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250. Letter From the President's Consultant on Vietnam (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 27, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 312 (Situation in Vietnam, 1964-1965). Secret. McGeorge Bundy sent this letter to the President with the following comment: "Max Taylor prepared this at my request, and I think you will find it an interesting and thoughtful contribution." A note on Bundy's covering memorandum indicates this letter was sent to the President in Texas on December 31 at 11:45 p.m.; a notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Dear Mr. President: As the New Year approaches, I am sure that the thought uppermost in your mind and that of your senior advisers is what to do about Viet-Nam in 1966. Not knowing exactly the present state of development of plans within the government, I am venturing to convey to you some of my personal views as to the goals set for next year. Our overall objective remains that of assuring South Viet-Nam the right to determine its own form of government and its own way of life without having to accept a Communist government imposed by Hanoi. It may or may not be possible to attain this objective in 1966; we should, however, establish ambitious bench marks in all sectors of our endeavors which, if reached, should offer a reasonable hope of convincing the Communist leaders that the invincibility of the "War of Liberation" being waged in South Viet-Nam is a myth and hence they had better change their game. In seeking to establish an objective for the ground combat in South Viet-Nam during 1966, I would suggest its expression in terms of population made sufficiently secure to permit progress by the non-military agencies in developing the secured areas. At present, it is estimated (although the estimate is sometimes challenged) that about 53 percent of the population is already in this state of security. If we took some figure like 75-80 percent of the population as our year-end goal for security, it would have the effect of focusing the military effort more specifically on population as our primary objective rather than territory. If we take control of territory as our goal, it invites us to disperse our forces throughout the jungles and forests of negligible military and political value and into terrain most favorable to the military operations of the enemy. It will create endless U.S. troop requirements if we undertake to pursue the guerrilla bands into the remote fastnesses of Viet-Nam; we had better concentrate our troop resources on securing the maximum number of people and thus get the most out of our deployments. The role of our U.S. ground forces in this campaign for increased population security should be primarily the destruction of mainline Viet Cong-North Vietnamese units, preferably after they have been located by South Vietnamese ground action. Let the South Vietnamese army find and fix the enemy; we are best suited to hold and destroy them. I know that no pat formula such as this can apply in all cases but it can serve as a general guide. I have been disturbed by growing evidence from Saigon that our military in South Viet-Nam are inclined to turn over all or most of the heavy fighting to U.S. forces and allow the bulk of the Vietnamese forces to retire behind a screen of U.S.-provided protection to perform clearing jobs and local defense. At least half of the South Vietnamese regular units should be used in mobile combat roles and some such level of Vietnamese participation should be required by the U.S. military authorities in Saigon. It is more difficult to set concrete goals in the area of development and rural reconstruction. I would suggest one, however; namely, that we take as a 1966 objective the conduct of free elections in all the secure areas of South Viet-Nam for the purpose of electing a constituent assembly. If all elements of civil government are oriented toward this goal, I would expect substantial progress to be made in all the subordinate programs for such purposes as the improvement of administration, agriculture, distribution of commodities, public health and the like. For our part, we should indicate our unequivocal support for such elections and our willingness to accept the results whatever they may be. In planning the air campaign against North Viet-Nam for 1966, we should first remind ourselves of the three purposes we had in starting it in February, 1965. First, there was the need to give the South Vietnamese the opportunity for the first time in eleven years of conflict to strike back at the source of all their troubles; it also gave us an opportunity to retaliate for such terrorist attacks as the mortaring of the Bien Hoa air base, the bombing of the Brink hotel and the attack on U.S. barracks at Pleiku. Second, there was the need to use our air superiority to retard and make more difficult the continued infiltration of men and materiel from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam. No one expected air power alone to be able to stop infiltration and clearly it has not. But any serious examination of the physical destruction of our bombings and the effect on daily circulation of our armed reconnaissance is bound to conclude that the air campaign has made life very difficult for those in the North who are supporting the Viet Cong insurgency. The third and, in the long run, the most important purpose of our bombings was and is to convince the Hanoi leaders that the aggression must stop or they will have to pay an increasingly high price for its continuance. We are all aware that they have thus far given no indication of an intention to mend their ways. But neither did the leaders in Moscow give any intention of calling off the Berlin airlift or the North Korean-Chicom leaders of abandoning their effort to take over South Korea until the game had been played down to the last card. Up to that point, their attitude was one of defiant, aggressive confidence. We should expect nothing different from Hanoi now. The leaders there still hope that international or U.S. domestic pressures will cause us to weaken and modify our purpose--or perhaps the Saigon Government may cave in as it has in the past. Until these hopes prove vain, I am convinced we must keep up the pressure and pursue inexorably a bold offensive course in 1966. In this spirit, I would recommend that, during 1966, we continue the deliberate destruction of all fixed targets in North Viet-Nam outside of heavily populated areas which have any relation to the war-supporting capability of North Viet-Nam and continue to interdict road and rail movement throughout the country. This will require after due warning the aerial mining of the principal ports. In order to increase the reluctance of the DRV to denude North Viet-Nam of army units to reinforce the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam, it may be desirable to encourage the South Vietnamese to conduct commando raids with U.S. support along the North Vietnamese coast to give an occasional reminder that the ground of North Viet-Nam may eventually be no more of a sanctuary than its air space. On the politico-economic front in Saigon, we need to sustain and improve the Ky government and work increasingly to hold inflation within bounds. We also need to keep the Saigon political leaders in mental step with us as we plan for the termination of hostilities. If, as I believe, we are going to be obliged to take the Viet Cong in some form into any negotiation, we need to work hard now to overcome the inevitable objections of our ally. In conditioning Hanoi for negotiation, we need to work much harder in 1966 to carry the message to the people of North Viet-Nam and to the Viet Cong that a better life awaits them if they abandon their aggression against the south. Some of the specific advantages need to be spelled out more precisely than up to now. All our propaganda activities should then be directed at getting this message to a people who must be coming increasingly unhappy under the burdens of war. On our domestic front, I am sure you will agree that there is continuing work to be done in explaining the Viet-Nam situation to our people. Since returning to the U.S. in August, I have made nearly fifty speaking or TV appearances from which I have drawn two conclusions. The substantial people of the country are solidly behind the actions of our government but there is wide-spread criticism that the government does not adequately explain what is going on. There is even some suspicion that this government is holding back and perhaps concealing some of the facts. At the moment, in many quarters there is an unreasoning confidence in negotiations as an end in themselves and their initiation as necessarily synonymous with the restoration of peace. Our people need to be reminded again and again of our Korean experience--twenty-five months of negotiations while we lost some 46,000 American and 150,000 allied casualties. I suggest the need in 1966 of many more high-level explanations to our people of the basic issues in South Viet-Nam to give them the feeling of being taken more into the confidence of their government. In closing, let me say that, as one of your advisers, I am not discouraged or dismayed by the prospects in Viet-Nam for 1966--provided we stay on course and refuse to be diverted from the overall objective which you have stated so many times--the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. My attention was recently drawn to a staunch sentence of Sir Francis Drake which gives me considerable comfort in such times as these. "There must be a beginning of every matter but it is continuing unto the end that yields the true glory." With warm regards for a New Year which will bring its share of glory, Respectfully, Maxwell D. Taylor
251. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, December 27, 1965, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR MAC BUNDY B told of his talks with the Pres re the pause;/2/ he feels he has gotten into this without making a diplomatic record except with the Hungarians. Sec said he would be inclined to go ahead; the Hungarian Charge just came in; he had a message from Foreign Minister, a question; Sec briefed B on the talk;/3/ Sec did not feel this affected the bombing in the north problem. B said it was not any argument for going ahead either. Sec agreed; the argument for going ahead is not to have misunderstandings; if we start now we would be under a handicap of doing a four days pause. They had a rather lengthy discussion of the problem. Sec was inclined to go ahead with the bombing and perhaps have another pause beginnning with our new year; we cannot count these four days if we expect to develop a pause from a diplomatic point of view; it also misleads Vietnamese for we have not developed with them the concept of a pause; Sec said he was with Thompson, Johnson and Wm Bundy/4/ and all of us feel we should resume even if we can develop another type of pause in the next few days. B will report Sec's views; B did not think anything would be done until Pres had talked with McNamara. /2/According to his diary, the President and McGeorge Bundy talked by telephone at 9:35 a.m., noon, and 1:06 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) /3/See Document 258. /4/Rusk was meeting with these men from 6:55 to 7:35 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)
252. Draft Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/ Washington, December 27, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII. Secret. 1. I talked to Dean Rusk/2/ to urge him to get on every diplomatic wire and tell people that there has been no noise over North Vietnam for four days and that we certainly would like to know it if anyone has heard any signal of any sort that this lack of action has done any good. I found him very resistant indeed and he told me that he and Alex Johnson and Tommy Thompson and my brother Bill all think that we cannot get diplomatic mileage this way. They really would prefer to resume bombing right away and have a longer pause later on, with advance notice to the Russians, as they initially recommended last week. /2/See Document 251. 2. I tried gently to say to Dean that this was not the present problem. I said that I thought we now had a 4-day start and the question was what use we could make of it if we continued for another period of up to a week. He continued to resist my suggestion, and I do not feel that I should make further diplomatic contacts tonight behind his back. 3. What I do think is that if you should decide--as I myself hope you may--that it makes sense to withhold the bombing for another several days, you might then speak to the Secretary yourself about the usefulness of directing the attention of every available diplomat to the fact that there is a pause and the further fact that we certainly want to know it if anyone has any way of finding out whether there is any prospect of a response.
253. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, December 27, 1965. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-310-69. Top Secret. This memorandum, dated January 3, 1966, is based on Taylor's notes, which he took at the time of the conversation. Telephone call to my apartment from President Johnson, 10:00 PM on December 27, 1965. President Johnson called me from the Ranch to ask my opinion of an extension of the Christmas bombing pause in North Viet-Nam. Secretary McNamara was on the line. The President explained his feeling of the need of the extension to meet domestic opinion and to strengthen all fences prior to asking the Congress for more funds and more men for Viet-Nam. He had had a strong message from Westy and Admiral Sharp supporting an immediate resumption of the bombing of North Viet-Nam/2/ and was clearly reluctant to override their military arguments. I told him that I had always opposed a pause in the bombing, feeling that it was futile to expect Hanoi to make any responsive moves during a pause while international attention was concentrated upon their every move. I expressed the view from a military point of view the commanders were right and we should get on with the bombing campaign. /2/See Document 245 and footnote 3 thereto. However, in my judgment, a few days delay would not matter from a military point of view if the President felt that, by an extension of the cease-fire, he could expose once and for all the futility of expecting reasonableness from the leadership in Hanoi and Peking. I felt there was no danger to our troops in terms of loss of life or exposure to attack as the result of the extension of the bombing pause for a few days. I repeated my often expressed fear of being trapped into extended negotiations in the course of a pause. The President expressed his determination not to be caught and to resume bombing within a few days as soon as he had given our opponents a reasonable chance to respond to the extension of the cease-fire. MDT
254. Editorial Note At approximately 10:30 p.m. on December 27, 1965, President Johnson called Secretary Rusk from Texas and advised him that he had decided to defer resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam for several more days, possibly into the middle of the week beginning January 2, 1966. At 10:55 p.m. on December 27, Rusk called the Department of State Operations Center and asked that Vance, U. Alexis Johnson, Thompson, and McGeorge and William Bundy be asked to assemble at the Operations Center immediately. (Chronology of Second Pause in US/GVN Bombing Program against North Vietnam; Johnson Library, Papers of Paul C. Warnke, McNaughton Files, V, Planning Pressures) According to Cooper (The Lost Crusade, page 291), the men assembled at the Operations Center and dispatched instructions to Saigon; see Document 255.
255. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, December 28, 1965, 3:45 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Pinta; Exdis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by William Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, Thompson, and in substance by McGeorge Bundy and Vance; and approved by Rusk. A copy of this telegram was sent to the President in Texas in White House telegram CAP 65927, December 28, 11:06 a.m. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIV, Cables) 1805. Eyes only for Ambassador and Porter from Secretary. 1. President has given most searching consideration to question of further delay in resumption of bombing of DRV, and has taken fully into account views expressed by you and Westmoreland on this subject./2/ He has decided that he wishes to defer resumption of bombing for several more days, possibly into middle of next week. No commitments would be made, publicly or privately, which would limit our freedom of action in the event of a major contingency or serious provocation. Air, ground, and sea operations in SVN would continue, including Arc Light, as well as air operations in Laos. /2/See Document 245. 2. For your own personal guidance, a major factor in decision is the action which will have to be made public in January. The prospect of large scale reinforcement in men and defense budget increases of some twenty billions for next eighteen month period requires solid preparation of American public. A crucial element will be clear demonstration that we have explored fully every alternative but that aggressor has left us no choice. 3. We do not, quite frankly, anticipate that Hanoi will respond in any significant way. We have seen nothing in the mass of speculation or diplomatic gossip pointing to an interest in peace on Hanoi's part and we have certainly had no such indication through any official channel. If, contrary to our expectations, there was some significant response, we would of course be in touch with you immediately. Thus, we do not want to commit ourselves irrevocably to a specific date for resumption. 4. While confidential until published this week, most recent Harris poll will show that 73% of American people would favor renewed effort for cease-fire (including 64% of Goldwater voters) and 59% would favor bombing pause (including 48% of Goldwater voters). Same poll will show 61% favoring increased bombing effort if cease-fire or pause fails to elicit interest of other side. Such polls do not make decisions, but they illustrate need to prepare our people for major sacrifices by making it crystal clear where responsibility lies. Same problem is reflected in Congress which will be reconvening on January 10 to face hard facts of required national effort. The simple fact is that we must sustain support for what has to be done in months ahead, if the other side is not interested in peace. Compared to this over-riding requirement, the destruction of the limited targets which would otherwise be struck during this period is a secondary matter. 5. Underlying above reasons is our genuine interest in securing SVN without major bloodshed if that can be accomplished. There is only the slimmest of chances that suspension of bombing will be occasion for basic change of objective by other side but communist propaganda on this point should be tested and exposed. 6. Another purpose of continuing suspension would be to drive rift between Communist powers and between Hanoi and NLF. We have considerable reason to believe differences exist that would come into play in a suspension, and tend to interpret Hanoi's propaganda blast against pause on December 10 and 11 in sense that Hanoi itself is concerned about this./3/ To this end we will be in touch with a few interested governments. /3/Reference is to a Hanoi radio broadcast in English on December 10 and a commentary in Hanoi's official paper, Nhan Dan, December 11, that the potential U.S. bombing pause was a trick to mask aggression, which deceived no one. (FBIS, North Vietnam, December 13, 1965) 7. Accordingly, you should discuss this decision ASAP with GVN officials, in whatever way you think best, to obtain their private understanding and concurrence with this brief delay in resumption of bombing./4/ Following are additional elements you should explain: /4/In telegram 2306 from Saigon, December 28, Lodge reported that he called on General Ky and gave him the "pertinent and appropriate parts of Deptel 1805. When I had concluded he allowed a moment's silence to go by and said: 'I understand the problem and, of course, I have no objection.'" (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) a. We plan no formal announcement other than responding to questions as to when bombing will resume by saying no decision taken. b. All actions for further reinforcement in SVN will go forward without change, including specifically plans for two additional brigades and Marine Landing Team due to arrive in January. USG plans major further reinforcement in 1966 as required, and you may tell GVN this. c. On side of countering possible GVN objections, you should note that Hanoi can hardly doubt our resolve in face of our present and planned effort. Suspension does not suggest, nor is there, slightest change in our negotiating position and objectives, which are familiar to GVN. 8. I know you will appreciate the importance of overwhelming support from the home front for the gallant job you and all hands are doing on the fighting front. Rusk
256. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/ December 28, 1965. /1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Johnson, Pres., 1965. No classification marking. The President was in Texas; Harriman was in Washington. According to his diary, President Johnson telephoned Harriman from the LBJ Ranch at 10:36 a.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) The President called WAH. P--Hello, Averell, how are you getting along? H--I wrote you a little note. Hope you saw about the . . . P--Averell, I talked to Rusk this morning and I don't know how you feel about it. We talked to the Hungarians last Thursday./2/ Are you familiar with the conversations? /2/See Document 241. H--Only in a general way. P--We told them that we were listening and we were hoping they would listen if they heard anything we would like to know about it and if they could get any encouragement along the peace front, it would certainly be appealing to us. They come in now and want to know if we are willing to talk to the VC on some of our 14 points and we told them we would have no trouble for the VC to be adequately heard./3/ Actually, we don't have much confidence that much will come out of this but that is no reason not to try. I don't think I would be elected to Congress the first time when I ran. I think with your friends Fulbright, Scotty Reston, Mansfield, Arthur Krock and the New York Times (men), all these people thinking there could be peace, if we were only willing to have peace, we ought to give it the old college try. There's the poll--43% of the people think we haven't tried enough diplomatic moves--they don't know enough what economic work we are doing in SEA. If you don't mind picking up your old kit bags, going to visit your old friend Tito, tell him how we feel and how I feel, sit down and talk to him, and see if he has any channels, go to Poland--just quietly, one of your general vacationing around, the elder statesman visiting around the world to see the state of the world, then probably get into see that Hungarian Foreign Minister; you can go to Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, any place you drop in or out. /3/See Document 258. H--What about seeing Bo in Paris? P--That would be good. He ought to be talked to. H--I think all of this ought to be done with Rusk's blessing. J--I have told him this morning that I wanted you to do this. You report directly to me like when you were down in Chile and some of these other good trips you have taken. When you get back, you can talk to the Times people, etc. I think that yesterday it has been four days now and there hasn't been a bomb dropped on NVN. We are not going to drop any until after the New Year if there is no serious provocation. Keep your trip at low level as you can. Don't be making us explain--you never do. I talked about it to Bob McNamara this morning. Said you went down to Chile and nobody knew (you were there until you got the job done). Bob McNamara is here. There is a plane warming up. You go see Dean Rusk. You just get him the word just as soon as you can. . . . There has been five days since there hasn't been a bombing. H--Which should I go to first? J--You be the judge. I think you want to build Gronouski up a little and pull him in on it. Tito, good. Hungarian Foreign Minister--they are the first ones (notify). You ought to look at it--when I go before the Committee for 25 billion dollars for special mission in VN--and an extra 500,000 men. Then I can say the day before Christmas no bombing, and then we sent Harriman to Poland, to Yugoslavia, and we sent Goldberg and Rusk here and Wilson there. We have walked the last mile. H--Do you think we ought to go to Hungary first? J--It seems to me that they are not any of them in State very strong for this. You bear that in mind. But they weren't strong for Chile. You can at least explain when you get back to Washington where you have been, whom you have talked to, you have tried everything. And maybe you can see the Russians later. We are seeing Dobrynin. H--It might be good for me to stop there. J--Don't you let Dean talk you out of it. You had a mighty good year. You were a great comfort. My love to Marie. H wished the President a Happy New Year and said no one deserved it more.
257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Burma/1/ Washington, December 28, 1965, 6:13 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S/PINTA. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Pinta. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Rusk. 202. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. 1. President has decided that he wishes defer resumption of bombing for several more days. We are most anxious that word of this action be conveyed directly to DRV, although we are also naturally conveying message to key Communist governments that are in touch with Hanoi. 2. Accordingly, you should convey aide-memoire in text given below in some manner to DRV Ambassador Rangoon. Moscow experience last May was that DRV Ambassador refused to meet with Kohler or to accept written communication. However, junior member of Embassy was able to hand written note to junior member of DRV Embassy staff so that effective delivery was achieved even though DRV Embassy returned note on following day allegedly unopened. We would suspect DRV Embassies may now have prior instructions to reject any communication from us, and you will have to explore carefully how to make first move in way that would ensure physical delivery of note to some DRV representative, even if, as we expect, Ambassador himself refuses to receive you. Use of reliable Burmese intermediary is not excluded if purpose can only be achieved in this way. If necessary, you could approach appropriate level RGUB to remind them of Burmese willingness, expressed to U Thant apparently during 1964, that Rangoon would be available as site for contacts between US and DRV. We leave method entirely to you, but action should be taken soonest and in way that ensures effective delivery. Please give full account of actions you take and of DRV reactions. 3. Text of aide-memoire is as follows: Begin text: "1. As you are no doubt aware, there has been no bombing in North Viet-Nam since December 24 although some reconnaissance flights have continued. No decision has been made regarding a resumption of bombings and unless there is a major provocation we would hope that the present stand-down, which is in its fifth day, could extend beyond New Year. If your government will now reciprocate by making a serious contribution toward peace, it would obviously have a favorable effect on the possibility of further extending the suspension. "2. I and other members of my Embassy staff stand available at any time to receive any communication you may wish to address to me or to us."/2/ End text. /2/In Paris, Paul Sturm was instructed to inform Mai Van Bo of his knowledge of this telegram and that a possible DRV response to a bombing cessation would be "a clear major reduction in level of VC military activity and terrorism in SVN." On January 1, 1966, Sturm tried to contact Bo but was told that Bo was sick. On January 3, Sturm met with Vo Van Sung of the DRV delegation in Paris and gave him a copy of the Rangoon aide-memoire. (Telegrams 3707 and 3732 from Paris, January 2 and 3, 1966; ibid., POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ) Rusk
258. Paper by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, December 28, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 1, Vol. 1. Secret. Record of the Secretary's Contacts with the Hungarian Charge 1. December 23. The Secretary called in the Charge in order to give him a message inquiring whether the Hungarian Foreign Minister had received any information that would throw light on the question the Secretary had asked Peter at the UN in October. (The Secretary's question had been, in effect, what would happen on the other side if we were to stop bombing.) In the course of the conversation, the Secretary spelled out in some detail 12 basic points concerning the US position. He asked that these points be brought to the attention of the Hungarian Foreign Minister and anyone else he chose. The Charge said that he would report the conversation urgently./2/ /2/See Document 241. 2. December 24. The Charge called the Secretary to say that he would like to see him urgently. The Charge asked for clarification of our intentions concerning a Christmas truce. The Secretary responded that we had received no indication of the VC attitude on our own 30-hour military ceasefire. He stated emphatically that any ceasefire, of 12 or 30 hours, could not be unilateral. He said that he might know more about our precise military plans during the day. Finally, the Secretary said that we remained interested in knowing what the other side would do if we stopped shooting or bombing. 3. December 25. The Secretary telephoned the Charge during the evening to say that the outcome of the ceasefire within South Viet-Nam depended on the VC attitude and actions. However, he went on to say that he wished the Charge to know that we did not expect to conduct bombing attacks in North Viet-Nam for "a day or two" after Christmas. He said that he would be most interested in any message the Charge might produce on the basis of this information. 4. December 27. The Secretary called the Charge early in the afternoon to ask if he had had any message. The Charge responded in the negative, but later in the afternoon called again to say that he now had instructions. Accordingly, the Secretary received him at 6 p.m. The Charge conveyed a very precisely phrased message from Peter: "Can the Secretary's messages be interpreted to mean that the USG is ready or willing to enter into negotiations on 'the platform presented by you' with the NLF?" The Charge went on to say that the "platform" obviously referred to the 12 points summarized by the Secretary to the Charge on December 23. The Secretary responded by making five points: 1. He referred to President Johnson's remarks at his July 28 press conference/3/ to the effect that the VC would not have difficulty being represented or having their views presented, "if Hanoi decided it wished to cease aggression." /3/See Document 97. 2. The US problem of peace lies with Hanoi, not the NLF. US forces are in Viet-Nam only because Hanoi has sent tens of thousands of men, including regular forces, into South Viet-Nam. If Hanoi had not done this, US forces would not be there. Thus, our problem is with Hanoi. 3. Our 12 points are a matter of public record. If the NLF is seriously interested in these 12 points, they can tell us or Peter or anyone such as the Geneva Co-Chairmen. We would be interested if Peter has any indication that the NLF is thus interested. 4. There is no technical problem applicable to contact with the NLF. Members of the NLF have family ties and are well known in Saigon. The Charge interjected to ask whether this meant they could talk to the US or to South Viet-Nam in both directions. The Secretary responded by going on to his fifth point below. 5. The USG cannot enter into negotiations with the NLF. The Secretary emphasized this two or three times in the conversation. He pointed out that there were other groups in South Viet-Nam--Buddhists, Catholics, Montagnards, sects, etc., who had their own leaders and would have to be considered. The local VC were part of a population of 14 million. One could not negotiate with them simply because they happened to have rifles. At this, Charge grunted disagreement, and the Secretary remarked: "I predicted your disagreement," and the Charge responded: "You predicted correctly." Having made these five basic points, the Secretary went on, "in confidence," to say that at times there seemed to be nuances of difference between the NLF and Hanoi, between Hanoi and Peiping, and of course well known differences between Moscow and Peiping. Under these circumstances, it was very hard to find anyone with whom to make peace. The Secretary said he put this remark in confidence because he did not wish to exaggerate, but that this was the reason for the suggestion that he would be interested in any expression of NLF views on the 12 points. The Charge complained at this point that they had been given very little time to get any response and had had no time to get out "to the jungle." The Secretary then said he did not connect Peter's message to the bombing. He could not say at that moment when the bombing would be resumed. It could be at any time. However, he wished to underscore that even the cessation of bombing for these three days had shown that it was a point of flexibility on our side, if there was any interest on the other side. At this point the Charge asked if he might make a personal remark, and asked rhetorically: "Do you think Peter speaks on his own?" (The obvious intended implication was that Peter had been in touch with Hanoi or the NLF, or both.) The Secretary responded that if Peter had reported Hanoi moving in the direction of peace, that would be very important. Peter's report on the NLF was also interesting, but he repeated that he did not connect Peter's message with the bombing of the North. The Secretary went on to say that we could stop the bombing but we still wanted to know what Hanoi would then do--not a commitment but at least an indication. He recalled his own participation in the negotiations that terminated the Berlin Blockade and started up in 1951 concerning Korea, and said that there were ways for diplomats to find these things out privately. He went on to say that our 12 points meant exactly what they said and were reliable. If Hanoi thinks we are not in good faith, let them probe us. The Charge interjected that the present US response appeared to be that we could not negotiate with the NLF. The Secretary said this was indeed the case. The Secretary said however that we mean all we say, for example about not having bases or a military presence in South Viet-Nam and that if Hanoi gets out, we will. The Charge put on an act of discouragement at this point and asked how we could find a solution. The Secretary responded that if Hanoi was determined to absorb South Viet-Nam by force, there was bound to be further war. The Charge then asked what would happen if free elections led to Communist control of the South. The Secretary said this was a matter for the people of South Viet-Nam. The Charge then backtracked a bit with some remarks about how hard it was to find the will of the people in any circumstances, and admitted under the Secretary's teasing that he took a standard Communist view of elections. The conversation then went back to what would happen if the bombing continued to be suspended. The Charge again complained that he had had no time to get "to the jungle." He thought this was a pity, as this was a very good psychological moment. Now, he regretted to say, he found our response discouraging and was afraid the bombing would resume. Nonetheless he would carefully report the Secretary's statement that our action should at least be taken as an indication of our flexibility on this point. The Secretary then noted that the VC had put on at least 20 incidents even during their own ceasefire period, and then 60 more during ours. The Charge responded that he had been surprised there hadn't been a major attack; the VC didn't have IBM machines to give orders. The Charge then referred to the Secretary's call on Christmas evening. The Secretary said that our informing the Hungarians of our intent was part of our saying that we were interested in peace, but could not pay the price of South Viet-Nam. If you looked at our 12 points, we had been fair and constructive on every other element, but we were simply not about to trade South Viet-Nam for peace. The Charge then reverted to saying that that was all very well, but we still wouldn't talk with the NLF. The Secretary then asked, as a point of information, whether there was now an NLF office in Budapest. The Charge responded that one had just been installed. The Secretary brought the conversation to a close by saying that he did appreciate Peter's interest. 5. December 28. The Secretary summoned the Charge about noon to give him a simple statement that we were not proposing to resume bombing for at least several more days. The Secretary's message followed exactly the text used with the Soviets and Poles as well, and is attached. In response, the Charge gave the Secretary the following message from Peter (subsequently phoned in absolutely correct form to Mr. Bundy). It was as follows: "I have got your newer message and your pressing questions. Every one of your proposals is under careful study [in place of 'I am carefully studying all your proposals,' which the Charge explained orally to Mr. Bundy meant that the proposals were being studied by 'someone other than Peter.']/4/ /4/Brackets in the source text. "I will give a complete answer soon."
Attachment/5/ Washington, December 28, 1965. /5/No classification marking. 1. As you are doubtless aware, there has been no bombing in North Viet Nam since December 24th although some reconnaissance flights have continued. I have been asked to tell you that no decision has been made regarding a resumption of bombing and that this will depend upon developments. We would hope that the present standdown, which is in its fifth day, could extend at least through New Year's. We cannot make a flat commitment as to timing because of the possibility of some particularly outrageous action or some major new move by the other side. If, on the other hand, the other side should reciprocate by making a serious contribution toward peace, it would obviously have a favorable effect on the possibility of extending the suspension. 2. Because of the interest and concern of your government about this problem, this information is being passed to you for whatever use your government may wish to make of it.
259. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 28, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS I made the following oral statement to Dobrynin: [Here follows the identical text of the statement that Rusk gave to Radvanyi; see the attachment to Document 258.] Dobrynin said he would, of course, promptly inform his Government but he wished it understood that he was not undertaking to pass this information to Hanoi. He asked if we were taking any steps to inform Hanoi, to which I replied that we were informing the Hungarian Government and possibly some other Governments and assumed that the information would reach them. In any event, they would be aware that the bombing had been suspended. Dobrynin said that, speaking quite off the record, his Hungarian colleague had obtained the impression from the Secretary that as of yesterday the Secretary had thought that the bombing might be resumed any day, including possibly today. He asked me if I could tell him for his own information whether the Hungarian had misunderstood or whether something had happened between yesterday and today. I replied by drawing his attention to the fact that the President was in Texas and said that my guess was that the Secretary was simply being cautious in order not to mislead the Hungarian the other way. Dobrynin asked me what the words "could extend beyond New Year's" meant. When I said I hesitated to make any interpretation of these words as I wished to be very careful not to mislead him, he said that he would assume that the stand-down would probably go for a few days beyond New Year's. I said I thought this was probably a reasonable interpretation. [Next documents]
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