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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume V Soviet Union DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

250. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, October 16, 1962, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/10-1662. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only.

974. Policy. Khrushchev-Kohler Part II. Harassment of Shipping. Khrushchev asked me inform President that "hooligan overflights" of Soviet ships continue to take place in all seas and demanded "How long will it last?"

I said I had had long talk with President before I came/2/ and knew there had been communications both ways on subject, but I could add some background to conversation Khrushchev had had with Ambassador Thompson and to correspondence.

/2/Kohler had talked with the President for about 30 minutes on September 6, but other than an entry in the President's Appointment Book, no record of the conversation has been found. (Kennedy Library)

But first I wanted to say it had been very interesting to hear what the Chairman had said and I appreciated particularly his description of differences between Stalin's time and today. As foreigner who served in Moscow during Stalin's time, I could feel difference now and was glad we could talk as we were. While we appreciated their efforts in foreign policy, we believed positive achievements which had been reached had been due to joint effort. US had tried to help in reaching those decisions. I was sure I reflected President's attitude in saying that we compliment Chairman and Soviet people on what they have done to make progress in their economy. We hoped progress made by all peoples would redound to benefit of all mankind in peaceful world.

I didn't have text of President's Buffalo speech, so I would reserve comment on this and just say that we have very close feeling for Poland and believe Poles should have had greater freedom of choice. But I was sure President's speech had no provocative intent.

On question Chairman had asked re overflights, I had discussed this with President and he wanted me to make following clear (I then read appropriate portion my instructions of Sept 6,/3/ supplementing from Deptel 864/4/).

/3/Document 233.

/4/See footnote 2, Document 248.

Evidently somewhat taken aback by description of buzzing of Tanner, Khrushchev commented he could not say anything about this since he did not have facts. He said it not Soviet policy to create obstacles to navigation on high seas. But Americans do have such a system and engage in these practices according to system. He was surprised that President was so unaware of this and wanted further evidence about it. When he talked with Ambassador Thompson, President gave orders not to do it. It stopped for a few days, then began again. Now I said US ships had orders not to fire at Soviet ships. We must not shoot at each other, for that would be war. There have been demands by US warships for Soviet ships to stop but he had given orders to them not to submit.

Khrushchev then recounted anecdote about Soviet ship en route to Cuba which US destroyer hailed and asked for destination. Soviet ship continued on way whereupon destroyer demanded it stop. Soviet captain then ordered radioman transmit continuously to US ship: "Peace and friendship". Destroyer then replied "Peace and friendship" and left Soviet ship alone.

I asked when this had happened and Khrushchev said he could give me date and place if I wished.

I said I knew President did not want our ships to interfere with navigation and would be interested to know of any incidents in which his orders were not being obeyed.

Khrushchev then produced memo describing alleged incident Sept 23 in Aegean Sea in which Soviet commercial vessel Fryanovo, buzzed by two US navy planes from Carrier No. 65 (translation follows septel)./5/

/5/Telegram 980 from Moscow, October 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/10-1662)

I said President would be interested and matter would be investigated.

Khrushchev then spoke circumstantially about incident supposed to have occurred about one month ago in which, after having buzzed Soviet commercial vessel, plane crashed in sea and all aboard drowned, despite rescue attempt by Soviets. When he was asked what should be done about crash, Khrushchev ordered his people to wait since Americans usually publish this kind of news. Since nothing was published, it clear this had been military aircraft and news had been concealed from US people.

I said such crash could not happen without publication of news and asked if he sure this was American plane.

Khrushchev said he knew nothing had been published, since he had followed newspapers, and added he would give us information on incident.

I said we could check into it even without details but it would be helpful have these.

At this point, Smirnovsky pointed out that interpreter had not translated sentence from my remarks to effect that some Soviet shipmasters in their reports might be confusing normal maritime recognition procedures with harassment. Khrushchev said he not aware of norms of recognition at sea, but no nation had right to hinder vessels in international waters. These were not US territorial waters.

When he came to New York by ship a few years ago and was greeted by "dogs' concert", he recognized it was our right stage such greeting since it took place in our territorial waters. But Soviets did not recognize any nation's right to stop Soviet ship on high seas.

After again denying we do so, I once more made point that some shipmasters may confuse recognition procedures with harassment.

With some heat Khrushchev said that when planes fly repeatedly over ships and their identification numbers are visible, what kind of recognition was that? These were provocative actions which had nothing to do with good intentions and did not contribute to better relations between our two countries.

I said I agreed and President agreed and I would report Chairman's statements to him.

Kohler

 

251. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, October 16, 1962, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-1662. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only.

979. Policy. Khrushchev-Kohler--Part IV/2/--U-2; Cuban fishing port; nuclear test-ban; US elections. Khrushchev said he had to give President his due. He was a good politician and picked good men to work for him. Khrushchev had had very good conversation with Secretary Udall, who understands his job, is very free and has a free mind./3/ Udall made very good impression and Khrushchev would give him job as minister if he did not already have job. Of course, Udall represents capitalism and Khrushchev is communist, but this didn't interfere with conversation. Khrushchev gave Udall film about Soviet electrification and asked him to show it to President. President is very clever at making speeches: he is a "demagogue of great note." But he didn't mean that in a bad way.

/2/In Part III (telegram 978 from Moscow) Kohler reported the discussion on Cuba; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XI, pp. 47-49. In Part V (telegram 981 from Moscow) Kohler summarized the discussion on Berlin; see ibid., vol. XV, pp. 359-362.

/3/See Document 236.

I said he probably meant President was a good politician.

Khrushchev agreed. He said President Eisenhower was not a bad man, but politics was "not his dish." He still owed President Eisenhower something, because Eisenhower had sent him a bull. He had wanted to send Eisenhower a sheep, but then Powers case occurred. Khrushchev had been on Eisenhower farm and wanted to repay him. He had also received bull from Admiral whose name he couldn't recall.

I said it was Admiral Strauss, who had just written interesting book about his years in public service./4/ (Khrushchev asked Kuznetsov to get book for him.)

/4/Lewis L. Strauss, Men and Decisions, New York, 1962.

I said Khrushchev would not be surprised that his remarks reminded me of another point I wished to mention: incident with U-2 plane on which we had exchanged notes. I then read appropriate portion of my instructions./5/

/5/See Document 233.

Khrushchev said he was very glad to hear what I had said and he believed President's words. At the time, he had asked his military people and they said weather had been very bad, with result violation could have been unintentional. He then asked what it was that drew us to Soviet borders, saying Soviets do not violate US borders. No doubt it was just the way imperialists acted.

I said reason was the same as that which made their trawlers do the same thing.

Khrushchev said Soviets stayed in international waters and didn't violate US borders.

I agreed but said that this was electronic age and both sides apparently liked to listen to electronic emission.

Khrushchev asked whether we should dig ourselves deeper into ground and just sit there.

I said no, but we should use good judgment and that is what President wants to do.

Reverting to Cuba, Khrushchev said he wished to assure President that port regarding which Soviets had signed agreement was just fishing port. "I give you my word." He said he would reveal a state secret. While he was away, they had signed agreement without consulting him. When he came back he cursed them and said they should have waited until after US elections. Japanese fish off Brazil and have a base there where fish are processed. Cubans couldn't build port themselves so Soviets decided to help them. But agreement had been signed at wrong time. If they had asked him, he would have said sign it November 10 or 15, because he knew it would provide fuel to Republicans who are frying President at the moment. Since Soviets value good relations with President, they could have waited to sign. (Kuznetsov changed "signed" to "published" when interpreter translated this.)

I thanked him for these remarks and said I thought President would be glad to hear them.

Khrushchev said perhaps President would think he had concluded this agreement on purpose just to "put a little salt on his wounds."

I said I believed President was a little surprised.

Khrushchev said, "and rightfully so," adding that when Soviets do a silly thing they recognize it as such, but Americans don't.

I said I thought President had been very frank about a couple of matters at Vienna.

Khrushchev said that was right. Soviets were formulating agreement right now to send ten to fifteen fishing boats to Cuba. Cubans were having trouble with sugar cane harvest. In past, US had sent Cuba dried cod fish but had now stopped shipments. So Soviets had to help Cubans get fish to feed their people. There were no electronics involved, just plain fishing boats.

I said I took good note of his statement.

Khrushchev said there were other basic problems still confronting our two countries. One was nuclear-test-ban. We are now very close on this issue. Only problem is that of underground tests. Soviets didn't want these to continue since they were source of arms race. USSR is on even basis with US on underground testing. We should agree on proposals of English scientists. But President wants inspection, which Soviets will never accept. This is invention of American imperialists and monopolists. Soviets had arranged underground tests which US had detected and announced next day. So national means are clearly enough to detect underground tests.

I said I was familiar with (recent exchanges) on this subject, but wished to read to Chairman what I had written down after talking to President. (I then read applicable section instructions.) I said I might just add that we on our side, President, Secretary, Foster, and all concerned, had done our best to recognize their sensibilities and to reduce possibility they might view inspection as espionage. While unmanned seismic stations had greatly improved chances of detecting explosions or what seemed like explosions, there was nothing of which we knew that would replace a certain measure of inspection to determine whether certain events in particular were tests or natural events.

Khrushchev said statement by American scientists published two days ago admitted there were means to verify this.

I said I thought this was an inaccurate statement. We had looked at all possibilities and were convinced no means existed to determine nature of event. Fact that event has occurred can be determined, but inspection is needed to establish what kind of event it was. Number of cases in which inspection would be necessary would probably be infinitesimally small, but in those cases it would be necessary. Such inspection would also be helpful to USSR, since our scientists say there must be inspection to establish nature of event. I personally had no doubt that, if USSR said it would not test, then it would not. But there must be provision for objective observers to determine whether events were natural or not, or doubts would remain in rest of world.

Khrushchev said there were various points of view on that question and that is why there is no agreement. But Soviets had found out that there are means to determine nature of event without inspection. It was situation in Congress which prevented President from moving on this subject; he can't convince Congress to agree and consequently holds on to argument about inspection.

I said Congress represents public opinion. Difference between us is now so small, President hopes we can come to agreement. But agreement must be ratified by Congress and Congressional opinion represents US public opinion. We had made every effort to reduce this so it would not be a problem for Soviets and President really hopes for agreement.

Khrushchev asked for my evaluation of elections.

I said nobody quite knew how they would go. Normally, administration in power tends to lose some votes in off-year elections and this is not regarded by anyone as a disaster. Latest polls I had seen showed chances about even, but should be remembered that Democrats already have big majority in Congress.

Khrushchev said that was so, but they didn't support President.

I said they didn't always, but much of his program had gone through.

Kohler

 

252. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, October 16, 1962, 9 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/10-1662. Secret; Priority. Eyes Only.

982. Policy. Comment completing series on Khrushchev-Kohler talk today.

1. While Khrushchev slightly qualified his remarks on visit to USA, fact that he returned to subject twice on his own initiative, fact he already has agenda in mind, and manner of speaking made clear to both Davies and me that he has as of now made basic decision to make the trip.

2. I plan to see Kuznetzov next week to follow-up on some lesser matters of bilateral interest, at which time I shall express our interest in knowing as far in advance as possible development of Khrushchev's plans.

3. Khrushchev is thinner than I remember him from visit to USA. However, he had some color from his recent travels in the central Asian country-side and looked to be in good health. His speech was restrained even when he was voicing standard polemical anti-"imperialist" themes, and these were relieved by occasional banter or roguish expressions which seemed to assure I would not take his words too seriously.

Kohler

 

253. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, October 18, 1962, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Gromyko Talks. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in the White House on October 23. The meeting was held at the White House.

SUBJECT
Miscellaneous

PARTICIPANTS

US
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR
Foreign Minister Gromyko/2/
Mr. Semenov
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Sukhodrev

/2/Gromyko was in the United States to attend the U.N. General Assembly session.

After a discussion on Germany and Berlin, Cuba, and the cessation of nuclear tests,/3/ Mr. Gromyko said that he wished, with the President's permission, to make some observations on certain other points.

/3/In the discussion on Germany and Berlin, the President emphasized that the U.S. was anxious to work out mutually satisfactory procedures on Western access to Berlin. However, the greatest concern was Soviet insistence on the withdrawal of Western forces from the city. For text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XV, pp. 370-376. On the subject of a nuclear test ban, Gromyko accused the U.S. of "seeking ways and means of continuing the build-up of nuclear weapons." The President responded that the "US had sought a test ban agreement for a long time and it wished to end tests." But "the problem today was a technical one, because there was no assurance that underground tests would not be carried out while the treaty was in force unless there was some means of verification." For text of the memorandum of conversation, see ibid., vol. VII, pp. 589-592. For text of the memorandum of conversation on Cuba, see ibid., vol. XI, pp. 110-114. A memorandum to the President from Rusk containing talking points on all these topics is in the Department of State, Central File 033.6111/10-1762.

Continuing to read from his prepared text.

Mr. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union continued to base its policy on the premise that differences in ideology were not a barrier to peaceful coexistence and peace. As Mr. Khrushchev had stated, Americans and the Soviet people were different from the standpoint of ideology; the US was capitalist, and the Soviet attitude toward capitalism was well-known. The USSR was socialist and it was building Communism. The question of who would win must not be resolved by force but by peaceful competition, and the Soviet Union had adhered to this principle ever since Lenin's days. The Soviet Union was against the use of arms in resolving ideological differences. Competition in the economic field and in the satisfaction of spiritual and material needs of the people was a domain where the question of which system would gain the upper hand must be resolved. He said that he wished to reaffirm these views on behalf of the Soviet Government.

Toward the very end of the conversation, after having touched upon the possibility of Mr. Khrushchev's visiting the United States, Mr. Gromyko said he wished to thank the President for this opportunity of discussing with him questions of interest to our two states, since those questions related to very important aspects of the foreign policies of the US and USSR respectively. The Soviet Government had always believed that it would be a historical achievement if the US and the USSR found common language on these questions.

The President said he agreed with Mr. Gromyko's last point. As he had said in Vienna, the US was a large country, and the Soviet Union was also a large country. Both had many things to do at home. As to the outcome of the competition between the two systems, history would be the judge. The President emphasized that neither he nor Mr. Khrushchev must take actions leading to a confrontation of our two countries. He said that since he had assumed the office of President, the US had attempted to adjust US/USSR relations. Laos had been a success so far, but there had been no success with respect to Germany and West Berlin until now. What was inexplicable in the light of what he had thought to be Mr. Khrushchev's understanding of the United States was what now happened in Cuba since July. Since Laos, that particular situation had been the most serious one. Finally, the President asked Mr. Gromyko to convey to Mr. Khrushchev his appreciation of the opportunity Mr. Khrushchev had given Ambassador Kohler and other American visitors to meet with him and have discussions.

Mr. Gromyko concluded his conversation with the President asserting that the Soviet Union's policy had been and still was aimed at strengthening peace and eliminating international differences, first and foremost the differences existing between the US and the USSR; Soviet policy was aimed at living in peace and friendship with the United States. This applied to Cuba as well; after all it was not the USSR that had invented this problem. It also applied to the question of a German peace treaty and the normalization of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty, as well as to other questions on which there was no common language between the US and the USSR. He said he would of course convey the President's remarks to Mr. Khrushchev and that he was sure that Mr. Khrushchev would be happy to receive them.

The meeting ended at 7:20 p.m.

 

254. Current Intelligence Weekly Review/1/

Washington, October 19, 1962.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Secret. Prepared by CIA's Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 1-6 of the Special Articles section of the issue. Photographs of Kosygin, Kozlov, Mikoyan, Brezhnev, and Suslov are not reproduced.

The Khrushchev Succession

At age 68 Khrushchev is still in generally good health, but advancing years and the rigors of high office have begun to slow him down. The time may not be far distant when death or physical incapacitation removes him from the political scene. Almost inevitably direction of the nation's affairs will then be assumed by an interregnum "collective leadership" composed of the remaining members of the party presidium and secretariat. The Soviet system contains no built-in machinery for ensuring the orderly transfer of power; when the top leader goes, a power vacuum is created, and collectivity provides the facade of unity behind which the fight for the post of party first secretary is waged.

Like Lenin and Stalin, Khrushchev has made no attempt to devise a permanent solution to the succession problem; he has merely designated his favorite in advance. As early as 1959--in an interview with Averell Harriman--he revealed that he and Mikoyan had decided upon Frol Kozlov, now 54, as the man who would eventually succeed to power. Kozlov's status as heir apparent was first publicly acknowledged in the USSR last October; in the official listing of the party secretariat elected following the 22nd party congress, his name appeared second to that of Khrushchev and out of the customary alphabetical order, thus formalizing his position as second-in-command. What little is known about Kozlov suggests that he would adhere essentially to the Khrushchev line, but probably with increased emphasis on control rather than incentive.

Kozlov's designation as heir comes with no guarantees, however. It is not binding on his peers, and Khrushchev can always change his mind. More important, among the shrewd and ambitious men who make the inner circle of leaders, there is bound to be at least one who regards himself as better qualified and with a better chance of winning. Once another hat is tossed into the ring, the power struggle is on.

Emergence of the New Leader

Ultimately, the victory will go to that member of the hierarchy who succeeds in establishing personal domination over the Communist Party, the single cohesive political force in Soviet society. It tolerates no rivals, and no organization or group of any kind is permitted to exist outside its control. Thus, he who runs the party runs the country, without constitutional or other legal restraints.

However, since no single member of Khrushchev's coterie appears politically strong enough to step immediately into the dictator's shoes, the new leader must establish a position of pre-eminence among his colleagues in the presidium and secretariat, and he must circumscribe and then reduce the influence of possible rivals in those bodies. In the process, it will not suffice for him to argue his own merits and to espouse policy positions to which his associates can accommodate. Very few of them can be expected to pledge their support without some kind of commitment in return.

Gaining the support of the members of the secretariat will be particularly important. Through the staff departments of the central committee, they control personnel appointments at all levels of the party and government. From the outset, the future dictator must seek to secure as many key positions as possible for members of his personal following and to see to it that no posts of consequence fall to his opponents.

Heads of other elements in the power structure will also have to be won over. For example, bearing in mind that the Soviet military high command sided with Khrushchev in his 1955 polemic with Malenkov--the advocate of increased consumers' goods production--the new leader will seek the support particularly of those marshals who are central committee members. In order to ensure that they do not become disenchanted and side with his opponents, he will be likely to advocate a strong military establishment and the high budgetary appropriations involved.

At the same time, he will identify himself with a high living stand-ard and will give vague promises of improvements in the welfare of the consumer. While he gives public indications of his intent to continue the "liberalization" begun under Khrushchev, he may be privately assuring the secret police that there will be no inroads on their powers and prerogatives.

Once he has engineered his "election" as party first secretary, the emergent new leader begins the task of transforming his leadership of the coalition into leadership of the Soviet Union.

For the most part he will accomplish the job by continuing to exercise leadership in the presidium. In the period immediately following his election as first secretary, he must consistently win a majority of that body to his point of view on policy positions. Success in the presidium would increasingly establish his authority in the lower party echelons. With the passage of time, the working level would, by and large, accept the fact of his predominance and fall into line behind him.

Role of Central Committee

The central committee normally has no life of its own except at its periodic plenary sessions, and these are usually devoted to speeches approving decisions made in advance by the top leaders. However, by basing his authority largely on control of a majority in the central committee and by using that control to defeat his opponents in 1957, Khrushchev in effect institutionalized the central committee as one of the principal bases of political strength. Its very real potential for intervening in power struggles makes it imperative that the would-be dictator build up support among its members as soon as possible.

To judge from the composition of the central party bodies elected by the 22nd congress, however, Khrushchev's lieutenants have had little success in maneuvering their allies into key slots. Very few of those elected for the first time have discernible ties to any of the current leaders. The only change was an increase in the number of members associated with the Leningrad party organization, which Kozlov headed for several years. Presumably these are men upon whom he can draw for support, but their number--along with the old Leningraders in the central committee--is still too small to give him a decisive advantage.

Kozlov clearly cannot now take steps toward achieving domination of the party without a green light from Khrushchev. The latter, who once boasted that he would run the party as long as he lived, shows no signs of allowing Kozlov to start building a personal political machine. Indeed the only top-level personnel shift since the congress apparently worked to Kozlov's disadvantage; the reasons for the removal of Ivan Spiridonov both from the central party secretariat and as Leningrad party boss last April have never become clear, but intentionally or not, his downfall very likely cost Kozlov a well-placed ally. The effect of the move--if any--on Kozlov's status as successor-designate is still not known but it must certainly have forced him to take a hard look at those presidium members who--both individually and as a body--will play vital roles in the succession. He must gauge their willingness to accept his claim on the first secretaryship, seek their support, and at the same time identify and assess the strength of those who might contend against him.

Kozlov's Peers

In all probability the four senior members of the hierarchy--Mikoyan, Brezhnev, Suslov, and Kosygin--will be the major voices in determining who steps into Khrushchev's shoes.

If past performance is any indication, First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan will be primarily concerned with maintaining his present position in the hierarchy. Both his Armenian nationality and his age--he is 66--argue against an attempt to grab the top job. His activities will nevertheless bear close watching. He has survived nearly 30 years of purges and other crises in the leadership largely because of his ability to perceive the realities of Kremlin politics--as he did by lining up with Khrushchev against the anti-party group. Thus, any sign of a change in his attitude toward Kozlov would suggest that his political intuition is again at work, and could foreshadow a fight in which the advantage has shifted away from the successor-designate.

Brezhnev, the Soviet "president," must be considered a potential candidate for the top job. Since 1938, he has been a regional party secretary in the Ukraine, high-ranking army political officer, party boss of Moldavia and Kazakhstan, chief of the navy's political directorate, and central party secretary for industrial, transport, military, and police affairs. This experience has very likely left him a long line of well-placed friends from whom he could ask political favors.

As a presidium member, Brezhnev has a direct voice in the formulation of Soviet policy, but his "election" as titular chief of state in May 1960--to replace Voroshilov--deprived him of the vantage point he enjoyed as a central committee secretary. The Soviet presidency is basically a sinecure and has traditionally proved a poor political springboard. In contrast to his predecessor, however, Brezhnev has brought some authority to the job and has used it mainly as a vehicle for expounding Moscow's foreign policy line.

Contrary to frequent press speculation, there is little evidence to suggest that Mikhail Suslov is now or could become the rallying point for a "Stalinist" faction. A central party secretary since 1947--longer than Khrushchev himself--he has been concerned primarily with ideology and relations with foreign Communist parties. Since Stalin's death and particularly since the 20th party congress, he has concentrated on building a framework of Marxist-Leninist respectability around Khrushchev's policies, and he sided with Khrushchev against the anti-party (and pro-Stalin) group.

To judge from his past performance Suslov does not measure up as a Stalinist diehard; on the other hand, he is not a simon-pure Khrushchev man, and on occasion the two may have disagreed over various aspects of Soviet policy. The future leader will very likely expect of Suslov the same service he now renders as doctrinal apologist for the regime. Like Mikoyan, Suslov has never evinced a desire for more power, and because he deals in political intangibles, he has not had these opportunities to cultivate a personal following normally available to a central committee secretary.

Of the senior presidium members, only First Deputy Premier Aleksey Kosygin would appear to have no chance of becoming party first secretary, but he is likely to occupy a high position in any post-Khrushchev administration. Kosygin is perhaps the top member of the Soviet managerial elite, and with the exception of the two years immediately after Stalin's death, has been a deputy premier continuously since 1940. He has never held a full-time job in the party's apparatus, having come up through the administrative and planning departments of the economic bureaucracy. Since it is doubtful that Khrushchev's successor will be strong enough, at least in the early days, to take on both the party first secretaryship and the premiership, Kosygin might become head of the government when Khrushchev leaves the scene.

The Younger Leaders

There is always the possibility that a dark horse could emerge. Their brevity of service at the top would seem to militate against a power bid by Dmitry Polyansky, Gennady Voronov, or Andrey Kirilenko, the three newest members of the presidium. Yet each of them has considerable influence and prestige in his own right, and during the course of a prolonged succession crisis, one of them might be able to maneuver himself into a commanding power position.

Of the four central committee secretaries who are not presidium members, Aleksandr Shelepin would seem best able to rise to the top. His long service as head of the Komsomol--the young Communist league--may have given him considerable influence among the younger party generation. However, perhaps to his disadvantage, he is tainted by past association with the Soviet secret police (KGB) which he headed from 1958 to 1961.

Shelepin's current duties apparently involve party supervision of the police and judicial apparatus as well as some responsibilities for industry, and his support will thus be invaluable to those who do contend. The future leader will need control of the KGB not only because of its coercive power, but also because of its unique ability to keep him informed of what is going on in the party, and particularly among possible rivals.

Shelepin and the other non-presidium secretaries may have been selected with one aspect of the succession problem in mind. The exact division of responsibilities in the secretariat has never become clear, but there is information to suggest that the new members are being groomed to replace some of the senior secretaries.

Leonid Ilichev and Boris Ponomarev are concerned with propaganda and agitation, ideology, and relations with foreign parties--fields in which Suslov and Kuusinen are primarily interested. Their apprenticeships would presumably ensure that, when the time comes, Suslov's or Kuusinen's duties could be passed to experienced understudies without any break in the continuity of party policies or methods of operation in these fields.

KHRUSHCHEV'S COLLEAGUES

	AGE	AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
Presidium Members
Kozlov	54	Party 2nd Secretary	The Successor-designate
Brezhnev	56	"President of the USSR"	Senior Presidium members
Kosygin	58	1st Deputy Premier
Mikoyan	66	1st Deputy Premier
Suslov	59	Party Secretary
Podgorny	59	Ukranian Party Boss	Influence limited by permanent residence in Kiev
Kirilenko	56	1st Deputy Chairman RSFSR Bureau	Relative newcomers to the top leadership
Polyansky	44	RSFSR Premier
Voronov	51	1st Deputy Chairman RSFSR Bureau
Kuusinen	81	Party Secretary	"Old Bolsheviks," each nearing end of career
Shvernick	74	Chairman, Party Control Committee
Party Secretaries (not Presidium Members)
Demichev	50	Moscow City Party Chief	Junior leaders, possibly grooming to replace senior men. (areas of responsibility obviously incomplete)
Ilichev	56	Agitation & Propaganda
Ponomarev	57	Relations with Foreign Parties
Shelepin	44	Food Industry; Police & Legal Affairs

 

Similarly, the appointment last year of Zinovy Serdyuk as first deputy chief of the party control committee could signify that Shvernik's job is to be taken over by another of Khrushchev's old Ukrainian associates.

Such moves are perhaps indicative of a nagging concern over the future; they certainly appear to be an initial attempt to staff the next administration in advance and thereby help ensure continuation of Khrushchev's policies. But they fall short of solving the basic problem of the orderly transfer of the dictator's powers, and Khrushchev has proved unwilling or unable to make any arrangements which guarantee that his authority will carry over to his chosen successor.

Conclusions

On balance, Khrushchev has evidently undertaken to see that his policies will be carried forward by staffing the top leadership with men who are in general agreement with his way of running the country. With the future--and Khrushchev's personal niche in history--thus probably regarded as partially provided for, the identity of the new first secretary loses some of its importance. Under these circumstances Khrushchev probably sees no compelling need to determine in advance the outcome of the power struggle which, it seems, must surely come.

This struggle, unlike the Stalin succession with its cleavages over basic policies, seems likely to center on personalities and methods of operation. There seems little likelihood of any radical alteration of present policies and programs. The probable composition of the new leadership itself would, for example, seem to argue for this conclusion.

In addition, the bulk of the party's professional apparatus is similarly composed of Khrushchev men. From conviction and an instinct for self-preservation, they would probably throw their support to whoever seems most likely to continue along the Khrushchev line.

 

255. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, October 20, 1962, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-2062. Secret; Priority.

1023. Policy. At invitation Acting FonMin Kuznetzov, I and four Embassy officers had lunch at Spiridonovka with Kozlov and MFA officers present. Presumably invitation motivated in part by Soviet wish facilitate my establishing contact with Kozlov, since his only government position is that of Supreme Soviet Presidium member. For Soviet side, he dominated conversation.

During luncheon, discussion was rather general with frequent references on Kozlov's part to impressions he had gained in 1959 visit to United States including repeated references to US-USSR as two great powers which will decide fate of world.

Conversation after luncheon in which Kuznetzov, Smirnovsky and DCM participated included discussion of Berlin, disarmament, and nuclear-test cessation. In response my direct question why much-vaunted "coexistence" theory of Soviet Union is not applicable to Berlin, Kozlov, with assistant Kuznetzov, largely re-hashed old arguments about necessity of recognizing changed conditions, that post World War II agreements have outlived usefulness, that neither Soviet Union not Ulbricht threatens West Berliners, etc. Kozlov said that "speaking personally" (phrase which he used recurrently during conversation) Berlin was a relatively minor difficulty between our countries, that we should focus on the basic problem of disarmament and first of all cessation of nuclear tests. He pointed out that if resolution of these problems could be obtained, Berlin problem would have disappeared.

After expounding on the "most important problem" of disarmament, he quickly shifted into need for early resolution problem of cessation of nuclear tests. He graphically described effect on whole world of continuation of large-scale tests in atmosphere, under-water, and in cosmos, which he described as being 99.99 percent of the problem. Only subsequently, and with some prompting from Kuznetzov, did he get into the question of a moratorium on underground tests as part of the package of agreement on cessation of tests in other three atmospheres. Continued discussion of this question with his heavy emphasis on atmospheric, cosmic and underwater testing, with but slight reference to and in fact deprecating dangers of underground testing, left clear implication that as far as Kozlov concerned an agreement could be reached with something less than formal agreed moratorium on underground tests.

Throughout three-hour meeting Kozlov gave impression of great self-confidence and vigorous good health. At one point he referred to himself as the "political deputy" of Khrushchev. Foreign Ministry representatives, whom he inclined jokingly to deprecate, seemed somewhat ill at ease in his presence and somewhat concerned that he might fail to expound government line in questions discussed without deviation./2/

/2/Airgram A-720, November 20, elaborated on the summary transmitted here, providing specifics on the interaction of the Soviet officials, and concluding that "the atmosphere of the luncheon, while formal, was relaxed, primarily owing to the unbuttoned manner in which Kozlov conducted himself." (Ibid., 611.61/11-2062)

Kohler

 

256. Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs' Special Assistant (Garthoff)/1/

Washington, October 29, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General. Secret. Attached to an October 29 memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the NSC Staff to Bundy, which stated that it was the best analysis of the Soviet backdown over Cuba that he had seen. Documentation on the Soviet removal of missiles from Cuba is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XI.

SUBJECT
Significance of the Soviet Backdown for Future US Policy

1. Short-Run Effects

Political--The short-run effects should be very favorable to the US. Unquestionably the US will emerge from this confrontation with increased prestige world-wide. The Soviet action should demonstrate once again the offensive nature of Soviet motivations more clearly than anything we could say. It should also demonstrate that the Soviets are not prepared to risk a decisive military showdown with the US over issues involving the extension of Soviet power. (We should be clear however that this is not to be confused with Soviet lack of willingness to "go to the mat" over an interest vital to Soviet security.) More specifically, short-run political effects should include the following:

a. Soviet ability to penetrate Latin America should suffer a reversal, though a base for future penetration may remain in Cuba for some time. Soviet intentions have been unmasked, and Soviet inability to force its will clearly demonstrated. Our problems in assisting Latin America to achieve a higher state of political and economic development will still require all of our best efforts. However, our efforts should be focused on the fundamental nature of the problem, and it is important that we continue to pursue our Latin American country internal programs, along with our broader development programs.

b. NATO should be strengthened. The firmness of the US stand, and perhaps even more importantly the categorical refusal to barter NATO assets for immediate US security interests, should provide assurance of US commitment to the Alliance.

c. Our position on Berlin should be greatly strengthened. Our resolute willingness to act in Cuba should result in a complete reassessment by the Soviets as to how far they can safely push US will in general, including Berlin. Similarly it should provide our Allies with fortitude for meeting Soviet threats.

d. The effect upon the neutrals is more difficult to estimate, but in general is favorable. It must raise in the minds of many of the neutrals who may have a pro-Communist leaning a question as to how far they may safely "get in bed" with the Soviets and still protect their own national interests.

e. While there is probably very little immediate effect on Soviet Satellite relations, it cannot help but plant the seed of doubt as to Soviet omnipotence. This could have important implications for the future.

f. The effect on the USSR can be beneficial, but this will depend on how we further use our present strong position. It is conceivable that within the Soviet leadership the events of the past several days may be considered so serious a setback that changes may occur in the current Soviet leadership.

Military--The military benefits secured as a result of the Soviet backdown are similarly immense. Agreement not to proceed with additional missiles, and to dismantle existing missiles and launch facilities, cancels out the temporary increase in capability vis-a-vis the continued United States, which the Soviets achieved in their short-lived attempt to offset the current US nuclear strategic advantage [sic].

2. Long-Run Effects

Political--An analysis of long-run effects is of course more uncertain. Unquestionably the Soviet defeat will have its impact on Soviet thinking and policymaking. Over the long run, one effect may be to make the Soviets far more responsive to our efforts at finding peaceful solutions to the whole range of world problems. However, and this is an important qualification, this effect is certain to take a considerable period of time. We should not delude ourselves into believing that great and rapid changes will result in Soviet policy. People and governments simply do not and cannot change that quickly, even assuming the stimulus for doing so. Thus while it is useful to explore all avenues of solutions to world problems, such as disarmament, we must not expect quick or easy solutions. We would expect that the US will meet with the usual Soviet criticism, resistance, and negotiatory pressure. In short, we must not slip into euphoria over the successful cover of events, assuming it continues to develop favorably.

Military--Viewed in its long-run perspective, the Soviet backdown does not affect the Soviet military position in any important essential other than, of course, the important removal of the missiles from Cuba and awareness in Moscow of US refusal to permit any such venture. It is possible that the effect of these events might be to set in motion a redoubled Soviet effort to close the gap to development by the Soviets of a secure second strike capability.

3. General Conclusion

Our over-all preliminary conclusion may be summarized as follows:

a. We have in the recent situation gained broad political and military assets, on which we should attempt to capitalize. We have probably gained important, but less definite, long-range benefits.

b. In these circumstances, it is vitally important that the US take the initiative in offering to negotiate on major issues between East and West. Without being bellicose in the basis of our new-found strength, nor on the other hand making concessions which would adversely affect our position of strength, we should press for fair but safeguarded solutions to outstanding problems.

If we have learned anything from this experience, it is that weakness, even only apparent weakness, invites Soviet transgression. At the same time, firmness in the last analysis will force the Soviets to back away from rash initiatives. We cannot now, nor can we in the future, accept Soviet protestations of "peaceful" coexistence at face value. The words may sound the same, but the meaning is different. Their willingness to cooperate in common endeavors can only be judged by performance. The difficult task for US policy in the future is to strike the correct fine balance between seeking cooperation from a forthcoming posture, while retaining the necessary strength and skepticism to insure ourselves and our friends against future duplicity.

 

257. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, October 30, 1962, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 911.2161/10-3062. Confidential.

1142. Deptel 1024./2/ During call on Gromyko today, I raised question of faster communications between Embassy and Washington, pointing to experience of past week as good example of why it would be desirable for Embassy to have leased teletype wire running to Paris. I pointed out question had been hanging fire for year-and-half and reviewed recent conversations with Ministry on subject. I noted our understanding that it was technically possible have such link, since at least two Western press agencies in Moscow have leased wires, and pointed to line TASS has out of New York as well as SMUN line. I also referred to new legislation which would permit us offer Soviets possibility of radio on reciprocal basis. I said I was not raising radio question in formal way now, but wanted let Soviets know we have this possibility.

/2/See footnote 2 below.

Gromyko said he was not in position to go into details on subject. He knew it was a question with a beard, which was now growing gray, but, not having known in advance I would raise it, he had not been able prepare self. He thought there were some technical difficulties. It was difficult for him to say anything about this now, except that he would "look into matter."

Comment: Both what Gromyko said and way he said it did not encourage me to expect Soviets will give us leased line. In view fact MFA had been alerted to possibility I would raise subject with him (Embtel 1122)/3/ I would guess we shall have to find some means of exacting reciprocity on this issue. Gromyko did not react at all to suggestion on radio.

/3/On October 29 Kohler reported that a conversation that day with a Foreign Ministry official had brought no resolution of the problem of delays in transmitting Embassy telegraphic traffic. In view of this Kohler reported that he would take the question up with Gromyko during his first call. (Telegram 1122; ibid., 911.2161/10-2962) In telegram 1024, October 29, the Department of State approved the approach and stated that it was prepared to make available immediately to the Soviet Government a leased commercial circuit. (Ibid.)

Kohler

 

258. Memorandum From the President's Press Secretary (Salinger) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, October 31, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-3162. Secret. Copies were sent to Bundy, Rusk, and Thompson.

Following is a report of a conversation I had today with Yuri Zhukov, Foreign Editor of Pravda; Georgi Bolshikov, Editor of USSR Magazine; Mr. Boglov of Novosty.

Mr. Zhukov opened the conversation by saying that he would be most interested in my giving my observations of the past 10 days. I told Mr. Zhukov I would have to speak to him personally and with that proviso I gave him an historical review of US-Soviet relations since January 1961 during the Kennedy Administration.

I said the release of the RB-47 pilots by Chairman Khrushchev right after inauguration had been looked upon as a hopeful sign and could lead to the opening of Soviet-US relations. The Vienna meeting, while it produced an impasse on Berlin, had been significant for its agreement on Laos which both the President and the Chairman carried out following their meeting in Vienna. I said that I felt that the Laos agreement had been taken as an indication that the United States and the USSR could reach agreements and could be carried out; that they could strengthen the integrity of contacts between the two countries. I went on to say that in subsequent discussions on Berlin and nuclear testing, while they produced no satisfactory solutions, there was a feeling of integrity of communication and particularly private communication.

I then said I would like to review the Cuban situation. The developments of the Cuban situation were highlighted by the fact that in May 1962 when I met with Mr. Khrushchev/2/ there had been no discussion of this subject. They had become an issue following the start by the USSR of sending military materials to Cuba. This, I said, placed an immediate and heavy pressure on the President to do something about this situation. But, I said, the President had withstood this pressure and had made the September statement/3/ which clearly outlined what the United States considered to be the difference between "defensive" and "offensive" weapons. I said I was not interested in getting to a semantical discussion on this subject but that there was no question that the President's speech should have served as an international warning as to what we considered to be dangerous to our national interest. I pointed out that the political pressure increased after the speech but that the President had still refused to be pushed into any precipitous action regarding Cuba. During this period, I pointed out, the TASS statement was put out in which it was stated that the Soviet Union has sufficient offensive weapons in its own territory so that it would not be required to put offensive weapons on any other land. I said we had received a number of private assurances that the Soviet Union would not place offensive weapons in Cuba. I said the President, in the face of political pressure, maintained his own position and even spoke out against those who urged a harsher policy against Cuba. I said the President was therefore astonished when the evidence was presented to him which showed that missiles had been placed in Cuba by the Soviet government. I said I did not need to review the events between 22 October to the present time because they were well known.

/2/See Document 195.

/3/For text of the President's September 4 statement on Cuba, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 369-370.

I said there should be no illusion however in anyone's mind that we had not reached a point when we were on the brink of the deadliest of dangers. I said the situation now is very clear. The commitments made by Chairman Khrushchev should be carried out swiftly and demonstrably. It was not possible that the United States and the Soviet Union would allow Castro to prevent this. Anything short of swift and demonstrable dismantling of the missile sites in Cuba would let the situation slip back and I further said I didn't think that either the United States or the Soviet Union wanted that to happen.

Mr. Zhukov then reviewed the situation. He said he could not agree with me more when I said that the situation should not be allowed to slip back. At the President's press conference tomorrow,/4/ he said, there should be no back-down on the President's position on Cuba. He said if the President backed down on this matter, Khrushchev would be in a very difficult position. He said the President and Chairman Khrushchev were both in difficult positions. "It is most important to repeat again what has been agreed to," he said. Zhukov said it is all very well for newsmen to get involved in details and interpretation but "the skill of the statesman is not to be involved in details."

/4/The President did not hold a press conference on November 1.

Zhukov then asked "how do we proceed from here? At Andover our American friends discussed the possibility of a Summit Meeting. Mr. Cousins/5/ talked to me and suggested several alternatives. I don't know if these statements represented any official view of the government but this is what Cousins suggested: (1) the possibility of a meeting of the Security Council attended only by heads of state; (2) a meeting between President Kennedy, Chairman Khrushchev, Castro, U Thant/6/ and a representative of the OAS." Zhukov expressed the view that neither of these suggestions would be very effective. Zhukov said that Cousins then suggested a Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting followed by a meeting with Castro, U Thant and an OAS representative. Zhukov said he would like to know what our views were on this subject. Would such a meeting be helpful? What subjects could be discussed? "I do not exclude the possibility of such a meeting to finalize the present agreements."

/5/The Andover Conference of Soviet and American scientists and intellectuals, hosted by Phillip Mosely and Norman Cousins of the American Council on Foreign Relations, was held the last week of October. A memorandum of Mosely's telephone conversation with Ralph Jones (SES), October 29, about some of the activities of the conference is in Department of State, Central Files, 511.613/10-2962.

/6/Acting Secretary General of the United Nations.

Mr. Zhukov said he thought the solution to the Cuban problem would open "the way for settlement of other wider ranging problems." He said that yesterday he met with Scotty Reston,/7/ who said that he thought such a meeting would not be particularly useful at this time and would not yield results; that it might first be better to seek a solution through the Disarmament Committee or perhaps agreement of the NATO and Warsaw Pact groups.

/7/James B. Reston, chief Washington correspondent of The New York Times.

I told Mr. Zhukov that I was not in a position to discuss with him our government's feeling on a Summit at this time; I had not had a chance to discuss it during the past week; that I could not tell him anything other than my personal feeling prior to the Cuban outbreak and that was that during discussions of Chairman Khrushchev's possible visit to the United Nations, I had gotten the feeling around Washington that such a meeting between the President and the Chairman would not be particularly useful at that time for it would put us in a difficult position if they were unable to come to any agreement. This, I pointed out, had been Mr. Khrushchev's own view when I talked with him in Moscow in May. Mr. Zhukov then dropped the subject of the United Nations and the agenda and said he would take it up with Ambassador Thompson who he was seeing next.

He made the following additional points:

(1) He was concerned about reports circulated, he said, by the State Department that Castro had sent a message to Communists in Latin America to begin acts of sabotage. He said he was concerned about the implication that the blowing up of oil fields in Venezuela had resulted from such a message. He said he was certain that Castro had not sent out such a message and further he wanted to point out that Castro was not the boss of Communists in Latin America and would not give such orders. He said he feared that such talk would again start Latin American countries into taking such actions against Cuba. He said this would be very unfortunate: "the fate of the world is in question here." He said "let U Thant settle these problems." He said the solution of the Cuban problem must be "the test of sincerity of both sides."

(2) Zhukov wanted to know if the President would find it useful to meet with Anastas Mikoyan. If so, Mikoyan could stop in Washington on his way to Havana.

(3) He complained bitterly about a movie called We'll Bury You released by Columbia Pictures. He said it was a terribly distorted view of Khrushchev and an insult to Lenin. He said that if the Soviet Union prepared such a film about President Kennedy the United States would pull its Ambassador out of Moscow. I pointed out to Zhukov that unlike the Soviet Union the United States Government does not control communications, i.e., films. He said he was aware of this but wanted to call it to my attention.

(4) Khrushchev's statements about Berlin and the United States elections/8/ did not mean that Mr. Khrushchev would sign an agreement with East Germany after the election. The Chairman, he said, does not have a desire to move on this problem unilaterally: "We do not want to solve this problem without your participation." He said that what Mr. Khrushchev meant was that we should start active negotiations after the elections with a view of seeking an acceptable solution to the problem.

/8/See Document 232.

Pierre Salinger/9/

/9/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

259. Memorandum From Carl Kaysen of the National Security Council to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, October 31, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Staff Memoranda, Kaysen. Secret.

SUBJECT
Summits and All That

The only way to test the assumption that the events of the last week have created the potential for a major change in US-Soviet relations and consequently in the international political scene is to act on it. We can act in two directions--Berlin and disarmament. There is reason to believe that these are complementary not competing possibilities.

Discussions on both subjects have been going forward and there exist channels for continuing them; however, disarmament discussions have been languishing and Berlin discussions are almost dead. It seems reasonable as a first hypothesis to assume that in order for a useful initiative to be taken, it must be taken in a new channel. A bilateral summit directed at reaching agreements in principle on Berlin and disarmament, to be followed by foreign ministers' meetings of four powers would seem to be the best way to organize an initiative with a maximum chance of securing big results. The powers involved in the German negotiation include all those that would be required to deal with nuclear test-ban and non-diffusion agreements; if more on the disarmament front is attempted, a wider forum will be necessary. There are two kinds of counter arguments to be made against a bilateral summit. The first is that our allies do not like it. If we assess the probability of a useful outcome as being at all high, we are justified in ignoring this consideration. The other is that the internal turmoil in Moscow is such as to make it unlikely that the Soviets want a bilateral summit now. The assertion of fact upon which this argument rests is probably true; however, the conclusion does not follow. Indeed, it is precisely the existence of turmoil which makes the opportunity for a productive summit. Absent uncertainty and an ongoing prospect of re-evaluation on the Soviets' side, it is unlikely that we would achieve any significant change in the terms on which we confront each other. Further, a Berlin summit properly arranged may indeed be a way of avoiding what must be a most difficult problem for the Soviets in entering into any negotiations at the moment--that of appearing to the rest of the world as bowing to U.S. demands. This argument points up in turn another condition of a successful summit, that we view our situation in relation to the Soviets as symmetrical; namely, that recent events have enabled us both to see with greater clarity where our joint interests lie and how it is in our joint interest to limit occasions of conflict and direct confrontation between us and to reduce the potentiality for any remaining occasions to escalate into general war.

On disarmament, the minimum results worthwhile aiming at appear to be a comprehensive test ban treaty, and a nuclear non-diffusion agreement. Some further trimmings could be added to this minimum in a way of an agreement to refrain from putting weapons into outer space and agreement on a list of measures to reduce the dangers of surprise attack. The former appear easy; the latter not particularly significant.

Khrushchev's recent letters to the President suggest that the events have themselves been enough to move the Soviets from their previous position on a comprehensive test ban treaty to an acceptance in principle of inspection, although this is not yet evident in Tsarapkin's/2/ statements at Geneva. It will be necessary to us, however, to take some risks with respect to the number of control posts and the number of inspections. This is a problem which we have examined fairly carefully, and we have the bases for decision on this.

/2/Semen K. Tsarapkin, Chief of the International Organizations Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry and Representative at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

On Berlin, our problems are more difficult. The course of events has probably caused the Soviets to abandon any plans they have for cutting off allied military access in a drastic way in the near future. If by the immediate threat in Berlin we mean the threat of a sharp enough interference with allied access to lead to a military confrontation, we can then say that the immediate threat has vanished for some (indefinite) time. If, however, we view the existence of even last Summer's degree of tension and uncertainty and the prospect that it might increase at any time as in themselves undesirable, then we can say that the Berlin crisis is still with us. Moreover, the pains in the present situation to the Berliners themselves and the importance of the German problem in intra-European politics, argue that the problem demands a major effort absent a Berlin crisis in the immediate sense.

The minimum results we might seek in Berlin would almost certainly require substantial movement by us from our past positions if we are to do more than ratify the status quo in the narrowest sense which we have failed to do in a year-and-a-half of effort. An international access authority with full control, ideally, of an autobahn, a railway line and a canal route, plus operation of the relevant airways, would be our access guarantee. In addition, we must ask for some provisions covering movement of persons, both between East and West Berlin, and East and West Germany. This might well take the form of minimum quotas which can be revised upwards by mutual agreement but not downwards, and with the right to reject specific individuals on the admitting authority of either side. Further, we should seek a clear contractual basis for the presence of western troops. It might be desirable to make West Berlin legally part of the Federal Republic, but subject to certain limitations on the kinds of armaments and the number of troops that can be put into it, on the basis of reciprocal engagements and conditions for East Berlin. This would be useful as a precedent for an arms control agreement. The case against this particular provision in the settlement is the traditional German fear that we would be contracting out of our responsibility for the defense of West Berlin. This is also in large part the case for it. On balance, my judgment leads me to be for it.

In order to achieve so much, what must we be prepared to give? At a minimum, enough recognition of the authorities in East Germany to accomplish some of the Soviet purposes. This would certainly include defining the borders of Germany to the east, as well as the sector borders. It would certainly include allowing the East German membership in the access authority. It would include that degree of recognition implied by East German bilateral negotiations with the Federal Republic on a variety of subjects. It could include an explicit declaration that Germany would be unified on the basis of discussion and agreement between the authorities of the two parts of Germany. If we add renunciation of the use of force to change the boundaries between the two, and mutual declarations of non-aggressive intent between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, we have the substance of the 10 points which we never succeeded in selling either to the Germans or to the Soviets last year.

The double package of Berlin and disarmament proposals might be negotiable on a bilateral basis. To test its negotiability, however, we would have to take the step of substituting a policy of informing our allies for a policy of consulting them in advance. It is not clear that the week's experience has had a powerful enough effect on the principal ally concerned, the Federal Republic, to warrant the conclusion that we can achieve this result. But here again only the attempt can provide the test.

Having gone so far, it may be worthwhile to go much further. Much further in the Berlin direction would involve trading some kind of all-Berlin solution involving neutralization, with either four-power or UN troops and guarantee, for explicit recognition of East Germany and a German peace treaty. The treaty would provide for ultimate unification and contain the kinds of provisions described above for movement between the two Germanies and between each Germany and Berlin. To make this offer now would certainly offend the West Germany Government deeply. In my own judgment, the temperature of last week's events was not sustained at a high enough level over a long enough period of time to make this proposal acceptable either to the Russians or the Germans. It might be made more acceptable to the Russians and less acceptable to the Germans by adding to it provisions limiting the number of troops in both Germanies and providing some troop-free zone for a short distance around Berlin and on either side of the boundary between East and West Germany. This would be very difficult for the West Germans to accept unless NATO integration went a great deal further than it has gone to date.

On disarmament it is obvious that the step beyond is a first-stage agreement of some sort. Here again the difference between the U.S. and Soviet positions is very substantial. Even if we are prepared to move a good deal in dismantling bases, and speeding up the rate of disarmament in the first stage, we would be very far from the Soviet position, which calls for something like nuclear parity by the end of the first stage. The experience of last week probably reinforces our judgment that we are not now ready for nuclear parity.

With disarmament, as with Berlin, the conclusion seems to be that a radical change is unlikely. Thus, the final question is: Is there enough in the limited program in two spheres to justify the risk of summit failure and alliance alienation? This writer votes "yes", loudly. (Oxymoron?)

CK

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