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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume V Soviet Union DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

40. Editorial Note

On March 8, 1961, John McCloy, President Kennedy's Adviser on Disarmament, forwarded a memorandum to Kennedy in which he contended that it was "in the overall interest of the national security of the United States to make a renewed and vigorous attempt to negotiate a test ban agreement along the lines now contemplated." Such an agreement, McCloy stated, "would be a significant step in the field of arms control" and "might well contribute to better and more stable relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R." It could also "be helpful in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities among other countries." Finally, a workable test ban agreement would "gain credit for the United States in responsible world opinion," whereas "the damage to the stature of the U.S. in world affairs and the effect on U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations which might result if the U.S. were to fail to take reasonable steps necessary to reach a satisfactory test ban agreement, and then resume testing, would be serious." For text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VII, pages 14-17.

The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests reconvened on March 21. For text of the opening statement by the head of the U.S. delegation, Arthur Dean, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pages 55-65.

 

41. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, March 10, 1961, 10 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-1061. Secret; Priority.

2135. Eyes only Secretary. I met Khrushchev at 12 pm March 9 at guest house outside Novosibirsk for talks lasting nearly three hours.

I began by giving him President's letter/2/ and translation, which he read carefully. He asked me thank President for his message and said they appreciated and agreed with spirit of letter; it could serve as good beginning. He asked me convey his gratitude and good wishes to President and added he refrained from traditional wish of long life for President because he being so young did not need such wishes.

/2/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VI, pp. 5-6.

I explained Macmillan would be in Washington April 4 and Adenauer April 12 and President planned see de Gaulle in Paris after that, but could not suggest exact time for meeting with Khrushchev. I said President had in mind first week in May and was thinking of either Vienna or Stockholm as convenient place to meet.

Khrushchev replied would be necessary work out reason for meeting. He seemed inclined prefer Vienna but did not rule out Stockholm and thought sometime during first ten days May be suitable date.

I replied exact time would depend on date President's meeting with de Gaulle in order avoid flying twice over Atlantic. Khrushchev said he knew well transatlantic flights. I said President will be in touch with him further on this matter.

Khrushchev said it would be necessary study President's letter but he inclined agree with proposal and thought would be useful become acquainted with President. He said he had pleasure of meeting President when he member Senate Foreign Relations Committee but had exchanged only few words with him.

Later at luncheon Khrushchev said he hoped it would become possible to issue invitation for President visit Soviet Union. He said they would receive him with all their traditional hospitality; they would like welcome him and his family and show him their country but time not now ripe for this.

I told Khrushchev that for present we would consider President's message confidential and he agreed.

Comment and report on subjects discussed in septels./3/

/3/Telegram 2136 is printed as Document 42. Telegram 2138, which reported on Laos, is excerpted in Document 34 and printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXIV, pp. 80-82. Telegram 2139, which transmitted Thompson's impressions of the discussion on Laos, is in Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-1061. Telegram 2145 reported on the Congo. During the discussion Khrushchev expressed strong opposition to the UN role in the Congo, stating that the "UN has been used to oppress peoples and help colonialists retain colonies" and that the "USSR cannot support organization which assists colonialists, who are not only Belgians but also those who oppose struggle for liberation." Replying that "we were not always satisfied with UN decisions either but for different reasons," Thompson stated that "we thought it wise to keep cold war out of Africa." For text of telegram 2145, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XX, pp. 99-101.

Telegram 2146 is printed as Document 43. In telegram 2147 Thompson reported that, regarding Germany and Berlin, Khrushchev said the USSR "did not want to change anything in Germany, but to fix juridically what had happened after the war. He said to leave the situation as is would cause instability and encourage German revanchists." Khrushchev commented further that "to conceive of unified Germany under either Adenauer or Ulbricht would be unrealistic." Therefore "let us conclude a treaty with two Germanies; we are ready to stipulate with US a provision of whatever is necessary for people of West Berlin to have political system of their own choice." For text of telegram 2147, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIV, pp. 18-20.

Thompson

 

42. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, March 10, 1961, 11 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-1061. Secret.

2136. Eyes only Secretary. I had assumed Khrushchev's reference to need find reason for his meeting with President was motivated by need for explanation to ChiComs./2/ In plane returning Moscow however I queried Dobrynin re meaning Khrushchev's remark and he replied he thought Khrushchev had in mind merely what kind statement would be made to press. He thought my remark to him that meeting would be presented simply as opportunity two statesmen get acquainted and review problems of mutual interest would cover matter but pointed out this was not fully made clear in letter.

/2/See paragraph 3, Document 41.

Khrushchev obviously pleased with President's initiative and believe it moderated position he took on various problems discussed.

He appeared extremely tired and his appearance shocked even Soviets who accompanied me. He said he was leaving today for Aklominsk and would go from there to Alma Ata returning Moscow about March 23 or 24. When I inquired when party program for October Congress would be published he replied in August or possibly earlier. He said he planned go Central Asia in early April for rest and work on program. He pointed out too early go Black Sea. He took pills during lunch and drank only small amount red wine. During lunch in addition usual toast to President, etc. he remarked President had asked him use diplomatic channel and he wished propose toast to this method getting some results.

Thompson

 

43. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, March 10, 1961, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.6141/3-1061. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

2146. Trade. I told Khrushchev we have been reviewing restrictions on import of Soviet crabmeat and hoped be able lift them. I said I realized this would be small step but I believed it was in right direction. I said we did not want to say anything publicly for present./2/ To my surprise Khrushchev displayed considerable satisfaction and agreed this would be good move. He said we must normalize our relations and that it is difficult to explain why USSR has little commerce with US when it trades with other Western powers. He brought up recent cancellation of grinding machines and said USSR can fly its rockets without US machines. (On return trip Dobrynin told me Hammer/3/ had told Khrushchev they would soon receive good news about an export license without specifying what it was for. Soviets had assumed it was for grinding machines and had therefore been particularly surprised at cancellation.) I gave Khrushchev confidential explanation this transaction and little lecture on how American Govt operates. I told him I had discussed with Secretary Hodges importance of maintaining license once it had been issued and that he had agreed this was important.

/2/On March 20 the Department of the Treasury announced that it was lifting the ban on the importation of Soviet crab meat.

/3/See Document 32.

Khrushchev expressed opinion that small minority in US is blinded by hatred for USSR and expressed regret because their attitude does not create conditions for trust. He also raised question of purchase of urea factories and said if US would sell them USSR ready to buy them. He said USSR had already purchased three from Netherlands. He said USSR had lived 200 years without such factories and could live a few years more. Later at luncheon he said USSR does not compete with US in trade field and could be very good consumer of its goods. If we had different trade relations, he said, they would not have been developing some branches of their industry and instead would be buying from us.

Thompson

 

44. Airgram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, March 14, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-1461. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

G-665. The following miscellaneous items supplement reports on my recent conversation with Khrushchev. Most of these points arose during informal luncheon conversation.

(1) During luncheon I mentioned to Khrushchev that one area for cooperation between the US and USSR would be Outer Space. Khrushchev replied that he agreed, but he did not pursue the subject.

(2) Khrushchev said that he had received many letters from statesmen abroad and that these emphasized that much depended upon Soviet relations with the US.

(3) Khrushchev recalled his recent conversation with Mr. Hammer and repeated much of what the Embassy has already reported; namely, that Hammer was the first foreign concessionaire in the Soviet Union, that when Hammer was in Rostov both Mikoyan and Voroshilov/2/ were there, that Hammer was able to visit the pencil factory that he had organized in Moscow. Khrushchev seemed much impressed by Hammer and recalled he had been told that Hammer had earned nearly $1 million at the same time that he was attending college. Khrushchev also repeated what he had told Hammer about the Soviet process of making synthetic rubber directly from gas. He referred with pride to fact that Hammer's nephew had recently visited U.S. and had been urged to stay but had preferred return to Soviet Union.

/2/Kliment Y. Voroshilov, Marshal of the Soviet Union and member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

(4) When I mentioned to Khrushchev at luncheon that there were few important direct problems between the US and the USSR, that our differences lay outside bilateral relations, he readily assented.

(5) During our discussion of Germany, Khrushchev to illustrate what little importance West Berlin has for the USSR said that the annual Soviet population increase is 3.5 million and that the total population of West Berlin is 2 million-- "one night's work."

(6) In talking about Soviet desire to purchase urea plants, Khrushchev said that Garst/3/ had advised him to procure such plants.

/3/Presumably this is reference to Roswell Garst whose farm in Coons Rapids, Iowa, Khrushchev visited in 1959 during his trip to the United States.

(7) During our discussion on disarmament, Khrushchev interjected the remark that Stevenson in the UN seemed to go astray like Lodge./4/ He then inquired what Lodge was doing at the present time. I told him I understood Lodge was connected with an international educational foundation.

/4/Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., former U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

(8) Khrushchev spoke with great conviction of the need to reform the United Nations set-up. He asserted that the US had mis-used its voting majority but what did this prove? The day might soon come when the majority would be against the US and we would then understand the Soviet position. Great powers could not be made to do things against their vital interests by UN votes. The veto provision in the UN charter had been very wise and something must be done so that the UN Secretariat could not act in favor of one side. The only solution he could find was his proposal for a three-man Secretary-General.

(9) When I mentioned that President had many important domestic problems to tackle Khrushchev remarked that all countries had their internal problems.

(10) Khrushchev not only stated that Soviet Union would overtake US in per capita industrial production by 1970 but added that later--presumably by end 20-year plan--their output per capita would be double ours. He added, however, that we need have nothing to fear from this. I observed that the Soviet Union would have to begin to devote more of their resources and manpower to service industries. Khrushchev agreed and said they were far behind us in this field.

(11) Khrushchev said his daughter Rada had come out to join him two days before but she did not appear at lunch as she was doing some work at the Novosibirsk Academy of Science. He mentioned that Rada's husband, Adjubei, had met President Kennedy when he was in the United States with a delegation of journalists that had been invited to the Kennedy home. Khrushchev spoke with approval of number of young men in new administration and observed that it was important to develop leaders by giving them responsibility early in life.

Thompson

 

45. Airgram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, March 14, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-1461. Secret; Limit Distribution.

G-666. Returning from my meeting with Khrushchev at Novosibirsk I had a two-hour conversation with Mr. Dobrynin, head of the America Section in the Foreign Office. I found this of considerable interest, particularly in view of the fact that Dobrynin has served in the United States and is as friendly toward us as any communist official I know. I began by expressing discouragement at the prospect of reaching agreement with Soviet Union on major issues in view of the wide disparity between the way the two countries saw the same problem. I suggested there was a double distortion in the Soviet view of these issues. In the first place they saw everything through the prism of Marxism and secondly, I could not help but believe that they did not get an objective picture of a given situation because of the tendency which had existed for years of reporting facts which tended to support Soviet positions. When Dobrynin asserted that they had excellent factual information, I agreed this might be true but I was convinced they did not understand what motivated western countries.

Dobrynin said that from his experience in the United States he thought we would fall behind the Soviet Union in economic development because we lack a goal. The Soviet people have the goal of overtaking the United States and are prepared to sacrifice and work hard for this. In his opinion this was far more effective than in the US where many people are satisfied with what they have and see no reason to strain themselves to increase production. I agreed that there was something in this thesis. Dobrynin went on to observe that when the Soviets achieve their goal of overtaking us this would have a major effect upon the standing of our two countries in the rest of the world. He said the US was a rich country and therefore all less developed countries looked to us for assistance and this gave us great influence. In the future it would be the Soviet Union to which they would turn.

Latin America having come up in this connection, Dobrynin said he thought we had made every possible mistake in dealing with Castro's Cuba. Castro had made overtures toward us which had been rejected, he had visited the US and had received what amounted to a rebuff, and each move we made to punish him was met by a counter-move on his part. I suggested that the opposite was true in that we had been most patient and had finally broken relations when virtually forced to do so by Castro. I referred also to his dictatorial moves in dismissing most of the judiciary and in arbitrarily executing hundreds of honest Cubans. Dobrynin said that bloodshed was of course deplorable. He pointed out that Lenin had wished to avoid it in the Soviet Union but was obliged to resort to terror in order to deal with counter-revolution.

Dobrynin discussed the Laos situation and our efforts to curtail the UN agenda, which I have already reported./2/

/2/See Document 34.

In this connection I urged that at any time there was doubt about our intentions or our policies, they should ask us frankly rather than guess. He admitted that there were frequent misunderstandings. I pointed out that the removal of such misunderstandings was one of the principal reasons for the current approach to Mr. Khrushchev.

Discussing the Congo, Dobrynin said he thought our policy was influenced by our commercial interests there. I said I was sure this was not the case and thought we had very little commercial interest in that country. He mentioned diamond interests and oil companies. I said that we had important interests in some of the newly-established African countries but I thought that the Congo had been dominated commercially by the Belgians and I was not aware of any important tie-up with American industry. In any event I could assure him that there were no commercial interests in a position to influence US policy decisions. (This seems to me a good example of the Marxist slant which Soviets give to every problem.)

I was struck by the extent to which Dobrynin is convinced that the Soviet Union will achieve its goals and that democratic capitalism is doomed.

In the course of the discussion Dobrynin asked for my opinion of Ambassador Menshikov. I did not consider it expedient to answer this directly. I referred however to his intense activity in buttonholing various American public figures and by other indirect remarks indicated that I did not think he had been very successful. Later on I had occasion to remark that the type of official who in my opinion would succeed in the US was Kuznetsov. Dobrynin remarked "A number of us in the Foreign Ministry would agree with you.''

Thompson

 

46. Editorial Note

Ambassador Thompson offered his analysis of Chairman Khrushchev's thinking on Berlin in telegram 2209 to the Department of State, March 16, 1961. "All my diplomatic colleagues who have discussed matter appear to consider that in absence negotiations Khrushchev will sign separate treaty with East Germany and precipitate Berlin crisis this year. My own view is that while he would in these circumstances almost certainly conclude separate treaty, he would likely attempt avoid immediate crisis on Berlin by some method such as instructing East Germans not to interfere with Allied access for given period of time." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XIV, pages 30-33.

 

47. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, March 18, 1961, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-1861. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by Bohlen, Kohler, and in S on June 28. The conversation took place in the Secretary of State's private dining room. Gromyko was in the United States to attend the resumed session of the United Nations General Assembly.

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations, etc.

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Under Secretary Bowles
Ambassador Stevenson
S/B--Mr. Bohlen
EUR--Mr. Kohler
D--Mr. Akalovsky

Mr. Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Mr. Arkadiy Sobolev, Deputy Foreign Minister
Ambassador Menshikov
Mr. Smirnovski, Counselor, Sov. Emb.
Mr. Grubyakov, Counselor, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

During the luncheon, the conversation was of a social nature.

Toward the end of the luncheon the Secretary rose to pronounce a toast. He said that he had not had the pleasure of visiting the Soviet Union although he had seen the harbor of Leningrad when he was a young student. He had made several round trips between London and Leningrad on a Soviet steamer but had not been allowed to go ashore in Leningrad. This was the least expensive way to spend vacations and everybody had a marvelous time. The Secretary said that it was well known that the hospitality of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people were unexcelled anywhere in the world. The Secretary expressed the hope that during the luncheon, and also perhaps later, useful discussion could take place with the assistance of aides as desired. He then welcomed Mr. Gromyko to Washington. Mr. Gromyko, the Secretary said, was at home in Washington because he had been Ambassador here at the time when the US and the USSR were working together to achieve victory over the common enemy. The Secretary then raised his glass to the development of friendship and of solidarity of interests between the US and the USSR.

Mr. Gromyko, in reply to the toast, said that he had indeed seen the US before and not only from a ship. (Ambassador Menshikov interjected that this had been an exception.) Mr. Gromyko then said that the Soviet Union also desired a constructive development of relations between the US and the USSR, and that he saw no other way to achieve that objective than to sit down and discuss all the problems involved. He then raised his glass to the strengthening and development of ties between the US and the USSR so that later, perhaps not in the distant future, the fruits of the labors could be seen; namely, closer and friendlier relations between the US and the USSR.

Mr. Stevenson said that he wanted to add a postscript to Mr. Gromyko's toast and recalled that in 1945 Mr. Gromyko had said in London that he wanted to be in a position to raise a toast to the UN when it had teeth. Of course, in 1945 the UN was in a state of infancy, but now that the UN does have teeth, the Soviet Union doesn't seem to like it. Mr. Gromyko replied that some teeth grew in the wrong direction and caused pain.

The Secretary then stated that before leaving the table he wanted to say that the new Administration hoped very much that the relations between the Soviet Union and the US could be improved on a serious and mutually advantageous basis. The US realized that there were a number of serious problems between the two Governments which should be thought about. Also, there were a number of lesser questions which should not be too difficult to resolve, and which were worth our attention. He said that what he had in mind was the fact that certain individuals were being held, for various reasons, in the respective countries. He noted that the US was gratified that the USSR had released the RB-47 fliers. The Secretary then expressed hope that progress could be achieved in several other areas, such as conclusion of a civil air agreement, conclusion of a consular agreement restoring consular activities in the two countries, and in the field of exchanges both on the technical level and of tourists. The Secretary remarked facetiously that the US needed dollars and that therefore it hoped that the Soviet Union would send many tourists, rich ones if possible. The Secretary went on to say that he was of the opinion that the problems affecting strictly bilateral relations between the US and the USSR were by and large simple, and that the most difficult problems were those that involved other countries. He reiterated his hope that these bilateral problems could be resolved and that as a result of that, improvement in mutual relations between the US and the USSR would be brought about. The Secretary said that the US favored open exchange programs in the fields of science, technology and scholarships, and that it was prepared to open negotiations on the next exchange agreement, which are scheduled for October or November, with bilateral informal discussions in the near future. The Secretary said that some of these lesser problems may appear to have no more significance than a thread in a web; however, one should realize that if these threads were put together, this would lead to an improvement in US-USSR relations. The Secretary then said that the Soviet people and the American people had a great deal in common. Both were gay and friendly, and American visitors were impressed by Soviet hospitality. As far as bilateral problems were concerned, the Secretary said that one problem which was of symbolic significance was that of Soviet exports of crabmeat. He said that he didn't know how much crabmeat the Soviet Union could send to the US or how much crabmeat the American people could eat, but he felt that solution of this problem would remove a minor irritation in our mutual relations. He said that he hoped that we could remove many such minor irritations. The Secretary then stated that the President was very much interested in a constructive development of US-USSR relations, and that as many steps as possible be made in that direction.

Mr. Gromyko replied that he appreciated the Secretary's remarks and that he would like to say that the Soviet Government, and Mr. Khrushchev himself, attach great importance to US-USSR relations and that the Soviet Union believes that the significance of the relations between the two countries does not diminish with the development of the international situation but rather increases. Therefore, the Soviet Government believes that the responsibility of the US and the USSR for the international situation will increase rather than diminish. Mr. Gromyko said that the Secretary was correct in saying that there were different problems confronting the two countries. Some of them were of lesser and some of major importance. However, the development of US-USSR relations and of the world situation depended on the solution of the major problems. There was no question that the solution of the lesser problems would also influence US-USSR relations and that, as the Secretary had said, they could form a web of some significance for the development of those relations. However, the USSR believes that the main attention should be focused on the major problems. While lesser problems are of certain significance, it is the solution of major problems that will determine the development of US-USSR relations, the state of world affairs, and the question of whether there will be war or peace. Mr. Gromyko went on to say that there were several key problems before the US and the USSR. No one would deny that disarmament was of paramount importance. It was a problem to which many other questions were related and around which many other problems were orbiting like sputniks. The second key question is Germany, particularly the question of West Berlin which at the moment brooks no delay. Mr. Gromyko said that he did not know whether the Secretary was prepared to discuss these questions in detail at this time. He said that he would not insist on their being discussed now. However, he did want to stress that these two problems were among the major problems confronting the US and USSR and perhaps they were the most important problems. Mr. Gromyko said that he wanted the Secretary, the US Government, and the President to know that the Soviet Government sincerely wants to facilitate the solution of the disarmament problem. The Soviet Union is prepared to accept the most effective kind of controls over disarmament. It was gratifying to see that all states had accepted the principle of general and complete disarmament, but that principle should now be implemented. In view of the considerations expressed by Ambassador Thompson in Moscow and by Ambassador Stevenson in New York, the Soviet Union does not insist on having a General Assembly debate on the substance of disarmament. The substance of disarmament could be discussed at a later date. He expressed hope that this willingness of the Soviet Union to postpone substantive discussion of disarmament would be appreciated. Mr. Gromyko said that he believed that the General Assembly should limit its discussion of disarmament to the adoption of a general resolution on the principles of general and complete disarmament so that the world could see that the major powers are devoting their attention to that problem. Later, when the US was ready, the composition of a smaller forum could be agreed for the purpose of resuming substantive negotiations.

The Secretary replied that he hoped that Ambassador Stevenson could work out these problems with Mr. Gromyko in New York. The Secretary said that he wanted to stress the seriousness with which the US Government is approaching the problem of disarmament. The US Government is very serious with regard to the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests and hopes that an agreement can be obtained that will be in the interest of all parties concerned and will not affect their security. As far as general disarmament is concerned, the Secretary said that he wanted to be frank on this subject. The American people have never been against disarmament, if given a chance. After World War II the US demobilized very quickly so that in 1946 there was not a single division or Air Force group ready for combat. If our military budget today is four times larger than the one we had in 1946, it is because of the events that have occurred since World War II. The fact is that democracy never likes to bear the burden of armaments in peace-time. The Secretary then observed that the US was now studying intensively the general question of armaments and hoped to be able to exchange views with the Soviet Union on that subject before formal negotiations resumed in a forum that might be established. In this area, much depends on the confidence in the national purposes of nations engaging in such commitments. The American people would welcome it if a basis could be found for arms reduction and if certain political problems were resolved and disappeared from the world scene.

Mr. Gromyko replied that he believed that the point had been reached where not only the arms race should be stopped, but disarmament should begin as well. The Soviet Union believes that the peoples of the world realize the heavy burden of arms and the need for disarmament. No wise man can be found who could say where the line should be drawn beyond which no one should go. The Soviet Union believes that all problems, including that of armaments, are created by man, and that man can resolve them. The Soviet Union is not fatalistic in this respect. It believes that the question of disarmament, including agreement between the US and the USSR, can be resolved. As to the question of nuclear tests, the Soviet Union has made very many concessions but has not seen a similar attitude on the part of its negotiating partners. Frankly speaking, the Soviet Government has gained the impression that its negotiating partners have been trying to be shrewd and to obtain an agreement that would be detrimental to Soviet interests. As the US knows, the Soviet Union has not been testing. Furthermore, there are instruments today which can detect any nuclear explosion in the world. Mr. Gromyko said that he did not know whether the Secretary wanted to discuss the details of this particular problem. For his part, he did not insist on such a discussion but would be prepared to discuss these questions if the Secretary desired. In any event, Mr. Gromyko said, one should realize that if there should be no agreement, the Soviet Union would not be the only one to stand a loss. Such a development would harm everyone and, most of all, peace and the world situation at large. With regard to strictly bilateral US-USSR relations, the Soviet Government, in so far as this depends on it, will make every effort to improve them. The Soviet Government believes that the possibilities for such improvement are inexhaustible. Political, economic, cultural and other relations could be improved. Mr. Gromyko then recalled the conversations Mr. Khrushchev had had with American business groups while in the US in 1959. Mr. Khrushchev also had similar conversations with former President Eisenhower and Mr. Dillon. The impression gained at that time was that certain US groups believed that the USSR would suffer a loss if economic relations between the two countries did not develop. This, however, is not correct; rather, the reverse may be true since the Soviet Union, in the absence of trade with the US, has developed certain branches of industry which would not have been developed had that trade existed. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union is still willing to develop economic relations if the other side is willing to do the same. Mr. Gromyko said that he mentioned the question of economic relations only in passing and only for the purpose of giving a well-rounded picture of US-USSR relations. Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the Soviet Government did not fail to note that the President and the new Administration had made certain indications of their interest in improving US-USSR relations. This interest was evident in particular from the President's message to Mr. Khrushchev, the Thompson-Khrushchev discussion, today's discussion, and also the talks with Ambassador Stevenson on disarmament. Mr. Gromyko then said that on behalf of the Soviet Government he could say that any similar steps on the part of the US Government and the President personally would not only be welcomed and understood by the Soviet Government, but would also meet with the Soviet Government's readiness to accept them. The Soviet Government is not only willing to meet such steps half-way, but is also, as before, proceeding in the direction of improving US-USSR relations. The Soviet Government is ready to take every step in that direction that depends on it. Mr. Gromyko said that, in all frankness, the Soviet Government and the Soviet people had been greatly displeased (at this point Mr. Gromyko said that perhaps the w

The Secretary observed that he believed the climate was now such as would make it possible to find out whether progress on the international scene could be made. The US Government and the American people are ready to take constructive steps. This should be done against the background of the national purposes of the various countries. The problem is not only of what we believe, but also what we do about what we believe. He then said that he did not see any reason why the two governments could not find constructive solutions of problems standing between our two countries and elsewhere in the world. The US is under no illusion that these problems are simple; obviously hard work will have to be done to resolve the details of these problems and to limit their scope. However, the US, for its part, is willing to do everything in order to bring about more constructive relations between the two countries. Obviously there are basic differences underlying our relations. As Mr. Khrushchev had said, the US could not convert the USSR, nor could the USSR convert the US. However, in the final analysis, we do not believe that the problems we are confronting are insuperable. We are devoted to peace and to constructive relations and we are prepared to work as prudently as possible to resolve the problems that divide our two countries now or may divide them in the future. Of course, the interests of many other governments and the attitudes of many other peoples are also involved in the situation and neither the US nor the Soviet Union can be indifferent to these interests or attitudes. Yet, if both sides are willing to tackle the problems constructively, they could be resolved. We believe that neither side is interested in creating a crisis. The most important objective is to maintain peace. So both sides should see what can be done to avoid difficulties and to resolve the problems which by frank discussion and statesmanship can be eliminated from our scene.

Most members of the group then retired to the Secretary's office, where the conversation continued./2/

/2/A memorandum of the conversation on Laos, which lasted from 2:45 to 6 p.m., is ibid., 751J.00/3-1861. A 3-paragraph addendum to the memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXIV, Document 34. In a summary telegram to the Embassy in the Soviet Union on March 18, the Department of State commented that the results were quite negative and could have been accomplished in less than an hour. (Telegram 1529; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-1861) For text of the agreed statement issued after the conversation, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 568-569.

 

48. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, March 20, 1961, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-2061. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

2229. In frank but friendly discussion Kuznetsov yesterday believe made dent in his thinking but only small one. Depth of Soviet suspicions is incredible.

[Here follow three paragraphs on Laos.]

On disarmament Kuznetsov observed Stevenson and Gromyko had reached agreement not discuss substance disarmament at GA but would confine debate to establishing directive on general principles. I said certain we were not going to get ourselves bound to principle one treaty on general and complete disarmament and pointed out they had even exploited UN resolution to limit debate in previous meetings. On forum I said we were beginning to think no point in making concessions to Soviet point of view. We had reluctantly agreed to parity on disarmament committee and now they were pressing for their thesis of a three bloc world. I said even neutrals opposed to this and we considered committee already too large.

Kuznetsov said they were trying to be considerate of our position to give us time work out policies but pointed out we had many experts already familiar with problem. I replied that in previous meetings and in Pugwash discussion appeared to us they had not seriously studied disarmament problem. Each time we were about to come to grips with real substance they broke up meeting and walked out. I emphasized strongly seriousness with which we approaching problem but said this involved questions which were vital to our survival and no attempt of theirs to manipulate public opinion would cause us to jeopardize our security. If they wanted to exploit this situation they could do so but this would not advance cause of disarmament. Kuznetsov expressed suspicion we were merely stalling in order build up our armaments. He referred to increases in US military budget. He also referred number of times during our conversation to statements made by President and others about Eastern Europe and particularly Bowles' speech at Farmers Union Convention./2/ He quoted several times sentence Bowles alleged to have used to effect US could not tolerate Communist regimes. He said Soviet Govt was seriously studying meaning this phrase and others used by American statesmen. I replied sentence he had quoted did not appear in summary which I had received and basic thesis Bowles' speech was endeavor find accommodation between us. I also pointed out that after Declaration 81 parties and Khrushchev's Jan 6 speech they could scarcely expect us not to reply. They had expressed readiness support so-called wars of liberation. In contrast I cited restraint we had shown during Hungarian affair. Would have been easy for us at that time to have stirred up Poles and East Germans but we had no desire use force or cause useless waste of lives. I said this in sharp contrast to their policy of stirring up trouble wherever they could. When he tried to slide over Communist parties statement I said declaration that US was enemy of peoples of world had made deep impression in US. He tried contend this referred only to certain circles but I suggested he re-read statement. I said we could never take actions condoning regimes in Eastern Europe unless and until they were supported by people but this did not mean we were going to take any action overthrow them.

/2/For text of this speech, March 14, see Department of State Bulletin, April 3, 1961, pp. 480-486.

I raised lend-lease question but got no reaction except his complaint that we were refusing sell them tractors which they could not understand.

Kuznetsov expressed opinion frank exchange of views had been helpful and hoped we would have further occasion discussions this kind.

Thompson

 

49. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts/1/

Washington, March 23, 1961, 9:05 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 961.63/3-2361. Confidential. Drafted by Richard T. Davies (SOV/P); cleared with McSweeney, USIA, P, AF/P, ARA/P, FE/P, and EUR/P; and approved by Davis.

1457. Joint State-USIA. According press reports from Moscow, Soviets have lifted censorship on despatches filed from Moscow by foreign correspondents. Dept has issued statement welcoming move as step towards removal barriers to free flow information and expressing hope it will be followed by removal bars to flow of information into USSR (principal bars are selective jamming foreign broadcasts in Soviet languages and non-availability to general Soviet public of representative non-Communist foreign periodicals and publications).

In commenting upon this action, US officials and output should take primary guidance from Dept statement (carried in Wireless File). Officials should avoid giving impression we do not regard lifting censorship as welcome advance, should stress hope this step will eventually be followed by removal or attenuation present severe controls on material from outside world available Soviet people and should draw upon following background points in order put move in context.

1. Censorship of foreign correspondents' despatches was no longer effective bar to transmission censorable information to outside world, since present relatively heavy flow foreign visitors ensures many such items in any case become known outside USSR within a few days.

2. Consequently existence of censorship apparatus served only as propaganda liability, in removing which Soviets now able create impression further "liberalization''.

3. Ultimate sanction against foreign correspondents who seriously offend regime or consistently transmit critical material remains, i.e., Soviet ability either expel them from country or, in less urgent cases, refuse allow them re-enter once they have left USSR on leave. (Since 1945, according Dept records, six American correspondents expelled from USSR; nine refused visas.)

4. Removal censorship thus reinforces compulsion upon responsible correspondent whose duty to his employer requires him strive maintain representation in Moscow, to exercise self-censorship and avoid offending Soviet Government to point at which it would expel him or refuse let him re-enter. While censorship in operation correspondent could have some assurance it would excise material Soviet Government might regard with disfavor. Correspondent must now be his own judge in questionable cases.

5. Censorship has been lifted on outgoing material but situation unaltered with regard material available to Soviet people: latter continues be as tightly controlled as ever by Soviet Government. Most serious controls exercised through continued selective jamming foreign radio broadcasts in Russian (about 30-35% jammed out) and other Soviet languages (a high percentage of which jammed out) and through fact non-Soviet-bloc periodicals and publications (except for Communist Party literature) not available for purchase by Soviet citizens and can be read in libraries only by those who have political clearance.

As facts warrant also useful cite situations elsewhere particularly in your host country, which emphasize general accessibility variety of foreign press, radio, television, motion-picture materials, in contrast with thoroughly controlled flow such materials to Soviet citizens.

Report official and press reactions to Soviet move.

Rusk

[Continue with Documents 50-59]

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