NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
1. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 6, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Beigel and approved in S on January 19. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. The source text is labeled "Part II of V." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS United States France Ambassador Alphand said the results of the latest meetings at Brussels/2/ are good and may open the way for moves toward political institutions. He was struck by the fact that this result is not considered such a good thing here. He said the allegations about an ultimatum were unfounded and that the Six had reached decisions in accordance with their previous agreement to take action on a common agricultural policy by the end of 1963, and to agree about undertaking trade negotiations with outside countries. The consolidation of the EEC will increase demand for US goods, which had increased 60 percent over the past five years, although perhaps not for the same goods. He did not believe this was a sign of protectionism. /2/For an analysis of the European Economic Community (EEC) meeting, which ended on December 23, see circular telegram 1163, Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 90. The Secretary said we have been cautious in commenting since we were not sure what happened at Brussels. He had indicated in his press conference/3/ last week that we find the results politically encouraging but realize that in trade questions details are important. Some misunderstanding had arisen out of reports of the talks with Erhard./4/ When we get the details of the Brussels decisions we will discuss them with the Commission and with the Six, but there is to be no special US-German machinery. We are pleased by the absence of catastrophe at Brussels but we did not wish to go overboard until we had seen the details of the decisions. /3/For a transcript of Rusk's press conference on January 2, see Department of State Bulletin, January 20, 1964, pp. 81-89. /4/For documentation on Chancellor Erhard's visit to the United States December 28-29, 1963, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 89, and XV, Documents 248-256. The Ambassador said that while they may not make the full 50 percent linear reductions they will at least move in the direction of tariff cuts. He realized how complicated were tariff negotiations. He deplored the fantastic article from Luxembourg in today's Wall Street Journal about protectionism under French leadership. This is not at all what de Gaulle said to the President in November. The Secretary noted that decisions may be taken at Luxembourg this week about steel tariffs and said the question is whether we can get into the trade negotiations in May before restrictive measures are taken in various countries. Ambassador Alphand said that the French had the idea that Wormser should come here for talks but he would not wish to see charges of any special US-French machinery. Although the visit had been envisaged before Brussels, he wondered if we were still interested. The Secretary said that we would inquire of Governor Herter and would be in touch with him.
2. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 14, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Givan and approved in S on January 19. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Italy /2/Foreign Minister Saragat accompanied Italian President Antonio Segni on his visit to the United States January 13-18. A memorandum of the part of the conversation on the Italian political situation is ibid., DEF (MLF). Additional documentation on the visit is scheduled for publication in volume XII. United States After a discussion of the Italian political situation, the Secretary asked the Foreign Minister to comment on the situation in the EEC and prospects for European unity in light of the Brussels meeting. The Foreign Minister replied that Brussels marked an important step toward a common agricultural policy, but there should be no illusions that it also marked progress toward political union; much water must flow before political unity is achieved. Noting that both de Gaulle and Erhard have mentioned the possibility of new initiatives, the Secretary asked what measures to promote European unity the Foreign Minister considered likely or desirable in the near future. The Minister replied that it was good for leaders to talk about unification and that, viewed in the spirit of Atlantic partnership as outlined by President Kennedy, it is obvious that Europe must become united; but it is impossible to conceive of a unified Europe without the UK. Although we cannot stand immobile, we cannot do anything that would hamper Britain from adhering later. If there is to be a political relance, it must be done without polemicizing with the UK and with the British fully understanding every step. If any group of Italian politicians should agree on a European initiative without the UK, their initiative would lead nowhere because a majority of Italians would never approve it. The Italians intend to make this clear to de Gaulle next month in Paris. At the same time Italy does not intend to join any crusade against de Gaulle; this is unnecessary since his policy collapses by itself, as illustrated by the fate of the Paris-Bonn axis. But de Gaulle must be convinced that Italy will not accept European integration without Britain. The Secretary asked what the Foreign Minister would advise the United States to do now: Should we stay outside the problem and leave it to the Europeans? The Foreign Minister replied that the United States cannot stay outside because it and Europe are members of the Atlantic community. The only question is where the United States should intervene, and the best place is the UK. The Minister regretted having to criticize friends in the British Labor Party, but when Wilson attacked the Brussels decisions he did a disservice to integration. Secondly, when Walker (hopefully a future Foreign Secretary) talks as if it were necessary to have a directorate with Germany and France he is adopting a Gaullist position. The Secretary said the Italians could dismiss the second point from their minds. Any proposals of a directorate would have a high infant-mortality rate. The first point on the Brussels decisions is more complicated and depends mainly on a successful outcome of the Kennedy Round trade negotiations,/3/ which we consider necessary for Atlantic cohesion. The Secretary invited the Foreign Minister to comment: Did he anticipate a successful Kennedy Round? /3/Reference is to the GATT Ministerial negotiations which would begin on May 4 to discuss tariff reductions. The Foreign Minister replied that Italy's views are receptive, as are those of the Benelux and to some extent Germany since the Kennedy Round more or less suits their economic situation. The French are more reserved, but the atmosphere as a whole is favorable and the French will find this difficult to resist. Governor Herter asked whether the Brussels decisions implied that the EEC agricultural policy is now fixed or whether it is still negotiable; we are concerned since it is our position that industry and agriculture should not be considered separately but as different aspects of the same thing. The Foreign Minister replied that he did not regard himself as expert in agricultural matters and could only reason as a man in the street. He believed, however, that agriculture would present the most difficulties to negotiators, even among the Europeans themselves, in view of the disparities in their agricultural development. A common policy, however, has the merit of inducing all concerned to modernize their agriculture. It has effectively awakened Italian leaders, who are now doing something to renovate Italian agriculture. The Secretary said he felt the Kennedy Round negotiations deserved to be approached on the broadest political basis in the perspective of the Atlantic partnership. Too technical an approach could have a poor result. For example, in 1960 he would have regarded the Trade Expansion Act of 1962/4/ as impossible, but fortunately this legislation was approached with a broad view for the common good of all concerned. /4/The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, approved October 11, 1962; P.L. 87-794. Governor Herter commented that it would be difficult to divide the problem into agricultural and industrial sectors. Restrictions in agriculture would make it difficult to move in the industrial field--hence his earlier question whether EEC agricultural policy is fixed or still negotiable. The Foreign Minister replied that the EEC members have reached agreement in three fields--meat, rice and fats--on the basis of compromises considered useful for Europe. It may be possible to change them when they are reviewed in a wider framework. Though no expert, he thought these agreements were not unchangeable. He cited as a parallel the Italian shift recently with regard to steel tariff increases. When the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community, headed by an Italian citizen, moved against the Italian position, Italy accepted the High Authority's decision.
3. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 14, 1964, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF (MLF). Secret. Drafted by Meloy and approved in S on January 27. The conversation was held at the White House. The source text is labeled "Part I of II." While the Secretary of State and the Italian Foreign Minister were discussing the MLF, President Johnson and President Segni also talked about the question. A 4-paragraph memorandum of their conversation is ibid. A memorandum of the Presidents' discussion of U.S. interest in the Atlantic Alliance, European unity, and the Kennedy Round is ibid., POL EUR W. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS United States Italy Foreign Minister Saragat said that for Italy the problem of the MLF was one of timing and principally timing affecting the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). The Foreign Minister had talked to Nenni on several occasions recently and has found Nenni personally favorably disposed to the MLF. The problem of time, however, is unavoidable and cannot be telescoped. Nenni told the Foreign Minister he must have time to prepare his party. He does not need a long time--only four or five months, perhaps. Foreign Minister Saragat said it is important to note Nenni has undertaken a commitment to prepare his party for the decision. The Foreign Minister said that the attitude of the UK is an important one and will have great influence in Italy whatever the results of the UK elections. Anything that the U.S. can do to bring about a more favorable attitude by the UK would be helpful in Italy. Foreign Minister Saragat said he has accepted British Foreign Minister Butler's request that he prolong his stay by a few days during his forthcoming visit to the UK. He plans to use this time to talk to Labor Party leaders. He will ask them not to do anything which would make the Italian problem more difficult. He will also tell them of the Italian position on MLF. Saragat continued that despite the Italian commitment in principle to the MLF and the favorable disposition of many groups, some obstacles remain and must be removed before final and formal acceptance of the MLF by Italy. The Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister for his views. He did not see any contradiction between what the Foreign Minister had been saying and the need to move along with the MLF. If we have a MLF report by the first of March we can then move on to draft an agreement. Meanwhile the multilaterally manned ship experiment can go forward. The Secretary emphasized that it was important not to lose forward movement. With regard to the UK, the Secretary said the Foreign Minister may find during his visit to the UK that there are differences of opinion there. It should also be noted that there are differences between what the British of both parties say now and what they are likely to say or be able to say after the election. The Foreign Minister will need to feel his way to see what the real UK position is. The Secretary emphasized that in any event he wished to assure the Foreign Minister the US is not pulling away from the MLF. We feel that the MLF is of great importance. Foreign Minister Saragat reiterated that the Italian decision has been made in principle. The Prime Minister is convinced on the subject of MLF as is the Vice Prime Minister (Nenni). The only thing that is required is a little more time. Ambassador Reinhardt knows the situation very well and can confirm this. The Secretary said that the Foreign Minister in a previous conversation in the day had said something important about his visit to London./2/ He had said the decision with regard to the MLF would be an Italian decision made in Italy's own interest and would not be determined by what was said to him in London. /2/See footnote 2, Document 2. The Secretary continued that the British lack interest in the MLF for two reasons: (1) they already have a nuclear force of their own and therefore lack political motivation; and (2) the British Military feel they will not be able to have other things they want if they are obliged to make the financial effort required by participation in the MLF. The Secretary said that on a personal basis he felt that the UK will not be able to stay out of the MLF in the long run if the momentum of the MLF is maintained. He believes the UK will come in if they see the rest of us going ahead. Foreign Minister Saragat said that the opposition from the right in Italy is attempting to overthrow the coalition government. The U.S. must be careful not to give them an opportunity by pressing Italy for too early a decision on the MLF. The Foreign Minister said that when he talked with Nenni regarding the experimental MLF ship, Nenni had seemed very understanding. The problem therefore was not connected with the matter of final acceptance of the MLF but was instead one of time. Nenni could have created difficulties over the ship experiment but did not do so.
4. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 16, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF (MLF) 9-5. Confidential. Drafted by Howard E. Furnas, Executive Director of the Multilateral Force Negotiating Team. SUBJECT I recommend that you approve prompt implementation of the MLF mixed-manning demonstration along the lines set forth in Secretary McNamara's memorandum of August 26./2/ Defense concurs in this recommendation. /2/Attached but not printed. A typewritten note on the source text states that the White House approved the recommendation on January 20. You will recall that the Secretary of Defense submitted his report in response to President Kennedy's instructions. It recommended that such a demonstration be carried out in a U.S. Navy ship. The Paris MLF Working Group has discussed this subject, approved the project, and invited governments to participate. We have now heard from the Germans, Greeks, Turks, Italians, and British, who wish to join us, using a U.S. guided missile destroyer in the demonstration. The Italian decision is particularly encouraging, since it must reflect a decision by the Socialists, as well as the other three Coalition parties. The Dutch representative has indicated that his country, which joined the Paris Working Group talks only this week, is still studying the matter. The Belgians have said that they do not intend to participate. Dean Rusk
5. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe/1/ Washington, January 25, 1964, 1:54 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by Schaetzel and Kaplan (EUR/RPE), cleared by Tyler and Hinton (RPE), and approved by Ball. Sent to Bonn, Brussels, Rome, Paris, London, Luxembourg, and The Hague. 1359. Brussels and Luxembourg pass USEC. Ref: Bonn 2451, 2454./2/ Subject: Guidance re UK and European Political Union. /2/Telegram 2451, January 13, stated that recent events in Europe suggested that the United States should reassess its position on European political unity, outlined German thinking on the question, and proposed that Washington adopt a sympathetic posture toward political initiatives. Telegram 2454, January 14, asked Rusk and Ball for their personal consideration of the question. (Both ibid.) 1. Despite momentary lull, the Six remain attracted, with varying degrees of interest and for different reasons, to new initiative for political union. Emboldened by their success in overcoming year-end Community crisis, they see a need and perhaps opportunity for further consolidating European Community and quite logically consider that next step should be political one. Some elements within the Five may be ready now or in the near future, in fact, to compromise and accept de Gaulle's "confederal" concept with only limited if any "revision" clause looking to eventual "federal" union. During past year, insistence by Five has weakened on British involvement in political union discussions. Further, there appears to be less sensitivity by Six about relationships of EEC to non-member European states. 2. We would be concerned, as we have been in the past, if discussions and negotiations were to lead to inward-oriented "small Europe," which had characteristics of excluding British for all time, promoting "Europe des patries," and ignoring collateral policy of Atlantic partnership. 3. Odds seem against French view prevailing out of current flurry of activity. As Embassy Bonn points out, history of past several years has demonstrated that self-interest of other Five operates as considerable safeguard to our basic political and security interests in Europe. 4. Important to note ambiguity Erhard's position. He emphasized during discussions in Washington in November/3/ and again December in Texas lack of parliamentary control over Common Market Commission. Referred vaguely to need for political authority but at same time turned back suggestions that answer could be found in directly-elected parliament. Nor did Erhard accept fact that Council of Ministers is institutional device to meet problem of high-level national political control. Noteworthy that Erhard's thinking on these subjects has not substantially changed over last several years, e.g. he has resented EEC authority over number of economic questions and implication that Community engaged in economic planning. He also dislikes President Hallstein. While Erhard seems to have retreated from position favoring early heads of government meeting on political unity outlined in his Bonn press conference, it cannot be discounted that his thoughts as outlined above in certain respects seem closer to De Gaulle's than to those of European integrationists. Question will be whether in longer run views of Schroeder or Erhard prevail. /3/For a memorandum of Erhard's conversation with President Johnson at the time of former President Kennedy's funeral, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XV, Document 242. 5. Evidence suggests that Belgians, Germans and Italians--and, of course, Dutch--would insist, at least at outset any discussions, on three criteria on which the Fouchet proposal floundered:/4/ the integrity of NATO, no undercutting of three economic communities, and option that political arrangements could be revised to introduce principle of federalism. In view of the array of nations opposed to De Gaulle's position, it seems unlikely that an early initiative will be launched. /4/Reference is to the November 2, 1961, plan for political union proposed by the French politician Christian Fouchet. 6. British Government has been conducting intensive campaign to insure its participation in any new moves toward political unity and has asked for our support to this end./5/ Even should we be wrong in our prediction that early initiative is unlikely, we do not see how United States could intervene to profit either the British or ourselves. In fact, expression of American views on a yet unborn proposition would hardly be persuasive with our friends and lend currency once again to epithet "Anglo-Saxons" which would be used against British (Deptel 4404 to London). /5/The British Ambassador had asked Rusk for U.S. support on January 13. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) On January 21, Tyler informed him that U.S. support of a British role in any movement toward European integration remained unchanged, but that direct U.S. involvement or representations would not be helpful and might raise charges of Anglo-Saxon interference in European affairs. (Telegram 4404 to London, January 21; ibid., Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC) 7. In this complex European situation American officials will have to move with care. While we want responsible Europeans to be in no doubt as to our views as to desirability or value of political unity, we do not wish to be charged with interference in matter. Against this background you may use foregoing analysis and following specific points to restate US views on European unity or in response on inquiries about US attitude on UK participation in any new initiative in this field: a. Although we remain vitally concerned with form and direction of European unity, we intend to keep open mind and await clearer indication than we now have of nature and timing of any new move. At this stage, before any European state has put forward a specific proposal we may have best opportunity to reiterate our support of basic criteria outlined in paragraph five above, without opening ourselves to charge of interference in delicate internal community negotiations. b. We feel that UK interests will be kept in mind and defended most capably by combination of Britain's own diplomatic efforts and those of the Benelux countries, Italy and Germany. We would hope that Five will find it possible to defer any new initiative until after British elections as means of keeping European issue out of the British campaign. c. Finally, it is clearly up to British to demonstrate to their Continental friends--and to skeptics as well--that in fact and theory they want to play a constructive role in making of Europe. Ball
6. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 4, 1964, 11:30 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Van Hollen on February 5 and approved in S on February 16 and in U on February 11. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Dr. Dirk U. Stikker, NATO Secretary-General/2/ /2/Stikker visited Washington February 3-5. A memorandum of his conversation with Tyler on February 3 at 4 p.m. on current NATO problems is ibid., SCI 3 NATO; memoranda of his discussions with various U.S. officials at 10:15 and 10:45 a.m. on February 4 on Cyprus, MRBMs, and NATO force planning are ibid., DEF 4 NATO and DEF 12 NATO. The Secretary Dr. Stikker said that he might say something at the May meeting about the importance of NATO political consultation. However, he was disappointed because while there was general agreement to improve such consultation, NAC discussions tended to be limited to questions of procedure. It was essential to consult on the implications of the French recognition of Communist China, on Berlin and Malaysia, as well as on Cuban trade and credits to the USSR. However, there was little chance of success on the latter two subjects because of the fixed British attitude. The Secretary noted that in his earlier private conversation with Dr. Stikker/3/ he had asked whether it might be useful for the United States to prepare a paper which would assess the possible erosion of United States public support of NATO if the current trends in NATO continued, such as French recognition of Communist China and a relaxed attitude toward Cuba trade and credits to the USSR. When such a paper was prepared, Ambassador Finletter could absent himself while the other fourteen Permanent Representatives discussed it. Usually the question was asked "What is the United States going to do about NATO?" The purpose of the proposed paper would be to seek an answer to the question "What is NATO going to do about the United States?" /3/No record of this conversation has been found. Noting that the Belgians had been pressing for NATO consultation on the question of French recognition of Communist China, Dr. Stikker said that the danger was that the Belgians might interpret NATO's refusal to discuss this question as giving Belgium a free hand to carry out its own explorations with the Communists. Spaak might feel free to make a trip through Eastern Europe because of a belief that there was no common NATO policy with regard to the Alliance's relationship to the Communist Bloc. Dr. Stikker added that he had attempted to discourage such an interpretation by the Belgians. Mr. Popper pointed out that one of the problems for the United States was that political consultation often seemed untimely because the United States faced specific operational problems which made consultation difficult. For example, one question which had to be considered was whether or not it would be prudent to consult in NAC on the Chinese Communist recognition issue in advance of deGaulle's press conference. In reply to a question from the Secretary, Dr. Stikker said that five NATO countries now recognize Communist China, observing that as Dutch Foreign Minister he had favored recognition by the Netherlands, although such recognition had taken place before the Korean War. Commenting on our relations with the French, the Secretary said that there was considerable understanding on fiscal matters, some meeting of minds on trade, and that Secretary McNamara and Messmer/4/ seemed to get along well. But there was no area of agreement on the larger political issues./5/ /4/Pierre A. Messmer, French Defense Minister. /5/Rusk and Stikker also discussed the May NATO Ministerial Meeting and the relation between NATO civil and military authorities. On the former, Stikker believed it was too early to make an appreciation of the meeting; on the latter, he reported that decisions taken by the Standing Group and Military Committee were seldom based on coordinated governmental positions and this often created problems. (Memoranda of conversation; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) Stikker developed the problem of relations with NATO military authorities further in a conversation with Ball on February 4, stating that he was not kept fully informed of their activities and that the only solution was to station a representative of the Secretary General with both the Standing Group and the Military Committee. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files, DEF 4 NATO)
7. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 5, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Schaetzel and approved in U on February 10 and by the White House on the same day. The conversation was held at the White House. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Ball told the President that Dr. Stikker had finished a series of useful discussions with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and invited Dr. Stikker to summarize the current situation in NATO./2/ /2/Memoranda of Stikker's conversation with McNamara on February 5 and with other Department of Defense officials on February 4 and 5 are ibid., Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. These conversations dealt primarily with NATO force planning, infrastructure, and MRBMs. For a memorandum of Rusk's conversation with Stikker, see Document 6. Dr. Stikker began by noting that de Gaulle's influence was to be seen everywhere. He was personally not so worried about the Six in view of the cohesion of the European Community and the internal French pressures in favor of the Common Market which together were too strong to permit the General to break up the Community. Dr. Stikker went on to say that this does not mean the French will be easy to negotiate with. For instance, at the December Marathon meeting the French got all they wanted while the Germans made all the biggest sacrifices. However, we must anticipate that de Gaulle would continue to block U.K. entry into the Common Market for this would challenge his dominance. Dr. Stikker said he was disturbed about de Gaulle's influence on NATO. He recalled de Gaulle's attempt to develop a Tripartite Directorate which he did not get and which would have been highly disruptive. French cooperation since then can be obtained only to the extent that this helps France have its own way. Dr. Stikker added that he thinks a Directorate would not work in any event due to the mounting importance of Germany and the increased influence and pride of Italy. Dr. Stikker insisted that he admired de Gaulle as a man but thought it important to appreciate the extent to which he blocked so many avenues of progress. He does not want to take action and thus presents the alliance with a difficult dilemma of how to react. There will either be hard collisions or we shall have to find some way of working around the General. He felt that a collision is not the way to handle him, that it will not change his position. He said, for instance, that the alliance has not been blocked on an air defense system but had succeeded in working out an arrangement in which there was a degree of French cooperation. Dr. Stikker defined this alliance operation as one of mutual respect or tolerance in which the French would not be asked to do things they did not want to do but would not block action by other members of the organization. Dr. Stikker noted, however, that on many occasions when you need de Gaulle he says no as he had just done on Cyprus. Dr. Stikker suggested that the danger of de Gaulle could be seen from the press conference/3/ to which he had listened twice to be sure that he got an accurate impression. Dr. Stikker said this was the same type of nationalism Europeans had experienced in earlier periods. The message was one of power of station, and "no one can control me." Dr. Stikker indicated that there are many in France who like this talk and this type of strong man. But what had been and will be the reactions in other countries? The French insist they have to have a nuclear bomb but why will not others insist on the same national prerogative. Right now we have a good democratic government in Germany through such leaders as Erhard, Schroeder and von Hassel, but what does the future hold with men like Strauss and Guttenberg?/4/ In Italy at the moment there is devoted support for NATO by men like Segni and Saragat. /3/For a transcript of de Gaulle's press conference, January 31, see Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958-January 31, 1964, pp. 245-258. /4/Franz Josef Strauss, former West German Defense Minister, and Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg, Bundestag member. The President said he understood, but asked what we could do about this situation. Dr. Stikker went on to say that a somewhat similar situation arose out of the position of the U.K. No member of the alliance should come to the Council with a rigid position. This induces other countries to perform similarly. Dr. Stikker referred to the November 18 NAC meeting on credits. He suggested it must be made clear to the British what their obduracy means. He speculated on whether Home actually realized the significance or the implications of British positions in NATO. Mr. Ball injected that there would be an opportunity to talk about this matter when the Prime Minister arrived in Washington, and Dr. Stikker said this was why he was raising the question. He went on to say he was as much worried about what the U.K. is doing now as by the French attitude because both would encourage other countries to act in the same fashion. The President turned to Mr. Ball and asked what was the status of the Cyprus matter. Mr. Ball replied that he was not going off to London today in view of the fact that there seemed to be some flexibility in the Cypriots' position and this would give the British a day or two to see what they could negotiate. He said it was much better for the British to take the lead if they were able and willing to do so. He said it would be necessary to watch Ankara very closely for the next few days. There might be involved a week or so of negotiations. Dr. Stikker said while the immediate problem of Cyprus was not in his compass, nevertheless the implications were of vital importance to NATO. Mr. Ball was asked whether he thought Makarios/5/ would accept the proposals put forward, to which Mr. Ball replied he thought there was a possibility he would. /5/Archbishop Makarios III, President of the Cypriot Republic. The President, turning to Dr. Stikker, said how much he admired his work as Secretary General and the personal sacrifice he was making for NATO. While things were perhaps not as good as we would like them, they were better than we had a right to expect. He said he understood Dr. Stikker's view on France and this was a problem we would have to live with. He said he had had good visits with Erhard and Segni and looked forward to seeing Home shortly.
8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, February 11, 1964, 4:41 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)3. Secret. Drafted by Spiers on February 10; cleared by Schaetzel, Furnas, Klein, S/P, and DOD; and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Paris Topol and CINCLANT for POLAD. 5001. Re London 3805./2/ Department of course agrees need to lay out and achieve clear understanding military justification for MLF. However this different from accepting obligation to prove (as UK appears to wish) that MLF has built-in advantage, in purely military terms, over other strategic weapons systems, since this not our contention. We wish stress concept of military "utility" in discussions with UK and others and do not plan try to demonstrate across-the-board "advantage" which we do not claim. We do believe that in certain respects MLF would have advantage over other alternatives which might be considered able to meet desire for strategic nuclear capability under theatre command, e.g. MLF cheaper and more quickly available than Polaris subs; it is based on operationally ready system, unlike Missile X; it is more modern and less vulnerable than manned bombers based in Europe. Also, since it would add diversity to overall West's strategic force by introduction new system, it would thereby complicate defensive operation for Soviets and this could be counted as advantage. However, fundamental point is that MLF would be efficient and effective weapons system fully capable fulfilling part of overall Western requirements for next generation missiles. It is not in any sense merely a "political" weapons system, although political purposes it designed to serve are of major significance. /2/Telegram 3805, February 7, reported that the British seemed inclined to drag out the deliberations of the Paris Working Group, particularly in light of the expected parliamentary elections. The British also believed that although the political merits of the MLF were obvious, a convincing statement needed to be made on its military benefits. (Ibid.) Essential fact is that in terms of accuracy, reliability, yield, range, cost and invulnerability MLF would meet military criteria which must govern choice of systems programmed for future construction. MLF, any more than any other single strategic weapons system, is not designed to be simultaneously most accurate, highest yield, longest range, or most invulnerable system in Western arsenal; no such "ideal" weapon exists. However, its particular combination of capabilities and characteristics will ensure MLF would have important military role in armory of West's strategic retaliatory forces and be significant contribution to versatility these forces. Neither would MLF simply be unnecessary add-on to West's strategic forces. If MLF is built along presently conceived lines, 200 ready well-protected "in theatre" MRBMs it would provide would be substituted for other presently programmed external strategic forces. Since MLF will be assigned SACEUR, these missiles will be available for inclusion in his Scheduled Program to cover targets on ACE threat list. These targets presently covered by mix of theatre and external forces, including both aircraft and missiles. With passage of time, and in light of changing technology--including obsolescing aircraft in both US and Europe--and changing nature of Soviet targets, increased Western missile strength--both in theatre and external--will be needed to maintain this effective coverage. MLF can contribute to this increased missile strength by furnishing its portion of the mix targeted against Soviet missile sites, airfields and other targets which constitute threat to NATO Europe. In absence MLF, other missile forces would have to be procured to maintain this effective coverage. US is convinced on basis thorough study that MLF can be fully justified in strictly military terms. Nevertheless we continue to believe some most important arguments in favor are political in nature and it is mistake to look at MLF only from standpoint military aspects. This message does not deal with political factors since apparently UK has found these fully persuasive already. Rusk
9. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 12, 1964, 11 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2369. Confidential. Drafted by Trezise and Knox and approved in S on February 20. The conversation was held at the White House. The source text is labeled "Part II of IV." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS British Side /2/Butler accompanied Prime Minister Alex Douglas-Home on his visit to Washington February 12-14. U.S. Side After Secretary Rusk had introduced Governor Herter, the British Foreign Secretary remarked that it was becoming increasingly clear that there would be much difficulty in deflecting Common Market countries from an autarchic commercial policy. Despite Mr. Erhard and the goodwill of Italy and the Benelux countries, the United Kingdom was not at all sure that the Six could be kept on a liberal trade path. From the British point of view, the Kennedy Round affords a great and unique opportunity for influencing the direction and future of the Six in trade policy. It was a matter of great concern, therefore, to HMG that the Kennedy Round aim of a fifty per cent linear tariff cut might be diminished and eroded by agreement on an unfavorable disparity formula or by a failure of the Six to allow sufficient access to EEC markets for exporters of agricultural products. Mr. Butler noted that the United Kingdom is undertaking a system under which domestic agricultural production will be limited and exporters given a more or less assured share of the market. He wondered whether the European position would be in any respect as liberal or forthcoming. Governor Herter replied that we find ourselves in near agreement with the United Kingdom. We too are concerned that the eventual disparity formula may be used by the French to disrupt the entire Kennedy Round, especially if France first were to obtain from its European partners a favorable arrangement for intra-EEC agricultural trade. We think that the next few weeks should be devoted to probing Common Market intentions, both with respect to disparities and on the Mansholt plan for agriculture. Governor Herter noted that the French have said that they do not wish bilateral talks with the United States until the middle of April and he assumed that they hoped in the meantime to get a good settlement within the EEC on agriculture. He thought that the French did not necessarily wish the Kennedy Round to succeed but that France's position would depend on intra-EEC developments. Mr. Butler wondered whether the decisions taken by the Common Market Ministers in December could be taken to mean that these were final judgments which could not be altered, or whether they were negotiating positions which could be subject to change. Secretary Rusk observed that it seemed to him that the Common Market decisions could scarcely be taken as final since we are considering a process of mutual commercial exchange. Obviously, if the Six were to think about keeping the United States or other suppliers out of Europe, then the United States for its part would have to consider what access should be provided to the American market. Sir Richard Powell said that he did not think the Common Market could have an entirely autarchic end in mind. He did think, however, that the French would be more or less satisfied to have nothing happen in the Kennedy Round. After all, French industry already has been exposed to a large dose of competition within the Common Market. Moreover, there are indications from remarks made by General de Gaulle and others that the Government of France takes a reserved view about the political importance of the Kennedy Round. Although he had no hard evidence that the French would stand consistently opposed to a sixth round of tariff negotiations, Sir Richard's guess was that the French would not be willing to move unless pressure could be exerted on them. Such pressure, he thought, would have to come from Germany and other EEC countries. The question in his mind was whether the Germans and others would be able to exert enough pressure. He had noted in this connection that Governor Herter appeared not to be in a hurry to complete the Kennedy Round. Governor Herter said that this was right, that he was in no great hurry. His concern was with getting a satisfactory end product. He thought that if we were in good shape by the spring of 1965, the United States would be quite satisfied. The British Foreign Secretary came back to the question of disparities and asked if the United States had an alternative to the Common Market formula to be presented at Geneva. Governor Herter said that we have looked very closely at the trade statistics and that, subject to further examination, the EEC two-to-one formula might not be very damaging to the principle of a 50 per cent cut. This would be particularly the case if we could add the principal supplier criterion or qualification to the EEC approach. However, more work needed to be done in this area. Sir Richard Powell noted that we have a tactical problem here which also involves the Swiss and the Swedes. Mr. Butler turned then to agriculture and wished to know whether we were prepared to take a more flexible approach in the agricultural sector than in the industrial sector, taking into account the wide range of agricultural commodities involved and the special problems surrounding agriculture in every country. Governor Herter said that the answer was "yes", that we could entertain special approaches and arrangements for agriculture. He said that the British representatives should remember, however, that the United States is a large agricultural exporter with special interests in agricultural trade. Sir Richard Powell remarked that although British and American interests in the Kennedy Round were very close indeed, UK and US trade configurations were not identical. The UK is not a large agricultural exporter but it does have vital interest in the export of industrial products. The UK exports to the Common Market three times as much as it exports to the United States and most of the British exports are industrial goods. The Foreign Secretary observed at this point that the European Free Trade Area, with 90 million people, would achieve free trade between its member countries by 1966 and already had an overseas trade equal to that of the United States. Mr. Butler summed up the discussion by repeating that the United Kingdom put a very high premium on obtaining a 50 per cent linear cut on Free World tariffs through the Kennedy Round. From the British point of view, this was an over-riding objective. The United States, [he] said, could expect from HMG the fullest possible measure of cooperation. Governor Herter said that we were in very close rapport and that he, for his part, could assure Mr. Butler that the United States not only welcomed the statement of British intentions but would be actively consulting the UK at every point during the preliminaries to the Kennedy Round and in the course of the tariff negotiations themselves. [Next documents]
Volume XIII Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
