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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
200. Letter from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, August 4, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Committee of Principals Record Book, January-December, 1967. Secret; Restricted Data. The source text was sent to Rusk under cover of an August 14 memorandum from Kohler requesting Rusk's approval to circulate the source text to the members of the Committee of Principals. Rusk indicated his approval with a checkmark on the covering memorandum with the date "8/15/67" next to it. Dear Dean: Bill Foster's reply to Mrs. Myrdal at the ENDC meeting of July 11, 1967 on the subject of our attitude toward a comprehensive test ban was quite appropriate in the light of our stated policy./2/ On the other hand I am concerned that our present commitments to our defense requirements may be in conflict with the interpretation made by some that given adequate inspection we are prepared to accept immediately a comprehensive test ban treaty. /2/For Foster's reply, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 294-298. On June 29 Mrs. Myrdal, the Swedish Representative to the ENDC, delivered a statement to the ENDC in which she urged that a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests be considered in any discussion of a comprehensive test ban. (Ibid., pp. 272-278) Several days later Charles Johnson informed Walt Rostow in a July 7 memorandum of the views of several agencies on Foster's proposed draft response to Mrs. Myrdal's statement. In his memorandum, Johnson emphasized to Rostow that "ACDA believes strongly that we must rebut Mrs. Myrdal's charge that we have lost interest in the CTB because failure to do so would have a very adverse effect on our position on the NPT negotiations." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. III, Box 6) You will recall that at a Meeting of the Principals about a year ago,/3/ we discussed our policy regarding a possible threshold test ban treaty of a comprehensive test ban treaty. At that time certain estimates were made regarding the period of underground testing that might be required in order to complete the accelerated testing of nuclear weapons that then might be regarded as indispensable for future security. /3/Regarding this meeting, see Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 26, pp. 312-316. Since that time our requirements for these new weapons have been further clarified and our careful and detailed analysis of possible accelerated weapons development and test programs has given us sufficient additional information to indicate that the time estimates of a year ago cannot now be considered to be realistic. Therefore, the Atomic Energy Commission believes that it might be useful to give you a brief assessment of the situation as it now exists. As you know, the DOD and AEC are currently developing a complete new generation of weapons for the strategic offensive forces. Both development and proof tests are required for these high priority systems. Additionally, since these new systems will constitute the major U.S. response to the Soviet ABM deployment, it is vitally important that there be assessments of their vulnerability to nuclear attack. This requires exposure of components and assemblies to large fluxes of neutrons, gamma and X-rays that can only be provided by nuclear detonations. The development of the techniques for carrying out these nuclear effects tests within the constraints of the limited test ban treaty has been an important achievement of recent time. The requirement for continued underground testing is further emphasized by the Spartan 6MT, "hot" X-ray ABM warhead. Development and confirmation testing of this warhead by underground techniques involves efforts at least through 1970 because a capability to test at this yield must also be developed. The need to test has not been and presumably will not be entirely dependent on developments for the future stockpile. There have been instances in which nuclear testing was the only solution or that which offered the highest degree of confidence with respect to the urgent correction of defects found in stockpile weapons affecting either operational reliability or safety. I had personally hoped that the necessary underground testing associated with the development of the DOD weapons systems could be accelerated so that the results would be available at an earlier time; however, I cannot find a way, despite a great deal of personal attention to the problem. I realize the advantages of taking steps beyond the present limited test ban treaty as soon as it is feasible and I continue to be hopeful that we can reach some broader agreements with the Soviets. I thought that this information might be useful to you, and I would be pleased to discuss it further with you if you believe that this would be helpful. Cordially, Glenn
201. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 10, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/21/67, Vol. II, Box 26. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "rec'd 1:46 p.m." Mr. President: Bill Foster called to say that the Russians have informed him that they are prepared to table the NPT jointly with us with a blank Article III./2/ /2/For a discussion of this Article, see Foster's statement, August 24, to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 342-347. There are two Soviet proposed amendments/3/ to work out; but they look to Foster manageable. /3/Foster sent President Johnson a memorandum, August 10, on the "Proposed Submission by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the Geneva Conference." This memorandum was also sent to Secretary Rusk. In this memorandum Foster informed the President that in the U.S. text of the Treaty which was recommended to the Soviets, Article V, the amendments' clause, contained two alternatives. Foster wrote, "The first alternative provides only the nuclear weapon parties with a veto on amendments, but does not oblige any party to accept amendments which it does not approve. The second alternative provides a veto for the nuclear weapons parties and all other parties who are members of the IAEA Board of Governors, but also provides that once adopted amendments are applicable to all." The United States preferred the first, and informed the Soviets and its allies of this, though either was acceptable. The Soviets, however, preferred the second. (Memorandum for the President; Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the White House, 1967) He will inform the Gore sub-committee tomorrow morning; testify before the Appropriations sub-committee tomorrow afternoon;/4/ return to Geneva, leaving Dulles at 8:00 p.m. Saturday. /4/For Foster's testimony on the afternoon of August 11, see Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1968: Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session. (Washington, 1968), pp. 989-1019. Now the game will move to the non-nuclear powers; and some months of negotiations lie ahead. But it is something of an event. He is, of course, available if you wish to see him. Walt
202. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, August 28, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret; Noforn. SUBJECT On several occasions over recent years the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has made clear that a U.S. decision to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense system would have serious consequences for U.S. arms control objectives. In a speech to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference [Committee] on August 16, 1966,/2/ the U.S. pointed out how we believe that ABM deployment would exacerbate the strategic arms race. This effect was also made clear in Secretary McNamara's statement to Congress on January 23, 1967,/3/ and was a basis for President Johnson's suggestion to Premier Kosygin that U.S.-U.S.S.R. discussions should be held in order to control this race./4/ Even though the ABM deployment were limited, we still believe it would pose serious risks to our arms control objectives, in the first instance the non-proliferation treaty. /2/Statement by ACDA Deputy Director Fisher; see Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 562-567. /3/Presumably a reference to McNamara's military posture statement given to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Department of Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, January 25; for text, see ibid., 1967, pp. 5-24. /4/See Document 178. The ultimate decision with respect to deployment of an ABM system will, of course, be made in the light of the total range of considerations affecting U.S. security, including the Chinese Communist build-up and the Soviet failure to date to agree to the initiation of discussions on controlling the strategic arms race. If these considerations were to lead to an early U.S. decision to initiate deployment of an ABM system notwithstanding the adverse effects of such a decision on U.S. arms control objectives, I believe it would be essential that certain actions be undertaken by the U.S. Government in order to minimize insofar as possible these adverse effects. In particular, every effort must be made to avoid such a U.S. decision from preventing the maximum acceptance of and continued adherence to a non-proliferation treaty by non-nuclear-weapons countries. With this objective in mind, I am forwarding herewith for your consideration a paper suggesting various actions which might be taken by the U.S. Government in the event of a U.S. decision to deploy ABMs. I and my representatives will be glad to discuss this with you and your staffs at your earliest convenience. Adrian S. Fisher
Enclosure/5/ August 25, 1967. /5/Secret; Noforn. CONTINGENCY PAPER ON THE ARMS CONTROL If a U.S. decision were to be made to deploy an ABM system along the lines of the "I-67 Program" (an area defense system with hard-point defense of some Minuteman complexes), then extremely important arms control considerations would have to be taken into account prior to the announcement of any such decision. Such a deployment would probably be based upon and justified by the emerging Chinese ICBM capabilities and the continued Soviet offensive missile buildup; the area defense component would provide protection against Chinese ICBM's and possible accidental launches, and the hard-point defense of Minuteman would decrease the vulnerability of this component of our assured destruction capability by raising the "cost" to the Soviets should they attempt a counterforce first strike. Such a U.S. ABM deployment decision at this time could have adverse effects on at least four important U.S. arms control objectives: 1. Preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons by obtaining maximum acceptance of and continued adherence to a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); 2. Controlling the offensive and defensive strategic arms race between the U.S. and the USSR; 3. Assuring the continued adherence to existing arms control agreements; specifically, the "Limited Test Ban" (LTB) treaty; and 4 Maintaining continued U.S. Government support of stated U.S. policy positions on important arms control proposals; specifically, the cutoff in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes ("Cutoff") and the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). The potentially adverse consequences of a U.S. ABM deployment decision on the foregoing arms control objectives could be minimized by the following recommended specific actions: 1. Private discussion with the USSR prior to announcing our ABM deployment decision emphasizing: a. The emerging Chinese ICBM threat as a primary basis for our decision; b. The "limited" nature of the planned deployment and our intentions to keep it "limited"; c. The hard-point defense of Minuteman as a partial response to continued Soviet offensive missile buildups, and as posing no threat to the USSR per se; d. The increasing importance of achieving meaningful private discussions between our two nations on ways of controlling the strategic arms race in order to prevent any misunderstanding as to the nature of any deployment and to avoid further escalation of the strategic arms race; e. The importance and urgency of showing some progress in other arms control areas, such as meaningful discussion on controlling the strategic arms race, in order to secure the widest possible acceptance of and adherence to the NPT; and f. The increasing pressures of many of our respective allies for their own offensive and defensive strategic systems and associated nuclear warheads if they observe a continued strategic arms buildup by the USSR and the U.S. 2. Private discussions with NATO prior to announcing our ABM deployment decision,/6/ emphasizing the first four points under "1" above as well as: /6/Note: The U.S. must be prepared to discuss the issues involved in ABM deployment at the Disarmament Experts' Meeting in Paris, September 12-15, 1967, and at the Ankara NPG Meeting, September 28 and 29, 1967. [Footnote in the source text.] a. The emerging Chinese missile threat is not directed towards Europe; b. There are no hardened strategic missile deterrent forces in Europe suitable for hard-point ABM defenses (FYI, future French solid IRBM silo deployments are not a part of U.S. NATO strategic missile deterrent); c. ABM defenses of overall urban populations against present and future Soviet offensive missile capabilities are not feasible at this time for either Europe or the U.S.; d. Some U.S. defense against the emerging Chinese ICBM threat can provide the U.S. more flexibility in its actions in support of its allies and friends around the world; e. The fact that the Soviets were the first to initiate ABM deployment and the very limited nature of our ABM deployment need not cause a new spiral in the U.S.-USSR strategic arms race; and f. Such an ABM deployment decision should not decrease in any way importance and desirability of an equitable NPT to other nations. 3. Private discussions with Japan prior to announcing our ABM deployment decision emphasizing: a. The continued deterrent value of the overwhelming strategic superiority that the U.S. will possess for the foreseeable future over the Communist Chinese, and the continued utility of this strategic deterrent in protecting the vital interests of Japan; b. Our ABM deployment in face of an emerging Chinese offensive missile capability is supplemental to our strategic deterrent forces and is designed to decrease U.S. vulnerabilities to possible Chinese threats of attack and thereby enhance the credibility of our commitments to Japan and other friendly nations (we do not consider China to be an irrational adversary); c. The U.S. is firmly committed to achieving an equitable NPT and does not consider that a U.S. ABM deployment decision should in any way decrease the desirability of an NPT to other nations. In fact, for the reason indicated in "b" above, the need for nuclear weapons by nations friendly to the U.S. will be reduced as will the utility of nuclear weapons to nations which may be enemies of the U.S.; and d. Our willingness to continue to hold detailed discussions with Japan on the overall ballistic missile defense problems--technical, military, economic, and political. 4. India will also require timely consultations, particularly in light of the growing Chinese threat and current NPT negotiations. Shortly after the announcement of our ABM deployment decision, a high-level discussion with Indian representatives should take place emphasizing the same first three points made with Japan (see "3 a, b, and c" above) and the points to be made public under paragraph "5" below. With India one should also emphasize that the U.S. ABM deployment decision is one of the least provocative U.S. responses to the continuing Soviet offensive missile buildup and the emerging Chinese missile capabilities. 5. At the time that the U.S. ABM deployment decision is made public, the following points should be clearly stated and emphasized by senior U.S. officials: a. While the U.S. has demonstrated its reluctance to initiate ABM deployment, this was the only prudent decision in face of an emerging Chinese ICBM capability and our need to protect our Minuteman force against the continued buildups in Soviet offensive missile capabilities; b. The limited scope and purposes of the planned ABM deployment emphatically stating that such deployment need not trigger a new strategic arms race between the U.S. and the USSR, and that the U.S. still desires meaningful discussions with the USSR on ways for controlling the overall strategic arms race involving both offensive and defensive weapons systems; c. The U.S. continues to consider the achievement of an equitable NPT as a priority goal; d. The U.S. ABM deployment decision in no way interferes with or detracts from stated U.S. positions involving important U.S. arms control objectives; and e. The planned ABM deployment will not require any nuclear tests which are inconsistent with the present LTB. 6. Specific talking papers on the arms control considerations of our ABM deployment should be prepared for use by our ambassadors and other senior officials in various private and public forums shortly after our ABM deployment decision is made public. Early consultations within the U.S. Government on the above-proposed course of actions should be held and specific actions agreed to in order that necessary staff-level preparations may be completed on a timely basis.
203. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, August 29, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, ABM Negotiations (II), Box 231. Secret. SUBJECT Having reflected on it overnight, I am convinced that it would be very undesirable, domestically and internationally, to announce in mid-September a decision to deploy a limited ABM system. The unusual procedure of a special mid-September announcement/2/ would focus domestic and international attention on the decision and associate an undesirable urgency with the program. If the decision must be made, I believe it would be much wiser to announce it in January in connection with the many issues in the FY-1969 budget. /2/In a speech delivered on September 18 to the United Press International Editors and Publishers, McNamara discussed the current U.S. defense policy toward prevention of a thermonuclear war, and specifically about the possibility of deploying an ABM defense system. For text of this speech, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 382-394. Additional documentation on the origins and drafting of this speech is scheduled for publication in volume X. Domestically, I do not believe that the announcement will make anyone happy. Those opposed to ABM deployment will not be mollified by the limited nature of the system which they will consider as simply a foot in the door for a major deployment. Those in favor of an ABM deployment will consider it an inadequate program that does not serve the basic purpose for protecting the US population from Soviet attack and will immediately press for an expansion of the system. The military strategists who desire further protection of our retaliatory missile force will consider the program entirely inadequate since it backs off from the minimum program previously considered in the Pentagon and apparently eliminates all hard-point defense for Minuteman. If made in January, the announcement would be submerged to some extent in the many other problems and decisions in the FY-1969 budget. The anti-ABM forces would probably be somewhat appeased by the restraint on other strategic systems where McNamara will presumably be holding the line against the military; and the pro-ABM forces would be more aware of the competition for funds and the severe budgetary limitations on a broader system at this time. Internationally, the decision will be received, no matter what McNamara says, both as a major step-up in the nuclear arms race and as an impressive demonstration that the Chinese have achieved the status of a major nuclear power. In this context, a mid-September announcement would have a particularly adverse effect on the prospects for the NPT. It would clearly be seized upon by India, which has not yet committed itself on the NPT and has always called for a reversal in the US-Soviet nuclear arms race, as an additional reason for not supporting the treaty. This will still be a problem in January. However, if we can get India further committed on the NPT in the next few months, we might then have more success with the argument that India and others would have greater assurance that we would in fact respond to Chinese nuclear aggression provided we had a limited anti-Chinese ABM deployment. With regard to the Soviets, while the argument can be made that an early deployment decision would increase the pressure on the Soviets to discuss the ABM problem, I think that on balance it would reduce whatever small prospects there might otherwise be for such talks this year--certainly given McNamara's emphasis on our massive strategic superiority. In summary, I can see no real reasons or political advantages in announcing an ABM deployment decision at this time and some real problems that such a decision would create for the Administration. I recommend therefore that if the decision must be made it should be announced in January in the context of the FY-1969 budget. Spurgeon
204. Letter From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to the Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (Foster)/1/ Washington, September 1, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 80, Miscellaneous Papers. Secret; Exdis. FOR MR. FOSTER ONLY Dear Bill: This letter is for the purpose of keeping you abreast of developments in the ABM field. You will have received my August 28 memorandum to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and Walt Rostow on "Arms Control Considerations of a U.S. Anti-Ballistic Missile Deployment Decision."/2/ When it became apparent that things were moving toward a decision to initiate deployment of an ABM system, I spoke to Secretary Rusk and to Secretary McNamara urging that the announcement of such a decision be delayed, and pointing out its adverse effects on the NPT negotiations. /2/See Document 202. A decision, however, has been made to have Secretary McNamara announce the U.S. plan to deploy a thin ABM system in a speech which he will make on September 18./3/ It is presently planned to inform NAC on September 14; the Perm Reps will probably then join the Disarmament Experts Meeting later in the afternoon of the same day for a discussion of some of the implications, including those relating to arms control. /3/See footnote 2, Document 203. I know that the announcement on September 18 will pose very real problems for the current NPT negotiations. Hopefully, we will be able to arm you with the kind of statements recommended in Recommendation 5 of the contingency paper which I circulated in my memorandum of August 28./4/ We will be working on a contingency statement that you can use in Geneva to meet the excepted charges by those who would see a U.S. ABM deployment as a peg on which to hang criticism of the NPT effort. In any event I did want you to be forewarned of the planned announcement. /4/See the enclosure, Document 202. I am sure you will want to take the September 18 announcement into account in weighing the pros and cons of an early ENDC adjournment. It certainly will not be easier in Geneva after the 18th and it might well be better not to provide some of the opponents of the NPT with a ready-made forum after the 18th. The September 18 announcement is being treated here as a most sensitive subject and I would suggest that you limit knowledge of it to yourself and George Bunn. Sincerely, Adrian
205. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/ Geneva, September 1, 1967, 1909Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. 703. Disto. Subject: Co-Chairmen's Meeting --Soviet Recommendation on Article III. For Secretary and Fisher from Foster. 1. Summary: At September 1 Co-Chairmen's meeting at Roshchin's initiative, Soviets presented Foster with text of draft Art III (sent septel)./2/ Roshchin said there were many elements of draft which would be troublesome for Moscow to accept, but that his delegation had taken into account views presented by US regarding special Euratom problems. Roshchin said he considered draft best possible compromise between US and Soviet positions. He could not predict whether it would be acceptable to his superiors but would recommend it to Moscow for acceptance. Foster said he would report draft presented by Soviet delegation as basis for solution to Art III impasse. Foster said not sure that Washington would find Soviet draft satisfactory either to US Govt or its allies. However, he recognized that Soviet draft represented considerable departure from earlier Soviet position on NPT safeguards and that it had been the result of fruitful exchange of views between delegations. Foster said he would recommend Soviet draft to Washington as something US Govt should try out on US allies. /2/For the Soviet draft of Article III, see Document 206. 2. Details: Roshchin asked for Co-Chairmen meeting Sept 1 in order to present Soviet compromise proposal for Article III. Roshchin noted that Bunn and Gleysteen on US side and Antyasov and Shustov on Soviet side had debated two drafts following Aug 26 Co-Chairmen's meeting (Geneva 629)./3/ Soviets had obtained greater insight into safeguards problems as result Aug 26 and earlier Co-Chairmen's meetings and problems their draft Article III posed for US and its Euratom allies. These points had been further clarified during informal meetings of Deloffs. Foregoing had made it possible for Soviet delegation to present draft Art III which Roshchin thought takes into account problems of US and special interests of Euratom allies. Roshchin said Soviet draft had not been discussed with Moscow and he was not sure whether it would be acceptable, but he was prepared to recommend it as best possible compromise between Soviet position that IAEA safeguards apply to all non-nuclear-weapon signatories and US position that Article would have to take into account political realities of US alliance structure. /3/Telegram 629 from Geneva, August 26, reports: "At August 26 Roshchin luncheon, Foster reviewed tactical situation in ENDC, saying it most important to have ENDC recommendation of NPT in some form before draft passed on to UNGA. Roshchin said ENDC could not endorse NPT as a committee without unanimity, but saw no problem in finding procedural means to report to UNGA submission NPT by Co-Chairmen and status of debate on it in ENDC. Roshchin considered it essential to reach Co-Chairmen agreement on safeguards and security assurances as soon as possible in order that NPT would be easier defend at UNGA. Foster gave long review of U.S. and Soviet drafts on Art. III, pointing out deficiencies and loopholes of Soviet draft. Foster also pointed out need for Soviets to start moving on ABMs and conventional arms transfers before too late." (Department of State, S/S-I Files, Exdis/Limdis Telegrams/Airgrams, Reel 163A, August 25, 1967-September 9, 1967) 3. Foster said he would recommend Soviet draft as something to try out on Washington and on our allies. Foster said that while we are anxious to resolve Art III issue before NPT draft is moved on to UN, we of course would have to obtain views of allies before tabling any Co-Chairmen draft on Art III. While he personally hoped Soviet draft might provide basis for compromise of conflicting interests and recognized that Soviets had made important concessions, he could only say he would recommend draft to Washington for presentation to US allies. 4. Foster and Roshchin agreed that utmost discretion required to avoid leaks. 5. Several days after Co-Chairmen's meeting of 26 Aug, Antyasov and Shustov invited Bunn and Gleysteen to meet. Soviets suggested that Soviet Art III be utilized but that following language be added to it: "The above-mentioned guaranties shall apply to the states as provided for in the statute of the IAEA and the document on safeguards." Soviets contended that our Euratom allies could enter into "bilateral or multilateral" arrangements with IAEA because they were provided for in IAEA statute and safeguards document. They also said they thought some of our allies would like a specific reference to the IAEA safeguards document. 6. We said Soviet suggestion inadequate because it did not contain language from US Art III on following points: (1) Clear statement of purpose of safeguards in beginning; (2) Right of Euratom members to enter into verification agreement with IAEA through Euratom and related provisions recognizing important role of Euratom; (3) Application of safeguards to "source or special fissionable material within its territory or under its jurisdiction" rather than to "its nuclear activities" as in Soviet text; (4) Three-year transition period; (5) Language re economic and technological development and safeguarded international interchange of nuclear materials and equipment; (6) More precise language for export provision. 7. Subsequently Soviet Deloffs presented US Deloffs with text substantially same as text reported septel except for first sentence. They said they could not accept US statement of purpose because it referred to "source or special fissionable material" and Moscow would suggest addition of "principal nuclear facility." As to other references to "source and special fissionable material" in US text, they could perhaps be accepted provided language from safeguards document on when procedures applied to principal nuclear facilities could be added. (See second and third sentences of para 1 of text reported septel.) 8. Soviet Deloffs could not accept language US Art III referring to other safeguards systems and verification agreement for Euratom although they understood Euratom would enter into an agreement with IAEA on behalf of its members covering their NPT safeguard obligations. Soviets said Moscow would reject word "multilateral" but language "individually or together with other states" might be acceptable. They would not accept three-year transition period; they had guidelines permitting only year and one-half transition; but perhaps language of para 4 which based on LA-NFZ Treaty/4/ would satisfy Moscow as compromise. However, Soviets could not accept language like first sentence of provision in LA-NFZ Treaty; an undertaking to accept safeguards was required for them. US Deloffs said they would report above to Foster. /4/On February 12, 1968, Rusk advised the President to sign Protocol II of the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty; see Document 226. The United Stares is not a signatory to this treaty, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. For text of Protocol II, see footnote 2, Document 226. For text of the treaty, see 22 UST 762. 9. At the Co-Chairmen's meeting which occurred today, Roshchin asked Foster to consider the first sentence of the text reported septel as a substitute for the US language on statement of purpose. Soviet Deloffs said "nuclear energy" was vague and should be understood to include "source and special fissionable material" which they could not accept in first sentence of treaty. (Comment: It clearly does not include nuclear "facilities.") Brodie
206. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/ Geneva, September 1, 1967, 1910Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. 704. Disto. For Secretary and Fisher from Foster. The text of the Article III suggested to us by the Soviet Delegation today is as follows: Begin verbatim text: Draft Article III. 1. Each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty undertakes to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this treaty. As provided in the Agency's safeguards system, procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or outside any such facility. These procedures shall also extend to facilities containing or to contain such materials, including principal nuclear facilities. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out by it anywhere. 2. Each state party to the treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) Source or special fissionable material, or (b) Equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article. 3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article. 4. Non-nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty may conclude agreements with the IAEA to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other states as provided in the statute of the IAEA. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this treaty. For states depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. End verbatim text. Brodie
207. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, September 2, 1967, 1000Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President, July thru December 1967, Box 1. Secret; Nodis. 896. Ref: State 30165./2/ Subject: Strategic Arms Control Talks. /2/Not found. 1. Implication of reftel is that decision announce light deployment/3/ already made or at least will probably be made even if Soviets agree schedule talks. If this is the case I strongly believe we should not make further approach to Soviets unless we can tell them frankly that announcement will be made. Otherwise they will have good case for charging bad faith and canceling talks with great damage to our position before world opinion. If not possible tell them our intentions now, believe we should proceed promptly with announcement at same time expressing our desire proceed with strategic arms control talks. While our announcement would make more difficult Soviet agreement to talks, we could stress that they are already carrying out deployment. /3/Regarding the development of the proposed ABM deployment, see Documents 173, 202-204, and Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume X. 2. If we can give firm indication our intention make announcement, I believe would be useful for me to take up the matter informally with both Gromyko and Dobrynin, particularly if I could tell them that if they schedule talks we will be prepared present more concrete proposal. 3. My own view is that we should go further and put forward proposal now. We know Soviet military opposed and in absence of specific proposal they can conjure up all kinds of pitfalls in arguing against talks as well as argument that US not sincere and merely wishes obtain information on Soviet capabilities and plans. (Dobrynin indicated to me civilians found it difficult to counter military arguments on this highly technical subject.) Also in event Soviets continue fail to open talks we will be in much stronger position when our decision deploy announced if we had put forward serious proposal. I believe if specific proposal made Soviets will in fact at least agree to discuss it. 4. Since Soviet military position clear, believe attempt to advance consideration through military channels likely be counter-productive. 5. Re last question reftel, from Soviet point of view public emphasis that deployment necessitated by Chicom developments has both pros and cons. From ours I am inclined to view we should avoid taking any official position on this as uncertainty would bring more pressure on Soviets to negotiate. Might be helpful state that our basic position based on deterrence. We recognize interest of Soviets that deterrence be mutual and that we always stand ready to work out arrangements for both sides to achieve security at lowest practical level. Thompson
208. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, September 5, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret. SUBJECT The Soviets have proposed a compromise Article III dealing with safeguards which represents movement from their earlier position./2/ The key to their suggested language is their willingness to have non-nuclear weapon states enter into safeguards agreements with the IAEA "either individually or together with other states as provided in the statute of the IAEA" and the statement that the "exclusive purpose" for which IAEA safeguards are to be accepted is "verification of the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this treaty." /2/For text of the Soviet proposal submitted by Roshchin at the Co-Chairmen's meeting held on September 1 in Geneva, see Document 206. For Foster's summary of this meeting, see Document 205. These two factors appear to indicate that the Soviets are prepared to permit arrangements under which IAEA could make use of the Euratom system in performing the task of "verification" under such an Article. The Soviets also appear willing to have an Article III which permits the Euratom countries to negotiate with IAEA through Euratom. The new Soviet article also contains a two-year implementation period after the treaty's entry into force within which agreements with IAEA could be negotiated. We have told the Soviets that, while we are anxious to resolve the Article III problem before the non-proliferation treaty is discussed in the U.N. General Assembly we would now have to obtain the views of our allies on the Soviet compromise proposal. We now propose to discuss the matter at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council to be held tomorrow, September 6. A S Fisher
209. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, September 6, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, ABM Negotiations, 1/67-9/68, Box 231. Secret; Nodis. SUBJECT In his Nodis cable, dated September 2,/2/ on strategic arms control talks, Ambassador Thompson recommended that we put forward a specific strategic freeze proposal prior to the announcement of the ABM decision. Although I recognize that on the present schedule there is probably not enough time to work out any proposal within the US Government, I have nevertheless given some thought to what form such a proposal might take. In order to be useful in the present circumstances and time scale, the proposal would have to have the following characteristics: /2/See Document 207. --simple in concept so that it can be easily understood without complex explanations; --acceptable to all the interested elements within the US Government (DOD, JCS, and State). This means that from the US point of view it must clearly be to our over-all military advantage and consistent with the ABM deployment decision; --interesting to the Soviets and difficult politically for them to ignore. To this end, it should be forthcoming in accepting some Soviet position and/or containing some new element in their interest. I believe the proposal outlined below would be consistent with the above criteria and would provide a reasonable basis on which to start discussions. Although it lacks some of the elements that have been considered in the past, such as an ABM freeze, it would certainly be better than nothing. My proposal would consist of the following specific elements: 1. Freeze on any new starts on fixed land-based strategic missile launchers (ICBMs, IRBMs, MRBMs). This provides a substantial basis of interest for the Soviet Union since they would be allowed to complete the large number of ICBM sites now under way. Although it has been generally recognized inside the US Government that we would have to make this concession in any negotiable proposal, we have never to my knowledge specifically made the offer to the Soviets. If we make it clear that we are not trying to undercut the current Soviet building program, the Soviets would have a real incentive to agree before we start an expansion of our force. 2. Freeze on new construction of ballistic or cruise missile submarines. We have hedged on this proposal in the past apparently on the grounds that unilateral intelligence is inadequate. Actually, our intelligence on launched subs is extremely good. Any subs that have not already been launched would have to be declared to be permitted. This proposal would appear very forthcoming on our part and would be greatly to our military advantage. Even the Navy should be able to recognize that it could be to our advantage to stop or drastically limit the construction by the Soviets of the new class of Polaris-type (16 or more missiles) submarine which recent intelligence has identified. 3. Choice of either (a) no restriction on ABM deployment, or (b) limitations on ABM deployments for population defense to the same negotiated number of launchers (or missiles) in the US and Soviet Union. While expressing a preference for the latter approach, we would leave the choice to the Soviets since they have questioned the desirability of placing any limitations on defense. The approach of limiting launchers (or missiles) to the same number would leave open the question of the function of the Tallinn system for the time being. In the unlikely event it indeed has a significant ABM capability, we would have the option of a rather substantial ABM deployment. If the Soviet deployment is limited to the Moscow system, we would have placed a reasonably tight ceiling on ABM deployments while retaining the flexibility to undertake part or all of the proposed 1-67 Nike-X deployment./3/ Time and negotiations would clarify this situation. Even though it complicates the verification job, we probably should use missiles rather than launchers as the unit of measure since we know that both the Tallinn and Moscow systems have more than one missile per launcher while the proposed US system would have a separate launcher for each missile. As a starter, this formulation would exclude deployments intended exclusively for the hardpoint defense of strategic missiles since these might be particularly difficult to sort out from air defense and would in any event only contribute to a secure deterrent posture. /3/See footnote 3, Document 207. 4. Verification of the agreement would be based solely on unilateral capabilities. This would accept the Soviet position on verification. Although our own thinking has also been based on this premise, our previous proposal to the Soviets was ambiguous on this point and could have been interpreted as meaning that we wanted to include provisions in the agreement that would require formal verification or inspection./4/ /4/Not further identified. Since that which is not prohibited would be permitted, we and the Soviets would both be able to pursue qualitative improvements in our existing missile systems to whatever extent we desired. We, for example, would presumably continue the Poseidon, MIRVs, and Pen Aids; and the Soviets would presumably continue FOBS (fractional orbiting bombardment system) and whatever other qualitative improvements they have in mind. I am not very hopeful of getting the Government to focus on this issue at this time. I do believe, however, a proposal along the above lines would be mutually advantageous to the Soviets and ourselves and would give the Soviets a concrete proposal to consider if that is what they need to force a decision to initiate the proposed strategic discussions. Spurgeon [Continue with the next documents]
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