they? Rusk: If there is a chance Russia would take advantage of a suspension to start a movement toward peace, it is good. If it fails . . . (I am) influenced by the fact Russia and Iron Curtain countries acted in India-Pakistan crisis. Also they don't want China policy to win. Also, they don't want a confrontation with the United States over Southeast Asia policy. If it moves to the U.S. and China directly engaged, they have a deadly problem. This worries them. This ought to be clarified. We may get this clarified on the 3rd day like the last time. A minor point (it would) make sure the world knows the U.S. is not the obstacle to peace. Those who support us will find it easy to support us. President: From a propaganda point, there is a long shot chance. First, the Russians owe us something; second, it gives supporters reasons to go along with the U.S. Rusk: Possibility of trap--parlay pause into unilateral pause. President: Do we eliminate this by keeping the pause on an indefinite time limit? Rusk: Right. Another concern is a pause that fails. It will bring pressure to go all out to get it settled. President: That is the most dangerous aspect. Don't we know a pause will fail? If we are in worse shape then, won't we be bringing a deadly crisis on ourselves? The Republicans are looking for an exit. When we suffer reverses, it will be attributable to this. The support we have will be weak as dishwater. Rusk: The answer to Dirksen is that no real settlement came from Korea . . . They allowed North Viet-Nam to become communist. President: Bob? McNamara: The Soviets have not applied all the pressure they could. President: Have they ever applied pressure? Rusk: Yes. During the first pause. They said they didn't have time. McNamara: Our first pause was a propaganda effort. It was a propaganda effort--not for the Soviets to help. Rusk: Another indication is that the Russians have waged a great struggle against China. President: Do we gain anything by doing this on the heels of the Italian move?/4/ /4/See Document 205. Rusk: There is some disagreement in the timing. (One) the hardliners say you paused in the face of Hanoi's intransigence. (Two) the leftwing says you are pausing because you don't believe anything will happen. McNamara: My point is they haven't made all the effort they are capable of. President: How do you know that? Have they talked with you? McNamara: No. No contacts. This comes from State. This pause will give us leverage on them. It stops them from precipitous action against us--such as an amphibious landing. Such Russian action is less likely if we pause. I think there is some movement from the DRV. We don't really understand the DRV reactions. We don't really know. We are out of communication. (There is) danger because of this. (There is a) bare chance this pause will help them move toward us. President: What does Thompson say about the Russians? Ball: It would relieve them of intense pressure on response to our actions. (There is) more danger of Russian response than Chinese response. So we must push them into a corner. Rusk: Suppose the Russians were trying to avoid a confrontation with the U.S.? What are those Americans up to? (The President left the room to take a phone call at 1:40. He re-entered at 1:50 p.m.) Bundy: We don't think you should contact Ford of the House of Representatives. He will denounce us. (The President did not answer.) McNamara: 1. The Soviets have not applied all the pressure they are capable of. 2. Action stops Russians from responding as forcefully to our attacks . . . 3. North Viet-Nam might make a favorable movement. We don't know enough of their reactions to judge. 4. Suspension of bombing will widen the gap between the Russians and Chinese. 5. Strong feeling of American public that Government peace efforts have been superficial and inadequate. 6. Military solution to problem is not certain--one out of three or one in two. Ultimately we must find solution, we must finally find a diplomatic solution. President: Then, no matter what we do in military (field) there is no sure victory. McNamara: That's right. We have been too optimistic. One in three or two in three is my estimate. Rusk: I'm more optimistic, but I can't prove it. McNamara: I'm saying: we may not find a military solution. We need to explore other means. It is impossible to negotiate a settlement we find acceptable. Rusk: I don't agree. The other side knows South Viet-Nam is not going to negotiate on uneven terms. McNamara: Our military action approach is an unacceptable way to successful conclusions. Ball: What you are saying is: they quit and come to the conference table? McNamara: Right. This seems a contradiction. I come to you for a huge increase in Viet-Nam--400,000 men. But at the same time it may lead to escalation and undesirable results. I suggest we look now at other alternatives. 1. Military advantage to North Viet-Nam infiltration. I don't think it is serious--small advantage to North Viet-Nam. 2. Possibility North Viet-Nam will interpret a pause as a sign of weakness. 3. May lead to trouble with Lodge and the South Vietnam. It doesn't make any difference what or who is in South Viet-Nam--don't worry about them. Lodge is a great admirer of the President. He will act like a soldier. President: I differ with you. I think Lodge and the South Vietnamese government are problems. We've had enough governments out there. We must give thought to where the St. Louis Post-Dispatch episode/5/ leads to. /5/On December 17, the Washington correspondent of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Richard Dudman, broke the story of the Rusk-Fanfani exchange of November 20-December 4, compelling the Department of State to release the texts of the exchange on December 17. See Document 205 and American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 917-919. Ask Dobrynin in the light of North Vietnamese reaction where are we? Also Mansfield--he is arriving with a full report. McNamara: Pressure for escalation after suspension. Don't believe it will be a major problem. This pressure is only in terms of the North. Republicans don't dare suggest we bomb cities. P.O.L.? I will recommend we bomb them too. Mine Haiphong Harbor? I will suggest this later myself. Three to six months from now we will have to do this. But danger is Russian reaction. It will be less if we have pause. Rusk: Think you underestimate problem we face with South Viet-Nam. McNamara: Find it inconceivable that is so. Greatest danger is right in this room. Simply cannot discuss this with your wife. I can see stories about this--and I am embarrassed. Please let us check ourselves and discuss with no human being. (Meeting adjourned for lunch at 2:20 p.m. Meeting resumed at 3:05.) Bundy: For the pause. Share McNamara view that settlement must be political. This will be form of diplomatic initiative. President: I'm not in position to quote Wheeler on pros or cons of pause. He is a good soldier and will follow Commander-in-Chief. Don't think his views are emotional. He is loyal to McNamara and me-- --but has convictions . . . point up systematically his views. McNamara: Whatever decision you make, Wheeler will follow. Bundy: If we are going to do a pause, I'd much rather have done it before the Congress comes back. Fortas: Divide into two parts: 1. Military effects. 2. Psychological and political aspects. Political effects on this country: (1) Case is not proven. Believe this action will be good--if it results in some kind of conference or suspension of hostilities. Think public reaction will be negative--showing uncertainty. Always think there is possibility of error in assessing public opinion. What they really want is cessation of hostilities. Not very much point in responding to manifestation of public opinion that says "you're not doing enough". Anytime there is evidence of lack of certainty on the government's part, it leads to negative thinking in the public mind. It will cause people to worry about depth of conviction in government objective. Negative on net balance. Real question--on whether this action should be taken--is whether this action results in actual accomplishment. As I understand it, this action will not be done with pre-arrangement with Russians. This is an action ambivalent and ambiguous. We use the Christmas season--and by that fact and presentation we are diluting the effort [effect] in its hoped-for psychological and political results. Also diluting effect on Russians--and any bringing about of peace negotiations. Concerned as to what happens if this fails. If failure, we won't get credit for it. There will be renewed pressure for drastic action. We'll have obstacles to negotiations because of failure of major and spectacular effort. President: What do you think? What would be the value? Fortas: If we could do this by pre-arrangement with the Russians: "If we would finally consider a pause, would this give you an opportunity to get the VC to the conference table?" President: We've already done this with the Russians. Bundy: We don't think we can put them in a corner. The paper to the Russians is drafted carefully to go as far as we can with the Russians. Rusk: We've tried to engage the Soviets in the Viet-Nam settlement but Moscow can't deliver Hanoi. Fortas: This venture depends on the Russians using our actions for some purpose with North Viet-Nam. All I do is raise the question as to whether we have adequate reason for assumption. Ball: This assumption is not based on one conversation, but on a number of them. Very often the means used by communists is not direct. Also this assumption is based on direct conversation with the Soviets. If we paused, the Soviets tell us they will do the best they can (based on twenty or more conversations). Fortas: There is danger Hanoi would greet a pause as visible evidence that protests have had effect on the U.S. Government. Ball: The thing that offsets that is heavy deployment in the South. Alex Johnson: We can't have it said by Hanoi and China that Russia is conspiring with the United States. Clifford: Arguments for pause are well presented. Even if I accepted them, I still feel deep concern over this move. 1. Tried to figure out the circumstance under which North Viet-nam would talk. Only their belief they are not going to win the war in South Viet-Nam. I don't believe they are at that stage now. I think they believe they are not losing. They are sending large numbers of men down. They have the example of the French before them. They believe that ultimately the United States will tire of this and go home and North Viet-Nam will prevail. Until they know they're not going to win the war, they will not talk and the Russians cannot convince them. 2. Believe the President and the government have talked enough about peace. Don't believe any more talk will do any good. Any objective citizen knows the government's position. Talk of peace is interpreted as a sign of weakness. This pause would encourage North Viet-Nam--take this to be a step backward, in response to U.S. protest opinion and world opinion. Anything that hinders the North Viet-Namese from figuring they can't win hinders the close of the war. 3. When the time comes to resume (and it will resume because chances are only one in twenty or one in fifty) those who want peace at any price, who want us to get out are . . . that we not resume. They will urge enough . . . events to happen to encourage the pause to go on. 4. If you accept the hypothesis that there is no chance of success, others will know it too. And I don't like the President to take a posture that is clearly unproductive. Might end up being viewed as a gimmick. Timing during Christmas is unfortunate. 5. Don't believe Viet-Nam is going to be settled publicly. Humphrey and Harriman publicized trips will not settle anything. Only when Hanoi feels nothing to be gained by further fighting is this war going to end. 6. If Soviets believe it is to their best interest to take favorable steps, they can do it at any time. Simply because bombing is going on will not stop them from intervening. 7. Time might come when pause would be valuable--if we thought there was a chance it would be successful, then and only then would I do it. Ball: Think we make a mistake in feeling Hanoi has freedom of action. They can no more give up this war alone than we would let Saigon fall. It's what the communist powers believe is the right course. The bombing immobilizes China and the USSR. McNamara: Should we pursue military estimate of 50-50 chance of victory--or what should we do? Rusk: In carrying the political battle, I need something more than we have at the present time. We need to make clear that the United States is honorable and has been given no alternative. We strengthen our position by proving we want peace. Fortas: Seems to me you have already made your case for peace. Perhaps it looks different on the inside than it does on the outside. McNamara: If we put in 400,000 men, what will they do? They will match us. We are going to be bombing assets of North Viet-Nam dearer to them than the ones we are bombing. China is beginning to ready planes to meet us in the skies. It appears that MIGs are being introduced into North Viet-Nam. They are getting ready for escalation--and will call on Russia. They don't want to confront us in Vietnam--they want a way out. Fortas: The way we are doing it is too little to get the Soviets to do anything. Ball: But North Viet-Nam would know a diplomatic offensive is going on on behalf of the Russians. If North Viet-Nam says "no" to the Soviets, they have a way out when North Viet-Nam calls on them for more arms and men. President: Dean, have you given any thought to me going to the UN? Rusk: Yes. It is related to whether or not you envisage doing the pause. If you are going up to greet and thank the UN on their last day--a short statement--recount the main elements of our policy--also try to look beyond Viet-Nam--and the hopes of mankind all over the world--education, health and peace--that kind of twenty minute visit would be worthwhile. It would be particularly worthwhile if you do the pause. McNamara: Not so sure if you are not going to pause. Want to see the speech before final decision. President: Anything further to be gained between the Secretary or Goldberg and the Russians--on the basis: We will do this if you will follow through? Tell them: Here's what we want to do if you will acknowledge that you will do something. Bundy: You're never going to be in a position to be in partnership with the Russians. They will always deny being in league with a capitalistic power. Rusk: Moscow, Poland and Hungary have been in touch with Hanoi. We have never heard from Poland and Hungary. If we don't do this, have we any other diplomatic moves we can make--any approaches with any other government? (Silence for a few minutes) Rusk: We could take it to the Security Council if the Russians didn't veto and ask the Secretary General to go to Hanoi. We could press the Hungarian channel pretty hard--they are in touch with Moscow. I worry about bringing this to the assembly in view of the Rhodesia question. We could continue these discussions of which we have had a lot. President: Did Wilson say anything about this?/6/ I don't know. /6/See footnote 2, Document 231. Rusk: He was very relaxed about it. President: He asked me about the 12-hour truce. Rusk: That should be left to local commanders. It's not very long. President: Let's outline all other courses and see them. Ball: We have just about exhausted third party contacts based on what we have given them about our position. President: But the Viet Cong haven't done anything. They get a lot of hay by just talking. Bundy: If we had a newspaper in Hanoi not under their control, we could do more (laughter). Down the road there are a lot of areas we haven't done--such as formulas on when they shoot and we shoot back as we move around Vietnam. We could plow a straight furrow during winter and spring and clean out the South--and put the onus of continued fighting on them. I would like to get the diplomatic experience of this pause. We have a lot of diplomatic maneuvering to do. Rusk: One of the pitfalls is that a new situation can always turn out different. For example, lifting of the Berlin blockade came as a surprise. In the Pusan peninsula, we thought we couldn't hang on--and we did. I have a feeling that the other side is not that tough--and it does not follow in a year or two we won't be in the far more favorable position. I think the other side is hurting just as we are hurting. Clifford: We could make quite a case that our stand is producing good results by preventing the Viet Cong from achieving their objective. Perhaps we can connect beneficial events in Indonesia with our presence in Viet-Nam. At heart we are preventing a communist takeover in Viet-Nam and that is to our credit. Rusk: I presume you don't think we can put a greatly increased offensive? (to McNamara) McNamara: No. We are increasing but so are the Viet Cong. We have 34 U.S. battalions plus 7 more soon, plus 10 Australian and others. South Viet-Nam has 600,000 men. The Viet Cong have 240,000 (probably two or three North Vietnamese divisions--and increasing). By the end of January, 230,000 U.S. and others. President: What do you think we ought to do if we don't pause, Bob? McNamara: As a minimum, carry on the military buildup. Study the possibility of a ceasefire, which I would recommend in a few months, whether as a propaganda device or a military standstill. President: Any solid information of increasing of North Vietnamese activities? McNamara: Stepped-up infiltration to 1500 a month through Laos. Soon up to 4,000 a month--this has not been proved, however. About a year ago they began bringing in regular troops instead of cadres. About nine regiments of regulars are there. They have substantially expanded facilities. Fortas: What would the Viet Cong propose in this 12-hour truce? Alex Johnson: They said that soldiers without arms would not be attacked for 12 hours. Fortas: If we are concerned about public opinion, this is something we ought to consider carefully. This would be capable of producing an adverse reaction in this country. President: Mac, would you undertake to lay out a speech for Tuesday? Dean, would you lay out alternatives available to us? Alex, do you have any strong views. If you were President what would you do? Alex Johnson: I'd take the pause--if for no other reason than to engage the Russians. President: Couldn't we engage them by saying we are ready to stop if the Viet Cong are? Alex Johnson: No, I don't think we can without a bombing pause. President: What troubles me more is their doubt as to our will to see this thing through. What problems do we get into if we don't bomb on Christmas--and tell the Russians what we are doing--and that we might do more? You say the Russians won't and can't do any more unless we stop bombing. And they probably won't do anything. Meeting adjourned at 5:10 p.m.
236. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 19, 1965, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII. No classification marking. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum. I attach two papers which you commissioned yesterday afternoon. At Tab A is a memorandum from Dean Rusk on alternative diplomatic actions. As he points out himself, the proposals are modest--not because of caution, but because there simply is not much more that we can do by diplomatic means alone. At Tab B is a draft speech for your use in the United Nations./2/ It is very much of a first draft, and it needs a lot of cutting and polishing. There are three points worth making about it: /2/Not printed. (Ibid.) 1. It includes an announcement of a pause. I know this is not something you are planning to do, but I thought it important to have a try at the right kind of language because Art Goldberg has told me most emphatically that he thinks it would be a great mistake for you to go to the UN if you do not have some sort of dramatic announcement to make. I can't think of any other. 2. I have included a pretty full discussion of the international programs which are now being prepared by Joe Califano's office in the fields of food, health and education. I have also drafted a pretty bold statement on population policy. I feel sure that Joe would recommend strongly against such a discussion of major elements of your 1966 program in the UN forum. But we have given all the general assurances before, and without something concrete, this part of the speech would have little interest. 3. I have reviewed your speech to the 20th Anniversary celebration in San Francisco, and I attach a copy at Tab C,/3/ because I think it shows the problem we are up against. That speech was thoughtful and eloquent, but it had little hard news in it, and it got a disappointing reception. Unless we go beyond it in some clearly specific way, we run the risk of a renewal of this same line of argument--that the Johnson Administration takes no real interest in the UN and has nothing of importance to tell it. /3/For text of the speech given on June 25, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 703-706. I think there may well be some way of stating our Vietnam position which is a little less precise about the pause but which still has some news and punch in it, and I will have another look at that problem this evening. But I send you these papers now because I know how hard and steadily you are thinking about this whole business. McG. B.
Tab A Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/4/ Washington, December 19, 1965. /4/Top Secret. 1. We have established the American position with regard to Viet Nam and have made known our position through all possible channels, public and private. The result has been a firm and repeated negative from Hanoi and Peiping. 2. We see no serious possibility of immediate diplomatic progress of a public nature unless we are prepared to change the conditions under which public diplomatic action could be undertaken. The principal change of condition available to us would be a pause in the bombing. 3. We have reexamined the question of a formal consideration of Viet Nam by the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly. I have discussed this today with Ambassador Goldberg. We both believe that the results would be negative. There would not be general and strong support, in the votes cast, for the United States position, and there is a high probability that a majority in the Security Council or in the Assembly would call for a unilateral termination of the bombing by the United States. We believe that the Soviets would bitterly resist any constructive action by the United Nations and would veto any resolution in the Security Council acceptable to us. The point remains that a bitter debate in the United Nations would further freeze the Soviet public position and reduce their options for the future. 4. Private diplomacy. I do believe we should continue our discussions with the Soviet Union, Hungary, Yugoslavia and others to make sure that at least the Eastern European Communists fully understand our position and understand that Hanoi's insistence upon their four points (amounting to victory in South Viet Nam) is the central obstacle to peace. I am attaching a copy of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Zinchuk of the Soviet Embassy and William Bundy which you will find of interest./5/ From this memorandum it appears that Hanoi's attitude toward a pause would be negative, but that the Soviets themselves would be much interested in one. /5/Dated December 16, not printed. A copy is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. 5. I believe that we should send a new circular on Viet Nam to all of our Missions abroad giving them an up-to-date recapitulation of peace efforts and our understanding of the present position of Hanoi, as a basis for full discussion of the problem with other governments. 6. The Vice President, after attending the Philippine inauguration, should visit Korea and Japan and make a special effort in Japan to explain the Viet Nam question. 7. I should think, also, that Averell Harriman might take a trip after the Christmas holidays and combine interest in Viet Nam with a number of other matters, visiting, for example, Paris, the North African Arab countries, Saudi Arabia and Iran. There are a number of other questions which he could usefully take up in a number of these capitals. While in Paris he could get a full report from Chauvel's trip to Hanoi and Peiping./6/ /6/Reference is to French diplomat Jean Michel Henri Chauvel's visit to Hanoi and Peking. No record of Harriman receiving a briefing on the trip while in Paris has been found. 8. The above proposals are rather modest. The central point is, however, that diplomacy cannot produce miracles if Hanoi remains determined to seize South Viet Nam. I have no doubt that this remains their objective. The reason they do not come to a conference table is that they know that we would not agree to the attainment of their objective at such a conference. What is true of Hanoi is even more true of Peiping. In this instance diplomacy is working within the limitations imposed by Hanoi's objectives in South Viet Nam, which are still in fundamental conflict with our own, and Hanoi's continuing hope that they can somehow succeed on the battlefield. Dean Rusk
237. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Saigon, December 21, 1965, 1:35 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIV, Cables. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Goodpaster. MAC 6569. Reference: JCS 4939-65./2/ /2/Not printed. (Ibid., Papers of William C. Westmoreland, Eyes Only File) Part I--General 1. In accordance with reference, commencing 0300 this morning I discussed thoroughly with Lodge and Westmoreland subject President outlined to me last Friday evening./3/ I covered the following salient points: /3/Wheeler met with the President from 5:50 to 6:47 p.m. on December 17. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found. A. The international and domestic pressures on the administration to undertake this action. B. The desire to bolster our position both at home and abroad by silencing, or at least disarming, critics of our policy in order that we may proceed with solid backing to achieve US objectives in SE Asia. C. The fact that, for military and other reasons, I had recommended that this course of action not be adopted. The JCS agree unanimously with the foregoing recommendation. D. That, if this course of action were adopted, I believed the following safeguards, as a minimum, were needed: (1) no public announcement of the fact; (2) continue as flying conditions permit photographic, visual and other reconnaissance over the DRV; (3) continue and possibly increase air reconnaissance, air strikes and armed recce against infiltration routes through Laos; (4) continue and possibly increase ground and air operations in South Vietnam; and (5) continue our military buildup in South Vietnam. E. That the President had authorized me to consult with General Goodpaster regarding this matter in order further to analyze and evaluate the problem and to inform him, through Goodpaster, of any "alarming or overly-dangerous aspects". F. That, in evaluating the problem, we should consider this course of action could be followed throughout the period Christmas Eve through Tet (21-22-23 Jan '66) unless DRV actions led us to resume pressures on DRV. 2. Upon conclusion of our discussion we agreed that Ambassador Lodge would prepare separate comments. The remainder of this report is arranged accordingly. Part II--Views of General Westmoreland and General Wheeler 1. We can identify no military advantage to be derived from this course of action except the faint chance that US objectives in SE Asia might be achieved without prolonged armed conflict. In this connection, we note that advocates of this course of action consider chances of this action bringing the Hanoi regime to the conference table are so remote as to be negligible. 2. In theory advantages could accrue if conditions/safeguards could be established on a practical basis. But it is a fact of life that the covert nature of the VC/DRV operations makes it virtually impossible to determine on a day-to-day basis the extent of infiltration of men and equipment. We could therefore find ourselves in a position of ceasing to apply our primary instrument of pressure on the DRV regime without adequate means of proving or determining the extent of continued DRV aggression. Reconnaissance aircraft are reasonably effective in good weather in detecting movement along well established routes. However, we have limited capabilities of determining movement at night or in foul weather. The extent of compliance with our demands can be ascertained to a degree by enemy fire on reconnaissance aircraft. However, this action is completely unrelated to the aggression which we are trying to stop. 3. We consider it a surety that the DRV would use a period of relaxed pressure on the DRV and lessened restrictions on movements of men and materiel to repair and improve LOC's, to improve the readiness of AA defenses, to increase security of vital installations, and to step up the movement of men, equipment, and supplies to the south. In summary, we believe that our relative military posture could be weakened substantially. 4. Additionally, we consider that there are important political and psychological detriments inherent in this course of action. These are: A. We could be inhibited from resuming pressure against the DRV by the force of world opinion, by publicized threats or commitments of aid by the USSR and/or the ChiComs which would raise the specter of intervention by one or both, and by lack of clear evidence on our part that the DRV are in fact continuing substantial movements of men and materiel to the south. B. Inevitably the nature of our action would leak and concern would be created in the minds of the RVN military leadership, which concern would be difficult to dispel. Our actions could be interpreted as a prelude to US unilateral negotiations and as a softening in attitude toward Hanoi while the VC are stepping up their military initiatives and acts of terror. C. It would seem that we would be in a stronger psychological and political position if we had achieved a more solid military posture with respect to troops, airfields, and logistics prior to any consideration of slackening our military efforts. We believe that we have now stopped losing but have not yet started to win. A winning stance would seem to be essential to any successful negotiations. Can we expect Hanoi to negotiate until she has been convinced that she cannot win? 5. In briefest terms, the "alarming or overly-dangerous aspects" of this course of action are comprised of the following: A. Finding ourselves inhibited from resuming pressure against the DRV, despite the need to do so for the protection of our forces and to prove to the Hanoi regime the costs of aggression. B. Allowing our forces to be tactically endangered because of rapid deployment of DRV forces to the south. C. Encountering increased risks of further confrontation with the ChiComs or Soviets should resumption of pressure against the DRV be required. D. Risking misinterpretation of our actions by the GVN leadership. 6. In consonance with the foregoing, we recommend against adoption of this course of action for the reasons set forth, which we believe cogent. However, if this course of action is nevertheless adopted, we recommend that the safeguards set forth in sub-paragraph 1D of Part I be established as a minimum. 7. We feel that there is merit in cessation of our bombing campaign in the DRV on Christmas day, on New Year's eve and New Year's day, and during the three day period of Tet (21, 22 and 23 January). During these days reconnaissance aircraft should be evident in the skies over the DRV for the purposes of distributing leaflets as part of a psywar campaign and to demonstrate that the GVN/US are calling the shots in this war. Part III--Views of Ambassador Lodge Herewith my comments on the proposal for an indefinite suspension of bombing, said suspension to begin at Christmas, bombing to be resumed if infiltration from North Viet-Nam is continued, the purpose being to bring North Viet-Nam to the negotiating table. Comment: 1. I recognize current political realities and the appeal of this idea to some persons. Yet it rests on fundamental misconceptions as to the real nature of Communist governments and would, if carried out, tend to defeat its own purpose. 2. Actually a proposal like this will lead the Communists away from negotiations because it will be interpreted by them as being a sign of weakness and indecision. The proposal assumes that the Communists are like us; that they are in effect like misguided Americans who will reciprocate our kindness and our toleration and our sense of fair play when every experience we have had with Communists, whether at the United Nations or Panmunjom, or in Berlin, shows that the reverse is the case and that they can only be induced to follow a certain course by the application of pressure. They are in truth indifferent to human life and are always probing. 3. The way to end this war, therefore, is by the application of U.S. force. If talks should ever begin, they must be held to the accompaniment of the application of force or else they are foredoomed to failure. We should not forget that there were more people killed after the peace talks began at Panmunjom than there were before because we overlooked this simple principle. I believe the proposition, therefore, as stated, looks at the Vietnamese situation through the wrong end of the telescope, and that it would achieve the opposite result from what its sponsors intend. 4. The fact is that our bombing of North Viet-Nam must be equated with the Viet Cong aggression against South Viet-Nam--and not merely the infiltration aspect. Indefinite cessation of bombing without cessation of the Viet Cong aggression would leave the Viet Cong free to devastate the south with impunity while we tie our hands down in the north. 5. Cessation of bombings should be equated with withdrawal of North Vietnamese units through international checkpoints to the north; unimpeded access of the GVN to any part of its territory; a significant reduction of incidents; cessation of infiltration of men and materiel; and an agreement that at any talks which would be held the matter of an inspection system and enforcement devices would be the first item on the agenda. 6. There is, to be sure, in the proposal no mechanism wherewith to check infiltration or withdrawal of North Vietnamese units. Suppose we started bombing again on the basis of intelligence information, the source of which we could not reveal. Would not the uproar among the wishful thinkers be even greater than it is now? Would we not be in an interminable wrangle over resumption? 7. As far as the GVN is concerned, the Fanfani talks had a devastating effect here because the GVN thought for a moment that we were negotiating their very life behind their backs. It threatened to destroy much that had been built up here in the way of confidence and good feeling. An open ended, unequated suspension of bombing could, I think, either bring about the collapse of the government or its determined opposition. It would also collapse morale in the ARVN. 8. Finally, it would destroy the very big political accomplishments which the President's policies have brought about. Let us not forget that the strongest thing in Viet-Nam is not seeing the B-52s overhead; it is not having the Seventh Fleet come circling in; it is not the huge expenditures by USOM. It is faith in American steadfastness. It was when the Vietnamese saw the American soldier on the ground that they were persuaded that we were committed, and said to themselves: "If the Americans can commit themselves, then I can commit myself." It is on this belief that the government, which no one thought would last more than three weeks, has lasted as long as it has. This was a big political accomplishment before our troops even fired a shot. When they distinguished themselves in battle, of course, it added to the confidence. 9. An open ended, unequated cessation of bombing would destroy the tremendous political accomplishments President Johnson has wrought, and for which American fighting men sacrifice themselves--some of them, their lives. This is a very serious thing to do without a real chance that the objective of peace will be achieved--a chance which I do not see. 10. A variant of the main proposal is that the bombing be stopped for Christmas, New Year, Tet and during bad weather. It might be possible to do these things without a public announcement and not do too much harm, although I believe we should tell the GVN, as they would certainly find out about it. 11. I recognize the President's very grave problem.He is the one who must cope with the Senate and with public opinion. Yet he deserves to know what his representatives on the spot in their heart of hearts think of the consequences. I shall, of course, loyally support his decisions. Appendix: I believe steps should be taken to educate public opinion about the nature of the problems involved in negotiating with Communists; for example: That NBC or CBS make a TV documentary based on Admiral Joy's book about negotiations with the Communists at Panmunjom./4/ /4/C. Turner Joy, How the Communists Negotiate (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1955). That Professor Henry Kissinger, who is extraordinarily well informed and persuasive on this subject, having taken part in the Berlin negotiations himself, have private conversations with Senator Mansfield, Senator Fulbright, and so forth. He would not be suitable for television but he is very persuasive in private with intelligent, well-informed men.
238. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, December 21, 1965, 12:25 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisers. Secret. There is no drafting information on the source text, but the notes were taken by Valenti. The time of the meeting, which was held in the Cabinet Room, is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) (President, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, A. Johnson, Bundy, Valenti) Rusk: Let the Christmas stand-down go. President: What should I say? Ball: There is perfectly good language. A Johnson: Not everyone in Saigon is signed on--they are getting to Ky now. This evening the Vietnamese will be making a statement./2/ It's a good statement. Having urged this on them, I wouldn't want to take the play away from them. /2/Apparent reference to an announcement by Republic of Vietnam authorities on December 23 that they would observe a cease-fire from 6 p.m. on Christmas eve until midnight on Christmas day. The United States made a similar statement. President: I can't say anything tomorrow. If we have anything, we ought to say it and get credit for it. A Johnson: The question is, how it is said in Vietnam. Tonight our time. Everybody but the Prime Minister has signed on. President (?): I don't think I should say anything except yes or no on the cease fire. A Johnson: My thought was we'd follow up with a similar statement. President: I would say: "We and our allies will take no military initiative except in self defense on Christmas Day". We'd say this as soon as it is cleared. What about New Years and Tet? Rusk: Much more comprehensive operation on Tet. President: Do we do anything else? Bundy: We ought to examine the question of a continuous pause, the only kind useful with the Soviets. Benevolent, but not internationally significant unless we have a clear specific period. We could get a major political advantage from this. One paragraph in Lodge's message says that bombing be stopped on Christmas, New Years, and Tet--bad weather, etc./3/ /3/Apparent reference to Part III of Document 237. Rusk: Would that story work? McNamara: Not really, but we can blur it with statistics and bad weather. Rusk: I'd go ahead with Christmas--and beyond that, talk to the Hungarians to see. We won't link anything else to it--and wait to hear. Bundy: But you won't hear in that time frame. Unless you tell the Russians something they won't do anything. Rusk: I'm not giving up the possibility for a pause. But we ought to talk to the Hungarians and Russians. Bundy: I don't see where it leads us. Rusk: Go for one day at Christmas. Defer further action until we talk to the Hungarians and Russians. Bundy: Do you think they will tell us anything they haven't before? Rusk: If Thompson had one of his personal chats with Dobrynin he might pick up something. Does the President think a pause is possible while Congress is in session? President: Yes, but don't look with favor on it--it's more a sign of weakness than anything else. All we'll get is distrust from our allies, despair from the troops, and disgruntled generals. Hanoi and Peking tell us we're weak--won't do anything if we pause. If we suffer a severe reverse as a result of this, we'd never explain it. It's not difficult to explain why we fight when we are attacked every hour. But when commanders say it's suicide, and we do it anyway, there's no explanation. I want more evidence from the Russians before I override Taylor and Wheeler et al. Rusk: Congress returns on the 10th? We'll see if we can get more evidence from the Hungarians and Russians. Bundy: I don't find the cables persuasive, but I understand your position. I think the cables miss the point--as a commitment to do nothing for a month. We can stop bombing, not say anything, and resume when we choose. President: Would pressure mount to tell the press? Bundy: Yes, it would be brutal. But Christmas and [Congress' recess?] seem a logical time to pause. Ball: We don't know if the Russians are really organizing a Communist Congress in the spring. President: 1. Once we take our step, we could have serious problems to resume bombing. 2. The danger is that it conveys the wrong signal--and I think it does. If men we rely on to fight for us feel as strongly as they do--as Lodge does--I'd hate to have them at odds with us. McNamara: We've had a good discussion. But we need political initiative. But we have had the best discussion ever on this subject. President: Yes, but this is not the political initiative we want now. McNamara: Question: Should we take out POL in Haiphong? I say we need to--but not at this time. We need to go into Hanoi circle--30 miles--and take three bridges in this circle. Let the field commanders pick up 4 out of 7 possible targets. This would begin Thursday noon our time. The probability is that it will be after Christmas due to weather. Those targets are only a few miles inside the circle. Bundy: There is a Cambodian problem as a result of giving commanders the right to defend their troops. The leak came from Saigon. The first story came from Keyes Beech--and Times confirmed it. President: Mansfield was very laudatory about Keyes Beech. I think our Congressmen go out and are very frank--and to show how smart they are. I had the Governors out to my Ranch--and I told Reed of Maine he was the leak to Charles Mohr of the Times. [Here follows a short discussion unrelated to Viet-Nam.] Meeting adjourned at 1:10 p.m.
239. Special Intelligence Supplement/1/ SIS 1221-65 Washington, December 21, 1965. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-311-69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared jointly by CIA and DIA. A table entitled "DIA Results of Strikes on DRV Targets Thru Tuesday, 14 December 1965" and a distribution list are not printed. AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM Effects on the DRV Economy The US/GVN air strikes to date fall far short of crippling the North Vietnamese economy. But the sustained and increasing rate of attrition is causing the economy to develop a noticeable limp. Even with increasing assistance from other Communist countries, the adverse impact is now becoming more apparent in the economically important areas of the country. The extension of interdiction measures to lines of communication joining important industrial centers is compounding already aggravated distribution problems. The regime is apparently making increased use of ocean transport to provide relief to overland distribution channels. Hanoi now admits publicly to a substantial upheaval of production plans in many industrial plants. Import and export programs are in disarray. The planned program under the First Five Year Plan (1961-1965) has undergone substantial rearrangement. A recent report indicates, moreover, that implementation of the Second Five Year Plan scheduled to begin in January 1966 has been postponed. The increasing rate of deterioration of some important sectors of the economy still has not greatly reduced total economic activity. The primary strains continue to be in distribution, allocation of manpower, and management resources. In the face of great difficulties, however, priority traffic continues to move. The air strikes have not yet halted, or even reduced, priority short-term support by the economy to North Vietnam's military efforts, but this support has been maintained only by transferring men and materials away from long-term activities and projects. The air strikes against overland transport facilities and routes in North Vietnam have hampered the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies but have not significantly reduced the North Vietnamese capability to provide and increase their logistic support for the Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. The capacity of specific transport routes has been reduced by the bombings, but on most routes it is still in excess of the present level of logistic movements. The North Vietnamese have demonstrated a remarkable capability to keep supplies moving in spite of the air attacks. The various improvements and improvisations instituted by the Communists have increased their capability to move men and supplies into Laos and South Vietnam during the present dry season. Even with an intensification of air attacks it is doubtful that the capacity of the overland transport system can be reduced below the level required to provide logistic support at the existing scale of combat in South Vietnam. The ability of the North Vietnamese to keep the industrial economy moving on a makeshift basis, to maintain priority transportation movements, and to provide the support necessary for military operations, is in large part a result of increasing assistance from other Communist countries. This assistance has taken several forms: the assignment of elements of two Chinese railroad engineer divisions to help keep transportation lines open; large increases in shipments of motor trucks; the provision of structural steels and prefabricated shapes for bridge repair and reconstruction; and the assignment of technical and industrial advisers from the USSR and European Satellite countries. The amount and scope of this support continued to grow in recent weeks. Direct losses caused by damage to economic facilities and equipment are now estimated at almost $23 million and measurable indirect losses amount to almost $9 million. The cost of permanent reconstruction of rail/highway bridges would be more than $10 million, and the replacement or repair of destroyed or damaged transport equipment would cost an additonal $5.4 million. The cost of temporary repairs to bridges would be more than $1 million. Reconstruction of the damaged electric power plants, the petroleum storage facilities, and the Nam Dinh textile mill would cost about $6 million. The loss of foreign exchange earnings totals at least $5.2 million. The growing losses from lower production throughout the economy can be quantified only in agriculture where losses in the fall rice crop may have amounted to about $3.5 million. The measurable costs of reconstruction, replacement, and repair of damaged facilities, if attempted, would represent more than 20 per cent of total gross annual investment in industry. The additional cost which North Vietnam is incurring for temporary expedients to compensate in part for the damaged facilities cannot be quantified at this time. The most severe disruptions of economic activity in North Vietnam have been in the southern part of the country where the transportation system has been heavily bombed and electric power stations have been destroyed. Industry in this part of the country normally accounts for only about 20 per cent of total gross industrial output, however, and consists mainly of textile production, food processing, lumber and paper production, chromite mining, and processing of crude phosphate fertilizers. Continued shortages of manpower and equipment in the areas directly affected by bombing have hampered reconstruction efforts and created severe hardships for local populations, but the primarily rural nature of these regions has permitted continued functioning of the subsistence economy. The disruptions caused by bombing are now being felt in the more economically important areas of the country. The difficulties in maintaining production in the face of insoluble management problems and shortages of skilled manpower have been compounded by the disruption of the distribution system. In November, for the first time, the transportation system connecting North Vietnam's major industrial areas was attacked. Through rail service between Hanoi and Nam Dinh was interdicted by the destruction of the Phu Ly railroad bridge on the Hanoi-Vinh line. However, rail traffic is apparently still moving on stretches of this rail line between interdicted points. A combination railroad and highway bridge serving the Hanoi-Haiphong railroad line and Route 5 was also attacked. The damage to this bridge was light and by undertaking priority repair measures rail service on the line was quickly restored. Nevertheless, these air strikes undoubtedly further disrupted the flow of exports, imports, and goods for domestic use. According to the regional press, distribution problems resulting from damage to the transportation system have "turned upside down" production plans in many enterprises in Haiphong, where some plants have been substituting inferior materials for unavailable regular supplies. Essential materials and equipment can still be delivered to Haiphong by sea, however, and until 1 December other industrial centers could still receive supplies from China via the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line where previous bomb damage was quickly repaired. On 1 December, however, the Cao Nung railroad bridge on the Hanoi-Dong Dang line was again attacked and several spans were dropped. Several weeks will be required to make temporary repairs to the bridge. In the meantime some cargo probably will be moved across the river by fording, and some can be moved by road on alternate routes such as 13B, which has not been attacked, and 1A and 18, where enough time has probably elapsed for bomb damage to have been repaired. Some freight normally shipped by rail between China and North Vietnam probably was already being transferred to sea transportation before the 1 December strike. This action was taken so that high priority items such as military supplies could be handled more easily by rail. Despite the increasing disruptions, work on major economic development projects of the First Five Year Plan (1961-1965) is continuing and several new projects have been undertaken in the past few months. The Hanoi-Lao Cai railroad line reportedly was opened for through traffic early in December even though there were a series of strikes against this line at the end of November. Although photography is not available to assess the results of these strikes, damage must have been slight or negligible for the line to be opened so quickly. If the line remains open we would expect to see a resumption of apatite shipments moving to Haiphong for export. Practically no Chinese transit traffic to and from Yunnan has moved through North Vietnam since July. There have been no indications, however, that either Yunnan or the rest of China has suffered serious shortages because of the loss of transit service through North Vietnam. Truck transport within China apparently is being used to replace this transit service. Transportation in the southern part of North Vietnam continues to be complicated by air attacks. In spite of heavy damage to bridges, substantial amounts of both economic and military traffic continue to be hauled by motor truck and on a makeshift rail line south of Vinh. The movement of all types of traffic on the waterways also appears heavy. Supplies are again being moved from North Vietnam on Route 15 to Routes 12 and 23 in Laos through Mu Gia Pass and on a newly reported truckable by-pass around the Pass. The transport system of North Vietnam appears to be carrying as much tonnage during 1965 as it did during 1964. The interruption on certain rail lines, however, will result in a considerably lower performance in terms of ton-kilometers. There have been no recent strikes or restrikes against bulk oil storage facilities or electric power plant in North Vietnam./2/ There are localized problems in petroleum distribution and storage, but there is no over-all petroleum shortage in the country. Bulk petroleum storage facilities have been reduced in capacity by about 17 per cent. No action has been taken to rehabilitate any of these bombed POL storage facilities. However, recent photography discloses the existence of seven additional petroleum storage sites distributed in an arc at distances of about 30 miles north of Hanoi. These sites include a total of about 300 semi-buried tanks (each about the size of an airport refueling tank truck), but represent total storage of only 2,200 tons. The size of the tanks and the number of sites suggest that this storage is intended to disperse petroleum supplies rather than provide for significant reserves. The reduction of total generating capacity by about 14 per cent continues to cause relatively minor curtailment of mining and industrial operations and loss of power for irrigation systems. A continuing study of all available source material has disclosed no recent information concerning bomb damage to machine building plants or to non-food light industrial plants. Priorities and alternate means of communication have been established in the telecommunications industry. /2/This assessment does not take into count the 15 December air strike against Uong Bi Thermal Power Plant, since Bomb Damage Assessment data is not yet available to confirm initial pilot reports. [Footnote in the source text.] There is no evidence that the air strikes have further aggravated the tight food situation in North Vietnam. The harvest promises at best to be mediocre, and in light of increased distribution problems because of the war the tight food situation will continue. Labor shortages in the agricultural cooperatives continue to be aggravated because of the air strikes. North Vietnamese Political and Public Reactions There continues to be no indication of any significant decline in North Vietnamese morale. Regime propaganda continued to stress the resolve and ability of the Vietnamese to ultimately defeat the "US aggressors." Hanoi paid particular attention to the Vietnam protest movements in the US and cited them as an indication that the cost of the war in men and materiel could ultimately undermine American morale and force a change in the US policy toward the war. This theme was generally coupled in DRV propaganda with claims of world-wide support for the Vietnamese Communists and references to the recent Viet Cong "victories" over US and GVN forces. Although both these themes were designed to sustain the fighting will of the insurgents as well as the DRV populace, they probably accurately reflect current Hanoi estimates of the situation. The disruptive effect of the air strikes on the DRV's economy was reflected in the regime's propaganda. This recently took the form of efforts to spur the populace on to greater patriotic endeavors in order to meet and overcome the difficulties caused by the strikes. A party daily editorial on 18 November in taking note of the disruption in transportation and communications called upon persons to pay more attention to these two areas and to be "determined, urgent and flexible in meeting war circumstances." In addition, other articles stressing the necessity of increasing food production and distribution as well as improving public order "for the sake of the anti-US and national salvation cause" were highlighted in DRV propaganda. The growing disruption caused by the bombings also appeared to be the motive behind Hanoi's dispatching its high-ranking economic expert, politburo member Le Thanh Nghi, to Moscow, Peiping and Pyongyang in late November. Nghi's trip--his second in less than six months--is probably an indication that the bombings have affected the DRV economy to such an extent that consultations on additional economic aid from the Bloc are now needed. Through Nghi's trip Hanoi may be seeking additional supplies of capital equipment for bomb damage repair and perhaps even food, clothing and other necessities. The North Vietnamese may also believe it essential to get some long range commitment on future Bloc assistance in the event that US bombings destroy most of North Vietnam's industry and transportation system. Effects on Military Targets There has been no recent, appreciable change in the intensity of air operations against North Vietnam. The air effort continued to place emphasis on the armed reconnaissance program, aimed at inhibiting movement over the lines of communication and restriking and neutralizing previously attacked targets. The JCS-designated targets recently attacked have been predominantly rail and highway bridges north of 20 degrees. As the air strikes concentrated on targets north and east of Hanoi, the requirement to neutralize SA-2 sites accelerated. Armed reconnaissance aircraft have continued to attack SA-2 sites. These attacks produced few dramatic results, but possibly caused a more frequent displacement of SA-2 firing elements which could result in reduced operating efficiency. Since no major effort has been expended against barracks, supply and ammunition depots and POL storage areas, related national capacities have not been appreciably altered. The North Vietnamese are continuing their efforts to disperse such vulnerable elements of their infrastructure as barracks, supply and ammunition depots. Recent evidence points to a new program of dispersing POL stocks to locales north of Hanoi within the SAM protected area. While there are periodic indications of specific, tactical, reactions to the air offensive, the most overriding reaction is the emergence of strategic indicators which suggest Hanoi's willingness to persevere indefinitely. These latter indicators include dispersal of industry, partial mobilization, intensified coordination with other Communist countries to obtain increased military aid, and long range construction programs aimed at improving military air facilities. In a tactical sense, the North Vietnamese have recognized the effectiveness of US measures to counter the SA-2 threat. In this regard, they have taken action to degrade our capability to detect and counter FAN SONG (SA-2 guidance radar) operations by compressing the operating time of this vital guidance system. While the air strikes against logistics facilities and sensitive lines of communications are causing major distribution problems, these operations have not significantly reduced the DRV capability to continue to support the Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. [Next documents]
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