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1961-1963 Volume V Soviet Union |
70. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts/1/
Washington, May 18, 1961, 3:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-1861. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Boster and cleared with Davis, Bohlen, Guthrie (SOV), and the White House. Also sent to the Mission at Berlin.
1823. At 10 AM Washington time Friday, May 19, President plans announce meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna June 3 and 4. If this announcement made,/2/ missions may in their discretion draw on following background in discussions with Government and public leaders where appropriate.
/2/For text of the announcement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 569-570.
Purpose of meeting is to take advantage of convenient opportunity for first personal contact between two leaders and general exchange of views. Idea that such a meeting might be useful when international atmosphere was right first discussed through diplomatic channels earlier this year, but following developments in Laos and Cuba US had dropped idea from active consideration. Soviet Government recently reopened question of meeting and agreement was reached to proceed at this time.
Mission officials should emphasize, in any discussions they may have, that meeting will not seek to negotiate or reach agreement on major international problems which it is recognized involve the interests of many countries and on which there must be full consultation between US and its allies.
Bowles
71. Editorial Note
On February 21, 1961, Assistant Secretary of State Kohler sent Secretary of State Rusk a memorandum asking him to raise at a Cabinet meeting the question of Soviet Ambassador Menshikov's appointments with U.S. officials. In reply Rusk asked whether the U.S. Government might request the Ambassador to make all such appointments through the Department of State and how this practice conformed to Soviet procedures in Moscow. In an April 12 memorandum Kohler replied that Soviet practice was to conduct all appointments through either the Foreign Ministry or Ministry of Foreign Trade, but that in recent years direct contacts with Soviet officials had expanded, and the Department of State was "most reluctant to provide any excuse for a reversal of this trend." To this end he suggested raising at Cabinet level coordination of Menshikov's appointments "in some fashion." (All in Department of State, Central Files, 601.6111/4-1261)
Under Secretary of State Bowles discussed the problem with McGeorge Bundy following the Cabinet meeting on April 20 and proposed that the question be handled in a memorandum from the Department of State to the White House suggesting that individual memoranda be sent to each Cabinet member outlining the procedure for making appointments with Menshikov. (S/S memorandum, May 3; ibid., 601.6111/5-361) On May 20 the Department of State sent the memorandum to the White House asking that any official having "any discussion" with Menshikov provide the Department of State with a record of the conversation and offering to make available for such meetings, officers proficient in Russian. (Ibid., 601.6111/5-2061)
72. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/
PMK-A/1
Washington, May 23, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1905. Secret. Drafted by Armitage and cleared by Kohler. In preparation for the Summit meeting the Department of State drafted five series of papers. Series A: General; Series B: Position Papers; Series C: Bilateral Issues; Series D: Background Papers; and Series E: Reference Papers. Complete sets of these papers, which were transmitted to the White House on May 27, are ibid.
PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KHRUSHCHEV
Vienna, June 3-4, 1961Scope Paper
I. U.S. Objectives
A. To improve the prospects of finding an acceptable and workable basis for improving relations with the Soviet Union.
B. To impress on Khrushchev our capacity and resolve to resist Soviet and communist encroachments if he is unwilling to seek a satisfactory basis for better relations and to stress the dangers attendant on continued, sharp confrontations between the two countries.
C. To communicate to Khrushchev the President's understanding and grasp of the world situation, in an historical as well as immediate sense, and his capacity and intent to influence the course of world events.
D. To gain a clearer understanding of Khrushchev as a man and of Soviet policy and intentions.
II. Khrushchev
A. Khrushchev will probably seek--directly or indirectly-- to convey and gain acceptance of the following view of the world situation:
1. The world is divided into two power systems, the communist and the capitalist.
2. The communist system is firmly established beyond challenge in the bloc countries and the processes of political change can take place only in the non-communist countries.
3. The balance of world power has shifted and is shifting toward the communist system, the Sino-Soviet bloc.
4. The Soviet Union does not wish to advance that process by war, that is, a major global nuclear war.
5. Neither can the capitalist powers afford to inhibit that process by resort to war.
6. The capitalist powers must recognize the "realities" of the world situation, i.e., the power shift toward the bloc, and accommodate themselves to changes which accord with the "will of the people," i.e., Laos, Cuba, the Congo.
7. Part of this "realistic" approach requires the recognition that no significant decision on international questions anywhere in the world or in international bodies can be taken without accommodating the views of the Soviet Union.
8. The process of contention between the systems can be carried on by all means short of war, i.e., overt war across international borders, without the risk of global war and without serious effect on U.S.-Soviet relations or the prospects of disarmament.
9. Those relations should be improved; there are no important bilateral differences impeding them; but the U.S. should remove its discriminatory trade policies and withdraw from foreign bases threatening the USSR.
10. The Soviet Union is seriously interested in disarmament but not control and inspection systems without actual disarmament; its proposals are comprehensive and control provisions could be worked out if the Western powers accepted the Soviet proposals.
11. The problems of Berlin and a peace treaty are urgent and should be solved.
B. Khrushchev probably is confident that the communist chances in the long run are good. However, he has a healthy respect and probably a reasonably accurate understanding of the military power and productive capacity of the Western nations, particularly the United States. He, therefore, has little taste for risky adventures.
He believes that there is still room for steady communist gains. This belief stems in part from his doubt that the Western powers have the will or resolve to translate their resources into the elements of power sufficient to cope with the bloc and his doubt that they can find the basis for building effective non-communist political institutions in the under-developed countries. He, consequently, is led to the conclusion that by alternating pressure and overtures he can make the gains at the negotiating table and by shielding local Communist advances with Soviet power. He is also constantly conscious of the specter of growing Communist Chinese power and this gives him added reason to maintain his communication with the Western powers and to explore the terms of a possible accommodation with them.
There are indications that he is sufficiently concerned over the risks of nuclear war and sufficiently convinced of Soviet political capabilities abroad to be seriously interested in disarmament. However, he finds political capital in playing on the disarmament issue and has apparently not thought through the problems associated with disarmament in any meaningful way. He, therefore, has probably not reached conclusions on the terms under which various disarmament measures would be acceptable.
He will undoubtedly press hard his position on Berlin and a peace treaty with East Germany and will try to get some form of commitment to negotiate the Berlin question.
This meeting itself gratifies him and he may extend the President an invitation to visit the Soviet Union if the talks go reasonably well from his point of view.
III. Tactics
In an exchange of this type, particularly with so outspoken an leader as Khrushchev, it is not practicable to expect that the course of the talks can be charted in advance. However, the total content of the President's remarks to Khrushchev should convey the clear impression that essentially two broad alternatives are open to the Soviet Union. It can seek to encroach on the free world. In this event, force will surely be met with counter-force, the costly and dangerous arms race will be continued and probably accelerated and the risk of nuclear war will probably become acute. Alternatively, it can seek an accommodation of legitimate Soviet national interests with ours, reduce the intensity level of our confrontation, open up the prospect of arms limitation with its attendant benefits and broaden the area of mutually profitable cooperative endeavor. It should be borne in mind that current Soviet foreign policy which Khrushchev will espouse presupposes the charting of a course profitable to the Soviet Union between these two alternatives.
The tone of our approach should not be ultimative. It can emerge from the discussion of our approach to the vital problems of U.S.-Soviet relations as the realistic recognition of the logical course of events. We keep well to the forefront of the discussion our earnest desire and our readiness to build a basis for constructive relations and our conviction that this course is in the Soviet as well as our national interest. But we make it clear that our patience has already been severely tested and that we are determined that there be no Soviet illusion concerning our intent and capacity to resist communist encroachments by whatever means are needed.
Perhaps one convincing way to make the point is to stress the urgent need and our most serious desire for prompt agreements on disarmament measures and to insist throughout the talks that all other questions, including Berlin and Germany specifically, are secondary to this one. It should be made explicit that this does not mean that disarmament talks can proceed hopefully regardless of the state of political relations. On the contrary, it should be stressed that the acceptance, whether formal or tacit, of reasonably orderly and peaceful procedures for affecting political change and protecting national and human rights is fundamentally necessary to an atmosphere in which disarmament talks could be promising. Exchanges on this point will afford ample opportunity to convey our determination to meet communist incursions and to articulate our concept of a peaceful world community within which legitimate Soviet national interests can continuously be accommodated or negotiated.
The talks might well be opened with a discussion of the nuclear testing talks. This is a subject in which we have an immediate interest and a current tactical advantage; it serves to emphasize our interest in disarmament, and the Soviet tripartite proposals are both a matter of important concern to us and a favorable ground on which to criticize the Soviet world outlook and the dual nature of Soviet foreign policy.
The President's exposition and criticism of the Soviet world outlook and the reality of communist rule within individual countries will inevitably call forth a spirited if not heated rejoinder. Khrushchev's reply will doubtless be lengthy. In order to preserve time during the second day for an exposition of our view of a constructive world order, the discussion of matters more capable of solution and to reserve the possibility of ending the talks on a hopeful note, this sensitive topic should probably be brought up toward the end of the first day's conversation.
The second day would proceed from the discussion of divergences in beliefs to more immediate problems of courses of action: disarmament negotiations, the possibility of negotiations on Germany and Berlin, the provision for peaceful transition in the newly independent areas, and, if it is appropriate, cooperative endeavors in the fields of science and exchanges.
IV. Invitation to the Soviet Union
The President might say that he appreciates the invitation and would welcome the opportunity to visit the Soviet Union. Both he and Khrushchev appear to have heavy schedules for the immediate future. An improved outlook for U.S.-Soviet relations would be a desirable background for such a visit. As Khrushchev visited here in 1959, there would appear to be no need for a reciprocal invitation to him at this time.
V. Communiqué
It will be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid a joint communiqué. A draft communiqué which seeks to exclude language the Soviets might favor but which we wish to avoid has been prepared as a starter./2/ The final communiqué will have to be drafted toward the end of the talks.
/2/A copy of the draft, PMK-A/7a, is ibid.
73. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/
PMK-A/2
Washington, May 23, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1905. Secret. Drafted by Anderson and Armitage (SOV) and cleared by Kohler.
PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KHRUSHCHEV
Vienna, June 3-4, 1961Talking Points
Testing Talks
1. The U.S. attaches great importance to the prompt and successful conclusion of a testing agreement not only for itself but as a means of moving to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and particularly as providing evidence and precedent of U.S. and Soviet ability to reach agreement on an important issue and in the disarmament field and to create a favorable climate for moving forward in broader fields of disarmament. The consequences of failure are seriously adverse.
2. After many months of negotiations, the U.S. undertook thorough and serious review of its position, and the U.S. delegation returned to Geneva with proposals going a considerable way to meet the Soviet position. The President expected that agreement could be promptly reached; he still hopes it can.
3. The Soviet response has been disheartening. Not only has there been no Soviet attempt to negotiate seriously but the Soviet Union has withdrawn previous agreement on a single Administrator and has introduced a new political obstruction by its proposal for a tripartite Administrator.
4. A tripartite Administrator is not a negotiable proposal. It is totally unacceptable as it would make a control system unworkable by introducing political differences into every administrative and operational measure.
5. It is also wholly unnecessary. The political concerns of the parties are fully provided for in the Control Council and the United States went far to accommodate Soviet desires in its composition.
6. If the Soviet Union continues to base its position on this principle, there seems little hope for progress in broader disarmament negotiations. The U.S. is not prepared to sign any disarmament agreement with an inoperable administration.
7. It is just possible that Khrushchev will drop the tripartite administration proposal and propose a broad formula for settling the important remaining differences. Alternatively, he may ask for the President's suggestion. The President will need to be prepared to use such an opening to discuss the major issues and hopefully to move the talks toward agreement.
8. If Khrushchev's position is rigid and if--but only if--we have made a decision to resume testing in the absence of progress at the talks, the President should convey to Khrushchev, in whatever terms seem appropriate, the understanding that we regard resumption of testing as our only alternative if no agreement can now be reached.
World Situation
1. We reject the Soviet view of the world and particularly the shift of power to the bloc, and stress that for the USSR to act on it will mean an intensification of the arms race, a blow to the chances of disarmament and greater risk of the war all should seek to avoid.
2. The system of world Communist parties--and the program for action prescribed at the Moscow conference by representatives of the Soviet and eleven other bloc governments--constitute blatant interference in the internal affairs of the 69 other countries from which Communist delegates come, and are a major deterrent to world peace. To make this point we could probe Khrushchev's reaction were there a similar system of democratic parties with branches in bloc countries and we might detail the subversive Communist activities in South Viet-Nam.
3. We spell out the contradiction between Soviet national interest and the maintenance of the world Communist system, stressing our mutual paramount interest in disarmament and the economic well-being of our peoples and emphasizing in some detail how Communist China will pose this contradiction in more acute and explosive form in the not distant future. We also note the remote connection between Soviet national interest and the engagement of Soviet power in distant areas like Cuba, Laos and the Congo.
4. The Soviets can believe Communism will be adopted throughout the world, including the U.S. We believe that democracy will emerge in more and more countries, including the USSR. The important issue is what we each do to bring the objective about and whether we can create the political machinery to accommodate the processes of peaceful change.
5. Great restraint is required and we do not consider that the USSR has understood, appreciated or reciprocated the restraint we have shown in Eastern Europe where the political potential for our exploitation is as great as that of the colonial areas is for the Soviets.
6. Soviet endorsement of war in colonial areas (Moscow conference) and Soviet efforts to poison and exploit relations between newly independent countries or colonial areas and the Western powers can only lead to more instances of violence and greater danger the hostilities will expand past control. Past Communist successes should not obscure this truth. In fact, they have made our reaction more certain.
7. In our view the national interests of our countries are not directly involved in the character of the regimes in the newly independent countries--so long as the prospect is kept open for expression of the popular will.
8. We have no desire to exclude the Soviet Union from normal relations with the newly independent and under-developed countries--but we can not consider those relations fully normal so long as the USSR maintains its ties with local Communist parties and groups.
9. We detail our concept of a more stable order. Mention could be made of the broad scope for cooperative action--in outer space, in help to under-developed countries, in the fields of science and technology. If the talks have made the moment propitious, cooperative endeavor and expanded exchanges might be discussed in greater detail.
Disarmament
1. In the interest of their own security, the well-being of their people and the peace of the world the U.S. and the Soviet Union have a profound common interest in disarmament.
2. In the absence of agreements the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the greater rapidity with which delivery systems will operate, still greater risks will become probable.
3. The U.S. is prepared to disarm all its forces except for those required for internal security and any forces required to provide authorized security forces for the UN. Disarmament, however, is only one component of a peaceful world community ruled by law and providing for orderly processes of peaceful change and progress in this field must progress in disarmament, particularly in the later stages.
4. Given the advanced state of modern arms, disarmament is an extremely complex matter. It involves the most vital questions of national security. It is, therefore, imperative that it be carried out in a way which builds the confidence and trust of the participating parties at all stages. This is equally important for all sides; should serious doubts arise that the system was fulfilling its functions, the prospects for disarmament would be set back for a long time. Some discussion of the common interest in effective control would be in order. Some emphasis might be put on the vital necessity of the control system covering existing as well as surrendered armament and on the incompatibility of the present Soviet concept of military secrecy and a viable control system.
5. Consequently, the provisions for implementing and controlling disarmament must be worked out with care and thoroughness. It is not too much to say that the problem of disarmament is virtually the problem of the provisions for its effective and safeguarded execution. We regard no disarmament proposal as really serious that does not come to grips with the control problem.
6. We have suggested that the U.S. and the USSR exchange views prior to a resumption of negotiations. Agreement has now been reached to begin the discussion on June 19. We have made this suggestion for the purpose of attempting to arrive at an understanding on the basic framework in which disarmament negotiations should be conducted and on the negotiating forum. At the same time, we would like to discuss actions the two sides could take in order to minimize the dangers inherent in modern weapons systems. For our part, we have been seeking to introduce in our forces safety and precautionary devices aimed at reducing accidents or misinterpretation. However, there is a limit to what we can do unilaterally and we would hope to discuss what can be undertaken of a reciprocal nature.
7. We will have proposals to make when disarmament talks are resumed. The USSR will also presumably have proposals. We would hope that the negotiations could proceed promptly to a serious consideration of specific disarmament measures without lengthy delay in discussing the merits of the two approaches. Perhaps examination of the means of implementing both Soviet and allied proposals could proceed simultaneously.
8. We regard disarmament as a subject too serious to play politics with in the scheduled bilateral talks. We conceded to the Soviet position in order to get talks initiated in the Ten-Nation forum. While we regard disarmament as a concern of all powers, it is a subject for negotiation between the powers directly concerned. The commencement of negotiations should not be delayed by attempts to take them out of that context.
Germany-Berlin
1. As Khrushchev has pointed out, disarmament is the paramount question of our relations. Questions of Germany and Berlin are second-ary in comparison. They and the question of European security can be approached in a more promising context when progress is made in disarmament.
2. Aspects of the situation in Berlin and Germany are unsatisfactory to the Western powers as well as to the Soviet Union but nothing is intolerable to either; the security interests of the Soviet Union are not threatened.
3. The wisest course is to leave the situation alone until arms reduction makes solutions easier.
4. The association of West Germany in NATO and other forms of European integration should alleviate instead of exacerbate Soviet concern. West Germany has accepted significant limitations on its sovereignty and institutionalized the defensive nature of its armament.
5. Khrushchev may recall that by his menacing policy Stalin was primarily responsible for creating what he least desired, a coalition of Western European powers and the United States.
6. Khrushchev might seriously ponder the effect that unilateral Soviet moves in Germany might have. The restraints which Chancellor Adenauer has exercised in his conduct of German affairs should not be taken for granted--nor could the Soviet Union assume that Adenauer or his successors would be able to exercise them regardless of Soviet actions. Soviet moves might well make such policies untenable in Germany and might bring about the developments in Germany the USSR seeks most to avoid.
7. In Berlin the U.S. has undertaken firm commitments and obligations together with its allies. It must and will honor its commitments regardless of the cost.
8. If Khrushchev defends the "free city" proposal, the President might state that the U.S. is not prepared to make the fulfillment of its commitments dependent solely on the will of the Soviet Union.
9. As Khrushchev will doubtless press the matter, we should be prepared to say that we will undertake negotiation of the problems of Berlin and Germany at a suitable time, but only as part of a broader discussion of problems of concern to both of us.
Laos
1. There are a few reports intimating that the USSR intends to protract the Geneva Conference on Laos in order that Premier Khrushchev may seek to "settle" basic issues bilaterally in his talks with the President, despite the mutual understanding that these talks are only exchanges of views. Whether there is any real basis for such reports is unclear. However, it is probable that (a) a violent, military scuttling of the cease-fire by the Communists will not occur prior to June 3, (b) Premier Khrushchev will raise the problem of Laos in such a manner as to seek some U.S. "agreement" on ways to settle this problem, (c) the present Royal Lao Government under Prime Minister Boun Oum will still be in office, and (d) the Geneva Conference will still be under way.
2. The President might welcome both statements that the USSR, like the U.S., seeks a truly neutral Laos and USSR moves, in the capacity of co-Chairman, to seek a peaceful settlement through the present Conference. Since that Conference is in session for the expressed purpose of resolving the Laotian problem, it would be inappropriate to attempt to shift negotiations to the Vienna meeting. However, the President might note that the co-Chairmen's instructions to the ICC, which led to its recent return to Laos, stated the ICC's basic tasks would be, first, "fixing the cease-fire" and, secondly, exercising control over the execution of an agreement to be negotiated among the belligerent parties on questions related to the cease-fire. Despite these instructions, Pathet Lao represent-atives, in talks convened to discuss "questions connected with the cease-fire," insist that arrangements for a coalition government must be negotiated before cease-fire questions can be resolved. In the U.S. view, the USSR is in a key position, both by virtue of its contacts with the Pathet Lao and in its capacity as a co-Chairman, to persuade the Pathet Lao and Souvanna Phouma/2/ elements to negotiate agreements on questions related to the cease-fire promptly in order that the ICC may properly discharge the co-Chairmen's instructions.
/2/Prince Souvanna Phouma, leader of Laotian neutralists.
3. The U.S. agreed to attend the Geneva Conference on the express understanding that a properly verified cease-fire existed before the Conference was convened, and it was the assumption of the United States that the ICC would be able to carry out its continuing verification functions during the Conference in accordance with the instructions of the Geneva co-Chairmen to the ICC. The attempt of the Pathet Lao and Souvanna group negotiators at Ban Namone to introduce substantive discussions into the talks there as a precondition to negotiations on matters pertaining to the cease-fire is preventing the ICC from operating in the manner contemplated.
74. Editorial Note
In telegram 2887 from Moscow, May 24, 1961, Ambassador Thompson reported that the previous evening Chairman Khrushchev had told him that "if no agreement [is] reached on Berlin they [Soviet Union] would sign separate peace treaty in fall or winter after [West] German elections and probably after [Soviet] Party Congress. This would end our occupation rights and East Germans would control communications. He realized this would bring period of great tension but he was convinced would not lead to war." For text of telegram 2887, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XIV, pages 66-69.
75. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, May 25, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.6111/5-2561. Secret. Drafted by Edward I. Killham (SOV); concurred in by Bohlen, Tubby, Coombs, Whitman, Chayes, H, SCA, and S/EWC; and transmitted through and initialed by Bowles. None of the tabs is printed.
SUBJECT
United States Travel RestrictionsProblem
To determine whether we should revise our present restrictions on the travel of Soviet citizens in this country.
Background
In 1952, the United States retaliated against long-standing Soviet restrictions on the travel of American citizens in the USSR by requiring that Soviet officials in the United States give advance notification of travel outside the immediate area of New York and Washington. If the Department denied permission, the trip had to be cancelled. In 1955, the requirement was extended to all Soviet citizens other than those who were members of the UN Secretariat. Closed zones, modeled on those in existence in the USSR, were also established. This followed adoption by the NSC of NSC 5427 (Tab E)/2/ which provided that "restrictions should be placed upon diplomatic and official representatives of Soviet bloc countries in the United States on the basis of strict reciprocity for restrictions placed upon U.S. representatives in each Soviet bloc country."
/2/Not printed, but see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. VIII, footnote 9, p. 1246.
On November 11, 1957, the United States proposed to the Soviet Government that closed zones be abolished on the basis of reciprocity./3/ Subsequently, we have repeated that proposal several times and have also suggested partial elimination, again on a reciprocal basis. The United States last repeated these offers in a note of January 6, 1961/4/ which made a number of changes in the American closed zones in response to the Soviet changes announced in August 1959.
/3/For text of this note, see Department of State Bulletin, December 9, 1957, pp. 934-935.
/4/For text of this note, see ibid., January 23, 1961, pp. 119-120.
The Soviet Government has never replied officially to these proposals although there have been unofficial intimations from Soviet officials that the question was being studied. Ambassador Menshikov's statement to you on February 3/5/ that his government has tried several times to approach the matter of lessening travel restrictions but had been prevented by unfavorable developments in its foreign relations is consistent with these earlier intimations. A summary statement concerning the history of the restrictions is attached (Tab B).
/5/See Document 21.
Discussion
From time to time the Department has been under public pressure to abolish or reduce travel restrictions. The principal thrust of this pressure has been against individual restrictions which have prevented Soviet citizens from traveling to a particular area. The sources of the pressure have usually been American citizens who were inconvenienced by the inability of Soviet citizens to travel to their areas. There has also been a certain amount of pressure from individuals and groups which feel as a matter of principle that travel restrictions are alien to our way of life and should be abolished entirely.
The restrictions have on occasion been the source of difficulties for us by complicating the administration of the East-West Exchanges Program. Our attempts to cope with the situation have bred numerous exceptions, some of which we have been able to employ to gain reciprocal exemptions from the Soviet side. With regard to the Soviet restrictions on our Embassy staff in Moscow, however, the restrictions have been of only limited utility as a bargaining tool.
It should be noted here that the Soviet authorities sometimes exercise a certain amount of flexibility in permitting American exchange visitors and tourists to visit areas that are formally closed. As a consequence, these American visitors receive the impression that the Soviet restrictions are less onerous than they actually are. Also, the recent abandonment of advance censorship of the dispatches of foreign correspondents in the USSR indicates some sensitivity to our complaints over this practice and may presage similar steps in the field of travel.
Ambassador Thompson has previously opposed elimination of travel restrictions for exchange visitors because of his belief that important Soviet visitors are probably those most annoyed by the limitations. Such visitors, he has pointed out, are in all likelihood raising their influential voices against restrictions in the USSR. The Ambassador has now stated, however, that while up to now he has not advocated an exemption for Soviet exchange visitors, he would not oppose such action and believes it might enhance our overall position on exchanges with the Soviet Union.
Substantial easing of our travel restrictions at this time may call forth strong protests from some parts of Congress and public opinion which may express concern for its effect on security. The FBI may also oppose any significant lessening of the restrictions on the grounds that this would make their counterintelligence task more difficult.
On balance, it appears that we might gain some advantages if we could advance a sufficiently dramatic proposal for reduction of restrictions that would, simultaneously, protect our security interests. It is even conceivable that such a proposal could prod the Soviet Government into some easing of its restrictions on American travel in the USSR. In any case, it must be admitted that our efforts over the course of the past six years to use our travel restrictions as an instrument with which to exert pressure for a lessening of Soviet restrictions have been largely ineffective. Moreover, the passage of time has resulted in a blurred impression abroad of the responsibility for the initial imposition of travel restrictions. This has tended to remove any incentive the Soviet Government might once have had to consider a reciprocal reduction of restrictions. While we would weaken somewhat our ability to get reciprocal treatment in the negotiation of exchange itineraries, this disadvantage seems outweighed by the advantages.
If we should decide to withdraw some or all of our travel restrictions, there are three general possibilities to be considered.
1. We could withdraw the restrictions entirely, abolishing the closed zones as well as the notification requirement for Soviet officials. While this would undoubtedly have the greatest advantage from the propaganda standpoint, we do not believe it would succeed in inducing the Soviets reciprocally to lift their restrictions and we would have lost all of our leverage for protecting the ability of our officials to travel in the Soviet Union. Further, we would lose all control over the travel activities of the Soviet Embassy and UN Mission officials.
2. We could abolish closed zones for all but retain the notification requirement for permanently assigned officials. This would have nearly as much propaganda advantage as would lifting the restrictions altogether (since it is the closed zone concept which is the most controversial aspect of our travel regulations) and yet would enable us to retain effective control over Soviet travel through our ability to deny any given travel request under the notification system. While there would be a very slight security disadvantage from the fact that there would no longer be specified closed zones, it should be noted that the closed zone system offers very little real security in any event as the Soviets are able to obtain information through many sources, including other bloc travelers not subject to closed zone regulations and from American Communist agents.
3. We could abolish the closed zones for exchange visitors and tourists but retain them for officials, who would, in addition, continue to be subject to the notification procedure. This would also bring some propaganda benefit, and would largely remove the present friction with university and exchange-minded groups. (It is true that some friction may continue in those cases in which the Department decides to control the itineraries of visiting Soviet nationals for security or other reasons, but this should be manageable.) At the same time, it would enable us to retain our present controls over the most important categories of Soviets, the officials permanently assigned here, and would also probably retain for us some leverage in protecting the travel of our own officials in the Soviet Union. Since exchange groups travel on the basis of mutually agreed itineraries, control of such travel would remain in our hands and access to any part of the country could be denied if this were thought desirable for security reasons. As the itineraries of Soviet tourists in the United States are arranged by American travel agencies, we would also maintain effective control over such travel. Soviet buyers and other "businessmen" would continue to be controlled, as they are now, via the advance itineraries they are required to submit.
For travel control purposes we regard Soviet correspondents, Intourist and Amtorg representatives, whether or not permanently assigned, as officials. They are subject to the same notification requirements as Soviet Embassy and UN Mission personnel. This category also includes Soviet citizens who apply for visas in order to visit Soviet officials on a "personal" basis. This corresponds to the position in the USSR of American correspondents, American Express Company representatives and personal guests of American officials.
It has been suggested that, if we decide to reduce our restrictions, we do so only for a stipulated period of perhaps one year, with the understanding that they would be resumed if the Soviet Government failed to respond to our initiative. This appears to us seriously to reduce the impact we might achieve with such an overture by casting doubt on our sincerity. At the same time, it seems unlikely that it would appreciably strengthen our bargaining position. Were the Soviet Government to fail to ease its own restrictions, we should have to reinstitute our own with the negative political effect this would have. It would seem preferable not to lift the restrictions at all rather than to go through this procedure.)
Conclusion
We believe that the third alternative is the most advantageous of the three and recommend your approval of it. We would retain virtually the same degree of effective control over Soviet travel as we do now, while removing the greatest source of friction with American groups. This alternative also preserves our bargaining position on strictly official travel which may be of assistance in attempting to ensure reciprocity for our officials in the USSR while, at the same time, enabling us to gain an important propaganda advantage. We could announce such a decision as another modest but forward-looking step in the direction of more normal relations with the Soviet Government and invite it to respond to our initiative.
Recommendations
1. That you approve our recommendation that we abolish our system of closed zones for Soviet exchange visitors and tourists./6/
2. That you sign the attached letters to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of Justice and Defense requesting their comments on our suggested memorandum to the President (Tab A)./7/
/6/According to a note attached to the source text, Rusk neither approved nor disapproved this recommendation, presumably because his approval was not necessary until it was concurred in by other agencies.
/7/None of these letters, which were transmitted on June 9, is printed, but see footnote 2, Document 184.
76. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/
PMK-D/2
Washington, May 25, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1905. Confidential. Drafted by John P. Shaw (RSB) and cleared by John Keppel (RSB), Allan Evans (INR), and Guthrie (SOV).
PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KHRUSHCHEV
Vienna, June 3-4, 1961BACKGROUND PAPER
Soviet Aims and Expectations
Summary
Khrushchev will regard the Vienna talks as far more important than a probing of the President's views. In discussing foreign relations in general, Khrushchev will expound the Soviet line on peaceful coexistence, stressing in particular the need for both sides to avoid actions which could produce nuclear war and the thesis that the US must draw appropriate conclusions from the growth of Soviet power. He will seek specific agreements, and will expect that the conference outcome will set the pattern for Soviet diplomacy for some months to come. Khrushchev would prefer that the talks end on a note of accord, and may make some conciliatory gestures for this reason. But his attachment to this aim will depend primarily on the outcome of the talks on major issues. Probably Khrushchev's foremost aim will be to obtain some commitment to hold resumed negotiations on Berlin and Germany. Short of a categorical rejection of any further negotiations on Berlin, Khrushchev would probably be willing to accept considerably less than his optimum demands on conference arrangements. Khrushchev's approach to disarmament questions is less predictable, but the possibility of modifications in the present rigid Soviet position on a test ban agreement or general disarmament cannot be excluded.
Introduction
The Vienna talks will be the culmination of a procession of Soviet approaches--some made as early as last November--for a meeting between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy. This record leaves little doubt of Khrushchev's keen interest in the meeting.
The record also contains clear pointers to the topics the Soviet leader will want to discuss. He will stress the need--
(a) to arrive at an early, negotiated "interim" settlement of the Berlin question,
(b) to reach an understanding on various issues relating to disarmament and security,
(c) to "slow down" the arms race,
(d) to base US-Soviet relations on the principles of "peaceful coexistence" Soviet style, and
(e) to expand US-Soviet trade.
Khrushchev may also invite the President to visit the Soviet Union, and despite his intimations to the contrary, may raise the questions of Cuba and Laos. And, of course, he will wish to sound out President Kennedy as a leader, to test the man against impressions and hypotheses formed by Soviet diplomats and propagandists.
While this much is clear, these matters are of such scope and elasticity that they give Khrushchev considerable leeway in deciding how to play his cards. Before examining these particulars, it is useful to analyze several trends in Soviet policy which will have a bearing on Khrushchev's approach to the conference.
Trends and Pressures in Soviet Policy
Soviet diplomacy over the past year has shown marked inconsistencies. These inconsistencies have been partly the result of immediate circumstances, but in almost every instance they also reflect certain deeper, inherent features of present-day Soviet foreign policy.
In the first instance, "flexibility" is the hall-mark of Khrushchev's style. This flexibility takes shape in several ways. But most pertinent here is the tactic of alternating assertive and détente phases in the expectation that the West can be induced to yield positions peacefully through negotiations in a period of détente by virtue of the pressures that led up to it. Khrushchev's handling of the Berlin issue can be explained to an important degree in these terms.
Beyond this contrived ambivalence, there is also a true inconsistency in Khrushchev's diplomacy which has been increasingly discernible in recent years. The implications of the nuclear age, the political isolation in which Stalin's rigid policies placed the USSR and the communist movement, and internal requirements of the Soviet regime, compelled Stalin's successors to develop a new look in foreign policy--a strategy based on minimizing the risks of nuclear war, consolidation of Soviet holdings in Eastern Europe, a paternalistic alliance (where possible) with the forces of nationalism in the underdeveloped world, a generally gradualist approach to the goal of bringing communist parties to power, and more open and normal state relations between the West and the USSR.
On the other hand, the USSR's acquisition of a growing strategic strike force and increasing economic power have lent a new, assertive impulse to Soviet policies in recent years. Khrushchev maintains that the change in the world "correlation of forces" to the USSR's advantage should compel the West to recognize the "reality" of irrevocable communist rule in Eastern Europe, to "normalize" such anomalies as West Berlin and the unrecognized status of East Germany, and to refrain from "counter-revolution" (intervention) in the face of communist advances outside the bloc.
Both of these trends are compatible with the Soviet understanding of that elastic concept, peaceful coexistence. And Khrushchev would like to have the best of each. He seems to hope that by incessant though relatively unprovocative pressures (primarily political) he can consolidate and extend Soviet influence, particularly in the underdeveloped world. At the same time, he seems to hope that when these pressures do arouse adverse reactions, he can minimize the military risks (in relations with the US) and the political liabilities (in relations with nationalist neutral governments). But a harmonious blending of these approaches is not always possible, even in the day-to-day functioning of Soviet diplomacy. Over the long run, these two trends hold profoundly different implications for Soviet relations with the free world.
Finally, even deeper contradictions flow from the dual role the Soviet leaders play as rulers of the USSR and heads of the communist world. In the former role, their primary concerns are the security and the political-economic well-being of the Soviet state. But the impulses these concerns lend to Soviet policy often are circumscribed or nullified by the obligations and loyalties assumed by the USSR as center of the bloc and communist movement. This factor is most conspicuous in Soviet relations with Communist China, not only because of mutual obligations but because Peiping's challenge from the left to Soviet leadership of the communist world imposes upon the Soviet leaders a need to prove their militancy if they are to hold the support of other communist parties. At the heart of the matter are the conflicting national interests of the USSR and Communist China (as defined by the communist rulers) and the difficulty of reconciling the divergent policies and views of these two communist superpowers in a political system based on the proposition that there is a single source of authority and truth.
Pressures arising out of the Sino-Soviet dispute have been an important consideration behind the assertiveness characterizing Soviet foreign policy over the past year. They may well influence Khrushchev's behavior at Vienna. Still, Communist China by no means has a veto--whether direct or indirect--over Soviet policies. In recent months, the USSR has continued to pursue policies which, in several specific instances, run directly counter to Chinese Communist interests.
This ambivalence is nowhere better illustrated than at the Geneva test ban negotiations. There is little doubt that Moscow's desire to inhibit Communist China's acquisition of nuclear weapons has been one important reason why the Soviets have seriously entertained the idea of a supervised nuclear test ban. And there is equally little doubt that Peiping's ambition to become a nuclear power is one important reason why the prospects for a test ban agreement have dimmed during the resumed session of the conference.
General Approach
Despite the agreement to keep the Vienna meeting informal, Khrushchev will regard these talks as far more important than a mere probing of President Kennedy's views. His own position convinces him of the importance of having the ear of the man in charge, and he will want to impress upon the President his views as to how US-Soviet relations, and the affairs of the world, should be governed. He probably will seek specific agreements, if only to prove to his own audiences that his summit diplomacy pays off. And he will expect that the conference outcome--both the particulars and the general atmosphere--will set the pattern for the style of Soviet diplomacy for some months to come.
Khrushchev will come to Vienna in a confident mood, his confidence swelled by the events in Laos, in Cuba, and in outer space, and by the general growth of Soviet power. But it would be a mistake to overestimate this confidence. Khrushchev's vacillation over pressing the Berlin issue during the past year indicates an awareness of the potential dangers involved. He might well feel that a vigorous US response to a sharp Soviet challenge on Berlin would be more likely, not less so, in the wake of Cuba and Laos. There is also convincing evidence of Moscow's concern over its exposed position in Cuba, the growing US-Indian rapprochement, and increased US defense expenditures. In addition, Khrushchev has his own problems within the bloc--with Communist China and Albania--and internal problems as well.
During the talks, Khrushchev might, for effect, strike a note of anger and bluster--particularly in response to strong language on sensitive issues. But it seems likely that he will generally assume an attitude of reasonable firmness, coupled with a pitch for improved US-Soviet relations.
Khrushchev would prefer that the talks end on a note of accord, that they convey the beginning of a new period of relaxed international tensions. (However, mindful of the Sino-Soviet polemics of last year, Khrushchev will not be prepared to go so far in this regard as he did following his talks with President Eisenhower.) In addition to other, more general, considerations which are cited below, he probably believes that a détente atmosphere would establish a political deterrent of sorts to forceful US action against Cuba, and against Laos in the event the current negotiations break down. He might also hope that this atmosphere would take some of the steam out of an expanding US arms program. And, while not essential, an atmosphere of US- Soviet accord would harmonize with the type of Party Program Khrushchev evidently plans to present at the CPSU Congress next October (which it is anticipated will emphasize consumer welfare, and ultimate communist victory through economic competition and peaceful coexistence).
Khrushchev might be prepared to make some conciliatory gestures for the sake of outward harmony; he might even have "saved up" some lesser concessions for this purpose. But his attachment to harmony will not be without conditions; it will depend to a large extent on the outcome of the talks on the major substantive issues.
Specific Issues
Berlin and Germany. Probably Khrushchev's foremost aim will be to obtain some commitment to resume negotiations on Berlin and Germany. To buttress his position, he will probably reaffirm Soviet determination to conclude, if necessary, a separate treaty with the East Germans, and he will not refrain from generalized warnings about the consequences of such action. But he will stress the Soviet Union's desire to "solve" the Berlin question peacefully, through negotiations. Indeed, there is little doubt that negotiations represent Khrushchev's preferred approach. In the Soviet view, even a relatively limited negotiated agreement--provided it left the door open for further Soviet action at some future date--would be preferable to the uncertainties and potential dangers of unilateral Soviet action.
Khrushchev will restate the maximum Soviet position; the conclusion of a "two Germanies" peace treaty on the basis of which West Berlin would be converted into a "free city." If the discussions delve deeper into the substance of the Soviet demands, Khrushchev will probably outline a proposal along the lines of the May 9, 1960,/2/ aide-memoire, that is, an "interim agreement" containing first-step limitations on Allied rights in West Berlin and designed as well to enhance the international status of the East German regime. He might soften some of these provisions in an effort to induce agreement on another round of negotiations.
/2/For text of this Soviet proposal, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. IX, pp. 395-397.
It seems likely that Khrushchev will table a formal proposal for convening an East-West summit conference on Berlin and Germany. If Khrushchev meets with a categorical rejection of any further talks on Berlin, this will occasion an angry response which might well set the tone for the rest of the talks. Short of this, there would probably be considerable flexibility in Khrushchev's position. He would like to get a firm commitment to hold a conference this year; but he would be willing to settle for general agreement on a conference in the late fall of this year, after the Party Congress in October. Also, he would probably agree to expand the conference agenda to include other issues and he might not insist on holding the conference on the summit level. Khrushchev might even be satisfied with an equivocal US response to the proposal for a conference of this kind.
Disarmament and Security Matters. Khrushchev's approach to disarmament and related questions is less predictable. He will almost certainly dwell on these matters at some length, intending to set the stage for the forthcoming US-Soviet bilateral talks on disarmament. He will maintain that the bilateral talks should deal with matters of substance and not just procedure. He will stress, probably with real conviction, the need for disarmament and for the US and Soviet Union to make every effort to avoid a nuclear war. He will also express what is probably a genuine concern over the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the burdens of the arms race. He may use the occasion of privacy to indicate misgivings about Communist China's emergence as a nuclear power.
But the specifics of Khrushchev's future position are not clear. Regarding Moscow's current tactics at the nuclear test ban talks it is unclear whether they are designed merely to strengthen its bargaining position, or represent a firm decision not to conclude a separate agreement on a test ban. Very likely there is some indecision in the current Soviet attitude. If the Soviets have decided against a test ban treaty, it is doubtful that Khrushchev will so indicate directly during the Vienna meeting; he would prefer to have the US assume the onus of breaking off the test ban talks. (There are indications, however, that Khrushchev might argue that a test ban agreement, because of the extensive inspection requirements of the US and UK, will have to be related in some fashion to an agreement or negotiations on broader disarmament issues.) But if this decision has not been made, he may hope to bargain with the President over some of the remaining unresolved differences. In this case, he might agree to modify the Soviet demand for a three-man directorate; there is some evidence that the Soviet delegation to the test ban talks wishes to do so.
In discussing general disarmament, Khrushchev will try to impress upon the President the virtues of the Soviet single-treaty approach to "general and complete disarmament." He may stick rigidly to the Soviet position that this approach must be the basis for any resumed negotiations on general disarmament. But he may wish to sound out the President about the possibility of negotiations on what he must realize to be a more realistic disarmament package proposal, particularly one geared to the "Nth country" problem. Such a proposal could take the form of a separately negotiable "first-stage" agreement linked in only a declaratory sense to the goal of general and complete disarmament. Or, the Soviets might propose that negotiations on complete disarmament be conducted parallel with talks on other proposals. In any event, Khrushchev would probably be interested in hearing whatever new ideas the US may have concerning measures to check the spread of nuclear weapons.
Peaceful Coexistence. In this first encounter with the President, Khrushchev should be particularly disposed to expound the Soviet philosophy on East-West relations. This will include, at a minimum, the standard line on peaceful coexistence: that the existence of two world systems is an established fact; that these two systems must resolve their differences and prove which is superior through peaceful, economic means, and not by wars between states; that there can be no interference in the affairs of another state (i.e., the West must respect the authority of established communist regimes); but that there can be no cessation of the ideological struggle (i.e., communist subversion), as this is an objective law of history transcending the level of relations between states.
But Khrushchev will go beyond this familiar dialectical rationalization of imperialist intent and self-survival in the nuclear age. He will wish to establish the thesis that the US must draw appropriate conclusions from the growth of Soviet power. In particular, he will maintain that the West's acceptance of the permanence and legitimacy of the satellite regimes of Eastern Europe is a sina qua non of tranquil East-West relations. He will present parallel arguments for a "solution" of the West Berlin problem.
Khrushchev may not choose to bring up the question of Cuba, but if he does, he will probably raise it in connection with these connotations of peaceful coexistence. If so, he will warn the President of the dangers to peace involved in armed intervention in Cuba. But Khrushchev will be careful to avoid any embarrassing, specific commitment to render Castro all-out military support. Instead, he will take the line presented in his letter of April 22/3/ that US intervention in Cuba could justifiably, and might well, provoke similar action by the USSR along its periphery. Realizing Soviet inability to give Castro's Cuba effective military support short of running grave risks of nuclear war (which in the final analysis he would have no intention of doing), Khrushchev will concentrate on maximizing the political price for any overt US action.
/3/For text, see ibid., 1961-1963, vol. VI, pp. 10-16.
Khrushchev will probably maintain that as another consequence of the growth of Soviet power, the communist bloc should have a voice equal to that of the West in international councils. The question of the USSR's "troika" proposal for administering international organizations will inevitably arise in this connection, or in connection with the test ban talks. Khrushchev might vociferously voice his determination to press this proposal until it is fully accepted. But it would be a mistake to assume that the Soviet position on this question is immovable. The Soviets almost certainly expect this fight to be lengthy--one that will require compromises along the road if it is to be successful. And they will be prepared in the end to abandon their extreme demand if they become convinced that it will antagonize rather than win the neutralists to their side. To date, the Soviets have been notably unsuccessful in securing neutralist support--which is essential--for this proposal.
Laos. Apart from probable cautions concerning the consequences of SEATO intervention in Laos, any points Khrushchev chooses to raise regarding the Laotian situation will be conditioned by the course of negotiations in Geneva and Ban Namone. For this reason, an estimate now of Khrushchev's position on this major issue is particularly imprudent.
There is a possibility that Khrushchev might concede one or two non-essential points on the Laotian question (the Soviets have a fair amount of leeway) if he were pressed and felt that such concessions would promote an amicable outcome of the Vienna conference.
Other Issues. On his own initiative, or in response to US initiatives regarding other US-Soviet bilateral issues, Khrushchev might well raise the various standing Soviet proposals for expanded economic relations--in particular, the extension of US credits and most-favored-nation treatment to the USSR.
Unless the talks take an acrimonious turn, Khrushchev might seek to promote an atmosphere of accord by making some conciliatory gesture on a lesser issue. He might agree to a US initiative on bilateral relations, retool some earlier US proposal on bilateral cooperation in scientific or medical endeavors (though probably not in the exploration of outer space), or invite President Kennedy to visit the Soviet Union (though the CPSU Congress and the Berlin question would pose vexing problems of timing to Khrushchev).
Finally, with the eyes of the world on Vienna, Khrushchev might regard the meeting as an appropriate occasion for some dramatic step intended to demonstrate Soviet progress or peaceful intent. This might mean a new space shot; and it is another reason for some Soviet initiative in the field of disarmament.
77. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, USSR. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but a handwritten notation states that it was signed by Rusk on May 25. Another copy states that it was sent to the White House on the same day. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1906) A third copy was attached to a memorandum from McCloy to Rusk, May 25, which stated his belief that a direct telephone communication system might reduce "the risk of war by accident or miscalculation." (Ibid., S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Owen Chron)
SUBJECT
Direct White House-Kremlin TelephoneIt may be useful, in your meetings with Khrushchev, to mention that we propose to install a direct telephone connection between the State Department and the United States Embassy in Moscow if the Soviet Government has no objection. This telephone would permit direct communication between the heads of the United States and Soviet governments without being ostensibly and exclusively designed for this purpose. Such communication might be useful, in a grave crisis, in reducing the risk of war by miscalculation.
Khrushchev has in the past indicated that he favored a "white telephone" between the United States President and himself, in order to reduce the risk of war by miscalculation. This telephone connection could serve the same purpose, without creating as many political problems.
This discussion might afford you an opportunity to avert to the broader question of the risk of war by miscalculation, and to the fact that this risk may be of some significance during the next few years, when the advantage accruing to a first strike could lead to a pre-emptive strike if one side thought that the other was about to attack.
There is little evidence that this problem has yet figured prominently in Soviet thinking about arms control. It may be useful to get Khrushchev to thinking about the problem and about the need for remedial measures. This might possibly increase the chance of progress in any later discussions of such measures with the Soviets. A sober view of this risk might also help him to appreciate the risks that he will be accepting if he initiates further aggressive moves in the period immediately ahead.
78. Editorial Note
In a memorandum to President Kennedy, May 26, 1961, Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Rostow stated that it was his view that "the Viet-Nam situation is extremely dangerous to the peace and that we must push on all fronts to force a deflation of that crisis before it builds to a situation like that in Laos. If it comes to an open battle, the inhibitions on our going in will be less than in Laos; but the challenge to Russia and China will be even greater." Rostow noted that the United States was working on two fronts: "to build Diem's strength" and "to heighten the awareness of the international community about the border issue and to make the ICC the focus of the Laos conference." But, Rostow continued, "a third front on which we must work is Mr. Khrushchev himself. Thus my efforts to get the town to focus on the role of Viet-Nam in Vienna." For text of Rostow's memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume I, pages 157-158. As it turned out, Kennedy and Khrushchev scarcely mentioned Viet-Nam during their meetings in Vienna on June 3-4. For records of their conversations, see Documents 83-85 and 87-89.
79. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, May 27, 1961, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-2761. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
2941. Believe Khrushchev will wish meeting with President to be pleasant one and that he will desire if possible to make some proposal or take position on some problem which would have effect of improving atmosphere and relations. I find it extremely difficult however to imagine what this could be. Some change in attitude on Laos problem is possibility since quite possible Soviets consider neutral Laos at this time desirable from their point of view. Slight possibility K might intimate to President his concern over Red Chinese policies but think this unlikely in any direct way. Believe K will place main emphasis on general and complete disarmament. Revival of Central European regional security arrangements possibility as well as renewal proposal Warsaw-NATO non-aggression agreement./2/
/2/In a conversation on May 23, primarily devoted to Germany and Berlin, Khrushchev had mentioned the idea of a non-aggression agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Thompson noted that the proposal had little meaning for the West, but might make it easier for the Soviet Union to concede points on Berlin or atomic testing. Thompson concluded by saying the President should be prepared to knock it down completely or consider such a proposal. (Telegram 2908 from Moscow, May 25; ibid., 611.61/4-2661)
President should be prepared for K exploitation two weaknesses in our position. In any discussion self-determination he will probably bring up our failure carry out elections Viet Nam. In any discussion our concern over expansion Soviet influence Latin America via Cuba he will bring up question our bases and activities on Soviet periphery.
With respect Laos best agreement we can hope to get will apparently rest on shaky foundations. At appropriate time and possibly during President's talk would be advisable my opinion attempt put on Khrushchev responsibility for seeing that Laos in fact remains neutral and that this will be gauge of over-all Soviet intentions. Unless and until there is radical deterioration of our relations believe this could have real value as domination Laos itself not major Soviet interest particularly in view Chinese angle.
Believe Soviets will be concerned about moves of administration in arms field and K may well raise this subject contrasting this with his action to demobilize substantial number Soviet troops.
As gesture of goodwill K may respond favorably on subject joint projects in outer space. K likely express appreciation of President's action in controlling provocative statements particularly on part military officials.
K may probe our intentions in Congo and on this question believe good case can be made for fact that Soviets have been misinformed and have misjudged our actions.
In course conversation K likely rake up U-2 case and may well make gesture release of Powers. Believe caution advisable on former as K might later quote President in order stir up controversy in US. President might take line that flight was major error particularly timing thereof, but that Khrushchev apparently does not realize extent to which Soviet secrecy caused concern over Soviet intentions to those responsible for US security.
Assume President will also have been briefed on subjects of trade, CIA activities, Vershinin visit,/3/ Korea, and possible eventual Presidential visit to Soviet Union.
/3/The question of a visit to the United States by Soviet Air Marshal Constantin A. Vershinin had been under discussion during the spring of 1961 without resolution. While the Department of State favored it, the Department of Defense in a letter of April 5 stressed the negative aspects of such a visit. (Memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, July 3; ibid., 033.6111/7-361) On July 9 Secretary of Defense McNamara wrote to Rusk saying that the climate for the visit was not right and on the following day Ambassador Thompson was informed that the issue was dead. (Davis letter to Thompson, July 10; ibid., 033.6111-VE/7-1061)
Thompson
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