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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume V Soviet Union DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

380. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 26, 1963, 11:35 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by S/AL on November 27 and by the White House on December 2. For a memorandum of another part of the conversation, see Document 381. The meeting was held at the White House.

PARTICIPANTS

US
The President
Under Secretary Harriman
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Tyler--EUR
Mr. Bundy--The White House
Mr. Akalovsky--ACDA/IR

USSR
Mr. Mikoyan
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Smirnovski, Chief of the American Section, Foreign Ministry
Mr. Sukhodrev

SUBJECT
Call by Mr. Mikoyan on the President

During a brief exchange of amenities while pictures were being taken, the President handed Mr. Mikoyan a personal message for Mr. Khrushchev in response to the latter's published letter./2/

/2/Khrushchev's letter of condolence, November 24, and the President's reply are in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VI, pp. 311-313.

Mr. Mikoyan opened the conversation by saying that before leaving Moscow Mr. Khrushchev and he had talked about Mr. Khrushchev's meeting with the President, then a Senator, at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the US in 1959. Mr. Khrushchev recalled that the President had asked him some questions at that meeting and that the President and Senator Fulbright had seen him to his car when he was leaving. The President had then told him, with a touch of American humor, that he should become a US Senator and that he would make an outstanding one. Mr. Khrushchev had replied that each of them should work in his own parliament and fight for peace. Mr. Mikoyan continued that he remembered the press reporting at that time that in Mr. Johnson's view the meeting with the Foreign Relations Committee had gone well and that Mr. Khrushchev was a strong man who was well able to defend his point of view. Thus, even at that time there had been some contact and a beginning of mutual understanding between the President and Mr. Khrushchev. As he had said earlier, Mr. Khrushchev and he had talked about this before his departure from Moscow.

Mr. Mikoyan then said that on the basis of his own meetings in Moscow he thought contacts could be maintained and mutual understanding brought about.

The President responded that the leaders of our two countries would be a failure in the history of the world if they were unable to find an answer to how the two sides could live together peacefully and beneficially in the world. This was the big challenge of our times. President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev had seemed to be making, with their respective leaders, some advances in that direction. The only really important thing was what was the answer and how we could do it, because if we could find an answer, the world would be indeed a much better place to live. The United States was earnestly seeking friendship and cooperation with all nations of the world. The United States did not seek hostility with anyone; it courted no territory and was not seeking domination of any people. The President went on to say that President Kennedy's foremost thought every day had been what steps could be taken on that particular day to bring about a better understanding between the peoples of the world. The President said this policy had been fully embraced by him and would be respected and continued. The United States would meet anyone more than half way.

The President then noted that the United States was not planning to invade Cuba, but that the Cuban problem was a very serious one with our people. He hoped that as days came and went we would be able to find a solution there which would make it possible to lead our peoples further towards peace and understanding. Actions already taken had gone part of the way and some lessening of tension had taken place. We had a number of problems at home which were quite troublesome, and if there was any indication at any time that we could in some way bring about better understanding and better relations we would go our part of the way. We were dedicated to our system and intended to preserve it, but this did not mean that we wanted it to dominate or enslave any other people.

Mr. Mikoyan said he was happy to hear these words uttered by the new President of the United States. The President's desire to live in peace and friendship with the USSR and with other nations was in full accord with the views of the Soviet Union.

The President stated that there would be no change in the Kennedy policy. We were very happy that Congress had shown evidences of approving negotiations and exchanges of views between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev. This had offered us real encouragement not only in their attitude but also in our people's attitude. Our constant purpose, each day, would be to seek to travel the road of peace and to find solutions to many problems that engaged the two sides and to many differences existing between them.

The President continued that as an immediate comment he wished to say that the problem which was the biggest with our people was the result of the Castro-promoted subversion. This inevitably and invariably gave us strained relations. He hoped, however, that in future both sides would find that they had moved further to peace and had made gains greater than even those made by his predecessor and Mr. Khrushchev.

Mr. Mikoyan said he was very much gratified to hear this. However, there was only one point he wished to comment on, namely, the President's remark concerning Cuban subversive activities. He said he could not understand how a small nation like Cuba could subvert anyone, let alone a big power. On the contrary, the whole world could see how small Cuba was being subverted by a number of various, well-financed organizations. The Soviet Union believed that all subversive activities should be ended everywhere. He asserted that he knew Cuba did not want to subvert anyone. In his conversation with Castro, the latter had told him that he wanted good relations with the United States. In his statement on the occasion of the tragedy falling upon the United States, Castro had shown himself as a great humanitarian as he had voiced deep regret about President Kennedy's death. Therefore, Mr. Mikoyan continued, he wished to ask the President not to accept the allegations which were sometimes mentioned in the press. He wanted the President to believe him that good relations with Cuba were in the interest of the United States.

The President responded that his intention had been simply to give an evaluation of the feelings of our people and of what gave them problems. He said he had spoken sincerely and earnestly about US intentions with respect to Cuba. We had no plans for invasion, and we believed that there was no justification for Cuba to invade others by subversion or otherwise. The President reiterated that what he was seeking now was merely to give Mr. Mikoyan an evaluation and expressed the hope that better understanding could flow from this.

The President then thanked Mr. Mikoyan for his coming to Washington to honor and to pay tribute to the late President by his presence. He said he looked forward to further meetings and exchanges of views of this kind and hoped that they would be fruitful.

Mr. Mikoyan concluded the conversation by noting that he knew the President was very busy today and that he did not wish to take any more of the President's time. However, he wished to add just one comment of a personal nature, and note that he had turned 68 yesterday, while here in Washington. He said he trusted that further meetings would take place, including meetings with Mr. Khrushchev, and that those meetings would be fruitful.

The meeting ended at 12:30 p.m.

 

381. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 26, 1963, 11:35 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky. For a memorandum of the first part of the conversation, see Document 380. The meeting was held at the White House.

PARTICIPANTS

US
The President
Under Secretary Harriman
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Tyler--EUR
Mr. Bundy--The White House
Mr. Akalovsky--ACDA/IR

USSR
Mr. Mikoyan
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Smirnovski, Chief of the American Section, Foreign Ministry
Mr. Sukhodrev

SUBJECT
Communications between the President and Mr. Khrushchev

In response to the President's remarks about the peaceful intentions of the United States, Mr. Mikoyan said that instead of setting forth the Soviet views on these matters he wished to hand the President a message for him from Mr. Khrushchev. He then asked Mr. Sukhodrev to read the text of the message in English./2/

/2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VI, pp. 311-313.

The President said he appreciated the message very much and noted that we would certainly continue the policy of exchange of information and free communication. He observed that when he had been a little boy he had been told that no man's judgment on any question was better than his information on that particular question. Of course, information could come only from communication. He hoped that Mr. Mikoyan would convey to Mr. Khrushchev that he was looking forward to communicating freely with him. This could be done by means of letters, provided, of course, that they remained private. In this connection, he assumed that Mr. Khrushchev's and his own letters already exchanged were not for publication.

Mr. Mikoyan assured the President that if it was agreed that the exchange be private there would be no leaks anywhere as far as the Soviet Union was concerned. The system at the top of the Soviet Government was such as to preclude the possibility of any leaks. He also wished to point out that as far as the Soviet Ambassador in Washington was concerned, the President could be absolutely sure that he would not allow any leaks. Consequently, if the President wished to communicate with Mr. Khrushchev through the Ambassador, he could be assured that no one in Washington, except the Ambassador himself, would be familiar with the communication. As to Moscow, only Mr. Khrushchev himself and his closest associates would have the knowledge of the message.

The President said that he wished to give the same assurances on our part.

Mr. Mikoyan commented that he realized even without this the exchanges would be private.

 

382. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, November 26, 1963, 7:14 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-USSR. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted and approved by Davis and cleared with Thompson.

1674. Mikoyan with Dobrynin and Smirnovsky called on Secretary afternoon November 26 for 80-minute conversation./2/ Following based on uncleared memcon:

/2/A copy of the 10-page memorandum of conversation is ibid., POL US-USSR.

Secretary stressed continuity of US policy. US intends continue seek opportunities improve international relations and prospects for peace. Mikoyan replied pleasant hear these convincing words. He had favorable impression President Johnson and way he intends carry on. Thought useful to convey his impressions to Khrushchev and other leaders USSR.

Secretary said despite our differences and method of approach to problems, important that we explore all possibilities where areas of common interests might be found even though formal agreements could not be concluded. Cited as example arms race and expressed wish find some way this could be dampened and expenditures lessened even without formal agreement.

Secretary mentioned non-dissemination as one area where our two Governments had common interest in preventing non-nuclear powers obtaining nuclear weapons or nuclear capability. Much of remaining time was taken by Mikoyan in arguing against MLF along standard Soviet lines. Secretary explained in forceful terms MLF would not involve transfer of nuclear weapons to Germans or any other nation. Asked Soviets to wait until details on MLF known. This would convince them that no transfer involved. Mikoyan did agree that two Governments had common interest in non-dissemination.

Conversation concluded with Secretary saying on bilateral matters that we would go ahead with Consular Convention and exchanges negotiations, would be in touch on civil aviation and hoped to improve trade, though this was more difficult. As regards broader international questions, Secretary would be consulting with our Allies in December and perhaps after the New Year would be in position to discuss them.

Rusk

 

383. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, December 3, 1963, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-USSR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

1824. In course my meeting with Gromyko today, which I had requested for purpose discussing pending bilateral issues (e.g., Civil Air Agreement, leased line, Consular Convention), FonMin briefly and in general terms touched on desirability of progress toward relaxation of tensions. Gromyko said he had in mind need for action on broad issues which he had discussed with Secy and late President when in Washington last fall./2/ He had noted statement by Pres Johnson that new administration intended to follow foreign policy lines laid down by Pres Kennedy/3/ and he hoped, therefore, Washington would soon come up with specific suggestions for further steps. Sovs, for their part, Gromyko said, were prepared to move ahead.

/2/See Documents 362-364.

/3/For President Johnson's address to Congress, November 27, during which this statement was made, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, pp. 8-10.

I said I understood Secy had discussed problem with Mikoyan/4/ when latter in Washington for Pres Kennedy's funeral and had underlined need for continued consultation with allies on issues of multilateral concern. I reminded Gromyko that there would be further opportunities for such consultation at upcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting as well as during planned visits to Washington after first of year by leaders of certain of our allies.

/4/See Document 382.

Gromyko commented wryly that he hoped in such consultations we planned to search for keys to solutions rather than provide additional locks. He then said if he were asked to name problem requiring most urgent solution, he would be obliged to cite problem of Germany.

I said I readily agreed that German problem was of cardinal importance but, unfortunately, our suggestions for its solution were widely disparate. In any case, I could assure Gromyko that we were equally anxious to seek and settle on ways of relaxing tension but we did feel at moment best chances of quick progress toward this goal lay in bilateral field.

Gromyko concluded the discussion by remarking that while avoiding a worsening of international situation is better than worsening it, best course is to take positive steps for improvement by removing current blocks. I said that was precisely purpose of my visit today./5/

/5/Kohler also discussed the forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union of FAA Administrator Halaby, communication problems for the U.S. Embassy, the cultural exchanges agreement, and the consular convention. (Telegrams 1822 and 1823 from Moscow, December 3; Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 FAA and EDX 4 US-USSR)

Kohler

 

384. Editorial Note

On December 5, 1963, President Johnson held his first National Security Council meeting. The topic was "Soviet Military Capabilities." Following a briefing by Director of Central Intelligence McCone, the President asked Secretary of State Rusk to comment. According to the summary record of the meeting, Rusk "emphasized that despite the problems which the Soviet Union is having in the economic field, and despite our nuclear superiority, the Russians are making a tremendous effort. We cannot reduce our effort in any way--military, space, economic assistance, etc. We have a full agenda ahead of us. We should concentrate on those factors which make people pull the nuclear trigger. We should be ready to explore agreements with the Soviets which are based on our current military strength." Secretary of Defense McNamara then commented on the relative military strength of the United States and the Soviet Union, noting that during the 1960s "our advantage over the USSR in the nuclear area will not fall below two times." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VIII, pages 543-544.

 

385. Letter From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Ambassador at Large (Thompson)/1/

Moscow, December 10, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

DEAR TOMMY: So much has happened since the autobahn impasse and the post midnight calls to me in Cornwall last month that it all defies review or appropriate comment--November 7 and the Time-Life group, Freddie Barghoorn's ordeal, the devastating assassination of President Kennedy, the encouraging start of President Johnson. So instead of reviewing the past, I'll just move toward the future.

I greatly appreciate your letters of November 29 and particularly the enclosures to the second./2/ As you well know, these are indispensable to the intelligent conduct of our business here and I shall of course handle them and any future exchange with appropriate caution.

/2/The second letter transmitted copies of Khrushchev's November 24 letter to Johnson and the latter's reply; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VI, pp. 311-313. The other letter has not been identified further.

I have been giving considerable thought--as I'm sure you and others in Washington have--to the question of how we may best continue the dialogue between ourselves and the Soviets. I was glad that in his talk with Mikoyan/3/ President Johnson subscribed to the desirability of maintaining the tradition of private exchanges with Khrushchev and that in his letter the Chairman also endorsed the idea./4/ While this is useful, I feel strongly that if this medium has been valuable in the past it was precisely because it had its origin in a personal confrontation between the two principals. This is a missing element now, and just as I felt nearly three years ago--a feeling you shared--that there should be an early meeting between President Kennedy and Khrushchev, so do I now feel that such a meeting would be useful for the new President.

/3/See Documents 380 and 381.

/4/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VI, pp. 311-313.

There seems little question that Khrushchev would welcome the idea. In his remarks to me at Spaso when he signed the book of condolences,/5/ he referred several times to the usefulness of Vienna in his relationship with President Kennedy and he pointedly remarked on his lack of knowledge of the successor. He makes a similar point in his letter to President Johnson.

/5/See Document 378.

I have just read the President's statement about traveling abroad./6/ Despite this, I would hope he also would see merit in an early meeting. I'm sure he recognizes the advantages of personal confrontation over correspondence and the advice of even the best experts in taking the measure of a principal adversary. Beyond this, there is, it seems to me, a sound tactical reason for early agreement on the idea of a meeting. Khrushchev, given his personal modus operandi and the imperatives of communist dynamics, must at some point test the will and determination of his new adversary. While we can't avoid this, we can and should, I think, make an effort to postpone the test until the new administration has time to shake down a bit. With a meeting in the offing, I doubt if Khrushchev would attempt an early showdown.

/6/For a transcript of the President's press conference on December 12 during which he stated that he would not be traveling abroad, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, pp. 34-38.

On timing, I would think a meeting should follow the upcoming round of talks with Allied leaders and well precede the Party Conventions. March or April would seem the most suitable time--certainly not later than May. If a NATO spring summit is in the cards, as I have heard suggested, I would think a meeting with Khrushchev before rather than after would be preferable to avoid an impression that the President was in a position to negotiate on behalf of the alliance or even to act as its spokesman. Perhaps it would be desirable to schedule a meeting with Khrushchev just prior to a NATO summit to permit the President to report directly to his colleagues on the return trip.

As far as we can tell, this timing would fit Khrushchev's schedule; his only announced activity which he would find it difficult to rearrange is his June trip to Scandinavia.

On the site, I suppose an obvious requirement is that the meeting take place on neutral soil. There have been rumors about Stockholm as a suitable spot; I would not think this desirable because of Khrushchev's plans to visit there on his Scandinavian swing. I would opt for Vienna or some city in Switzerland.

One more thought. Despite the lack of positive reaction, the Soviets have not abandoned their idea of an ENDC summit in Moscow. While recent treatment has been in low key, the proposal has been kept alive by occasional references in the press, the most recent being in the joint communiqué following Novotny's visit. The prospect of a private meeting with the President would almost certainly abate any enthusiasm Khrushchev may have for an eighteen-nation summit and would relieve any pressure there may be from neutral quarters for the idea.

Finally, a hooker. On the record, Khrushchev is committed to visit Cuba sometime this winter. We have heard little about this lately and the idea may have been abandoned in view of Castro's failure to sign the Test Ban Treaty and of his general wavering between Moscow and Peiping. Such a visit would clearly be absolutely incompatible with any meeting with President Johnson, at least before our election next fall. Consequently, if there should be a tendency toward a US-USSR meeting in the reasonably near future, this consideration should be put forward to Khrushchev frankly and firmly. I believe he is enough of a realist to get and accept the point.

For obvious reasons, I felt it unwise to surface these ideas in a formal message from the Embassy, but felt they should be put forward to you--and through you to the Secretary and any others with whom you may think they should be shared. I should, of course, appreciate your own informal reactions to the foregoing and your own thoughts on the subject.

Sincerely,

Foy

 

386. Current Intelligence Weekly Review/1/

Washington, December 13, 1963.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by CIA's Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises p. 3 of the issue.

Moscow Shifts Tactics in Struggle With Peiping

Having failed to rally sufficient support among foreign parties for a new international Communist conference to condemn the Chinese, the Soviet leaders now seem to be preparing for a protracted stalemate in the conflict. They have reverted to a position set forth by Khrushchev at the East German party congress last January, when he appealed for "tolerance and patience," a cessation of polemics, and a pause to give the adversaries a "chance to calm down" before convening a conference./2/

/2/See Document 280. For text of Khrushchev's January 16 speech, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XV, No. 3, February 13, 1963, pp. 3-7, and No. 4, February 20, 1963, pp. 13-20.

Two authoritative Pravda articles on 27 November and 6 December commemorating the anniversaries of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow meetings renewed Khrushchev's appeals, avoided direct assaults on the Chinese, and reiterated his dictum that "time will determine which point of view is correct."

In view of the strong resistance within the Communist movement to any Soviet attempt to force a showdown, which almost certainly would result in a formal and avowed rupture, the Soviet leaders apparently see no alternative to accepting another pause, during which they will pursue less provocative and risky efforts to isolate the Chinese and prove that Peiping is solely responsible for continuation of the conflict.

Moscow is maintaining a virtual suspension of anti-Chinese propaganda. The Pravda article of 6 December piously warned against "overdramatizing" the situation and regarding it as "irreparable." It recalled Khrushchev's appeals in January and October for a cessation of polemics and proposed discussions within the "normal channel of inter-party relations," which would create "more favorable conditions" for a new world Communist meeting. There are no indications, however, that the Russians expect either a resumption of bilateral talks or an international conference in the near future. The Soviet ambassador in Peiping told the British charge on 2 December that the Chinese had not suggested resumption and that no meeting was planned in Peiping or elsewhere.

Although the Chinese have not directly commented on the new Soviet appeal, they have made it clear that they have no intention of accommodating the Russians. On 10 December, Peiping repeated its charge that "anti-China propaganda" in the Soviet press has exposed the "hypocrisy and ulterior motives behind the CPSU leaders' so-called call for a halt to open polemics." Whereas Moscow ignored the defiant tactics of the Chinese delegation at the recent World Peace Council session in Warsaw, Peiping played up the clashes and denounced the USSR for "stage-managing an anti-China scandal."

Peiping has also continued its series of long articles attacking the July exposition of Soviet positions. The sixth, published simultaneously in People's Daily and Red Flag on 12 December, juxtaposes Khrushchev's revisionist views of "peaceful coexistence" with the correct Leninist line followed by the Chinese. There does not appear to be anything new in the Chinese argumentation on this question, but the article maintains the Chinese insistence that Khrushchev is evil incarnate.

 

387. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, December 17, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Initialed by Thompson. Copies were sent to Ball, Harriman, and Bundy.

SUBJECT
Suggested President/Khrushchev Meeting

You will note from the attached letter that Foy Kohler/2/ advocates a meeting between the President and Khrushchev not later than May of next year in either Vienna or Switzerland. Although I would suggest that we keep an open mind about such a possibility, I would not, myself, at this time, recommend such a meeting for the following reasons:

/2/Document 385.

1. I should think it would be far better if the President could defer meeting Khrushchev until after the elections when he can face him with a mandate from the people based upon his campaign platform. I should also think that in any meeting shortly before the Party conventions, the President would be greatly handicapped in what he could say and do and that a meeting would risk injecting into the campaign East-West issues in a form that may not be helpful. The Soviets have given many indications on a low level that they recognize that major agreements with the United States will be difficult if not impossible until after our elections.

2. So far as Khrushchev is concerned, while I think he might like a meeting for reasons of prestige, I think that he also would be handicapped in any meeting at an early date. He will probably still be beset by internal difficulties and, more importantly, it is unlikely that his quarrel with the Chinese Communists will have reached a definitive stage. Moreover, he will not have had much time to see what direction the four new governments in the West are going to take.

3. While it would be possible to bill such a meeting merely as an opportunity for the two men to get acquainted along the lines of the Vienna meeting between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev, I think that in fact this poses some difficulties. I think it would be essential for both parties to have at least some discussion of the Cuban and German and Berlin problems and, at this stage, I should think any such discussion would probably be harmful in the sense of resulting in a hardening of positions on both sides. Moreover, President Johnson has met Khrushchev when he visited the United States and has followed so closely our relations with the Soviet Union that I do not think the need is the same as it was with President Kennedy when he first took office.

4. I should also think that no matter how we tried to play such a meeting, it would disturb our Allies for a variety of reasons.

The views expressed above would be materially affected should the possibility of an agreement on some major subject develop between now and next Spring, but I think such a prospect most unlikely.

 

388. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, December 18, 1963.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files. Secret.

SUBJECT
Lunch with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, December 18, 1963

I had a very agreeable two hours today with Ambassador Dobrynin. His first and dominant interest was to learn of the points of view and the process of action of the new Administration. I told him that the President's first object was to strengthen the peace, and that he could rely on the depth and sincerity of the comments in this direction expressed by the President to Mr. Mikoyan/2/ and on a number of other occasions in recent weeks. I also told him that we were appreciative of the restraint and good will shown by the Soviet Government toward President Johnson.

/2/See Documents 380 and 381.

The Ambassador seemed to accept these assurances, but said that he was concerned about one area--Cuba. He called attention to press reports of a re-examination of our Cuban policy and was at some pains to emphasize that such press reports always created concern in Moscow. I told him that any new American President would necessarily have to ask for a re-examination of the Cuban situation, since that situation was unsatisfactory to us both on the merits and in political terms. But I said that he could rely on the President's assurance to Mikoyan that we did not intend to invade Cuba, and I told him that while we would continue to seek ways and means of strengthening our position toward the Castro regime, we had no intention of provoking a war in that area. I said that our position toward Cuba was not very different from what I understood to be the position of his government toward Berlin; I assumed that the leaders of the Soviet Government were dissatisfied with the situation in Berlin, but did not wish a war there, and that they might well be asking their staffs continuously what could be done to improve the situation in Berlin without provoking a war.

In response to his more general question about the new Administration, I told the Ambassador in a general way about the continuation in office of the principal officers of the Kennedy Administration. I described briefly the high quality and the good sense of the principal new staff officers at the White House. I told the Ambassador that he could continue to rely on the Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and myself with respect to the most private communications. And when he suggested that the Attorney General might be less engaged in these problems, I told him not to be so sure--that the Attorney General was a very important member of this Administration, too, and continued to have a deep interest in foreign affairs. But later in the conversation when the Ambassador asked in the most explicit way where he should go with his most private messages, I told him that I thought his best bet was Ambassador Thompson.

The Ambassador and I had quite an exchange on Germany in which for a minute or two I thought he was going to talk quite informally about the importance of reaching a solution that would be more secure than the existing situation. I told him quite bluntly that the key to a more forthcoming position on our side was the possibility of self-determination for the East Germans, and said that it seemed to me that much could be done in the real interest of our two countries if the Soviets could accept the prospect of a change here.

In this connection the Ambassador gave me a long and emotional account of Soviet opinion of the Germans, pointing out the depth and strength of the emotional deposit of the two World Wars. I told him that we understand this feeling and respect it and that our own German policy was designed with this concern in mind. We discussed the MLF in the usual terms, but I think I made some slight progress in persuading him that our German policy, including our proposal for an MLF took account of the German right in a way in which his government's policy did not. At least he failed to answer my questions about the consequences for the German right of the standard Soviet policies which he was urging. The Ambassador, as on previous occasions, refused the contest when I made uncomplimentary remarks about Ulbricht.

We had an extended discussion of the wheat deal, in which I think we agreed that there had been an honest misunderstanding with respect to American bottoms and their prices. The Ambassador explained how he had been surprised to be instructed that he could offer to carry the wheat in American bottoms, and I explained that we had assumed that no such offer would be made except with an understanding of the costs implied. He said that, for his part, if anyone had asked him about the cost he would have been careful to reserve the Soviet position. I said that the value of the wheat deal seemed to me to be much greater than the difference in price still existing between the negotiators, and that therefore I would urge on his government an increased flexibility and responsiveness in seeking individual agreements. I said that it was very difficult for us to make a package deal but that, on the other hand, we had no desire to make profits on any small differential in price. The American bottoms were necessary to us for quite straightforward tactical reasons, relating especially to the attitude of the unions which would have to load the wheat. I had the impression that the Ambassador had only an incomplete understanding of the domestic complexities of the wheat deal from our point of view, and I think it may be useful for a more expert witness to give him another dose on this score. The Ambassador told me that his own government at the moment was quite discouraged about the wheat deal but that at least they were treating it in a low key, which he indicated had been his own urgent recommendation. I repeated that the political advantage was worth further effort, especially on the Soviet side.

The Ambassador went from this point to a discussion of the wider possibilities of trade and pointed out to me with considerable force and persuasiveness that the U.S. was at a big disadvantage with respect to trading opportunities with the Soviet Union simply because the Soviet official representing the American Division in all discussions was always at a disadvantage in Moscow when it came time to share out to foreign countries parts of the purchase programs authorized by higher authorities in Soviet economic planning. The official from the American Division almost always had to say that he could not guarantee delivery or terms, and under Soviet processes such uncertain bargains were seldom interesting.

The Ambassador returned at the end of the meal to the question of the new President's personal style, and I repeated what I had said earlier about continuity and about the President's commitment to peace. I also explained that this President, like President Kennedy, used both written papers and oral discussions, but in somewhat different proportions. I emphasized the new President's skill in seeking and weighing the opinions of many different individuals, and the Ambassador said that the new President's method sounded to him very much like that of Chairman Khrushchev.

We parted with a final toast to peace. On the whole this was the most searching and instructive conversation I have yet had with a Soviet diplomat. Somewhere in the middle of lunch, we switched from formal address to first names.

McGeorge Bundy/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

389. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, December 23, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 FAA. Confidential. Drafted by Kempton B. Jenkins (SOV).

SUBJECT
Mr. Halaby's Trip to Moscow--Status of U.S.-Soviet Civil Air Agreement

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Mr. N. Halaby, Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. A. Ferguson, Director, Office of Aviation Affairs
Mr. Jenkins, SOV

Mr. Halaby began his report with reference to the fact that he is faced with a regular monthly press conference and a request for a VOA interview in the near future. Therefore, he desired to receive the Secretary's views and guidance at this time.

Mr. Halaby reported that after discussions with Soviet officials/2/ he has found that there are no known insurmountable technical or operational obstacles to the New York-Moscow service which cannot be resolved either by us or by the Soviets. He found to his surprise that the Soviets intend to use the very large and out-dated TU-114 to initiate the service instead of the more modern four-jet Ilyushin-62. Mr. Halaby confirmed that he himself had flown the 114. He found that it has a serious noise problem and poses significant traffic control problems in the high-speed tight Idlewild landing patterns. However, the Soviets indicated to him that they are aware of our noise standards and can do such things as modify the propellers on the 114 if necessary.

/2/Halaby visited the Soviet Union December 8-18. Memoranda of his conversations with Kuznetsov on December 13 and with Loginov on December 17 were transmitted as enclosures to airgrams A-837, December 17, and A-876, December 24. (Ibid., POL 1 US- USSR and ORG 7 FAA)

Ambassador Thompson inquired about the teletype line envisaged in the Air Agreement for service messages between two air lines. Mr. Halaby said that Aeroflot indicated there would be no problem establishing the line as provided in the Agreement. They specified, however, that such a line would be limited to transmitting operational messages for the air service.

The Secretary asked what attitudes Mr. Halaby encountered toward the Air Agreement. Were technical people, for example, strongly interested in the Agreement. Mr Halaby responded that he found great interest among the Soviet officials with whom he spoke. He added that this was a little hard to understand since in any genuine competition in this field they would clearly be at a disadvantage. The Secretary said that the Soviets undoubtedly believe that it might assist them in their efforts to fly to other countries. He added that the Soviets will have to give something to the Danes and others in order to secure overflight privileges. "We want to stay out of this situation. That's their problem, not ours."

Mr. Halaby explained that the service is scheduled to be non- stop but provides for four emergency points: at Shannon, Prestwick, Gander and Oslo. He continued that in accordance with his instructions he had laid out a schedule for technical talks before Aeroflot officials. However, three days later General Loginov responded that there would be no further technical talks until the bilateral agreement was formally signed. Under questioning Loginov indicated they estimate that four months would be required to complete technical preparations prior to service. Mr. Halaby explained that this is a minimal figure and that six months might be more realistic. Thus, it was determined in Moscow that if service is to begin this summer it would be necessary to sign the Air Agreement in January or February.

Mr. Halaby then discussed the Soviet officials with whom he met, explaining that Loginov is equivalent to the FAA, CAB, and airline presidents all wrapped up in one person. Mr. Dementiev, Chairman of the Committee for Aviation Production, is the equivalent of Mr. Webb, Harold Brown/3/ and several other figures. Mr. Halaby added that Dementiev had proposed a series of visits by Soviet civil aviation engineers to the United States and that such proposals are now being framed for negotiation within the cultural exchange negotiations beginning next month. In response to the Secretary's question, Mr. Halaby affirmed that the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs was represented at all his talks by Second Secretary Davydov of the American Section.

/3/James E. Webb, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

The Secretary stated that the timing of the signature of the Agreement and technical talks is important. If, for example, we were to lay our prestige on the line in signing the Agreement and then have the air services break down on technical grounds, this would be a serious problem for us. Mr. Halaby agreed, adding that it also would pose problems for the FAA in the form of pressure to issue an operation certificate to the Soviets as quickly as possible. He recalled that there is a precedent for such difficulties in the form of a BEA-Aeroflot agreement which was delayed two years after signature because of a noise factor in the Soviet aircraft. Mr. Halaby also pointed out that the TU-114 now flies internally, but only to Havana and New Delhi in foreign countries.

Each time he talked to Soviet officials, Mr. Halaby said, he always stressed that the Air Agreement is only one facet of the general question of accessibility or communication. He would refer to air corridors into Berlin, the need for a direct tie-line between our Embassy and Washington for telegraphic traffic, and access between consular representatives and American citizens in the Soviet Union. Soviet officials usually listened without comment, he added, but Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov insisted these subjects are all separate. In response to the Secretary's question, Mr. Halaby stated that there is nothing concrete in the Air Agreement regarding access to citizens except in the form of a provision for search and rescue in the event of a crash. He explained that the present agreement consists of the agreement itself, a technical agreed minute, and an agreement between Aeroflot and Pan American. The Secretary suggested that the latter should include a specific provision on access to citizens such as PAA personnel. Ambassador Thompson added that he felt we should only go ahead with the Air Agreement if we get either a leased line or consular convention including our requirement on consular access and notification.

Mr. Ferguson introduced the problem of the effect of the Agreement on United States interests in other areas, particularly in Latin America. The Secretary stated that these factors have all been considered and we have decided on balance that we should go ahead with the Air Agreement. He asked Mr. Halaby whether the Soviets have any impression that they will be able to fly on to Havana from New York. Mr. Halaby responded no, that it seems to be clear in their minds that such would not be the case. He then recounted the background of the distortion of this point by the Baltimore Sun and summarized his explanation to the President as to why the FAA follows the navigation of Aeroflot flights to Havanna. The Secretary opined that it is logical to keep track of Soviet aircraft off our coast and questioned whether the Soviets do not now have the right to make emergency landings in the United States during these flights. Mr Halaby confirmed that they do and that our airfield at Charleston, South Carolina, has been alerted for the possibility.

The Secretary stated that we will aim at signing the Air Agreement but not before February. He asked Mr. Halaby whether he owed a response of any kind to his opposite numbers in the U.S.S.R. Mr. Halaby explained that no action is necessary now with Aeroflot and that Dementiev's exchange proposals are being handled in the cultural exchanges negotiations.

In response to Mr. Halaby's question, the Secretary advised him to make the following points in his press conference:

1. He had visited Moscow to hold technical discussions with his opposite numbers.

2. He has found that technical problems for Moscow-New York service could be worked out but that several details remain.

3. He has made a full report on his trip to the Secretary and to the President.

Ambassador Thompson suggested Mr. Halaby play down the results of his visit in order to avoid promoting the impression that the signing of the Agreement is imminent. The Secretary commented that as so often with the Soviets broad agreements break down over technical considerations. He recalled General Marshall's advice never to make arrangements in principle with the Soviets, but always in detail.

Mr. Halaby summarized by saying the fact the Soviets would have established organized flights to New York would inevitably mean that they will not send their planes to New York empty. There will be 14,000 seats a year in their aircraft. Secondly, he pointed out that in a US-Soviet competition in this field of civil aviation we have a clear superiority. In short, he concluded, this provides an opportunity to use the airplane for its intended purposes. The Secretary agreed, saying that "I would like to see us get ahead with this."

 

390. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, December 31, 1963.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files. Secret.

Ambassador Dobrynin called on me this morning, at his request, to tell me that he had been thinking about our recent conversation/2/ and had some ideas which he wished to share with me as a result. He reminded me that we had discussed in a non-committal way the possibility that at some time in the future there might be a meeting between the President and Chairman Khrushchev, and he said that he now wished to give me his own further reflections on this matter. He then drew out of his pocket two sheets of handwriting and read a statement which I summarize below.

/2/Document 388.

The Ambassador said that on reflection he believed it would add to the possibility of mutual understanding, and would therefore be useful, if the President and Chairman Khrushchev could hold a meeting. Such a meeting would allow them to become more closely acquainted and this acquaintanceship could be of positive importance because of the responsibilities which they carry as the leaders of the two greatest powers in the world. The Ambassador believed that such a meeting would be useful if it merely resulted in a better acquaintance between these two world leaders. The Ambassador expressed his opinion that in this respect the meeting in Vienna could now be seen, with the passage of time, to have had real value.

The Ambassador said that of course it would be even better if such a meeting could have concrete results. We were both familiar of course with the range of the problems before us and they could all be discussed, and the Soviet Government would welcome solutions even to the largest problems, but if the United States did not think that the time was right for such larger settlements, which was his impression, then perhaps there could be study of one or more similar matters which might be more ready for settlement.

The Ambassador thought it would be helpful to know whether the U.S. thought there were such problems, and what they might be, and what American proposal for agreement there might be. He was sure that any suggestions would be carefully studied in Moscow.

The Ambassador repeated his view that with or without specific agreements a meeting would be useful. He said that he well understood that such a meeting could not well take place after June or July because of the election in the United States.

Finally, the Ambassador said that in his view it was an open question as to who should take the initiative, and he said he was confident that if it were felt more convenient by the U.S. the initiative could easily be taken by Moscow.

I told the Ambassador that I was very much interested in his reflections and would engage in some reflection of my own and would communicate with him reasonably soon. I told him that one thought which did occur to me was that if there were to be any meeting in which no agreements were likely to be registered, it would be important not to create false hopes on either side. The Ambassador responded by saying that he thought it would be possible and desirable, in the event that such a meeting was held, that there should be an understanding between the governments as to their own view of its purpose and meaning, and that this view should then be communicated to the press.

In order to avoid giving the impression that I thought no agreements were possible, I added that I thought it would be very useful for both sides to review the possibilities for both small and large agreements. I said that I thought the Ambassador should understand that the U.S. was in fact ready for even the largest kinds of agreements, and regretted that on larger issues the Soviet Government still seemed to be urging solutions which did not seem workable to us. The Ambassador grinned, and we then turned to a discussion of the New Year, which is being celebrated in an imaginative way at the Soviet Embassy; the party begins at midnight Moscow time and continues until midnight American time./3/

/3/Dobrynin states in In Confidence, p. 117, that he met with Bundy in December and Bundy "expressed an interest in a summit meeting provided it would lead to some kind of agreement lest a failure endanger Johnson's election campaign the next year." Khrushchev and Mikoyan were interested, according to Dobrynin, "but Gromyko was not, fearing Khrushchev might be carried away and ruin relations from the start without careful advance preparation."

McGeorge Bundy/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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