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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume V Soviet Union DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

240. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/

Washington, September 19, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-UD/9-1962. Confidential. Drafted by Guthrie, initialed by Tyler, and sent through S/S to Ball who also initialed it.

SUBJECT
Comments on Secretary Udall's Memorandum to the President/2/

/2/Document 238.

We are in general agreement with the tentative conclusions which Secretary Udall reached after 11 days in the Soviet Union as to the direction Soviet society is taking. With regard to specific points made by the Secretary we have the following observations. The stressing of economic incentives and awards has been a growing practice. However, with reference to the specific examples cited by Secretary Udall, premium wages for priority work in Siberia and other "frontier areas" was standard practice even under Stalin. As for 10-year loans for private homes and the growing attachment of the elite for dacha-living, recent Government pressures have been in the opposite direction, i.e., loans for private homes and dacha construction are now much more difficult to obtain than just a few months ago.

It is true that the Soviets see benefits in the exchanges program with the U.S. and are as a result compelled to pursue a limited "open window" policy. It should be noted, however, that the Soviets have very clear objectives in the exchanges program, utilizing exchanges primarily for the purpose of obtaining as much technical and technological information as possible from the U.S. while giving as little as possible in return. They are also interested in prestigious exchanges, such as performing arts. However, where the exchanges deal with subjects such as exhibits, dissemination of information, etc., which have an obvious impact on Soviet citizenry, and in which we have greater interest than the Soviets, we find the going very heavy indeed. We have recently concluded time-consuming negotiations to arrive at the present exchanges agreement and have the problem of how to utilize these exchanges to our best overall advantage constantly under review. Thus, we do not feel that a fresh study of the problem is called for at this time.

Finally, as a general proposition we recognize that there is a liberalization process taking place within the Soviet Union. In our view, however, this is bound to be an extremely slow process with a dynamic of its own and while we should of course do whatever is possible to further this development, it would be a mistake to believe that we can exert undue influence on it through such actions as high-level exchanges.

With regard to increased high-level exchanges, Secretary Udall's trip was of course arranged under the Exchanges Program. It should be noted, however, that the Soviets, in welcoming such exchanges, attach considerable political significance to them and expect the high-level visitor to have a similar political motivation. For this reason we believe that we should reserve high-level visits for times when we have something important to convey to the Soviets. A visit to the USSR by the Attorney General would have inescapable overtones which may or may not be desirable at any given time. In this connection, the Soviet Government utilizes such exchanges to purvey to the Soviet people and the world a sense of normalcy in U.S.-USSR relations which does not in fact exist. We do not, for example, believe that the current time of increasing tensions between the U.S. and the USSR is a propitious one for high-level visits with accompanying atmospherics. Lastly, the only visit to the Soviet Union which would have a real and deep impact on both Soviet leaders and people at large would in our estimation be a visit by the President. Obviously the current state of U.S. and USSR relations and the international situation are not propitious for such a visit.

As regards the prospect of return visits by men in high places such as Frol Kozlov, we understand that Secretary Udall's suggestion is in part motivated by his belief that Kozlov is a likely successor to Khrushchev. Indeed, Secretary Udall has asked that the Department give him its consensus on Khrushchev's probable successor. A paper addressed to this problem is attached and you may wish to give it to Secretary Udall when you see him. In this connection it should be pointed out that Kozlov visited the U.S. only two years ago when he was a First Deputy Premier. At the present moment, while he holds high offices in the Communist Party, he does not hold an important position in the Soviet Government which might provide a convenient pretext for an invitation. In summary, we believe that high-level visits either way between the U.S. and the USSR should have greater motivation than the belief that they will serve to educate Soviet leadership or open up Soviet society.

Attachment/3/

/3/Confidential.

PROBABLE SUCCESSION TO PRESENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP FOLLOWING DEATH OR RETIREMENT OF N.S. KHRUSHCHEV

It generally is estimated that the departure of Khrushchev from the top leadership scene will pose less of an immediate problem in the transfer of authority and the maintenance of stable control channels than did the death of Stalin. The top group around Khrushchev, more accustomed to the exercise of both individual and collective responsibility, should be able to retain authority as a leadership "collective" for a more or less extended interregnum period. Some members of this leadership collective are expected to exercise relatively more authority and leadership initiative than others, and it seems inevitable that even initially some focus of authority will be evident. By general consensus, this initial focus most likely will be on the personages of Party Second Secretary F.R. Kozlov, Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman L.I. Brezhnev, First Deputy Premiers A.N. Kosygin and A.I. Mikoyan and Party Secretary M.A. Suslov, all members of the Party Presidium and Khrushchev's leading lieutenants. For the sake of displaying continuity with the past older but lesser figures like N.M. Shvernik and O.V. Kuusinen initially may be given prestige attention without, however, responsibility permitting the exercise of added influence.

There is less of a consensus concerning possible later shifts in the top leadership structure although some of the more dynamic members of the lesser leadership are expected to rise in authority and importance. Of those already on the Party Presidium, A.P. Kirilenko and G.I. Voronov (First Deputy Chairmen of the Central Committee's Bureau for the RSFSR), D. Polyansky (RSFSR Premier) and N.V. Podgorny (First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party) may fall in this category.

Although Kozlov stands high on the list of possible successors to Khrushchev and not infrequently is termed the heir apparent, there can be no assurance that he will emerge sooner or later as the "most equal of equals" in the top leadership. His position as Khrushchev's next-in-command in the Central Committee Secretariat both provides him with the opportunity to consolidate his personal position and identifies him to Presidium associates as a person whose authority may need to be "contained" if their own relative positions are not to suffer.

Ambassador Thompson recently has expressed views similar to those outlined above. Somewhat more specifically, he feels that if Khrushchev should depart from the scene now Kozlov and Kosygin might well assume the major Party and Government responsibilities, respectively. As power relationships within the leading group are at best unstable and shift with different times and pressures, however, the Ambassador feels that should Khrushchev remain at the helm the chances are good that in time neither Kozlov nor Kosygin will figure as an heir apparent.

 

241. Editorial Note

In a letter of September 28, 1962, to President Kennedy, in which he discussed a nuclear test ban (see Document 239), Chairman Khrushchev also discussed Cuba and Berlin and protested Kennedy's September 7 request to Congress for authority to call up the Ready Reserve. He called the request "a step making the atmosphere red-hot" and one "that, naturally, forces the other side to respond in kind. What could it lead to, all the more that you consider that the U.S. has the right to attack Cuba whenever it wishes?" Khrushchev concluded his letter: "I would ask you to correctly understand our anxiety and not to do anything that could further aggravate the atmosphere and even expose the world. We on our part again say to you that we will do nothing with regard to West Berlin until after the elections in the U.S. After the elections, apparently in the second half of November, it would be necessary in our opinion to continue the dialogue." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VI, pages 152-161.

 

242. Editorial Note

On September 29, 1962, Under Secretary of State Ball forwarded Talking Points on the Congo to President Kennedy for use at a luncheon meeting the next day with British Foreign Secretary Lord Home. Ball's paper expressed concern over the possibility that prolonged civil war in the Congo would "create a power vacuum into which the USSR would almost certainly try to move." Similarly, in an October 2 meeting with the President, Representative to the United Nations Stevenson warned that the consequence of failure in the Congo "would be extremely serious," resulting in "continuous civil war, and a golden opportunity for the Soviets." For text of Ball's paper and the memorandum of Stevenson's conversation with the President, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XX, pages 594-597 and 599-600.

On December 10 during a long discussion about the Congo at a White House staff meeting, President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Kaysen said, according to a memorandum for the record, "that the threat of a 'Soviet presence or menace' in the Congo was the gut issue--i.e., if we were certain that the Soviets would not rush in to replace us, we would probably try to leave and convince everybody else to do likewise." For text, see ibid., page 716.

 

243. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, October 10, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of Sate, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2. Secret. Drafted by Thompson. Copies were sent to Bundy, Tyler, Foster, and Martin J. Hillenbrand (Director of the Berlin Task Force and of the Office of German Affairs).

SUBJECT
Memorandum of luncheon conversation with Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR, Soviet Embassy, Wednesday, October 10, 1962, 1:00 p.m.

Dobrynin asked me to lunch alone today. In discussing inadequacies of his Embassy, he pointed out that the last time Mr. Khrushchev visited the United States, he stayed at Blair House, and had not been aware of the need for better accommodations. Dobrynin said he was hopeful that this time Khrushchev would stay in the Embassy and realize the need for a better one.

This gave me the opportunity to ask when he was likely to come. Dobrynin said this had not yet been decided in Moscow. When I said the rumors seem to indicate the latter part of November, he added "or early December."

Dobrynin then asked for my personal opinion as to the wisdom of such a visit at this time. I said I found this difficult to answer, to which he interjected that this was a difficult question which was why he was asking my opinion. I went on to say that frequent contacts between the President and Mr. Khrushchev would be helpful as I was convinced that many misunderstandings existed and that at least some of these could be cleared up through closer contact. On the other hand, I said he must be aware of the feeling aroused in this country by developments in Cuba, which did not provide a very good background against which to discuss other questions. I also said that I could not observe, in the exchanges which we had had so far, much hope for a successful settlement of the Berlin question.

Dobrynin indicated he agreed with this view and said that such a meeting was bound to generate hopes which might result in disappointment. He also mentioned the imminence of American elections.

I pointed out that Secretary Rusk had told Mr. Gromyko/2/ that our elections need play no role in negotiations about Berlin, but said that the Republican Party apparently intended to exploit the Cuban issue in the coming campaign, which might further arouse public sentiment. Mr. Dobrynin said that purely from the point of view of elections, he assumed that next Fall would be the ideal time for a meeting, but then went on to indicate his own view that early December of this year might be an appropriate time. My impression is that he will recommend against any visit at this time but that if Khrushchev insists on coming, it should be some time in early December.

/2/For a record of Rusk's conversation with Gromyko, October 6, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XV, pp. 348-351.

Dobrynin then asked me for my opinion as to what area I thought there was the most hope for some progress in improving our relations. In reply, I said it seemed to me the logical way to approach this question was to seek areas in which our interests in the settlement of a problem coincide most closely. I said that in theory, it seemed to me that an agreement on atomic testing best met this criterion. On the other hand, from my talks with Mr. Khrushchev before my departure from Moscow, I had been obliged to conclude that there appeared to be little hope of an agreement on this problem and had so informed the Secretary. I said I thought this was due to the firmness of their position on the inspection issue. I said I could not see why they could not accept a ban on atmospheric, outer space, and underwater tests. Dobrynin said they could not agree to this as long as we took the position we were going to test underground, and said he did not see why we could not agree to a moratorium of several years. In reply, I referred to Congressional and public opinion as well as the fact that we had a particular problem in keeping our scientists engaged in this work in the absence of any indication that the work would go forward.

Dobrynin observed that we could always have a program of tests prepared for us in case it became necessary. He also suggested that we could educate Congressional and public opinion. I said I understood there was also a considerable division of opinion within the Administration and among the experts. I cautioned him, however, that I was not really in touch with people competent in this field and he should not, therefore, attach much importance to my expressions of personal opinion on this subject.

When Dobrynin indicated that the Soviet military were strongly opposed to an agreement which would leave open the possibility of underground tests, I said this seemed strange to me since I assumed that underground tests would mainly be valuable for the development of small arms, and that we were probably ahead of them in this field. It therefore seemed more to their advantage than ours, from a military point of view, to leave open the possibility of underground tests. Dobrynin replied that if this were, in fact, the case, then we should be able to agree to a moratorium. He also referred to the possible use of automatic unmanned seismic stations, and argued that these should be able to establish whether an explosion was due to an earthquake or an atomic device. He said that earthquakes did not spread their effects evenly, whereas an atomic explosion did, and that by comparing the readings on various stations around the location of the disturbance, one could easily tell its nature. I observed that this would require a considerable number of stations, and I did not know enough to judge how reliable such a system would be, but understood that our experts considered that some inspection of doubtful cases would, in any case, be necessary.

Turning to general disarmament, I referred to my conversation with Mr. Khrushchev on our zonal inspection plan,/3/ and said that since this met most of their objections to our proposals and was in accord with their principle, that the amount of inspection should be commensurate with the amount of disarmament, I could not understand why they had not more seriously considered our proposals. Dobrynin did not seem to have any answer to this but merely observed that he had to admit that we had at last produced a fairly comprehensive disarmament program.

/3/See Document 214.

On the Berlin question, Dobrynin asked me if I did not think that our principals, meaning Secretary Rusk and Mr. Gromyko, had at least made some little progress in their last talk. I said that there had been some little movement in the talks between us; that anything new, no matter how slight, looked important. He said he did not have a full report, but was going to New York shortly to see Mr. Gromyko. Dobrynin observed that of course no progress had been made on the principal question, which was the removal of our troops, but as the hour was late, we did not pursue the matter further.

 

244. Current Intelligence Weekly Review/1/

Washington, October 12, 1962.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by CIA's Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 3-4 of the Weekly Review section of the issue.

Sino-Soviet Relations Continue To Deteriorate

The closing of the last two Soviet consulates in China is the latest illustration of the steady deterioration in governmental relations resulting from the Sino-Soviet controversy over party doctrine.

According to some reports, the consulates were closed at Peiping's request. The Soviet Embassy in Moscow has tried to put a better face on the matter by depicting the closing as an economy measure. It is possible that the Chinese, taking a leaf from their treatment of US consuls in China during 1949 and 1950, conducted such a campaign of harassment that the USSR decided it had no recourse but to shut down the consulates.

Some evidence of Chinese harassment is provided by White Russians who recently left Manchuria. According to one report, Chinese authorities rejected protests of the Soviet consul general in Harbin relating to procedures governing the departure of Russian residents. The Chinese were said to have replied that they were masters in the area. According to the White Russian refugees, Chinese troops threw a security cordon around the Harbin consulate several weeks before it closed. At the same time, the Chinese reportedly raided the quarters of a Soviet citizens' organization in Harbin. The activities of such organizations have been directed since World War II by Soviet consular officials.

The Chinese pressures against the consulates may have reflected Peiping's view that they provided bases for subversion that could not be ignored in the context of the growing estrangement between the two countries. In this connection, the Chinese could have recalled the subversive activity fostered by Soviet consulates in Sinkiang during the 1940s.

In its anxiety to diminish the Russian presence in China, Peiping appears to be expediting the emigration of White Russians, whom the Chinese regard as a suspect segment of the population. Well over 400 White Russians arrived in Hong Kong in September. This total compared with figures of about 170 in August and of only 50 or so per month earlier in the year.

Peiping's concerns about security have apparently led to increases in the contingent of border guards along the Soviet frontier, at least near Manchouli. Reports from the White Russians appear to be corroborated by a letter received by a recent Chinese Communist defector. The letter refers to the training of a Chinese public security unit for border-guard duty near Manchouli. The defector believes that this activity reflects Chinese Communist concern about subversive operations in the frontier area.

These measures to tighten state security have been accompanied by allusions in recent Chinese propaganda to "revisionist" efforts to subvert members of the Chinese Communist Party. A sign that these efforts may be continuing was provided by the publication in Pravda on 28 September of a "new document" purporting to be a decipherment of a hitherto missing Lenin draft. The Soviets claim that the document is an earlier version of certain chapters of Lenin's report on "The Immediate Tasks of Soviet Rule," which he had presented at the April 1918 session of the highest governmental body in Russia at that time.

The "new document" was offered by Pravda as a rebuttal to Chinese jeers at Soviet "economism"--i.e., an excessive concern for economic development, with a consequent refusal to wage the struggle against the West with sufficient militancy. Lenin was represented as affirming that political tasks are subordinate to economic tasks after a Communist party has come to power. "Agitators," according to Lenin's newly discovered precepts, were useful mainly for the tasks of seizing power; later and more complex economic tasks were said to require "practical leaders and organizers." The implication that Communist China should borrow from the experience of the USSR was contained in Lenin's alleged observation about learning from the "neighboring and very much more developed countries."

The "new document" thus invokes Lenin in support of Khrushchev's long-standing condemnation of the extremist economic programs promoted by Mao and his associates against the objections of more realistic sections of the party. The Chinese leaders are obviously sensitive about such appeals by Moscow to susceptible elements in China. Recent Chinese statements ominously suggest the vulnerability of such elements in any new party purge.

For those who might have questions about the presence of these unreliables in the armed forces, Communist China's chief of staff included some pointed remarks in a speech on 6 October. He "expressed the hope," according to the Chinese Communist news agency, that the army would be the agent of further victories "in the defense of the party central committee and Chairman Mao." He exhorted the armed forces to heightened vigilance against the country's enemies "no matter who they are."

 

245. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, October 13, 1962, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123-Midthun, Kermit S. Confidential.

955. Embtel 945./2/ With expulsion Midthun (following expulsion Commander Smith),/3/ Embassy now has presumably paid in full for way in which trap was sprung on Nelson Drummond in New York and two Soviet diplomatic officers apprehended, photographed and detained./4/ Cost to U.S. Government in terms of deprival specially qualified and trained personnel and impairment of operations of this Embassy is significant.

/2/Telegram 945, October 12, transmitted the text of note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry requesting Kermit S. Midthun, First Secretary at the Embassy in Moscow, to leave the country for activities incompatible with his status as an accredited diplomat. (Ibid.) A copy of Midthun's report on the incident on September 23, which brought this action, was transmitted as an enclosure to airgram A-563 from Moscow, October 19. (Ibid.)

/3/On October 2 the U.S. Naval Attaché, Commander Raymond D. Smith, had been forcibly seized, searched, and held for 4-1/2 hours in Leningrad without being able to communicate with the Embassy. Despite an Embassy protest on October 4, Smith was expelled from the Soviet Union. (ALUSNA 031605Z and telegram 849 from Moscow, October 3 and 4; ibid., 120.162261/10-362 and 10-462)

/4/On September 28 Nelson Drummond, a U.S. Navy enlisted man, and two officials from the Soviet U.N. Mission were arrested in Larchmont, New York, with classified documents in their possession. The Department of State summarized the case, in which the Soviet officials were described as "uncooperative" and "resistant," in telegram 821 to Moscow, October 5. (Ibid., 304.61/10-562)

Fully recognizing the importance to U.S. security of disrupting activities such as those of Drummond, must nonetheless question whether, in fact, Drummond case (which according to news reports has been going on in at least partially controlled fashion for years) could not have been resolved in a way that would meet those security requirements without involving such cost to ourselves.

Apart from the ill effect on Embassy operations and prestige of retaliatory PNG actions, consideration must also be given to the personal security of Embassy officers who are required in the course of their official duties to be exposed to whatever form of maltreatment the Soviet Secret Police find appropriate or amusing. Given the nature of this society, the Soviets can always beat us in the application of humiliation, force, duress and coercion. Midthun received the most gentle possible kind of treatment. Commander Smith got a small taste of what can happen. Military Attaché officers, because of the nature of their assignments including travel to and in isolated areas, are particularly vulnerable, though this is also true to a lesser extent of non-military as well.

Would hope foregoing considerations could be brought to the attention of all appropriate elements of U.S. Government and kept in mind in the not unlikely event of future cases involving Soviet diplomatic personnel.

As regards our reaction now to Smith and Midthun expulsions, believe Soviets consider balance has been effected. (The circumstances of the Midthun action, i.e., failure thus far to document allegation against him, would indicate they do not want to go beyond simple man-for-man reciprocity by establishing a second full-blown incident.) Department will have noted that two elements of U.S. Government involved in Prokhorov/Vyrodov affairs have been involved in retaliatory actions here: Navy (Smith and Drummond) and FBI (Midthun's previous association with the bureau cannot be unknown to the Soviets).

In the circumstances, believe we should not propose further expulsion of Soviets in U.S. in connection this matter since Soviet Government would undoubtedly consider this as opening a new round.

Kohler

 

246. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Bowles) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, October 14, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.6111/10-1562. Secret. The source text is attached to an October 15 memorandum of transmittal from Bowles to Rusk. Copies were sent to Ball and U. Alexis Johnson.

REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON SATURDAY, OCTOBER 13th, REGARDING CUBA AND OTHER SUBJECTS

A week ago Ambassador Dobrynin called my office to say that he understood I was leaving for Africa and would like to have our "long postponed luncheon" before my departure.

I met him at the U.S.S.R. Embassy on 16th Street at 1 p.m. on October 13th. With the exception of an occasional exchange of courtesies at diplomatic functions, this was the first time I had talked with him.

It was a frank, free-wheeling discussion, lasting more than an hour and a half. Dobrynin's manner was pleasant, with a show of reasonableness and concern about the current drift in Soviet-American relations.

At my first opportunity, I expressed deep disappointment that no more progress had been made in reducing tensions and concern over the consequences of a further decline. I said that since I was speaking wholly unofficially, he should not attempt to read anything into my remarks. I would like to be utterly frank with him.

Almost immediately Dobrynin brought up the question of Cuba and expressed worry and surprise at the intensity of U.S. public reaction.

In response to his question as to why we attached such importance to a relatively small island, I outlined the history of U.S.-Cuban relations and drew a parallel to the situation in 1898, the presence of Spanish misrule, and the U.S. public agitation that abetted the outbreak of war.

When he protested that the Soviet presence in Cuba was no greater provocation than the U.S. presence in Turkey, I pointed out that the present Administration had inherited a status quo that had grown up since the war. In some areas the advantage in this status quo had been with us, in others with Moscow; in still others it was a stand-off.

Our presence in Greece and Turkey, for instance, represented our reaction to Stalin's military and political pressures against these two countries following the war. It had become part of a status quo which in all its complexity could safely be changed only by negotiation with reciprocal benefits to each side.

The Kennedy Administration had hoped and expected that we could in fact negotiate a more rational set of relationships, easing the various danger points on a basis of reciprocal action to everyone's benefit.

However, in Cuba the U.S.S.R. had unilaterally altered this status quo by introducing a wholly new element. Our reaction, in these circumstances, should have been foreseeable.

Moreover, many U.S. students of Soviet affairs were soberly convinced that the U.S.S.R. had made this move deliberately to provoke a U.S. military response against Cuba on the theory that this would divert our energies from Berlin, and elsewhere, and enable Soviet spokesmen to charge us with aggression in the UN.

If this kind of thinking had in fact played a part in the Soviet analysis, it was extremely dangerous. If we did move into Cuba in response to some overt act or offensive build-up by the U.S.S.R., a global chain of events might be set in motion which could have catastrophic consequences.

For instance, the Soviets might then be tempted to take what they would term "counter-action" in Berlin and perhaps Turkey; and the United States, by that time in an extremely tense mood, would react with vigor.

The U.S.S.R., in turn, would feel pressed by the Chinese and other extremists to counter our moves, and we would be on our way together down the long slippery slide.

I asked Dobrynin if he had read The Guns of August./2/ He said "only a three-page summary."

/2/Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August, New York, 1962.

I urged him to read at least the first few chapters in which he would see a pattern of politico-military action and counter-action that could be repeated in the next six months.

In July 1914, men of intelligence in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France and England, all quite conscious of the forces which were feeding the approaching holocaust, found themselves enmeshed in internal pressures, commitments and precedents which left them powerless to avoid the inevitable. It would be the greatest folly in history if we were to repeat this insane process in the nuclear age.

Dobrynin asked me what, in the circumstances, I thought could be done in regard to Cuba. Stressing that I was speaking solely as an individual, I suggested three moves that the U.S.S.R. could sponsor to ease the situation.

1. Dobrynin should remind his government of President Kennedy's sharp distinction between defensive and offensive weapons in his recent statement. I was particularly concerned on this point because current reports indicated that Soviet shipments were in fact beginning to include weapons which had a clearly offensive capacity.

If this continued, it could produce--with the help of some incident perpetrated perhaps by individuals striving to provoke another "Remember the Maine" incident--the very conflict which the Administration is anxious to avoid. President Kennedy had committed himself to act under certain specific circumstances. This was a clear commitment, and the U.S.S.R. should not take it lightly.

2. From many reports, Castro now had ample defensive arms with which to protect himself from casual landings. The U.S.S.R. should tell him that under present circumstances no more arms will be shipped. The U.S.S.R. should then ask Castro himself to make a statement announcing that the defense of Cuba was assured and that no more arms were needed. Moscow could then inform us that no more arms would be shipped.

3. Castro should be asked by Moscow to state that he has no design on his neighbors, that his entire energies would henceforth be devoted to the economic development of Cuba, and that he sought only peaceful competition with other Latin American nations. His decision not to indulge in further subversion, propaganda, and expansion in neighboring Latin American countries would, of course, have to be confirmed by deeds. However, Soviet assurances on this point would serve to reduce some of the current tensions and give us all a breathing spell.

If some progress along these lines were not possible, I had deep forebodings about the weeks ahead.

To all of this Dobrynin appeared to listen intently. I believe he was impressed.

He answered that in spite of our worries, the U.S.S.R. was not shipping offensive weapons and well understood the dangers of doing so. Moreover, it was unreasonable for the U.S., as a major power, to expect a small, weak country such as Cuba to make such public concessions to U.S. public opinion even though both the U.S.S.R. and Cuba might accept all three points in principle.

Why, he asked repeatedly, do we get so excited about so small a nation? Although the U.S.S.R. could not let Cuba down, they had no desire to complicate the situation further. Was it not possible for us to negotiate a modus vivendi with Castro directly?

I commented that Cuba had initiated the current conflict. Indeed, in 1959 most Americans had strongly applauded Castro's revolution. If Dobrynin were misinformed about the types of weapons now arriving in Cuba, it would not be the first time in diplomatic history that this had occurred. As long as Soviet weapons flowed into Cuba and Cuban money was used to subvert Latin American countries which we were striving to assist into the 20th century, the situation would remain dangerously explosive.

I hoped that his government would see the danger and act accordingly to help ease the tensions.

Without directly responding to my remarks, Dobrynin referred to Max Frankel's story in the morning Times which cited agitation by various private agencies, Cuban and American, to provoke a "Maine incident" with the connivance of U.S. official groups. I replied that our government would have no part in such an operation, that we were genuinely worried, and that his government should view the situation with serious concern.

Dobrynin then switched the subject: What did I think of a meeting between Khrushchev and the President this fall or early winter?

Speaking purely for myself, I said I felt that such a meeting would be worthwhile only if we could be assured in advance of some areas of agreement. Otherwise it would only result, as had the meeting in June 1961, in a further sharpening of our differences, in a frustration of public hopes, and a strengthening of the extremists in both Russia and America.

Dobrynin said that this was precisely his view; but on what subjects could we agree?

I suggested several possibilities. For instance, the U.S.S.R. could state that it endorsed the Cuban position (along the lines of my suggestion) that no more arms were needed and that no more would be shipped; also that it endorsed the proposed Cuban statement that Cuba would forego expansionist exploits and would henceforth concentrate on internal development.

We should also be able to agree on a nuclear test ban in the atmosphere and under the sea, as well as cooperation between our two governments to conduct research in regard to underground testing, with a report on this subject to be prepared within some stated period. On the basis of this agreement, we could then announce our intention to work together to discourage other nations, including China, from developing nuclear weapons.

Parenthetically, I added that I could not understand the U.S.S.R.'s reluctance to deal seriously with arms control and reductions on a broad scale. I said that in February 1957 I had chided Khrushchev about being a poor Marxist, since otherwise he should assume that a capitalist nation such as the U.S. could not agree to arms reduction without facing economic collapse--and should therefore press for an agreement which we could not refuse./3/

/3/For a short summary of Bowles' conversation with Khrushchev, February 20, 1957, see Chester B. Bowles, Promises to Keep, New York, 1971, p. 252.

What, I asked, was holding up the serious, thoughtful negotiations on the broad subject of arms control that most of us hoped would by now be underway? The longer we postponed such discussion, the harder it would be to reach agreement. In the present competition we had all the immediate advantages since our economy had plenty of slack; yet it was a crazy, dangerous contest for all concerned, however you looked at it.

Dobrynin said frankly that in the U.S.S.R., as in the U.S., there were differences of view, that suspicions ran deep, and that no generals ever had enough weapons.

In further references to a meeting between Khrushchev and the President, I suggested that agreement could be reached to put Berlin on ice until we could discuss the situation in a less emotional atmosphere.

Why not frankly say just that? We realized that Khrushchev was in a difficult situation because of his statements four years ago that we would soon be out of Berlin; but surely he must realize that we were totally committed to staying there.

I then urged with great emphasis that the U.S.S.R. should not minimize the depth of this commitment. On the essential point of the U.S. presence in Berlin, we have absolutely no room for maneuver.

The 11,000 Western troops in Berlin had no military significance. They were purely a symbol of our rights there.

If we increased the symbolic number by 5000, the U.S.S.R. would react because the symbol had been changed; just so, our friends would react if we moved the symbol downward by 5000. For this reason, there was no basis for a negotiation of our presence under present conditions.

Even if differences should arise with our allies as to how to respond to "Ulbricht's pressures," we Americans would be forced to react, alone if necessary--move for move, threat for threat. We had absolutely no alternative. Khrushchev simply must understand this, or there could be a tragedy.

Dobrynin nodded but said nothing.

These were some of the things that could be agreed on in a Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting. They wouldn't assure world peace; but they would give both nations a fresh chance and some urgently needed room for maneuver and reduced tensions. Unless some such understandings could be reached, a meeting between the two principals might cause us to lose more ground.

We then talked briefly of Germany as a whole. I said that many of us shared Soviet concern over German's past tendencies towards aggression, and that "their Germans" were largely Prussians who had traditionally led the parades. Why not get rid of Ulbricht so that we could all talk more reasonably?

Our support of the Common Market and British participation was not only a result of our desire to see the construction of an efficient, united Europe, but because we wanted to see Germany peacefully and politically involved as a member of a united Europe, with Britain--which has great skill in this respect--acting as a balancing force. I stressed that this political objective was also in Moscow's ultimate interest.

A re-united, floating Germany, as an (unlikely) alternative, could scarcely resist an effort to bargain Moscow and Washington against each other, with even more unpredictable and potentially explosive results.

We then talked briefly of Afghanistan. I said that if what the U.S.S.R. really wants there is a buffer state, we should work together frankly to this end. The U.S. has absolutely no military objectives there. Indeed, in 1953 when the Afghan government asked us for military equipment and a military training mission, we refused because Afghanistan was traditionally neutral, directly bordering on the U.S.S.R., and under such circumstances a U.S. military mission would be provocative. It was unfortunate that the Soviets had not shown similar restraint in regard to Cuba.

Dobrynin answered that the U.S.S.R. agreed on Afghanistan's proper neutral position, but that we Americans were encouraging or at least tolerating Pakistan's "belligerent pressures" against Afghanistan. This was bad for everyone and seriously jeopardized the proper buffer-state status of the Afghans. (This was his only barbed comment.)

Finally, we turned to mainland China. I reiterated our intention of defending Taiwan against any Chinese attack and our determination not to allow Chiang to start trouble. Dobrynin said that Chiang was dangerous to all of us; I responded that he was far less so than Ulbricht.

In response to Dobrynin's questions, I discussed Formosa's economic success, its land reform, high literacy, the deep distaste of its people for the mainland government, and their preference even for Japanese rule if they were ever forced to choose between the two.

I said that in my recent visits to Asia I found widespread understanding of the extent of Communist China's failure. The hopes created by the "Great Leap Forward" were totally shattered.

Why, therefore, didn't the U.S.S.R. really take charge in Hanoi and insist on a live-and-let-live solution in East and Southeast Asia?

Of course, much depended on Laos. This was the test of everyone's intentions.

Dobrynin insisted with vigor that we were incorrect in saying that Moscow had allowed the Vietminh to remain in Laos. According to Soviet information, they were now practically all gone.

Why then, I asked, not allow the ICC to look and see for itself? He said that this could be worked out.

We returned to China's future. I pointed out that China, unlike Russia, lacked key natural resources--particularly oil and arable land. Someday the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., working together, could bring effective pressure to bear on China--the U.S.S.R. through oil and the U.S. through food. Why should we delay?

I said we understood that the Soviets were now supplying 70% of China's petroleum; he commented "It's more than that," and he added that oil would soon be flowing directly to China from the "newly discovered unlimited Siberian oil fields only a few hundred kilometers from the Chinese borders."

I asked if this did not cause concern in Moscow since a successful grab by the Peking government for the new Siberian oil and Siberia's wheat potential could make China self-sufficient. "In that case," I added facetiously, "we might help guarantee your borders--provided by that time we are on speaking terms, with no Berlin and Cuba to cause us trouble."

Seriously, I asked, why should we quarrel? Neither we nor the U.S.S.R. can run the world, since it is much too diversified. Burmese want to be Burmese; Brazilians, Brazilians; Japanese, Japanese. No one wants to be run by either Moscow or Washington. Together we cannot only keep the world from exploding; we can create rational relationships that will benefit all of us, eventually even China.

In the course of his many questions and comments, Dobrynin stressed what he called the Soviet Government's desire for better understanding, its inability to fathom U.S. public opinion, its irritation over the fact that we are constantly saying "wait until after the election--and you are always having elections," its concern over its own internal needs, and its rejection of my "thesis that the U.S.S.R., Cuba or someone else should make all the concessions."

Yet I came away feeling that his concern was genuine. Our reactions to Cuba appear to have surprised him, and he is frankly at a loss how to explain them. He returned to this question again and again.

Dobrynin politely asked me about my African trip and said he would look forward to a "further discussion" on my return. This occasion, he said, had been most helpful to him in understanding how "you Americans look at things."

 

247. Editorial Note

On the morning of October 14, 1962, a U-2 aircraft flying a reconnaissance mission over the western part of Cuba produced the first verified evidence of the existence of Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba. Two further U-2 missions on October 15 revealed additional ballistic missile sites. McGeorge Bundy notified President Kennedy the morning of October 16, and the President immediately called a meeting of his principal advisers, during which they began to formulate a policy to respond to the Soviet threat. These deliberations marked the beginning of Cuban missile crisis, the most dangerous U.S.-Soviet confrontation during the cold war.

Extensive documentation on the missile crisis and its aftermath, including the subsequent, lesser known "Soviet bomber crisis," the U.S.-Soviet failure to negotiate a post-crisis resolution, and the ongoing problem of Soviet military forces in Cuba, is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, and the microfiche supplement. Given the documentation in volume XI, material on this aspect of U.S.-Soviet relations from mid-October through the end of 1962 will not be cross-referenced through Editorial Notes in this volume. For Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin's recollections of the missile crisis, see his In Confidence, pages 71-95.

 

248. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, October 16, 1962, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-1662. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Kohler had presented his credentials on September 27.

970. Policy. I met with Khrushchev for three hours in talk which ended only because at that point Khrushchev was giving luncheon for Kekkonen./2/ Agreed at end we would both say to press we discussed important international questions and questions relating to American-Soviet relations in meeting characterized by frankness and mutual understanding. Khrushchev was accompanied by Acting Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, Chief of US Section Smirnovsky and interpreter; I by Counselor Davies. Atmosphere was cordial and frank with no tirades.

/2/Urho K. Kekkonen, President of Finland.

Aside from amenities and generalities, talk covered harassment of Soviet vessels, Cuba, U-2 incidents, nuclear testing, Germany and Berlin and meeting between President and Khrushchev.

Khrushchev confirmed intention to come to New York latter part of November and expressed hope to meet President. I replied on lines pen-ultimate paragraph Deptel 864./3/ Khrushchev said we could be sure he would take no action before meeting which would make situation more difficult.

/3/Telegram 864, October 10, informed Kohler that his instructions did not need updating, but offered specific details on the Soviet harassment of the USS Tanner in August and September and mentioned that the President hoped to meet with Khrushchev if he came to New York for the United Nations General Assembly session. (Department of State, Central Files, 123 Kohler)

On harassment Soviet vessel, I used paragraph 2 my instructions on Sept. 6,/4/ adding material from second paragraph Deptel 864. Specific information re Soviet harassment USS Tanner was most timely and useful and gave Khrushchev pause. He provided me with specifics of one incident as reported in full account which follows/5/ and circumstantial description of another. This led to discussion of Cuba in which Khrushchev took general line of TASS statement and Gromyko's speech./6/ He raised particularly our efforts impede Soviet air communications with Cuba, which I confirmed, pointing out our refusal to support or help Castro regime did not constitute an attack or internal interference. He assured me on "word of honor" fishing base was purely for fishing and would remain so. Regretted that announcement had been published during electoral campaign in US which was due to his own absence from Moscow.

/4/Document 233.

/5/Not further identified.

/6/For text of the TASS statement, September 11, see Pravda or Izvestia, September 16, 1962; for text of Gromyko's speech before the United Nations General Assembly, September 21, see U.N. doc. A/PV.1127, pp. 37-48.

On U-2, I used paragraph 1 my instructions which he accepted. He also seemed to accept, although complaining of nearness of our approaches, that both sides engaged in electronic surveillance.

On nuclear testing, I used paragraph 4 of my instructions, saying they supplemented other communications between us on this subject in meantime. He professed to feel this question nearly resolved and could be finalized in meeting with President. However, despite long discussion improvement in methods of detection and strong plea on my part re essentiality of verification he refused to commit himself to any inspection.

On Berlin, Khrushchev, took the standard Soviet line. Since time was then running short, I did not comment at length, pointing out that both President and Secretary would be discussing this subject with Gromyko October 18 (Deptel 892)./7/ Neither Khrushchev nor Kuznetsov had heard this from Gromyko but Khrushchev expressed gratitude to President.

/7/Telegram 892, October 15, reported that Gromyko would meet with the President and Secretary of State on October 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-1562)

Should appreciate guidance on briefing Allies and especially Brit, French and German colleagues here, who will besiege me on subject tomorrow./8/

/8/In telegram 912 to Moscow, October 16, the Department of State authorized Kohler to brief his colleagues in general terms on the subjects of U-2 flights and harassment of vessels and more fully on Cuba and Berlin. Kohler was advised to restrict his summary on nuclear testing to an expression of Khrushchev's optimism that some final agreement might be reached, but should not reveal that the Chairman intended to come to New York. (Ibid., 761.5411/10-1662)

Kohler

 

249. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-1662. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only.

Moscow, October 16, 1962, 5 p.m.

973. Policy. Khrushchev-Kohler Part I--Introductory remarks: I opened conversation by saying I was glad to be back and had been struck by changes I had seen. I intended listen very well, report accurately, and also set forth as clearly as possible policies of President and desire people of US to preserve peace.

Khrushchev said this was good platform.

I replied it is President's platform.

Khrushchev said glad to hear you have this kind platform and we'll do our best to help you fulfill it. You were last here with Nixon. We have succeeded in doing great deal in time that has passed since. You haven't been here long enough to see all the changes that have been made and even when you were here earlier you didn't see everything because you were flying. I am personally very glad to tell you my feelings about those changes. I worked very close to Stalin here in Moscow and in Ukraine. Stalin's sickness was that he didn't believe anyone and always thought they had secrets from him, so he had secrets from those who were close to him, even from me. He never shared his plans. He regarded his task as leader of party and people as that of prophet. He thought he was only one who could see what was happening and would happen. One day he fell violently upon Mikoyan. I don't remember what the occasion was. He said, "When I die you'll all perish. Imperialists will strangle you." He underestimated people who worked around him. We had nothing to do with foreign policy. Only he and Molotov handled that. I didn't even see the documents. So when Stalin died it was a very hard time for us. For example, I had never met any foreigners, because this was treason, but contacts are very necessary. When Stalin died it was difficult for us to establish contacts. And we had acute questions before us: Austrian Treaty, Trieste, Japanese Treaty. Most difficult one was Korean war, which had been imposed on us by US. It was very difficult period for us inexperienced people. But we took an initiative to stop Korean war. We established contact with US and Americans understood our purpose and we settled war. True, problem of Korea still remains because foreign troops are still there, but nevertheless there is no shooting.

He continued, we decided question of Indo-China. Americans didn't keep their word, and supported Diem. Americans know when to support nation-wide election and when not to. We liquidated Trieste question. We liquidated our base at Port Arthur, Finnish bases, and Iranian border problem. We thought Americans would follow our good example but they were not so kind as to do so. We've cut our armed forces twofold, but Americans continue increase theirs. We've done much work in agriculture, industry, and housing.

After war, Stalin said if we could produce 60 million tons oil and same amount of steel we would have one foot in communism. We will have 185 million tons of oil this year and we have 56 and half million tons steel for first nine months this year and will have 67 million tons for all 1962. Your economist Harry Schwartz points out that for one period this year we will have produced same amount of steel as you. In 1961, we built 3.9 million square meters housing. Before revolution Moscow had 11 million square meters, result of 800 years capitalist-feudal structure. And those were wooden houses with poor sewer system. But now we build very solid houses and in one year construct one-third the number of houses as there were in all pre-1917 Moscow. Main thing, however, is that imperialists didn't strangle us.

I said we hadn't tried and didn't want to try to strangle USSR.

Khrushchev replied he couldn't say there was no desire to do so. He produced the President's speech in Buffalo/2/ and said that, according to President, USSR is oppressing Poland but "Poland has still not perished". Khrushchev added that this is old Polish nationalist slogan. This, then, was prelude to his meeting with Mr. Kohler. This was obviously campaign speech in which President making election promises to get Polish votes. President says US will free Polish people, but Poles freed selves long ago with America. We regret Americans are aggravating tensions between our countries. Such is nature of imperialism.

/2/For text of the President's remarks at the Pulaski Day Parade in Buffalo, October 14, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 782-783.

Kohler

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