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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume V Soviet Union DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

10. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, January 21, 1961, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/1-2161. Secret; Priority. On January 20 Thompson reported that Khrushchev wanted to see him the following day and asked for guidance. (Telegram 1688 from Moscow; ibid., 123 Thompson) In its reply the same day the Department of State said that in view of the timing of the meeting, Khrushchev could not expect the Ambassador to have prepared positions and suggested that Thompson go primarily to listen to what the Chairman had to say. (Telegram 1171 to Moscow; ibid.)

1707. Eyes only Secretary. After offering congratulations inauguration President and hope there would be better US-Soviet relations than in past, Khrushchev had Kuznetsov read aide-memoire (text Embassy telegram 1706)./2/ When Kuznetsov had finished, Khrushchev said he would like to add that Soviets ready release fliers immediately, as soon as appropriate notification received from US that we were in agreement with Soviet position. He said it was still Soviet position that there was intrusion Soviet territorial waters and it was a Soviet right shoot down plane and Soviets would continue such action if further intrusions. If US agrees with Soviet aide-memoire Soviets will release fliers. If not, only logical outcome would be to organize a trial although Soviets recognize this would only lead to further exacerbation situation.

/2/Document 9.

I replied that I appreciate spirit in which proposal made but at pres-ent moment old administration had gone and I as yet had no instructions from new and therefore what I said would have to be on personal basis. Of course I was prepared transmit proposal to Government but at risk seeming ungrateful wanted point out certain considerations. As Chairman knew, our position is that plane did not violate Soviet territory and we prepared submit case to international arbitration in order solve difficult situation. However, this did not change fact that we would like fliers back and I thought I could be sure President Kennedy also would like forget past and make new start, and utilize opportunity change of administration for this purpose. As I understood it however fliers would only be released if we expressed agreement Soviet point of view. Khrushchev thought I had misunderstood and had thought we were supposed to agree with Soviet version of incident. I explained this not case but pointed out there were two problems involved in his proposal. Judging from President's statements during campaign there would appear to be little doubt about his intention not approve violations Soviet frontiers by overflights. Aide-memoire however referred to dropping UNGA agenda items, and I assumed that it meant on our side resolutions on Hungary and Tibet. I said he should realize difficult position in which he would put President if he insisted upon making bargain which involved these fliers where we thought our position right and other matters. Khrushchev made clear each side was free to maintain its point of view regarding incident and he simply asked that we not attempt exploit release of fliers against them. He intimated that upon their return they could be made to say things which would exacerbate relations. I said we had once made clear we would not do this but pointed out we had free press and there would doubtless be some publicity. With regard question exploitation Khrushchev said this was reason aide-memoire had referred to my conversation./3/ He said they realized we had free press but wished point out their press also free and said if not how could they have published such thing as article referring to eleven missing airmen./4/ He grinned and said "you were not slow to pounce on this" and added of course article nothing but carelessly written novel. I pointed out that of course much time had passed since my conversation to which he had referred. He acknowledged this but said frankly they had not wished release these fliers to Eisenhower administration for if they had Nixon would have exploited it during campaign. In order illustrate how I thought matter should be handled I told him of suggestion I had submitted that President make statement about overflights at his January 25 press conference and assume Soviets would release fliers. With great glee he said he had taken action first. He then went on to explain that there was no link between question of fliers and dropping agenda items. He said offer to release fliers was not subject to conditions and that aide-memoire would not be published. I said it was necessary to be clear what was expected of US. Was I to understand that if President either informed them or said publicly that he had no intention to send planes across their frontier, fliers would be released? Khrushchev said that if President were to add to such statement regarding overflights that US wanted good relations not only with Soviets but with all governments, this would be favorably received by them.

/3/For a report on this conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. X, Part 1, pp. 547-549.

/4/Khrushchev is referring to an article in Ogonek, January 15, 1961, which stated that 11 of the crew of a U.S. C-130, shot down over Soviet Armenia on September 2, 1958, were captured near Yerevan.

I said that at time fliers were released this would be news and it would be necessary to understand clearly what would be said to press. Khrushchev suggested we work out problem with Soviet Foreign Minister in order that we both say same thing. Unclear whether this would be joint statement or agreed position.

On agenda items he said they did not wish to start off Assembly discussions by arguing cold war matters with Stevenson. They had their own cold war agenda items but such discussion would spoil relations.

Comment: Recommend we reply accepting Soviet proposal re fliers and state that UN agenda items will be subject further discussion. Somewhat difficult define precisely what Soviet proposal is but I understand two factors involved. (1) We accept in some form their interpretation new President's position re overflights; (2) we give at least oral assurance to endeavor not exploit release of men against them. Since President will probably have to take public position on overflight policy, it might be handled at his press conference where distinction between U-2 and RB-47 can be made clear. Anticipate difficulty reaching agreed position with Foreign Office although think they clearly understand that each side will maintain its position on facts RB-47 incident.

Other topics in separate telegrams./5/

/5/In telegram 1708, January 21, Thompson reported briefly on the Congo and Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/1-2161) In telegram 1709 Thompson reported that he had asked Khrushchev whether he had read the President's inaugural address. The Chairman replied that he had and would have the Soviet papers publish the full text, since he had seen several constructive things in it. (Ibid., 711.11-KE/1-2161)

I am telling press here only that interview concerned Soviet-American relations.

Thompson

 

11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, January 23, 1961, 5:57 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/1-2361. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Kohler on January 23 and approved by Rusk. Also printed in Declassified Documents, 1977, 73B.

1180. Eyes only for Ambassador. Immediately following telegram contains text of Aide-Memoire/2/ for delivery to Khrushchev in your discretion either directly or through Foreign Minister. You may in delivering this communication assure the Soviet Government that we have no intention of exploiting the release of the Air Force officers to the detriment of Soviet-American relations. There will inevitably be some publicity but to the extent possible we will seek to minimize undesirable aspects. We would hope that release can be arranged prior to President's press conference scheduled for 6 pm Jan 25./3/ Arrangements should be made for them to be accompanied out of the Soviet Union by Air Attaché or representative and Embassy doctor. Air Force will send separate instructions regarding specific arrangements for delivery of released officers.

/2/Document 12.

/3/For a transcript of the President's press conference on January 25, in which he stated that the release of the RB-47 flyers removed "a serious obstacle to improvement of Soviet-American relations," and that American flights penetrating the air space of the Soviet Union would not be resumed, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 8-17.

A statement by President at press conference would be limited to first two sentences of Aide-Memoire. If questions asked, he would state position in second paragraph of Aide-Memoire as respects distinction between RB-47 and U-2 and non-resumption of flights of American aircraft into or over Soviet territory. Beyond this he would in response to questions reiterate hope for improved relationship along lines his inaugural address/4/ and message of Jan 21 to Khrushchev/5/ as referred to in Aide-Memoire.

/4/For text of the President's inaugural address, January 20, see ibid., pp. 1-3.

/5/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VI, p. 3.

While we have considered desirable to make clear in Aide-Memoire we are not prepared to seek withdrawal of specific UN items, we have no intention, as President stated in his inaugural speech of "belaboring those problems which divide us." Clearly the nature of the debates at the resumed UN session would reflect the international atmosphere prevailing at that time. It would be our hope that this would be improved over atmosphere characterizing first phase of the current session.

We fully agree that the Aides-Memoire exchanged should not be published. On our side comment on this exchange will be limited to the President's remarks at the press conference on the lines stated above plus announcement with factual information regarding the physical release and travel of the airmen. We hope latter can be coordinated with Soviet Govt. Report urgently.

Rusk

 

12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, January 23, 1961, 6:56 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/1-2361. Confidential; Verbatim Text. Also printed in Declassified Documents, 1977, 73C.

1181. Eyes only for Amb. Thompson. Aide-Memoire.

The United States Government is gratified by the decision of the Soviet Government to release Captain Freeman B. Olmstead and Captain John R. McKone, members of the crew of the United States Air Force RB-47 aircraft who have been detained by the Soviet authorities since July 1, 1960. The United States Government considers that this action of the Soviet Government removes a serious obstacle to improvement of Soviet-American relations.

The Soviet Government is fully aware of the United States Government views with respect to the distinction between the question of the United States Air Force RB-47 and the incident which occurred over Soviet territory on May 1, 1960, involving an American U-2 type aircraft. Flights of American aircraft penetrating the air space of the Soviet Union have been suspended since May 1960 and President Kennedy has ordered that they not be resumed.

As respects the stated willingness of the Soviet Government not to insist on discussion at the resumed Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly of the Soviet inscribed item "concerning aggressive actions of the USA," it would not seem feasible to the United States Government to seek to remove specific items already included on the General Assembly agenda. However the United States Government believes that in so far as possible the work of the United Nations should be approached in a constructive manner and that restraint should be exercised in debating matters of difference between member states. The United States Delegation to the resumed session will approach its tasks in this spirit.

As was stated in the inaugural address of the President of the United States and reiterated in his message to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of January 21, the United States Government shares the hope expressed by the Soviet Government that progress can be made toward improving the relationship between the two countries and toward common efforts of both governments designed to assure a peaceful and more fruitful life for all mankind. The United States Government, for its part, will do everything within its power to promote these high purposes.

While the United States Government will naturally wish to study carefully and deliberately the broader international issues, it is prepared to proceed without delay to practical first steps in the field of relations between the United States and the USSR. In this connection, the United States suggests a prompt review through diplomatic channels of proposals presented by either side./2/ The United States Government is ready, for example, at the early convenience of the Soviet Government to undertake the negotiations with regard to an air transport agreement which were postponed in July 1960. The United States Government would also be pleased to proceed expeditiously to renewed consideration of the proposal which has been previously discussed between the two governments for the establishment of a United States Consulate General at Leningrad and of a Soviet Consulate General at New York./3/

/2/For a statement by Secretary Rusk on January 23 along similar lines, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 560.

/3/On January 24 Thompson reported that he had delivered the aide-memoire to Kuznetzov at 11:30 a.m. that day and had suggested that the fliers leave Moscow on January 25. (Telegram 1729 from Moscow; Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/1-2461) In a later telegram Thompson stated that Kuznetzov had discussed the question with Khrushchev who agreed to the release on January 25 and transmitted the text of a statement that the Soviet Government would issue unilaterally the following day concerning the release. (Telegram 1735 from Moscow; ibid.; printed in Declassified Documents, 1977, 73D)

Rusk

 

13. Airgram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, January 24, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/1-2961. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also printed in Declassified Documents, 1977, 73C.

G-504. During my conversation with Khrushchev on January 21 he expressed sympathy for difficulties I had faced in Moscow which he attributed to uneven policy U.S. Government past eight years. After his expressing his usual opinions on Eisenhower and Dulles, I said I had become convinced I had been a poor Ambassador as there was clearly wide misunderstanding on both sides, but particularly Soviet. I referred to his January 6 speech/2/ and said I thought major part of difficulty was that Soviets interpreted everything in terms of class struggle and saw the world only through Marxist eyes. I said Soviets seemed to think we were concerned about Communism as an economic system. This was not the case. Many Americans thought of Soviet Union in terms of worst days of Stalin whereas Soviets thought of the West as in the days of Marx. There have been changes on both sides, but their margin of error was greater. What worried the West was not economic and social organization, but concern that Soviet Union itself desired to dominate the world with Communism as means to this end. We believed every country should decide its own system and if they freely decided on Socialism or Communism that was all right, but once a country became a member of the Communist Bloc the whole power of the bloc was used to keep it Communist regardless of the wishes of the people and I cited Hungary. If this sort of thing went on, of course eventually the world would become Communist.

/2/For text of Khrushchev's speech before a meeting of Communist Party organizations, January 6, see Pravda, January 24, 1961; extracts are also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 555-558, and Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 1-15. For a summary and analysis of the speech, see Document 15.

Khrushchev said idea Soviets desire to dominate world neither correct nor possible. He cited Soviet initiative in changing designation of Soviet Union as leader of Communist bloc. There was no leader and each party equal. I read quotation from his speech that Soviet Union would do everything to maintain unity of Socialist bloc and asked if everything included use of force. Khrushchev said this passage referred solely to ideological questions. He said Westerners were always talking about China, implying that this could be exploited against the USSR. While he said nothing further about China specifically, he said what he really meant by stating that everything must be sacrificed for bloc unity was that Communist countries must make mutual concessions in order to preserve the strength of the bloc. At this point he launched into the discussion reported mytel 1708./3/ In discussing the US role as "international gendarme," he ridiculed US fear of Communist agents implying that we looked for danger to ourselves in the wrong places. As an example he cited Western charges that Lenin was a German agent. He also mentioned Iran and said that Shah was not really afraid of a Soviet attack, but of Iraq and its example to his own people.

/3/See footnote 4, Document 10.

Khrushchev suggested consider disband all blocs and they would pull their troops out of the countries of Eastern Europe. I replied they would still have a monolithic system and I could not believe the contrary until some country which had become Communist was allowed to change its system. I said I believed the Soviet people in general supported the system here, but this was not true of most other Communist countries. Khrushchev observed that Hitler had counted on the people turning against the regime when he invaded the Soviet Union, but they had been wrong. I said that there had been serious disaffection in the early days and Molotov himself had told us of his concern about it, but Hitler had helped them out by insisting upon mistreating the population and maintaining the Germans were the master race. Khrushchev responded that Hitler was a fool and that if he had been wise he would not have been Hitler, but Stalin.

Referring to our earlier discussion, I said the Soviets misunderstood the economic system of the United States and I described the workings of our laws against monopolies and the functions of the regulatory agencies in the United States. As an example of how this system works, I cited the case of the International Business Machines Company which had been forced by the Government to make a large number of its patents available to other companies. I reminded him of his visit to one of this company's factories near San Francisco./4/ I said that they should operate on the basis of fact and urged that they have their people study how our system really worked. I said it had its weaknesses, but it did not justify their interpretation that everything could be explained by exploited and exploited.

/4/For documentation on Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September 1959, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. X, Part 1, pp. 388 ff.

Khrushchev referred to their action in widening contacts with America and observed that the system was going well, but said he thought trade should be developed and this in turn would improve political relations. He said the State Department and his friend Mr. Dillon who is now Secretary of the Treasury, were opposed to this view. He said it was the U.S. which suffered from this attitude and they were having good trade relations with the companies in West Germany, the U.K., France, and others.

I said I had never understood why they had agreed to negotiate about a lend lease settlement knowing that the position they were taking was unacceptable to us. Khrushchev merely repeated the usual Soviet arguments on this subject, but ended by saying perhaps we could freeze this question and trade in the meantime. He also reported the apparent misunderstanding which Mikoyan had of his conversation with Mr. Dillon when he asserted that Dillon had said the United States would supply credits if a lend lease agreement were reached. I said I had been present at the conversation and had heard no such statement./5/

/5/For a memorandum of Khrushchev's conversation with Dillon, September 27, 1959, see ibid., pp. 470-476.

Khrushchev said there were many problems for the new administration regarding the USSR and that not everything could be done at once but we could make good beginning with main subject discussed that morning.

Several times in the conversation, which was already long, both he and I agreed not to go deeply into the subjects discussed, but he suggested that we might one day have a long talk at his dacha.

Khrushchev asked if I would remain as Ambassador. I said I had no information other than press reports and expected none for several days. He said with a smile they would gladly give me their vote but he was not sure this would be helpful. I replied I also had some doubts. I said if I did remain I assumed I would be returning to Washington before long for consultation. Khrushchev asked me to give his regards to the President, Stevenson, and others whom he had met.

Khrushchev seemed reasonably well but there were some signs that he had felt the strain of the long debates in the Central Committee Plenum.

LET

 

14. Editorial Note

On January 24, 1961, Charles E. Bohlen transmitted a memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk suggesting that he send a personal telegram to Ambassador Thompson to inform him that the President intended to call him back once the President and Secretary both had time to devote for serious consultations. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.00/1- 2461) The following day Rusk sent the telegram stating that the recall would be both to get Thompson's advice and to demonstrate the President's highest level of confidence in him. (Telegram 1196; ibid., 123 Thompson) On January 30 Rusk cabled further that he and the President wanted Thompson to return at his earliest convenience for 10 days to 2 weeks. (Telegram 1228; ibid.) The following day the White House announced that the Ambassador would return on or about February 8 for consultations since President Kennedy was interested in having Thompson's first-hand observations and report on the situation in the Soviet Union. (Telegram 1243 to Moscow, January 31; ibid.)

 

15. Current Intelligence Weekly Review/1/

Washington, January 26, 1961.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Confidential. Prepared by CIA's Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 1-3 of Part II of the issue(Khrushchev Speech on Moscow Meeting of World Communist Leaders) and pp. 1-5 of Part III of the issue (Khrushchev--The Soviet Public Image). Two photographs in the source text and their captions have not been printed.

PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Khrushchev Speech on Moscow Meeting of World Communist Leaders

Khrushchev's report on 6 January, published in the Soviet party journal Kommunist on 17 January, was intended to stand as the definitive Soviet interpretation of last November's Moscow conference of world Communist leaders. Khrushchev vigorously reaffirmed his party's position on the issues in dispute with Peiping and made it clear that the conference did not alter the views of the Soviet leadership.

Probably timed to complement the short and formal 18 January Soviet central committee resolution on the results of the conference, the speech took a more forthright position in dealing with the major questions of doctrine and policy than the often equivocal Moscow declaration of 6 December. The handling of the various issues indicates continuing areas of disagreement with Peiping and suggests that Moscow is determined to make no important concessions to the Chinese.

In effect, Khrushchev defended the validity of his foreign policy and reaffirmed that the only correct and prudent course under conditions of a nuclear stalemate is a policy of limited risks to achieve political gains. As he put it, "We always seek to direct the development of events in a way which ensures that, while defending the interests of the socialist camp, we do not provide the imperialist provocateurs with a chance to unleash a new world war."

Exuding confidence that the trend of international events continues to run in favor of the socialist camp, Khrushchev stressed that the general strategic line and tactics of world Communism depend on correct evaluation of character of the balance of power. While reiterating the standard proposition that the bloc is the "decisive factor" in world affairs, he warned that imperialism retains "great strength"; under these circumstances, he implied, the bloc cannot undertake the extremely militant, revolutionary program advocated by Peiping. As Khrushchev put it, "To win time in the economic contest with capitalism is now the main thing."

Against this backdrop, Khrushchev went beyond the Moscow declaration in discussing policy toward the West. He stated, "Our party considers the policy of peaceful coexistence, which has been handed down to us by Lenin, to be the general line of our foreign policy." This statement takes on added significance in light of East German party leader Ulbricht's acknowledgment that the term "general line" provoked a dispute at the Moscow conference.

The term did not appear in the final declaration, and Ulbricht indicated that the Soviet party had attempted to extract recognition from Peiping of such a bloc-wide "line" and acceptance of the discipline it would impose on Chinese policies. Thus, in effect, Khrushchev made it clear that the USSR's basic foreign policy would not be adjusted to accommodate the Chinese.

Khrushchev also went further than the declaration in restating Moscow's intention to engage the West in further high-level talks. Unlike the declaration, Khrushchev reiterated his previous judgment that some elements in the West understand the danger of war and accept the need for coexistence. Building on this premise, he extended the Moscow statement by reaffirming that "socialist states" strive for "negotiations and agreement" with capitalist countries, and seek to "develop contacts" with capitalist statesmen. Presidium member Suslov, who delivered the formal report on the conference to the Soviet central committee plenum on 18 January, elaborated on Khrushchev's remark and specifically pointed out that these contacts should be between heads of states and governments.

Khrushchev supported the correctness of his approach by going into some detail on the consequences of modern war. After discussing the hundreds of millions who would perish in such a war, he called for a "sober appraisal" of the consequences as a necessary element in mobilizing the struggle to prevent war.

He also reaffirmed that the USSR is ordinarily opposed to local wars because of the danger that they might expand--a risk Peiping minimizes. As for one category of local wars, however, i.e., "liberation" wars such as the Algerian rebellion--Khrushchev stated his view, in apparent agreement with Peiping, that such wars are indeed inevitable as long as imperialism exists. He pledged that the bloc will give aid to such "liberation" forces.

The speech reinforced earlier indications that Moscow will pursue a more aggressive program in all "colonial" areas--among which Khrushchev specifies Algeria, the Congo, and Laos. However, the speech evaded the question--on which the Chinese have charged Khrushchev with timidity--of whether bloc support to "liberation" forces will go so far as to risk military clashes with the West. Similarly, in distinguishing a fourth category of wars--"national uprisings" such as Castro's--and in stating his expectation of and favor for such uprisings, Khrushchev declared that such wars must not become wars between states, but he evaded the question of what risks the bloc will take. He was particularly careful not to categorize the Laotian situation.

Khrushchev defended at length his policy of wooing the nationalist leaders of underdeveloped countries, even at the cost of sacrificing the local Communist parties there. The Chinese have accused him of exaggerating the importance of the neutralists (e.g., Nehru, Nasir, Sukarno), and have urged less Soviet aid and more of an effort to bring these leaders down. Khrushchev seems willing to move a little faster toward making pro-Soviet "national democracies" (e.g., Cuba) of the neutral nations, but still not as fast as Peiping wishes.

As for the tactics of Communist parties in the West, Khrushchev reaffirmed a gradualist program for these parties, envisaging lengthy preparation--through "democratic" movements--for eventual revolution. The Chinese have argued that "revolutionary situations" exist today in Western Europe and should be exploited.

In the latter part of his speech, Khrushchev discussed the question of the discipline of the world Communist movement, the underlying issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Khrushchev insisted that the "unity" of the movement is of "foremost importance," and he reiterated that the Soviet party recognizes the "equality" of other parties and does not regard itself as the "center" of the movement.

He followed this, however, by making clear that the Soviet party does indeed wish to be regarded as the principal party and as the spokesman for the bloc, and in effect he advised the other parties to get rid of those who sympathize more with Peiping than with Moscow. Several parties at the November conference had supported the Chinese on some issues, and many other parties were neutral or split.

Khrushchev, in conclusion, addressed himself directly to the Chinese, whom he condemned elsewhere in the speech, without naming them, for persistent "dogmatism and sectarianism." He reminded them that Sino-Soviet "unity" is necessary to "disappoint" and confound common enemies. Here and elsewhere he indirectly admitted that the Moscow conference did not resolve Sino-Soviet differences and may actually have made them worse.

Although Khrushchev quoted liberally from the Moscow declaration as testimony to the extent of agreement reached, the US Embassy has received reports that the original version of the speech contained sharp criticism of the Chinese. Khrushchev is reported to have bitterly castigated the Chinese leaders and stated that although they were "stupid," it was necessary to reach agreement with them.

He also reportedly presented a full review of the sharp debates between the Soviet representatives and the Chinese. He is said to have read to the meeting of party functionaries in the Kremlin the main parts of Liu Shao Chi's attack on Soviet policy as well as his own reply and concluded with the statement, "This is what happened--you can judge for yourselves."

PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

Khrushchev--The Soviet Public Image

Despite Khrushchev's clear-cut victory over a potent combination of enemies in 1957, when he carried out a sharp reorganization of the Soviet Union's top political command, there have been persistent doubts about the essential strength of his authority. During the past year in particular, there was widespread speculation--touched off by a number of developments in Soviet domestic and external policy--that Khrushchev's power had been weakened or had at least become subject to a collective "restraint" imposed by other leaders. Even exponents of the belief that Khrushchev has taken firm title to first place in the Soviet hierarchy concede, in the words of one of them, that his authority "is not yet independent of continuous, ever-renewed successes."

Certainly, 1960 was not a year of unqualified success for Soviet foreign and domestic policy or of unbroken calm in Kremlin politics. The juggling of the Kremlin hierarchy and the summit collapse last spring, the stresses in Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet premier's tumultuous behavior at the UN General Assembly, and the ailments of Soviet agriculture may well have provided the material for political controversy within the ruling command. Nevertheless, the sum of the evidence indicates that the question of Khrushchev's ultimate authority is not now at issue within the Soviet Union.

The Khrushchev Cult

One element in this evidence is the public image of Khrushchev as the uniquely gifted and natural leader--an image persistently developed by his subordinates at all levels and by the hacks of Soviet propaganda. The prestige conferred on Khrushchev is in part an outgrowth of the totalitarian mechanism itself, which inexorably funnels authority to a single point. This imbedded tendency, with its roots in the Russian past, has probably been consciously abetted as a means of furthering the Soviet Union's drive to expand its authority on the international scene and its competition with the Chinese Communists.

Moreover, even in the face of Khrushchev's expressed disapproval of adulation of leaders--possibly genuinely intended--there is probably an irresistible urge on the part of subordinates to ensure themselves a place on the leader's bandwagon.

The end product, a new version of the leader cult replacing the discarded Stalin cult, must not only reflect to a fair degree the actualities of Kremlin politics but also have become by now a political factor in itself. The overwhelming impression that Khrushchev is the focal point of the Soviet state and singularly endowed to prosecute its aims is not likely to encourage attempts to limit his authority or to increase his tolerance of political obstacles.

Shape of the Khrushchev Image

The central committee session just completed provided a new, vivid demonstration for the Soviet audience of the breadth of Khrushchev's authority. The meeting opened with the announcement that a party congress, nominally the Soviet Union's highest tribune, had been called for next October and that Khrushchev would present two major reports there, thus guaranteeing not only that he will be the dominant figure at the meeting itself but also that his name will be prominently featured in the massive pre-congress build-up.

Published reports of the proceedings at the central committee plenum were themselves a considerable addition to the leader image. They pictured Khrushchev denouncing with almost Jovian ire the managerial sins of top party figures, brushing aside their excuses but accepting their fawning compliments, and repeatedly interrupting speakers to give his own detailed prescriptions for agricultural ills. All of this earned Pravda's praise as a model of the "Leninist approach" but scarcely conveyed a picture of "collective leadership" to the Soviet public.

Despite occasional semantic variations in the propaganda formulas applied to the Soviet hierarchy and reiteration of the "collective leadership" theme, the vast majority of party and government officials as well as ordinary Soviet citizens cannot but be heavily influenced by the cumulative impact of the Khrushchev cult. They are exposed to a steady daily dosage comprised of the deference paid him publicly by his lieutenants, the precedence given him on public occasions, the attention devoted to him by Soviet communications media, and by the kinds of ritualistic formulas by which he is conventionally described.

It is difficult to find a speech by an important figure in the regime without sycophantic passages or an editorial in the central press which does not cite Khrushchev as authority for one or another aspect of Soviet policy. On days when such organs as Pravda and Izvestia do not feature the text of a Khrushchev speech, their front pages are weighted down with pictures of the leader at some public function and, more and more, with the texts of mutual exchanges of praise between him and Soviet organizations or individuals who have distinguished themselves in some area of production.

The general outlines of this cult present Khrushchev to the Soviet public in several aspects: as a pre-eminent international statesman whose grasp of the common man's aspirations is either admired or feared by other world leaders, as the true spiritual successor of the revered Lenin, and as the dynamic but flexible architect of party and government policy. Presidium member Dmitry Polyansky attempted to span this whole spectrum at the recent central committee meeting:

In the successes of the international Communist movement we must note the leading role of the Leninist central committee of our party, headed by the outstanding fighter for peace, democracy, and socialism--Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. (Stormy applause) He has won the respect of working people all over the world by his profound knowledge of life, his bold and keen posing of problems, his ability to orient himself quickly and correctly under difficult circumstances, his wisdom, and his presence of mind.

Outstanding World Figure

The Soviet premier's numerous foreign excursions may not have been unmixed successes and their results have probably been discussed and assessed soberly in the Kremlin's inner councils, but the Soviet propaganda mill has concealed any misgivings and has invariably pictured them as resounding personal triumphs for Khrushchev and his policy of "peaceful coexistence." Only one speech by Khrushchev in the previous four and one-half years was given greater treatment by Radio Moscow than the one he made following his return to Moscow from the summit failure. The US Embassy in Moscow reported for the same period an "extremely high volume of Soviet materials quoting, praising, or otherwise calling positive attention to Khrushchev."

Khrushchev's excursion into the UN last fall was accompanied by an unprecedented outpouring of propaganda support. Before, during, and after the General Assembly session, Soviet media were inundated with reports of nationwide meetings which invariably expressed enthusiasm for Khrushchev's conduct, with the texts of his speeches at the UN, and with TASS dispatches picturing Khrushchev's dominance of the proceedings and the favorable worldwide "echo."

This episode in Soviet diplomacy has, in the aftermath, been unremittingly described, in typical examples, as a further demonstration of "the impassioned and seething activity of N.S. Khrushchev," of "the indefatigable herald of peace, the true Leninist, N.S. Khrushchev," and, more broadly, as proof of "the consistent peaceful policy of the Soviet Government and the purposeful and tireless activity of the outstanding champion of peace and friendship between nations, Comrade Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev."

On the Home Front

Although he may feel and act as though the USSR's world position is his primary concern, Khrushchev has at the same time given away no part of his claim to a special grasp of domestic problems. At the January central committee plenum he played to the limit the role of the stern, broadly informed overseer of agricultural affairs, and the Soviet image-makers have labored constantly to portray him as a leader of wide-ranging interests and knowledge, both profound and imaginative, but still humble and solicitous for the public welfare. The phrases "as N.S. Khrushchev has said" and "on the initiative of N.S. Khrushchev" are staples of Soviet propaganda and appear in contexts of all kinds.

The first party conference held in the newly organized virgin lands administrative territory, for example, dispatched a message of greetings to "Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, the initiator of virgin lands reclamation who daily displays solicitude for the development of the Kazakh virgin land."

Such tributes to Khrushchev for his part in the virgin lands and corn-planting programs, with which he is closely identified, are commonplace, but the gamut is much wider. Among other things, Khrushchev can take credit, according to presidium candidate member Korotchenko, for exercising "an enormous, beneficial influence" on Soviet literature and, according to the chairman of the State Planning Committee, for "indefatigable attention to a fuller satisfaction of the growing demand of the population for consumer goods." Podgorny, a member of the presidium and head of the Ukrainian party, carried the matter close to its most absurd level at the opening of the Kiev subway last November:

The inhabitants of Kiev know very well that Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was the initiator of the construction of the Kiev subway, and as its construction proceeded, we always felt his attention and the assistance of the CPSU central committee and the Soviet Government.

Leninist Leadership

Khrushchev's carefully constructed association with the image of Lenin has become imbedded in the formulas of Soviet propaganda. References to Khrushchev as "the faithful Leninist" or as "head of the Leninist central committee" are standard. Placing the Lenin hagiology at the service of the present leadership, Soviet propaganda incessantly reiterates that this leadership exemplifies a genuinely "Leninist style," that the "Leninist norms of party life" and "collective leadership," ignored by Stalin, have been restored, and that the party has overcome the "cult of the leader, alien to Lenin."

The commemoration of Lenin's 90th anniversary in 1960 produced a flood of literature describing both his accomplishments and his personal excellence--his modesty, distaste for sycophancy, and respect for the opinions of others. The adulation heaped on Lenin had, of course, the effect of increasing what he allegedly most detested, the "cult of the leader," and of strengthening, by association, the Khrushchev cult.

Soviet propagandists seem to feel no embarrassment in affirming the existence of "collective leadership" at the very moment when their output is increasingly focused on one man, Khrushchev, nor in setting criticism of the leader cult side by side with phrases such as "the central committee headed by N.S. Khrushchev," "the Presidium headed by N.S. Khrushchev," or "the central committee, the Council of Ministers, and N.S. Khrushchev personally."

If, however, any of the party faithful should detect a contradiction, they can refer to the "dialectical" reconciliation provided by the authoritative text Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. The masses are the levers of history, this document declares, and "the cult of personality contradicts Marxism-Leninsm." At the same time, it is pointed out, "the overwhelming majority of the masses of the workers are well aware that the authority and popularity of the outstanding leaders of the working class have nothing in common with the personality cult . . . . Without leaders who enjoy authority and who are linked up with the masses and are popular among them, there is no organized socialist movement . . . . The first-rate leaders of the working class, who are intimately linked with the people and who successfully conduct the struggle of the workers for their vital interests and ideals, play an outstanding role in history and deserve the people's love."

Khrushchev no doubt considers that this description fits him very well.

Conclusion

For the past two years, Khrushchev, evidently considering the domestic front relatively secure, has been deeply immersed in pressing the USSR's international ambitions. Atop an underlying movement of social and ideological change, whose long-term political effects are probably only vaguely sensed in the Kremlin as elsewhere, the regime's internal actions have remained centered mainly on pragmatic, economic objectives.

The failure of Soviet agriculture to measure up to expectations appears to have forced Khrushchev once again to concern himself directly with an area of policy which was once his major interest. In the interim, however, his involvement in foreign affairs and lengthy periods of rest, dictated by the state of his health, have necessarily given many of the other members of the party presidium a good share of the responsibility for the conduct of political and economic affairs at home.

With the question of the succession always in the background, these circumstances have created the ground for conflicts of ambition within the hierarchy and for more or less sudden shifts in the fortunes of key figures. Moreover there is still within the presidium, according to the best available information, some room for "give and take" on important issues and therefore an area in which Khrushchev is, to a degree, subject to influence and restraint. However, the shape of Khrushchev's present public image, while only part of the evidence, provides some measure of his position and suggests that his authority is neither threatened nor diminished.

 

16. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts/1/

Washington, January 27, 1961, 11:17 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/1-2761. Confidential; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Davies; cleared by Kohler, Davis, McSweeney, AF, EUR/P, RA/P, and USIA; and approved by Tubby.

1115. Joint State-USIA message. We note from news reports some Western European, and particularly British, newspapers are dealing euphorically with release RB-47 fliers as possible harbinger substantial and rapid improvement Soviet-US relations.

USIA is preparing and will transmit via Wireless File wrap-up responsible US editorial comment on release RB-47 fliers. PAO's should strive achieve maximum placement, particularly Western European press.

In discussing matter US officials should point out that:

(1) US gratified by release, as President noted;

(2) No US concessions involved;

(3) No high level meeting mentioned nor future negotiation on any international issue discussed;

(4) President's orders not resume penetrations Soviet airspace only continuation situation which has obtained since last May;

(5) Basic US view Olmstead-McKone release is that it belatedly rectifies wrong done by Soviets in illegally holding two airmen for seven months;

(6) US, like other countries, waiting to see how Soviet Government, which has recently stridently re-proclaimed its goal of achieving Communist world by any and all feasible means short general nuclear war (81-Party Statement of December 6/2/ and Khrushchev speech of January 6) will translate into deeds its often-proclaimed desire for better relations.

/2/For text of this declaration, see the World Marxist Review, December 1960, vol. 3, No. 12; an extract is printed in RIIA Documents on International Affairs, 1960, New York, 1964, pp. 222 ff.

For USRO--Distribute to other dels public-affairs guidance contained numbered paras above. (Do not distribute first two unnumbered introductory paras.)

Rusk

 

17. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, January 28, 1961, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/1-2861. Secret; Limit Distribution.

1784. There would be many advantages in informal meeting between President and Khrushchev before President in position where he could be expected to take definite positions on controversial issues. Principal one would be to enable President to convince Khrushchev of his intention not to seek solutions by force and of his willingness undertake serious negotiations. I believe Soviet policy was for a time influenced by conviction Khrushchev gained from his meeting with Eisenhower that latter man of peace. Probably only specific result such meeting would be agreement upon which issue we would tackle first, which I assume would be atomic testing.

On other hand it would be difficult and perhaps unwise to hold such meeting until President has had at least preliminary contact with our Western allies. Moreover, if Khrushchev came merely to continuation of assembly he would for his own reasons probably feel obliged to take part in discussion of current issues and although he might keep his shoes on, such intervention could scarcely be helpful. Particularly difficult would be such questions as Laos and Congo. I suspect Khrushchev realizes this and will not take initiative although position might be different if there were special session on disarmament alone.

Thompson

 

18. Record of Secretary of State Rusk's Staff Meeting/1/

Washington, January 30, 1961, 9:15 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147. Secret. Prepared by Stoessel.

[Here follows discussion of NATO and the Congo.]

3. Information Line on Soviet Union

Mr. Tubby suggested that consideration should be given to the tone of the line being used at present in VOA broadcasts to the Soviet Union. It might be that this line should be modified down somewhat. Mr. Washburn/2/ felt that the present line was satisfactory. It is factual and does not seem to bother the Soviets. In fact, jamming is easing in some degree.

/2/Abbot M. Washburn, Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency.

The Secretary thought we should review the situation with regard to Soviet-US relations. We have our fliers back and we have announced that no more overflights are to take place. Otherwise, there is no real change in the situation. We should not encourage the thinking that a new dawn is rising in relations with the Soviet Union. The Secretary doubted that we should make any change in our information line toward the Soviet Union although he agreed that serious thought should be given to the problem.

The Secretary asked Mr. Bowles to look into this subject to see whether any modification in our line is desirable.

[Here follows discussion of Mexico and Laos.]

WJS

 

19. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, January 30, 1961, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.51/1-3061. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also printed in Declassified Documents, 1977, 77E. A copy of this telegram at the Kennedy Library bears the notation, "President has seen." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR General)

1797. Eyes only Secretary. In non-political fields this Embassy chiefly supplier raw materials and not staffed to attempt finished intelligence estimates. Nevertheless I am becoming increasingly convinced we are grossly over estimating Soviet military strength relative to ours.

I of course am not privy to all our intelligence on this subject though I do see much of end product. It seems to me this over estimate has resulted from natural tendency our military to assess enemy's capabilities at maximum as may be only prudent from this point of view. Other factors have been US service competition for funds, our under estimation their capabilities in past, Soviet forceful exploitation of their achievements in atomic, missile and space technology.

I shall not attempt go into evidence that leads to my conclusion but hope have opportunity discuss this upon my return Washington. It clearly not my province attempt estimate our military needs and I am in any event convinced we must maintain strong military posture along with attempt reach practical measures reduce or eliminate armaments. From political point of view would hope we would concentrate on second-strike capability and make clear doing so.

Wish point out however our estimate Soviet military capabilities also affects our (1) estimate their intentions in political field, (2) formulation our own policies to meet our estimate of their capabilities and intentions and (3) our estimate their reactions our policies and actions.

Among other things I think re (1) that because of emphasis on danger in military field we have tended underestimate seriousness of threat in political. Re (2) I think we sometimes react in military way to Soviet political actions which in turn helps them achieve political objectives. Re (3) if Soviets as relatively weak militarily as I suspect, their reaction to SAMOS,/2/ attitude toward inspection, etc. would be quite different than if they are as strong as we give them credit for. (While I am convinced we should proceed with SAMOS I believe its use will require careful preparation and handling).

/2/Satellite and Missile Observation System.

It may be that we need two estimates of Soviet military capabilities, one for purely military use in determining our own defense needs, and other as basis for policy determinations, particularly in political field, in which case we could be more realistic and not allow such wide margins for security reasons.

Thompson

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