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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume V Soviet Union DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

190. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, May 7, 1962, 5:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on May 8.

SUBJECT
Memorandum of Meeting with The President, 5:30--Monday--May 7, 1962

The meeting consumed an hour and 15 minutes, attended by the President, McCone and General Maxwell Taylor, the latter being present at McCone's request.

[Here follows unrelated material.]

5. McCone reported on the fact that further study of most recent Corona mission which was basis of briefing of Macmillan, the President, and McNamara on April 28th,/2/ had disclosed that additional Soviet ICBMs which now total 81 in being or under construction and MRBMs which now total 440 located sites in being or under construction. We are not raising our mid-62 estimate but the President was told that the matter was under review and that we will probably raise our mid-63 estimate of Soviet capabilities. McCone furthermore reported that after one more Corona shot scheduled for May, the National Board would review all available data./3/ Furthermore, 10 additional Corona shots are scheduled for the summer and upon conclusion of this series, the National Board would make another review and possibly a new estimate which would be ready in October or November. McCone reported that most recent Corona failed because the parachute did not open and the most recent Samos was lost. The President was further advised that Discoverer units were being purchased in sufficient number to carry on the program through '62 and into '63, if trouble developed with Samos.

/2/McCone summarized the April 28 briefing in a memorandum of discussion, April 30. McCone noted that, following the briefing, "the President asked whether our recent photography caused a change in our estimates. McNamara answered no, that our '62 and '63 estimates remain. I however took a different position. I stated there were now 76 ICBM launching pads located and there were probably some which we had not located. Some were completed, the majority apparently under construction. I pointed out our mid-62 estimate was 35 to 50 ICBMs on pads and ready to go. I now felt we have to accept the higher figure as the minimum." (Ibid.)

/3/On July 6 the intelligence community issued NIE 11-8-62, "Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, pages 332-342.

McCone reviewed the attached memorandum/4/ on the number of operational U.S. ICBMs and Polaris missiles, stating that the figures were approximate but representative of the order of magnitude of our own situation. He advised the President that on the basis of these figures and known Soviet effort, there would not be a "missile gap" in the future. However, there is a wide disparity between the Soviet MRBM capability and that of the West. The question of the '58, '59, '60 estimates which created the illusion of the missile gap was raised with the President. General Taylor defended the estimates for those years on the basis of conclusions drawn from all intelligence which was then available to the Intelligence Community and to the military.

/4/Not printed.

[Here follows unrelated material.]

John A. McCone/5/
Director

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

191. Editorial Note

On May 10, 1962, Ambassador to Laos Winthrop Brown informed the Department of State in telegram 1534 from Vientiane that the military situation in Laos continued to deteriorate. The seizure of the provincial capital city of Nam Tha and its subsequent rapid exploitation by Pathet Lao/Viet Minh forces "has transformed what just prior to May 5 had begun to be a somewhat encouraging situation, into a dangerous and ugly one. The collapse of the FAR [Royal Armed Forces] on their retreat from Nam Tha has left the whole of northwest Laos open to PL/Vietminh seizure at their option." Brown added that the refusal by the Soviets thus far to help rectify the situation was entirely consistent with the theory "that the Soviet desire for a peaceful settlement here has, to say the least, substantially diminished." Brown argued that he did not see "how we can let this breach of cease-fire agreement and personal undertakings go without some form of positive reaction if the Russians remain indifferent to our protests." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXIV, pages 735-739.

 

192. Editorial Note

An internal Department of State memorandum on Communist aims in Southeast Asia, May 11, 1962, prepared by the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Task Force, Chalmers Wood, expressed the opinion that "the Russians think Communism can make gains without local wars. They will back wars of 'National Liberation' provided the risks are controllable." The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, "think local wars are the best way to spread Communism and will accept higher risks." The memorandum argued against holding an international conference with the Soviets and Chinese on Vietnam, asserting that U.S. participation in such a conference would be seen as an "act of weakness." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume II, pages 387-389.

Another internal Department of State memorandum, prepared about the same time by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, discussed the international implications of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal to establish a military "command structure for US forces being moved to Thailand and the Southeast Asian area in connection with the situation in Laos." The memorandum contended that Moscow understood and gave credence to U.S. claims that its military buildup in Southeast Asia was for a limited purpose only, but that Peiping and Hanoi were "more directly concerned than Moscow, and we think they are more apt to view our assertions with a jaundiced eye." For text, see ibid., pages 390-393.

 

193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, May 12, 1962, 3:49 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 101/5-1262. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Bundy. According to Salinger, when he, Sorensen, and Akalovsky arrived at Sheremetyevo Airport late in the afternoon on May 11, they were met by Ambassador Thompson who told Salinger that he was going to spend the next day with Khrushchev. (Salinger, With Kennedy, p. 222) Since he had not been expecting to talk with Khrushchev, Salinger, after a quick briefing at the Embassy, cabled the President for instructions. No copy of this telegram has been found. The source text is the White House response.

2571. To Ambassador for Salinger from Bundy. The President wants to be sure that no impression is given that you have come to Moscow to talk substantive matters with Khrushchev. Therefore, in any public discussion of your meetings with him you should take the following line: first, the meetings were informal and took place entirely at the Chairman's initiative; second, your own discussion of substantive matters was confined entirely to the field of wider exchanges of information, such as the proposed TV exchange; and third, the rest of the conversation on your side was entirely informal and personal.

If the conversation was limited in the same way on Khrushchev's side, you should emphasize that fact. But if Khrushchev has used the occasion for a serious presentation of his substantive views, and if you believe that this fact will become known in Moscow, you should make it plain that while the Chairman expressed certain substantive views to you, you confined yourself to listening, because you had no authority from the President to engage in any policy discussions./2/

/2/Source text not signed.

 

194. Editorial Note

On May 12, 1962, Walt Rostow, Chairman of the Department of State's Policy Planning Council, recommended in a memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk that the United States "inform Moscow that we are counting on continued Soviet support for the Laos solution agreed between us at the highest level; i.e., a neutral, independent Laos. We have moved the politics of the RLG in this direction and are prepared to move them further. But the role of North Vietnam in Laos, in the context of the Nam Tha engagement, is unacceptable to us, as is the North Vietnam role in South Vietnam." Rostow wrote further that "Soviet behavior suggests that they have agreed to let Hanoi and Peiping experiment with extended aggression in Laos; but there is no indication that they [the Soviets] are prepared to let their prestige become involved or their freedom of action be determined by others in a U.S.-Hanoi or U.S.-Peiping military engagement." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume II, pages 393-395.

In a second memorandum to Rusk, May 31, Rostow urged that, in addition to issuing firm statements of policy and making public the "crucial role of North Vietnamese forces in Laos, as well as in South Viet-Nam," the United States "propose to inflict selective damage on North Viet-Nam for its aggression beyond its borders until that aggression ceases. I do not have in mind here massive bombing of Hanoi. I do have in mind highly selective attack on transport and power facilities, by precision methods, which are now within our capability, plus some mining of Haiphong harbor." Rostow acknowledged that there were risks involved but contended that "the internal situation in both North Viet-Nam and Communist China, plus the relatively favorable balance of nuclear strength between the US and the Soviet Union, and the Sino-Soviet split, make this as good a time to face this risk as any we are likely to confront in this decade." For text, see ibid., pages 432-433.

 

195. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, May 13, 1962, 1 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-1362. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. For another account of Salinger's meetings with Khrushchev on May 12 and 13, see With Kennedy, pp. 223-237. Transcripts of the private conversation are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Trips and Conferences Series, Salinger Trip to the USSR, and Department of State, Central Files, 101/5-1562, as transmitted in telegram 2965 from Moscow, May 15. A copy of Sorensen's account of the visit is in the Kennedy Library, Salinger Papers, Box 154.

2935. Eyes only President. Following is more complete account of meeting with Khrushchev./2/ Sorensen, Akalovsky and I spent night at Dacha Ogorevo some 20 miles outside Moscow. Also there were Adzhubei, Kharlamov, Zamyatin,/3/ and Mr and Mrs Victor Sukhodrev. In morning we were joined by Mrs Adzhubei and two smallest children and Mr and Mrs Yuri Zhukov and Mrs Zamyatin. K appeared about 11:30 and we immediately went for motor boat ride on Moscow River. This and subsequent 5-mile hike through woods was limited to pleasantries and explanations of Soviet horticulture. We sat down to lunch about 2 pm. K immediately brought up subject of Adenauer's statements on Berlin. [Here follow the remainder of this paragraph and 6 more paragraphs on Berlin.]

/2/Salinger had transmitted the highlights of his conversations with Khrushchev on May 12 in telegram 2934 from Moscow, May 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-1262)

/3/Leonid M. Zamyatin, Deputy Chief of the American Countries Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Following lunch K indicated he wanted have private conversation with me and he brought in Sukhodrev. He said he wanted take opportunity my presence to make historical review of relations Soviet Govt with this administration. First he wanted tell me he had never been impressed by Nixon whom he considered intellectually shallow. He said prior to election Lodge, with whom he had had very friendly relations and with whom he had enjoyed traveling around US, had made overtures through certain Soviet contacts of his to have K release RB-47 pilots. He said he was cognizant that to have done that would have won election for Nixon. He had determined in his mind that Kennedy would make better President and he said also determined that if Kennedy was elected he would immediately release RB-47 pilots in order improve relations with new administration. He went on to say he had enjoyed meeting President at Vienna whom he had found most vigorous and forceful advocate of his country, very able man who was trying to see new ways through old problems. He said in year since Vienna there had been great improvement in American public opinion and he had also noticed improvement West German public opinion. He was particularly grateful President had received his daughter Rada and his son-in-law Adzhubei. He said no other recent President would have made such generous gesture toward Soviet Union. He then went on to say Berlin problem was central issue that divided US and USSR and solution this problem would bring about solution all other problems that involved two countries. He said he was not sure US was sincere on subject of disarmament and nuclear test ban. Soviet Union really wanted achieve disarmament. I interrupted him to say I knew US would not have gone forward and tested had it been able arrange agreement on test ban with Soviet Union and further that President had stated only several months ago at press conference that he considered failure achieve test ban agreement as greatest failure his first year in office./4/ K said he was sorry hear that because if that was President's position we would never arrive at agreement because SU would never tolerate inspection posts on its territory. Inspection had to be done by nations without use of permanent inspection posts.

/4/For a transcript of the President's press conference on January 15, 1962, at which this statement was made, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 15-23.

In a discussion about lines of communication K expressed highest confidence in Dobrynin and said any information passed to Dobrynin for him would get to him directly. K also expressed great confidence in Amb Thompson with whom he said he had had best possible relations.

We briefly discussed proposed Khrushchev-Kennedy TV exchanges. K said he was for them but said he did not think they could go forward now. He said under present situation he would have to take hard line and he preferred wait until such time that both his and President's TV speeches could be constructive. He closed discussion by suggesting we have luncheon again tomorrow and invite Amb Thompson but on arriving back at house he was talked out of this idea by Adzhubei. I told K that because there was no other American present during our discussions it would be helpful to me to have transcription of conversation Sukhodrev had prepared from his notes and K ordered Sukhodrev to give me transcript as quickly as possible. Sukhodrev promised to give me transcript in Russian tomorrow morning.

Thompson

 

196. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, May 18, 1962, noon.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 101/5-1862. Secret; Limit Distribution.

3000. From Embassy point of view Salinger visit was useful, particularly in development contacts with top personalities Soviet information media. Although no immediate results in facilitating communications, believe Soviets somewhat softened up for future progress. It was quite clear that Soviet policy remains on dead center and that Salinger's contacts not free at this time to make any significant new moves. Adzhubei several times referred to current tense situation in our relations.

Thompson

 

197. Editorial Note

On May 19, 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara, expressed their views on seven issues relating to the draft treaty outline on disarmament. The Joint Chiefs were "convinced that disarmament without full verification of retained armament would jeopardize our national security." They pointed out that "since late 1961 there has been continuing pressure to negotiate the reduction of US nuclear capabilities in isolation of other proposed disarmament measures. Success in this effort would seriously reduce the major military advantage we now enjoy and drastically alter our military posture. Further there is a danger of US positions being weakened by proposals which have been submitted in attempts to make them more 'negotiable' by approaching the Soviet positions." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VII, pages 456-457.

 

198. Editorial Note

In a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington on May 30, 1962, Secretary of State Rusk argued that the two sides were unlikely to agree soon on the principles of a lasting agreement on Berlin. To avoid confrontation, they should agree to disagree and focus on learning to live with that fact as they continued to work for a permanent settlement. For text of the portion of the memorandum of conversation dealing with Germany and Berlin, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XV, pages 161-172.

At the same meeting the Secretary told Dobrynin that "organically, there was no connection between Berlin and disarmament negotiations, but in the broadest political sense it was inevitable that these matters should influence each other. A crisis over Berlin would obviously have the gravest implications for disarmament." Dobrynin responded that he "could agree that there was no direct connection between disarmament and the Berlin problem, but that they were related." For text of this portion of the memorandum of conversation, see ibid., volume VII, pages 459-460.

For Dobrynin's brief account of his meetings with Rusk on Berlin and Germany during this period, see his memoir, In Confidence, page 63.

 

199. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, May 31, 1962, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/5-3162. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

3102. At Kremlin reception for Keita last night just as my wife and I were preparing to leave Furtseva/2/ asked why we did not invite Khrushchev to attend Goodman concert. I explained I had not done so as this would result in considerable publicity which I had assumed he would wish to avoid in this connection. She urged nevertheless that it would do no harm to ask him, which I did, explaining reason for not having done so earlier for which he expressed understanding and appreciation. He said he would come if Kremlin reception ended early enough. He turned up accompanied by his wife, Kozlov, Mikoyan and Kosygin and stayed for first half of concert. There being no private box at this theatre, row of seats on raised sector had been hastily cleared for Khrushchev party and he invited my wife and myself to join them there. Audience showed great interest in Khrushchev's reaction and he in theirs. Kozlov remarked on obvious audience recognition of various numbers and spontaneous applause as they were begun, somewhat in pride at its sophistication. With exception of Kosygin's wife, however, Presidium members had no understanding of jazz and K told me afterwards that he did not dance and did not understand jazz but admired skill of musicians. Change in attitude toward jazz during 5 years I have been here is remarkable and K's presence last night will doubtless be great boon to jazz lovers here.

/2/Yekaterina F. Furtseva, Soviet Minister of Culture.

Significance of event is that despite their own lack of understanding and even dislike of jazz music, Soviet leadership has yielded to popular pressure, particularly of Soviet youth. This is probably most striking evidence that public opinion is beginning to play some role in Soviet affairs.

Adzhubei, who was in K's party and attended my reception afterward, said he hoped President Kennedy would attend Bolshoi Ballet performance and that K's presence was gesture toward President.

Thompson

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