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1961-1963 Volume V Soviet Union |
290. Editorial Note
On February 8, 1963, President Kennedy met with key advisers on U.S. test ban policy. According to Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Seaborg's record of the meeting, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Foster stated that "the key to any test ban is underground tests because the detection of the other types is easy and not at issue." Further, he "said he would like to have authority to go eventually to six on-site inspections as a fall-back position." Commenting that he thought six on-site inspections "the rock-bottom position," President Kennedy "said we should proceed on the assumption that the USSR will cheat, and then work out the advantages, that is, compare what they might gain by cheating with the advantages that banning tests would have with respect to the Chinese situation." Kennedy added that "the whole reason for having a test ban is related to the Chinese situation. Otherwise, it wouldn't be worth the disruption and fighting with Congress, etc." For text of Seaborg's record of the meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VII, pages 644-646.
On February 17 the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency circulated a paper recommending U.S. positions at the test ban talks in Geneva. The next day the President discussed the paper with the Committee of Principals, and inspection procedures were agreed on. For more information and text of ACDA's memorandum to President Kennedy summarizing the recommendations in its February 17 paper, see ibid., pages 648-650. On April 1 the United States and United Kingdom submitted a memorandum to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee that proposed an annual quota of seven reciprocal, on-site inspections, with each side inspecting the other rather than relying on an international commission, and seven automatic seismic stations in both the Soviet Union and the United States. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pages 141-145.
291. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, February 9, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks. Secret. Drafted by Kohler. Copies were sent to Bundy and Tyler. Kohler was in Washington for consultations.
SUBJECT
Conversation with Soviet AmbassadorI had luncheon on February 8 and a two-and-a-half hour talk alone with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. Following are the highlights.
Embassy Housing. I assured Ambassador Dobrynin that the State Department would do everything possible to help him in connection with his plans to acquire new housing in Washington. At the same time I mentioned to him my own plans to get new housing for our people and for our offices in Moscow./2/
/2/A memorandum of Kohler's conversation with various Department of State officials on this question, also on February 8, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 USSR-US.
Nuclear Non-proliferation. We had a long discussion on this subject along the lines of the Secretary's conversation with him on February 7./3/ We agreed that our interest in this subject was a common one and I argued strongly that our own plans for a multilateral nuclear force were the best way to forestall the growth of pressures in Germany for an independent nuclear capability or a possible Franco-German deal on this subject. I expressed my skepticism about the threat in his démarche to the Secretary that the Soviet Union would share its nuclear weapons with its own friends. He did not directly reply but did say that they did not want either of us to do any sharing.
/3/See Document 288.
Cuba. Dobrynin said that he realized the Cuban question was poisoning the atmosphere of our relationship but that frankly he was at a loss as what to advise his Government./4/ He sometimes had the feeling that even if they abandoned Cuba entirely and even helped our overthrow of Castro, some people in the United States would charge that it was too little and too late. I told him I could not discuss this in detail. However, I pointed out to him the President's problem in this respect and the efforts the President was making to restrain the emotions connected with this question. I gave him the personal opinion that it would be very helpful if there could be well publicized photographs in the papers every week or so of Soviet ships leaving Cuba with Soviet military personnel obviously visible on the decks.
/4/In a meeting with Dobrynin on February 9, Rusk twice repeated the comment that Kohler had made to Dobrynin the previous day, that Cuba was "poisoning" U.S.-USSR relations. Rusk indicated that the United States had "no desire or intention to invade Cuba" but that a "wholly unqualified commitment" depended "on the attitude of the Cuban Government." Rusk also emphasized that the continued presence of Soviet troops in Cuba "contributes to the heightened tensions in our relationship." For text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XI, pp. 696-698.
Nuclear Tests. Dobrynin apparently felt optimistic about our reaching agreement on a nuclear test ban agreement. At the same time he made it clear that the Soviets would contemplate the signing of such an agreement as an appropriate occasion for a meeting between the President and Chairman Khrushchev. I argued that this would be premature since the ratification process would still lie ahead in the United States and the charter members would be committed to solicit other adherents. I expressed the opinion that the ratification process would be complicated here since under our system the Senate could charge that the President by dramatizing the signature was taking Senate ratification for granted and abrogating their function. I therefore thought it would be much better that any meeting should follow the accomplishment of ratification and hopefully could take place at a time when other problems could then be dealt with successfully by the Heads of Government.
292. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, February 11, 1963, 7:44 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, STR 12-3 USSR. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Kupinsky (EUR); cleared by EUR, E, Tyler, Kohler, Davis, and Bundy; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Rome, London, Paris, and Moscow.
Topol 1108. Deliver Ambassador Finletter/2/ by 9:00 a.m. February 12.
/2/Thomas K. Finletter, U.S. Permanent Representative at the North Atlantic Council.
1. Before US Ambassador to USSR left Moscow for consultations in Washington, Sov Foreign Minister Gromyko made oral statement to him expressing Soviet Government's concern re alleged US pressure on other countries to prevent deliveries of wide-diameter pipe to USSR./3/ Gromyko asked US Ambassador to inform President of US that head of Soviet Government, Khrushchev, placed particular emphasis on this problem and hoped US Govt and President would take that into account in considering it.
/3/The Embassy in Moscow transmitted the text of Gromyko's statement in telegram 1841, January 26. (Department of State, Central Files, STR 12-3 USSR)
2. USG planning low-key reply to Gromyko on US Ambassador's return to Moscow, about February 14, in following terms:
a) US treats pipe over 19 inches as having military and strategic significance and prohibits its export to USSR. If international situation improves and Western Allies able feel danger to their national security has lessened, US would naturally re-examine its position on pipe exports.
b) Determination what constitutes "strategic" goods matter for decision by countries concerned based evaluation national security interests. Recent issue East German military magazine emphasized military and strategic importance to Sov Bloc of Friendship pipeline and compared it to NATO pipeline.
c) NATO countries have been discussing question of strategic significance of pipe and exports of pipeline to USSR: If certain NATO countries have taken action to restrict such exports, such measures have been undertaken strictly on their own responsibility in light of their judgment of their own security interests.
3. Request USDel inform Stikker/4/ beforehand and NAC Perm Reps at beginning Defense Data briefing February 12 of Gromyko approach and nature intended US oral reply.
/4/Dirk U. Stikker, NATO Secretary General.
Rusk
293. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 13, 1963, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 USSR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Owen.
SUBJECT
Warning to Soviet Embassy on Intelligence Activities of Soviet OfficialsPARTICIPANTS
Mr. Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Mr. Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
SOV--Robert I. OwenCounselor Kornienko was called in to the Department to receive a protest against continuing intelligence activities by Soviet personnel of their Embassy and Amtorg.
Mr. Davis reminded Mr. Kornienko that on various occasions in the past the Department has called the Embassy's attention to impermissible activities carried on by officials of the Soviet Embassy and Amtorg. He recalled his conversations with Mr. Smirnovsky on this subject August 9, 1961 and December 21, 1961 and referred to Mr. Guthrie's discussion on this question with Mr. Filippov on June 5, 1961.
Mr. Davis said that the Department is seriously disturbed by the continuing intelligence activities of a number of Soviet Embassy and Amtorg officials and employees, activities which continue in spite of repeated warnings in the past. He observed that the only apparent effect of the US warnings seems to have been the shifting of some of these activities from Amtorg to Embassy officials. Mr. Davis cited as Soviet officials particularly flagrant in improper activities Mr. G.A. Nikolaev of Amtorg, Mr. B.S. Petrikovski, an employee of the office of the Embassy's Commercial Attaché, and Embassy Third Secretary A.V. Kuznetsov. Mr. Davis stressed that we are aware of improper activities by a goodly number of other Soviet officials and that the three persons mentioned were those whose activities have been especially bad. Mr. Davis said that we are asking that such activities be stopped.
Mr. Kornienko asked if he had correctly understood Mr. Davis to say intelligence activities. After receiving Mr. Davis' affirmative response, Mr. Kornienko stated that he could not accept this kind of accusation since he knew that the Soviet Embassy and other Soviet establishments in this country are not involved in any "unofficial" activities. He would, of course, report Mr. Davis' comments to his Embassy and the government of the USSR. He repeated that, as far as he personally was concerned, he absolutely could not accept "that kind of accusation."
Mr. Davis said that on our part we consider that our knowledge of these activities was conclusive, that our sole interest is that these improper activities cease and that we do not intend to give publicity to our warning. Mr Kornienko said that he had nothing to add but repeated that he would bring the matter to the attention of his Embassy and government./2/
/2/Following this conversation Davis and Kornienko also discussed plans for new U.S. and Soviet Embassy buildings in Moscow and Washington. A memorandum of that part of the conversation is ibid.
294. Editorial Note
On February 13, 1963, Assistant Secretary of State Harriman called in Ambassador Dobrynin to remind him of the President's comments to Soviet First Deputy Chairman Mikoyan on Laos on November 29, 1962 (see Document 270). Viet Minh troops were still in Laos, and North Vietnam was still using Laotian territory as an infiltration route to South Vietnam, in violation of the Geneva agreements. For text of telegram 1697 to Moscow reporting on the meeting, February 14, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXIV, pages 933-934.
295. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Editor of the Saturday Review (Cousins)/1/
Washington, February 19, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2. Secret. Drafted by Rusk.
Mr. Norman Cousins came in to give me an interesting account of his visit to Moscow and his discussions with Khrushchev in December 1962./2/ The following is the substance of his report:
/2/For another account of the visit, see Cousins, The Improbable Triumvirate, pp. 32-57.
Mr. Cousins had been invited by the Vatican to undertake a private mission to Moscow in order to put certain questions to Khrushchev on behalf of the Vatican. [Here follow 5-1/2 paragraphs on Cousins' mission for the Vatican.]
Upon arrival in Moscow he saw Khrushchev during a very busy week but was given considerable time (I had the impression of two hours by the Chairman). When Cousins remarked to Khrushchev that he, the Chairman, had had a very busy week the Chairman said that, in political life, such weeks were like a lady's corset--"It was necessary to have them from time to time in order to stay in shape but it felt very good when you could take them off."
Khrushchev spoke at some length about Russian affairs. He claimed that Soviet industry was showing an encouraging twenty per cent overproduction in terms of the Plan and that he felt that major gains were being achieved. He affirmed that there was a genuine crisis in agriculture and that agricultural norms had been missed by a wide margin and that much remained to be done. He said that they were trying to work out some means by which responsibility could be decentralized to the "action level" and to shake off the paralysis of undue centralization. Khrushchev expected the Communist Party to be the "mind and eyes" of the people and to take the action necessary in local situations to produce results in accordance with the demonstrated desires of the people concerned. Khrushchev said that they were borrowing from capitalism the notion of incentives and that the Soviet Union would be placing more and more emphasis upon personal incentives in order to get on with the job. In discussing de-Stalinization, Khrushchev commented that it was necessary to shift from the highly centralized and ruthless regime of Stalin to a dimension of responsibility to all those who are in a position to take action. Khrushchev said that the difference between Lenin and Stalin was that Lenin forgave his enemies but Stalin killed his own friends.
Cousins, on instruction from the Vatican, made the point to Khrushchev that the Vatican was very upset by the distortion which Soviet propaganda had given to the statements made by the Vatican during the week of the Cuban crisis. If the Soviet Union thought that these statements represented any basic movement away from the West toward the Soviet Union or any revision of the Vatican's attitude toward genuine co-existence this was a great mistake. Khrushchev responded that some of his own journalists "don't know how to handle good news". He said that he has constant difficulty with his own propaganda machine because they respond in a doctrinaire fashion where a more pragmatic attitude would be more productive.
Khrushchev said to Cousins that he knew full well that he would not convert the Pope to Communism and that the Pope would not convert him to Catholicism. But he added, "But stranger things than this have happened."
[Here follows another paragraph on the Vatican mission.]
Khrushchev then asked Cousins to see Zhukov. Cousins replied that he had seen Zhukov two days before whereupon Khrushchev said he ought to see him again--implying that the Chairman had had some discussion with Zhukov since Cousins last saw him.
Cousins then saw Zhukov who said that "the Chairman has to have some results for his policy" of attempting to find some agreement with the West. Zhukov said that unless the Chairman can show some results there would necessarily be a major change in the Soviet attitude. He said that he was not saying this to Cousins as a threat but simply as a statement of the political facts of life in the Soviet Union. Zhukov thought that there were three fields in which some real progress might be possible: (a) nuclear testing; (b) Berlin; (c) outer space. Zhukov thought that cooperation in outer space was in pretty good shape and was on the tracks. On nuclear testing he insisted that Khrushchev was convinced that his agreement to three on-site inspections and three automatic seismic stations would fully meet the United States requirements. Zhukov referred, for example, to his own conversation with Dr. Weisner/3/ and claimed that Dr. Wiesner had said that two or three on-site inspections would be all that would be required. Zhukov said that Soviet leaders had been deeply disturbed about President Kennedy's rejection of the 3-3 proposal and felt that they had been hoodwinked.
/3/Jerome B. Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.
On Berlin, Zhukov said that the only remaining question of any importance was the presence of American forces in West Berlin. He said that it was necessary for us to help Khrushchev to "save face" by accepting a UN flag over Western forces in West Berlin. I questioned Cousins specifically about whether Zhukov had used the phrase "save face" and Cousins insisted that Zhukov had in fact done so.
Cousins concluded the conversation by saying that he would be returning to the Soviet Union and would be in touch with me in the event that I had anything I wished to say before he went./4/ I thanked him for his report and told him I would be glad to have a word with him before he returned to the Soviet Union.
/4/For Cousins' account of his second trip to the Soviet Union in April, see The Improbable Triumvirate, pp. 83-110.
Dean Rusk/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva/1/
Washington, February 21, 1963, 7:47 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 Switz (GE). Secret. Drafted by Robert Baraz (INR); cleared by Valdes, INR, ACDA, EUR, and BTF; and approved by INR. Repeated to Paris and Moscow.
Todis 811. Following is Dept's assessment Soviet draft nonaggression treaty tabled Geneva Feb 20:/2/
/2/For text of the Soviet draft, which was transmitted in Disto 1105 from Geneva, February 20 (ibid.), see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 57-58. In commenting on the draft, the U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee stated that the committee was an inappropriate forum for its discussion since not all of the NATO or Warsaw Pact countries were participants. (Disto 1107 from Geneva, February 20; ibid.) There was no formal discussion of the Soviet draft treaty.
1. Obviously this not draft which Sovs expect West to sign because multilateral treaty form would require Western signature along with GDR. As such it is less forthcoming toward West than standing Soviet offer dating back to May 5, 1958/3/ to work out form which would not require Western and GDR signatures on same document.
/3/For text of this Soviet proposal, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 794-800.
2. Sovs have long been interested in NATO-Warsaw nonaggression treaty or no-force pledge (their first proposal made in July 1955),/4/ both as device for creating impression that USSR not a military threat to Europe and as means of securing Western acquiescence to status quo in Eastern Europe and acceptance existence of--if not formal recognition--GDR and its frontiers which would be implied in new formal renunciation of use of force. Sovs may hope nonaggression pledge would embarrass Western response to pressure on Berlin.
/4/For text of this proposal, July 21, 1955, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, p. 454.
3. Sovs apparently believe that public discussion European security topics at this time will spur questioning of Western defense arrangements and contribute to differences among allies. Tabling of nonaggression treaty on heels of draft declaration on bases/5/ suggests Sovs may intend table refurbished versions other European disarmament schemes such as denuclearization (possibly including new emphasis on Balkans), troop withdrawals, and possibly prevention of surprise attack.
/5/For text of this declaration, February 12, 1963, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, p. 49.
4. In context ENDC, tabling draft treaty and declaration on bases suggests Sovs intend use Geneva as platform for propaganda attacks on Western defense arrangements. Draft documents may be designed in part to draw attention away from exclusive focus on test ban issue at Geneva, although even if this supposition accurate move does not shed light one way or another on Soviet intentions with regard to test ban.
5. Soviet move may be intended to remove nonaggression pact from context of talks on Berlin, and may reflect Soviet effort to narrow range of issues to be discussed in any new round of Berlin conversations in order to press for agreement on status, troop-presence and access questions.
6. Soviet draft treaty bears strong family resemblance to earlier Soviet draft treaty language. Most notable difference is duration clause which is not specifically tied to conclusion of general European security treaty. Though new draft would not preclude re-introduction of Soviet proposal for such pact, it suggests Sovs prepared to let that idea lapse.
For USRO: You may use foregoing assessment in POLAD or NAC./6/
/6/Printed from an unsigned copy.
297. Editorial Note
In telegram 2094, from Moscow, February 25, 1963, Ambassador Kohler reported that he had carried out the instructions in telegram 1771 from the Department of State, February 21, to inform Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko of U.S. readiness to resume "bilateral exploratory talks on Berlin and Germany to see whether basis for fruitful negotiations exists." For text of both telegrams, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XV, pages 489-490 and 492-493.
298. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the Executive Director of Central Intelligence (Kirkpatrick)/1/
Washington, February 25, 1963.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A. Secret. Also addressed to Cline and Kent; a copy was sent to Carter.
I continue to be concerned over the objectivity with which our analysts and estimators appraise the developments in Sino-Soviet relations. It is of interest to me that press, radio and TV commentators all seem to interpret various actions by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists as indicating some effort towards rapprochement and reconciliation. In fact some reporting has been very optimistic--probably greatly overstated--on the prospects for reconciliation. On the other hand, the tone of CIA reporting as evidenced by this morning's item on Sino-Soviet relations,/2/ indicates to me that our analysts continue with the conviction that no reconciliation is possible and that new steps in the controversy are in preparation.
/2/Not further identified.
A reconciliation or a suspension of the hostility that we have witnessed for the past year or so would have a very considerable effect on our vital interests. It would, for instance, permit the Soviets to take more aggressive action against the West with a confident feeling that they were not exposed dangerously on their southeastern border. Likewise, Sino-Soviet relationships would affect importantly such matters as the India-ChiCom controversy, nuclear testing, disarmament and other current problems.
I raise this question because I feel we must study the indicators with great care and great objectivity and not be influenced by a preconceived conclusion in this matter. It appears to me that it is in Khrushchev's interest to find a reconciliation and, with the ChiComs hard-pressed technologically and economically, it might be in their interests to "make up", even at the cost of setting aside some of their basic ideological positions.
John A. McCone
299. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, February 25, 1963, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, STR 12-3 USSR. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, London, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels.
2095. Deptels 1668/2/ and 1741/3/ to Moscow. Pipeline. I made oral statement to Gromyko on pipeline as per reftels.
/2/Printed as Topol 1108, Document 292.
/3/In telegram 1741, February 18, Kohler was instructed to make an oral reply along the lines laid down in telegram 1668 and to preface his remarks with the following statement:
"I am under instructions to assure you that in view of the personal interest of Chairman Khrushchev in this matter, as conveyed by your remarks to me on January 26, the United States will continue to keep all aspects of this question under consideration. I am also instructed to inform you that my statements represent the carefully considered views of the United States Government at the highest levels." (Department of State, Central Files, STR 12-3 USSR)
Gromyko said he would inform SovGovt and Khrushchev personally of US reply. He said USG obviously considers that threat to cut off export of pipe by certain countries to USSR would sabotage Soviet economic development. Such calculations were groundless. This could in no way weaken Soviet economic potential. USG had brought pressure on FRG, which had in turn brought pressure on its industrialists, some of whom had specially constructed facilities to supply USSR with pipe. Latter were forced to refuse export pipe to USSR. Only FRG industrialists would suffer from this, not USSR. Calculations that Soviet economic potential would be weakened or that it would be damaged were founded on nothing. It was, rather, a question of principle for USSR.
Gromyko said that when Khrushchev meets with President, Soviets hear statements from American side that US is striving for international cooperation, and US reps say same sort of thing in UN and other international bodies on cooperation in economic, political, and cultural fields. At same time, US applies gross pressure to stop trade with USSR, in crude contradiction to those statements. It was hard to reconcile these two things: US statements about improving US-Soviet relations and pressure to force certain countries to stop trade with USSR in peaceful products, "and I emphasized peaceful."
Gromyko said SovGovt categorically protested this. That was why he had taken advantage of my trip to Washington to bring this to my attention so I could transmit it to USG.
Referring to statement that USG would "continue to keep all aspects this question under consideration," Gromyko said this was not clear to him. SovGovt hoped there would be substantive change in situation. This sentence sounded as though situation could go on this way for number of years, while US continued keep it under consideration. He would be grateful if I could clarify this sentence.
I said I could. I said our attitude was not directed against Soviet economic potential, but concerned strategic goods of military significance. I said we had restricted list of such goods, which does not affect normal trade. Nor could I accept contention that US had pressured other countries. These countries had made their own decisions. It was of course true that matter had been discussed in NATO. I noted I was not accustomed to hearing that US had pressured Adenauer, since usual accusation was that Adenauer had pressured US.
Specifically as regards his query, I said that two matters we had discussed thus far (i.e., Berlin/Germany/4/ and pipe) were not unrelated. So long as tension in Central Europe, it would be necessary to take such measures. If there were progress toward real relaxation, this might warrant reconsideration.
/4/For a report on this part of the conversation, transmitted in telegram 2094 from Moscow, February 25, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XV, pp. 492-493.
Gromyko said he could not regard my clarification as satisfactory; it was fully unsatisfactory. Soviets believed it was a mistake to carry on business with USSR this way.
I said I would report this further discussion of the subject./5/
/5/In telegrams 2096-2099 from Moscow, all February 25, Kohler reported that Gromyko had remained unresponsive on the question of communications links for the U.S. Embassy (telegram 2096; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Gromyko Talks); had expressed Soviet disappointment over the U.S. reception of its latest proposals on a nuclear test ban (telegram 2097; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 Switz (GE)); had said that the Foreign Ministry would reply soon about Embassy building sites (telegram 2098; ibid., BG 6 Moscow); and hoped that the uproar in the United States over the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba would stop (telegram 2099; ibid., POL 27-5 USSR).
Kohler
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