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270. Memorandum From the Director of National Intelligence Estimates (Kent) to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms)/1/ Washington, December 29, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Memos (B). Secret. SUBJECT 1. I have asked the boys, on the basis of the bombing pause and press reports of some kind of US contact with the DRV, to think about a number of the possibilities raised if these stories are true. The results, which I attach, are:/2/ /2/All of the tabs are attached but none is printed. (a) A paper outlining current Soviet tactics on Vietnam and how these relate to Moscow's recent maneuvers against China; it concludes that Shelepin in Hanoi will push hard the case for more reliance on diplomacy and politics, less on military means. (Tab A) (b) A paper thinking about China's attitude toward negotiations and concluding that Peiping will threaten big difficulties whenever it senses a weakening of Hanoi's resolve to continue fighting. (Tab B) (c) A paper on South Vietnamese attitudes toward negotiations, which concludes that they are largely negative but not insurmountably so. This one was promised to the Director some time ago and has been approved by the Board of National Estimates. (Tab C) 2. None of these deal with the central question of how Hanoi itself now views its options. Some in this town may be better informed than we on this one; perhaps we'll get some evidence soon. 3. I think you will find all of these papers interesting and hopefully a contribution to your thinking. At least the first two (A and B above) were written with this principally in mind and we do not recommend any further circulation. In a few days we may all know enough more to warrant review, revision, and circulation to a wider audience. SK
271. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State/1/ Rome, December 29, 1965, 11:45 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Pinta. Also sent to USUN for Yost. Received at 6:49 p.m. and passed to the White House. 1654. For President Johnson LBJ Ranch, SecState Rusk, Under Secy Ball. From Ambassador Goldberg. 1. I arrived in Rome at 1600 and shortly thereafter at 1800 had an hour-long private audience with Pope Paul VI. His interpreter Mons. Cronin, an American priest, was only other person present. I handed His Holiness letter from the President/2/ which he read with great care. He immediately expressed his appreciation for what he termed a very sincere and prompt response to his appeal for a Christmas truce and to mankind's anxiety for concrete steps working toward permanent peace in Vietnam. He said he would like me to assure the President that he does not want to disturb in any way the American situation in Vietnam but rather to be of help in the direction of a fair and honorable settlement. His Holiness said that all his efforts would be directed to this end, which he was confident the President shared. He enquired about the President's health and I assured him the President was in fine fettle. /2/Transmitted to Rome in telegram 1363, December 29. (Ibid.) 2. His Holiness said he recalled with great satisfaction his private conversation with the President during his visit to the UN in October and said there too he was impressed with the President 's sincerity and devotion to peace, now reaffirmed by this communication. I then enquired whether he had received any specific replies to his Christmas appeal. In answering he handed me a copy of Osservatore Romano of Dec 27 which contains full text of his message and in his own hand underlined text of appeal on Vietnam. I understand this text has already been forwarded to Washington. The Pope then went on to say that he had received replies from Ho Chi Minh and from the Govt of South Vietnam. He termed the Ho Chi Minh reply harsh and distressing. The text (in French) of this reply is being sent by separate telegram./3/ He apparently had received the reply from South Vietnam only this morning and therefore had no extra copies. He showed me the text which he termed, and I agreed, to be quite affirmative. He directed Mons. Cronin to make this reply available to us shortly and it will be forwarded as soon as received./4/ His Holiness then said he intended, notwithstanding the harsh nature of Ho Chi Minh's reply, to pursue the matter further. To this end he was planning to send to Vietnam Mons. Rodhain, a French priest who is head of Caritas, a charitable organization of the Church. He said Mons. Rodhain's purpose would be charitable in nature but that he would also be vested with instructions from the Pope to explore avenues of a peaceful settlement. The Holy Father emphasized that Mons. Rodhain is a man of great discretion and enjoyed his complete confidence. Plan would be for Mons. Rodhain to go Hanoi as well as Saigon and the Pope indicated that enquiries had been made to Hanoi as to whether Rodhain would be received there. The proposal is to send him promptly. /3/Not found. /4/The text of this December 27 message is in telegram 1657 from Rome, December 30. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 3. The Pope then enquired as to our govt's views on the situation in Vietnam. I reviewed the various steps which President Johnson and his administration have taken to transfer this conflict from the battlefield to the bargaining table and stressed that the latest move--the bombing pause--was further evidence of the US Govt's desire to seek peace in this troubled area. The Pope then specifically enquired whether the Geneva Agreement of 1954 was considered by the US Govt a cornerstone of a possible peace settlement. I replied that the President on several occasions, the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and I at the UN had repeatedly confirmed that we would be willing to negotiate on the basis of the Geneva Accords, at Geneva or at any other appropriate forum. I explained that we did not agree with Hanoi's interpretation of the Geneva Accords; particularly their point--one of the four--that the Government of South Vietnam had to be reconstituted along the lines of the program of the National Liberation Front. I pointed out that this nowhere appeared in the Geneva agreement and that postwar experience had shown that governments reconstituted by Communist movements had frustrated rather than forwarded genuine self-determination by the people involved. I recalled that Poland, among other countries, was a case in point. His Holiness nodded in agreement at this stage. 4. I conveyed the content of the aide-memoire cabled to Rangoon (Dept's 202 to Rangoon)/5/ to be communicated by Ambassador Byroade to the North Vietnamese Ambassador there. His Holiness was much impressed by the forward step taken in this aide-memoire and again repeated that this was great evidence of President Johnson's sincere desire for peace and willingness to take long steps forward toward achieving it. His Holiness then turned to another aspect of the problem. He said he wanted the President to know that his own efforts stood apart from any initiatives by La Pira. He esteemed La Pira as a good person but the Pope was pursuing his efforts in his own way and through his own channels. In this connection the Pope mentioned Archbishop Palmas, Apostolic Delegate to Vietnam and Cambodia. The Archbishop, while concerned primarily with refugees and religious matters, was also being employed by the Pope to help in the political situation. I interjected to express our grave concern at the sanctuary being afforded the North Vietnamese in Cambodia and indicated that this situation was most troublesome, particularly in light of Prince Sihanouk's failure to take effective action to prevent his territory from being used for purposes of aggression by Hanoi. I also reminded the Holy Father that Sihanouk had avoided resumption of the Geneva conference on Cambodia which, hopefully, might have led to discussions on Vietnam. /5/Document 257. 5. At this point I conveyed the greetings of Secretary General U Thant which U Thant had asked me to express when I met with him last night. The Pope expressed great regard for U Thant as a man of peace and said that before issuing his Christmas appeal he had in general terms obtained U Thant's concurrence that such an appeal would be desirable. The Pope showed great interest in the fact that the President had conveyed messages concerning the bombing pause to Moscow, Budapest and Warsaw, as well as to a number of our allies. He enquired whether we had communicated with Peiping. I replied that I did not know, but doubted that we had, in the belief that Peiping would not accept a direct approach. I pointed out, however, that undoubtedly Peiping would have knowledge of this development through a Communist source. The Pope indicated indirectly that he shared the belief that the Soviets would be more inclined to urge a favorable response than the Red Chinese. 6. Finally His Holiness indicated that after consultation with his Secretary of State and other advisors he would prepare a written reply to the President's letter, hopefully in time for delivery before my planned departure tomorrow evening. It will be cabled when received./6/ /6/The text was transmitted in telegram 1661 from Rome, December 30. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S/PINTA) 7. Although His Holiness was warm, affable and gracious to me, recalling our exchanges when I was part of the President's party in New York on the occasion of his UN visit, and also when he received me in private audience in the summer of 1964, his general demeanor was one of grave concern about the Vietnam situation. 8. The Pope asked whether the President's letter could be made public. I said that this was in his discretion but that I would not do so. With his approval I prepared following press statement to be made tonight by Embassy spokesman. 9. "The Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg, US Ambassador to the United Nations, arrived in Rome late this afternoon and immediately had an audience with His Holiness Pope Paul VI lasting about an hour. 10. "The President sent Ambassador Goldberg on a special mission to convey to His Holiness Pope Paul VI the President's gratitude for the Holy Father's message and inspiration which were so helpful in helping to bring about a Christmas truce in Vietnam. The President also asked Ambassador Goldberg to thank His Holiness for the continuous efforts he is making in furtherance of peace in Southeast Asia. The President's gratitude, on behalf of the American people, is, in his view, shared by all mankind." 11. The Pope stated that upon inquiries from the press he would make a statement of similar import. It was my latest impression that he would not publicize the text of the President's letter but would refer to it in favorable terms. 12. Following the audience I called upon Secretary of State Cicognani and spent approximately one half hour reviewing in briefer terms my conversation with His Holiness. The Sec of State indicated sympathy with the American point of view on Vietnam, but added that perhaps the best way towards a peaceful solution was the Pope's more evenhanded approach. 13. Prime Minister Moro is out of Rome but is returning tomorrow and has asked to see me about 7:00 p.m. tomorrow evening. He requested that the President's letter/7/ be sent to him through Pompei, his diplomatic advisor. This has been done. Pompei indicated he would make a copy of the letter to the Prime Minister available to President Saragat. /7/The text was transmitted in telegram 1632 to Rome, December 29. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) Reinhardt
272. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/ Bangkok, December 30, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 2, Vol. 1. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:53 a.m. and passed to the White House. 1277. Deptel 1075 to Bangkok./2/ /2/In telegram 1075, December 28, the Embassy in Bangkok was instructed to inform the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the decision on and purpose of the suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 1. In absence of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, I conveyed requested information to Acting FonMin Pote Sarasin as directed in para 4 reftel. 2. After a long pause Pote asked that I convey to the Secretary his understanding of the action taken. He said that as an Asian, thinking as an Asian, he thought it was a mistake. It would be interpreted in Asia as a sign of weakness and indecision and would reinforce Hanoi determination to carry on until American public opinion forced withdrawal. Consequently, he thought it would prolong war rather than shorten it and cost more American casualties rather than fewer. 3. In referring to third purpose as outlined in para 4-D reftel, Pote doubted effect on third countries would be as beneficial as we might have thought. He said it would not help to convince the already convinced and as for the others we would always get the argument that if the pause had been extended for "another day, another week, another month," it might have been successful. 4. In response to my direct inquiry he said that he personally had no doubt whatever as to American firmness. 5. I later conveyed the same information to Deputy Prime Minister Praphat who had much the same reaction as Pote. He added reporting of comment which Tun Razak, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, attributed to Ne Win, who had suggested closer consultations between Burmese, Thai, and Malaysians for their own protection when Americans pull out. He said he had told Tun Razak he did not expect Americans to leave until the safety of Southeast Asia was assured. He also added that every day the pause continued, however, the more question there would be of American intentions and this, he added, was a dangerous attitude to let build up for too long a time./3/ /3/In telegram 1096 to Bangkok, December 30, the Department of State sent assurances to Thailand that the bombing pause was not the prelude to U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia, but a test to see if Hanoi could come to a realistic appraisal of the situation. The United States was in Vietnam "to stay whatever and how long it takes." (Ibid., EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 2, Vol. 1) Martin
273. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and President Johnson/1/ December 30, 1965, 11:20 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Telephone Conversations, Presidential Conversations. No classification marking. The President was in Texas; Ball was in Washington. Ball reported to the President that Goldberg had made a courtesy call on the Italian Govt and the press had not created any problems. Ball said we had had word from Paris that De Gaulle is prepared to see Goldberg at noon tomorrow. Ball said the radio was announcing that Harriman had seen Gomulka and was seeing Tito. Ball said there were two proposals for H. 1) H might go on to India because India is a member of the ICC. Pres thought this a very good idea. In covering this Pres thought it should be said that the Pres had given his views in some detail to PM Wilson, Chancellor Erhard, and Ayub Khan. He had sent McG Bundy to talk to Pearson; Goldberg to certain diplomats at the UN and to the Pope because the Pope had been in communication with the Pres and the Pres wanted him to know his views on VN; Goldberg will also be seeing others. Pres said he thought Mann should fly down and see the Pres of Mexico and tell him how strongly we feel; how much we are trying; what we are trying to do. Pres thought India as head of the Commission should be talked to. Pres thought Shastri needs a little buttering up. Shastri should be told how much we are looking forward to his visit; what a fine visit we had with his Agricultural Minister; we thought the talks went very well with Ayub although there is a lot of bitterness there; we thought the visit with Ayub a plus; we are getting our experts together to go to India on their food problem; and tell him how we feel on VN; what can they do; we salute them; we just want to keep them informed. Ball agreed these were all good points and it would be good to get Harriman out to see Shastri before he leaves for Tashkent and sees the Russians. Pres thought in talking to Shastri the point to be stressed would be the food problem and his visit. This gives it a little cover and we don't want to give the impression that we are in a panic or frantic, the Pres said. Pres said he wanted to be sure that every person that should be informed of our views is informed and that we come through loud and clear. Pres said Ball knows how he feels--like Ball on this peace business--but he is not sure this has been conveyed. Pres thinks that this is now a good chance to do this. Pres said he had talked to Bundy and told him to get in touch with Ball and for them to spend an hour to see who has not been informed and who could be informed. Pres said it did no harm for an Ambassador to say the Pres of the US asked me to tell you that he wants you to know how he feels. Pres said for Ball to get the Mann thing cleared up. Ball said he would do that right away. Pres said if it could be arranged for Harriman to go by New Delhi it might be a good idea for him to come by and see Nasser. Ball agreed with this. Pres thought they should be informed right away so they would not think they were on the second table. Ball told the Pres that the Hungarians would rather not have Harriman at the moment. They have given the impression this would embarrass them. Ball said that our intelligence people had told us that Shelepin would probably be in Hanoi over the week-end. Ball said that Harriman had come in asking about seeing Bo in Paris. Ball told the Pres that we had another contact we were reactivating there on another basis. Pres thought we had better be careful here and he did not think it wise for Harriman to see Bo. Pres said he would leave it up to Ball's judgment. Ball said he thought it would create problems. Pres said Ball should tell Harriman to see just the above two and when he finishes seeing them we would have other plans--imply that H will come by there (Paris) later, but we don't want the visits too close together. Pres said we did not want to mess the Bo thing up. Pres asked Ball if he had any ideas for Moyers. Pres said he had to be a little more affirmative. Pres suggested saying, "The Pres, Sec. of State and Bundy have been giving their views. We are going to other capitals. The discussions that are taking place are not in any way unusual." Ball said he thought this good enough and that the press would be fairly understanding. Pres said he thought Ball should give some serious thought to getting away a few hours and flying down to talk to Fulbright. Pres said Ball was first to explain to Fulbright that the stories about his not being invited to the WH had no basis and were nonsense. Pres said there was no custom where the head of the For. Relations Committee had to be invited to all the WH functions. Pres said they had checked the records and found that Fulbright had been invited to the WH at least three times more than anybody else. Second, when Princess Margaret was here, Fulbright had been in New Zealand. Third, no one but govt people had been invited to the Wilson dinner. And there was nothing significant about Ayub that they thought should call for including Fulbright in the dinner. Pres said Ball should tell Fulbright that he (the President) had been laughing about most of this bunk and that he thought most of it was coming from Marcy. Re VN Ball should point out that this is what Fulbright has been saying and the Pres is trying to show our real feelings in the matter and our attempt to do so is not because we are in a panic. Ball should tell him that Bundy talked to Pearson; Pres talked to Erhard; Bruce talked to Wilson. This is just reiteration of our points and our feelings. It is just an execution of what Fulbright has talked about. Ball should try to make it a Fulbright proposal. President thought Ball should do the same thing with Mansfield. Ball should say the President had thought it over carefully and thought he should try for peace. Goldberg and Harriman do not have any great hope but in effect are doing what Mansfield has said. Pres said Ball should do this if he has someone in the Dept who could take over for him. Ball said that Johnson was backstopping him. Pres said this was fine if he had enough initiative to go on through. Ball said that Dirksen was also in Florida. Pres said Ball should tell Fulbright, Mansfield, and Dirksen not to tell anyone that he is coming down. Ball mentioned Hickenlooper. Pres said he should be talked to. Pres said Hickenlooper says he does not know enough. Ball should emphasize that this is just a continuation of what the President has said--starting in Baltimore. Ball should not let Hickenlooper think we are retreating. Re the bombing nothing much could be gained by bombing during Holy Week; the weather is not good; and we are just telling everybody about our position. Pres told Ball to get Mann out and for him to say we are exchanging views. Ball is to tell Mann he should come back by the Ranch. Ball said re the Goldberg visit to de Gaulle, they would like not to have it announced until after the meeting. Pres agreed with this. Pres thought more thought should be given to seeing some other people. He said the main thing was to call them and tell them that the President had asked Ball to talk to them.
274. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/ Warsaw, December 30, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:51 p.m. and passed to the White House. 1073. From Harriman. 1. Memcon with Michalowski, Director General, FonMin, 7:30-8:00 p.m., December 29, 1965 at Ambassador Gronouski's residence. 2. Michalowski said the Polish Government was treating our approach on the Viet-Nam matter very seriously and would do its best and use all means at its disposal, but he would like to impress upon us question of time. He said it was not easy to communicate rapidly with Hanoi through ordinary channels and they might have to use special means. He repeated it may take time to get an indication of any value from Hanoi. 3. He said Poles were transmitting to Hanoi their opinions and judgment together with their own formulation of U.S. position. He wanted to make clear there would be no misunderstandings of the facts concerning U.S. position in the Polish approach. He listed the following five points the Polish Govt intends to send to Hanoi as their interpretation of U.S. views: A. The U.S. realized that in order to facilitate entry onto a road of negotiations in the Viet-Nam conflict that a period of calm and tranquility is required. So the U.S. made a pause in the bombing beginning December 24. The U.S. expects that the Viet-Nam side will reciprocate with a parallel gesture. The U.S. side hopes that mutual gestures of that kind will facilitate entry on the road to negotiations. The U.S. has made certain suggestions as examples of the gestures which it would expect from the North Viet-Nam side. It envisages possibilities of other types of gestures and would welcome any other similar gesture from the North Viet-Nam [side]. B. The U.S. side is quite conscious of the need to give appropriate time. However it wishes to draw attention to the difficulties stemming from the convening of the U.S. Congress, the approaching budget considerations and other domestic pressures. In this connection it would appreciate some indication from the Viet-Nam side at the earliest possible time. C. The U.S. side has reiterated the statement of President Johnson's of July 28, 1965 that there will be no difficulties with finding ways for the Front to present its attitudes and views during talks. It elaborated, however, that it does not recognize the Front as a government and from this fact, in the U.S. opinion, would stem certain limitations for the role of the Front in the possibility or event of a conference of the Geneva type. On the other hand, future negotiations can take various forms. The U.S. attitude in this regard is flexible and it is ready to consider the possibilities of talks in all variations and with different participants including also the National Liberation Front. D. In the course of eventual talks the U.S. side is ready to discuss the 4 points of the DRV as well as all other proposals coming from other parties including also South Viet-Nam. E. The U.S. side wishes also that the known position of the USG in the 14 point statement published on December 29/2/ also be taken into consideration as expressing the general attitude of the U.S. /2/See Document 248. 4. I told Michalowski there was an urgent need for quick action and prompt response from Hanoi. I described at some length the pressures affecting the USG. Michalowski reiterated that in such a complicated situation it was necessary to be patient and quiet. He said the Polish initiative is in good faith and time would be required. He said he understood pressures on USG, but we must understand Hanoi is in a very delicate position and will need a little time to work out its response. 5. He said Poles are convinced of necessity of secret negotiations and they are afraid publicity might jeopardize their initiative. I agreed the less publicity the better. Gronouski
275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, December 30, 1965, 8:48 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. Drafted by William Bundy. Repeated to the White House. 1853. 1. We are again keeping you up to date on diplomatic developments for your own information and for use with GVN as you see fit. 2. Harriman had most useful talks in Warsaw. Since major operating result is message that Poles may now convey to Hanoi, we are repeating to you Warsaw's 1073./2/ Although not in exact form stated by Harriman we believe this represents fair summary of position as it might be conveyed to Hanoi. Reference to "14-point statement" is to memorandum (actually composed by Secretary) which you will receive through circular to all posts sent tonight./3/ We suspect Poles may be most active Eastern European at least until Shelepin reaches Hanoi. /2/Document 274. /3/See footnote 4, Document 269. 3. We continue to have only public information on Shelepin visit to Hanoi,/4/ but fact that announcement came only very shortly after we informed Dobrynin that we were deferring resumption of bombing indicates that visit arranged on some other basis. Our best guess is that it was political in character (Shelepin being Party man) and perhaps related to large volume of reports suggesting plans for early conference of Soviet-oriented nations, in which Vietnam would be major topic. We have reports Shelepin may arrive Hanoi over weekend, and his presence and possible statements there may of course become major factor in situation even though trip arranged on other grounds. /4/Assessments of the announced visit to Hanoi of A.N. Shelepin are in telegram 2040 from Moscow, December 29, and Intelligence Note No. 651 from Hughes to Rusk, December 30. (Both in Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions and Initiatives--Soviet) A CIA assessment by William Hyland, December 29, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Memos (B). 4. Harriman is now in Belgrade and we believe will go to New Delhi thereafter, rounding out ICC consultations represented by Harriman in Warsaw and McGeorge Bundy in Ottawa. (Latter released today.) FYI: Harriman may then go to Karachi, Teheran, and Cairo, in some order, plans not yet final. End FYI. We do not anticipate significant substantive results from talks with Tito or Shastri. 5. Goldberg had useful, although general, talk with Pope, who among other things expressed gratification at message received from GVN. You might convey this to Do and indicate it was distinct plus in worldwide terms. Goldberg now goes to Paris and will see de Gaulle tomorrow. We will naturally take no initiatives and will not encourage any from French side. 6. Mann going to Mexico for consultation there on general basis, as part of effort to cement our Latin relations on Vietnam and generally. This will probably be announced sometime tomorrow. 7. All of above adds up to continuing effort to demonstrate diplomatic activity and to open all avenues for constructive Hanoi response. So far there has been no such response. We have of course noted first indirect Hanoi reference to situation but have not completed our analysis. At first glance, Hanoi is at least taking somewhat different rhetorical line, even though it concludes with familiar statements about accepting four points and taking other actions./5/ Would be much interested in your analysis. /5/Reference is to a broadcast by the Voice of Vietnam on December 30, entitled "We Are Determined To Smash All Maneuvers of War Expansion and All Peace Tricks of the U.S. Aggressors." Text in FBIS, North Vietnam, January 3, 1965. A Department of State telegram sent as 717 to Harriman in Belgrade and 2960 to Goldberg in Paris, December 30, provided INR interpretation of the North Vietnamese commentary. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 8. One sidelight of Harriman talk with Rapacki was that latter brought up "second-hand" report that Chauvel may propose handling NLF representation issue on basis co-chairmen convening conference, with each then free to invite any party they choose. Would appreciate your comment on this suggestion. Rapacki conversations generally, as well as Hungarians over weekend, have indicated NLF representation issue may well become central focus of some Communist counter-gambit. We have all along taken line that any position NLF might be granted should be matched by equivalent status for other interested groups in South Vietnam such as Buddhists, Catholics, sects, etc. Chauvel proposal might lend itself to such handling, although it would remain vital to affirm position of GVN as sole legitimate government of SVN. Rusk
276. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 31, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 5:12 a.m. and passed to the White House. 2337. For the Secretary from Lodge. 1. In response to your 1821,/2/ I called on Archbishop Palmas, told him that I was indeed still interested in meeting his "former Minister" and asked him if there was any news. /2/Document 269. 2. Palmas said that he had received a note from the "former Minister" under date of December 23 (when I was in Bangkok) asking to be excused because of his inability to come personally to express his good wishes for Christmas and the New Year. The note went on to say that for more than twenty years, the war had gone on in Vietnam and that he prayed to God to put an end to it, saying that the Vietnamese people had paid a heavy price, and that if the war continued there would be a "general extermination". 3. The note went on to say that he was "still waiting for news of the matter we talked about", adding that "when I do get news I will come and we can examine the question together". 4. On December 28, Archbishop Palmas acknowledged receipt of the note. He showed me the note which was written in rather illegible French, and down at the bottom was a rather illegible signature, which could be interpreted as spelling out Hoac. If so, it would confirm our surmises. 5. Palmas' theory that the "former Minister's" initiative had been genuine, but had been quashed by Hanoi as soon as Hanoi heard of it seems plausible. 6. We then branched out into a general discussion, with Palmas expressing the view that the one thing above all others which was keeping the war going was the division of opinion within the free world. He believed that if the French Government would recognize the true interest of the French people, and merely show verbal non-disapproval of the U.S. effort that it would have a very discouraging effect in Hanoi. The Hanoi regime, it appears, pays attention to French moods and French postures way out of proportion to the amount of chips which France actually has bought in the poker game--which is practically nil. 7. He said the fact that the Pope had sent messages both to Ho Chi Minh and General Thieu did not mean that he equated them both, or that he was unmindful of the fact that North Vietnam was the aggressor and wished to exterminate Christianity. Indeed, said Archbishop Palmas, if it were not for the arrival of American troops, Christianity would already be in the process of extermination in South Vietnam now, and he, Palmas, would not even be here at this time. Lodge
277. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State/1/ Belgrade, December 31, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:02 a.m. and passed to the White House. Repeated to Warsaw for Gronouski. 965. For President and Secretary from Harriman./2/ /2/Harriman was in Yugoslavia to talk to Tito, but his appointment was delayed until January 1, 1966. 1. Upon reflection on talks at Warsaw I and officers traveling with me are convinced from statements and attitude of Rapacki and Michalowski as well as Gomulka that Polish Government intends to carry our message faithfully to Hanoi and add their own arguments to influence Hanoi. They are deeply concerned over their own possible involvement if war continues to escalate and as Rapacki put it "everyone including U.S. may lose control of events". 2. Poles also frankly expressed concern over possibility of increased Chinese influence unless we move towards peaceful solution. 3. The Poles repeatedly emphasized the time required to present their arguments to Hanoi, indicating that their usual means of communication were erratic and that special means might have to be used. 4. In order maintain pressure on Poles for prompt response from Hanoi you may wish to authorize Ambassador Gronouski to tell Rapacki that the U.S. Government is following with close interest the Polish efforts with Hanoi and also explain purpose of my trip to India as consultation with Chairman ICC--although we realize that Indians do not have the intimate relations with Hanoi as have the Poles. Furthermore, because of Polish emphasis on secrecy he might indicate that my visit to India (ICC Chairman) and other countries will serve to divert attention from Polish efforts. Elbrick
278. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/ Paris, December 31, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:15 p.m. and passed to the White House. 3701. For Secretary, Under Secretary and Yost. Department pass LBJ Ranch. As arranged I/2/ called on General de Gaulle at the Elysee Palace and conversed with him for about an hour and ten minutes. General de Gaulle opened the discussion by expressing great appreciation to President Johnson for his letter/3/ and for the President's extreme courtesy in advising him privately and promptly as to the moves President Johnson was taking in regard to the Viet-Nam conflict. /2/Ambassador Goldberg. /3/The text was transmitted in telegram 2899 to Paris, December 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) I in turn on behalf of the President congratulated General de Gaulle upon his re-election, assured him of the President's great respect for substantial achievements on behalf of the people of France and thanked him for his courtesy in receiving me as the President's representative on short notice. As requested in the Department's 2943,/4/ I brought up the question of Cambodia and told the General that our desire [was?] to preserve the neutrality of this country provided Prince Sihanouk would maintain a neutral attitude on his part. The General expressed the strong hope that the Viet-Nam war not be extended in any form to Cambodia and I assured him this was not our government's plan or desire. The problem, I explained, was the failure on the part of the Cambodian Government and the ICC properly to ensure that the border was sealed and that Cambodia was not used as a sanctuary for the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong and as a source of supply. I urged the General as I had done earlier in the day to Couve de Murville that the French Government support our efforts for an enlarged and effective ICC supervision of the international boundary. As reported in a separate telegram Couve de Murville stated that he had already made representations to this effect/5/ and the General indicated support for this move. /4/Dated December 30. (Ibid.) /5/The discussion between Couve de Murville and Goldberg, which lasted 50 minutes, was reported in telegram 3700 from Paris, December 31. (Ibid.) The General then spoke at some length about Viet Nam. He said that the President's latest move could have a good and constructive effect upon world opinion and would strengthen the position of the United States in the eyes of nations troubled as to its intentions. In all candor, however, he added that he did not believe that the bombing pause would lead to an acceptance by Hanoi of President Johnson's offer for unconditional negotiations at Geneva or in any other forum. He said that in his view that only tenable solution for the Viet Nam problem was the withdrawal of US forces but he recognized how difficult this was since the honor and prestige of America as a great and powerful nation was involved by its commitments. Perhaps, he said, it is too late to consider whether these commitments should have been publicly extended but he recognized that they were there and that they were a substantial factor in the situation. Notwithstanding, he stressed that he thought withdrawal was the key to a solution of the problem and the only basis on which negotiations were possible. This, he added, did not mean that American troops had to be withdrawn immediately but he stressed that withdrawal had to be agreed upon in principle before the negotiations commenced if Hanoi was to be brought to the bargaining table. I intervened to point out that it has been our repeated policy that we desire no permanent presence in Viet Nam and that the President and his advisors had made it clear that American troops could and would be withdrawn after the aggression from the north ceased and the south had an opportunity under free conditions to determine its own destiny. The principle of self determination did not preclude reunification, provided that the unification was determined by the people of South Viet Nam in a free and properly supervised [garble--election]. America, I added, however, would not withdraw its troops under pressure or force and leave South Viet Nam and its people to the tender mercies of the Communists. This was not contemplated by the Geneva agreements and is not contemplated by our government. Without debating the point, the General went on to say that his view was that it was not detrimental to the interests of the free world, including the United States, if all of Viet Nam, Thailand and Laos were to have Asiatic Communist regimes. Asiatic Communism, in his view, would not be either Chinese or Soviet Communism but would follow its own patterns, and emergent nationalisms would control the future of these countries. Cambodia could and might remain neutralized although the same philosophy could be applied to Cambodia. The General, however, recognized that America was, despite his contrary views, firmly determined to support the independence and sovereignty of South Viet Nam. Of course, he said, the United States has the power to do this and perhaps after one or two years of demonstration of this power Hanoi might be willing to come to the conference table but he did not conceive that it would do so before then. Red China had no interest in any peaceful accommodation in that area of the world but he agreed that the Soviets and the Eastern bloc countries would be much more likely to encourage a detente with the U.S. Hanoi, however, would not now agree to any such detente and its lack of agreement would ultimately be supported not only by China but by the Soviet Union and the other bloc countries as well. I emphasized that one of the considerations leading to the pause was the repeated assertions of the bloc countries and even intimations from the Soviet Union that this would possibly lead to the conference table. General de Gaulle dismissed this as an assumption on their part not warranted by realistic understanding of Hanoi's determination to unite the country along its lines and to eliminate American influence in the area. As requested in the Deptel,/6/ I did not invite any proposals from President de Gaulle as to our future course of action nor did I attempt to indicate what it would be if the bombing pause did not lead to negotiations. /6/See footnote 4 above. The views expressed by General de Gaulle were on his own motion. The General reiterated that he was extremely grateful that the President had sent him a private letter indicating our intentions and he was particularly pleased that the President had dispatched me to give him a more extended review of President Johnson's thinking in this grave matter. He inquired about the President's health and I assured him that President was in the best of health and spirits. I extended on behalf of the President and Mrs. Johnson their best wishes for the New Year. As the meeting concluded, I brought up the question of our cooperation at the UN, pointing out that this was increasingly necessary because of the voting strength of the Afro-Asian bloc. I praised the cooperative attitude of his representative, Ambassador Seydoux, and told General de Gaulle that the Ambassador had played a very cooperative role in the Kashmir debate and in other matters before the Security Council. I further said that the Ambassador and I had discussed the necessity for coordination of the four big powers activities in preparation for the next General Assembly. The General said in reply that he in turn was grateful for my cooperation at the UN and that indeed the future of the UN depended upon the cooperation of the five major powers including China. He obviously meant Communist China. I said that we were not finding Communist China cooperative in Viet Nam or anywhere else. We parted, however, on the more cordial note of his expression of greetings for the New Year to President and Mrs. Johnson. McBride [end of document]
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