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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume V Soviet Union DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

30. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, February 17, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files, NSAMs: Lot 72 D 316. Official Use Only. Drafted by Siscoe.

SUBJECT
Expansion of Exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Your memorandum of February 8/2/ asked for a report on exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and for recommendations for expanding those exchanges with the Soviet Union and Poland. An interim reply was sent to you on February 11./3/

/2/Reference is to NSAM 13, which reads: "I would like to get a memorandum on our exchange of persons programs behind the Iron Curtain, particularly with Poland and Russia. What could we do to step them up?" (Ibid.) Also printed in Claflin, The President Wants To Know, p. 14.

/3/Not printed. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files, NSAMs: Lot 72 D 316)

The report which you requested is attached/4/ and consists of four parts which are summarized below.

/4/Not printed.

1. Interim Report on Implementation of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Exchanges Under November 21, 1959 Agreement. This paper reviews the implementation for 1960 of the current America-Soviet Agreement and reflects that only about 40 percent of the planned exchanges have been completed. The performance within the several categories varies for different reasons, the primary ones being Soviet interest in scientific and technical exchanges, reluctance to engage in long-term exchanges and a desire to avoid informational exchanges.

2. Exchanges with Eastern Europe and Possibilities for Expansion. This paper reviews exchanges with Eastern European countries and indicates that, except in the case of Poland, exchange activity has been strictly limited because of the unfavorable political climate in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the cautious attitude of Rumania, and the only recent resumption of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria. Modest and gradual increases can be expected with Rumania and Bulgaria, but there is little hope for any significant change in the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The large-scale Polish program is unique because exchanges have been developed and financed primarily by private American groups, particularly the Ford and Rockerfeller Foundations. The opportunities in Poland are still large but these are limited by the attitude of the Polish Government and the available political funds.

3. Background Considerations: Expansion of Soviet Bloc Exchanges. This paper considers the basic factors involved in joining in exchange programs with the Soviet Union, notes the inherent risks and the need to negotiate firmly for equivalent advantages, but concludes that exchanges arranged and carried out imaginatively, persistently, and with adequate resources of trained personnel and funds can be responsive to and advance our long term interests.

4. Possible Increases in Exchanges Program with the Soviet Union. This paper reviews the possibilities for expansion of exchanges with the Soviet Union and suggests specific fields in which these exchanges may be increased. It also sets forth financial requirements for this expansion and recommends measures to increase the efficiency of administrative procedures.

Dean Rusk

 

31. Editorial Note

A meeting to discuss differing views on the best way to proceed with the paramilitary operation against Cuba was convened at the White House on February 18, 1961. According to summary notes of the meeting, CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell outlined the status of planning and preparation, following which the group discussed how to generate support for the operation and other matters. Ambassador Bohlen expressed the view that the USSR would not react if the operation were finished quickly but might react if it dragged on. For text of the notes, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume X, page 108.

 

32. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, February 18, 1961, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 032 Hammer, Armand. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

1967. Department pass Secretary Commerce. Embtel 1958./2/ Following are highlights of Hammer's conversations with Soviet officials:/3/

/2/Telegram 1958, February 17, reported that Armand Hammer, President of the Occidental Petroleum Corporation, had arrived in Moscow as a private citizen, but at the request of the U.S. Secretary of Commerce was looking into the possibilities of expanding U.S.-Soviet trade. (Ibid.)

/3/Memoranda of Hammer's conversation with V.M. Vinogradov, in the Ministry of Foreign Trade on February 14, and with Mikoyan on February 15, were transmitted as enclosures to despatch 558 from Moscow, February 17 (ibid.); a memorandum of Hammer's conversation with Khrushchev on February 17 was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 563 from Moscow, February 21 (ibid.). A copy of his report on the trip to the Soviet Union is attached to a letter from Secretary of Commerce Hodges to Secretary of State Rusk, March 3. (Ibid.) For Hammer's own account of the background to the trip and his conversations with Soviet officials, see Hammer, pp. 312-328.

(1) Re US prohibition crab meat imports: Both Mikoyan and Khrushchev stressed US inspection to resolve "slave labor" issue out of question but would permit Hammer or other "tourists" to visit and see for themselves no slave labor employed. Clear implication this intended as way out of impasse and that Soviets would expect "tourists" to report their findings to US Government.

(2) Mikoyan intimated he might welcome meeting with Secretary of Commerce as a step toward improved economic relations. However, both he and Khrushchev appeared reluctant to take the initiative.

(3) Khrushchev stated he had already given order to settle lend-lease debt (prior to January 1960 discussions). "Just treat us as you did the British and we will be satisfied." He clearly stated this meant assurances that credits would be forthcoming following agreement on lend-lease debt. Mikoyan had stated that negotiations regarding credits and a trade agreement should parallel discussions for lend-lease settlement. Mikoyan also said USSR prepared to place orders for one billion dollars if credits can be arranged. Both Mikoyan and Khrushchev revealed their expectation that present US recession would be factor prompting us to seek expanded trade with USSR. They realize, however, that lend lease settlement and matters requiring legislation (credits, MFN) will take time. Mikoyan said that in any event substantial trade could be carried on with us on cash basis.

(4) Mikoyan and Ministry of Foreign Trade officials took same line saying three things need to be done to improve trade relations:

(A) Soviet buyers must have assurance that contracts will be honored without interference (e.g. license revocation) by US Government.

(B) USSR must be able to sell products with minimum of restrictions (need for MFN). Agreed Soviet products must be geared more effectively to US market.

(C) Better psychological atmosphere required among US businessmen. Must want to seek Soviet trade. General attitude of US Government important this respect. Export license determinations on borderline decisions also major factor.

(5) Throughout all discussions Hammer had clear impression Soviets eager to expand trade with US. Hammer stressed in discussions that improvement in economic relations would take time. Soviet officials in all three conversations recognize this and appeared to accept as fact to which they must accommodate.

(6) Hammer suggested to Mikoyan and Khrushchev that USSR send representative selection from its art treasures to US for exhibit--particularly selections from Hermitage. Also suggested that Eleanor Roosevelt could be appointed chairman of committee to arrange undertaking and that he believed exhibition could open at National Gallery in Washington followed by exhibits other large cities. Khrushchev said this an excellent idea and asked Hammer to prepare plan for carrying it out. He said he would give orders to Zhukov to work out arrangements with Embassy Counselor for Cultural Affairs after Hammer had submitted plans. Hammer intends to prepare plan after consultation in US.

(7) Hammer stated to Soviets that he preferred no publicity and none has been observed. While general activities known to some members Embassy staff, no evidence that foreign correspondents here yet aware his visit.

(8) Hammer had intended round world trip. In light these conversations plans to return to Washington early next week for report to Secretary of Commerce and Senator Gore. Would also like to talk with Ambassador Thompson. One copy each of memos of conversation personally being carried to Washington by Hammer at his insistence. No classification marked on these copies.

(9) Embassy Economic Counselor accompanied Hammer on introductory visit to Ministry of Foreign Trade. No Embassy officer present at meetings with Mikoyan and Khrushchev.

Freers

 

33. Editorial Note

French Ambassador Alphand met with Secretary of State Rusk on February 20, 1961, to discuss the situation in the Congo. According to a memorandum of the conversation, "Alphand said he thought we should be very tough with the Soviets and tell them frankly we would not accept a Communist regime in the Congo. He added Khrushchev anyway is not in a good logistic position vis-à-vis the Congo. The Secretary agreed and said that sometimes he thought we were over pessimistic about our own position in the Congo since the Soviets were having troubles too." For text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XX, pages 70-73.

 

34. Editorial Note

On February 20, 1961, Secretary of State Rusk called in Soviet Ambassador Menshikov to inform him that the United States supported the statement issued the previous day by the King of Laos insisting on his nation's neutrality. However, the United States did not support the King's call for an international conference to work out a settlement in Laos. Menshikov replied that the Soviet Union supported Laotian neutrality, as it had since the 1954 Geneva Conference. For text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXIV, pages 56-58.

On February 21 the United States Intelligence Board approved Special National Intelligence Estimate 58-61: "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to Laos." According to a brief of the SNIE, it expressed the Board's judgment that "except possibly in the case of more extreme U.S. military measures, we believe that Soviet leaders would not match U.S.-sponsored military actions in Laos with corresponding, step-by-step, Bloc military measures. Except in the case of the most modest U.S. military measures Bloc leaders would almost certainly expect that most of world opinion would be sharply critical of the U.S., and that this fact would deter the U.S. from pressing too far." For text, see ibid., pages 59-61.

On February 28 Menshikov informed Rusk that the Soviet Government believed that the 1954 Geneva Accords were not adequate to resolve the present situation in Laos and therefore supported the call by Prince Sihanouk for an international conference to strengthen the International Control Commission created in the 1954 agreement. For text of the memorandum of Menshikov's conversation with Rusk, see ibid., pages 63-66.

In telegram 2138 to the Department of State from Moscow, March 10, Ambassador Thompson reported on a meeting with Chairman Khrushchev on Laos, during which Khrushchev said the USSR shared "the same desire as you, namely to end fighting which only sheds blood, gives neither you nor us anything, and hurts relations between us." Khrushchev welcomed "a Laos that pursues neutral policy on model of Austria" and suggested that Rusk and Gromyko meet to discuss the matter. For text of the telegram, see ibid., pages 80-82.

In telegram 2139 to the Department of State from Moscow, March 10, Thompson reported that Khrushchev seemed convinced that the United States was "genuinely seeking" neutrality for Laos and was "intrigued by the possibility" of settling the problem. (Ibid., page 82, footnote 3) Nevertheless, a Rusk-Gromyko meeting in New York on March 18 produced little. Rusk found Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko "completely elusive," according to a memorandum of the conversation. Gromyko refused to give substantive answers beyond a repeated insistence that discussions on Laos must begin with an international conference. (Ibid., page 93, source note)

 

35. Editorial Note

In a letter to Chairman Khrushchev, February 22, 1961, President Kennedy expressed the hope that "it will be possible, before too long, for us to meet personally for an informal exchange of views" and indicated that he had asked Ambassador Thompson to pursue the question of a meeting. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VI, pages 5-7. Khrushchev's reaction to Kennedy's proposal is described in Documents 41 and 42. In a May 12 letter to Kennedy, Khrushchev accepted the U.S. proposal for a meeting in Vienna on June 3-4 and reviewed some of the international problems requiring solutions. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VI, pages 18-21.

 

36. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 24, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-2461. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Bohlen.

SUBJECT
Luncheon with Ambassador Menshikov

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Menshikov
Mr. M.N. Smirnovsky, Minister Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

While the conversation ranged, as it had in the past, over many subjects, it was clear that the chief purpose of the invitation to lunch was to endeavor to find out exactly what "instructions" Ambassador Thompson was taking back to Moscow, with particular emphasis on disarmament and the question of "normalization" of trade. I explained to Menshikov that Thompson's consultations here had been of an exploratory and background nature and that it was too soon for any specific or concrete proposals to be made on these two or other subjects; that Mr. McCloy was working on an examination of the entire disarmament picture, but it would be some time before definite conclusions could be reached.

On trade, I told him that the Soviets must understand that under our system of separation of powers, the President could not direct Congress and tell it what to do, (this is an old subject of discussion with Menshikov) and that in regard to trade, most of the limitations were embodied in legislation which would require new laws to change, and that the Congressional reaction to effecting such change was at best problematic in the absence of some indication that there was to be an improvement in relations.

I referred, in this connection, to the abortive attempt last year to settle the lend lease problem as a first step in a program of removing such limitations. Menshikov on this point adhered to the previous position that there could be no discussion of lend lease settlement unless accompanied, simultaneously, with negotiations for the removal of limitations and the granting of credits./2/ At the conclusion of this part of the discussion, Menshikov said that it would appear that the United States position had not changed, and that he "did not envy Mr. Thompson if this was all he would have to say on this subject." I told him it would be a mistake to regard any previous position as that necessarily of the new Administration, but that the objective factors which I had outlined were still there to be dealt with.

/2/On February 22 Menshikov had made the same points in a dinner conversation with Secretary of Commerce Hodges (memorandum of conversation, February 23; ibid., 611.61/2-2361) and a letter to Rusk, February 24 (ibid., 601.6111/2-2461).

The following is a brief outline of the other subjects covered:

1. Laos. Menshikov repeated that he had told you that our proposal on Laos was "one-sided" and did not take into consideration the attitude of "the other side."/3/ I told him that President Kennedy had said, in his Inaugural speech, we should concentrate on those areas where we might be able to concentrate on those elements in which we seem to have a common view as against belaboring those which divided us, and in this situation we had one point in common; namely, the desirability of the neutralization of Laos, and that an exchange of views which Thompson was authorized to have as to how this principle could be given effect in the mutually acceptable manner would be worthwhile. Menshikov agreed but kept returning to his thesis of the "one-sided" nature of our suggestion.

/3/See Document 34.

During the discussion, Smirnovsky made an interesting remark in which he said, "How could Laos be neutral without the inclusion of some communists in the Government?" I pointed out that by definition, any communist-controlled or influenced government could not be neutral, unless I had misread all of the statements that had recently come out on the aims of the communist move. He seemed to realize that he had made a mistake and rather lamely referred to the presence of communists in the Italian and French Governments at the end of the war. (I believe this inadvertent remark by Smirnovsky reveals where the main problem will lie in regard to any future Laotian Government.

Menshikov said he had been informed by you of our opposition to the idea of a conference and could not see why we were opposed to it. I told him that it appeared to us to be a mechanism for the exacerbation of the situation in Laos rather than a practical method of handling it.

2. Germany and Berlin. Menshikov asked me if Thompson would raise the question of Berlin, to which I replied that since they, and not we, were seeking a change in the present circumstances, this was not a question we would raise. He then asked what Thompson's view would be in the event that Khrushchev raised it. I told him that beyond the very obvious elements of the United States position, which would not be subject to change, Thompson had no specific instructions. These elements, as I saw them, were:

(a) We were not prepared to accept anything in regard to West Berlin which would derogate or impair the position of the Western Powers in that city which was ours by right, reinforced by agreement.

(b) The Soviet Union should understand that it would not be possible for the United States or its allies to accept a political or diplomatic defeat over Berlin, and

(c) Finally, that, of course, Thompson would report, confidentially, whatever views Mr. Khrushchev chose to give him.

I added, on my own, that I thought the whole situation in Germany was abnormal, including Berlin as a city, and that you could not claim one part alone--West Berlin--as abnormal, to be dealt with in isolation; adding that, personally, I could not see why the existing situation in Berlin could not be left alone even if the Soviet Union felt it essential to make some arrangement of a peace treaty nature with East Germany, which, of course, we would not approve or recognize but this was essentially their business. Menshikov did not pursue the subject of Berlin further.

3. On the Congo. Menshikov raised, himself, their attitude toward Hammarskjold, saying that here we had a profound and deep difference--with which I agreed. He said he could well understand our support of Hammarskjold since he was "our man," to which I replied it was difficult to see how any individual could have been more objective and neutral than Hammarskjold, and that the Soviet denial of the possibility of a genuinely objective or neutral figure in an international position was an extremely serious one which would have an effect on any form of control of inspection in the disarmament field or nuclear test bans and one to which I did not see much of an answer if they persisted in this attitude.

4. Test Negotiation. Menshikov agreed that the nuclear tests negotiations might afford the first real opportunity to agree on something, but did not go into any detail of the unresolved issue except to state that too many on-site inspections would be a reflection of suspicion and distrust, which would be a bad thing. I told him that on the contrary, that if we were to be realistic and serious, that an excess of assurance for verifying the mutual observance of such an agreement was infinitely preferable to inadequate assurance, pointing out, in this connection, that any agreement would have to attain the support of Congress if it were to be adopted by this Government.

In general, the conversation followed along the standard lines of previous talks I have had with Menshikov, with the exception of his intense interest in finding out whether Thompson was taking back something "concrete" in the way of propositions. He seemed to be disappointed when I told him that Thompson would have no new proposals but was thoroughly familiar with the President's thinking on the general subject of our relations with the Soviet Union and that the possibility to avoid unnecessary misunderstanding through exchange of views of a quiet, unpublicized nature would be a great step forward. It would seem clear from this that Menshikov, at least, rather expected that Thompson would go back with some startling new proposals in some form or other following his consultations here.

The subject of any meeting between Khrushchev and the President was not raised by Menshikov at any time and I, of course, did not do so.

 

37. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, February 26, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.616/2-2661. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text.

SUBJECT
Soviet Crab Meat

You will recall our discussion on February 21, concerning the prohibition against the importation of Soviet crab meat./2/ It is my recommendation that the ban against imported Soviet crab meat be lifted, and I am advised that Mr. Dillon concurs in this recommendation.

/2/Presumably at the meeting during which the President's February 22 message to Khrushchev was drafted; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VI, pp. 5-6.

We believe that it is of great importance at this juncture to take some action which would further our objectives of developing the channels of communication with the Soviets. Removal of the ban on the importation of Soviet crab meat would be a tangible demonstration of our desire to improve United States-Soviet relations. It would remove a barrier to United States-Soviet trade which Soviet leaders apparently regard as particularly discriminatory and which was imposed at a time of considerable political tension.

The ban on the importation of Soviet crab meat was imposed at the time of the Korean War in 1951 by the Department of the Treasury in conformity with the provisions of Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, on the basis of its finding that Soviet crab meat was produced by convict, forced and indentured labor. The finding was based on eye-witness affidavits, mostly from former Japanese prisoners of war, regarding the employment in Soviet crab meat canning and crab fishing of Japanese prisoners of war, Japanese civilians trapped in areas occupied by Soviet forces at the end of World War II, Korean civilians, and Russian convict labor.

In the last few years various Soviet officials have denied that slave or convict labor conditions exist in the Soviet crab meat industry. These include Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan and Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Kuzmin. Other information which has come to the attention of the Departments of State and Treasury bears this out. In the Department's opinion these statements should be sufficient, in the absence of any recent evidence to the contrary, to justify a lifting of the crab meat prohibition. It is our understanding that the Department of the Treasury is also convinced of the justification for removing the prohibition.

Under these circumstances, I am convinced that a lifting of the crab meat ban at this time would be in the national interest.

Dean Rusk/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

 

38. Editorial Note

On February 27, 1961, Walter J. Stoessel, Director of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State, sent to the White House for clearance the drafts of four telegrams to Ambassador Thompson. The four cables were approved the following day and transmitted to Moscow late on February 28. In the first, telegram 1401, the Department of State reiterated the points that Bohlen had made to Ambassador Menshikov on February 14 concerning expansion of trade between the United States and the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Central Files, 411.6141/2-2861) Telegram 1402 outlined the U.S. position on Germany and Berlin, stating that the "central difficulty is of course continued division of Germany" and that the "United States continues to believe that there will be no real settlement of this problem or any real tranquillity in Central Europe until Germans were permitted to unite themselves. This will remain our constant aim and we would not be disposed to take any legal or other definitive steps which would appear to perpetuate or legalize this division." For text of telegram 1402, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XIV, pages 16-18. Telegram 1403, which outlined the U.S. position on the Congo, is included in the microfiche supplement for volume XX. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/ 2-2861) The final telegram, 1404, instructed Thompson to inform Khrushchev that the President intended to make a vigorous effort to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing. (Ibid., 397.5611-GE/2-2861)

Following the despatch of these telegrams, the Department of State sent Ambassador Thompson two additional cables, 1405 and 1406, drafted on February 28. In the first Thompson was authorized to deliver the President's message (see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VI, pages 5-6) to Gromyko if circumstances warranted, although the Department preferred delivery to Khrushchev. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/2-2861) The second elaborated on the President's desire to reach an agreement on disarmament. (Ibid., 600.0012/2-2861)

On March 2 following a discussion of how to proceed on disarmament, Thompson reported that he had explored with the protocol section of the Foreign Ministry the possibility of meeting Khrushchev outside Moscow. (Telegram 2050 from Moscow; ibid., 600.0012/3-261) The following day he reported that Khrushchev would see him at Novosibirsk on March 9. (Telegram 2065 from Moscow; ibid., 123 Thompson)

 

39. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/

Washington, March 3, 1961, 10:16 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.6194/3-361. Confidential. Drafted by Stoffel (TRC/AV) on March 2 and cleared by TRC, SOV, RA, and EE. Also sent to the NATO capitals and Moscow, Prague, and Stockholm.

G-768. Following is guidance requested Topol [Polto] 1059 (also Topol G-1306)/2/ concerning approach by Hooper on clarifying US position civil aviation relations with Sovbloc. Department regrets delay in reply which resulted from fluid situation concerning negotiations and other aspects Sovbloc air activities.

/2/Polto 1059, February 3, reported that Acting NATO Secretary-General Hooper had asked for clarification of the U.S. position on civil aviation relations with the Soviet Union. (Ibid., 611.6194/2-361) Polto (also incorrectly cited as Topol) G-1306, February 24, reported that the British representative had given an account of Czech and Cuban efforts to obtain landing rights in the United Kingdom. (Ibid., 941.7249/2-2461)

Department appreciates problem of apparent discrepancy in having US suggest to USSR commencement bilateral air transport negotiations and US attitude in POLAD on Sovbloc operations into Middle East and Cuba. Your reply to the effect that key factor was that of areas which Communists seeking penetrate is quite right. Sovbloc air service penetration of Near East is accomplished fact and US would seek keep extension of penetration to manageable proportions and in framework orderly development international civil aviation. In particular problem of keeping ICAO members like Poland and Czechoslovakia out of such areas realized. Czecho now flies to the Far East by way of Near East, South, and Southeast Asia. Likewise Czecho flies deep into Africa.

As to Latin America, the United States wants make serious effort keep all Sovbloc airlines out of area. In particular we can not tolerate their using United States Air Force Bases abroad or civil airports in the United States for purpose carrying out these operations. It is quite clear basic purpose such operations is political and not commercial and therefore not consistent with Chicago Convention/3/ which specifically prohibits misuse civil aviation for other purposes. Would be inconceivable think of Czechoslovak airline having flown to Cuba under any regime before Castro. Such service just would not make economic sense.

/3/For text of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, December 7, 1944, see 61 Stat. 1180.

As far as Soviet service Iceland is concerned, except for the presence of US defense forces at Keflavik, situation would be similar other Western European countries to which Sovbloc airlines now fly. However, the military operations at Keflavik do provide additional element. The US would hope, for that reason, and in view common NATO interest those military operations, that any rights given by Iceland would eliminate the possibility of 1. having Soviet personnel stationed at Keflavik, 2. having direct rapid electrical communication between Keflavik and Moscow. In addition, if either traffic or transit rights are granted in Iceland, for general political reasons, the US would also hope that rights would terminate at Keflavik or, if they went beyond, would not be granted until terminal rights had been granted by other non-sensitive countries and that such rights be carefully restricted only to specified terminal points. This for purpose preventing Soviet long-range aircraft flying from Keflavik to Latin America.

US desires conclude satisfactory air transport agreement with USSR because it feels that, in view of services between Moscow and most European capitals, it is logical for Moscow have such connections with New York. We realize dangers and problems involved and are making every effort avoid such dangers and minimize problems./4/

/4/At this point in the source text the following sentence was deleted before transmission: "The draft agreement which US is putting together will be a tough one which Soviet Union will have difficulty accepting."

It is not intention of the United States to in any way urge any country which must provide overflight rights or intermediate landing rights for Aeroflot in connection with an eventual US/USSR agreement to do so only in framework of the common policy i.e. to exact from the USSR adequate reciprocal rights.

Your statement contained Topol 1059 that US would not let Soviet airline fly Moscow-New York-Havana is completely correct. US will make sure there is no possibility of rights beyond New York and for that reason will not request rights beyond Moscow. Also, intermediate points will be carefully spelled out so that sensitive points like Havana could not be used as an intermediate point.

Dept agrees with other points raised by you as needing clarification for example your point number 1. that air transport agreement should be drafted so as permit consultation with NATO members before establishing air routes which will in effect call for intermediate stops whether traffic or non-traffic in territory other members or fanning out "points beyond" rights to areas which now are or in the future might be sensitive is an excellent one. As matter of fact we interpret 1958 common policy as requiring such consultation and were therefore disturbed to see the United Kingdom had revised its agreement with USSR so as make intermediate points unlimited, without consultations with the US or other NATO members. It is true that airlines of member countries may wish seek maximum air services. However in any agreement with USSR, Aeroflot is bound get at least equal rights in a market which can not possibly be of more than limited value for some time to come. For that reason political aspects appear over-riding. We are also aware that a number of countries are not really interested in reciprocal services and will not insist on operating them at the same time that the Soviets begin service. Presumably such soft attitude results from the desire to trade with bloc or other interest not particularly related to civil aviation.

Your second point, to effect that transit right problem complicated not only by Two Freedoms Agreement/5/ but by difficulty justifying refusal transit rights in light relations not only with communists but with other states, presumably refers to fact that state granting terminal right might be irked if it could not exercise its reciprocal rights if another member country denied essential transit rights. However US feels that countries granting such rights should take a hardheaded attitude towards Soviet Union and we have, for example, once again informed Sweden we would not any way expect that country grant overflight or technical transit or traffic rights to USSR for purpose flying to New York, without exacting from USSR adequate reciprocal benefit. We would take same attitude toward other countries as well.

/5/Presumably a reference to the International Air Services Transit Agreement, December 7, 1944 (59 Stat. 1693).

It is hoped that above will be some help. Actually you have done excellent job of carrying the ball this difficult subject and Department will attempt keep you continuously informed on developments so you may always be prepared interpret U.S. intentions.

Rusk

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