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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
160. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 10, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AE 6. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Malcolm Toon (EUR/SOV) on October 18 and cleared in S/S and S on October 19. Regarding the location and time of this conversation, see footnote 1, Document 158. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. USSR After the dinner meeting Mr. Gromyko raised with the Secretary the idea of exchanging views on peaceful uses explosions. Mr. Gromyko referred to the Secretary's discussion on this matter with Dobrynin some time ago/2/ and asked where we should go from here. The Secretary said we would be prepared to set up a small group of experts to focus on the problem and Ambassador Thompson could discuss the matter further with Ambassador Dobrynin. Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviets were indeed interested in going forward with such an exchange of views and the arrangement suggested by the Secretary would be entirely acceptable. /2/Document 123.
161. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 14, 1966, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Mortimer D. Goldstein (EUR/BMI) and approved in S, October 28. The source text is labeled "Part 2 of 7." The conversation was held in the James Madison Room of the Department of State. Foreign Secretary Brown was in New York in early October to attend meetings of the U.N. General Assembly and visited Washington to confer with U.S. officials. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS UK US Secretary Rusk gave the Foreign Secretary a copy of the latest draft of US thinking on nuclear sharing./2/ The Secretary said that the US would try out the new language on the Russians. The Foreign Secretary indicated that he was persuaded that the Russians were now interested in concluding a non-proliferation treaty. He said that he hoped to have British reactions to the new US draft text in a short time./3/ /2/Reference presumably is to Rusk's October 13 draft of Article 1 of the draft Nonproliferation Treaty. See Tab A to Document 162. /3/Sir Michael Stewart, Minister of the British Embassy, told Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., on October 19 that "he had been instructed to inform us that the UK thought it very unlikely that the Russians would like the proposed treaty language. The UK nevertheless thought it would be a good thing to do to give them the language to keep the ball rolling. The Foreign Office had requested that he ask the US to tell the UK when we were thinking of giving the language to the Russians and would also like to be informed of their response." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6) In discussing the principal points of Soviet interest in a non-proliferation agreement, Secretary Rusk mentioned the concern of the Russians about the possibility of a change in US attitudes. Secretary Rusk said that, when he referred to existing US law on nuclear matters and to Congressional resistance to change in this area, he was met with the argument that Congress might change the law in the future. Secretary Rusk observed to the Foreign Secretary that, under our constitutional system, one Congress cannot bind another against changing the law; thus, the Russians must find their protection in the withdrawal clause of the agreement. Secretary Rusk also said that it seemed clear on both sides that there should be no direct or indirect (through an alliance) transfer of nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear state. Gromyko was troubled, however, by the idea of transferring nuclear weapons to an alliance. Gromyko seemed to be involved in a metaphysical question; he seemed to think of an alliance as something separate from its members. The Foreign Secretary stated that Gromyko did not seem to be concerned about NATO consultation arrangements on nuclear matters, whether old or new. Secretary Rusk observed that certain things were cleared away in the US talks with Gromyko: Gromyko would not raise questions on NATO consultations and was not interested in what the arrangements would be in time of war or how the Allies might decide to go to war.
162. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ I-27134/66 Washington, October 15, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 388.3, Non-Proliferation, September, 1966. Secret. The source text bears the stamped indicator, "15 Oct 1966, Sec Def has seen." SUBJECT I understand that Secretary Rusk has prepared a Memorandum for the President on a nonproliferation treaty which he hopes he may be able to discuss with you and the President some time this weekend, possibly this afternoon (Saturday)./2/ /2/No record of the proposed memorandum for the President or of the discussion under reference has been found. Attached (Tab A) is Article I, recommended and drafted by Secretary Rusk. Tab B is a short summary of the events leading to this draft. Comments on Presidential Memorandum The memorandum advises the President that this formulation: 1. Would not disturb existing arrangements. 2. Would not affect NATO's decision to go to war, or the establishment of any NATO nuclear planning committee. 3. Would not prevent assignment of additional Polaris or other US weapons to NATO. 4. Would not rule out the establishment of a multilateral entity in which non-nuclear weapon states participated and contributed so long as this entity did not obtain ownership of the warheads. 5. Would not bar succession by a federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. Note:--The ownership question is implicit, not explicit. Recommendation I recommend you support the Rusk memorandum. John T. McNaughton
Tab A/3/ DRAFT OF ARTICLE I OF A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY /3/Secret. Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives directly or indirectly to a non-nuclear-weapon State, either individually or by virtue of its membership in a military alliance or group of States; not to relinquish its control over its nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives./4/ /4/In a telephone call to President Johnson in the early evening of October 16, McNamara mentioned that on the previous day he and Secretary Rusk had given him a paragraph on non-proliferation for the President's approval. President Johnson believed, however, that Secretary Rusk had said that he was going to prepare a paper giving the arguments for and against the paragraph. The President then read this paragraph, which he had in front of him. McNamara twice told him that the key sentence concerned the provision restricting the transfer of collective ownership of the warhead. When the President asked what the Germans will think, McNamara said that they will grumble. McNamara continued that he and Rusk favored the paragraph but thought Robert Bowie, Department of State Counselor, was opposed. As for the Soviets, it was not the language Gromyko had proposed, "but we think there's a reasonable chance they'll either accept this or suggest a relatively minor modification of it." The President said he wanted a memorandum from Secretary Rusk giving the pros and cons of the language, and McNamara said he would speak to Rusk about it. (Johnson Library, Records and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Robert McNamara, October 16, 1966, 7:03 p.m., Tape F66.29, Side A) In a telephone conversation with Secretary Rusk a few minutes later, President Johnson inquired about the non-proliferation memorandum, and the Secretary responded that he would have it for the President to read on the plane the next day. (The President was going to give a speech in Doylestown, Pennsylvania.) He also said he favored the language, but there was "not one chance in a hundred that the Soviets will buy it." In reply to the President's question about Bowie's position, Rusk said that Bowie was for it too and had helped to draft it. "Well, OK, that's fine then," replied President Johnson. "If you're for it, you give me the memo and I'll try to decide." (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Dean Rusk, October 16, 1966, 7:14 p.m., Tape F66.29, Side A) This memorandum has not been found, but in an October 18 memorandum to the President, Rostow presented in some detail the pros and cons on the non-proliferation language. (Ibid., National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Proliferation, Box 11)
Tab B/5/ /5/Secret. EVENTS LEADING TO PRESENT DRAFT Monday Evening (10 October). At dinner Gromyko made it clear that continuation of present AEC law on ownership would meet the Soviet condition on ownership and transfer./6/ Secretary Rusk clearly said that we would be willing to accept an obligation to retain ownership of our warheads. At the end of the dinner, Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Foster to have instructions drafted reflecting these discussions./7/ /6/Reference presumably is to Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; 42 USC 2122. /7/Not found. Thursday Evening (13 October). Because of differences of view, a meeting was held with Secretary Rusk, Eugene Rostow, Butch Fisher and Bob Bowie attending./8/ The present article was debated and personally drafted by Secretary Rusk. (Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Fisher support this formula. Eugene Rostow and Bob Bowie are opposed.) /8/No record of this meeting has been found. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION Bill Foster discussed this problem at some length with Art Barber on Thursday. His chief points were: 1. Gromyko made it absolutely clear that the earlier Foster-Roschin text/9/ was acceptable to the Soviet Union without change. /9/Not the one attached (it included the word "ownership"). [Handwritten footnote on the source text.] 2. Any text which met three basic conditions would be acceptable to the Soviet Union. These conditions were: a. No transfer of nuclear warheads to non-nuclear states. b. No transfer of nuclear warheads to alliances made up of nuclear and non-nuclear states. c. No transfer of warheads to alliances of non-nuclear states. 3. Gromyko, in his discussions with the President and Secretary Rusk, made it quite clear that the Soviets consider a non-proliferation treaty a major objective of Soviet foreign policy which will be pursued despite Vietnam and other difficulties.
163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, October 31, 1966, 7:52 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Alan F. Neidle (ACDA/IR) and Lawrence D. Weiler (ACDA/DD); cleared by Fisher (ACDA), McNamara (DOD) (in substance), McNaughton (DOD/ISA), and Sherrod McCall (S/S); and approved by Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach. The President and Secretary Rusk were in Seoul October 31-November 2 to meet with Korean President Park Chung Hee. 76255. For the President and Secretary. Following are instructions which we are proposing to send USUN re non-aligned resolution on non-proliferation,/2/ in particular that part dealing with non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. /2/Reference is to a draft resolution submitted by 32 Latin American, Asian, and African countries in the U.N. General Assembly's First Committee on October 27. (U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.371) Begin Text. 1. US Del should vote affirmatively for non-aligned NP res. 2. Operative para 3 which "invites the nuclear weapon powers to give an assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states" provides opportunity for US Govt state public position regarding use of nuclear weapons which of particular timeliness in view possible developments in NPT negotiations. 3. We believe that pressure to gain security assurances through proposals to limit use of nuclear weapons, such as Kosygin proposal for clause in NPT,/3/ has been growing and is likely increase considerably as impression grows that conclusion of NPT is becoming imminent. Accordingly, we wish take this opportunity to state conditions, as formulated by United States, under which United States would limit use of nuclear weapons. Since operative para 3 of NP res "invites the nuclear weapon powers to give an assurance,"/4/ we believe US Govt can properly respond with unilateral assurance formulated in fashion acceptable to US Govt. Having made public statement, we would then impress upon others as necessary that we do not intend agree to assurances provision in NPT. /3/See footnote 3, Document 122. /4/The sponsors of the draft resolution submitted a revised draft in the First Committee on November 9, which among other things replaced paragraph 3 with a new paragraph 4, urging the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to consider the proposal that the nuclear-weapon powers give assurance that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states without nuclear weapons on their territories. (U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Add.1-6) 4. In explaining affirmative vote of the US, you should state that the US fully understands the security concerns of non-nuclear weapon states which undertake not to obtain their own nuclear weapons. You should state that the US has previously recognized this concern, quoting from President Johnson's statement of October 18, 1964, that non-nuclear weapon states "can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it."/5/ You should then point out that it is particularly appropriate for the UN, which was founded for purpose of maintaining international peace and security, to consider question of security for non-nuclear states, and to do so at time when there appears to be increasing opportunity to conclude a non-proliferation treaty. You should express conviction of the US that a non-proliferation treaty will advance the security of all states, nuclear and non-nuclear. You should then state on behalf of the US Govt that the US, taking into account all of these considerations and in view of the invitation contained in operative para 3 of the resolution, declares its intention to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state that is party to a general non-proliferation treaty and that is not engaged in an act of aggression supported by a nuclear weapon state. Finally, you should reaffirm US dedication to purposes and principles of UN Charter and state conviction that both NPT and policy just enunciated by US will strengthen UN. /5/President Johnson made this statement in a radio and television broadcast. For text see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, pp. 1377-1380. 5. In advance of making above statement, you should explain to US allies and others, in your discretion, US thinking behind decision to make statement. In addition to drawing on considerations in para 3, you should stress following: a. US Govt wishes create most favorable climate for maximum adherence to possible non-proliferation treaty. b. US Govt believes UN is proper forum for consideration question security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states and does not intend agree to incorporating assurances clause in text of non-proliferation treaty. c. Qualification that non-nuclear weapon state must not be engaged in act of aggression supported by nuclear weapon state is essential for US. If questioned about desirability of using words or concepts inherently vague, i.e., "aggression" and "supported by nuclear weapon state," you may explain that the US would make its own determinations, should this ever be necessary, and that this is situation which exists under present circumstances. d. No implications should be drawn re US policies in Vietnam. End Text. Joint Chiefs "express their opposition to the Kosygin proposal or any variation thereof. Their opposition was based on the reason that such a non-use assurance could provide an impetus toward total prohibition of nuclear weapons and that the total impact could alter the current military balance to the detriment of the US." They also said that a vote for the resolution would "offset the deterrent effect of US nuclear power and free the non-nuclear states for aggression without fear of nuclear reprisals." Secretary of Defense and ACDA support affirmative vote indicated in above instructions, as do I. Believe NP resolution in question will be adopted overwhelmingly. All other parts of resolution are free of problems for US. Adoption of this resolution permits US to declare in its own terms the conditions under which it willing to refrain from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries. Such a declaration should encourage accession to NPT. Moreover, of more immediate importance, it would give US grounds for resisting proposals for other disadvantageous limitations on use of nuclear weapons. Extent of limitation on US nuclear deterrent resulting from terms of proposed resolution plus declaration would not be significant: Restriction would not apply in the event of any war in Europe in which Soviets gave their support; for declaration to apply to North Korea and North Vietnam they would have to become parties to NPT and would have to keep ChiComs and Soviets from giving them support in any hostilities; and perhaps most important, question of whether an aggression has taken place and whether a nuclear weapon state is providing support would be subject to US determination. I would propose to send the instructions if necessary at the appropriate time if you do not indicate non-concurrence. It now appears, however, very unlikely that vote will come this week. Katzenbach
164. Editorial Note When President Johnson approved Latchkey II on November 3, 1966, the AEC-DOD program consisted of eight underground nuclear tests scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal year 1967. (See Document 134.) Cabriolet, the first of a series of six nuclear cratering experiments under the Plowshare program was not one of these eight; its authorization still awaited final Presidential approval. The purpose of Cabriolet and other tests like it was to obtain basic technical information about cratering and the subsequent distribution of radioactivity that would be applicable to excavation of a trans-Isthmian canal. It was not until December 20 that Glenn Seaborg received a telephone call from Spurgeon Keeny that the President had approved going ahead with Cabriolet. There was, however, one caveat, as recounted by Seaborg: "there is to be a prior announcement of what we propose to do (spelling out the nature of the test, that it is peaceful in nature, that we see no problems with it, that it has to be done within the Limited Test Ban Treaty, etc., . . . )." (Seaborg, Journal, Volume 13, page 654.) Cabriolet was scheduled to be set off on February 1, 1967, but was delayed for technical reasons, and rescheduled for February 10. However, on February 9, President Johnson abruptly changed his mind and decided to cancel Cabriolet for the present. Concerns were raised over Cabriolet's potential to hurt the ongoing negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty and the Latin American nuclear free zone treaty, in both of which peaceful nuclear explosions were an important issue. After more discussions with Rostow in April regarding the rescheduling of Cabriolet, Seaborg received a telephone call on May 1 from Rostow informing him that he was to proceed with "the planning of both Cabriolet and Buggy." However, Seaborg continued, "There was no commitment as to actually conducting the explosions--we were merely to plan--and there was to be no public announcement." (Seaborg, Stemming the Tide, pages 333-334)
165. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, November 22, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1966. Secret. A notation on the source text reads: "Secretary Saw." SUBJECT I believe there are two points which should be kept in mind relative to the timing of the possible talks with the Soviets on Plowshare: 1. US/USSR talks on Plowshare with their inevitable attendant publicity are likely to increase Indian reluctance to sign a non-proliferation treaty which denied the non-nuclear countries the option to develop peaceful nuclear explosives. The Indians have already raised strong objections to this at the U.N., and their views have carried considerable weight with other non-nuclear countries./2/ Holding these talks coincident with the attempt at the ENDC to induce the non-nuclears to accede to the non-proliferation treaty which had been agreed to by the Soviets could present serious difficulties to the achievement of this critical objective. /2/For an explanation of the Government of India's position on peaceful nuclear explosions and a nonproliferation treaty during this period of U.N. debate, see the statement by the Indian Representative to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, October 31, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 676-686, and his statement the following month, November 7, to the same organization; ibid., pp. 699-705. 2. If Cabriolet is carried out during the period between the agreement to conduct the Plowshare talks and their actual occurrence, and if venting occurs which places radioactive material outside the borders of the U.S., the talks would provide the Soviets with a golden opportunity to belabor the U.S. for violating the limited test ban treaty. Therefore, it would appear desirable not to raise with Ambassador Dobrynin the Plowshare talks until either a decision has been reached to defer Cabriolet or until Cabriolet has been fired and the results evaluated. Adrian S. Fisher
166. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AE 6. Confidential. Drafted by Scott George (G/PM) on November 22. A typed notation on the source text reads: "ORIG hand carried to President by Secretary per S/S--JPWalsh." SUBJECT Recommendation: That you approve a proposal to conduct technical talks with the USSR on peaceful uses of nuclear explosives./2/ /2/A typed notation on the source text reads: "Approved by Pres. c. 11/30/66." Discussion: For some time we and the Soviets have been feeling each other out on talking about the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. On March 18/3/ I told Ambassador Dobrynin we would be prepared to have technical talks with a view to exchange of Plowshare information, as well as discussions concerning the relationship of Plowshare to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. I mentioned also the possibility of machinery through which the US and USSR might provide Plowshare services to other countries. On October 10, Foreign Minister Gromyko told me the USSR was willing to hold technical talks./4/ He was not precise as to their nature, and it was agreed that Dobrynin and Ambassador Thompson should work out the details. /3/See Document 123. /4/See Document 160. There has been some delay in coming back to the Soviets because of the need for inter-agency review, but we now plan to proceed in this way: We would suggest that the talks be technical in nature, with the attached agenda/5/ being used, and that they be held in Moscow as early as may be convenient, perhaps in mid-January. We would send a small delegation of technical people, headed by AEC Commissioner Tape. The delegation would be instructed to stay strictly within the bounds of the technical agenda, assuming the Soviets accept this as a framework for talks. If such talks take place and the Soviets make any formal or informal attempt to widen them, the delegation would say that this is beyond their terms of reference, but that they will be glad to refer this expression of Soviet interest in wider talks to the U.S. Government. /5/The attachment, "Agenda for Plowshare Talks," is not printed. As far as public information is concerned, we are thinking in terms of a low-key announcement that US-USSR technical talks on peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being held, but we would not plan any communique or other public statement as to the nature or results of the talks. Appropriate press guidance would be prepared prior to the talks, since it may be difficult or impossible to avoid the fact becoming known that the talks concern nuclear explosives. Press handling as well as other aspects of the talks would of course have to be worked out with the Soviets. I believe a limited probe and discussions of this nature might be very useful in terms of giving us better knowledge than we now have of Soviet interest and intentions regarding peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. Such knowledge could help us deal on a more informed basis with such things as the Ball proposal for an international Plowshare arrangement,/6/ other matters that have been considered in the Committee of Principals and elsewhere, and forward planning of our own Plowshare program. If technical talks take place they would be carefully handled with the object of avoiding any harm to our non-proliferation and other disarmament activities. /6/Not further identified. I would like to move ahead along these lines in the near future, and unless you think it inadvisable would plan to have Ambassador Thompson call in Dobrynin before the end of November and propose technical talks as indicated./7/ /7/On December 6, Thompson and Dobrynin met for lunch at which Thompson reminded Dobrynin that Foreign Minister Gromyko had told Rusk on October 10 (see Document 160) that the Soviet Union was prepared to hold technical talks with the United States on peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. Thompson suggested at this luncheon that such talks be held in Moscow, beginning January 16, 1967, where AEC Commissioner Tape would head the U.S. Delegation of five or six technical experts. (Memorandum of conversation, December 6; Department of State, Central Files, AE 6) If the Soviet response is to suggest a broadened agenda, extending the talks into political or disarmament areas, we will need to re-think our course, and I will make a fresh recommendation to you. It is also possible they might accept a limited agenda but attempt to broaden the talks in Moscow. In that case, the delegation's instructions would call for referral back to the U.S. Government, and I would anticipate the need to prepare for talks of a different nature. Dean Rusk/8/ /8/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
167. Editorial Note On November 30, 1966, Ambassador Goldberg reported in telegram USUN 2813 that the Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. General Assembly's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, under the Chairmanship of Polish Representative Lachs, was working to finalize agreement on the Space Treaty, and to resolve several legal problems: (1) assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles; (2) questions concerning the definition of outer space; (3) regulations governing non-prohibited uses of outer space and celestial bodies; and (4) regulations governing space activities which may have effects on the territory of other states. (Department of State, Central Files, SP 4) In a telephone conversation on the morning of December 8, President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg discussed the preparation and agencies' clearances of a presidential statement confirming that the U.N. Outer Space Committee had agreed to a draft text of the outer space agreement. (Johnson Library, Records and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Arthur Goldberg, December 8, 1966, 10:15 a.m., Tape F66.12.01, Side B) This statement was released later the same day. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, page 1441. On December 19 the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the "Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies," and requested that three depositary governments: the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, open the Treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date. (Department of State, Central Files, SP 4)
168. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 7, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thompson. The source text is labeled "Part V of V." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS I referred to the conversation I had had with the Ambassador yesterday on the subject of ABM Systems./2/ I said I had looked up the record and had been surprised to find that I had forgotten that following his conversation with Mr. Foster on March 17, the Secretary had told him in my presence the following day that we would be glad to discuss this matter quietly with the Soviet Union on a bilateral basis./3/ /2/When Thompson brought up the subject of ABMs at a luncheon meeting on December 6, Dobrynin reminded him that the U.S. Government had never responded to the Soviet Government's reply to Foster on March 17 that the question of limitation of ABM systems was worthy of consideration because of the huge sums of money involved. Dobrynin also told Thompson that the ABM question should be considered together with the problem of delivery systems of offensive nuclear missiles. (Memorandum of Conversation; ibid.) In a supplementary memorandum of this December 6 conversation, Thompson added that Dobrynin asked why Secretary McNamara had made statements about the ABM problem that might only stimulate pressure upon him to deploy an ABM system. When Thompson responded that McNamara, by mentioning evidence of a Soviet deployment and by stating that it had already been taken into account in the administration's plans, "had intended to build a kind of backfire against just such a demand," Dobrynin remarked that he understood and had already come to the conclusion that "this was a kind of anticipatory blow." (Memorandum, December 7; ibid.) /3/A memorandum of the Secretary's March 18 conversation with Dobrynin on limitations on ICBMs and ABMs is ibid., DEF 18. The Ambassador pointed out that this was still not a reply to his remarks to Mr. Foster. I said that in any event, I was authorized to tell him that the President would like nothing better than an agreement on this subject that would hold./4/ When the Ambassador pointed out that this statement when translated into Russian would not be clear, I agreed he could say that the President would like nothing better than an effective agreement on this subject. /4/In a telephone conversation with President Johnson earlier that day, Secretary McNamara said that Thompson wanted authorization to tell Dobrynin at their 4:30 p.m. meeting that afternoon that the President endorsed talks with the Soviet Union on the ABM issue. President Johnson replied, "Yes . . . Let's go ahead. That sounds good." He added that he could not think of anything that "would be more desirable" than "an agreement that would hold in that field." (Johnson Library, Records and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, December 7, 1966, 2:16 p.m., Tape F6612.01, Side A) I continued that we recognized that an agreement would have to cover ICBMs as well as ABMs. I said there were problems that would have to be discussed such as what to do about submarines, if the agreement rested on unilateral means of verification. I said the same might be true for mobile launchers. I said I could tell him that we had already spent four billion dollars on research and development of an ABM System and could now proceed to manufacture and deploy, but said that this would involve an enormous cost. He interjected that according to newspaper reports this could amount to 30 or 40 billion dollars. I said that the cost would depend upon how big a deployment was made but that it could run as high as he had indicated. I said that if we both spend these enormous sums, we would probably both end up still able to inflict terrible damage on the other and we would be prepared to discuss what we could do to avoid this great cost when we both had many other uses for our resources. I said that we would be glad to have the Soviet Union's ideas on what channels should be used for discussion of this subject and when. I pointed out that there were several complications. One was that the Secretary would not return until December 18/5/ and that he was very much concerned and interested in this subject. I also pointed out that the Ambassador's return to Washington was also uncertain. I pointed out that we had not taken up this subject with our Allies and that because of the Ambassador's departure, we had moved very fast on this matter and that I could not be very precise about our thinking. /5/Secretary Rusk was abroad from December 4-18, first visiting Japan, then Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, India, Iran, and finally France, where he attended the NATO Ministerial Meeting December 13-16. Speaking personally, it occurred to me that it would be possible to have a formal agreement, but also that a tacit understanding might be possible in which each of us would refrain from deployment unless we concluded that the other side was going ahead. Dobrynin said he would take this matter up with Brezhnev and Kosygin immediately upon his return. Because of the meetings which would be taking place in Moscow, he could not tell how soon we would have an answer. I pointed out that the urgency of the problem arose from the need of Secretary McNamara to present his budget to the Congress in January./6/ /6/For excerpts of McNamara's budget statement, January 25, 1967, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 5-24.
169. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, December 10, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, 471.94, ABM, November-December, 1966. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A stamped notation on the source text reads "Mr. Vance has seen." SUBJECT You have inquired as to what I think the Soviet reaction would be to an ABM deployment by the United States under either Posture "A" or Posture "B" of Secretary McNamara's memorandum./2/ /2/Reference apparently is to McNamara's December 2 draft memorandum to the President on the Nike-X, which he circulated at a meeting held on Wednesday, December 7. Thompson's account of this meeting is scheduled for publication in volume X. At this meeting, McNamara also asked the participants to comment on probable Soviet reactions to both a light and heavy ABM deployment by the United States, Postures "A" and "B." For responses by Thompson and Helms, see Documents 170 and 171 respectively. Additional responses are scheduled for publication in volume X. 1. It is not presently clear how extensive the present Soviet ABM deployment is. Whether or not they intend presently a full scale deployment, I would assume that the initial reaction of any announcement of a U.S. ABM system would be to encourage and expedite a full scale Soviet deployment. I base this conclusion on the history of Soviet emphasis on defensive systems coupled with the fact that they have already commenced such a deployment. I think the Soviet Union will also be forced to react by increasing its offensive nuclear force to take into account our ABM deployment. While it would clearly be rational to do this immediately--and there is no question about Soviet technical competence in this regard--I am less certain as to how quickly they would react. Ideology and history to the contrary notwithstanding, I think we should assume that they will react in this way, although it may not be their first reaction. The cost of a Soviet ABM deployment and improved and expanded ICBM capabilities might be prohibitive in cost if pursued simultaneously. In this event, the rational thing to do would be to cut back ABM deployment and concentrate on an offensive nuclear force. But the fact that they are defense-minded and that they have already commenced an ABM program might lead them to postpone committing extensive resources to improve ICBMs. I would agree with Secretary McNamara's conclusions that a rational response by the Soviet Union would not essentially change the existing situation; but I believe there is a good possibility that this response (offensive missiles) might be delayed for a period of time. If this is correct, deployment of an ABM system would give us a short term advantage over the Soviet Union, and it might be two, three or four years before the status quo was restored. That it would be restored, I have no substantial doubt. 2. I think the Soviet Government should be approached directly with as candid a statement of the existing situation as security permits--and I think this could be quite candid. I think we should inform them of our intentions, absent an agreement, which would as nearly as possible freeze existing offensive and defensive systems. I think we should state our intention of deploying some ABM system if it is impossible to reach a satisfactory understanding. The Soviets have always linked the need for a freeze on both offensive and defensive systems. I find this both significant and puzzling since it would seem to me that a purely defensive freeze would be clearly to their advantage. The only explanation of this that I can see is that they do tend to think in defensive terms which, to a degree, would support the thesis that they don't approach the problem as rationally as we do. 3. While you have not asked my views on Third Country problems it seems to me that how these are handled is perhaps an equally important problem to be faced. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach [Continue with the next documents]
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