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1961-1963 Volume V Soviet Union |
20. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, February 1, 1961, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-161. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also printed in Declassified Documents, 1977, 73F.
1813. As new administration will apparently have to move rapidly in determining our basic policy toward Soviet Union, I have attempted select, with no pretense at originality, number of considerations which seem to me worthy of emphasis this connection. Principal question I suppose is whether we should attempt to reach accommodation with Soviet Union and resolve principal issues by negotiation in serious manner; meaning being prepared take risks in order reach agreements. While I gather from President's and other statements that decision in affirmative has already been made, I think we should be under no illusions as to what can be accomplished within reasonable period time. I am on balance strongly in favor of making effort although there are substantial arguments against it. In brief, any other course would in my opinion cause further disunity in West, would greatly diminish our chances of influencing or winning newly-emerging and neutral countries, and would probably eventually end in war.
Soviet people ardently desire peace and friendship with US, in which they see best hope of peace and better life for themselves. Soviet Union is, however, in control of small group Communist leaders and likely remain so for long period time. It is on this leadership that I feel most qualified to speak as I have probably had more contact with these men than any non-Communist, but it is also here that I find most difficulty in reaching my own conclusions. Khrushchev is dominant personality but quite possible he could disappear from scene within next few years from natural or other causes, state health and methods operation. Fact which I believe we must constantly remind ourselves is that these men believing Communists. While true they are men who have ruthlessly fought way to power, they have almost religious faith in their beliefs and this motivates them to larger extent than generally believed. It is, of course, true that no Communist regime will consider itself entirely safe as long as there are powerful democratic, capitalist countries existing in world. It also true, however, that these men are nationalists and there is constant inner struggle between nationalism and their belief in Communism. This is part of their continuing difficulty with Chinese Communists. Their experience with Chinese Communists has made them realize, I suspect, that even all-Communist world would leave them beset with enormous problems, but I repeat they believers and will go on working toward goal of world Communism for long time to come. To fail do so would be to deny faith which justifies their position of leadership, but degree of effort and methods used are factors which our own policies can influence. Khrushchev probably most pragmatic and least dogmatic of all, but he basically as devout believer as any. He is reported once to have said something to effect that if Communism did not demonstrate its superiority and prevail throughout world, his life would have lost its meaning. Difficulty in appraising such men well expressed by Yugoslav Dedijer in article in London Times when he said "in every Communist leader there are different psychological layers which contradict each other: Original revolutionary idealism, bureaucratic attitudes developed over long Stalin phase Communist development, and finally pragmatism derived from today's realities. These elements intermingled, and often reactions to particular points depend on which layer has been reached." When Khrushchev speaks as chief of state of his desire for peaceful solutions, he quite sincere and therefore effective. (He is liked and admired by nearly all my diplomatic colleagues.) At same time he has in his speech of January 6 frankly and bluntly expressed his Communist beliefs and policies. Most discouraging aspect of East-West negotiations is that we both look at same set facts and see different things and this complicates arriving at solutions. From their visits to US, Khrushchev and some other leaders know that US is not ogre that their propaganda paints, and Khrushchev has frequently said to me that he realized it would take long time for US to come to Communism. Leadership convinced, however, that there are circles (military, Wall Street, monopolists) which are terrified by Communism as economic and social system and are disputing with forces for good in US. As they look around world they can find plenty of evidence which they can use to justify to themselves their belief in class struggle. They pose everything in these terms and do not accept that our support of rightist or reactionary governments motivated by our fear their attempt obtain world domination for power reasons, and instead see it in terms of exploiters banding together to maintain exploited in subservience.
Most hopeful aspect is that evolution which has taken place in Soviet Union is proceeding rapidly. With abolition mass terror an element of democracy has entered both party and country as whole. Soviet people have little interest in international goals Communism, and tend be pro-American.
Their view of US and rest free world distorted through years of isolation and intense propaganda, and they in general have come to accept Soviet system, although they would like change and improve it. Nevertheless they exert constant pressure toward accommodation with us. Year ago in my despatch 412/2/ I attempted describe some current strains within Soviet system and I would today make little change in views there expressed although others would be added. I see enormous problems ahead for Soviet leadership, but not such as should lead us to expect any breakdown in system.
/2/Dated January 29, 1960. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/1-2960)
I am convinced that key to Khrushchev's policy, which I believe supported by bulk leadership, is that he believes if he can gain period of reduction tension and hopefully some diversion resources from armaments to productive purposes and possibly even aid in form credits and technology from West, he can lead Soviet Union into era Communism and, by way of example, set most of rest of world on path toward this goal. I am impressed by constant emphasis which all Soviet leaders with whom I talk put on desirability trade (and I am sure they have in mind credits and technological aid) with US. Whether or not Khrushchev actually said to Nehru that if he could have five years peaceful coexistence he could blow us over, remark is as Italians say "bentrovato."
Declaration Communist parties in Moscow, Khrushchev's January 6 speech and Suslov's report to CC were surprisingly frank in showing that apart from concern over possibility of war, Communists look upon their approach to West as temporary expedient. Given situation in which Soviet party found itself in relation to Eisenhower administration at time Moscow meeting of CP's it had little alternative to compromise with Chinese Communist position since it could not at that time demonstrate that there was any real possibility accommodation with West. Extent to which Soviet party will be prepared modify program outlined, should détente with West become fact, is something which only time can demonstrate.
I am sure we would err if we should treat Communist threat at this time as being primarily of military nature. I believe Soviet leadership has long ago correctly appraised meaning atomic military power. They recognized major war no longer acceptable means achieving their objective. We shall, of course, have to keep our powder dry and have plenty of it, for obvious reasons.
Although non-military, Communist threat nonetheless lethal as it stands today, and we shall be obliged devise better methods meet it or we will surely lose. Communists look at everything in terms of victory and defeat and probably realize that if Communist movement loses its dynamism it would risk breaking up. Unfortunately Chinese Communists have considerably rejuvenated revolutionary posture of Soviet party. Moreover, disunity of West and our failure meet challenge presented by newly emerging countries as well as our failure deal adequately with problems of Latin America, have presented tempting prospects even to more mellowed Soviet Communists. On the other hand, even Soviet Communists have strong strain of nationalism and if he can offer hope of period tranquillity I would not exclude eventual complete break between Soviet and Chinese Communists. Great question is whether strains within Communist bloc and more importantly evolution of Soviet system will develop quickly enough to counterbalance added economic power which successful completion their 7-year plan will give them. Soviets are estimating they will over-fulfill plan by equivalent of $100 billion. While doubtless exaggeration and while much of any excess will have to be diverted to dealing with problem agriculture and to satisfy growing demands their people, even one-fourth this amount if used, for example, for foreign aid programs, subversion, propaganda, etc., evoke awesome possibilities.
This will be followed by separate telegrams on some specific foreign policy questions.
Thompson
21. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 3, 1961, 4:30-5:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-361. Confidential. Drafted by McSweeney and approved in S on February 12. A copy of Kohler's briefing memorandum to Rusk, February 3, is ibid., 601.6111/2-361.
SUBJECT
Discussion of U.S.-Soviet RelationsPARTICIPANTS
Mikhail A. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador
Mr. Levchenko, Second Secretary, Soviet EmbassyThe Secretary
Mr. McSweeney, Director, SOVThe Ambassador opened the conversation by extending congratulations to the Secretary and expressing the hope that with the installation of the new Administration the American Government and people could now find the means of improving relations between the two countries--the first steps taken by the new Administration give the Soviets and all other peoples hope that there can be concerted action between the two countries.
The Secretary said he looked forward to working with Mr. Menshikov toward improvement of relations, a matter of enormous mutual interest. He suggested it would be valuable to find means of progress on lesser but tangible questions thus providing a proper framework for consideration of more difficult questions. For example, there are the questions of an air transport agreement, establishment of consulates at Leningrad and New York, and expansion of the exchange program. While these are not the most important questions they can build a basis for mutual understanding and also assist in developing public understanding. The Secretary said he wanted to comment on the timing of the nuclear test ban negotiations--the date suggested by the United States does not constitute delay but rather the minimum time for a new Administration to review and prepare. He asked if the Ambassador had any knowledge of the Soviet Government's reaction to the suggested date of March 21.
The Ambassador said he had no word, noting that the United States approach had been made by Ambassador Thompson. He said he would remind his Government that a reply is expected.
The Secretary noted that Ambassador Thompson is returning from Moscow on consultation, and suggested that he might bring the Soviet Government's answer with him. The Secretary said Ambassador Thompson is not returning with a collection of problems acquired in Moscow but rather to consult with the new Administration in order to go back better prepared for discussion on a whole range of questions. The Secretary expressed his and the President's utmost confidence in Ambassador Thompson.
Ambassador Menshikov said that the Secretary had not mentioned in his early remarks normalization of trade, which was one thing that the Ambassador thought would help greatly, not so much from the economic standpoint as from the standpoint of creation of a better climate. The Secretary said that the items he mentioned, i.e., air transport and consequent increased travel, would be a part of normalization of trade and referred to the fact that there are many more American tourists in the Soviet Union than Soviet tourists in the United States. Ambassador Menshikov said the Soviets buy more U.S. goods. He said that it is not Soviet policy to earn dollars--rather they are glad to spend these dollars in the United States. Soviet tourism in the U.S., he said, is increasing and there have been 1,000 this year. The Secretary mentioned the admiration of a colleague of his of the roadside tourist camps he encountered on a drive from Leningrad to the Crimea. The Ambassador said that the President of Intourist had recently said that Soviet capacity to handle tourists would be increased by 1965 by 200,000 per year. He then reverted to the question of trade normalization and problems created by U.S. restrictions. He noted that the U.S. was the only big country with which the USSR does not have a trade agreement with most favored nation provisions. Most favored nation treatment, he said, is a sign of normalcy. The Secretary mentioned that a major element restricting trade can be the patent and copyright situation in countries with different policies. The Ambassador said that commercial contracts can take care of this situation, noting his own trade experience for many years with the Soviet Government. He said that the present trade level of 40-50 million dollars between the U.S. and the USSR is only about a tenth of what it was in 1930. He said the Soviet Government does not wish to purchase military or strategic items--indeed, he said, they could offer such items to the U.S.
Ambassador Menshikov then inquired whether the Secretary had any ideas or proposals regarding the possibility of discussion of some of the things that he had discussed earlier with the Secretary and Ambassador Bruce./2/ He disclaimed that he was in any way attempting to push the administration but only wondered when, how, and where discussion of particular items could take place. He mentioned as subjects of this sort disarmament, a peaceful German settlement including West Berlin, and improvement of relations between the two countries.
/2/See Document 2; the conversation with Rusk has not been further identified.
The Secretary said that with regard to the last general question it is useful to find specific points on which progress can be made--big questions are made up of many little questions. Normal diplomatic means should be used to find points capable of resolution. He said that we feel disarmament to be of the utmost importance, mentioning that Mr. McCloy, who has been charged with this responsibility, is undertaking intensive work in close collaboration with the Secretary. Our priority attention first goes to the question of nuclear testing where we must have a little time for review. He suggested it might be useful at an appropriate time for Ambassador Menshikov and Mr. McCloy to discuss these matters. The disarmament question as a whole is more comprehensive and complex and probably would require a little more time than review of the testing question. He noted that it is difficult to insulate or isolate disarmament from the general situation regarding our relations. The Ambassador said that a disarmament settlement would settle most other things as well.
Ambassador Menshikov noted that the U.S. aide-memoire/3/ included the two points of an air transport agreement and consulates. The Secretary had also mentioned widening the scope of the exchanges. He, the Ambassador, had added the subject of trade which he considers important. Finally, the President had mentioned cooperation in the scientific field./4/ The Ambassador asked if the Secretary had any idea how and when these questions might be discussed. The Secretary said he hoped to be able to work out something after Ambassador Thompson arrives. After discussion with him the U.S. might be in a position to make some suggestions.
/3/See Document 12.
/3/For text of the State of the Union address, January 30, during which the President made this suggestion, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 19-28.
The Secretary then asked Ambassador Menshikov, unofficially, if he thought there was any point of raising the question of lessening travel restrictions, which are now anomalous. Ambassador Menshikov said he personally favored such relaxation and said that on several occasions in the past his Government had tried to approach this matter but each time something happened in the field of foreign relations which prevented development. He said that a year ago when preparations were being made for the visit of President Eisenhower all kinds of things were developing in this direction and everyone was hopeful that steps forward, including this particular problem, could be taken. They now again hope for a radical improvement of the situation. He suggested that progress in other fields might have a good result in the field of travel restrictions. He said the restrictions were left over from the last war and noted that they applied to all foreigners, not just Americans. The Secretary said he fully understood that security of certain installations would have to be retained both in this country and the USSR. Close-in protection could be provided while the rest of the country could be open.
The Secretary expressed the hope that quiet employment of normal diplomatic channels could give both sides a better approach to larger questions. The Ambassador said that he felt an exchange of views on all questions was useful either in Washington or Moscow or both places simultaneously. He noted that Mr. Bowles yesterday had expressed the hope that in the future the two countries could go into all international forums with joint views./5/ The Secretary said it is important to guarantee the success of important debates in international forums since the effect of failure is serious. The Ambassador said this was indeed the Soviet approach, i.e., through discussion in diplomatic channels to establish a common basic point of view. The Secretary said that the significance of a new Administration in Washington is that it offers an opportunity to both sides to review the situation. Such review can open the way to a common approach at least in some questions. The Secretary said that the Administration has no illusions that the problems involved are simple. The Ambassador said that with a common desire the two countries could do many things. The Secretary suggested that we need also to find a common vocabulary--we need to examine this question in a relaxed fashion. The Ambassador agreed that words have different meanings in our two societies. This is natural, he said, given the difference of our ideologies. Neither one of us will persuade the other, he said, but we can co-exist. The Secretary agreed that the important questions between the countries are not ideological--but we must be careful in the field of action and be sure we understand each other in this regard. The Ambassador said that the Soviet Union is all in favor of a quiet purposeful approach involving reasonable compromises. But this must be on an equal basis and there must be no attempt to achieve any one-sided settlement.
/5/A 3-page memorandum of Menshikov's conversation with Bowles on February 2, which covered the same topics as his conversation with Rusk, is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-261. Kohler's briefing memorandum for this meeting is ibid., 601.6111/2-161.
As the Ambassador left, the Secretary said he hoped he would see the Ambassador and Mrs. Menshikov at the President's reception on the 8th.
22. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-461. Confidential; Priority.
Moscow, February 4, 1961, 5 p.m.
1844. Eyes only Secretary. Following is text of aide-memoire handed me by Gromyko at two p.m. today:
Begin Text:
Government Soviet Union expresses satisfaction in connection with statement contained in aide-memoire of US Government of January 24/2/ this year that US Government will do everything possible for improvement relations between USSR and USA. Government USA can be sure that all efforts in this direction will always meet with positive response and support in every possible way on part Soviet Government.
/2/See Document 12.
Soviet Government has taken note of announcement that President USA has issued directive prohibiting American aircraft from violating air space USSR. Thus, one of reasons, which as known, led to serious deterioration Soviet-American relations, has been removed.
Soviet Government welcomes intention US Government engage in joint consideration of broad international problems, which determine state of international relations in our time. We hope that US Government informed in detail about certain views of Soviet Government on most important of these problems, which were set forth by Ambassador USSR in USA in course recent unofficial exchange of opinions. Comments and views, which might be expressed by US Government on questions touched upon in course of this exchange of opinions will be studied with full attention by Soviet Government.
Soviet Government shares point of view US Government expressed in aide-memoire that work of UN and discussions of controversial questions between member states of UN should be approached in constructive manner. Such approach especially necessary for removal of questions preventing achievement healthier international situation and fruitful work of UN.
In our opinion, preliminary exchange of views between two governments is expedient in nearest future for purpose of seeking mutually acceptable decisions on questions which are before 15th Session General Assembly UN, which, as known, will soon resume its work. Appropriate instructions could be given, for example, to our representatives in UN. Representative USSR in UN is employed undertake such an exchange of views.
Government USSR, just as US Government, is prepared to discuss practical steps in sphere Soviet-American relations and to examine concrete proposals of both sides. Soviet side, specifically, confirms its agreement to conduct negotiations for purpose concluding agreement on air communications between USSR and USA. Soviet representatives can start these negotiations in Washington or in Moscow at time which will be mutually agreed.
Soviet Government considers that in nearest future discussion of draft consular convention between USSR and USA could be started, about which exchange of opinions between parties already had begun some time ago. In this connection question of reciprocal opening of Consulates General raised in aide-memoire Government USA of January 24 of this year could also be examined. Moscow 4 February, 1961.
End text.
Thompson
23. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Tubby) to the President's Press Secretary (Salinger)/1/
Washington, February 6, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 911.6261/2-661. No classification marking. Drafted by Kluckhohn (SCA).
SUBJECT
Luncheon Discussion with TASS Correspondent/2//2/Mikhail R. Sagatelyan, Washington TASS Bureau Chief.
The requirement that Soviet correspondents be finger printed if they remain more than one year in this country applies to all nonimmigrant aliens./3/ It is also true that the Soviet Union does not require such finger printing of our correspondents but it does place many other impediments in their way.
/3/On March 24 and 28 McSweeney discussed this question with Soviet Embassy representatives, stating that the fingerprinting issue was being considered, but that until a final decision was made Soviet correspondents would not be fingerprinted. (Memoranda of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 911.6261/3-2461 and 3-2861)
The objections of Soviet correspondents to comply with this requirement was first brought to the attention of the Department of State in October 1960. In November the Department informed the Minister Consular of the Soviet Embassy (Mr. Smirnovsky) that the question would be reviewed.
For the moment the Immigration & Naturalization Service has agreed to the Soviet correspondents remaining in the United States without complying with the finger printing requirement.
For your information only, conversations were held between the Department of State and the Immigration Service on this subject as late as last week and indications are that the nonimmigrant alien finger printing requirement will be removed. If this is decided upon it requires action by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General who jointly and formally agreed to the present system. This Department does not think it would be helpful to engage Mr. Sagatelyan in a polemic inasmuch as this might have an adverse effect on American correspondents in Moscow.
American news correspondents in Moscow are subjected to rigid censorship and are subject to having their six months' residence permits unrenewed if they fail to report the news in a manner favorable to Soviet interests.
Most important, however, is the difficulty in getting American correspondents admitted to the Soviet Union. The U.S. Government has not refused a visa to any Soviet correspondent desiring to come to the United States during the past several years. In contrast the Soviet Government has failed to take positive action on the application of a reputable American news organization, Fairchild Publications, which wishes to station a permanent correspondent in Moscow. The New York Herald Tribune informed us Thursday that it was concerned because a visa had not been issued yet to Walter Lister who will replace Tom Lambert in Moscow. Lambert is leaving Moscow having finished his tour, but his dispatches have been severely criticized by the Soviet Government.
Attached is a statement prepared by our Soviet Affairs Office on the Fairchild Publications' application. Enclosed also is a memo from the Visa Office about the refusal of Mr. Shishkin, presently Chief of the TASS Office in New York City, to apply for an extension of stay as required by the law./4/
/4/Neither printed.
It is felt that you could help by mentioning the problem of getting American correspondents into Moscow. The Department would appreciate anything that you could tell us about the results of your conversation.
24. Editorial Note
At an interagency meeting on Cuba, February 7, 1961, Adolph Berle, Chief of the Department of State's Latin American Task Force, "indicated that he had given considerable thought to the establishment of a naval blockade of Cuba as a weapon against the Castro regime." The Department of Defense representative, Haydn Williams, reported that "a blockade of Cuba was physically feasible" and "to be effective, would require the stopping, boarding and searching of all vessels destined to Cuba, regardless of flag." Williams commented further that he thought "the Soviet Government would consider such treatment of its vessels as an act of war." For text of the memorandum reporting on the meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume X, pages 81-88.
25. Record of the Policy Planning Staff Meeting/1/
Washington, February 8, 1961, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Staff Minutes 1961. Confidential. Drafted by Carlton Savage.
PARTICIPANTS
George McGhee
George Morgan
Henry Brodie
Leon FullerHoward Furnas
Henry Owen
George F. Kennan, Princeton
Henry Ramsey
Edward Rice
Carlton Savage
Evan Wilson
William Webb[Here follow observations Kennan made on the work of the Policy Planning Staff.]
Mr. Kennan made the following observations on matters of substance:
There is little hope now for negotiation with the Russians on the fundamental problems such as disarmament and the division of Europe. We are likely to make more progress through reciprocal unilateral actions or tacit arrangements rather than signed agreements. This may be especially true in the disarmament field.
The US and the USSR have many points of common interest. We should endeavor to locate them and work on them. The USSR would welcome (1) the removal of the captive nations resolution from the Congressional calendar, and (2) strengthening commercial relations with the US, which to them would have symbolic political significance.
We should drop the problem of Hungary in relations with the USSR as it is an irritant and we cannot help the Hungarian people by continuing to press it.
It might be possible to work out informally with the USSR a mutually agreed arms limitation policy for Africa, even if this means US concessions regarding existing bases in North Africa.
Khrushchev with all his bluster is a sensitive man. We need patience and humor in dealing with him. We should not be worried by his statement that the Soviet Union intends to bury us--this was metaphorical, and the Soviet leaders know where their real interests lie.
The question of Sino-Soviet relations appears to be one for intelligence analysis rather than planning. We cannot do much to influence these relations but we must constantly observe them.
We have an identity with Russia in the Far East. Japan should not be a barrier in our relations with the USSR. It might be helpful if we agreed to withdraw our bases from Japan and made a Far East agreement with Japan and Russia. This could in turn help us deal with the Korean problem.
We have much more difficult problems with the Chinese than with the Russians. The latter have more in common with Western civilization./2/
/2/In a similar discussion on February 20, Ambassador Thompson stressed that Soviet officials emphasized trade in every conversation with him. He added that U.S. willingness to make trade arrangements with the Soviet Union "would be an evidence to them of good intentions." Thompson added that Moscow saw the Middle East as one of its greatest opportunities and he believed that their greatest problem was containment of Communist China. Thompson concluded that the best thing the United States could do to put strain on relations between China and the Soviet Union was to make progress bilaterally with the latter. (Ibid.)
Mr. Kennan thought it would be desirable for the Department to return to the old practice of giving instructions to a newly-appointed Ambassador explaining the purposes and objectives of his mission.
26. Notes on Discussion/1/
Washington, February 11, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR. Top Secret. Drafted by Bundy on February 13.
THE THINKING OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP,
CABINET ROOM, FEBRUARY 11, 1961
PRESENT
The President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, Ambassador Harriman, Ambassador Thompson, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Kennan, Mr. BundyThe subjects discussed can be grouped under four headings:
1. The general condition of the USSR and its government.
2. Current Soviet attitudes on foreign affairs.
3. Useful American policies and attitudes.
4. Methods of negotiation, and problem of a possible meeting between the President and Khrushchev.
1. General condition of the USSR and its government
Ambassador Thompson reported that, in a general way, the Soviet Government is strong, and Soviet economic growth a formidable fact. But agriculture is a deep problem; the government may be facing a third successive year of bad harvests.
On the industrial side, while there are still problems in the process of control and decentralization of the growing machine, prospects for continued strong growth are good, and the regime can use these resources in a showy way--as for example by constructing the largest heated swimming pool in the world. Both at home and abroad we can expect new Soviet activities as the economic base grows.
At the same time, there is a rapid growth in consumer demand. When there was almost no new housing, public pressure for more was slight, but now everyone has a friend with a new house, and "the appetite grows with eating," especially while the apparatus of terror is left unused. In agriculture, the avoidance of terror complicates a problem already made difficult by technological backwardness: Secretary Rusk pointed out in this connection that the agricultural experts of the Rockefeller Foundation are persuaded that there are deep weaknesses in Soviet work in this area, largely as a result of the influence of Lysenko./2/
/2/Trofim P. Lysenko, Soviet agronomist and biologist whose theories were supported by Stalin.
But difficulties in agriculture should not obscure the growing strength of the Soviet Union as a whole, or the stability of the Khrushchev government. Khrushchev's personal position is strong. While the Government is a collective enterprise, it is increasingly a collective enterprise of Khrushchev's supporters. Only if he should face unusually grave difficulties both in agriculture and in foreign affairs would Khrushchev's political control be seriously threatened.
Soviet military strength is formidable. Ambassador Thompson is inclined to believe that in the area of conventional forces this strength may be somewhat exaggerated by most American estimators, but he offers no separate estimate of Soviet missile capability, and he agrees with Mr. Bohlen's comment that in the last five years the general Soviet posture has been made stronger and bolder by growing confidence in the Soviet military position. On the other hand, there was general agreement with Mr. Kennan's comment that Soviet leaders do not think in terms of a narrowly military calculus, and expect to win by the play of other forces, while their military strength protects the "forces of history" from the "imperialists."
Khrushchev's own deepest desire is to gain time for the forthcoming triumphs of Soviet economic progress; for this he really wants a generally unexplosive period in foreign affairs.
2. Current Soviet attitudes on foreign affairs
While the Soviet attitude toward the world is fundamentally optimistic, Khrushchev would very much like some specific diplomatic successes in 1961. Perhaps his first hope here is that, through negotiations with the new American administration, there may be progress toward disarmament. Soviet interest in this area appears real; "we do have one common enemy--war." While Khrushchev's interest in exploiting Berlin continues, he is not likely to bring this situation to a boil unless there is a breakdown of negotiations on disarmament, or perhaps an increase in tension in such a place as Laos.
After the United States, the great long-run worries of the Soviet Union are Germany and Red China. These are the countries whose relations to the atomic problem seem an important one to the Soviet Union, and indeed effective restraint of the Chinese Communists is a continuing task of the Soviet government. In this connection, Mr. Bohlen recommended--and later agreed to send over--certain documents telling the exact nature of the sharp dialogue between the Russians and the Chinese.
But if Soviet concern over Germany's relation to atomic weapons is real, it is also an example of the duality of Soviet thinking: the German question is not only a real worry, but an excellent crowbar with which to pry at the seams of the Atlantic alliance. Mr. Bohlen, in particular, emphasized that nearly every Soviet argument must be appraised not only as evidence of the rational calculations of a powerful government, but also as part of a process of cynical manipulation by a group of doctrinaires profoundly committed to the advancement of their party and their ideology by every available means.
Meanwhile, around the world Soviet leaders are cheerfully taking advantage of targets of opportunity, and their recent successes in such areas as Laos, the Congo, and Cuba have made them confident, perhaps overconfident, about their prospects in such adventures. In these areas they appear to be following a policy of backing promising political leaders who are hostile to the West, whether or not they are explicitly Communist in their allegiance, in the hope that timely support of such leaders may make easier the gradual growth of Communist influence and the eventual Communist takeover; this is a change from earlier doctrinaire commitment to Communists alone.
3. Useful American policies and attitudes toward the Soviet Union
Precisely because of the double character of the Soviet behavior, American policy must be both rationally stated and evidently strong. Strength is not entirely a military matter, and, in some areas, other things are more important. In Laos, for example, allied disunity and the failure of the West to find and support an esteemed non-Communist leader have played into the hands of Communists. Moreover, while strength is essential, noisy demonstrations of strength are likely to be counter-productive, because of the high sensitivity and pride--and perhaps the inferiority complex, in some sense--of the Soviet government. On the other hand, it should not be assumed that the Soviet Union would react violently to a possible swift action against the Castro government. A quick fait accompli would probably lead to only verbal reactions. On the other hand a long civil war might well generate strong pressures upon the Soviet government to prove its greatness on behalf of an embattled ally in the great contest against imperialism. (In this connection, the experts agreed that Soviet intervention in Hungary was on an entirely different plane, resting as it did upon a deep-seated Soviet conviction that a continuation of the Hungarian revolution would have undermined the entire Communist position in Eastern Europe.) In such a case as Berlin, only strength and firmness would do.
4. Methods of negotiation and the problem of a possible meeting of the President and Mr. Khrushchev
In general, it was felt that we were on the right track in maintaining a quiet and courteous tone in direct exchanges with the Soviet government. The last months of the old administration had created blocks to communication which were now being removed by the fact of a change. While Khrushchev evidently disliked Nixon (especially because of a speech to the dentists), he had liked Eisenhower personally, without respecting him very much as a leader. But the events leading up to the Paris summit had been a great blow to his pride, and had so shaken him that further effective negotiation could not occur with the outgoing administration. He is now eager, above all other immediate desires, for an early meeting with the President, and there seemed considerable feeling among the experts that a meeting in due course, for an exchange of courtesies and the opportunity of becoming personally acquainted, might be useful. Nothing approaching a summit, in terms of serious negotiations, should be considered favorably for the present. There was a strong feeling, sharply expressed by Mr. Bohlen, that it would be unwise to have Khrushchev come to the United Nations, as a means toward any early meeting, because the Soviet leader cannot resist a rostrum, and his speeches in the UN would be unlikely to add to the sum of international good will, or Soviet-American understanding.
Thus it might well be wise to indicate quite promptly to Khrushchev that, while the President looks forward to meeting him before too much time has passed, it does not look as if a meeting in connection with the General Assembly would be possible or productive. In this same connection, Mr. Harriman suggested that the President might well say quite candidly that it would be hard to meet with Mr. Khrushchev before he has had a chance to meet and talk with the heads of the principal allied governments.
But if courtesy and a moderate tone of voice are appropriate in our first exchanges with Khrushchev, there is no reason to tolerate or leave without comment the continuing Soviet attempt to use both the high road and the low road. Savage and continuing denunciation of the United States as the principal enemy of mankind, from the highest levels of the Soviet government, is not really consistent with effective negotiation between the two great states, and this point can usefully be made. If they believe these things, what chance is there we can reach reliable agreements with each other? If they do not believe them, what use is there in our sitting down to talk with such obviously cynical opponents?
The President, in any meeting with Khrushchev, would wish to show both a willingness to negotiate reasonably and great strength and firmness. He would wish to avoid the fuzziness which made trouble for President Eisenhower in the Berlin negotiations--it never helps in negotiating with the Russians to use ambiguous words or phrases which may be taken in quite different ways by the two sides.
It was agreed that there would be no decision at present on the question of a meeting. Meanwhile communications with the Soviet Union could usefully continue, through diplomatic channels, on a variety of topics, as further examination might decree. Among the topics considered as likely for such treatment were Laos, commercial conversations, the consular convention, air transport, exchange of persons, and of course the test ban negotiations. These last may be perhaps the most important element in American-Soviet relations in the immediate future.
In Conclusion:
Ambassador Thompson, in response to a concluding question from the President, summarized the requirements upon the United States in four steps: first, and most important, we must make our own system work. Second, we must maintain the unity of the West. Third, we must find ways of placing ourselves in new and effective relations to the great forces of nationalism and anti-colonialism. Fourth, we must, in these ways and others, change our image before the world so that it becomes plain that we and not the Soviet Union stand for the future.
McGeorge Bundy/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
27. Editorial Note
On February 13, 1961, Ambassador Thompson testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for over 2 hours on conditions in the Soviet Union, U.S.-Soviet relations, and Soviet policy around the world. For a transcript of the proceedings, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), 1961, pages 135-178.
28. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 14, 1961, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-1461. Secret. Drafted by Armitage and initialed by Kohler.
SUBJECT
Relations with the Soviet UnionPARTICIPANTS
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
Lord Hood, Minister-Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. D.A. Greenhill, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. T. Brimelow, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. C.D. Wiggin, First Secretary, British EmbassyAmbassador-at-Large Averell Harriman
Ambassador David K.E. Bruce
Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary
Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. John M. McSweeney, Director, SOV
Mr. William C. Burdett, Director, BNA
Mr. John A. Armitage, SOVSir Harold opened the meeting with a query regarding the significance of the TASS statement,/2/ just received, attacking the UN Secretary General, calling for UN withdrawal from the Congo, and promising Soviet aid to Gizenga./3/ Mr. Kohler remarked that this would certainly change the tactical picture in New York. Reference was made to previous Soviet behavior regarding former SYG Trygve Lie. Mr. Kohler said that in that period the Soviets had addressed their communications to the Secretariat. Sir Harold asked if the sharpness and nature of the TASS statement made it possible for us to gain anything from this "ill wind." Mr. Kohler suggested any SC resolution on the Congo would now automatically be subjected to Soviet veto.
/2/For text of this February 14 statement, see U.N. doc. S/4704; an extract containing five Soviet demands is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 765-766.
/3/Antoine Gizenga, Acting Prime Minister of the Congo.
With regard to the subject of the present meeting, Mr. Kohler noted that there was little likelihood of any real difference regarding the subject, that we had prepared a brief paper/4/ which stopped short of conclusions and suggested that the meeting might usefully hear from Ambassador Thompson.
/4/This paper has not been identified further.
Ambassador Thompson opened by referring to Khrushchev's conversations with German Ambassador Kroll and the Icelandic Ambassador in which Khrushchev had said that the Soviets could not wait on the Berlin situation until after German elections. Mikoyan and Kozlov had been making equivocating noises but Khrushchev was sounding tough. Ambassador Thompson considered that a lot would depend on the international setting. If the testing talks go well and there is movement elsewhere, if the Soviets conclude that there is an effort to solve some of our problems, Khrushchev would probably go along some distance. He might agree to some type of procedural start before the elections which continued after the elections were held. On the other hand, if we seem to have locked horns at all junctures, Khrushchev would almost certainly proceed with a separate treaty with the GDR. He has somewhat of a commitment to get along with the German problem and would only withhold pressure if he can show that his policy is "getting somewhere" elsewhere.
Sir Harold said that the Soviets seemed to have designated three areas in which they wanted to get somewhere: reform of the UN, disarmament and Germany. It appears they have thrown their hat in the ring on the UN and taken a hard stand on reforming the UN completely.
Ambassador Thompson said he viewed the Soviet drive on the UN as a long-range project. Khrushchev does not seem sure how he can do it and had even vacillated some in his attitude toward the Secretary General. When Lord Hood asked if he understood that the drive on the UN was not in the same order of priority as the other two questions, Ambassador Thompson answered that was his view. Sir Harold observed that Khrushchev has already firmly joined the issue on the UN and asked if he could abandon this firm position. Ambassador Thompson said it was possible that he could, that in his opinion Khrushchev would not try to force all his proposals through the UN this year.
Ambassador Harriman asked how seriously Khrushchev would take the Lumumba/5/ affair. Ambassador Thompson said Khrushchev had little concern for Lumumba personally, that he had told Ambassador Thompson that he was sorry for him as a person when he was in prison but that his imprisonment actually served Soviet interests. Khrushchev's personal commitment is deepest of all regarding Berlin and the pressure is greatest on him here.
/5/Patrice Lumumba, former Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, was killed on January 17.
Sir Harold asked what other subjects than Berlin could we hope to get any movement on. Ambassador Thompson said there were divergent reports regarding Soviet intentions at the testing talks, but that he was inclined to believe that they were prepared to make substantive concessions and to get an agreement. However, it was possible that the ChiComs may have cooled them off on the testing agreement or that the Soviets may have taken the measure of the cost of the requisite inspection and concluded that it was too great.
Sir Harold observed that the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow had told British Ambassador Roberts that the ChiComs hoped a testing agreement would be reached so that they would not be forced to go ahead with the production of costly nuclear weapons.
Ambassador Thompson said the Pugwash meeting in Moscow had been interesting./6/ He thought that it has encouraged the Soviets to think now that we are more serious about disarmament than they had thought before. The talks had revealed how deeply we had been exploring the problems of arms control.
/6/Reference is to the Conference on War in the Nuclear Age, held November-December 1960 in Moscow.
Sir Harold asked for U.S. thoughts on how to spin things along and achieve a delay on Berlin. Lord Hood observed that he and Mr. Kohler had concluded the other day that we could get nothing better than a status quo and that no initiative on our part in Germany or Berlin was therefore worthwhile. Sir Harold said he understood that part of our answer was to have a serious try at achieving a testing agreement and perhaps go slow at the UN. The latter, he remarked, had now become much more difficult.
Mr. Kohler saw no good reason for us actively to seek a Berlin-Germany settlement. He said we can live with the status quo and even in NATO discussions it had been agreed that there were real dangers in a summit meeting on the single subject of Berlin. The question was what field offered the best chances of bringing about some relaxation of tension without facing a show-down on an issue like Berlin.
Ambassador Thompson offered his personal view that it was necessary to have some sort of program regarding Germany and Berlin. We must take it for granted that the Soviets will raise the subject at some time or other and we must be ready to talk about it. There was some danger that things such as Kroll's talk with Khrushchev might lead the Soviets to believe that after the German elections they can expect to gain substantial Western concessions. However, Kroll had never given any idea of what would be changed in the German position by the elections.
Sir Harold asked what were they seeking from us and noted that this meant essentially what do the Germans have to offer? He referred to the obvious field of securing the eastern frontiers of the GDR. Ambassador Thompson remarked that it might be helpful if the Germans would proceed to establish more extensive relations with the Poles, and possibly the Czechs.
Mr. Bohlen said that there was some danger in this position of leaving Berlin on ice until after the election. The danger was that this would tend to store up a powerful head of steam for a big show-down. Ambassador Dowling would be coming back shortly and perhaps we can find out something regarding the Germans' thinking on discussions with the Soviets after elections. There might be something in German preparedness to recognize the Oder-Neisse line and this, of course, very closely affected German elections.
Ambassador Thompson remarked that Ambassador Kroll held some dangerous ideas, for example, regarding the possibility of a meeting to draw up the terms of a peace treaty. Ambassador Kroll might be thinking of this as a stalling tactic but it would obviously have the effect of deceiving and confusing the public in Western countries.
Sir Harold asked if there had been any private communications from the Germans to the Russians. Ambassador Thompson said that, if so, it would have been by Kroll personally. Kroll seems to aspire to be the man that changed the course of post-war history.
Mr. Kohler asked if the Oder-Neisse line is as important to the Russians as to the Poles. Ambassador Thompson thought yes. It was needed to jell the situation in Eastern Europe, and that objective was high on the Soviet list. If the western Polish borders were changed in the slightest, the Soviets felt the Poles would look for compensating changes in the East. Lord Hood asked if they were more interested in this than in getting us out of Berlin. Ambassador Thompson said yes, but that the East Germans were, of course, more interested in Berlin. However, the Soviets could hold the East Germans in line if they wished to.
Mr. Kohler referred to the correspondence in late 1957 and early 1958 regarding the lists of topics that the West and the Soviet Union might discuss at a meeting. He asked whether there were any possibilities along this line or whether the Soviets were pressing for a quick summit meeting. Ambassador Thompson said that the Soviets had been pressing us on Berlin and would continue to do so. Their line is that if we do not like their proposals, what do we suggest? Mr. Kohler observed that our previous proposals had lasted only about 10 minutes (in 1959).
Lord Hood asked if the Germans would have to be in on any discussions. Ambassador Thompson said that apparently Ulbricht/7/ had supported Khrushchev strongly at the November CP meeting but that we don't know whether Khrushchev paid any price for this support. There seemed some evidence that the Russians were not particularly happy with Ulbricht right now.
/7/Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany.
Sir Harold remarked that Lord Home had followed the advice of the British Ambassador in Moscow and referred to the harsh essence of the statement of the Communist parties and Khrushchev's January 6 speech. Izvestiya had reacted sharply, asking if he were the minister of the cold war.
Mr. Kohler observed that we had circulated these documents to our missions, that the Secretary and the President had both called public attention to them and their significance and that we were working on the possibility of preparing an annotated edition of the documents.
Sir Harold wondered whether the sharp Soviet response to Lord Home were not meant for the U.S. as well as the British. He noted our problem of not fooling the public while we were stringing the Russians along. How we would do the stringing along was not clear except for the field of testing. The prospect for anything in disarmament would take much longer. Should Khrushchev come to the UN, the TASS release today would make it extremely hard to imagine the UN proceeding in a restrained manner.
Ambassador Thompson said that there was the possibility of a settlement in Laos which Khrushchev could regard as some achievement. It was not clear how the Soviets were going to play the situation. They seemed disposed to let the Administration have some time to organize its approach but any successes tempted them to continue a hard line. It was hard for them to "renounce any opportunities."
Sir Harold referred to Laos, the Congo and Cuba as three areas of progress from the Soviet point of view.
Ambassador Thompson said Khrushchev may find that he does not want to push too fast toward an accommodation.
Mr. Kohler said it was doubtful that anything in the bilateral field such as exchanges would restrain the Soviets on the international front. He asked whether a series of meetings per se which would not be negotiations would have any virtue. For example, would the prospect or actuality of a meeting with the President deter them? Ambassador Thompson said from Khrushchev's personal point of view he would, of course, see that there were gains involved and it could have great importance to him. Mr. Kohler asked whether this would restrain him from raising concrete issues. Ambassador Thompson replied that Khrushchev would raise Berlin at any meeting.
Sir Harold said that it would not be easy for Khrushchev to come to the UNGA now. Mr. Bohlen said that New York was a bad place for a possible meeting between the President and Khrushchev. Given the nature of the issues before the UN and the chance to use the propaganda forum furnished by the UN rostrum, Khrushchev would be sure to employ it and would have to put on his Bolshevik hat in doing so.
Ambassador Thompson remarked that Khrushchev may come any way. If so, it would be better if he came at the end of the session. Sir Harold said that the U.K. Ambassador to the UN, Mr. Dean, reported some sentiment in New York for a quiet end to the current UNGA session but Sir Harold noted that this would probably mean a later special session on disarmament. Mr. Bohlen said that the Soviet proposal for the special disarmament session had never been withdrawn but had not been recently pushed.
Ambassador Thompson reported that Kosygin (Soviet First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers) had made a point of stressing that the Soviet disarmament moves in the UN should not be dismissed as propaganda, that they were part of the serious Soviet approach to the problem. Ambassador Thompson said that this meant that they viewed their UN operations as an attempt to force us into disarmament negotiations as part of their effort to overcome what they describe as the barriers interposed by the "Pentagon" and "Wall Street" to disarmament negotiations. Mr. Bohlen added that this was true even though the current exercise itself was pure propaganda.
Sir Harold asked whether from the U.S. point of view it was easier to foresee a meeting with Khrushchev if he was brought into the U.S. by other means than a special invitation to him. Mr. Kohler asked whether it was excluded that the Soviets would issue an invitation to the President. Ambassador Thompson said it was not excluded but not likely. Mr. Bohlen said the Soviets would fear a rebuff; Mr. Kohler noted that there would undoubtedly be some feelers put out first. Ambassador Thompson said the Soviets would want to know where the U.S. stood regarding current issues, that they would have to know this before they could determine what type treatment they should give the President during a visit. He believed that any invitation in the immediate future was almost excluded.
Sir Harold stated that another awkward thing about a new UN session would be facing the Chinese representation issue again. Mr. Bohlen said that the moratorium issue had been disposed of for this session but that the representation issue could still crop up in another form.
Ambassador Thompson considered that the Soviets were likely to start pushing for a summit meeting, even though they might think we are now more seriously approaching the disarmament question. The Soviets would want to gain credit for renewal of negotiations.
Mr. Bohlen said that he might put a little less emphasis on the kudos which the Soviets anticipate from a summit meeting per se. If their desire for such a meeting were in fact deeper than he thought, it might be useful to get word to Khrushchev that he could not expect to get such a meeting if current Soviet conduct was continued.
It was generally agreed that the West should not be hastened into a meeting.
Mr. Kohler reverted to the previous remarks that it might be better for the U.S. to take the initiative rather than being forced into a meeting. He added that this would, of course, involve other allies. Mr. Thompson said that it could be very dangerous if we did not know where we wanted to go on the Berlin question. We would have to take a look at this problem with Ambassador Dowling. One maneuver might be procedural, such as convening a Foreign Ministers meeting not long before the German elections which could carry over until after the elections. This could serve as a buffer to Soviet moves. So far the Germans have not even let us know what they themselves have in mind.
Mr. Bohlen read the TASS item regarding the Congo and the Secretary General and Sir Harold observed that there was little evidence of restraint in it.
Ambassador Harriman said that from our point of view it might be better than a cool and detached statement. Mr. Kohler said even this statement doesn't exclude the possibility of Khrushchev coming to the UN and might even serve as a basis for coming.
Ambassador Harriman asked whether the Soviet statement meant that the Soviet Union representative would not communicate with Hammarskjold and not attend meetings at which he was present. Lord Hood and Mr. Kohler agreed that he probably would not communicate with Hammarskjold but would attend meetings at which he was present without addressing him.
Mr. Kohler said this was illustrative of the indeterminate stage our relations were now in, that the Department would want to consult further with Ambassador Thompson, particularly in preparation for the next round of talks with the British.
Mr. Bohlen said Khrushchev must realize he cannot get the votes he needs to remove the Secretary General unless he thinks that great emotions have been stirred by Lumumba's death. Mr. Kohler added that the Soviets had indicated they got all they expected on the first round. Mr. Bohlen opined that they might ask for a special session to consider what they would describe as a crime against humanity.
Sir Harold attempted to sum up the discussion. We were agreed that it was useful to spin things along and that our actions in the testing negotiations and our efforts to achieve a settlement in Laos were part of the process. He asked whether it might not help to riposte in some manner. Could we not come back in the UN; might we not poll the delegations informally to see what might be done in the nature of a confidence vote for the Secretary General? Mr. Bohlen said the UNGA was not in session; could we call a session in order to put the brakes on Khrushchev? Ambassador Thompson said that we must find a way of saying convincingly that the UN cannot run away from its responsibilities in the Congo.
Sir Harold asked if there was any possibility of a response to the Venus shot. He referred to the Western actions reaffirming their unity after the Sputnik and asked if there was any way we could show Khrushchev we were doing something. Ambassador Thompson expressed his personal reservations regarding the advisability of rushing into some action in the scientific field. He had felt that we should see how the situation was developing before making more specific the President's suggestions regarding cooperative scientific endeavors and now we had probably better look still closer. Sir Harold said that it was sometimes possible in the wake of startling actions by the Soviets to do politically what ordinarily would be unthinkable.
Mr. Brimelow asked if the toughness of the TASS statement did not make summitry itself less thinkable. Ambassador Harriman asked for Sir Harold's first reaction on how we could meet the probable Soviet moves in the UN. Sir Harold said we should do something to show him that he does not have a majority behind him.
Ambassador Harriman said that Soviet support of Gizenga was now at least out in the open but that this meant that they would be unwilling to work with the Congolese government.
Sir Harold adverted to Laos and said the British thought they would have had an answer to their proposal last week but they had not yet received one.
29. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, February 16, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.6194/2-1661. Secret. Drafted by Harry G. Barnes, Jr., (EUR/SOV) and cleared by Kohler and Edward A. Bolster (TRC).
SUBJECT
Air Transport Negotiations with the Soviet Government/2//2/Following approval by the President, on February 21 McSweeney gave Soviet Minister-Counselor Smirnovsky an aide-memoire proposing that negotiations for an air transport agreement begin in Washington at a mutually agreeable date. A memorandum of McSweeney's conversation with Smirnovsky and a copy of the aide-memoire are ibid., 611.6194/2-2161.
You will recall that Ambassador Thompson presented an aide-memoire to the Soviet Government on January 24 which indicated that the United States Government was prepared to proceed with negotiations for an air transport agreement with the U.S.S.R. On February 4, the Soviet Government accepted our proposal and suggested that negotiations begin at a mutually agreeable date. We now propose to deliver an aide-memoire to the Soviet Embassy stating that we will present a draft agreement within the next 30 days and that we suggest that negotiations be held in Washington at a mutually agreeable time once the Soviet Government has completed its examination of our draft agreement.
Negotiations for an air transport agreement with the Soviet Government were scheduled to have begun last July 18. They were postponed on July 14 at our initiative following the shooting down of the RB-47 aircraft. The original undertaking for an air transport agreement was contained in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Exchange Agreement of January 27, 1958 and repeated in the Exchange Agreement of November 21, 1959. The United States had on several occasions since 1958 attempted to obtain Soviet agreement to an actual commencement of negotiations but only in March of last year did the Soviet Government finally make a concrete proposal. The United States accepted the Soviet proposal, and negotiations, as I have indicated, were set for July. On the eve of the negotiations, the Soviet Government presented a draft agreement, but the negotiations were postponed before we were able to submit a counterdraft.
In the general context of improving relations with the Soviet Union, we have two principal aims for an air transport agreement. The first is the safe and orderly development of direct air transportation between the two countries on the basis of reciprocal rights consistent with our national security. Secondly, we foresee an intelligence benefit as well as some advantage in demonstrating the high state of our civil aviation to the Soviet people. We would insure, of course, that any agreement contained adequate provisions for possible suspension or termination if this should subsequently be in our interests.
Pan American Airways was certificated some time ago by the Civil Aeronautics Board as the American carrier to serve the U.S.S.R. We would expect that a representative of Pan American would participate in the negotiations in an observer status. The route so far proposed by both sides has been New York-Moscow with no "beyond" rights.
If you approve, we will deliver to the Soviet Embassy an aide-memoire along the lines I have mentioned./3/
/3/On February 20 Kohler sent Rusk a memorandum recommending that the United States negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union providing for consulates in New York and St. Petersburg. (Ibid., 611.61421/2-2061) Three days later the Department of State instructed the Embassy in Moscow to inform the Soviet Foreign Ministry that the United States was prepared to begin negotiations for a consular convention in Moscow at the earliest mutually agreeable date. (Telegram 1365; ibid., 611.61241/2-2361)
Dean Rusk/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
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