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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume V Soviet Union DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

50. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, March 27, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in U on March 30 and by the White House on April 5. The meeting was held at the White House.

SUBJECT
Laos and US-USSR Relations

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Ambassador Stevenson
Acting Secretary Bowles S/B--Mr. Bohlen
EUR--Mr. Kohler
D--Mr. Akalovsky

Mr. Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R.
Ambassador Menshikov
Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter, U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The President opened the conversation by expressing his pleasure in meeting the Foreign Minister and talking with him about matters of mutual interest.

Mr. Gromyko thanked the President for this opportunity to meet him and said that he wanted to convey to the President greetings and best wishes from the head of the Soviet Government, N.S. Khrushchev.

The President thanked Mr. Gromyko.

Mr. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Government knew that the President was very much interested in the Laotian question. It was also familiar with the position of the U.S. Government and the President personally, as expressed in the President's statement, the Thompson-Khrushchev discussion, and the conversation between Secretary Rusk and Mr. Gromyko. Therefore, Mr. Gromyko said, he wished to set forth the views of the Soviet Government, and of Mr. Khrushchev personally, on the Laotian problem. The Soviet Government had recently received the U.K. proposal on Laos,/2/ which was in reply to the proposal of the Soviet Government on the same question, communicated previously to the U.K. Government. The U.K. proposal, as far as the Soviet Government was aware, also reflects the U.S. Government's views.

/2/For text of the British proposal on Laos, March 23, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 994-995.

The President confirmed this statement.

Mr. Gromyko continued by saying that the U.K. proposal was being thoroughly studied by the Soviet Government and that the latter would reply to these proposals very shortly. However, even now the Soviet Government believes that that proposal could serve as a basis for settlement in Laos, a settlement that would ensure peaceful development for the Laotian people and a policy of true neutrality for that country. Now that real ways for a settlement of the Laotian question are in prospect, it is necessary to manifest patience and restraint and not to do anything that might complicate that problem. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R., as great powers, undoubtedly can and must exert positive influence in the settling of the Laotian question by peaceful means, and undoubtedly can and must take steps to prevent the conflict from spreading. As Mr. Khrushchev had said in his conversation with Ambassador Thompson and as he, Mr. Gromyko, had said to Secretary Rusk, the policy of the Soviet Government with regard to the Laotian question is to strive for a truly independent and truly neutral Laos. If the U.S. Government is also for a truly independent and truly neutral Laos, as the Soviet Government is, possibilities exist for settling the Laotian question to the satisfaction of the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and all parties concerned. Mr. Gromyko said that these were the views he had been entrusted to convey to the President personally and to stress their significance.

The President said he appreciated Mr. Gromyko's remarks and expressed hope that this conversation and the Soviet reply to the U.K. proposal would lead to a peaceful settlement of the Laotian question. This is what we want. Mr. Gromyko probably understands that the U.S., as a great power, would be concerned if Laos were taken over by forces hostile to it just as the Soviet Union would probably be concerned if forces hostile to it took over that country. Therefore, it is important to stabilize the situation and prevent its further deterioration. It is for this reason that the U.S. stresses the importance of a cease-fire. The U.S. is concerned that, in the absence of a cease-fire, military activities will continue while the conference is deliberating what form the future Laotian Government should take. Both sides would put in more and more military supplies, which would make the situation all the more difficult. Therefore, the President said, he hoped that the U.K. proposal for a cease-fire would be accepted; what is needed is not only the conference but also a cease-fire. The President then said that he had read the recent Pravda article on the Laotian question and that the article indicated that there might be some ground for understanding. However, a cease-fire is important because, in its absence, Soviet supplies would continue and our supplies would continue, and that would create a more and more intense military situation. Consequently, both sides should do commonly everything to ease the situation.

Mr. Gromyko said that he could reaffirm that, after familiarizing itself with the U.K. proposal, the Soviet Government believed that there was a possibility for settling the Laotian question and that a reply to that proposal would be forthcoming in a short while. He said that he wanted to note that the fact that the U.S. Government had agreed to the convening of an international conference and the international control commission was a positive step. He recalled that when Secretary Rusk had told him about this he had told the Secretary that this was a positive step in the proper direction and that it eased the situation. Mr. Gromyko observed that Secretary Rusk's statement had been made at the end of their 3-hour long conversation.

The President remarked jocularly that Mr. Gromyko was a very persuasive man. He then inquired when, in Mr. Gromyko's judgment, the Soviet reply could be expected, and particularly whether it would be forthcoming this week.

Mr. Gromyko replied that he could give no fixed date but said that it would be in "the nearest future".

The President stated that the situation was inflammatory and that he was anxious to have the Soviet reply as soon as possible. The sooner an understanding was reached, the better off we would be. The military situation would be behind us and efforts to discuss a settlement could begin. He reiterated his concern that the situation might deteriorate and its military aspects might become more intense.

Mr. Gromyko said he wished to reiterate and stress again that it was very important not to do anything that would further complicate the situation. It is particularly important that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. use their influence and prestige so that no action is taken that would complicate the situation and spread the conflict.

The President agreed and emphasized once again that if both sides could come to an understanding, they should do so without delay so as not to expand the conflict but rather diminish it.

Mr. Gromyko said that it was good if the U.S. was taking steps to prevent the situation from deteriorating and to create a more favorable situation in Laos and around it.

The President replied that everything should be done to prevent the conflict from escalating and reiterated that the sooner this was done the better off both sides would be.

Mr. Gromyko observed that it was very good if the U.S. Government was acting in the direction of facilitating the solution of the Laotian problem. He then said that he wanted to ask a specific question relating to the Laotian problem, a question which he had mentioned to Secretary Rusk in Mr. Bohlen's and Mr. Kohler's presence. The question was that of the presence of Chiang Kai-shek's troops in Laos. The Soviet Government had expressed hope that those troops, numbering about 3,000, would be disarmed and withdrawn. Unfortunately, to the Soviet Government's great regret, according to information available to the Soviet Government, no such steps had been taken so far. He said that this was a specific question within the general scope of the Laotian problem, but that he still wanted to mention it.

The President replied that the U.S. also believed that those troops should not be there. He recalled that the troops had come from Burma and that when this question had come up, the U.S. had made strong overtures to Chiang Kai-shek in order to persuade him to withdraw those troops. The President then turned to Mr. Bowles and asked whether there was any recent information on this subject.

The Acting Secretary said that as of a week ago 1,500, or more than one-half of the troops in question had been withdrawn and that the movement was continuing.

The President then reiterated that the U.S. shared the view that there was no reason for those troops to be in Laos. They were an incendiary factor and should be removed.

Mr. Gromyko observed that this was a favorable development and said that the sooner those troops were removed, the better. Their withdrawal would facilitate the settlement of the Laotian problem.

Mr. Gromyko then turned to the general question of US-USSR relations. He recalled that Secretary Rusk had expressed the U.S. Government's views concerning the development of US-USSR relations and the Secretary's statement that the President and the U.S. Government were willing to take steps to improve these relations. In particular, Secretary Rusk had mentioned the possibility of bilateral exchanges of views on certain problems in order to develop US-USSR relations. This, Mr. Gromyko said, was in accord with the desires of the Soviet Government, and he wanted to assure the President that the Soviet Government had always striven and would continue to strive for the development of US-USSR relations. It would be well if some day the point was reached where genuine friendship were established between the two countries. Then both the American and the Soviet peoples could reap the fruits of improved relations.

The President replied that he shared this view and that he hoped that US-USSR relations could be developed. The problem was that of different national interests in some areas, such as Laos and certain other areas. What is necessary is to create an atmosphere where these problems could be settled without approaching the brink of a military situation. The President said that it was important to realize that differences existed in the systems and the national policies of the two countries, but that it was equally important to create an atmosphere where these differences could be settled without moves and countermoves by each of the two sides, and where neither side would have to take a strong stand. The areas where such settlements are necessary are particularly Laos, Africa and Cuba.

Therefore, the President said, he was glad to have had this opportunity to discuss the Laotian question with Mr. Gromyko. It was important to bring about solutions of these problems with due regard to the interests of the two countries and without embarrassing their respective positions or bringing us to the brink of disaster.

Mr. Gromyko said that the President's remarks were of great interest and that the Soviet Government believed the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., as the two greatest powers, possessing the greatest military potential, should in their relations do nothing that might bring us to the brink or to the point of a choice between war and peace. Problems where possibility for settlement exist must be settled peacefully with due regard to the interests of the two countries and of the interests of other states, if such interests are involved. Mr. Gromyko then stated that as Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., he considered that this attitude was a proper one and that neither side should do anything that might bring them to the brink. He observed that Ambassador Menshikov surely shared his view.

Responding to the President's invitation to make his observations, Ambassador Stevenson referred to Mr. Gromyko's statement in which he urged that no steps should be taken that would aggravate the situation in Laos. He said that he assumed that this also applied to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Gromyko said that he had stated earlier that both the Soviet Union and the U.S. should do nothing that might complicate the situation in Laos, around Laos, and around the Laotian question.

[The President then invited Mr. Gromyko to join him for a private talk on the lawn. The President reported that in the course of that conversation, he had reiterated the urgent need for preventing the Laotian situation from coming to a brink. Recalling the 1914 situation, he said that we should avoid a development where both sides would be moving in. He also said that the Soviet Government should not attempt to push the U.S. Government into a position where the latter's prestige is involved. The President also mentioned briefly the Cuban situation and the belligerent attitude of the Cuban government, as well as the Congo situation, which the U.S. hoped could be resolved peacefully. The President stressed the need for leaving communications channels clear in order to make it possible to reach solutions that would recognize the interests of both sides. The President also touched briefly upon the subject of disarmament and said that he hoped that Mr. Gromyko would be willing to reword his statement in such a way as to indicate that preliminary discussions prior to the resumption of negotiations would also involve countries other than the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. alone. The President said, however, that there would be bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union on that subject. The President said Mr. Gromyko had agreed with him as to the need for peaceful solutions and had expressed hope that there would be a chance for a personal exchange of views between the President and Mr. Khrushchev. As to his proposed statement on disarmament, Mr. Gromyko said that he would discuss this with Ambassador Stevenson in New York.]/3/

/3/These and following brackets are in the source text.

[During his conversation with Ambassador Stevenson after the meeting, Ambassador Menshikov, responding to Ambassador Stevenson's query, indicated that the Soviet reply to the U.K. proposal could be expected within three days.]/4/

/4/On March 30 Gromyko told Stevenson that he found the conversation with the President interesting and useful and his line of thinking "reasonable." (Telegram 2690 from USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/3-3061)

 

51. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, April 1, 1961, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-161. Confidential; Priority.

2362. Eyes only Secretary. After discussion of Laos problem/2/ Khrushchev said he was pleased at signs of possibility improvement our relations. He expressed particular satisfaction at President's action in stopping our military from making boasting and threatening statements./3/ He said each time this was done Soviet military felt obliged reply and this did much to worsen atmosphere. I pointed out President had not only taken steps to prevent statements which did not accurately reflect policy our govt, but was also strengthening civilian control over military policy. K remarked this was important and said they had had problem with Marshal Zhukov./4/ He had been friend of Eisenhower and thought he was smarter than Eisenhower. When latter became President Zhukov developed big ideas about his own role. However Soviet system had no place for juntas and when they had thrown Zhukov out he had himself stated they had been right to do so.

/2/In telegram 2354 from Moscow, April 1, Ambassador Thompson reported that Chairman Khrushchev had called him in that day to give him a copy of a Soviet aide-memoire responding to the United Kingdom's proposal of March 23 for an international conference on Laos and an immediate cease-fire. For text of telegram 2354, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXIV, pp. 110-111. The aide-memoire expressed both Soviet satisfaction that the United Kingdom now agreed to convening an international conference and Soviet support for a cease-fire appeal. Text of the aide-memoire is printed in Department of State Bulletin, April 17, 1961, pp. 545-546.

/3/On January 27 the White House had introduced stiff controls over speeches and statements by U.S. military spokesmen.

/4/Georgi K. Zhukov, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Minister of Defense, was dismissed by Khrushchev at the end of 1957 for "adventurism" and "Bonapartism."

Khrushchev said he deplored war propaganda in general and suggested we should conclude agreement, perhaps international one, to prevent publication of war propaganda. This already forbidden in Soviet Union. It might be alleged that this was interference with freedom of press but on contrary it was measure to prevent abuse of press. Press not allowed, for example, to advocate prostitution--why could it not prevent war propaganda. He also started to give example of convention banning chemical warfare but then recalled we had not adhered to this convention--something he had never understood.

I said I thought our view was that it was not really practicable to handle this problem by treaty and among other difficulties it was virtually impossible draw line and say what was war propaganda and what not. I thought however much could be done to diminish this type activity particularly if appropriate lead given at top.

Khrushchev then said he had fully agreed with President's position that we must both display restraint and try avoid confrontation of power of our two countries. They had however been very much disturbed by Bowles' speech. When I inquired what particular passage he had objected to he could not recall exactly but mentioned problems of Congo, Cuba, and Laos. (I believe Soviets had in mind particularly sentence beginning "Our international interests are not compatible with the global objectives of Soviet long-range strategy.")

With respect to Congo K said what had happened there and particularly murder of Lumumba had helped communism. Lumumba was not Communist and he doubted if he would have become one. He was man with limited outlook who easily became excited. He remarked we had discussed this problem before and Soviet position known.

Turning to Cuba he could not agree with our policy there. Each country should be free to choose its social system. They did not agree, for example, with Yugoslav internal policies but this did not prevent them from having good relations with that country. He said President had indicated that financial aid would be given to aid in overthrow of present Cuban Govt. Bands of émigrés had been formed and threats made against Cuban Govt. He said Soviet Govt. would openly support Cuban Govt and would give them economic aid. He pointed out Soviet Union had no base in Cuba and only base there belonged to us. He then went on to question our policy of having bases all around Soviet Union. He dwelt particularly on question of Iran. He said this was poor country where govt was doing little to help people. He said Shah liked to consider himself Monarch but his ancestry not particularly enviable. We sought special rights for ourselves everywhere. Soviet Union was not threatening Iran. Our trouble was that we were not confident of our own system. We had set up alliances to protect members not only from outside aggression but from subversion. Only subversionists in countries like Iran were students and others who were dissatisfied with conditions. We had military advisors in Iran and although he indicated he was not making a demand he wished to state that it would be most useful to our good relations if these were withdrawn.

Reverting again to Cuba he asked why we did not establish diplomatic relations with that country and try to resolve our problems with it peacefully. He made clear Cubans had not put him up to this but he was merely speaking his own mind.

I replied that with respect to Congo we had hoped UN would be able deal with this problem and that we could both have remained out of it. However Soviet Union had started furnishing military and other supplies to one faction. Khrushchev intervened to state they had furnished medicines and in any event these had been supplied to legal govt. He also said we were aware of his views on UN. Hammarskjold was US agent and carried out our orders. I denied this and said many of his actions had annoyed us but we considered him objective. I went on to say that I thought what bothered us particularly about Cuba was its use as a base for attempts on overthrow of other Latin American govts. When he disputed this I said I had heard Cuban pilots were being trained in Czechoslovakia in flying jet planes. Cuba would never be able attack us and therefore these presumably were designed for use against other Latin American countries. I said we had been most patient with Castro. In first place we had cut off supply of arms to Batista/5/ and although there had been differences of opinion in US about Castro we had been fully prepared accept his govt. However he had made most violent statements against US and had confiscated our assets there without compensation and finally had insisted on reducing our Embassy to handful of people. We had tried to be patient but he had given us no choice. Khrushchev replied Castro said we were using Embassy to harbor spies and Castro was not Communist. He said he had not heard of any training of jet pilots but if he were Castro he would buy jet planes since these were necessary to prevent arms being dropped to counter-revolutionaries from planes flying from US. He thought that in one case we had even admitted this. I said we had taken strict steps to prevent such activities although there had I believed been one case in which a plane had gotten through. In concluding Khrushchev said we should continue to be patient and should try to improve our relations with Cuba.

/5/Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar, President of Cuba until January 1959.

He said he considered Soviet position in world was good since they were on side of people trying to improve their lot. US was supporting reactionary govts in many places. We often spoke of elections and he inquired what would be result of election in Spain or South Vietnam or South Korea. In latter Syngman Rhee/6/ had disappeared but new man was not much better and people were dissatisfied. He did not think even we knew what went on in Diem's/7/ govt in Vietnam. I replied that there were cases where we supported reactionary govts and there were two reasons for this. First was that we did not believe we should intervene in internal affairs of these countries and second was we were concerned at these countries being threatened by Communist expansion. Khrushchev said he welcomed President's idea of our competing in economic field and in such matters as culture and to see who could bring people the most happiness. If our system could demonstrate it could do this better than communism he was ready to embrace our system. I said I could only repeat what I had said to him before, namely that much of our difficulty came from our different points of view and misinformation and misunderstanding. US wanted nothing more than prosperity and happiness of all peoples throughout world but we did not think this should come about by outside intervention. Khrushchev replied Soviet Union was also against intervention in others' affairs but there was no justification for ring of US bases around Soviet Union./8/

/6/President of the Republic of Korea.

/7/Ngo Dinh Diem, President and Secretary of National Defense of the Republic of South Vietnam.

/8/In telegram 2361 from Moscow, April 1, Thompson reported that Khrushchev expressed his agreement with the President's proposal for a summit meeting at the end of May, and that he would reply directly to Kennedy about it. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/4-161)

Thompson

 

52. Editorial Note

In a memorandum to President Kennedy, April 1, 1961, McGeorge Bundy discussed "some of the key diplomatic issues in the probable diplomacy" regarding Laos, commenting that "the Soviet Union in agreeing to negotiation believes that it can secure eventually what it is taking rapidly by military action. Consequently, we should consider immediately what encouragement and hard assistance might be given to Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam to strengthen their position with respect to a 'neutral' Laos which will provide a bridge to their borders for Communist subversion and guerrilla operations." For text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXIV, pages 112-116.

 

53. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, April 1, 1961, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.00/4-161. Secret.

2365. Eyes only Secretary. Difficult convey in telegram exact tone of conversation such as that today with Khrushchev./2/ In order conserve time interpreter frequently not used and too great emphasis should not be placed on exact words. He was friendly throughout discussion and seemed quite pleased and hopeful at President's initiative. Re Bowles speech I believe they are genuinely concerned that we may be saying that accommodation with us means they must renounce any support of govts which come into being by revolution and refrain from adopting attitude which would encourage such revolutions. This they not prepared do. Realistic question is whether they prepared refrain from initiating active subversion. With possible exception Laos they feel they have clear conscience since in Cuba and Iraq they did not take initiative. Khrushchev said he had never heard of Castro until it was announced he had taken Havana. Even in Laos they consider they were responding to our initiative. I am not supporting these contentions but believe they should be taken into consideration in judging Sov intentions. Khrushchev pointed out there is no industrial proletariat in country like Congo and he mentioned they had excellent relations with Ghana and Guinea which were not Communist countries. Sovs of course wish to expand their influence and his citing latter two countries not particularly reassuring. My judgment is Sovs will continue give political and propaganda support to movements against what they consider reactionary govts throughout world and that they will extend their influence wherever possible but that they can be brought to refrain from militant subversion by direct action such as heavy infiltration of agents, etc. I believe Khrushchev recognizes that newly developing countries particularly in Africa will not be ripe for communism for long time to come. I consider most discouraging aspect Khrushchev's current policy is his attitude toward UN Secretariat which will have wide repercussions on other problems including disarmament./3/

/2/See Document 51.

/3/On April 4 Thompson transmitted airgram G-736, which added eight minor vignettes on the conversation with Khrushchev. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/4-461)

Thompson

 

54. Editorial Note

The President's Special Assistant, Arthur Schlesinger, expressed his opposition to the planned paramilitary action against Cuba in a memorandum to President Kennedy, April 5, 1961. He argued that the operation was likely to turn into a protracted civil conflict which would "give the Soviet Union a magnificent opportunity to wage political warfare. Cuba will become our Hungary; and, since our pretensions to international good behavior have been greater than those of the Russians, we would be more damaged by Hungary than they were (and they were considerably damaged)." Schlesinger questioned, however, the view that "this operation would have serious substantive effect on Soviet policy, in Laos or elsewhere. My guess is that the Soviet Union regards Cuba as in our domain and is rather surprised that we have not taken action before this to rid ourselves of Castro." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume X, pages 186-189.

 

55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, April 5, 1961, 7:23 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-KE/4-561. Secret. Drafted and approved by Kohler and cleared with the President, Rusk, Bundy, and Bohlen (in substance).

1673. Eyes only for Ambassador. You will have noted White House announcement April 3/2/ setting firm dates worked out with French for President's visit to Paris May 31 through June 2. We are repeating to you Deptel to Paris/3/ regarding plans for this visit and will repeat future messages as pertinent. President would be prepared to proceed to Vienna for two-day "get acquainted" meeting with Khrushchev on June 3 and 4/4/ provided (1) these dates convenient to Khrushchev and (2) international atmosphere appropriate for such meeting at that time. Latter would presumably depend mainly on progress toward settlement question of Laos and Soviet restraint in not stimulating other crises. For example, if Laotian situation were still as sensitive as now, or if new crisis had developed in another area, popular reaction in the US would probably be hostile to a meeting and thus prevent it from assisting in the relief of international tensions. Therefore, President would not wish now to have any firm understanding that might later need to be changed, with attendant danger of recrimination. Nevertheless, suggest you should seek early opportunity to discuss dates and these other aspects of the question on tentative basis with Khrushchev or Foreign Minister.

/2/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 569.

/3/Telegram 1668 to Moscow, April 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-KE/4-461)

/4/On April 10 Thompson reported that Gromyko believed June 3 and 4 was acceptable, but would confirm it with Khrushchev. (Telegram 2441 from Moscow; ibid., 711.11-KE/4-1061) The following day Thompson cabled that Khrushchev had agreed. (Telegram 2459 from Moscow; ibid., 611.61/4-1161)

Rusk

 

56. Editorial Note

From April 4 to 6, 1961, Frank G. Siscoe, Director of the Soviet and East European Exchanges Staff, visited Moscow for conversations with various Soviet officials about U.S.-Soviet cultural, scientific, and technical exchanges. On April 5 and 6 he met with G.A. Zhukov, Chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and after explaining that both President Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk were interested in the exchange program, developed a list of problems and opportunities on the question. On April 4 and 6 he talked to M.S. Prokofiev, Deputy Minister of Higher Education, about exchanges in the field of education; on April 5, with G.V. Aleksenko, Deputy Chairman of the State Scientific and Technical Committee; and on April 6, with S.V. Kaftanov, Chairman of the State Committee for Radio Broadcasting and Television. At the end of the meetings Siscoe extended an invitation to Zhukov to visit the United States for further discussions after each side examined its programs in light of the other's desiderata. Memoranda of all these conversations were transmitted in despatch 705 from Moscow, April 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 511.613/4-1361)

 

57. Editorial Note

In telegram 1722 to Moscow, April 12, 1961, Secretary of State Rusk expressed concern at the effect in Laos of the Soviet delay in responding definitively to the British proposal of April 5, particularly the call for a cessation of hostilities. Rusk instructed Ambassador Thompson to remind Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko of President Kennedy's statement during their meeting on March 27 that "while we seriously and wholeheartedly supported the goal of a neutral and independent Laos, free from any foreign alignment or domination, the United States as a great power could not stand by if forces hostile to the United States sought to take over the country by military means." For text of telegram 1722 and information on the British proposal of April 5, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXIV, pages 124-125. President Kennedy's report of his meeting with Gromyko on March 27 is ibid., pages 105-107.

Gromyko responded to the British proposal on April 16; British analysts cited two major shortcomings in the response: it did not explicitly accept a cease-fire as a precondition for an international conference, and it did not provide for an immediate International Control Commission presence in Laos to verify the cease-fire. (Ibid., page 135) However, following a meeting on April 19 between Gromyko and the British Ambassador to Moscow, the United Kingdom recommended to the United States that it accept the Soviet response as "explained" by Gromyko with the understanding that it would not be binding on the United States and that the West would not attend the conference unless there were a cease-fire by May 5. The U.K. recommendation was discussed at a meeting of the Laos Task Force on April 19. For text of the memorandum of the meeting, see ibid., pages 137-138.

 

58. Editorial Note

The landings of the Cuban Expeditionary Force at the Bay of Pigs on the southern coast of Cuba began on April 17, 1961. On April 18, the Department of State received telegram 2550 from Moscow conveying a letter to President Kennedy from Chairman Khrushchev. The letter, which the Soviet Government made public, expressed "indignation" at the invasion of Cuba by armed bands "trained, equipped and armed in the United States" and called on Kennedy to "put an end to aggression." The letter also declared that the Soviet Union would "render the Cuban people and their government all necessary help to repel armed attack" and implied that the Soviet Union might retaliate by menacing U.S. interests elsewhere. President Kennedy responded the same day in a letter handed to Ambassador Menshikov and released to the press. Kennedy stated that the "United States intends no military intervention in Cuba" but could not conceal its "admiration for Cuban patriots who wish to see a democratic system in an independent Cuba." Kennedy also warned the Soviets not to use the situation in Cuba as a pretext to inflame other areas of the world. For text of the two letters, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VI, pages 7-10.

Khrushchev replied to Kennedy's letter of April 18 in a long letter of April 22 in which he reiterated and expanded upon his charge of aggression against Cuba and again pledged Soviet support for Fidel Castro's government. For text, see ibid., pages 10-16. The Department of State responded the same day with a statement in effect dismissing Khrushchev's letter as unworthy of reply. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1961, page 663.

In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs crisis, U.S. policy makers reassessed Soviet involvement in Cuba and the threat posed to the United States and its interests in Latin America. In a memorandum to President Kennedy, April 21, Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Rostow raised the issue of "a potential Soviet offensive base in Cuba." The United States must decide whether to permit Castro to acquire defensive arms, asserted Rostow, and "what the touchstones are between defensive arms and the creation of a Communist military base threatening the U.S. itself. I assume that evidence of the latter we would take virtually as a cause of war." For text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume X, pages 310-312.

In an April 26 paper prepared for the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency reviewed Soviet bloc military aid to Cuba, noting that since September 1960 its value was estimated at between $50 million and $100 million. A May 2 report prepared jointly by the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency stated that "with continuing material and technical assistance from the Bloc and with further military training and political indoctrination, under Bloc tutelage, the combat effectiveness of the Cuban armed forces will substantially increase. The Bloc will probably provide some MIG-17's when Cuban pilots training in Czechoslovakia return home. However, the buildup of a sizable jet air force in Cuba will probably be a slow process as compared with the improvement of the army. Nonnuclear air defense missiles may be supplied to Cuba, but the Bloc will not supply offensive type missiles nor nuclear weapons." A May 4 paper prepared for the National Security Council by an Interagency Task Force on Cuba stated that there was "no danger of effective direct attack against the U.S." and only a "remote possibility of an attempt to convert Cuba into a Russian base for strategic attack on the United States." However, Cuba clearly served "as an exporter of physical aids to revolution" and "as an example and stimulus to communist revolution." For text of the two papers and the report, see ibid., pages 389-390, 417-422, and 459-475.

 

59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, April 20, 1961, 5:11 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5261/4-2061. Secret; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by McSweeney and Boster (EUR/SOV); cleared with Bohlen, Chayes, and Kohler; and approved by Bowles.

1786. Eyes only Ambassador. Igor Melekh departed US April 7, due Bremen April 14, and should therefore be arriving Moscow anytime./2/

/2/Igor Y. Melekh had been arrested for espionage in October 1960.

You will recall (1) Soviet Embassy's informal approach to Department February 17 urging Melekh's release as gesture help improve relations; (2) Department's response March 3 that US Government prepared consider Melekh's early release on condition Soviet Government would release Powers; (3) Ambassador Menshikov's counter-response March 17 to Under Secretary expressing hope we would release Melekh without conditions, as they had released RB-47 fliers; (4) Under Secretary informed Menshikov March 23 of decision release Melekh as effort show good will and eliminate causes misunderstanding. (You should have all memoranda above conversations.)/3/

/3/A memorandum of Bowles' conversation with Menshikov on March 23 is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-2361. No memoranda of the other conversations have been found, but the Department of State transmitted brief summaries of the first two in telegram 1431 to Moscow, March 4. (Ibid., 711.6261/3-461)

While we clearly have no commitment for release of Powers, one interpretation of Soviet actions described above is that Soviet Government would be prepared respond favorably to request for release Powers as contribution to betterment relations if we were to have released Melekh unconditionally, and we were at least partially motivated by this interpretation in taking action as we did. You should therefore seek appointment at appropriate level in Foreign Ministry and recall these informal conversations re release of Melekh. You should indicate that, in light of Soviet approach, we took action to free Melekh unconditionally and that we are now hopeful that Soviet Government for its part will release Powers in similar step to help eliminate differences between us. Timing this approach left to your discretion, although we hope it can be made fairly soon./4/

/4/On May 4 Thompson reported that he had taken up the release of Powers with Gromyko who stated that the Melekh and Powers cases were entirely different and had nothing further to say about the matter. (Telegram 2711 from Moscow; ibid., 261.1111/Powers, Francis Gary)

Bowles

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