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240. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 23, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Memos (B). Secret. This memorandum was sent to the President who saw it on December 31. (Memorandum from Bundy to Johnson, December 31; ibid.) Harriman sent a copy of this memorandum to Rusk. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Johnson, President, '65) On the plane back to Washington from the Ranch on Friday afternoon, December 10, I discussed with Bob McNamara the potential for new flags and additional military contributions to Viet-Nam. I also reviewed the problem with Dean Rusk on my return. It was agreed that both Secretaries would discuss the possibility of a Greek and Turkish military contribution at the NATO Meeting in Paris,/2/ and that other NATO countries would be encouraged to increase their material assistance. As you know, Dean made a vigorous speech at NATO, urging that NATO Members make a greater effort in support of South Vietnam. Dean's initiative will be followed up with each country, as you did with Erhard./3/ /2/The Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council met in Paris December 14-16. /3/During the visit of Chancellor Erhard to Washington December 20-21. As to the Far East, Hubert Humphrey will take up the question of a Philippine military contribution with the new Philippine President, and will discuss getting a second division from Korea when he visits Seoul./4/ These Korean negotiations are already under way. /4/The Vice President visited Manila, Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul December 28, 1965-January 3, 1966. I talked with the Australian Ambassador here last week and our Embassy in Canberra has been in touch with the Australian Government. Bob Menzies plans to undertake to increase the Australian military contribution but he believes that any action should be an Australian self-starter rather than under pressure from the U.S. I told the Ambassador of your personal interest and he agreed to pass the message on to Menzies. The manner in which Thailand can be most helpful is being reviewed. As you know, the Thais are giving us the fullest possible cooperation in the use of their facilities. In Latin America, Brazil is the first case. Ambassador Gordon explained to President Castelo Branco that while the program loan decision was not contingent on a Brazilian military contribution in Viet-Nam, it was expected that Castelo Branco would make every effort to help in Vietnam. In a long and serious conversation with Castelo on December 15th he explained our position in great detail. Castelo has promised to give the matter his prayerful consideration. He pointed out that under the Brazilian Constitution Congressional approval is required before troops can be sent abroad and the Brazilian Congress does not reconvene until March. Gordon and our military attache, General Walters, will follow this up closely and, although keenly aware of the political problems Castelo faces, they are hopeful that a Brazilian contribution in some form can be worked out. We will take up with each of the other Latin American countries on a case by case basis the kind of contribution each might be induced to make. As far as Africa is concerned, all hands agree that there is no possibility of a contribution from any African country particularly at this time with the preoccupation over Southern Rhodesia. On Iran, Dean feels that a military contribution might stir up the Russians and that it would be better to let sleeping dogs lie. We are, however, going after Iran for a military-medical team on a large enough scale to take care of one Province. The senior USOM Public Health officer in Saigon, General Humphreys, will go to Iran to work out the details. I will continue to keep in close touch with the Regional Bureaus to see that the maximum effort is made to get more flags and more assistance, military or material, as well as to try to get more publicity on what is being done. Dean thinks that it might be useful for me to make a trip in January to certain European countries, possibly including Yugoslavia. Based on my talks with Tito last summer, there is a possibility that he might be induced to exert his influence on Moscow to persuade the Soviets to take greater initiative with Hanoi to come to the negotiating table. It might also be useful to stop off in the North African countries and Iran. Averell
241. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 23, 1965, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-VIET. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Drafted by Squire and approved in S on December 27. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS US Hungarian Hungarian Charge Radvanyi came to the Department at the Secretary's request. The Secretary said that he appreciated Radvanyi's coming to the Department just before the Christmas holidays, and expressed interest in whether Foreign Minister Peter had developed any postscript to his last talk with the Secretary in New York,/2/ at which Charge Radvanyi had been present. He was not inquiring whether Radvanyi had any instructions, although he assumed not. The Secretary had invited Minister Peter to use a little "16th Century Hungarian diplomacy", and would now be grateful if Radvanyi could ask Minister Peter if there were anything Peter could add to what was said in New York. /2/See Document 160. The Secretary said that he might make two or three comments as background for asking Charge Radvanyi to come to the Department. American newspapers had referred recently to peace feelers. Hanoi had denied these stories, and he knew of no instance in which Hanoi had taken an initiative in this matter. Others, such as U Thant and the Mayor of Florence, had taken such initiatives. All such initiatives were, however, taken by third parties. He had the impression that Hanoi's representatives abroad, and in Hanoi itself, were socially very busy; everyone wanted to see them. When third parties go to see such representatives, they come back with initiatives which evidently they believe important. We are not aware of any initiative taken by Hanoi at its own instance. His second point, the Secretary said, was that many initiatives had been taken by a large number of people towards unconditional discussions. The initiatives known publicly were only a fraction of those taken privately. Thus far no initiative had produced any results. The key question continued to be Point 3 of Hanoi's 4 points, namely acceptance of the program of the Liberation Front for South Viet-Nam. The third point was what the shooting was all about. Hanoi wanted it, and they could not have it by force. The Secretary said he would like to review for Minister Peter the things said publicly on our side with respect to peace in Southeast Asia: 1. We have said that the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are a basis for peace in Southeast Asia; 2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia, or on any part of it; 3. We would welcome negotiations without preconditions (using the terms of the 17 nations); 4. We would welcome unconditional discussions (using the President's term); 5. The question of cessation of hostilities can be taken first and then made the grounds for a conference, or, if anyone preferred, made the subject of preliminary discussions; 6. Hanoi's 4 points can be discussed at a conference, provided that those points others have in mind are also discussed; 7. We do not wish to maintain any bases in Southeast Asia; 8. We do not wish to retain any military forces in South Viet-Nam; 9. There could be free elections in South Viet-Nam; 10. The question of reunification is to be subject to the free choice of the people of Viet-Nam, and not to be imposed by force; 11. We would much prefer to use our resources, both economic and social, in developing Southeast Asia. North Viet-Nam was free to join in a regional program in which we were prepared to invest $1 billion; 12. We could stop bombing as a step towards peace, as Minister Peter knows we have said. But tell us what would happen if we stopped bombing. Would the bombing in South Viet-Nam stop? Would they come to the conference table? Would the 325th Division go home? When one put it all together, the Secretary continued, the basket was filled from our side. The only thing not in the basket was South Viet-Nam. The only thing we could add was "Take South Viet-Nam." That we could not say. Perhaps Hanoi did not believe some of these things we have said. The Secretary recalled he had said he would go to Geneva tomorrow afternoon. The way for Hanoi to find out, added the Secretary, is to find out. We can get there faster than they can. Perhaps they do not believe what we say about bases in Southeast Asia. But they can find out. Secretary Rusk told Charge Radvanyi that he just wanted Radvanyi to tell Minister Peter that he had thought often of their talk in New York. The Secretary wondered if there was anything else that Minister Peter wished to pass on. Charge Radvanyi asked the Secretary to clarify what had been reported in the papers about a 30-hour Christmas lull in Viet-Nam. The Secretary said that the 12-hour ceasefire proposed by the Viet-Cong was not very significant to us from the religious point of view since Christmas Eve and Christmas Day were a single unit. We were not particularly attracted to the Viet Cong idea that we take 12 hours to trim our Christmas trees and then watch out for the plastic bombs. So we had said we would treat the period as a whole, for 30 hours. He owed it to Minister Peter, the Secretary continued, to point out that this was an indication of some flexibility on our part. We did not expect the 30-hour period to be a political initiative, as the period was too short. It was indicative of some flexibility, just a tiny indication. If he were advising Charge Radvanyi how to report the importance of the 30-hour lull, he would not stress its political importance too much. The US had decided, so far as the Viet Cong would allow it, to introduce this lull at Christmas not only in South Viet-Nam but also as far as bombing of the North was concerned. The opportunity might arise again, at the time of the Vietnamese New Year. If the other side were responsive, we might find a way to move towards peace by steps like these. The Secretary stressed that no commitments could be made at this time with respect to the future, but he did mention the fact that New Year was coming, with its Viet-Nam holiday also, and this fact might offer an occasion to do something like the Christmas ceasefire again. No decision could be made on the future yet, however, as it depended partly on what happened at Christmas. The Secretary noted that he would also appreciate it if Minister Peter had any comments regarding the Hanoi and Peiping statements of the last two weeks which had been of some interest./3/ The Secretary would protect Minister Peter's discretion. Peiping had chided Moscow, which made it sound as if Peiping knew that the subject of peace moves had been discussed in Hanoi. Broadly speaking, the Secretary continued, what he was asking was that in the light of the very interesting conversation the Secretary had had in New York with Minister Peter, was there anything else that Minister Peter could add privately? /3/Apparent reference to a commentary in Hanoi's official paper, Nhan Dan, on December 9, broadcast by Hanoi in English; an interview of Ho Chi Minh by British journalist Felix Greene, broadcast by Hanoi on December 8; and a broadcast by Hanoi on December 10, commenting on the deceptive nature of U.S. peace moves. (Texts in FBIS, North Vietnam) On December 20, speaking at a reception in Peking in honor of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the National Liberation Front, Chou En-lai accused the Soviet Union of "sowing discord in an attempt to undermine the Vietnamese people's unity against U.S. aggression and the unity of the Vietnamese and Chinese people against U.S. imperialism." (Peter Cheng, A Chronology of the People's Republic of China (Totowa, NJ, 1972), p. 212) At this point Charge Radvanyi remarked that although the Secretary could count on absolute discretion from the Hungarian side, there had already been press inquiries about the subject of the Charge's call on the Secretary. It was agreed by the Secretary and by Charge Radvanyi that the press would be informed only that the present meeting was a continuation of the Secretary's previous discussion with Minister Peter in New York, on general questions and bilateral questions. Charge Radvanyi noted that as to bilateral questions, he believed the present atmosphere was less of an obstacle for bilateral US-Hungarian talks in Budapest then it was in Washington. The Secretary observed that the reverse was true in terms of US-Soviet relations. The Secretary indicated that after the holidays he would be glad to discuss bilateral US-Hungarian affairs at greater length. Charge Radvanyi said that he would inform Budapest immediately of the discussion, and would convey an answer to the Secretary as fast as he received it. The Secretary said he would await any answer with interest, that he would remain in Washington over the Christmas holidays, and that he could be reached at any hour of the day or night through the White House switchboard.
242. Editorial Note In telegram 1744 to Saigon, December 22, 1965, the Departments of State and Defense instructed General Westmoreland to announce in Saigon that U.S. commanders had given instructions to U.S. forces not to fire except in self-defense between 6 p.m. on December 24 and midnight on December 25, local time. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) At President Johnson's urging, the Departments of State and Defense also informed the Embassy in Saigon, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in telegram 1786 to Saigon, December 24, that the Christmas truce should not end by U.S. acts of force, but by a renewal of Viet Cong violence. Therefore, until confirmed and public evidence of significant Viet Cong violence was available, the restrictions prohibiting firing except in self-defense, suspending operations against North Vietnam and North Vietnamese troops in Laos, and halting B-52 operations would remain in force. Washington fully expected the Viet Cong to break the truce within a day or so. (Ibid.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, who was in Bangkok at the time, expressed "grave concern at the military hazards inherent in the directives," which he believed created a "de facto in-place cease-fire for US/GVN forces while permitting VC/PAVN forces complete freedom of movement." Wheeler feared that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces would capitalize on U.S. restraint and not renew hostilities. (Telegram BNK 1876 from Wheeler to McNamara, December 25; Johnson Library, Papers of William C. Westmoreland, Top Secret, Eyes Only Message File) General Westmoreland added his opinion that the military advantages of the Christmas cease-fire were outweighed by military disadvantages and hoped that it would not be repeated during Tet. (COMUSMACV telegram 260936Z, December 26; ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIV, Cables) Admiral Sharp, Commander in Chief, Pacific, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he agreed completely with Westmoreland. (CINCPAC telegram 262159Z, December 26; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Pentagon Papers Files: FRC 77 A 62, SecDef Cable Files, binder 45) In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense (JCSM 907-65), December 27, the Joint Chiefs reviewed the results of the Christmas cease-fire and concluded that "from a military standpoint, no advantages accrued to the US/GVN from the ceasefire," and there were considerable military disadvantages. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs opposed a similar cease-fire during the Tet holiday (January 21-22, 1966). (Ibid., OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 380)
243. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 23, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 12 VIET S. Secret. According to a December 24 memorandum from Read to Rusk, Rostow felt "some pressure to get his paper to the White House today." Rusk approved sending it immediately. (Ibid., POL 27-14 VIET) Herewith four ideas about Viet Nam, submitted to you at Jack Valenti's suggestion. A. A South Vietnamese Political Party 1. Proposal. That we focus our political energies in Saigon--and seek Korean assistance--in building a widely based South Vietnamese political party. 2. Discussion. The critical missing element in the stabilization of politics in South Viet Nam is an effective political party engaging the major groups which constitute now--and will constitute in the future--an effective majority. We all understand the deep splits in the political and social life of South Viet Nam: Northerners v. Southerners; French trained Catholics v. more indigenous Buddhists; etc. We are doing what we can in Saigon to urge them to come closer together; Ky is considering a representative advisory group; and the most wholesome political fact about South Viet Nam is that the Vietnamese are beginning to talk and worry about what the Communists will do to them if they remain split and peace (or negotiations) breaks out. Focussing right now on a political party may seem like a gimmick. But our experience in Korea over the last five years indicates that it is something more: it may prove the device for crystallizing minimum national unity. I am now convinced, for example, that it was the creation of the government party in Korea that converted Park from a well-meaning soldier into an effective politician and, even, a statesman--laying the base for the true Korean "miracle" now under way. To my certain knowledge, our people were almost as hopeless about Korea in 1961, after the young officers' coup, as they now are about politics in South Viet Nam. The Koreans were about as fragmented, inexperienced, and helpless in making a political life as the Vietnamese have been. Moreover, what we have seen happen in other parts of the world suggests that a widely based national political party is fundamental to stable government in a developing country. The secret of Indian democracy, for example, is not the British-trained civil service: it is the Congress Party, containing representatives of all regions and major social groups. Such parties are the secret of success in Mexico and Tunisia and of the relative stability of Tanzania, Kenya, and Ghana. I believe Castelo Branco is on the right track with his effort to force by law the making of big parties in Brazil. Why is this so? Big national parties force the various regional and special interests to come to compromise and to formulate national programs in order to get elected and enjoy the fruits of victory. They also establish a minimum political base and the minimum political discipline to permit an elected President to govern. The central political weakness in the developing nations is that fragmented political parties and squabbling politicians, representing narrow regional interests, press directly and irresponsibly against the democratically elected presidents. The presidents are so busy balancing off these pressures they find it hard to act. And that is why military coups happen. What General Soglo said the other day in Dahomey, as he took over, is the epitaph of scores of early experiments in democracy in developing nations: "Considering that after two years, the political authorities demonstrated their inability to lead the country to a better future by struggles for influence harmful to the superior interests of Dahomey; . . . "Considering that our country is obviously on the eve of a veritable catastrophe whose only victims will be the humble workers in our towns and rural areas; "[We]/2/ therefore decide in the superior interests of the nation and in order to safeguard our prestige on the international scene to take over power temporarily and endeavor to effect national reconciliation on which alone depends the moral and economic recovery of our dear fatherland." /2/Brackets in the source text. Can the job be done now in Viet Nam? I don't know. But I do know we should focus our efforts around the task. I do know there are glimmerings of a desire among the Vietnamese to pull together. And I do know they are beginning to understand they will either hang together or hang separately. Moreover, we should enlist the Koreans in the effort. Their experience is the closest parallel to that in South Viet Nam. They, too, began with a mandarin autocrat; then had squabbling civil politicians; then a young officers' coup. Finally, the Koreans have, next to us, the biggest direct political as well as military stake in the future independence and stability of South Viet Nam. 3. Action. a. We should approach General Park and suggest that he write directly to General Ky explaining fraternally the lessons of his experience in building a stable civil government in South Korea over recent years; the role of the government party in that process; and offering to send to General Ky men who will explain in detail how his national political party was organized and how they made the transition in Seoul from military to civil politics. b. That Ambassador Lodge and his staff, including the Lansdale team, focus their efforts on encouraging the government in Saigon and various non-governmental political persons to move in this direction. Many specific political projects now under consideration or under way in South Viet Nam would begin to take better shape if they were related to the making of a national political party; for example, the proposed Advisory Group, the attempts to formulate national objectives; to design a national economic reconstruction and development plan; to mobilize student leaders; to create a domestic peace corps; etc. B. The Military and the Future of Politics and Administration in South Viet Nam 1. Proposal. That we begin to consider with a few selected military leaders in South Viet Nam how the military organization now fighting the Viet Cong can, in the future, be used to bridge the gap until the time that a stable, civil politics can fully take hold. 2. Discussion. At the moment the military structure in South Viet Nam holds the country together and represents the biggest single pool of administrative competence. It probably also contains many of the men most capable of assuming political leadership in the postwar phase of the country. Until the kind of party proposed in suggestion A, above, comes into being and generates momentum, the country will have to rely heavily on the army for both administrative skill and political leadership. This could take many forms: --A massive civic action and public works rehabilitation program; --The actual transfer of competent officers into civil administrative posts; --The kind of literacy and agricultural education programs the Korean army has conducted; --The packing away of their uniforms by key officers as they assumed full time political life. In short, as we look ahead to the future of South Viet Nam, we should be looking at the army as a critically important administrative and political asset; and, as suggested in proposal A, the Korean experience should be made fully available to our friends in South Viet Nam. 3. Action. That we suggest this line of thought to Ambassador Lodge; make available to him full details of the Korean experience on the transitional role of the military in these various civil functions; and encourage the Koreans, under proposal A, to widen their discussions with the South Vietnamese to include this range of issues. C. The Proper Use of Air Power Against North Viet Nam Note: I appreciate that you, Secretary Rusk, and Secretary McNamara may well have come to solid conclusions about this subject; but I am moved to set down my own reflections because of continued evidence of widespread confusion at lower levels, reflected, for example, in the recent SNIE 10-12-65, "Probable Communist Reactions to a U.S. Course of Action."/3/ /3/Dated December 10. This SNIE included footnotes indicating dissenting views of most of the chiefs of the intelligence agencies. (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Aug-Dec 1965) 1. Proposal. That we systematically bomb the oil refining and storage capacity and the electric power facilities in North Viet Nam. 2. Discussion. Thought in this town is split between those who advocate massive and somewhat generalized air attacks on the Hanoi-Haiphong complex and those who fear that such attacks would dangerously escalate the war, deny Hanoi a stake in its future by destroying what has been built over the last decade, and lead to a last-ditch mentality which would make a negotiated settlement impossible. As you know, I have long felt that the proper course of action was a systematic but surgical use of air power to take out the oil refining and storage capability and electric power systems in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. This would exact a considerable cost but still leave the cities and factories standing. Given the possibilities of protracting the war by continued infiltration, this has seemed the only practical way to force Hanoi to pay a price sufficient to induce them to negotiate soon, without denying them a future. It is difficult for those who did not live through the application of systematic, precision bombing against the German air force, German oil facilities, and the Seine-Loire bridges to understand how vastly more effective this kind of bombing is than generalized air attacks. By systematic, I mean the attack on all the major plants in a given target system. In the Far Eastern war we conducted generalized bombing against Japan, including the burning of cities. In the Korean war we hit everything we could see and a lot we couldn't see. No one can tell you for certain--and only an irresponsible man would guarantee to you--that this kind of precise, systematic application of force will tip the balance of thought and policy in Hanoi to the acceptance of the kind of negotiation we envisage. Clearly, we must continue to hold them on the ground in the south and exact there a high price for continued aggression. Clearly, we must maintain minimum political stability in Saigon; for they would be tempted to continue the war, even if hamstrung around Hanoi, if their prospects for early military or political victory in the south were good. For what it is worth, however, my judgment is this: --We have an enormous stake at home and abroad in forcing an early, rather than late, ending to the war in Viet Nam. --There is a possibility that this kind of purposeful, systematic, and surgical attack on the Hanoi-Haiphong oil and power installations might so limit the economic and military capacity of North Viet Nam that those who now argue for a negotiated settlement in Hanoi might, at last, prevail. --The North Vietnamese civil casualties involved could be quite severely limited if the operations are well planned; and we should be conscious that our present level of sorties in armed reconnaissance and other attacks are imposing some civilian casualties on them and the loss of some of our own finest and best-trained men. --This kind of attack is not likely to change radically the degree of Soviet and Chinese Communist involvement in the war. --Such attacks will heighten the noise level in the Free World against us, but, if our backs remain stiff, it will also heighten the pressure on Hanoi from the outside to negotiate, including, especially, the pressure from Moscow. 3. Action. That we proceed early in the New Year to go swiftly and purposefully into the systematic attack on oil and electric power, but try to establish--even before the attacks--direct diplomatic contact with Hanoi, as suggested in proposal D. D. Direct Contact With a Representative of Hanoi 1 Proposal. That we soon quietly establish, at our initiative, direct diplomatic contact with a representative of Hanoi. 2. Comment. In all the other postwar confrontations with Communists, there was no great problem of communication when they decided to cease their aggression. They either knocked it off without talking to us, as in the case of the Greek guerrilla campaign, or they found a way to communicate through diplomatic channels, as in the case of the Berlin blockade of 1948-49, the Korean war, and the Cuban missile crisis. In these cases of communication, we were then, however, dealing with Russians. And, when the time comes, this is the way it may be again. But the fact is that Hanoi, not Moscow, is the center of this war; it is in a complex relation to both the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Communists; in the long run it must live with Communist China, even if it decides to negotiate; and, thus, the Sino-Soviet split makes it hard for them to turn wholly to Moscow at this critical moment in their history. Therefore, direct contact with us may facilitate getting over the hump into negotiations--even if what we discuss is whom to talk to and where. Hanoi's position is compounded by the fact that if they knock off the war, without negotiations, they leave the U.S. with all our troops and bases in South Viet Nam and with great freedom of action. For that reason alone, they may be led to get the best deal they can out of a negotiation, including our withdrawal; but negotiations in the midst of a large guerrilla war are exceedingly complex and require quite a bit of talk to get started. I am led to the view that a direct contact would be useful for another reason. Every war game I have been involved in has been marked by signals that were not accurately read. One side will say something or do something designed to give the other side a message; but the receiving side will not hear or it will misinterpret the message. Now we and the Russians have been at this game for a generation. And we rarely misread each other's messages. But this has taken a long time; and our communications are thick--operating at many places and levels. We must constantly bear in mind that, this time, we are not dealing with a self-confident major power. We are dealing with a small, provincial, isolated power which has had little contact with us, and is caught up between two allies who are bitterly contending with one another. Finally, our experience with third parties, however well meaning, suggests that they are not necessarily accurate; they leak; and they are too often bucking for a Nobel Peace prize. Action. That we consider promptly establishing a direct contact with a North Vietnamese representative. I would not pretend to expertise, but Mai Van Bo in Paris would be my first choice, for two reasons: he is quite high in rank; and Paris is a big city, easier for quiet contacts than most of the alternatives. Cairo, Vientiane, and Djakarta are other possibilities. If discovered, we should simply say that if we can talk with the Chinese Communists, we can certainly talk with the North Vietnamese Communists. The contact should be set up, if possible, before the bombing attacks suggested in proposal C. The first message should be an authoritative statement of all our present negotiating proposals. We should remain in contact steadily as the air attack mounts. If there is any indication of willingness to negotiate, we should be willing to explore formulae which would save Hanoi's face and offer a golden bridge of retreat. It is wholly possible that they will not be willing to make direct contact with us; but, especially if we plan to increase the heat on Hanoi-Haiphong, it is appropriate to try. Walt
244. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Meeker) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, December 25, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Prepared at the request of the President who wanted key officers in the Department of State below the Secretary and Under Secretary level to present him with ideas on new diplomatic initiatives in Vietnam. (Memorandum from Read to Rusk, December 24; ibid., POL 27-14 VIET) SUBJECT Background To summarize quickly, the United States in ten years has moved from the provision of military assistance to Viet Nam, through the furnishing of military advisers, the increase of their numbers and giving them an active role in combat, to infusing ever larger contingents of American fighting men in organized units to wage the war against the Communists. At the end of 1965's long monsoon season, we are evidently not poised for dramatic gains and military victory. We confront a limited number of choices: (1) to seek negotiations now; (2) to continue military operations at recent levels, with the aim of inducing a greater disposition on the part of the Communists to negotiate; (3) to increase three-fold or more our already heavy military investment in Viet Nam in order to crush North Viet Nam and wipe out the Viet Cong. Experience to date negatives any likelihood that carrying on the war will improve the prospects of negotiation. Stepping up the US military commitment to somewhere between 500,000 and one million American troops--in order to eliminate the Communist opposition in Viet Nam--threatens the following consequences: greatly increased US casualties, on a scale not known since World War II; substantially increased taxes at home, probably accompanied by inflation and increasing economic and social dislocations; an end, for practical purposes, to the struggle against poverty at home and the building of the Great Society; escalation of the Viet Nam conflict that could put the US in a war with Communist China, whose magnitude and course are withheld from our view today. The net of this paper is that we will do better to accept the fact of conflict in Viet Nam and seek to transfer it to the political plane; to wait out with patience and intelligent action the long period while Vietnamese nationalism gradually asserts itself against China, and while China goes through the process of development enabling it to function--in the way the Soviet Union has come to function--as a member of the community of nations. For the United States--with the aims and purposes we hold--the path is narrow between prevention or frustration of forcible aggression, on the one hand, and being drawn into actions that lead progressively to larger--and perhaps nuclear--conflict, on the other. There have been signs, coming out of Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow that we may be better able to pursue our aims at this stage through shifting to a political and diplomatic offensive. We are at a point where it may be possible to strengthen significantly the hand of the peace party throughout the Communist camp. Suggestions An armistice. The basic idea advanced here is that we want a cessation of fighting in Viet Nam followed by negotiations. It should be a total cessation, of ground action in the South, of air strikes against the North, of terrorism in the cities and in the countryside. The cessation could be initiated in connection with the observance of Tet in Viet Nam. It could be related to a public appeal that selected governments or Pope Paul VI might address to all the authorities concerned. The cessation could be proclaimed for a fixed time period (such as 30 days) and could be extended without limit of time if satisfactory steps were being taken with a view to negotiated settlement; this feature should probably be made clear from the outset. Whether such an armistice could last would, of course, depend on the willingness of the two sides. We should test the Communist side to see whether it would keep a cease-fire. An armistice seriously intended by both sides could survive incidents of violation through mistake or misunderstanding. If the Communist side breached the armistice, this would quickly be apparent. The US and GVN would be free to resume military operations. The responsibility would be clear, and this should have a good effect in furthering greater understanding and increased support for US policy toward Viet Nam. Upon the taking effect of an armistice, neither side would stand down its preparations, reinforcement, etc. If fighting had to be resumed, relative military advantage would be essentially unchanged. But this is not a state of affairs we should wish to see indefinitely continued. We should want to see the process of armament and military preparation put in reverse. This can only be done as the result of negotiated agreements. Negotiation. At the earliest possible time the United States should make a formal and comprehensive statement of our aims in Viet Nam. You summed them up very cogently at the end of the large staff meeting this last Thursday morning. A statement like this should be made to press, radio and TV. The text should be formally communicated to governments around the world. We should take pains to see that it is delivered to Hanoi--through the French, the Canadians, India, the USSR, other Eastern European countries, etc. This could be a factor in deciding the debates that must now be going on in Hanoi. Once an armistice is begun, a peace conference should follow whatever reasonable time is required to prepare it. There are many ways of organizing a conference. The Geneva Co-Chairmen could take the initiative. A meeting of 14 nations could be convened, or it could be limited to some of them. Perhaps the meeting should involve directly only Hanoi, the NLF, Saigon and the United States. The UK and USSR could stay in the background and seek to act as catalysts in the negotiating process. We should not exclude from consideration the idea of Communist China being absent from the international meetings, except to attend a formal conference of larger size which would confirm the understandings reached by a smaller group. We should look forward to protracted discussions. So long as the armistice were kept, we should be prepared to engage in a very long negotiation. It is impossible at this stage to block out the contents of a settlement. Terms can emerge only from prolonged and close bargaining and the inter-action of negotiating efforts. Negotiation might run through a series of phases, just as a settlement itself would have multiple phases. An early subject of discussion should probably be observation and policing of the armistice. International teams of military observers--perhaps made up of Commonwealth and Bloc personnel--might be employed. Withdrawal of military forces should be a focus of attention. International observation could identify what forces are present in Viet Nam, and could later verify and supervise an agreed withdrawal--perhaps first to staging areas, some for North Vietnamese units and others for US forces. Ultimately, all foreign forces would be withdrawn from South Viet Nam. One of the most difficult of all questions is what to do about the Viet Cong and their weapons. It is not likely to be practicable to segregate them in any supervised garrison areas. Experience with the disarming of insurgents and the central collection of their weapons gives no ground for believing this would be feasible in South Viet Nam. The Viet Cong would have to be left alone during the armistice, as would the GVN's military units. The military problem is likely to be solved only after a new political structure has been created in the South, following on internationally supervised elections, the establishment of a representative assembly, and the effective functioning of institutions of local government. International assistance. During the long period of negotiation as well as afterward there would be great value in a wide program of international assistance for the reconstruction of South Viet Nam. Organizations such as the United Nations, the FAO, and voluntary agencies could perform great humanitarian service and also contribute significantly to political settlement through the provision of needed food and medical relief, technical assistance in agriculture and building, war-scarce materials for civilian use, and personnel to help with community services. It might be possible for a large and imaginative program of this sort to supply the needs of local government for a substantial period of time--obviating the assertion of authority and the exercise of control by the GVN or Viet Cong in disputed areas. The US should be prepared to contribute largely to the financing of such a program, which would have to be under neutral direction. We should seek also at an early date to give practical effect to President Johnson's long-standing offer to arrange for the participation of North Viet Nam in an internationally aided program of economic development for Southeast Asia. Humanitarian measures. Whether or not an armistice is arranged in the near future, we should make every effort to proceed with an exchange of prisoners held by the two sides in Viet Nam. This could be undertaken by the ICRC along with its other responsibilities. Exchanges need not be on a one-for-one basis, but could be so calculated as to bring about the repatriation of all prisoners held on each side. In the event of an armistice, an early measure for consideration in the ensuing discussions would be an amnesty for political prisoners and others detained on account of offenses in connection with the war.
245. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/ Washington, December 27, 1965, 11:05 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIV, Cables. Top Secret; Exdis. The President was at the LBJ Ranch in Texas, December 21-January 2, 1966. CAP 65917. Following is the text of a message from Westmoreland/2/ regarding the resumption of bombing in North Vietnam. /2/COMUSMACV telegram 45265 to CINCPAC, December 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 1. Although I am not aware of all the considerations leading to the continuation of the standdown in Rolling Thunder air operations over North Vietnam, I consider that their immediate resumption is essential. 2. Strictly from the standpoint of the war in South Vietnam it is difficult to understand why the pressure has been taken off the nerve center of direction, supply and manpower located in North Vietnam. 3. Air attack against lines of communication is extremely difficult in this part of the world. It is clear that air interdiction at any one point can be circumvented by the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces and all local obstacles can be overcome by ingenuity and hard work, both of which they display in ample quantities. Therefore, our only hope of a major impact on the ability of the North Vietnamese to support the war in Vietnam is continuous air attack over the entire length of their lines of communication from the Chinese border to South Vietnam, and within South Vietnam. Although at any one point the impact may not be great, the cumulative effect of armed reconnaissance, bridge busting, rail cutting and barge sinking and forcing them to operate almost exclusively at night, must be great. Notwithstanding the heavy pressure on their transportation system over the past 9 months, they have demonstrated an ability to deploy forces into South Vietnam at a greater rate than we are now deploying US forces. 4. I notice that since the 3d of September, there has been a steady decrease in ordnance delivering sorties over North Vietnam. During the period 3 to 16 September, 982 such sorties were flown. By 15 to 28 October, this had been reduced to 700, and in the period 10 to 23 December, it had further diminished to 662. I recognize that part of this can be explained in increased activity in Laos, but this does not change the basic fact that our pressure against North Vietnam is decreasing. 5. Considering the course of the war in South Vietnam and the capability which has been built up here by the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces--the full impact of which we have not yet felt--the curtailment of operations in North Vietnam is unsound from a military standpoint. Indeed, we should now step up our effort to higher levels./3/ /3/Admiral Sharp in Honolulu sent comments that were relayed to the LBJ Ranch in White House telegram CAP 65918, December 27, 10:51 p.m.: "1. I have already indicated some of the disadvantages in a continued stand down of Rolling Thunder and recommended immediate resumption. "2. Westmoreland has made a plea for resumption of Rolling Thunder and notes the decrease in Rolling Thunder strike sorties in the last three months. He requests that pressure on North Vietnam be increased. "3. I have recommended programs for Rolling Thunder designed steadily to increase the pressure on North Vietnam. These programs will drastically reduce the flow of military supplies reaching North Vietnam and hence the Viet Cong. "4. The armed forces of the United States should not be required to fight this war with one arm tied behind their backs. I urgently recommend that Rolling Thunder commence immediately and that the target programs I have recommended be approved." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Reprisal Program, Vol. IV)
246. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations European Office to the Department of State/1/ Geneva, December 27, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 2:33 p.m. 1106. For Secretary. Subj: Quaker Committee meeting with DRV rep in Paris./2/ /2/Prior to the December 21 meeting with Mai Van Bo, Duncan Wood of the American Friends Service Committee called on Tubby in Geneva and asked if there was anything the United States wanted passed to Mai Van Bo. Tubby was noncommittal, but noted that the previous meeting on November 16 was discouraging. (Telegram 1063 from Geneva, December 20; ibid., POL 27-14 VIET S) Accounts of the November 16 meeting are in telegram 925 to Geneva, December 1; telegram 960 from Geneva, December 2; and telegram 2563 from London, December 4. (All ibid.) 1. Duncan Wood of Friends Service Committee told me today that meeting with Mai Van Bo on 21st in Paris not productive. Wood and Wolfe Mendel spent about hour with Bo, who rather ill at ease. 2. Bo had no response re Quaker offer aid to DRV, promised to let Committee know when or if received. When Wood raised question political situation in Viet Nam, Bo switched conversation to discussion differences family life in England, France. 3. Wood: "The time of our meeting could hardly have been worse, after the Italians' disclosure and especially after Chou En-Lai's speech." Tubby
247. Paper by Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, December 27, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Misc. Vietnam, Vol. IV. No classification marking. Cooper, in The Lost Crusade (pp. 293-294), describes and quotes from this paper. He states that it was prepared by Rusk "in considerable haste" for the benefit of Vice President Humphrey, Harriman, and the other high-level emissaries sent to other countries to explain the U.S. position in potential peace negotiations. Also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 740-742. THE HEART OF THE MATTER IN VIET-NAM I. The Fact of Aggression The simple fact is that tens of thousands of trained and armed men, including units of the North Vietnamese regular army, have been sent by Hanoi into South Viet-Nam for the purpose of imposing Hanoi's will on South Viet-Nam by force. It is this external aggression which is responsible for the presence of U.S. combat forces. Indeed, it was not until the early summer of 1965 that the number of U.S. military personnel in South Viet-Nam reached the number of those which have been infiltrated by Hanoi. If this aggression from the outside were removed, U.S. combat forces would not be needed. II. The U.S. Commitment The United States has a clear and direct commitment to the security of South Viet-Nam against external attack. This commitment is based upon bilateral agreements between the United States and South Viet-Nam, upon the SEATO Treaty (whose obligations are both joint and several), upon annual actions by the Congress in providing aid to South Viet-Nam, upon the policy expressed in such Congressional action as the August 1964 resolution, and upon the solemn declarations of three U.S. Presidents. At stake is not just South Vietnam, nor even Southeast Asia; there is also at stake the integrity of a U.S. commitment and the importance of that commitment to the peace right around the globe. III. Initiatives for Peace A. We are not aware of any initiative which has been taken by Hanoi during the past five years to seek peace in Southeast Asia. Reports of "peace feelers" have to do with initiatives by third parties. Hanoi has denied that it has ever made any "peace feelers". We ourselves know of none. During 1965 Hanoi has consistently insisted that its four points must be accepted as the sole basis for peace in Viet-Nam. The third of these four points would require the imposition of the program of the liberation front upon South Viet-Nam, whether the South Vietnamese wanted it or not. B. The initiatives for peace undertaken by our side, and by many other governments, would be hard to count. They began with President Kennedy's talk with Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961 and have not ceased. The publicly known initiatives have been multiplied many times by private initiatives not yet disclosed. On the public record, however, are the following instances: 1. Kennedy-Khrushchev talks in June 1961; 2. Geneva Conference on Laos; 3. U.S. reference of Gulf of Tonkin matter to the UN Security Council in August 1964; 4. The Polish proposal to convene the two Co-Chairmen and the three members of the ICC (India, Canada and Poland) to take up the question of Laos; 5. The call of 17 non-aligned nations for negotiations without pre-conditions; 6. Attempts by U Thant to visit Hanoi and Peiping; 7. President Johnson's call for unconditional discussions; 8. The British Commonwealth Committee on Viet-Nam; 9. Attempted or actual visits by Patrick Gordon Walker, Mr. Davies (MP), and Ghanaian Delegation. IV. U.S. Contributions to the Basket of Peace The following statements are on the public record about elements which the U.S. believes can go into peace in Southeast Asia;/2/ /2/These 14 points appeared in The Washington Post, December 29, 1965. 1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia; 2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof; 3. We would welcome "negotiations without pre-conditions" as the 17 nations put it; 4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it; 5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions; 6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose; 7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia; 8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet-Nam after peace is assured; 9. We support free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice; 10. The question of reunification of Viet-Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision; 11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their option; 12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Viet-Nam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars; 13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem." 14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped. In other words, we have put everything into the basket of peace except the surrender of South Viet-Nam.
248. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, December 27, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Top Secret. Prepared at the President's request; see footnote 1, Document 244. SUBJECT 1. Review of Elements of US Position. A summary of our basic position, and of Hanoi's contrasting resistance to any agreement, is a "must" in any case. This could be based on the memorandum you did today for the use of the Vice President,/2/ and might be supplemented by an up-dated history of the various negotiating efforts that have been made since the circulation of our 15-point list in July./3/ Such an up-dating should be ready in a day or two, although I would note that it is less thick and impressive than the record of negotiating efforts through July. /2/Document 247. /3/The 15-point list, July 26, updated the June 10 list of 13 points by adding references to the June 19 British Commonwealth initiative and the Harold Davies mission to Hanoi of July 9-13. (Johnson Library, Papers of Paul C. Warnke, McNaughton Files, State (Bundy) on Negotiations) The 13-point list is ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV. 2. Re-Statement of our Position in Four-Point Form. In your television appearance of last August, you dealt with the essential elements of a settlement in the same order as Hanoi's four points, but took out the clear objections in Hanoi's formulation. A more systematic effort in this direction might be used as a framework for an offer to negotiate on the basis of such a four-point statement. This would have the appeal in many world quarters, and among sophisticated domestic critics such as the New York Times, of using Hanoi's own framework and indicating the general principles which would be acceptable. It could be stated as a possible basis for negotiations, while we reiterated at the same time that we were prepared for negotiations without any conditions or basis whatever, or--as we explicitly said in the Fanfani reply--on the basis of Geneva Accords of 1954. If we provided two or three possible formulations, it would tend to strengthen our position verbally, without any substantive change. 3. Bombing Position. Assuming that we do not continue the Christmas pause, the next possible occasion for a pause would be the stand-down of all military operations that we have now virtually agreed with the GVN to take place over Tet, January 21-23. With a three-day opening period already agreed, we might well extend this for another ten days and take the prior diplomatic measures that we have all considered useful and indeed essential in the pause scenario discussed in the last six weeks. I would most emphatically not recommend a pause at this or any other time that lasted for less than about two weeks. It must be long enough to be convincing to third countries that a serious opportunity was given for diplomatic activity. Similarly, it must be preceded by careful consultation with the GVN and our key allies, and by messages at the last moment to Hanoi through various possible intermediary channels. 4. Pacing our Bombing in Accordance with Communist Activity in the South. Many of us have felt for some time that our bombing of the North would be much more effective in the military and psychological sense if it were more irregular in pattern in any case. It may be too difficult to introduce daily variation pegged to the level of VC activity in the preceding day or two, as today's Washington Post seems to be suggesting. However, we could make a general statement that the level of our bombing in the North would be governed by the pace of Communist activity in the South in the preceding period (not specified). This would have the advantage of a built-in justification for increasing the level of our bombing if Communist activity increases. But it would also have the "peace" significance of opening the way for the other side, by reducing its own activity, to bring about a reduction in our bombing and thus to open the way to what Kennan and others have urged as a progressive de-escalation of hostilities. At the same time, this line of approach is inherently more controllable than an outright pause and leaves the way open to increases that do not raise the problem of outright resumption after a pause. 5. Cambodian Supervision. We have already started probing with the British the question of their discussing this with the Soviets and the ICC members. We have Sihanouk's own request for expanded ICC supervision in certain areas, and the issue is one that is wholly consistent with our own past position. Conceivably it might be a matter for UN Security Council discussion, but only if the Soviets fully agreed. I would be much more favorable to a co-chairmen/ICC format, which could produce discussions that might go beyond Cambodia, although this should emphatically not be stated as a purpose at the outset. This strikes me as a useful initiative in any event, although of limited utility at least for a time in meeting any need for a Vietnam peace initiative.
249. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 27, 1965, 5:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII. No classification marking. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum. SUBJECT 1. I had a meeting of second-level public relations people dealing with Viet Nam this afternoon, and they all said very strongly, that if the pause goes more than another day or so, it should go long enough to be a real answer to our critics. Otherwise, we would fall between two stools and get criticized by the military without making any money with the peacemakers. I argued with them, but I think the point has force. 2. Bill Moyers has reaffirmed to me this afternoon his own feeling that since we have gone these days, we should go on through New Year's Day. He thinks we will be heavily criticized for a half-hearted effort if we resume now. 3. Most interestingly, General Taylor came to see me this afternoon to say that he now feels very strongly that since we have endured three days of pause, we might as well go on for long enough to take the starch out of the idea once and for all. He also undertook to write personally to Westie and to Admiral Sharp if you decide to continue the current suspension and to explain to them the great importance of this course of action from the point of view of proving to the American public that we have left no door to peace untried./2/ Taylor said that he does not think the military cost is great. He thinks the political reward of a solid pause is worth it at this stage. /2/See Document 252. 4. I should report that I planned to be in New York tomorrow for a day of talks with my prospective employers./3/ I can easily cancel this visit if you wish, and of course, I can be reached on the telephone through the White House Board at all times. Bob Komer will cover here and is fully briefed. /3/On December 4, McGeorge Bundy tendered his resignation and informed the President that he had been offered a position at the Ford Foundation. Bundy agreed to remain in his post until February 28, 1966. (Memorandum from Bundy to Johnson, Deceamber 4, with attached letter of resignation; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII) [Next documents]
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