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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume V Soviet Union DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

230. Editorial Note

Photographs obtained from a U-2 reconnaissance mission flown over Cuba on August 29, 1962, revealed that surface-to-air missile sites were under construction on the island. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Marshall Carter conveyed the information on August 31 to McGeorge Bundy at the White House. For further information, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume X, page 968.

In a memorandum to the President, August 31, Bundy stated that "we have two problems here which should be kept separate. The first is our reaction to the current step, and the second is our preparations to react against something which would require or make possible a major military operation against Cuba. The present actions in Cuba do not justify such action." Accompanying the memorandum was Bundy's analysis of the probable impact of the introduction of Soviet missiles into Cuba. He argued that surface-to-air missiles would "substantially increase Communist defensive capabilities there" but would not "carry any increased direct threat to the safety of the U.S. mainland." Surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads, on the other hand, "would constitute a very significant military threat to the continental U.S.," and "it appears probable that on military grounds alone, the establishment of such a capability would be unacceptable." For text, see ibid., pages 1002-1006.

In a memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk, September 1, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Hilsman concluded, among other things, that "current Soviet moves in Cuba do not appear to be synchronized with Soviet moves in Berlin, but they have a common root in Moscow's growing sense of power, and Moscow may hope that increased tensions in one area will lead to Western concessions in the other." In a memorandum to the President, September 3, Walt Rostow, Counselor of the Department of State, called the Soviet military deliveries "a testing thrust by Moscow" which "places before us the question of where and how we should draw the line with respect to unacceptable action and behavior by the Communists in Cuba and the Hemisphere." For texts of both memoranda, see ibid., pages 1014-1022 and 1025-1032.

On September 4 the White House released a statement by President Kennedy in which he noted the presence of antiaircraft defensive missiles in Cuba. Kennedy added, however, that there was no evidence of organized Soviet combat forces in Cuba, nor of military bases provided to the Soviet Union, nor of the presence of weapons with an offensive capability, such as ground-to-ground missiles. "Were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise." For text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 24, 1962, page 450.

 

231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, September 5, 1962, 7:52 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-UD/9-562. Confidential; Niact; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bundy.

539. For Udall from Bundy. President has seen Moscow's 587/2/ and asks that you be particularly cautious in responding to any remarks by Khrushchev outside range of your Cabinet responsibilities and cultural interests. A number of the international political questions Khrushchev might raise are now at very sensitive stage, and President believes we should avoid risk of misunderstanding in any comment you might make in view of your standing as Member of Cabinet and leading New Frontiersman.

/2/Telegram 587, September 5, reported that Khrushchev would receive Udall the following day and asked for any guidance that might be appropriate. (Ibid.) Udall visited the Soviet Union for 11 days beginning August 29 primarily to see hydroelectric projects.

Rusk

 

232. Editorial Note

On September 6, 1962, the President's Special Counsel, Theodore Sorensen, met with Ambassador Dobrynin at the latter's request. The Soviet Ambassador informed Sorensen that, as a result of their previous meeting on August 23, which he had reported to Moscow, he had received a personal message from Chairman Khrushchev directing him to inform Sorensen that he would not attend the opening of the United Nations General Assembly and that "nothing will be undertaken before the American Congressional elections that could complicate the international situation or aggravate the tension in the relations between our two countries. We shall follow this course, provided there are no actions taken on the other side which would change the situation. This includes a German peace settlement and West Berlin." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume X, pages 1045-1047.

 

233. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador- designate to the Soviet Union (Kohler)/1/

Washington, September 6, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Talks (Kohler). Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

There are four points on which the President wishes to give Ambassador Kohler personal guidance for his use in his first conversation with Chairman Khrushchev:

(1) With respect to the recent exchange of notes on the possible inadvertent violation of Soviet frontiers by a U.S. patrol plane,/2/ the President has particularly asked Ambassador Kohler to reiterate that his instructions of January 1961 are firm and will be most strictly enforced. Continuing investigation indicates that safeguarding procedures in the case of this particular patrol flight were not adequate, and corrective measures are being taken.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 236.

(2) The President would like to make clear to Chairman Khrushchev that he has given personal examination to the question of possible interference by United States aircraft and ships with the freedom of movement and navigation of Soviet vessels in international waters. On hearing of Ambassador Thompson's report of the Chairman's expression,/3/ the President instituted immediate inquiries, and as a result he can give definite assurance that there have not been any encounters since the President's inauguration which have had as their motivation the hindrance of movement or navigation in international waters of Soviet vessels. In particular, we know of no instance in which any Soviet ship was ordered to stop or be fired on by a U.S. naval vessel. It is always possible that a particular military officer may act with imperfect judgment, but instructions to all such officers are clear and have been reiterated. If the Chairman knows of specific instances which raise specific questions, the President will be glad to have them investigated if pertinent data are presented.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 215.

(3) If Chairman Khrushchev should again raise the question of any possible relationship between events in Berlin and political divisions in the United States, Ambassador Kohler should inform the Chairman that the answer which Mr. Thompson made at the time represents the official opinion of this Government. Any crisis precipitated by Soviet action over Berlin, at any time, would unite public opinion in the United States. The result of such a crisis would inevitably be a worsening of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, which would not be in the interest of either country. On the other hand, a settlement of this problem and the achievement of a modus vivendi which would reduce tension in Berlin would be to the interest of both governments.

(4) The President continues to regard an effective nuclear test ban as a matter of the greatest importance, and would like Ambassador Kohler to emphasize these two basic points: first, there is simply no way in which the President can bring the United States Senate to agreement on a comprehensive treaty without inspection; second, as the President sees it, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have three great common interests in a workable agreement:

(a) the fallout problem

(b) the hazard of high energy electrons contaminating outer space

(c) and, perhaps most important of all, the common interest in discouraging other powers from acquiring nuclear weapons.

 

234. Editorial Note

During the first 3 weeks of September 1962, Director of Central Intelligence McCone, who was on a honeymoon holiday in Europe, received daily briefing cables on the situation in Cuba from Deputy Director Marshall Carter. McCone concluded that the development of a costly surface-to-air defense system in Cuba could only be explained if it was designed to mask and protect the introduction of medium-range ballistic missiles. In a series of cables to Carter, McCone pressed his concerns and supported an expanded program of reconnaissance flights over Cuba. Return cables from Carter indicated that CIA analysts had considered McCone's concerns but concluded that the Soviet Union would not run the risk of provoking military reaction from the United States. In Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62, September 19, the conclusions of which were cabled to McCone the same day, the intelligence community stated that a decision to introduce medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles into Cuba "would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far." The next day, in his final cable in the series, McCone responded that "an offensive Soviet base in Cuba will provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take unexpected risks to establish such a position." A report of the arrival of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba, subsequently accepted as the first definitive such report, was received on September 21. For more information and the text of SNIE 85-3-62, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume X, pages 1052-1053, 1070-1080, and 1083-1084.

 

235. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 11-15-62

Washington, September 13, 1962.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-62, USSR. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force participated in the preparation of the estimate, which was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the USIB except the AEC representative and Assistant Director of the FBI who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

CURRENT SOVIET TACTICS ON BERLIN

Conclusion

The Soviets have declared a "pause" in the negotiations over Berlin, thus marking the end of a phase which began with the Rusk-Gromyko talks last fall. At the same time, they appear to have ruled out a separate treaty in the next few months, and indicated that they envisage an eventual resumption of negotiations. However, it is likely that Khrushchev will continue to make various unilateral moves in order to accomplish piecemeal and de facto some of the changes which would flow from a peace treaty.

Discussion

1. The Soviet pronouncement of 11 September/2/ confirms the end of a phase in negotiations on the Berlin problem which began with the Rusk-Gromyko meetings in the fall of 1961. In acknowledging that these talks have failed the Soviets did not renounce further negotiations; they apparently envisage a renewal of contacts with the US later this fall. For the time being, however, the Soviets have almost certainly concluded that continuation of negotiations in the manner of the last year holds little promise of success. At the same time, the Soviets have not chosen, as they previously threatened, to proceed immediately to a separate treaty. The statement of 11 September appears to rule out a separate treaty in the next few months. It is probable that their appraisal of the situation at this time, perhaps associated with the increase of tensions over Cuba, has led the Soviets to conclude once again that a separate treaty which poses a direct challenge to the Western presence in and access to Berlin is too hazardous a course.

/2/For text, see Pravda or Izvestia, September 12, 1962.

2. The deferral of a peace treaty, however, need not inhibit the Soviets from taking further action locally to advance their objectives. They have already taken one such step in abolishing their commandant's office in Berlin and replacing it with an East German authority. This step not only does away with one of the most important symbols of Four-Power responsibility for the whole of Berlin, but it also opens up a variety of possibilities for further encroachments, of which two seem especially significant.

Local Actions

3. First, a logical next step would be for the East German commandant to impose new conditions on Allied access to East Berlin, claiming that the Soviet departure had altered the basis of entry rights. The Soviets almost certainly believe that they can pose this question in a way which will not provoke the Allies to use force to maintain access. Thus, this move would be designed to force the Allies either to acknowledge East German sovereignty in some fashion, an important victory in itself, or to give up the right of access to the eastern half of the city.

4. The Soviets would closely observe the outcome of this maneuver in order to judge how far they could safely go in involving East Germany in controls on allied access to West Berlin. For example, if the West acquiesced in new documentary procedures at the sector border, or accepted East German escorts for its trips into East Berlin, the Soviets would be encouraged to believe that similar measures on the autobahn would not be very risky. They might conclude that they could begin to involve East German authorities in Soviet controls over access to West Berlin even before a treaty.

5. Second, the Soviets already are taking steps which seem designed to create de facto what they have long demanded of the Allies, namely, a new status for West Berlin alone, guaranteed by Soviet as well as Western forces, to replace the occupation arrangements. They evidently intend to maintain and even intensify their activities in West Berlin and have threatened to retaliate against Allied ground access to the city if the West interferes with or denies Soviet access to West Berlin. They probably expect that, since the West wishes the Soviets to remain in the Berlin Air Safety Center, they can alter the access procedures to and within the city without being thrown out of West Berlin. And if the West does take such action, the Soviets have laid the groundwork for retaliating on the autobahn. To the degree that the Soviets are successful in maintaining their presence in West Berlin, while transferring to East Germany their responsibilities in East Berlin, they will have made a major advance.

6. This is a potent maneuver, not only because it advances Soviet objectives vis-à-vis the Western Powers, but because it also has an important effect on Berlin morale. West Berliners are especially sensitive to any suspicion that the USSR is acquiring a voice in their part of the city. The Soviets realize, of course, that a high state of Berlin morale is a vital ingredient in the Western position and the economic viability of the city.

General Soviet Tactics

7. For the next few months the Soviets are keeping open a number of possibilities including further negotiations, a UN debate, a Khrushchev meeting with President Kennedy, and unilateral encroachments in West Berlin. All this suggests that they are still probing, still assessing Western positions and reactions, and not firmly committed to any fixed course. However, we think it likely that Khrushchev will continue to make various unilateral moves in order to accomplish piecemeal and de facto some of the changes which would flow from a separate treaty. In this tactical prescription, the signing of a peace treaty might come at the end of the process and merely formalize it, or it might come at some intermediate point but in a manner which would not pose a major showdown. As we have previously estimated, the Soviets will hold open the possibility of negotiation at all stages. However, unless they conclude at some point that the West has become willing to entertain significant concessions, their own stated willingness for negotiations or participation in further talks probably will be largely pro forma and will not reflect any serious expectation that some sort of mutually tolerable compromise could be achieved in this way.

The UN

8. The Soviets have recently encouraged rumors that they will raise the Berlin issue this fall at the General Assembly. If they do so, it seems certain that they will not simply turn the entire question over to the UN for whatever solution it can devise. Instead, they will be seeking certain political results, and the manner in which they present the issue will depend upon their objectives.

9. If the Soviets are primarily interested in further negotiations, they would use the UN mainly as a means of generating wider pressures among the neutrals for Western concessions. In addition to arguing the merits of their case, they would probably urge the UN to take some role in Berlin along the lines of various Soviet proposals for an end to the occupation status. They would almost certainly anticipate that such a UN debate would prompt neutrals to urge a meeting between Khrushchev and President Kennedy and a temporary maintenance of the status quo while the parties negotiated. If the Soviets proceed in this general manner, therefore, we would conclude that they were prepared to delay a treaty for a longer time and to continue negotiations, possibly under some UN mandate.

10. If, however, the Soviets intend to rely principally on additional unilateral measures, and perhaps ultimately sign a separate treaty, then any resort to the UN would be intended mainly to inhibit the West from sharp and possibly dangerous reactions. In this case, they would probably make some definite moves toward a treaty before raising the question in the General Assembly. By proceeding in this fashion, they would hope to focus debate on the "threat to peace" represented by Western insistence that the Allies would tolerate no diminution of their rights.

 

236. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, September 7, 1962, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-UD/9-762. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

616. For President and Secretary from Udall. Policy. Met with Khrushchev yesterday at Pitsunda for two hours followed by lunch and informal conversation./2/ First hour was very profitable discussion of electric power and resource development problems.

/2/A transcript of the conversation, drafted by Udall and his interpreter, is ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. An extract on Germany and Berlin is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XV, pp. 308-310.

Khrushchev then introduced West Berlin and other foreign policy issues. As expected, he reasserted his hard line and indicated the Peace Treaty will be signed. He stated flatly he would not allow Western troops remain Berlin and while permitting access for civilian traffic would not allow access for military purposes. However, he did make one significant suggestion which Chargé d'Affaires feels I should convey to you in person.

Khrushchev expressed his satisfaction with our handling of his U-2 flight protest./3/ He seemed even willing to give us the benefit of the doubt and concede such things might even happen accidentally. Obviously your pledge has considerable significance in his thinking.

/3/On September 4 McSweeney had been called to the Foreign Ministry to receive a note protesting a U-2 violation of Soviet air space East of Sakhalin. In its reply, transmitted to the Embassy in Moscow the same day, the United States allowed that a U.S. Air Force plane, which had encountered severe winds in that area, might have overflown Sakhalin. The note stressed that, if the plane had violated Soviet air space, it was unintentional and that the policy enunciated by the President on January 25, 1961, on U-2 flights had not changed. The texts of the two notes and McSweeney's account of the meeting at the Foreign Ministry are in Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/9-462. The notes are also printed in Department of State Bulletin, September 24, 1962, pp. 449-450.

Stated he had been reading statements of Senators who wanted US to invade Cuba and denounced them in strong terms but is fully aware of position which you have taken and expressed approval of it.

He also expressed strong satisfaction with solution reached in Laos.

As per your counsel, I listened and advanced established positions which our government has taken on issues discussed.

On two occasions, Khrushchev indicated his desire to have you and Mrs. Kennedy as guests at this resort. Of course, he did not express this as an invitation but by implication something which he was most anxious to accomplish and at the appropriate time.

Expect to be in my office on Monday morning and will be available for conference with you and/or Secretary Rusk.

McSweeney

 

237. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, September 13, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-UD/9-1362. Confidential. Drafted by Kamman.

SUBJECT
Discussion of Udall visit to USSR

PARTICIPANTS
Stewart L. Udall, Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin, Mrs. Dobrynin,Curtis Kamman

Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin invited today Secretary and Mrs. Udall to lunch at the Embassy to share the Secretary's impressions of his trip to the Soviet Union. Mrs. Udall was unable to attend; the Secretary therefore asked that the reporting officer accompany him. Current international political issues were not discussed.

Ambassador Dobrynin showed the Secretary a copy of Pravda containing new verses by Robert Frost./2/ Both expressed the opinion that the Frost visit had been an outstanding success. Dobrynin mentioned that no American literary figure of Frost's standing had ever visited the Soviet Union before. The Secretary stated that he appreciated the opportunity of visiting with Khrushchev/3/ and was especially grateful that Khrushchev had received Frost. He stated that he would do his utmost to provide an opportunity for Soviet poet Tvardovsky to see the President when Tvardovsky pays a reciprocal visit in October.

/2/Robert Frost visited the Soviet Union August 29-September 9. For an account of his trip, including an extensive summary of his conversation with Khrushchev on September 7, see Reeve, Robert Frost in Russia.

/3/See Document 236.

The gift of Georgian wine sent by Khrushchev to the President was mentioned by Dobrynin. The Secretary told of the circumstances which gave rise to the gift--wine tasting and toasting the health of the President at Khrushchev's Black Sea villa.

Dobrynin had not yet received a record of the Udall-Khrushchev conversation. He inquired whether Vinogradov had taken notes, and upon learning that he had, asked whether the Secretary had felt the conversation to be significant. The Secretary replied that the conversation had indeed been significant, and at Dobrynin's request outlined in two or three sentences Khrushchev's comments on the U-2 incident in the Far East and on the Berlin question.

The Secretary told Dobrynin of his conviction that exchanges at the very highest level, up to and including chief of state, were an important contribution to better understanding between USSR and USA. Dobrynin stated that an exchange of visits between President Kennedy and Khrushchev would mark the high point of his term as Ambassador in Washington, and that he hoped such an exchange would come to pass when the proper time arrived. He was equally receptive, in a general way, to the suggestion that Vice-President Johnson and Frol Kozlov each pay extensive visits to USSR and USA, respectively.

The Secretary mentioned to Dobrynin that the recent primary elections seemed to indicate that responsible men were gaining support at the expense of men with outmoded political views, and that he would soon be traveling throughout the nation campaigning for congressional candidates who favor President Kennedy's policies.

Other conversation revolved around places visited in the Soviet Union, personalities encountered along the way, and opinions on both Russian and American literature.

Dobrynin mentioned that he planned to attend the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly. He gave no indication who might be coming from Moscow.

Dobrynin also expressed the hope that Secretary of Agriculture Freeman would be able to visit the Soviet Union within the next year or so. He had talked with Secretary Freeman in connection with the visit of Soviet Minister of Agriculture Pysin./4/

/4/See footnotes 1 and 3, Document 219.

 

238. Memorandum From Secretary of the Interior Udall to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, September 14, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev/Udall. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Rusk.

Repeatedly during my Soviet Union trip I found myself asking this question:

What can the United States do to encourage and accelerate those changes in the Soviet system favorable to our own long-term objectives?

Some observers undoubtedly tend to overstate the liberalization that is occurring, but nevertheless there is a consensus that significant changes have taken place in the post-Stalin period. (Perhaps the best recent summary is the Edward Crankshaw article which appeared in the London Observer September 9.)

Some of my own tentative conclusions after eleven days in the Soviet Union were these:

1. There is an unmistakable and deep-seated respect for American power and American prowess. This means that at all levels the Soviet people are inordinately curious about the American way of getting things done. This is a very healthy condition.

2. A pattern of economic incentives and awards is developing in the Soviet Union which, in the long run, might also significantly alter the Soviet system. Some of the more interesting things which we observed (although caveats apply to each) were:

a. double-pay wages for the dam-builders on the Siberian frontier;

b. ten-year loans for private homes at Bratsk;

c. the growing attachment of the managers and the elite to what one might call dacha-living.

3. There is evidence of a growing awareness by the Soviets that their ability to compete is inhibited by the secrecy and suspicion which dominate their thinking. The experience of the Soviets with their exchange programs--and the activities of the vital State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research Work--has apparently convinced them that a limited "open-window" policy is beneficial to their own system. It is predictable that this window will be opened wider as time passes.

4. The Communist Party apparatus will, of course, remain dominant, but much important decision-making power is gravitating towards the scientists, engineers and managers who are the doers who make their system go and also have strong Party ties. For the most part, these are pragmatic men who are far more interested in building their country than in pursuing Marxian theories of revolution. A form of agnosticism, one might say, is showing up.

Therefore, it is my feeling that we have an opportunity to influence this process of liberalization, and I strongly recommend that a fresh study be made of this whole problem to determine what new courses of action might be pursued with profit.

As a starter, it seems to me we are missing a bet in not arranging more high-level exchanges. Visits to the Soviet Union by the Vice President, the Attorney General and selected members of the Cabinet would be very worthwhile. Return visits by men in high places--Kozlov, for example--would be equally effective.

Stewart L. Udall

 

239. Editorial Note

In a letter of September 15, 1962, President Kennedy informed Chairman Khrushchev that he was "happy to note your suggestion that you are prepared to negotiate a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in the immediate future. Now that the subcommittee on nuclear test ban is continuing in session throughout the recess in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference, I think we should make a serious effort to work out such an agreement in time to meet the target date of January 1, 1963." Kennedy added that the U.S. had prepared such a treaty. For text of Kennedy's letter, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VII, pages 568-569.

Khrushchev responded in a letter of September 28. Referring to Kennedy's comment that a serious effort be made to work out an agreement by January 1, 1963, Khrushchev stated that the Soviets would not keep the United States waiting. If an agreement were reached on a ban in three environments, he continued, "there remains the question of underground tests." Referring to the suggestion of British scientists at the recent Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs that automatic unmanned seismic stations could help determine whether an underground tremor was a nuclear blast or an earthquake, Khrushchev stated: "After thinking this suggestion over we came to the conclusion that it can be accepted if this would make it easier to reach an agreement. In this case it could be provided in the treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests that automatic seismic stations be set up both near the borders of the nuclear states and 2-3 such stations directly on the territory of the states possessing nuclear weapons--in the areas most frequently subjected to earthquakes." Khrushchev proposed that, after reaching agreement on a three environment ban, negotiations continue on an underground ban and that all nuclear powers refrain from carrying out underground tests during the negotiations. For text, see ibid., pages 575-579.

Kennedy replied in an October 8 letter: "I am encouraged by the areas in which we are in accord and by your statement that the Soviet Union is prepared to make 'new efforts' in order to conclude an early agreement. Certainly it would seem we are agreed in our approach to three types of tests--in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water." With respect to underground tests, Kennedy stated that the "development of automatic unmanned seismic mechanisms might very well, if properly worked out, facilitate agreement on the means of actually detecting underground explosions--although my scientists indicate that it would require much more than the two or three such stations you mentioned as being located directly in the areas most frequently subjected to earthquakes. Of course, these mechanical devices would still have to be supplemented by a modest number of on-site inspections." For text, see ibid., pages 585-586.

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