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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
180. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 8, 1967, 11:30 a.m.-1 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret. Drafted by Alfred Puhan (EUR/GER) and approved by S, M, and G on February 17. The source text is labeled "Part 1 of 2." The meeting was held in the Secretary's conference room. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Americans Germans The Secretary opened the meeting by welcoming Vice Chancellor Brandt and conveying the President's greetings. He characterized the achievement of a Non-Proliferation Treaty as a very serious task facing the world. He called it tragic that the Baruch proposals of 1946 had not been accepted./2/ We therefore, he said, now have five nuclear powers and that is five too many. He assured Brandt that we don't yet have agreement with the USSR and, indeed, as far as draft language was concerned the Germans have seen more of the proposed American position than the USSR had. He added that we will see the Russians again at Geneva at the conference on February 21./3/ /2/For text of Baruch's proposal, June 14, 1946, which was delivered in the form of a statement to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. I, pp. 7-16. /3/During 1967, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee held two sessions in Geneva; the first from February 21 to March 23, and the second from May 18 to December 14. As in previous years, all the members of the ENDC except France participated in the work of the Committee. Brandt was grateful for this early opportunity to meet. He pointed out that, while some reports may differ from what he was about to say, there were strong links between Germany and the United States. He referred to the Kiesinger policy statement/4/ and reiterated that Atlantic partnership was an essential of German policy. /4/Given by Chancellor Kiesinger on December 13, 1966, before the Bundestag on the foreign policy goals of the Federal Republic of Germany. See Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 935-941. Brandt stressed that they had no objection to the idea of an NPT. What concerned Germany was to make peace safe. This did not mean less interest in solving the German problem. Their principal objective remained the solution of the German problem. Nevertheless, the FRG had problems with the treaty. He conceded that the US had [also] serious problems, domestic as well as with its allies. Brandt said he wanted to talk about those things which would gain the support of the Bundestag for the NPT. He noted that the FRG Embassy had communicated the main German concerns. He said the Germans wanted strong links with disarmament. They were concerned about nuclear blackmail. His main point, he said, was that the NPT should not be used as an instrument of discrimination against the FRG in the peaceful development of atomic energy. He mentioned in this connection a German firm which was on the verge of a sale of a reactor to another country but subsequently was told by the prospective customer that an American firm had raised the question of German ability to guarantee an adequate supply of reactor fuel. By contrast, the Americans could guarantee delivery. In Brandt's mind this example raised the specter of potential unfair competition. On controls, Brandt stated his understanding that the USSR would not accept Euratom controls and wanted the IAEA system. He pointed out that if we get IAEA controls over civilian fields, any advantages the Germans may have attained would be exposed. He was concerned about industrial espionage. In addition, Brandt wanted assurances that the FRG's concerns regarding disarmament would remain in our minds, as well as problems which might develop with other allies. Brandt said the Germans, in common with others, wanted a letter or some other document in hand setting forth our interpretation of the meaning of the draft treaty language. This would be needed for domestic reasons. If they had to wait until we explained the treaty to the Senate that would be too late. Brandt said he therefore wanted to ask again for a letter giving our interpretations of the NPT. On the European clause, Brandt said that he and the Chancellor had agreed they could live with the American interpretation. Not all of his colleagues, however, were in agreement. By a united Europe he thought the United States meant a political organization which has common control over defense and political policy. Perhaps it would be best if we had some mechanism to cover the interim stage as well. The Secretary said he would comment on Mr. Brandt's observations. On problems of interpretation, the Secretary saw no great difficulty. He noted that, unless there was a meeting of the minds by the nuclear powers on essentials, there could be no treaty. If there are real differences on interpretations, there is no agreement in the long run. If significant disparities existed between the US and the USSR, we should know about them--if the Soviets denied our public position, then there would in effect be no agreement. Mr. Foster noted at this point that almost all of the above points had already been made to the USSR and therefore constituted no surprise. He agreed to give the Germans a formal note which he hoped would cover their concerns and which the Soviets could see. The Secretary said on the question of disarmament that all of us had undertaken the obligation to work toward disarmament. He thought a preambular statement on disarmament might be possible. He admitted that a downward trend in the arms race was not yet in sight. He mentioned as an example the ABM problem, which Brandt noted was a problem for Europe too. The Secretary said ABM production on both sides could lead to staggering multiplication of defense costs without a parallel rise in security for either side. On nuclear blackmail, the Secretary thought that this question should not trouble our NATO allies or Japan, but could be a real problem to nonaligned states such as India. There was the question of how we could risk 200 million American lives without receiving something in exchange--commitment was really difficult without a treaty such as the NATO agreement under which an attack on one is an attack on all. On peaceful uses, the Secretary said the treaty applied only to explosives and he didn't see how nuclear explosives, since they are weapons, could be excepted. Outside of explosions, there would appear to be no problem. He wondered to what extent it was real to think of technological benefits flowing from weaponry. He added that he had recently raised this question with Mr. Foster and that the only positive answer he had received concerned some applications to metallurgy involving perhaps $50,000 worth of business a year. The Secretary added that he did not really see where the example Brandt had raised earlier involved the treaty. Euratom controls, the Secretary recognized, were a genuine problem. Looking ahead to 1980, with plans by many countries for rapid use of nuclear power, the Secretary thought there would soon be enough material to make several nuclear weapons a day, adding that unless there was some control this was a danger for everyone. He said we were trying to work out parallel arrangements of IAEA and Euratom, recognizing that there would be a real problem if France objected. In this connection the Secretary said he really did not know what French views were, quoting one high French source as saying that if a nation has the capability of making nuclear weapons it has the obligation to do so, but others say that while France may not join an NPT it would have no objection if others did. The Secretary pointed out that happily no atomic weapon has been used in twenty-two years, adding that if proliferation continued, however, he was not sure this would always be so. He wondered whether a general acceptance of Euratom and IAEA controls might be helpful in providing a solution. On the question of a European option, the Secretary pointed out that it was hard to talk about something that did not as yet exist and the shape of which was not clear. What he could understand and what he thought we should avoid would be to interpret participation in the treaty as an obstacle to an integrated Europe. The Secretary thought that European political unification could justify the invocation of the withdrawal clause of the treaty. He mentioned again that the principal adherence problems should not properly lie in an East-West context but rather with countries such as India. He hoped that the problems raised would be manageable. Mr. Foster said he would like to give the Germans some suggestions on safeguards to allay their concern on questions such as technological spin-off. Brandt asked whether a signed treaty would be presented to the ENDC or would it be an open draft subject to amendment. The Secretary said there was no final view on this matter within the US Government as we were trying to interpret the results of our talks with the Soviets. He mentioned that we had not sought an "agreement" with the Soviets on Article I and thought that at Geneva the US and Soviet co-chairman would sit down to see where we both stood. He emphasized that we would not agree to language not previously circulated to NATO allies. Mr. Foster said that the present plan was to hold discussions in Paris with other allies in each case before submitting new treaty language to the ENDC. He assured Brandt on prior consultations in the event of any changes in the text that had been discussed. The Secretary added that there were seventeen countries in Geneva, some of which had not been consulted yet. He believed that more consultation would be required as well as a period of private and public debate. He thought that there would be some time "before this ship could be brought into harbor." He again pointed out that if there were different Soviet interpretations on significant points there could be no agreement. Brandt thanked the Secretary for his comments, calling them very helpful. He wondered, however, since both the US and USSR had voted on a UN resolution to curb vertical as well as horizontal proliferation why it was so difficult for both sides simply to reaffirm this position./5/ As for nuclear blackmail, Brandt stressed that this was a problem for non-nuclear states. It gave nuclear powers an opportunity to use methods to intervene on technological spin-off. He said that the problem of explosions mentioned by the Secretary was not the main problem and returned to the question of controls, specifically control of peaceful uses. As an illustration he mentioned the Soviet note of January 28,/6/ calling into question the peaceful purposes of the German nuclear program, and wondered if propaganda blasts of this kind would not be multiplied. /5/Presumably a reference to U.N. General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) adopted November 19, 1965, by a vote of 93 to 0 with 5 abstentions (Cuba, France, Guinea, Pakistan, and Romania). For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 532-534. /6/Not further identified. The Secretary thought that the IAEA system involved the acquiescence of the host country to the modalities. He asked Mr. Foster how IAEA dealt with the question of industrial secrets. Mr. Foster confirmed that the country composition of the IAEA inspection team must be agreed to by the host country. He added there was no limitation on research for peaceful uses but that the controls were simply an effort to account for fissionable materials, either those remaining in the producing country or, if exported, subject to an end-use check to assure that they remained in the country of destination for the purposes intended. He saw little danger of a leak of industrial secrets, citing an American reactor in Massachusetts that had been subjected to voluntary inspection four times. A concurrent meeting of the Atomic Industrial Forum at that time concluded that no danger existed of diversion of industrial secrets. He added that a country can turn down an undesirable individual inspector if it so desires. The Secretary returned to what he considered the kernel of the problem which he said has been raised by a number of countries--whether the option of becoming a nuclear power was ruled out by the treaty. He admitted this was an important question for any country but it was the heart of the matter. Brandt wondered whether the treaty did not bring about nuclear discrimination by dividing the world into three groups, the nuclear states with two not signing, those who will sign, and a group of about twenty states like Germany which are capable of producing nuclear weapons and would be inhibited from doing so by the treaty. The Secretary noted that the third group would grow as fuels become available. He noted that the possessor of a high school physics text and an ordinary reactor would soon be able to make a nuclear explosion. It was much simpler, however, if one did not have to start from the beginning. The Secretary asked if Mr. Brandt wished to designate someone to discuss further the questions of industrial secrets, controls, etc. Brandt thought that the experts might have some of these answers.
181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/ Washington, February 15, 1967, 9:15 p.m. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3539. Top Secret; Nodis; Priority. Drafted by Raymond L. Garthoff (G/PM) on February 15; cleared by Walsh, Kohler, Fisher, and Malcolm Toon (EUR/SOV); and approved by Katzenbach. 138194. Eyes only for the Ambassador. 1. Of prime importance among subjects you will take up with Kosygin is, of course, proposal for talks on strategic arms control. Kosygin will presumably be familiar with the President's letter/2/ and your oral remarks to Gromyko (State 123253),/3/ and we hope will be prepared respond. You should stress strong highest level US interest in subject; and desire to proceed with talks. /2/See Document 178. /3/See Document 179. 2. You may wish to repeat salient points your earlier statement. In particular, at your discretion, we suggest stressing; (1) fact that US prepared consider strategic offensive missile systems as well as defensive anti-missile systems, (2) need as urgent first step to seek agreement to head off escalation of arms race in such strategic-missile and anti-missile systems, and (3) US readiness rely to fullest extent on unilateral verification and belief that major step in freezing strategic systems possible on that basis without on-site inspection. 3. As you will have noted in London's 6503 to Department,/4/ repeated info to Moscow, Kosygin seems to rest on simple proposition defensive strategic systems morally superior to offensive ones. If he makes this point to you, you may wish note interaction and interrelation two sides of same coin of strategic relation of forces, and that as indicated US prepared discuss and reach agreement with respect to curbing both. /4/Telegram 6503, February 15, describes talks held in London between Wilson and Kosygin on arms control and security problems. Not printed. (Department of State, S/S-I Files, Exdis/Limdis Telegrams/Airgrams, Reel 147, February 11-28, 1967) 4. Kosygin may raise question of reductions in strategic forces. You should say that possibility agreement on reductions would certainly be enhanced by prior agreement not to make additional deployments, but we believe necessary first learn to walk before we can run. Also note that unilateral verification probably more difficult for reductions, though without implying that any and all reductions would necessarily require inspection. (You may also wish note one important difference from 1964 strategic nuclear delivery freeze proposal/5/ is focus on launchers, rather than on production of missiles, which latter would require on-site inspection for verification.) FYI: Current consideration US position focuses on launcher freeze, and not on reductions, which we wish defer. Special NIE/6/ has just been prepared which confirms very substantial, though of course not unlimited, capabilities for unilateral verification of measures along lines now being considered for strategic launcher freeze. End FYI. /5/See Document 21. /6/Presumably a reference to SNIE 11-10-67, "U.S. Capabilities To Monitor Certain Limitations on Strategic Weapons Program," February 14, 1967. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Box 4) 5. If Kosygin displays concern over stated need to discuss "respective strategic systems of both sides" you should stress that our only objective is have clear mutual understanding, not probe into Soviet military secrets. We will be prepared to limit focus our attention to matters directly relevant and necessary to reach agreement. At same time, Kosygin might bear in mind that to extent important uncertainties exist with respect nature and capabilities given system, elementary prudence will require defining categories of weapons systems or resolving doubts in favor of more formidable alternatives. May, therefore, be mutual advantages in clarifying certain ambiguities. This of course question requiring expert discussion. 6. If Kosygin asks what US regards as "offensive strategic nuclear missile delivery systems," you may note that we would expect discuss with Soviet representation but assume our general approach would be missile systems of medium and intercontinental ranges, land and sea based. With respect defensive anti-missile systems, would have to include systems capable of countering strategic missiles, including defensive systems having dual anti-aircraft and anti-missile capability. Again, we assume this type of question would be discussed more concretely in further discussions. FYI: Disarmament Principals have not yet met in proposed talks. Deputies reached consensus on including above indicated offensive and defensive systems: MRBMs and IRBMs, ICBMs, SLBMs and SLCMs, and ABMs and "SAMs which may have significant anti-missile capability." (We recognize difficulty in defining last named category.) However, final decision on categories US would propose or be prepared to include, on such questions as mobile land-based strategic missiles, not yet taken. Current consensus not to bring in bombers. You should not, therefore, go beyond general remarks this paragraph, and use them only if Kosygin raises question and if in your judgment such comments will be helpful in eliciting positive Soviet reaction. End FYI. 7. No decision yet taken on question what to do about deployments underway at present time or at time of possible agreement. We therefore wish avoid this question at this time. If Kosygin raises issue, you may note that we recognize question of facilities already under construction as problem which would need be addressed in the [future?]/7/ /7/The telegram is unsigned.
182. Message From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, February 18, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Kosygin, Box 10. Secret; Nodis. The source text is a typewritten copy of telegram 3560 from Moscow. SUBJECT /2/The word "Arms" has been crossed out, and "ABM's" has been inserted by hand. 1. I raised the ABM question by recalling our proposal for talks about ABM's and delivery vehicles, such as ICBM's,/3/ noting it had been made in hope that arrangements could be worked out to stop armaments race in this most expensive area. Of course, if we had to install an ABM system we would be capable of doing so as well as USSR could. We had spent four billion dollars on research in anti-missile defense, about half of it on ABM research. While no one knew exactly how much a full system would cost, there were estimates that up to 40-50 billion dollars would have to be spent on a system covering entire country. Yet we believed that by time U.S. finished installing its system and USSR took steps it could take in this area, both sides would be where they had started from in terms of their security. While President subject to great deal of pressure from some military men, manufacturers and Congressmen to go ahead with ABM's, he resisting that pressure in hope that two sides could find way of avoiding another step in arms race. Noting that one of major difficulties in arms control discussions had been question of inspection, I pointed out that we now prepared to rely, to extent possible, on national means of verification. As to our ABM research, it had been successful and we had developed a good system, but we believed that installation by U.S. and USSR of such systems would be destabilizing not only as far as these two countries concerned but also would raise problems in world generally. /3/See Document 181. 2. Kosygin responded by saying he would not put problem in context in which I had placed it. Question was not that of whose system better and whose worse. He could not agree to a discussion of problem in this framework. If two sides wanted discuss this problem, it was important to establish confidence. He did not have good knowledge of U.S. system, and neither did I know well about Soviet system. As far as he was concerned, perhaps U.S. system hundred times better than Soviet one. He said he wanted to stress that he regarded President's proposal from an entirely different standpoint, i.e., he believed that President wanted to have serious discussions of how arms race and related expenditures could be curbed, without any comparison of respective systems. Discussions could take place in that framework but not in the other. 3. Referring to my comment on verification and our willingness rely, to extent possible, on national means, Kosygin said this question of interest and could be subject of discussion. However, he wished to stress once again that main problem in this connection was confidence as no U.S.-Soviet agreement possible in absence mutual confidence. Soviets desire such confidence; Soviets want reliable arrangements under which parties would keep their word, and USSR certainly would do so. If a U.S.-Soviet arrangement, and particularly treaty, were achieved, USSR would not want to see it torn up next day, as tranquility would not be possible under such circumstances. 4. As to President's proposal, Kosygin said we already knew that USSR would want to discuss this problem. However, USSR still considering all aspects of problem and this was reason for delay in formal reply to President's message. He wanted me to report to President that delay in response was due to Soviet desire give a constructive reply and not to any underestimation of President's proposal. However, he could say even now that discussion could not be only about defensive weapons. As he had stated publicly in London, USSR could not hold any discussions in framework of now it is cheaper to kill; as Socialist country, USSR could not take such stand. Thus, it important to discuss entire complex of problem. As everybody knew, any weapons system could be overcome by another, and unfortunately progress in this area could be made much faster than in area of agriculture production and general increase of standard of living. This problem unquestionably complex, but I should report to President that Soviets seriously considering his message. Kosygin reiterated that Soviets want to weigh all aspects of problem and want their reply to be constructive. 5. Referring to Kosygin's assertion that I had compared U.S. and Soviet systems, I said I had no intention of doing so. Indeed, I did not know what Soviet system was. Only point I wanted to make in mentioning our research was that we also capable of installing an ABM system. Also, I did not mean to push for a speedy reply; we knew that problem very complex one and we prepared wait as long as necessary. Reason why we believed agreement in this area possible and desirable was that it would not only promote trust between our two countries but also enable them to spend their money on more constructive things. 6. Kosygin observed he had not understood me as pressing for an early reply, although he would not have objected if I had done so. Point he had tried to make was that, in his view, my remarks smelled of ultimatum. While he did not want to make this point a point of contention in our discussion, he did not believe discussion should be conducted in this vein. As to Soviet reply to President's message,/4/ he would have liked to reply sooner. /4/See Document 178. 7. When I said again I had not sought to compare our respective systems, Kosygin agreed but insisted tone of my initial remarks had been such as to convey ultimatum. I denied any intention of conveying ultimatum and reiterated that only reason why I had mentioned research was to indicate that we proposing agreement not because we incapable of installing an ABM system ourselves; in fact, we could do it if need be. I said I was sorry if I had perhaps expressed myself in way creating different impression. 8. Kosygin said this of course different question. Soviets wanted discuss problem as raised by President: President had not compared our respective systems. He had simply suggested that no system be installed. Soviets believed this was serious question which should be considered. In any event, Kosygin said he thought that if he and I were to pursue this discussion it could lead us very far. 9. I observed that if I had talked of who was ahead I would have had to say that it was USSR because we had not yet installed any ABM's. I then repeated my explanation of why I had mentioned our research in ABM field and reiterated my apology for conveying perhaps a different impression. 10. I asked whether discussion should turn to another subject, such as Vietnam. Kosygin had no objection and inquired if I was satisfied with his answer re ABM's. He repeated I should report to President that delay in his response to President's message due not to Soviets underestimating proposal but rather to their desire seriously consider problem. Thompson/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
183. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, February 25, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Secretary Saw." SUBJECT There are three immediate problems facing the United States in non-proliferation negotiations: The first relates to the manner in which we make it clear that a non-proliferation treaty will not prevent the creation of a federated European state. The second relates to the development of an acceptable article dealing with the safeguards problem. The third relates to a variety of other problems, some dealing with NATO security arrangements but more dealing with competitive problems in the field of peaceful nuclear energy, some dealing with clarification of the proposed treaty but more dealing with U.S. intentions. I. With respect to the first point, the objective which we wish to achieve is Soviet silence, or non-contradiction, when our allies and later the United States, state that the treaty would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. We cannot realistically expect the Soviets to say that they have agreed to the creation of such a new federated European state since they would have political objections to such a merger which transcend the problems of non-proliferation but we can expect them not to assert that this treaty bars it. We have already agreed with the FRG on the broad outline of a plan to achieve this objective. We have given the Germans a Draft Summary of the Interpretations dealing with the effect of the draft treaty formulations on the problems of European unity./2/ The Note stated that the draft treaty: /2/On February 21, Ambassador McGhee was instructed to give Kiesinger a draft summary of interpretations. McGhee received these instructions in telegram 141946 to Bonn, February 21. This telegram has not been found. The following day, February 22, Fisher discussed these interpretations with Charge von Lilienfeld in Washington. ". . . does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external security functions including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to be so centralized as to assume all governmental functions. It would bar, however, transfer (including ownership) of nuclear weapons or control over them to a new multilateral or other entity lacking the attributes of a federated state essential to bring into play the legal doctrine of succession."/3/ /3/This was the sixth and last paragraph of the Oral Note. The full text is printed in the ACDA historical study, The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency During the Johnson Administration, Vol. II (1969), pp. 125-126. In this Oral Note we also told the FRG that we would give our interpretations to the Soviets as soon as possible after we had agreed on the text of the provisions to be introduced into the ENDC. In the Oral Note we also stated that, pursuant to your discussions with Mr. Brandt we were agreed that it would not be desirable to request comments from the Soviet Union but that we would inform the Soviets that we are providing them with a summary in order to inform them of explanations we have given to our NATO allies in response to their questions. This exchange with the FRG still leaves unresolved the time at which we should make such a statement to the U.S.S.R. and how such a statement should be made. Mr. Foster, as you know, believes that at this delicate period of the negotiations we should hold off raising this matter with the Soviets, unless they raise it with us and wait until a complete text is agreed upon and raise the federation question only at the time we submit the full list of interpretations to them. On the other hand, I am aware of your concern that we should not go through the arduous task of further negotiations and consultations with our allies on the treaty text if the Soviets are going to publicly challenge an interpretation which the treaty supporters in Europe will have to make public if they are to be able to support the treaty. My own view on timing is largely influenced by the fact that, although Roshchin has not disagreed with Mr. Foster's statement to him that the treaty would not bar a federated Europe, his principal assistant, Grinevsky, has raised this question twice with members of the U.S. delegation and stated that the Soviets would have to object once the U.S. stated its position on this matter. These statements, in my judgment, point in the direction of a prompt statement of our position to the U.S.S.R. I do not believe we should make this statement, however, until we have had an adequate opportunity to satisfy ourselves that the statement we propose to make will satisfy the concerns of our NATO allies--particularly the FRG. We should therefore request information of Ambassador McGhee on the point and, at the same time, ask him to point out if the discussions going on between Bonn and the U.S.S.R. have produced any information which would cause us to change our plan. Once this has been done, I believe that in order to assure that the Soviets understand the seriousness of this matter an approach to them should be made simultaneously in Geneva and by you to Dobrynin. The approach would not ask for Soviet concurrence with our interpretation or with the desirability of a Federated Europe but would seek their assurance that they will not challenge our interpretation. This latter point would, I believe, alleviate most of the concerns expressed by Mr. Foster in Geneva's 2467./4/ /4/Foster sent this telegram from Geneva, February 23, in which he emphasized, among other things, his belief that the United States should not push the Soviets to agree or disagree with the U.S. position on this issue. Foster suggested that "If it should be deemed necessary to challenge them [Soviets] on this issue, it would seem to us far preferable to do so after they had committed themselves to tabling agreed draft text." (Department of State, S/S-I Files, Exdis/Limdis Telegrams/Airgrams, Reel 147, February 11, 1967-February 28, 1967) II. Regarding Article III, I propose we proceed along the lines which the Delegation and USRO have recommended for NAC discussions of that article in the general discussion of a complete draft treaty text. We would plan, therefore, to circulate to our NATO allies (and also to Japan) those parts of the text which they do not yet have. This would involve the preamble (the receipt of which would be helpful in meeting concerns about peaceful uses and desires to have the treaty set in the context of a first step toward general disarmament), the text of the definition of a nuclear weapons state (which we have already told our allies we intend to insert in the treaty), and a revised Article III (which would clarify the present language to meet some of the concerns that have been expressed). We would plan to ask for early NAC discussion on the basis of this complete text with a view to obtaining a "no objection" acceptance by the Council to our proceeding to table the text with Article III with the Soviets as a joint recommendation of the Co-Chairmen, with the understanding that further discussions and consultation will continue as the text is discussed in Geneva. As I indicated at your staff meeting, I think it would help overcome the fears of the FRG and others that safeguards would hinder peaceful nuclear programs and involve risk of industrial espionage, if we would indicate that we are considering an offer to invite IAEA to apply safeguards on a broad scale to U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities at such a time as IAEA safeguards are applied to non-nuclear weapons states under a treaty calling for mandatory safeguards on their nuclear activities. The offer would be made after determining that it would significantly facilitate acceptance of our safeguards article by key non-nuclear weapons states. We have already had positive indications that it would do so. This matter is sufficiently important so that I recommend that we not initiate this course of action without the approval of the President. I have sent you, under separate cover, a memorandum to the President on this subject./5/ /5/A handwritten notation at the end of this paragraph indicates that this memorandum from Fisher to the President was clipped to the source text; however, it is not attached. On February 28 Fisher wrote a memorandum to Rusk preparing him for his luncheon that afternoon with the President. In this memorandum, Fisher reminded Rusk that he had sent separately to the President a February 25 memorandum in which he recommended that the U.S. Government put U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967) III. With respect to the other articles of the treaty we would anticipate that the Oral Note which Ambassador McGhee gave Kiesinger on February 22 will meet most German requirements. There are various other German concerns and requests which were contained in the presentation which Minister von Lilienfeld made to me on February 22; some of these we can probably meet although some of them, such as the request for a simultaneous U.S.-German treaty assuring the Federal Republic of American supplies of fissionable material, we cannot meet but they were probably not put forward seriously. In any event, resolution of most of the additional points which the Germans wish to discuss with us need not be obtained before tabling the draft treaty but rather would have to be resolved before the Germans were faced with the question of ratifying a final text. What we will need to nail down with the Germans in order to obtain their "no objection" to our tabling a draft will be the question of whether the interpretations of the treaty which we have given them are satisfactory. We therefore will seek an early German response to our Oral Note. I believe that the question of whether the Italians can be persuaded to acquiesce in the "no objection" formula will be dependent upon whether we have the Germans on board at that time. The Italians are not likely to object if, at the time of the NAC discussions, they are the only holdouts. In any event, a letter from you to Fanfani might be in order.
184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva/1/ Washington, February 26, 1967, 7:48 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Nodis; Priority. Drafted and approved by Secretary Rusk on February 26. 144310. Literally Eyes Only for Foster From Secretary. This is not an instruction but a sharing with you of my increasingly grave concern about the possibility that we shall be in a false position on the NPT in the absence of a meeting of the minds with the Russians. I have in mind, of course, the effect of an NPT on European unity./2/ I find it hard to see how we could pretend that there was a treaty if the public interpretation given to it by the USSR and the US is directly contradictory on a crucial point. If the Soviets were to permit our public statement of interpretation to stand unchallenged, we would be in a strong position some years hence if the point became operational. But if they challenge it openly and publicly, then they are in position to employ maximum blackmail, threats and pressure to oppose European unity. I realize that the Germans do not require the Soviets to agree with our interpretation but I think we would have a different problem if the Russians were publicly to oppose it. This would give all those in Germany and Italy who might be looking for a pretext a major point on which to oppose the NPT. /2/See Document 180. This causes me to be very dubious about our joining with the Russians to submit an NPT to the conference with this problem of interpretation unresolved./3/ We would look rather silly to join in submitting a treaty and have it become immediately apparent that we and the Russians do not agree at all. /3/See footnote 3, Document 180. Please give me your best thinking on this point because I am not at all sure we have yet reached the right answer. I will be wanting to discuss this matter with the President very shortly and I want to have your full views. Best regards. Rusk
185. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson/1/ Moscow, February 27, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Box 11, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. Dear Mr. President: We have carefully studied your message transmitted by Ambassador L. Thompson./2/ /2/See Document 178. Your words about what great importance you attach to the improvement of relations between our two countries cannot but meet with a favorable response on our part. The confidential exchange of views through the communication channels mentioned in your message/3/ is undoubtedly useful both from the standpoint of a search for possible ways for a solution to certain international questions and from the standpoint of at least a better understanding of the positions of both sides on various problems. /3/See footnote 3, Document 178. As to the question referred to in your message regarding the possibility of reaching an understanding between us which would contain the strategic armaments race, the Soviet Government has always advocated and still advocates the curtailment of a race regarding any and all armaments. We are deeply convinced that a real guarantee of peace and actual means of strengthening national and international security can be provided only by concrete steps in the field of disarmament, including nuclear, rather than by a desire to solidify some "balance of power"--which in any case each side understands in its own way. Proceeding from this understanding of the problem, we are prepared to continue the exchange of views on questions relating to strategic rocket-nuclear weapons. As we understand it, you are in agreement with our view that such questions must be considered as a complex, including both offensive strategic nuclear delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. Certain additional considerations of the Soviet side regarding an approach to a solution of these questions are being transmitted through Ambassador Thompson./4/ Nor do we exclude the possibility of holding in the future, as you suggest, a special meeting of our appropriate representatives for a more detailed discussion of this entire problem. /4/See Document 186. Naturally, much more favorable conditions for businesslike consideration of this as well as other problems of mutual interest would be created if the situation in the world as a whole were normalized and above all such hotbeds of tension as that in Vietnam were liquidated. In this connection, one would like to think that the hope expressed by you that peace will return to our planet will be supported by appropriate practical action on your part. Respectfully, A. Kosygin/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
186. Oral Statement Delivered to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson)/1/ Moscow, February 28, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1. No classification marking. ORAL STATEMENT MADE TO AMBASSADOR THOMPSONON /2/See Document 185. We note with satisfaction the agreement of the US Government with the opinion of the Soviet side that the question concerning achievement of a mutual understanding on anti-missile defense systems should be considered simultaneously with the solution of the question of offensive nuclear delivery means. Such a combined approach is in this case the only correct one, since it would permit a real discussion of the broad objectives concerning both containment of the arms race and disarmament. However, as can be understood from your statement, the American side proceeds from the premise that as a point of departure for consideration of these problems it is necessary to recognize the present strategic situation as "most stable" and to seek to preserve it for the future. Unfortunately, in real life such "stability" by no means precludes the risk of nuclear conflict. This is especially true in the present situation which is characterized by the existence of dangerous hotbeds of international tension. A buildup of the means of nuclear attack which is being carried out in the US and the militant mood of certain US allies which is finding support among influential American circles further exacerbate the tenseness of the situation. The presently existing strategic situation, which you call stable, has another dangerous aspect. As a matter of fact, one can speak of the concept of "stability" at any given moment only in very relative terms, as of a combination and interaction of many factors which are understood differently by the parties. Such "stability" creates in practice a situation where one party in providing for its security is compelled, in response to the accelerated production and accumulation of offensive strategic rocket-nuclear means by the other party, to take steps for strengthening its defense capabilities, while the other party in turn sees in this reason for moving to a new and higher level in the armaments race spiral. We believe it necessary to find a way out of this vicious circle. This in our view can be done only if we seek equally to ensure the security of each side rather than attempt to solidify such a correlation of forces as this or that party regards at a given moment to be advantageous to it. Such an approach, in our view, would meet the interests not only of our countries but also of other nations, and it would meet the interests of the world at large. It seems to us that the best way towards nuclear disarmament which would take into account the considerations expressed above would be to destroy all offensive weapons and, in any event, to reduce to a minimum the arsenals of means for a rocket-nuclear attack, leaving--and then only temporarily--only strictly limited amounts of such means. In such a case apparently no great difficulties would arise for the solution of the anti-missile defense problem either. In our view, it is important first of all to reach some common understanding with regard to the approach itself to the solution of this problem, after which one could move to a discussion of more specific questions. We would be prepared to consider any additional considerations which the American side might wish to express on this matter. In this connection, we do not exclude holding in the future, if it proves necessary, a special meeting or meetings of our appropriate representatives for more detailed discussions of this entire problem.
187. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, February 28, 1967, 1345Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR File, Pen Pal Series, 1963. Top Secret; Nodis. 3682. Ref: Moscow 3674,/2/, 3675,/3/ 3676./4/ /2/Telegram 3674, February 28, is the translation of Kosygin's letter to President Johnson (Document 185). A copy of the telegram is in Department of State, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR File, Pen Pal Series, 1963. /3/Telegram 3675, February 28, is the translation of Gromyko's oral statement delivered in connection with Kosygin's letter to President Johnson (Document 186). A copy of the telegram is in Department of State, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR File, Pen Pal Series, 1963. /4/In telegram 3676, February 28, Ambassador Thompson noted that "at nine-thirty this morning Gromyko handed me Kosygin's reply to President's letter on ABMs and made some oral remarks." In this same telegram, Ambassador Thompson inquired about the possibility of a Department of State or White House response to Gromyko's statement and he asked for press guidance. A copy of the telegram is ibid. 1. I interpret Kosygin's letter and Gromyko's statement as effort to establish good negotiating position rather than intention avoid serious discussion. Although not spelled out, implicit in Gromyko's remarks is Soviet unwillingness to freeze present strategic balance which we have publicly boasted is in our favor. This, however, is difficult for Soviets to admit. 2. Possible approach to solution would be agreement by which Soviet would maintain present ABM deployment around Moscow, agree not to complete or activate other ABM launchers, and Soviets would be allowed to complete or harden agreed number of additional launchers which number would still be less than ours in view of their Moscow ABM deployment, larger territory and greater dispersal their targets, large size some of their warheads, etc. Both sides would be free to improve quality of their missiles. Since Soviets doubtless have a number of missiles in their production pipeline, our agreement for increase on their part would have some practical appeal. The alternative of some decrease in our missiles would make it easier for them to justify abstention from ABM deployment and would have greater appeal to world opinion. If we decide insist on deactivization Moscow complex they will probably demand parity in number of launchers. 3. Best way to proceed to rapid agreement would be for us to pre-sent concrete proposal but I realize this is difficult in view of uncertainty about their present deployment ABMs. 4. While would be useful to have expert assistance here, each step in negotiation at this stage will have to be considered at top level here which will be time consuming and I doubt if presence of expert yet justified. 5. I trust that any public statement on our part will be confined to announcement receipt of reply to President's letter and fact that discussions taking place in Moscow with no indication of position taken. Thompson
188. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, March 4, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State 1967. Secret. The source text was submitted under cover of a March 4 memorandum from Mildred J. Asbjornson (S) to the Secretary informing him that "Mr. Gene Rostow has asked if you would meet with him and Messrs. Leddy, Kohler, possibly this afternoon on the trilateral talks." The handwritten initials "DR" next to an approving line indicate that Rusk agreed to meet at 3:30 p.m. that afternoon. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Sir: A dissenting memorandum from EUR is at Tab C." This attachment, not printed, consists of two parts. The first, undated telegram drafted by George S. Springsteen (EUR), cleared by Leddy (EUR), Hinton (EUR/RPE), Baker (EUR/RPM), Fisher, and Rostow, and approved by Rusk, expresses EUR's principal view that alternative suggestions should be considered to gain our Allies agreement on Article III which could then be broached to the Soviets. Specifically, Springsteen wrote, "We are prepared to take account of two suggestions they [the Europeans] have advanced. One would concern compatible treatment of transition period throughout draft and other would deal with definitional problem of special materials and equipment." Part two is a March 4 covering memorandum from Leddy to Rusk. SUBJECT Attached (at Tab A) is a draft revision of Article III which, in accordance with our discussions of a few days ago, specifies the possibility of IAEA verification of Euratom safeguards. The draft article contains three other changes which should be helpful to our Allies. In response to concerns expressed to us, the new draft makes clear that there is the same substantial transition period for all undertakings in the article. There is no longer a provision requiring safeguards on the exports of non-nuclear materials or equipment. And there is a statement that the purpose of the article is to prevent diversion of materials to nuclear weapons manufacture. These last two changes could be quite helpful to gain FRG assent since the FRG, as you know, has feared that the present article might be a basis for communist espionage or for interference in peaceful industrial and scientific endeavors. The key question is whether we put an article along these lines to the Soviets before we discuss it with our allies. We feel strongly that we should. However, there is difference of view on this question. I would, therefore, recommend that you hold a meeting to discuss the issue, to which you might want to invite Mr. Rostow, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Leddy and myself. I believe that the case for proceeding with the Soviets first rests on the fact that, while the chances of the Soviet's acceptance of the revised Article may be great enough to justify proceeding with it, we will have considerably greater difficulty in selling the revised Article III to them than we will to our Allies. If we have developed the Article with our allies first and are unable to negotiate it with the Soviets, we have started a chain of events which may result in our inability to obtain any effective safeguards Article at all. We believe the Russians may fear that under the proposed article the US and its influential Western friends in the IAEA will fight strenuously for IAEA acceptance of Euratom safeguards with only a minimum of IAEA verification. They may thus want to avoid a situation in which they might be forced to utilize obstructionist tactics in the IAEA to ensure what they believe would be reliable IAEA verification of Euratom. The Soviets have also emphasized with us that safeguards must be exactly equal for Soviet allies as for US allies. The Soviets may not wish to place themselves in a situation in which, for whatever reason, they may feel compelled to establish parallel regional safeguards in Eastern Europe. It is of course clearly in our interest to avoid this also. If our doubts about negotiability with the Soviets should prove correct and if we should have proceeded with our allies first, we would then face a very difficult and possibly unmanageable situation. We would have far less prospect of a safeguards article for inclusion in the treaty, and we might have lost a month or more of valuable time. I also attach (at Tab B) draft talking points which we could use with the Russians when presenting this article for their consideration on an urgent basis within the next day or two. We would of course try to get an answer from the Russians as quickly as possible. But even on the assumption that no answer came back before Foster held his talks in Bonn, he could still have valuable safeguards discussions with the Germans. Among other things he could: 1. Explain to the Germans some possible amendments which we think in any event would be sellable to the Soviets, i.e., making clear that purpose of the article is to prevent manufacture of nuclear weapons, deletion of requirement for safeguards on exports of non-nuclear materials and equipment, and specification that there is a substantial transition period on all undertakings in the article; 2. Ask the Germans if it would be helpful for the US to undertake IAEA safeguards on a large segment of its peaceful nuclear facilities (assuming, of course, that Presidential approval for the offer is obtained); 3. Tell the Germans that we fully support the principle that non-nuclear countries should be inspected by IAEA inspectors of non-nuclear nationality (this is possible under existing procedures of the IAEA); 4. On verification of IAEA by Euratom, tell the Germans that we are in fact pushing with the Soviets the concept of IAEA verification of Euratom but we cannot be certain whether this can result in a change in the safeguards article; 5. Undertake with the Germans to give prompt study to any possibilities of developing additional automatic means of inspection, e.g., "black boxes." As Director of ACDA, Mr. Foster might state the willingness of ACDA to launch an immediate research program with ACDA funds. Recommendation: That you hold a meeting with Messrs. Rostow, Kohler, Leddy, and Fisher during the weekend or on Monday morning to discuss Article III./2/ /2/This sentence, along with the preceding word "Recommendation," has been inserted by hand on the source text.
Tab A/3/ /3/Secret. ARTICLE III (Safeguards) For the purpose of providing assurance that nuclear materials used or produced in peaceful nuclear facilities are not diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Parties agree upon the following provisions. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to accept, on all its peaceful nuclear activities, the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency or international safeguards the operation of which that Agency accepts and verifies as equally effective. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to provide source or fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State unless the material is subject to such safeguards. The safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be applied as soon as practicable but no later than three years after the entry into force of this Treaty, except with respect to activities or materials to which other international safeguards are being applied that meet the foregoing requirements of acceptance and verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Tab B/4/ /4/Secret. TALKING POINTS Revised Article III To Be Transmitted to Soviet Union 1. New article contains changes which we believe will greatly increase chance its final acceptance by US's Western European allies. However, amendments do not lessen fundamental effectiveness of article. 2. Article now requires IAEA safeguards or international safeguards the operation of which the IAEA accepts and verifies as equally effective. If the IAEA does accept and does verify as equally effective any regional system of safeguards, we believe this will provide reliable assurance to the IAEA and its members that effective safeguards are being applied. As practical matter, Soviet Union should take into account that IAEA countries subject to IAEA safeguards will not permit IAEA to accept any other safeguards as equally effective unless agreed verification arrangements with the IAEA are in fact reliable. 3. New article provides for transition period of three years from entry into force of treaty. Soviet representatives have previously informed US that transition period could be one, two, or three years. 4. New article states that purpose of article is to provide assurance that nuclear materials are not diverted to manufacture of nuclear weapons. We do not believe this changes any basic assumptions, but it will be helpful for many of our allies who wish reassurance that safeguards will not be used as basis for intervening in peaceful nuclear activities having no relationship to manufacture of weapons. 5. The article no longer contains requirement that exports of non-nuclear materials or equipment will be subject to safeguards. We believe this is not a significant change since there remains clear requirement that all peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear weapon parties will be subject to safeguards. 6. US remains strongly committed to negotiating an effective safeguards article in the NPT. We believe changes described above should meet all concerns expressed to us in the past by the Soviet Union and could result in widespread acceptance by the Western European countries, whose acceptance of the article is essential. 7. We request the Soviet Union to provide us its acceptance or comments on the new article as rapidly as possible since we are anxious to submit it to our allies. If a favorable response can shortly be received from the Soviet Union, we would be hopeful of including such an article in a co-chairman's NPT text to be submitted in the near future at the ENDC.
189. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, March 5, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret. SUBJECT Attached is a proposed memorandum to the President drafted to carry out the decisions you made at our Saturday meeting./2/ The memorandum and its enclosure have been cleared with EUR. /2/This meeting with Rusk at 3:30 p.m., Saturday, March 4, was attended by Eugene Rostow, Kohler, Leddy, and Fisher. At this meeting an action memorandum was circulated on the topic of the nonproliferation safeguards article; see footnote 1, Document 188. At the risk of sounding like a stuck whistle and at the risk of overloading even your magnificent quality of patience, I can't help but say that I believe this course of action would be a mistake. Myron Kratzer of the AEC, who has just returned from intensive technical consultations in the FRG, is of the view that a safeguards article along the lines we have been previously discussing could be agreed on with the FRG if we took care of certain of their objections./3/ /3/On Monday, March 6, AEC Chairman Seaborg met with Myron Kratzer and other members of the Atomic Energy Commission to discuss Rusk's recommendation that Article III be modified to accept verification of Euratom safeguards by the IAEA. For documentation on the AEC's position on and objections to Rusk's proposal, see Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 14, pp. 272-275. I have attached a safeguards article which I would recommend. It contains three changes helpful to the FRG. The new draft makes clear that there is the same substantial transition period for all undertakings in the article. The provision relating to safeguards on the exports of non-nuclear materials or equipment makes it clear that it is only the fissionable material produced with these items, and not the items themselves, which are subject to safeguards. And there is a statement that the purpose of the article is to prevent diversion of materials to nuclear weapons development or manufacture. These last two changes could be quite helpful to gain FRG assent since the FRG has feared that the present article might be a basis for communist espionage or for interference in peaceful industrial endeavors. Mr. Kratzer also believes the FRG can be satisifed that they will not have to accept Soviet inspectors from the IAEA by getting the FRG to understand that this is the case under the present IAEA rules, provided this interpretation is given them in writing and we assure them of our support in case their rejection of Soviet inspectors is challenged in the IAEA. I have discussed this matter with Mr. Leddy and he does not agree with the views expressed in this memorandum except that he does agree with the Memorandum to the President. Adrian/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that indicates Fisher signed the original.
Attachment 1/5/ /5/Secret. ARTICLE III (Safeguards) For the purpose of providing assurance that nuclear materials used or produced in peaceful nuclear facilities are not diverted to the development or manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices: (1) Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards on all its peaceful nuclear activities. In assisting non-nuclear-weapon States with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to provide to any such non-nuclear-weapon State: (a) source material or special fissionable material unless the material shall be subject to such safeguards; or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of fissionable material unless the fissionable material shall be subject to such safeguards. (2) The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied as soon as practicable but not later than three years after the entry into force of this Treaty.
Attachment 2/6/ /6/Secret. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT We are now entering a new phase in our consultations with our allies on non-proliferation. Bill Foster will be visiting key European capitals--Bonn, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels--during the next two weeks to further clarify questions that have been asked about the treaty draft, and hopefully to convince key leaders that their legitimate concerns are or will be taken care of. We will also consult with the Japanese and Canadians here in Washington--though their concerns are in some instances different than those of our other allies. As part of the consultation process we have already given key allies an Oral Note which includes draft Summary of Interpretations of the present treaty text,/7/ which we would propose to show the Soviets after this phase of allied consultation, but before a treaty text is actually tabled in Geneva. We have also given our allies a fuller version of the treaty text. This version is complete except for Article III, dealing with safeguards, the text of which is still under consideration. This Article will be considered as part of new consultations. /7/See Document 183. It is my hope that these new consultations would end in a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held as soon as possible after Mr. Foster's trip. At the Council meeting we will seek a "no objections" agreement to the U.S. and Soviet Co-Chairmen tabling a joint draft in Geneva which would be recommended by the two governments for consideration by the Conference. The problems which will be dealt with during these talks fall into three general areas: The first relates to the development of an acceptable Article dealing with safeguards. The second relates to the manner in which we make it clear that the non-proliferation treaty will not prevent the creation of a federated European state. The third relates to a variety of other problems, some dealing with NATO security arrangements but more dealing with problems of national competition in the field of peaceful nuclear energy. I. I am attaching as Tab A a draft revision of Article III which, in accordance with our discussions of a few days ago, specifies the possibility of IAEA verification of Euratom safeguards./8/ The revised draft contains changes which should be helpful to our allies. /8/Not printed. The key question with respect to the handling of this proposed revision relates to the timing of the discussions of this revised Article III with our allies. In view of the strong feelings of our Euratom allies on this subject, I would propose that ideas in the revised Article III be discussed by Bill Foster with our allies on his forthcoming trip. I would hope that one of them can be persuaded to sponsor the text of a revised Article III as its own; I have either the Federal Republic of Germany or Belgium particularly in mind for this purpose. It is not at all certain, however, that an Article of this kind will be negotiable with the USSR because, among other reasons, of the implied blessing they might feel that it gives Euratom. I am particularly anxious to avoid a situation in which we lose a month or so of valuable time, or having agreed with our allies with an Article III which the Soviets reject, find ourselves under increasing pressure from both allies and Soviets to drop the safeguards article. To initiate Soviet consideration of this approach I am instructing Bill Foster to indicate the concept, but not the details, of this particular solution to his Soviet counterpart before he leaves Geneva. At the same time the allies should be advised that if the revised Article III should prove non-negotiable with the Soviets, it would not mean that we would lose interest in the subject of safeguards, but we would be considering other approaches, including those along the lines of the original Article III that has been the subject of our recent consultation. It would help overcome some allied fears that safeguards would hinder peaceful nuclear programs and involve risk of industrial espionage, if we would indicate at a propitious time that we are considering an offer to invite IAEA to apply safeguards on a broad scale to U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities at such a time as IAEA safeguards are applied to non-nuclear weapons states. In concert with the AEC, I have instituted a program of consultations with key Congressional leaders on this point. The initial reaction has been favorable, but I will let you know when we have carried this program somewhat further. II. With respect to the federated Europe problem, the objective which we can realistically hope to achieve is Soviet silence, or non-contradiction, when our allies and later the United States, assert that the treaty would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. We cannot realistically expect the Soviets to say that they have agreed to the creation of such a new federated European state since they would have political objections to such a merger which transcend the problems of non-proliferation, but we can expect them not to assert that this treaty bars a federated Europe with nuclear weapon capabilities. The Oral Note which we have given key allies contains a number of our interpretations dealing with the effect of the treaty. One of them, dealing with the problem of European unity, states that the draft treaty: " . . . does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external security functions including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to be so centralised as to assume all governmental functions. It would bar, however, transfer (including ownership) of nuclear weapons or control over them to a new multilateral or other entity lacking the attributes of a federated state essential to bring into play the legal doctrine of succession." This is based on the principle that the treaty deals only with what is prohibited. We will state that this is what we have told our allies, that this is what we will be required to state in our Congress and if they publicly contradict us, by stating that the Treaty prohibits a federated Europe succeeding to nuclear assets of component states, such contradictions would undoubtedly result in the collapse of the Treaty. III. With respect to the other articles of the treaty we would anticipate that the Oral Note Ambassador McGhee gave Kiesinger on February 22 will meet most German requirements. There are various other German concerns and requests; some of these we can probably meet although some of them, such as the request for a U.S.-German treaty assuring the Federal Republic of continued American supplies of fissionable material, special nuclear guarantees beyond our commitments involved in NATO, and veto rights on the use of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on German territory, we cannot meet in the context of the negotiations on the draft text to be tabled in the ENDC. We can at this time tell the Germans that we are prepared to discuss the question of assuring the continued supply of fissionable materials--though not in treaty form. We should also tell them that we are prepared to work out veto arrangements similar to those we have with some of our other NATO allies. We do not believe we can or should give any encouragement to their request for further security guarantees. A favorable response to the first two requests may prove to be strong inducements for German support for the Treaty. In any event, resolution of most of the additional points the Germans wish to discuss need not be obtained before tabling the draft treaty but rather would have to be resolved before the Germans were faced with the question of ratifying a final text. What we will need to nail down with the Germans in order to obtain their "no objection" to our tabling a draft will be the questions of the text of Article III and whether the interpretations of the treaty which we have given them are satisfactory. We therefore will seek an early German response on these points. I believe that the question of whether the Italians can be persuaded to acquiesce in the "no objection" formula will be in large part dependent upon whether we have the Germans on board at that time. The Italians are less likely to object if, at the time of the NAC discussions, they are the only holdouts. A letter from me to Fanfani might be in order and perhaps one from you to the Prime Minister. [Continue with the next documents]
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