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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume V Soviet Union DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

120. Editorial Note

In telegram 1691 to Paris, September 22, 1961, the Department of State reported that in a 3-hour discussion the previous day Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Rusk had laid out their respective positions on Berlin. "Gromyko's presentation did not deviate from standard version of main Soviet themes as developed at Vienna and thereafter." Rusk stressed that the "current Berlin crisis was essentially of Soviet creation" and that changes in status quo desired by the Soviets "would move against vital interests and fundamental commitments of US." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XIV, pages 431-433.

On September 29 Chairman Khrushchev wrote President Kennedy the first in a series of letters, delivered through special emissaries and closely held, that later became known as the "Pen Pal Correspondence." Khrushchev repeated standard Soviet positions on Berlin and Germany but suggested Kennedy either send a special emissary to Moscow to discuss Berlin or authorize Ambassador Thompson to do so. For text, see ibid., volume VI, pages 25-38.

 

121. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, September 25, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Bowles and approved in U on September 28.

SUBJECT
US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov
The Under Secretary of State

I met with Ambassador Menshikov at the Soviet Chancery at 16th Street at 12:00 noon on September 25th. He has suggested lunch on several occasions, stressing that while he had no specific instructions, he would like to see me to exchange views. I left at 1:25 p.m.

Nothing of importance came out of the discussion. For the most part, Menshikov advanced the line that Khrushchev had opened up in Vienna and which is now readily available to us in Pravda and elsewhere. His purpose apparently was to induce me to spell out more specifically what we were willing to do.

I repeated what the Secretary said to Gromyko,/2/ and suggested that since Menshikov and I were unlikely to be able to negotiate a settlement, it was a waste of time for us to go over the same ground in general terms. At some stage it would be necessary for them to spell out precisely what they mean by their assertion that they would not interfere with access to Berlin. It would be up to the negotiators to find common ground if, as I hoped, common ground existed.

/2/See Document 120.

I added that in my opinion it would be a mistake for Mr. Khrushchev and President Kennedy to go into any conference unless it was well established in advance that agreement would result from it; that if they negotiated directly and the negotiations failed, the danger of war would vastly increase, since it would appear there was no other alternative.

Menshikov asserted that Attorney General Robert Kennedy's speech/3/ was provocative and threatening and that it would undoubtedly require some response from Moscow. I asked him if he had really read what the Attorney General had said. When he said he had only seen the newspaper reports, I pointed out that the Attorney General had referred to the use of nuclear weapons only in defense of Berlin and our interest there, and not in any threatening sense; it was a clear statement of an obvious fact, i.e., that if we were attacked, we would defend ourselves with whatever weapons were necessary.

/3/Presumably a reference to remarks the Attorney General had made on "Meet the Press," September 24.

I pointed out that Khrushchev on many occasions had used more provocative words, i.e. he could destroy Britain with eight or ten bombs, that he could blow up Italy with even fewer, and that the Acropolis would be one of the casualties along with the Greek people if Greece did not cooperate with the U.S.S.R.

Menshikov responded mildly, stressing that Khrushchev's remarks had been made in private conversations and not intended for publication. They were simply his way of expressing his concern over the possibility of war, etc.

I then asked Menshikov what Khrushchev had meant by his willingness to see the United Nations facilities transferred to Berlin. Menshikov stated that he had no instructions on this subject and had only heard indirectly that Khrushchev had said this.

He went on to say that the United Nations should not be in New York, that this was not good for us or others, since there were groups of Americans with violent views. From what he knew therefore the Soviet would be willing to negotiate the development of United Nations activities in Berlin. I said that we had no position on the subject but that in one way or another it might come up in discussions later.

In the last ten minutes I expressed the strong hope to Menshikov that he and his government have a better understanding of our country and its interests and objectives than I sometimes felt they had. In the course of this particular discussion I made the following points:

1. That President Kennedy, Secretary Rusk, Adlai Stevenson, Arthur Dean, Jack McCloy, myself, and others in the Administration had come into office with a strong desire to reach some kind of agreement with the Soviet Union which would allow us to work constructively to establish a peaceful and rational world;

2. That none of us could be classed as haters of the Soviet Union or in any way antagonistic to the interest of the Soviet people. And although we were disappointed and felt that we had been rebuffed, we had in no sense given up hope that some better relationship could develop in the future;

3. That if the present leadership of the United States is unable to reach reasonable agreements with the Soviet Union we will be replaced by others who will follow a far harder line.

Even though the Kremlin should somehow maneuver us into a position over Berlin that was to their immediate advantage and to our disadvantage, it would be a pyrrhic victory since it would leave America embittered, and no less militarily powerful;

4. That he must realize that while we were anxious to find ways of living and working with the Soviet Union, we were not afraid, and they should not ever assume that we lacked the will to protect our interests.

I pointed out that he personally had made remarks suggesting that we lacked that will and that this was dangerous. Anyone who had not known the British people in 1939 might have assumed their unwillingness to fight as they did in 1940 and 41 when they faced up to the entire Nazi power. I said that while the British, French, and Americans were often divided on small matters, they were united on large issues, and it was important that he understand this.

Menshikov hastened to comment on my reference to the story that he had said we would not fight. He said that the question had been asked him by someone in the Germany Embassy whose name he did not know, and it was taken entirely out of context. He seemed particularly anxious to correct what he said was a false impression.

My general impression was that Menshikov was less anxious to argue than usual and was almost mellow in his general approach. There were none of the angry replies encountered on previous occasions.

 

122. Current Intelligence Weekly Review/1/

Washington, October 5, 1961.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]; Noforn. Prepared by CIA's Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 1-3 of the Weekly Review section of the issue.

East-West Relations

Moscow's treatment of the conversations between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko and its general commentary on Berlin suggest that the Soviet leaders are confident formal negotiations will be arranged. Following the third meeting between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko on 30 September, Pravda on 2 October quoted from a US statement that the sessions were cordial, that they were related to the possibility of East-West negotiations, and that Gromyko was likely to meet with President Kennedy. Soviet press coverage of the first two discussions merely reported that the meetings had been held but gave no indication of the general atmosphere or possible results. The coverage of 2 October, therefore, conveys an impression that the talks are proceeding favorably.

Izvestia also injected a hopeful note in an article which claimed that the Soviet people did not believe that the international situation was entirely covered with the "leaden clouds of war." A speaker at a public lecture in Moscow on 26 September predicted that the Rusk-Gromyko talks would be followed by negotiations and cited the US-Soviet agreement on disarmament principles as a favorable sign. The East German party organ Neues Deutschland echoed this line in an editorial of 28 September, stating, "Everyone realizes now that there will be negotiations." Polish party First Secretary Gomulka on 30 September also asserted that "on our side nothing stands in the way of a peaceful solution of the German problem by means of fruitful negotiations and mutual agreements." The Polish news service reported that "UN circles" expect an East-West foreign ministers conference to be followed by a summit meeting.

This general line suggests that Moscow views the Rusk-Gromyko talks as the opening of a decisive phase in the Berlin crisis. A number of Soviet journalists, in their contacts with American officials, have stressed that the next several weeks will determine the future course for the bloc and have hinted that the Soviet year-end deadline for a solution could be revised if negotiations were in process or scheduled. The third secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City stated that the USSR was not disposed to sign a separate East German treaty if there were real possibilities for East-West agreement.

A Pravda correspondent claimed that the next six weeks would be most important for setting a date for a meeting at the highest level. He added that the date could be "sometime in 1962" provided the US agreed to the principle of negotiations. A TASS correspondent also emphasized negotiations and warned that if they failed to materialize, Khrushchev would have some "very interesting warnings" at the Soviet party congress.

Communist sources in London were apparently responsible for press reports that the bloc foreign ministers would convene in November to consider the next move on Germany. According to these reports, the bloc would review the results of current East-West contacts, such as the Rusk-Gromyko conversations, and decide whether to proceed with a peace treaty before the end of the year. If no East-West negotiations were arranged by November, the bloc would go ahead as announced and convoke a peace conference, but that if it was clear the West was prepared to negotiate, the Warsaw Pact ministers would recommend postponement of a peace conference until "two or three months" into 1962. Other press reports quoted "Communist diplomats" as saying that the bloc might postpone a separate treaty if the West agreed to negotiate a Berlin settlement.

These semiofficial statements have been accompanied by an official effort to appear responsive to Western views that the agenda of any formal negotiations should be broader than the Soviet proposal of a peace treaty and free-city status for West Berlin. The Soviets have begun to emphasize European security and certain limited partial disarmament measures to show willingness to enlarge the scope of East-West discussions. The Soviets have made it clear, however, that European security discussions are no substitute for a German treaty.

Disarmament

A Soviet Government memorandum submitted to the 16th UN General Assembly/2/ suggested reaching agreement on freezing military budgets, denouncing the use of nuclear weapons, banning war propaganda, concluding a nonaggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact nations, withdrawing foreign troops from the territories of other countries, taking measures against the further spread of nuclear weapons, creating atom-free zones, and taking steps to lessen the danger of surprise attack.

/2/Dated September 26. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 496-504.

All of these measures have appeared as provisions of earlier Soviet disarmament proposals, although not necessarily as "partial" disarmament measures. The increase in the number of partial disarmament measures listed may be aimed at countering neutralist dismay over the Soviet position that a test ban solution can be reached "only" through agreement on general and complete disarmament. Several of the measures--a NATO-Warsaw Treaty nonaggression pact, establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, withdrawal or at least reduction of foreign troops in Europe, and a ban on supplying nuclear weapons to other countries--are probably calculated to appeal to groups in Western Europe who favor tying European security arrangements to a German settlement.

The memorandum's call for reciprocal commitments not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is at variance with a recent statement by Khrushchev. The Soviet leader--who in past years had advocated such an agreement--told New York Times correspondent Sulzberger early in September, "It would be untimely at present to say that in the event of war, atomic weapons would not be employed." He added that if both sides were to promise not to employ nuclear weapons but retained their stockpiles and the imperialists unleashed a war, "any side" that felt it was losing would "undoubtedly use its nuclear bombs."

Berlin

Information on Khrushchev's discussions with Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio on 16 September supplements the line taken by Khrushchev in his talks with Nehru and Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak. Khrushchev stated he was willing to "accommodate" President Kennedy but that he could not infringe on East German sovereignty. He suggested that the access to West Berlin could be guaranteed in separate documents which would be attached to a peace treaty; the documents would be signed by both the German Democratic Republic and the USSR and in this way assuage East German sensibilities.

Bloc leaders continue to stress possible guarantees for future access to West Berlin. Gomulka said on 30 September that the peace treaty will allow a "solution of the West Berlin problem in a way . . . which will provide it with free communications with the world and international guarantees of the interested powers or guarantees of the UN." On the same day, Czech President Novotny asserted that if Berlin had become a question of Western prestige, "Let us agree on guarantees for West Berlin, as clearly indicated by Khrushchev."

[1 paragraph (13 lines of 2-column source text) not declassified]

The bloc's intention to sign a separate peace treaty by the end of the year continues to be muted in statements and propaganda, although it appears occasionally. Gomulka referred to the deadline in speeches during a visit to Prague; an Izvestia editorial on 29 September mentioned a treaty by the end of the year; and East Germany has continued to stress the deadline. Further information on economic planning to achieve a position to deal with any Western reprisals after conclusion of a separate treaty was contained in an intercepted East German message, which referred to the goal of being "completely free from economic disruption by 1 December 1961."

 

123. Editorial Note

On October 6, 1961, President Kennedy met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko for 2 hours at the White House. The latter stated, among other things, that if the United States would not agree to a peace treaty resolving the larger German issues, i.e., borders and nuclear weapons, the USSR would be willing to sign an agreement on Berlin alone. However, in that case the United States would have to agree to resolve the larger issues separately. The President again expressed the U.S. view that Soviet proposals to change the status quo in Berlin did so at the expense of U.S. interests. For text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XIV, pages 468-480.

 

124. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, October 13, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.613/10-1361. Official Use Only. Drafted by Mansmann on November 11.

SUBJECT
US-USSR Educational and Cultural Exchange Agreement

PARTICIPANTS

Boris Nikolaevich Krylov, Chief of the American Section of the USSR State Committee on Cultural Ties With Foreign Countries
Yuri Volsky, Cultural Counselor, Soviet Embassy

Philip H. Coombs, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs
EUR/SES--Ralph A. Jones
CU/PDS--Ernest J. Mansmann
CU/PDS--Ann Eckstein

Mr. Krylov said that he had seen Zhukov who wished him to extend his greetings to Mr. Coombs. Zhukov is concerned about receipt of the U.S. draft of the agreement, as time is now limited. He hopes that our draft will be expedited. The present agreement shows that we started to carry it out only in the second half of 1960 and that we lost at least three months in planning. Mr. Krylov said they want to carry out the new agreements from January 1, 1962.

Mr. Coombs stated that he looks forward to meeting Zhukov. We expect our draft to be ready shortly and want the Soviets to have ample time to study it. We do not want to lose momentum. Romanovsky was here and it was agreed that we are both anxious to continue and expand the number of exchanges./2/ Mr. Coombs said that our graduate students have had difficulty in obtaining access to libraries, etc., in the Soviet Union. Our most advanced graduate students are capable of studying in the best institutes in the U.S. The Soviet draft spoke of 50 students a year. Mr. Coombs stated that he was disappointed in this number and hopes to get a larger flow of students in the negotiations. This will benefit both sides. We should not skimp on the number. We also want a balance in the general categories and a balance between the natural sciences on the one hand and the humanities and social sciences on the other hand. We try to maintain such a balance in the U.S. We hope for expansion across the board and for balance. To destroy the myths about each other, we could go further in radio, TV, book and film exchanges. The experience in the performing arts under the present agreement demonstrates this and we should apply it to the other media. We must develop areas of communication immune to day to day difficulties.

/2/See Document 108.

Mr. Krylov said that they want to expand exchanges. We now have known each other for four years as far as concrete cultural exchanges go. We know what is more acceptable in each country. He stated that they are ready to speak about cooperation. They are ready and can cooperate in medicine, agriculture, and technical matters. He said that they had provided for 50 students in their draft because the U.S. had fallen below its quota for academic year 1961-62.

Mr. Coombs stated that we can get more students if we can assure them that their research experience will be as useful in the Soviet Union as their experience here. If we can take some of our brilliant young scholars into Soviet institutes and word of this gets back, we can step up the program.

Mr. Krylov said that in principle, there is no objection in the Soviet Union to letting U.S. students into institutes, but an institute in the USSR is like a research center in the U.S. He said that the institutes cannot incorporate U.S. scholars into their own plans. However, in some fields they could let them in.

Mr. Coombs stated that a Soviet student admitted to M.I.T. gets what a Soviet student does in his own university plus what he gets in a Soviet institute. Mr. Coombs wondered if this is a matter of semantics.

Mr. Krylov said that their students find that a subject is not well done in an American university and want to move to another U.S. university. He said that they have over 15,000 foreign students in the USSR who are genuinely satisfied with their programs.

Mr. Coombs said that we are not talking about undergraduates, but rather advanced graduate students from the U.S. to whom you must give the best research conditions.

Mr. Krylov said that we might discuss this; it is not a simple problem but it could be discussed.

Mr. Coombs said that we must work towards six months advance notice of names and groups. Our people cannot wait until the last minute, or we will lose good people, especially in the cultural presentations field.

Mr. Krylov said that he thought that we could work out things based on our experience with the first two agreements. He said that if the U.S. takes two and one-half months to study the Soviet draft, that does not give them two and one-half months to study the U.S. draft if we are to discuss the agreements together in November. He stated that Zhukov said that he will turn the money over for agreements with other countries if the U.S. is not interested in enlarging its contacts. Mr. Krylov said that the European students in the USSR usually stay one to two years, and are advanced students. The Asians stay longer and their background is weaker, yet they are in a hurry to get home.

Mr. Coombs said that as more new countries are opened up, we get more undergraduates in the U.S. He said that we have about 5,000 foreign students in the country under Department auspices. The total number of foreign students in U.S. colleges last year was about 53,000, of which some 10% received some government assistance. Of the 5,000, over half are fully financed by the U.S. Government; the other half received partial assistance from the U.S. Government.

Mr. Krylov stated that the bulk of foreign students in the Soviet Union are under agreements. He said that there are 15,000 foreign students in the USSR. He added that the expenses of the students at the University of Lumumba are fully covered.

Mr. Coombs said that his job is first, direct responsibility for State Department exchanges and second, coordination and policy-making for all U.S. exchanges. He pointed out that several government departments are involved in exchanges; ICA has about 5,000. HEW and AEC, etc., are concerned with specialized exchanges.

Mr. Krylov said that in the USSR, they have a simpler system--the Committee handles all the exchanges.

The meeting ended with expressions of good wishes on both sides./3/

/3/In a telephone conversation with Siscoe on October 18 Secretary Rusk initially suggested that the Soviets be given a U.S. draft exchanges agreement that could be discussed later. After Siscoe said that the Department of State was ready to do this but hesitated lest international developments change the situation, Rusk agreed to wait for the next Soviet move on Berlin in order to emphasize to Moscow that all was not business as usual. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192)

 

125. Editorial Note

In an October 16, 1961, letter to Chairman Khrushchev, President Kennedy raised the issue of Laos, questioning whether a situation as complex as Berlin could be settled peacefully if one much simpler in many ways, such as Laos, could not. "I do not say that the situation in Laos and the neighboring area must be settled before negotiations begin over Germany and Berlin; but certainly it would greatly improve the atmosphere." Kennedy noted as well that "the acceleration of attacks on South Viet-Nam, many of them from within Laotian territory, are a very grave threat to peace in that area and to the entire kind of world-wide accommodation you and I recognize to be necessary." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VI, pages 38-44.

Kennedy devoted the greater part of his October 16 letter to Berlin and Germany, largely restating U.S. views on the issue, though emphasizing his willingness to look for a pragmatic resolution with which both sides could live. He agreed to have Ambassador Thompson conduct discussions on the issue with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. In an October 20 letter to General Norstad, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe, Kennedy laid out U.S. policy on military actions in case of a conflict over Berlin. "What I want is a sequence of graduated responses to Soviet/GDR actions in denial of our rights of access." Kennedy's instructions to Norstad indicated that the United States was ready to escalate to "General Nuclear war" to defend its vital interests in Berlin and Germany. For text, see ibid., volume XIV, pages 520-523.

Following incidents on October 22 and 25 in which U.S. personnel were temporarily refused entry to East Berlin and an incident on October 27 when Soviet tanks took up positions for a day opposite U.S. tanks at Checkpoint Charlie, Secretary of State Rusk instructed Thompson to meet with Gromyko and convey Rusk's "surprise and chagrin" at the developments, which Rusk found "incomprehensible in light of our talks with him in the US." Thompson was further to say to Gromyko that he "must surely understand that serious discussions about Germany and Berlin cannot take place under conditions of duress and increased tension." For text of Rusk's instructions, transmitted in telegram 1165 to Moscow, October 28, see ibid., pages 545-547.

 

126. Editorial Note

In an October 30, 1961, letter to President Kennedy, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Seaborg reported that the Commission "as a whole" believed that "in view of the limitations of underground testing and in light of the comprehensive nature of the recent Soviet tests, national security considerations require that the United States embark upon a program of atmospheric testing at the earliest appropriate time." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VII, pages 210-214.

At a National Security Council meeting called on November 2 to discuss resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, Central Intelligence Agency analyses of recent Soviet tests were presented, indicating that there had been 37 or perhaps 39 tests at 3 sites, the largest detonation possibly exceeding 60 megatons. The tests had impressed the intelligence community with their broad nature. In subsequent discussion, Seaborg stated "that if the US tested only underground while the Soviets tested in the atmosphere, we would be in no position to compete with them." The President indicated his intention to release a statement to the effect that "no decision has yet been made on testing [in the atmosphere], but that authorization has been given to undertake preparation for testing." For text of the memorandum of the meeting, see ibid., pages 217-222. For text of the President's statement released to the press later the same day, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 692-693.

 

127. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts/1/

Washington, November 8, 1961, 6:17 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.001/11-861. Confidential. Drafted by Anderson (SOV) on November 7; cleared by Bohlen, RSB, and CA; and approved by Guthrie. Repeated to Budapest, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw.

CA-414. The following assessment of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU/2/ was initially prepared for the presentation to the NATO Council of the United States views on this event. At your discretion, you are authorized to draw on it in discussions with appropriate local officials.

/2/October 17-31.

Only time and specific developments will reveal the true significance of this Congress. The following brief analysis is, therefore, only tentative.

1. The general course of the Congress indicated careful advance preparation; Khrushchev's dominance in Soviet leadership was readily apparent in the re-endorsement of the basic lines of the 20th Party Congress and in the choice of the focal points for the 22nd Congress. The dominant aspects of the Congress (campaigns against the Stalin era; the anti-party group, Albania and indirectly Communist China; strong reaffirmation of the 20th Congress line; and the lack of emphasis on new Party Program) reflect Khrushchev's decision to reassert strongly Moscow's primacy in the bloc and the world communist movement.

2. In foreign policy, reaffirmation was given to (a) avoidance of actions entailing a serious risk of nuclear war; (b) endeavors to seek through negotiations with the West agreements favorable to Soviet objectives; (c) assertive Soviet efforts in the underdeveloped areas, and (d) a vigorous "struggle" under "peaceful coexistence" in East-West relations.

3. The moves against Stalinist methods, anti-party group and Albanian leadership were undoubtedly related and have the effect of clarifying Khrushchev's personal leadership status. The move to correct the Albanian problem was intended as a thinly veiled challenge to the Chinese Communists within the context of a "domestic" CPSU Congress and Soviet East European considerations (Albania).

4. The open attacks on Stalin and the specific revelations of the brutal acts attributed to his regime have evoked public discussion within the Soviet Union and are likely to result in considerable disorientation and confusion of the Soviet people unless the effects are carefully channeled. These, combined with public discussion in recent years of incompetence and deceptive acts of minor officials, could undermine faith in the Party leadership.

5. The form and method of the Chinese Communist response are still not indicated. One timing factor supporting Khrushchev's move may have been Communist China's basic internal economic weaknesses at this time. The 22nd Congress' developments confirmed earlier indications that the 81 Party Statement of 1960/3/ was a "papering over" effort required by the failure to achieve a real reconciliation of views.

/3/See footnote 1, Document 16.

6. The Party Program was obscured by other events at the Congress. Quite aside from Khrushchev's desire to focus attention on other matters, this treatment appears consistent with the fact that the Program was not an inspiring document.

7. It is too early to assess the ultimate effects of the changes in the top Party organs, but Khrushchev's pre-eminence has not suffered. While it is clear there is opposition to individual Khrushchev policies, there is no evidence of any organized opposition to Khrushchev's leadership as such. An action against the anti-party group will, however, serve as a warning to those who might be tempted to go too far in opposing the specific policies of Khrushchev.

8. The reasons for "lifting" the apparent deadline for a separate German treaty were not clear./4/ One factor undoubtedly was the apprehension that the USSR and the West were on a collision course. Another factor may well have been the normal evolving of a pre-negotiation position. In any event, the build-up of NATO forces and the firmness of the West on basic principles clearly played an important role. The fact of the existence of discussions with Gromyko afforded Khrushchev the opportunity to lift the deadline without an apparent loss of face.

/4/Khrushchev told the Congress that if the West showed readiness to settle the "German problem," then "we shall not insist on the peace treaty being signed necessarily before 31 December 1961." (Current Weekly Intelligence Review, October 20; Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A) Khrushchev wrote Kennedy in a November 9 letter that "in order to create the best possible conditions for the achievement of an agreed settlement the Soviet Government has decided not to insist that the peace treaty be signed by the end of this year." In the same letter Khrushchev proposed, since the West had taken issue with his earlier proposal to station a token force of Soviet troops in West Berlin when it became a "free city," that no Four Power forces be stationed there but instead a UN force be introduced to guarantee the status of the city. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VI, pp. 45-57.

9. Clearly, Soviet objectives and their determination to achieve those objectives remain undiluted; however, the implications for Western policy as regards intra-bloc and Sino-Soviet ramifications are not fully evident. It is, however, evident that the West must anticipate a continuous application of pressure on sensitive issues and, particularly, must prepare for an increased communist drive in the underdeveloped areas. As regards the Berlin and German problem, there is even a greater need for unity, preparedness and firmness of purpose.

Rusk

 

128. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, November 15, 1961, noon.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-KE/11-1561. Secret; Priority.

1528. Eyes only Secretary. Reference: Deptel 1265./2/ Suggest important have agreement Adzhubei either publish entire interview or agreed version.

/2/Telegram 1265, November 13, reported that the President had agreed to be interviewed by Adzhubei and asked Thompson for his views on subjects that would be useful to raise during the interview. (Ibid., 711.11-KE/11-1361) For further background on the origin of the interview, see Salinger, With Kennedy, pp. 199-200.

Believe Soviet public would expect discussion of Berlin problem although this will obviously be delicate to handle.

Believe our support of exchange program should be mentioned and particularly our desire have more Soviet visitors to US.

Our interest in disarmament should be emphasized and see no reason why President should not express our disappointment at Soviet failure agree to test ban and its action in filling atmosphere with radioactive debris.

While debates with Soviets on ideological grounds are generally not productive believe it would be useful emphasize difficulty which Communist ideology places in way of development of friendship and peaceful coexistence between our countries. President might refer to 81 party delegation [declaration?] which stated US imperialism had become enemy of peoples of world. Could also refer to Khrushchev's definition of peaceful coexistence with US as "intense economic, political, and ideological struggle" and point out that this could also serve as definition of cold war and hardly basis for real friendship. US believes every country should have system which suits it best and does not pretend that one particular system is bound to prevail throughout world. Communist belief to contrary is source of much friction between us. Believe would be useful for President to state US welcomes increased prosperity of Soviet people and wishes them success in future.

If occasion arises might be useful hit some of most common Soviet misconceptions about US. Soviet people for example unaware magnitude unemployment compensation, role of US regulatory agencies, etc. In referring to peaceful competition between states President could stress role of competition in US and describe our anti-monopoly legislation. Might be useful mention minimum wage and average income, widespread ownership of large corporations, high tax on large incomes, and general evolution capitalist system in US.

Thompson

 

129. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Bohlen) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, November 15, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, USSR, Adzhubei Interview. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

Just in case you couldn't lay your hand on Tommy's suggestions in regard to the Adzhubei interview, I am enclosing another copy./2/ I think Tommy's suggestions are very good, and should be carefully considered. However, while I agree that ideological themes are nonproductive, there is a terrible temptation to have the President go into some of them. But, I imagine that for a President to get into that swamp would probably not be wise.

/2/Printed as Document 128.

However, I do agree with Tommy's paragraph on the subject, and I think the President should hit the history of the Soviet Union and the fact that ever since its existence in 1917, it has never had normal relations with any country; the reason being, as Tommy points out, their adherence to a system which they claim is bound to prevail throughout the world. In this connection, I think he might dwell somewhat on the theme of "peaceful coexistence," pointing out that its constant repetition by Soviet leaders is curious, since heretofore there had been many different systems of social organization in various countries without the problem of existing side-by-side ever having been raised.

1. Other aspects which the President might treat are those of Stalin's actions in foreign affairs which, at this stage, might be capable of discussion. One of these might be the Korean war and, as an offshoot thereof, the Soviet Government's sponsorship on a world-wide basis of the charge that we had used bacteriological warfare in Korea. This has since been dropped completely by Stalin's successors, but it might be worth bringing up as an example of why our relations have been troubled.

2. We should try and think of some news or information which is banned to the Soviet people and this brings us directly to the question of nuclear testing. As you know, while the Soviet intention to test was published in the Soviet press, there was no report on individual explosions and nothing has appeared in the Soviet Union in regard to the fifty megaton one. The President might take the theme that facts are facts, regardless of opinion or ideological coloration, and that to censor everything that goes into a country is hardly a defensible exercise in the modern world.

3. In relation to 2., the President might emphasize the role of secrecy in Soviet international dealings and its destructive effect on the development of any state of confidence with the Soviet Union, quite apart from its obvious denial of elementary freedom.

4. The President might refer to the history of our military posture since the end of the war, dwelling on the complete demobilization of the mightiest force which had ever been assembled until just prior to the Korean war; our military budget was some fourteen billion dollars (I think this is right, but I am not sure) and pointing out as a reply to customary Soviet assertions on United States militarism, that facts and their sequence would demonstrate that our present budget resulted entirely from Soviet actions.

5. The President might dwell on our view of the role and potential usefulness of the United Nations, with special reference to the troika principle, pointing out that this principle was in itself contrary to the purposes of the Charter. He could indulge in a little philosophy here by pointing out that if there is a general denial of objective individuals who could serve as international civil servants, this would reduce the world to a jungle of competing systems, and that what seemed to be at fault here was the absence in Soviet doctrine of any objective morality. Even the most elementary of games requires some rules if they are to be played by people.

The President might, as a closer, state that when the Soviet Union came to realize that Bolshevism was not the system designed for every country and has only been installed by force or conquest, and that as the leaders began to act as the head of a national state, there would then be the first beginnings of a possibility of a reasonable and normal relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. He might point out, in this connection, that it is not specific United States interests which are being served by our world-wide involvement, but that we are, in effect, a third force, helping weaker countries to resist the efforts of a great power to install its system against the will of the recipients. The President might note, in this connection, that there has never been a case in history where the people of a country have voted in the communist system in any free vote or choice.

I enclose a list of points which were drawn up by the research boys here, which you may find useful./3/ I also enclose a copy of Raymond Aron's reply to a questionnaire from the Tass agency which Arthur Schlesinger sent over to me, which you will at least find amusing, and possibly useful for this exercise.

/3/Not found.

I imagine we will be getting together on Monday and Tuesday at some time to go over these various points.

CEB

[Continue with Documents 130-139]

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