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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume V Soviet Union DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

60. Editorial Note

In telegram Supnu 1549, April 21, 1961, the U.S. delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference informed the Department of State that since the resumption of negotiations on March 21 the Soviets had "not only stood still on positions they have been maintaining since the summit meeting last spring" but have made it "clear that they are not budging in even the most minute particular from previous positions." In a memorandum prepared for a National Security Council meeting on April 22, John McCloy stated that "it now appears clear that the intent of the Soviet negotiators at Geneva is to avoid a prompt conclusion of a Test Ban Agreement." For texts of telegram 1549 and McCloy's memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VII, pages 41-47. Earlier, in National Intelligence Estimate 4-2-61, "Attitudes of Key World Powers on Disarmament Issues," April 6, the intelligence community had expressed its belief "that the Soviet leaders see, in agitation of the disarmament issue, a prime opportunity to further their political purposes in the non-communist world. What is not so clear is the extent to which they may actually desire to conclude agreements on disarmament." For text of the NIE's conclusions, see ibid., pages 35-38.

 

61. Editorial Note

National Intelligence Estimate 11-7-61, "Soviet Short-Term Intentions Regarding Berlin and Germany," April 25, 1961, concluded: "We believe that in the relatively near future the USSR will present a formal demand for the renewal of negotiations on the question of a peace treaty for 'the two Germanies' and a new status for Berlin. Almost certainly, Khrushchev still prefers to negotiate on this matter rather than to provoke a crisis by unilateral action, chiefly because he desires to avoid the risks of a showdown in this dangerous area of East-West confrontation." For text of the NIE's conclusions, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XIV, pages 56-57.

 

62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, May 2, 1961, 7:02 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.613/5-261. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Martens (EUR/SES) and approved by SOV, OEE and Siscoe (EUR/SES).

1885. Your 2679 and 2695./2/ Professor Byrnes, Chairman of Inter-University Committee, informed substance reftels and reacts as follows:

/2/Telegram 2679, April 28, reported that Embassy officials had tried to dissuade Charles Gribble and Leonard Kirsch, who had come to the Embassy that day to announce that they intended to marry Russian women the following week. (Ibid., 511.613/4-2861) Telegram 2695, May 2, reported that a New York Times correspondent was aware of the situation but had agreed to hold the story until informed of developments by the Embassy. (Ibid., 511/613/5-261)

Difficult be specific from distance in situation like this. However, cannot overemphasize concern and desire for Gribble and Kirsch reconsider matter in terms their whole future life and happiness. Committee strongly hopes students would seriously reconsider, particularly in view (a) difficulty and possible inability for wives obtain exit permits (what would students do if wives cannot leave?) (b) fact emotions may mislead one in strained emotional and physical environment such as experienced by exchange students in U.S.S.R. (Is this time and place to make such important life-long decision?) (c) possible motivations of girls other than or in addition to normal feelings of love including possible desire find means of leaving U.S.S.R. or possible police control of girls (d) possibility for police pressures and dangers to families of girls who remain in U.S.S.R. and through them on girls and ultimately on their husbands. (End Brynes statement)

Department agrees serious efforts to discourage these marriages should be continued.

NY Times approach based on Committee passing of information to its Times contact on info-only basis. Committee has taken necessary steps with Times prevent any premature use./3/

/3/On May 4 the Embassy in Moscow reported that after a talk with Ambassador Thompson, Gribble agreed to postpone his marriage for at least a year, but Kirsch intended to proceed. (Telegram 2718 from Moscow; ibid., 511.613/5-461) On May 17 the Embassy reported that Kirsch had been married that day. (Telegram 2826; ibid., 511.613/5-1761)

Rusk

 

63. Editorial Note

Under cover of a memorandum dated May 3, 1961, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric forwarded to President Kennedy for consideration by the National Security Council a paper entitled "A Program of Action To Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam," which had been prepared by an interdepartmental Task Force. Among the paper's proposals was the following: "We should consider joining with the Viet-Namese in a clear cut defensive alliance which might include stationing of U.S. forces on Viet-Namese soil." Such a move "would place the Sino-Soviet Bloc in the position of risking direct intervention in a situation where U.S. forces were already in place." For text of the paper, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume I, pages 93-115.

 

64. Current Intelligence Weekly Review/1/

Washington, May 4, 1961.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Secret; Noforn. Prepared by CIA's Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 7-8 of the Weekly Review section of the issue.

Developments in Soviet Foreign Policy

Moscow last week expanded its attacks on the US over the events in Cuba to include vituperative criticism of the President personally as well as broad denunciations of US policies--especially in the "Observer" articles in Pravda on 28 and 30 April. While the Soviet leaders are determined to exact the maximum propaganda gains from the Cuban developments, their treatment of the May Day activities suggests that they do not plan a long period of bitter hostility toward the US such as followed the U-2 incident. Their statements made no mention of the U-2 affair of last May Day, and the official editorials for this year's celebrations and the address by Marshal Malinovsky were relatively moderate in comparison with the "Observer" articles and not predominantly anti-American in content.

Pravda's editorial on 1 May, however, referred to the "criminal intrigues of American imperialism" in Cuba, and Malinovsky in his order of the day and speech in Red Square repeated this line, stating that "armed intervention" against Cuba was organized by "imperialist circles of the US." Malinovsky also warned that the "aggressive circles of the imperialist states . . . are resorting more and more frequently to military action to put down the growing national liberation movement" in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The military section of the Moscow parade differed little from those in recent years. No new equipment was shown, and the emphasis was on missiles and armor, a common practice for several years. Malinovsky claimed at one point that the USSR now has "perfect weapons which excel anything an army has ever had." Although this could be taken to refer to weapons as yet unrevealed, it is more likely that he was merely praising the general quality of Soviet military equipment. In Berlin, the East German Army displayed 21 T-54 medium tanks and about 15 armored amphibious tanks, the first seen in its possession.

Malinovsky's warning that West Germany is the main point of military peril in Europe reflects the increasing attention given to Germany by the bloc. A communiqué issued on 28 April at the end of Rumanian leader Gheorghiu-Dej's visit to Warsaw called for the "fastest possible" conclusion of the German peace treaty and transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized free city. The communiqué also warned that the bloc would sign a separate peace treaty if the Western powers continue to "endlessly delay the conclusion of a treaty with the two German states."

Khrushchev also took up the German and Berlin issues in his conversation with West German Ambassador Kroll on 24 April. He used this talk to offset the impression that he was committed to a showdown on these issues before the Soviet party congress in October. He claimed that originally he planned to call for a settlement of the problem during the first quarter of 1961 but that he had decided to give President Kennedy more time.

While strongly emphasizing his determination to settle the issues during 1961, Khrushchev told Kroll that the bloc had set no precise deadlines and would be willing to wait until the West German elections and "possibly" until after the party congress before convening a bloc peace conference to sign a separate treaty with East Germany. Such restraint, however, would depend on no "unexpected" Western moves, such as a Bundestag meeting in Berlin.

As to the consequences of a separate peace treaty, Khrushchev stated that the Western powers would have to make arrangements with East Germany to maintain their communications with Berlin and that he would advise Ulbricht to abolish the air corridors. In response to Kroll's statement that this could bring about an international crisis, Khrushchev said he was convinced that the West would not risk a general nuclear war over Berlin. He said that he expected the West to resort to economic sanctions and possibly a break in diplomatic relations, but that the USSR could cope with such measures.

Khrushchev assured Kroll that the prospect of a showdown over Berlin "need not affect negotiations already begun with the US," but added that he was skeptical about the outcome of any such negotiations. Although Khrushchev failed to mention prior East-West negotiations before a bloc peace conference, his willingness to give the President more time suggests that he still expects a further round of negotiations. His readiness to wait until next fall also suggests that he is aware that the process of arranging new talks will take longer than he anticipated last fall and that negotiations could extend beyond the party congress.

 

65. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State/1/

Moscow, May 4, 1961, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-461. Secret; Priority.

2710. Eyes only Secretary. Gromyko called me in this afternoon and reading from paper made following statement. NSK would have liked personally to have talked with me and to have set forth certain considerations in connection with confidential letter from President Kennedy/2/ that I had transmitted to him in Novosibirsk. However he is leaving Moscow and expects return only by May 20. Soviet Govt and NSK deplore fact that discord has occurred of late between our two countries in connection with events regarding Cuba. He would not like to repeat what was said by Soviet Govt and NSK personally with regard to Cuba and US policies concerning that country. Position of Soviet Govt on this question was repeatedly outlined by NSK personally including occasion of his talk with me in Novosibirsk. SovGov regrets that the above-mentioned events have taken place and also regrets events in Laos as they have declared to USG in setting forth views of SovGov on Laotian problem. But if Soviet Union and US do not consider that there is an unbridgeable gulf between them, then both should draw appropriate conclusion from this, namely that we live on one planet and therefore ways should be found to settle appropriate questions and to build up our relations. In other words bridges have to be built which would link our countries. This viewpoint is held by SovGov. Initiative displayed in regard to a meeting by President Kennedy met with favorable attitude on part of SovGov and at present it would like to know whether or not proposal by President Kennedy on meeting and exchange of views remains valid or whether proposal made is being revised. SU still thinks above-mentioned initiative is useful for both countries.

/2/See Document 41.

Events that took place lately yet again confirm necessity of contacts between US and SU including contacts at highest level. Soviet Union owes debt in sense they have not yet replied by letter to confidential letter of President Kennedy in which was formulated proposal on meeting. Before sending reply they naturally would like to know how matters will take shape now. If President as hitherto favors meeting and exchange of views on relevant problems that is one thing. If for some reason he now holds different viewpoint that is quite another matter and Soviet Union would regret if that is so. Gromyko said he would be grateful if I could inform him on this matter whenever I am in position to do so.

Thompson

 

66. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State/1/

Moscow, May 4, 1961, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-461. Secret; Priority.

2714. Eyes only Secretary. Much hope that President will maintain plan for meeting NSK. Recognize there will be problem domestic public opinion but believe meeting could be divorced from recent events by revealing date of original proposal. Moreover on questions of Congo, Laos and Cuba President has made clear his firm stance in face of Soviet actions. Believe meeting would be useful for following among other reasons:

1) On short range, prospect of meeting will cause more reasonable approach by Soviets on such matters as Laos, testing, and disarmament;

2) On long range, Soviets will be taking major decisions at Party Congress for which preparations now in progress and it is to our interest to influence these decisions;

3) Mere fact of meeting will exacerbate Soviet-Chinese relations;

4) Believe Soviets correct in stating that recent events make meeting even more necessary;

5) Consider on balance meeting would strengthen position of US before world opinion and put US in better position to take strong stand on Berlin and other questions;

6) Despite recent sharp exchanges and Soviet actions do not believe there has been any major change in Soviet policy or Khrushchev's intentions. While it has always been clear that Soviets seek communization of world Khrushchev continues advocate peaceful means. Essential point of exercise would be to further President's policy of recognizing basic conflict of interest between us but endeavoring to avoid or minimize confrontation of two great powers in military sense. In this connection at risk being considered apologist suggest we should keep in mind that in recent trouble spots; Iraq, Congo, Cuba and so far as I am informed Laos, Soviets did not initiate crisis but followed their usual policy of taking advantage of opportunities.

Thompson

 

67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, May 6, 1961, 1:03 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-461. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen, cleared by Kohler, and approved by Rusk.

1919. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Your 2710 and 2714./2/ You should tell Gromyko that the President agrees with the considerations which Gromyko set forth to you concerning a meeting. The President remains desirous of meeting Khrushchev. He hopes that it will be possible to adhere to the original schedule of early June in Vienna but is not at the moment in a position to make a firm decision on this point. However, he will be able to give a definite reply prior to Mr. Khrushchev's return to Moscow on May twentieth.

/2/Documents 65 and 66.

FYI--In addition to the problem of the relationship of the meeting with Khrushchev to the De Gaulle visit, there are, as you indicated in your comments, a number of other considerations which the President must have in mind before making a definite commitment. Chief among these is the situation in regard to Laos but we should well before May twentieth have a clearer indication of the probable course of events. If for example the Laos subject is in the process of pacific negotiations at the proposed Geneva Conference, this would be a circumstance which would render the meeting easier from the point of view of public opinion here and abroad. If on the other hand the conference does not take place and the situation is again exacerbated in Laos, it would not be desirable for the President to be meeting with Khrushchev.

The President is taking up in a confidential personal message with De Gaulle/3/ the question as to his reaction in the light of the Paris visit to a meeting with Khrushchev immediately thereafter and this will be an important initial factor in the President's ultimate decision. What you should seek to convey to Gromyko is the President's continued desire to meet Khrushchev and leave no impression of any holdback in this respect but merely emphasize that there are a number of considerations which have to be examined before a definite date can be set.

/3/The text of this message, dated May 5, was transmitted to Thompson in telegram 1920 to Moscow, May 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-KE/5-661)

For domestic political reasons the President would have to be in a position of indicating certain specific subjects that he was to discuss with Khrushchev. Obviously one would be the nuclear test talks since according to present plans they will still be in session in early June. Since it would be desirable to have more than one subject, we would appreciate any suggestions that you have concerning other questions which President might discuss with Khrushchev, with some prospect of progress, to be publicly announced along with test ban topic. The fact of public announcement would obviously exclude a number of questions in particular Berlin, but possible upcoming disarmament talks apart from test ban might be conceivable./4/ End FYI.

/4/In telegram 2736, May 6, received in the Department of State at 3:14 p.m., May 6, Thompson reported that he had given Gromyko the message at 3:30 that afternoon. (Ibid., 611.61/5-661)

Rusk

 

68. Editorial Note

The opening of the International Conference on Laos in Geneva, scheduled for May 12, 1961, was postponed in order to resolve a dispute between the West and the USSR on the seating of Laotian delegations. In telegram Secto 118 to the Department of State, May 14, Secretary of State Rusk reported that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko continued his insistence that the Pathet Lao delegation be one of the three Laotian delegations seated. Gromyko did agree, however, to a statement that all three were delegations "from" and not "of" Laos. Rusk recommended that the United States agree to the opening of the conference on that basis, though taking every opportunity to make clear that the U.S. considered the Royal Laotian Government the only government in Laos. The conference convened on May 16. For text of telegram Secto 118, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXIV, pages 193-195.

In telegram Secto 164 to the Department of State, May 17, Rusk, expressed concern that events were moving more rapidly in Laos than had been expected "with respect to a coalition government which we will not like." He noted that the "Commies in Geneva are full of confidence and appear to be utterly relaxed about achieving their goals in Laos." Their speeches were moderate and their demeanor friendly. "I find it difficult to believe that this is because they want a neutral Laos as we see it." For text, see ibid., pages 199-200.

In telegram Confe 65 from Geneva, May 27, Averell Harriman, then acting head of the U.S. delegation at the Conference on Laos, decried continued Soviet stalling tactics at the conference and increasingly active fighting in Laos. "Soviet maneuvers have placed us in exact position we earlier declined to accept, namely, attending conference before cease-fire effective." For text, see ibid., pages 209-210.

 

69. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, May 16, 1961, 10 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-1661. Secret. Drafted by Davis and approved in the White House on May 22.

SUBJECT
Khrushchev's Letter of May 12 to President Kennedy/2/ and Possibility of Meeting in Vienna, June 3 and 4

PARTICIPANTS
The President of the United States
Mr. Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Ambassador Menshikov, Soviet Embassy
Mr. Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Soviet Embassy

At his request, Ambassador Menshikov called on the President at 10:00 a.m. today and read to him from an English translation made by the Soviet Embassy the text of a letter dated May 12 from Chairman Khrushchev in reply to the President's letter of February 22,/2/ which was delivered to Mr. Khrushchev by Ambassador Thompson in Novosibirsk on March 9.

/2/See Document 35.

After Ambassador Menshikov had finished reading the text, the President commented that the last time the subject had been broached was in the conversation of Ambassador Thompson with Foreign Minister Gromyko and he had indicated a reply would be forthcoming by May 20 when Mr. Khrushchev was expected to return to Moscow. At that time it was not clear when the conference on Laos would begin and when the international atmosphere would be conducive to a meeting or whether it should be put off. Now there have been these press reports about the possibility of a meeting. The President said he would wish to talk to Secretary Rusk before giving a definite reply but he would expect that in the next two days a reply might be given.

The President added that if it is decided to go ahead with the meeting Vienna is a place which appeared to be mutually agreed upon and he would expect to leave late in the afternoon on Friday, June 2, from Paris and would stay in Vienna Saturday and Sunday, leaving Vienna either Sunday night or Monday morning. Secretary Rusk would accompany him.

The President continued that if he is going ahead on this meeting, one of the problems would be how this meeting should be described in public statements. It would not be useful to say that we are going to reach agreement on Laos or a nuclear testing ban because if we could not reach agreement then nothing would come out of the meeting. It would perhaps be best to emphasize that this would provide an opportunity for a general exchange of views.

The President remarked that he had only met Mr. Khrushchev once before and that was as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the occasion of Mr. Khrushchev's visit to this country. The President was doubtful that any agreement on Laos or on nuclear testing would be reached by the time of his visit to Europe and it was important that the hopes of the peoples not be disappointed by false expectation of concrete results from a meeting. He wanted to better the present situation and not worsen it. In this connection, the President made a passing reference to reports which had already appeared in the press speculating on the possibility of a meeting between himself and Khrushchev.

Ambassador Menshikov slyly remarked that nothing had appeared in the Soviet press, as the President knew. The President responded that he had felt impelled to inform President de Gaulle of the possibility of this meeting/3/ in view of his official state visit to France, that inevitably this involved others becoming aware of this possibility, and, moreover, he believed that Chairman Khrushchev had informed Walter Lippmann during the latter's recent visit to Moscow./4/ The important thing was that an accurate impression be given in any public statements which will be made as to the purpose of the meeting, which, in his view, would be for a general exchange of opinions on many issues which, of course, involve the interests of other countries and could not be the subject of negotiation or agreement between just the US and the USSR.

/3/See Document 67 and footnote 2 thereto.

/4/Walter Lippmann's articles on his April 11 interview with Khrushchev appeared in The Washington Post, April 17-19, 1961. The Embassy in Moscow transmitted a 1-page summary of the conversation in telegram 2472 from Moscow, April 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 961.6122/4-1161)

Ambassador Menshikov quoted from the final paragraphs of Khrushchev's May 12 letter referring to a general exchange of views.

The President then went on to remark that if we cannot accomplish anything concrete on a nuclear test ban, it would be doubtful that we could make progress on disarmament; that it was easier to make progress on a nuclear testing treaty and we should try to make progress there. One of the reasons the President desired to talk with Khrushchev was that he believed the nuclear test talks were crucial negotiations and if we failed it could not help affect progress on other matters, particularly disarmament.

There was then some discussion as to what Ambassador Menshikov should say to the press who were waiting in great numbers outside. It was agreed that Ambassador Menshikov should merely say that he had delivered a message from Chairman Khrushchev in reply to the President's letter of February 22. The White House would confirm this but not add anything until there had been a reply on the subject of a possible meeting with Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna. In this connection, the President pointed out that we would have to talk with the Austrians and that he desired to talk with Secretary Rusk before giving a final reply. If it was decided to meet in Vienna, it would be desirable to discuss the type of public statement which might be issued by the US and Soviet Governments.

Ambassador Menshikov remarked that the President had used the word "if". The President replied that he remembered that in the last conversation between Ambassador Thompson and Gromyko that the Ambassador had said we would communicate our final decision before May 20 when Mr. Khrushchev was expected back in Moscow; that the final decision would depend on the international climate at the time; that a month ago the atmosphere was not as satisfactory as it had been previously or, perhaps, as it was today. However, the President would talk with Secretary Rusk and he would hope that a response could be made within the next day or so.

[Continue with Documents 70-79]

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