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260. Draft Telegram From the President's Consultant on Vietnam (Taylor) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/ Washington, December 28, 1965. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-360-69. Secret. Also addressed to Westmoreland. Taylor sent this draft to the President under cover of a memorandum that reads: "I understand you indicated yesterday to Mac Bundy that it would be helpful if I sent some such message as the attached to Sharp and Westmoreland. If the text is satisfactory, I shall send it at once." A note by Taylor on the memorandum indicates that the President wanted Wheeler to receive a copy as well. Apparently the telegram was sent. Having noted your messages on the resumption of Rolling Thunder/2/ and understanding thoroughly the sound military reasons behind your recommendations for a prompt resumption, it occurred to me that you might be interested in getting more of the feeling at the Washington end on this subject. /2/See Document 245 and footnote 3 thereto. Since returning from Saigon last August, I have made nearly fifty speaking or TV appearances about the country, an experience which has opened my eyes to problems of the domestic front which I did not know existed. Although there is a strong majority support for the Administration's position on Viet-Nam, it is more the normal American reaction to rally around the President in time of crisis than the result of any deep conviction that our course of action is necessary and right. There is still confusion over the basic issues in spite of the many statements of our leaders and a subdued but real uneasiness that important facts are being held back or concealed from the public. One often expressed doubt is over the sincerity of our desire for a negotiated settlement in Viet-Nam. This doubt has been fed by the false rumors of rejected feelers which have received extended press treatment. A recurrent allegation is that we deliberately create conditions under which Hanoi could not be expected to respond to our offer of unconditional discussions. Most of these critics make common cause in urging a prolonged bombing pause to give Hanoi a chance to respond. I have always opposed such a pause for a variety of reasons but have always feared that pressures for one might sometime get out of hand. Hence, once the Christmas cease-fire became a fact, I was inclined to take the position that, if a bombing pause were ever to be undertaken, now is the time to do it. It can be done in a low-key way without elaborate comment or explanation and terminated without fanfare after running for a short, unspecified period. If such an action would expose once and for all the futility of letting up the pressures on the enemy, it would be a worthwhile exercise despite the military disadvantages which you see so clearly. The overall thought which I want to convey is that there is justified concern over the long-term durability of our home front. Everything depends on the ability of the President to keep the country aligned behind his Viet-Nam policy in spite of mounting casualties, a vast budget increase and the seeming endlessness of the conflict. If the suspension of Rolling Thunder to New Year's or some such time will materially help him in this task, I have no personal hesitation in advising him to do so. After this test period is over, I would hope that Rolling Thunder would be resumed with a heightened intensity which, after the lull, would be all the more unpleasant for Hanoi. Regards to you both, Taylor
261. Memorandum for Personal Files/1/ Washington, December 28, 1965. /1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Divison, Harriman Papers, Secretary Rusk, 1963-1966. No classification marking. Drafted by Harriman. SUBJECT /2/See Document 256. The Secretary took a negative view. I told him the President told me "Don't let Dean talk you out of it." He proposed my going to Paris to see Chauvel./3/ Also to Rome and Iran. I said I wasn't going to Iran--that would not achieve the President's purposes, and there was also no use my trying to twist people's arms to increase aid to Viet-Nam during the bomb pause; and anyway the President wanted me to be able to testify when I got back that he had sent me to go the last mile in trying to come to a settlement. /3/See footnote 6, Document 236. He seems opposed to my seeing Bo. He says we are making a contact. He didn't tell me who. He said he would talk to the President this afternoon. I said the President wanted me to go today. That seemed to take him aback. I said it wasn't much time before the end of the year and the President wants the time to be used. He is afraid talking to the Hungarians would put them on the spot and be counterproductive. I asked him why, because I understood they had indicated that we hadn't taken their contact sufficiently seriously. He said "You and Tommy/4/ talk it over some more." Tommy suggested I talk to Alex to see whether the South Vietnamese wouldn't be terribly upset. I said "Tommy, this is the President of the United States, not South Viet-Nam, whom you are working for. South Viet-Nam we can protect as much as possible, but the President has the job of convincing Congress he has made the last effort. Anyway, Alex is basically opposed to talks." He suggested going to Paris, Rome, Yugoslavia, which could be done without any harm. I said that wouldn't equip me to testify that we had run down every lead. /4/Llewellyn E. Thompson. W.A.H.
262. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, December 28, 1965, 6:40 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Telephone Conversations, Vietnam. No classification marking. Mc said now that we have it we should try to make something of it./2/ B said we had sent a telegram to Byroade in Rangoon for him to get in touch with the DRV Ambassador and give him an Aide-Memoire./3/ B said he was also getting Presidential letters to Wilson, Erhard, Pearson, Moro and de Gaulle. B said we would get the French Ambassador in tomorrow subject to clearance with the Ranch. /2/The bombing pause. /3/See Document 257. Mc asked Ball if he thought it would be wise for Ball to go to see Wilson. B said he thought Wilson would appreciate a quiet Presidential letter more than he would someone coming over. B thought the same thing could be done in Ottawa. B told Mc that Harriman was going to Warsaw tonight. B said he and Rusk agreed that the Hungarians should work their own way out re Harriman. They have given indications they are trying to make a serious effort here. The Charge came back today with a lot of questions. B said we proposed, if approved by the President, that Harriman go to Budapest only if invited by the Hungarians. After spending a few days in Warsaw H[arriman] could go to Paris. B told Mc that Goldberg was on his way to N.Y. and presumably would see U Thant tonight; then he would fly to see the Pope; and return home. Mc said he thought this was what had been discussed earlier today. Mc thought it would be desirable for H to see Tito if he could. Ball said he thought the problem was that Tito is so unpopular with the rest of the Bloc. Mc said one of the things we should get are views of other people. How do they see this shaping up in the future. Mc said he realizes as well as Ball that it is unlikely that this is all going to end with unconditional surrender by NVN. They both agreed there had to be face savers. McN said if we send these people out we cannot end this pause New Year's Eve. Ball agreed and said if it did not run until at least the end of next week we would be charged with bad faith. Mc said he had told the Pres this last night and he thought he was prepared to go beyond the first if we get anything at all. Mc said he had sent a telegram to Westmoreland,/4/ Wheeler, and Sharp telling them why we were doing this and saying we were going to keep a sharp eye. /4/Telegram 5041-65 from McNamara to Westmoreland, December 29. (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV, Message Files) Mc said we were going to start our Blue Tree Reconnaissance again. We are not to return fire unless trying to recover a pilot who has been shot down and we are trying to rescue. Ball informed Mc of Moscow's announcement that Shelepin is going to Hanoi shortly. B thought this might be in our favor re timing. It was decided that when Rusk, McN and Ball meet tomorrow they should discuss what should be said to the press./5/ /5/No record of this meeting has been found.
263. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and President Johnson/1/ December 28, 1965, 10 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Telephone Conversations, Presidential Conversations. No classification marking. The President was in Texas; Ball was in Washington. Ball informed the Pres that he had sent him a long memorandum describing exactly what we were doing and proposing including some draft letters./2/ /2/Dated December 28. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Pres asked Ball to give him the gist of what was being transmitted. President told Ball he wanted him here because he was inspiring, stimulating and "shoving" just as he had on two or three other occasions in this field. Pres said even if all this comes to naught he would feel better. He said he had to survive this thing. He has 3 more years to go and he said he wanted Ball sitting at the bridge calling the signals and he is not to let "them" talk him out of "it". Pres told Ball to get his Dutch toes in concrete and is to say "this is what the man (the Pres) wants and I am here to shove." Ball told the Pres that Harriman left tonight at 8:00 and while enroute we are expecting clearance from the Polish Govt so he will go straight to Warsaw and will plan to spend a couple of days with the Poles. Ball said we had asked the Hungarian Govt whether they would like to have H come there. We have had an indication from the Charge that the Govt wants to be active in this. They have asked clarification of 2 or 3 of the things we gave them and Dobrynin told Thompson the Charge (Hungarian) had been in touch with him regularly. Ball said we think something significant might come from the Hungarian efforts. However, Ball said, we don't want to send Harriman there unless they want him but we do want to have him available and at their option so he can be helpful to them. We don't want to take a chance of Harriman's coming in and having them close-up by saying he has embarrassed them by coming. Pres said this is all right, however, he would not worry about the Hungarians. Pres thinks Harriman should go to Hungary in any event. He said we could always find reasons for his not going. Pres said he would not hesitate to take the responsibility. Re the Yugoslavs Ball said we had not been able to set it up with Tito. He has left Brioni but we would keep working on it. Ball said he thought we would have an answer from the Hungarians tomorrow and in the meantime H would go on to Warsaw and we would not lose any time. H will try to get the Polish govt to start moving. Ball said we had sent an Aide-Memoire to Amb. Byroade in Rangoon to deliver to the NVN Consul General there./3/ This was our appraisal of the best fellow to deal with on a fast basis and this is the fellow U Thant would have used last fall. Ball said he was going to have Goldberg tell Thant tonight what we were doing so he will know what we are talking about. Ball explained this was a formal way we could deal with the Govt and we would have an absolute record made. It should be delivered tomorrow as early as possible. /3/See Document 257. Goldberg should be leaving for Rome tonight at 2:00 Ball said. However, there is one problem, Ball told the Pres. Fanfani tendered his resignation today to Moro over the La Pira incident/4/ and apparently it appears that the Italian Govt is in a shakey position. Ball said he was concerned that since Goldberg was associated with Fanfani in the La Pira incident that the Italian press would say we are interfering in domestic politics. The Pres interrupted to say he wanted a Jew seeing the Pope. Ball said the problem was that since Goldberg was a high official in the Govt he would have to see the Italian officials. Pres said this had nothing to do with it. Goldberg is to call on the Pope and get right on to Paris. /4/Italian law professer and ex-Mayor of Florence Giorgio La Pira went to Hanoi for discussions with DRV officials. He then transmitted a peace feeler from the DRV through Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani to Goldberg; see Documents 205 and 207. When La Pira's identity was leaked by the Italian press and his connection to Hanoi revealed, the DRV disassociated itself from the peace feeler. Pres said Goldberg is to tell the Pope we appreciate what he said about the Christmas truce and we are responding to what he said about a truce on New Years and we want him to get busy and get some action of us and get right into Hanoi. Pres said what he liked best was a Jew talking to a Catholic. Ball said we would send Goldberg on but he wanted to alert the Pres to the difficulties that might arise. Pres said Goldberg should say he could not discuss the La Pira incident at all. It is an internal matter. Ball said on the UK, Canada, France, Germany and Italy we have drafted letters from the President./5/ Re Italy when Goldberg sees the Pope he would also deliver this letter from the Pres to Fanfani which would be a courtesy. Ball said we were trying to get the letters out tonight. Pres said he would look at them the minute they reach the Ranch. /5/The text of the letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Moro of Italy is in telegram 1362 to Rome, December 29; the letter to Pope Paul VI is in telegram 1363 to Rome, December 29; the letter to British Prime Minister Wilson is in telegram 3677 to London, December 29; and the letter to French President de Gaulle is in telegram 2899 to Paris, December 29. (All in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Ball read the Wilson letter and the President approved. He suggested that Ball add that he is restricting this information to a very few and he would hope that Wilson, etc. would do the same. Pres also said he preferred something other than the statement "the first of the year". He suggested "for a more extended period", or "for many days". Pres said he did not want to be committed. Ball said he would fix this. Pres said he thought someone should talk to Pearson. Ball said he could go up. Pres said he would rather Ball stay here. Pres thought MacBundy could perhaps meet Pearson in Philadelphia or go to Ottawa. Pres said Ball should be sure to have a letter from him to the Pope for Goldberg to deliver. It should thank him for the Christmas truce and the New Year's truce so the Pope would feel we were complying. Ball said he would do this. Pres said he was depending on Ball as his lawyer and his devil's advocate. Pres said Ball was not to let "them" talk him out of anything. Pres said Ball should stay right on it until we are sure we have bled it for all it is worth.
264. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 29, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:35 a.m. 2308. For the Secretary from Lodge. Herewith some comment on ideas in your 1805./2/ /2/Document 255. A. Your para 8. No one will applaud more than I your efforts to secure support from the homefront. With homefront support we cannot fail. Without, we cannot win. B. Your para 5 statement that "assuring South Viet-Nam without major bloodshed" is obviously of capital importance in bringing about steadfast homefront support. For this reason, I urge that USG in its own mind be clear as to what it regards as a satisfactory outcome of this war since some outcomes may require more bloodshed than others. C. Let me think aloud purely for illustrative purposes. It is obvious that if we define a satisfactory outcome as 1.) seeking out and utterly destroying the North Vietnamese military main forces and potential, or 2.) seizing the Laos panhandle and the valley of the Mekong, or 3.) as meaning a state of affairs in which elections free from any intimidation can be held in every one of the 2, 658 villages in all 43 provinces, we may be taking on jobs which cannot be done without major bloodshed. D. If, on the other hand, we define "satisfactory outcome" as the U.S. Mission tried to do it in our 1377,/3/ this is, hold the delta and the coastal plain, the provincial capitals and the roads, push out durably, even though slowly, within South Viet-Nam through the kind of pacification-countryside rebuilding which Lansdale is promoting and ward off the North Vietnamese aggression so as to make possible the achievement of the above, perhaps we could hold on for a long time without "major bloodshed". I realize that even this may cause bloodshed too. /3/Document 176. E. Your para 4. There is no doubt of the intense interest which public opinion polls must hold for all of us in government, and I do not question the authenticity of the Harris Poll. It does, however, point up the need for us who are in the work of foreign relations to educate one [our?] public at least in two respects: First, that a cease fire, unaccompanied by a verified withdrawal of forces in effect confirms the Viet Cong aggressors in all the places where they are now. It also denies the sovereignty of the Government of Viet-Nam. In a very real sense, therefore, it gives the Viet Cong the victory before negotiations have been started. In fact, had our Christmas truce offer been accepted, we might have been in an extremely critical situation for the above reason. Therefore, we should first consider educating public opinion about what constitutes an honest and a dishonest cease fire, and it was in that connection that I suggested that a television documentary be made based on Admiral Joy's book about negotiations at Panmunjom./4/ /4/See footnote 4, Document 237. Secondly, the public needs to be educated on the fact that Hanoi and Peking do not react like Americans, and that over-eagerness on our part is interpreted by them as a sign of weakness. Therefore the 72 per cent who favor "renewed effort for a cease fire" in the belief that it would promote the chance of peace are actually defeating their own purpose and are hardening the resolve of the enemy. I believe that sooner or later we are going to have to make these things very clear, and, of course, I will do everything I can to help. F. I am also interested in your paragraph 6 about differences existing between the Viet Cong and Hanoi. As my conversations with Palmas have shown, we suspect this also. Lodge
265. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State/1/ Rangoon, December 29, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:15 a.m. 315. Eyes only for Secretary. Ref: Deptel 202;/2/ Embtel 311./3/ I called upon DRV Consul General at 3 p.m. today. Was received initially by Lam Bao who remained as interpreter during discussion. I took Leo Reddy, junior officer of Political Section who speaks French, in hopes he might be useful if further liaison develops. /2/Document 257. /3/Telegram 311 from Rangoon, December 29, concerned preliminary arrangements for delivery of the aide-memoire under discussion here. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET) Vu Huu Binh then received me with slight smile and ready handshake. I told him I was grateful for opportunity to see him personally as my government wished me to convey message directly to him for transmittal to his government. I then handed him the aide-memoire. He and his interpreter studied document together with interpreter translating parts thereof into Vietnamese. After studying document Vu Huu Binh said he would transmit it to his government. At this point we were served with beer (I believe South Vietnamese). I thanked him and told him I planned to keep my visit to him and the subject thereof quite confidential. I had come in official U.S. Embassy car but not my own because it was conspicuous. He said that on his part he would also keep matter confidential. I told him my instructions had reached me just as I was departing for the airport to go to Sandoway for a few days rest and to join my family who were already there. I wanted him to know that I was cancelling my vacation and would be available in Rangoon anytime of day or night if he should wish to see me. Also, a member of my staff could always be available if he wished to relay a message. I told him I cared nothing about protocol niceties and we could meet quite secretly if he so desired. Vu Huu Binh said he could tell me nothing except that he would transmit message to his government. I thanked him again for receiving me and he thanked me for coming. He accompanied me to car and politely shook hands. Discussion lasted about eight minutes. Although conversation was interpreted, it was obvious Vu Huu Binh understood my remarks. Moreover, by his acceptance of formal communication I believe we got our message across to DRV. Byroade
266. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/ Warsaw, December 29, 1925. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:47 a.m. 1060. For the President and Secretary from Harriman. 1. Ambassador and I have just concluded one hour and a quarter talk with Rapacki, Winiewicz, Michalowski and Wierna. 2. I outlined President's position regarding pause in bombing as a step towards peace with hope Hanoi would respond. We gave Rapacki the Secretary's 14 points as U.S. attitude towards peace in Southeast Asia. 3. Rapacki, after some argument that we were giving ultimatum to Hanoi by threat of resuming bombing with possible escalation, finally accepted my contention that pause was in fact giving Hanoi an opportunity for peaceful settlement if she would seize it and respond with a return indication. 4. Rapacki suggested adjournment for lunch. He said our talk had resulted in an understanding of each other's position and that this afternoon he wants to discuss the kind of message he might convey to Hanoi. 5. Ambassador feels my visit and our discussion have been useful as Rapacki is obviously gratified to be consulted and is anxious to play a role in these events. Gronouski
267. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/ Warsaw, December 29, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:26 p.m. and passed to the White House. 1066. For the President and Secretary from Harriman. We lunched with Rapacki and same group of his associates. After some informal discussion on changes in Soviet leadership and Sino-Soviet dispute, Rapacki focused discussion on what he might transmit to Hanoi. He asked for explanations of several matters particularly President's statement on NLF representation at conference. As he tried to read into it acceptance on our part of NLF as full members conference I firmly stated our position that only governments could be members but Front could be fully heard. Argument over this lasted some time, but Rapacki finally accepted fact that we were only dealing at the moment with the possibility of a favorable reaction by Hanoi to the President's pause in bombing. Question of how further talks could take place was left open, necessarily through Geneva type conference. Rapacki was eventually satisfied on the points he had raised and said he would try to transmit US position faithfully to Hanoi for its consideration which might take some time. The Ambassador and I underlined pressures on the President which required a prompt reaction from Hanoi. We emphasized not only military considerations but early date of decision on State of Union message and budget. Discussion ended on most cordial note. Rapacki stated simply and with dignity that he would do what he could and pointed out how important ending of Vietnam war was to world stability. We agreed to give press brief statement that I had come to Warsaw to talk with Polish Government about Vietnam in its capacity as member ICC and had discussion with Rapacki, etc. Statement is now being drafted. Detailed memcons follow./2/ /2/The memorandum of this conversation was transmitted in telegram 1069 from Warsaw, December 30. (Ibid.) Gronouski
268. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, December 29, 1965, 12:46 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. Drafted by Bundy and approved by Ball. Repeated to the White House. 1815. Eyes only for Ambassador and Porter. 1. You should be aware of following diplomatic actions we have taken in connection with deferring resumption of bombing: a. We have informed British, Australians, and New Zealanders very fully here, and Canadians [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]./2/ Our Ambassadors have also informed ROK, Japan, GRC, RLG, and RTG at highest levels, and we expect to do same for Marcos probably 31st./3/ We have urged all these governments to hold our intentions closely, and we have no indication either way as to whether they are informing their Saigon representatives. Any inquiry from these governments in Saigon should be met by saying simply that their governments have been informed. Naturally, if representatives indicate they have received the word, you may elicit comment for whatever use it may be. /2/Further details are in William Bundy's Pinta Log, December 28-29. (Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 1, Vol. 1) /3/Instructions were sent in telegram 651 to Seoul, also sent to Bangkok, Vientiane, Tokyo, Taipei, and Manila, December 28. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) b. We have informed Soviets, Poles, and Hungarians here,/4/ treating matter as one of information and not pressing them for specific action. We have specifically told them period might be shorter in event of major provocation, but also that we are most interested in any Hanoi response. Our supposition is that one or more may already have been in touch with Hanoi, and Hungarians came back to us even over Christmas period to ask if we would negotiate with NLF. We replied clearly that we would not, for familiar reasons. /4/See Documents 258 and 259. No record of the discussions with the Poles in Washington has been found. In telegram 937 to Warsaw, December 28, Rusk instructed Gronouski to inform Rapacki of the talks. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) c. Byroade yesterday conveyed note directly to DRV Consul General in Rangoon informing them that resumption might be deferred at least over New Year's./5/ Same format as notification to Soviets, Poles, and Hungarians. Noteworthy that DRV rep received Byroade personally and did not seek to play games as DRV Ambassador in Moscow did last May./6/ /5/See Document 265. /6/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 299. d. We have also informed U Thant and Indians in general terms. e. Harriman has been dispatched to Warsaw and is talking today to Rapacki./7/ We have also indicated to Hungarians that Harriman available to go to Budapest, but have had no response. He may also be sent to Belgrade, to talk with Tito. Purpose of his mission is to show concretely our interest in discussion with Eastern European countries and generally to make strong record of diplomatic activity. There may be speculation Warsaw trip related to contact with Chicoms. We are doing nothing to encourage this here, and it might be specifically useful for us to tell Do privately this is not part of Harriman mission. /7/See Documents 266 and 267. f. Goldberg has been sent to Rome to inform Pope and consult with him./8/ This done in light Pope's general interest and not with expectation he has effective contact with Hanoi. /8/See Document 271. 2. Above adds up to broad notification and essential diplomatic effort so that we will learn rapidly of any response by Hanoi. Only direct contact with DRV has been by Byroade. We have no reason to believe this will be publicized, but if it should be there is ready parallel to our May efforts through DRV Ambassador Moscow and through British in Hanoi, which are well known to GVN and have been made public subsequently. 3. You may be assured that if anything substantive should appear as a result of this activity we will be in immediate touch with you. Rusk
269. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, December 29, 1965, 4:14 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Pinta. Drafted by Rusk. Repeated to the White House. 1821. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Many thanks for your helpful 2308./2/ My 1805/3/ was sent under some pressure of time and did not therefore go into certain details. Following are some additions. /2/Document 264. /3/Document 255. 1. No one is under any illusion here about our elementary choices if Hanoi and Peiping continue to push into Southeast Asia by force. We can either get out of their way and let them have it or we can meet them. We have decided to meet them. When I spoke of "securing South Viet-Nam without major bloodshed" I was referring to the contingency that the other side may look down the road ahead and decide that it is too costly or too dangerous for them to persist. This has happened with the Greek guerrillas, the Berlin blockade, Korea and the Cuban missile crisis. I realize important differences of attitude publicly expressed by Peiping but thus far (fingers crossed) Peiping has been much more cautious in its actions than it has been in its words. My remark was addressed to giving the other side every chance to pull back. 2. I personally do not see any "satisfactory outcome" which involves giving Hanoi and their Viet Cong puppets the fruits of their aggression by force in South Viet-Nam. A deal was made in 1954 and 1962. Once again the communist world is saying what is ours is ours and what is yours must be talked about and divided up further. I feel we should insist upon the 1954 and 1962 agreements. If the other side persists in attempting to destroy those agreements by force, then I fear there shall be bloodshed. 3. I agree with you fully that there is a fundamental difference between an honest and a dishonest cease-fire. From an operational point of view the most important point would be a pulling apart of North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam militarily. That would mean stopping infiltration, return of northern infiltrators and comparable actions on our side. This is feasible although verification would present some difficulties. We do not have in mind a cease-fire within South Viet-Nam itself which would deny the authority of the Government of South Viet-Nam in any part of the country. A long-term internal cease-fire could only be based upon a cessation of DRV aggression and acceptance by the Viet Cong of the idea that they must lay down arms and take their chances in peaceful political processes. It may be that public opinion needs more education on this subject. We have not undertaken it in any significant way because we have not even reached the point where Hanoi is willing to stop its aggression. 4. Your point that Hanoi and Peiping may interpret interest in peace as weakness is a good one and this has been much in our minds. We have talked about this frankly with Eastern European governments. If there is any such misunderstanding, it will be dramatically corrected when the President asks the Congress in January for $25 billion for Viet-Nam for the next eighteen months. You should know personally that we have made it very clear to those in touch with the other side that Hanoi is up against a moment of truth. If they do not now move towards peace, they must face the most disagreeable possible consequences. 5. As you may know, the Vatican is concerning itself very actively with Viet-Nam. They have not revealed to us fully what they are doing but our impression is that they are very busy. This makes it quite important that Archbishop Palmas fully understand that if there is any delay or reluctance in connection with his conversations with you, these are to be bound on the other side and not on our side. If you have not done so in the last ten days, I would suggest you merely inquire of him whether he has anything further pursuant to earlier conversations. 6. I am sending in a separate telegram a listing of points already made public by the United States on various occasions having to do with the basis for peace in Viet-Nam./4/ I find that when these are drawn together most people, including foreign diplomats as well as newsmen, are surprised. Their surprise comes from their lack of diligence in doing their homework. But under Pinta restrictions, I should tell you that the Hungarian Foreign Minister asked me the other day whether the United States would be prepared to negotiate with the National Liberation Front on the basis of "this platform". I replied that the Government of the United States cannot negotiate with the Liberation Front since they are only one element in a population of fourteen million and the views of Buddhists, Catholics and other sects and others must be taken into account. I told him I would be interested if he himself learned that the Liberation Front was interested in the points which we have made public./5/ Thus far no reply. I cannot overemphasize the importance of any substantial defection from the Liberation Front away from Hanoi. If this momentum should begin to roll, the other side's position would, in my judgment, deteriorate very fast. /4/Reference is to circular telegram 1243, December 30, which repeated the text of Document 247, to all diplomatic posts and Hong Kong. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) /5/See Document 258. 7. I need not repeat to you how grateful the President and I are for the job you are doing. I am deeply convinced that the American people will do what has to be done in meeting their commitments if they can do so in good conscience and with a clear understanding that all honorable and peaceful avenues have been closed by the aggressor. Warm regards. Rusk [Next documents]
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