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80. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 20, 1965, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by McKillop and approved in S and U on May 3. The conversation was held at the Department of State. The source text is labeled "Part IV of VI." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS United States Italy The Secretary referred to the Prime Minister's reaffirmation earlier in the day at the White House of Italy's strong support for a genuinely united Europe as a source of strength for NATO and the Atlantic Community./2/ The Secretary praised Italian steadfastness in this regard, stating it has proved a constructive and stabilizing influence in Europe's search for greater cohesion. Quoting the Prime Minister as having said a restatement of American support for European unification would be a valuable contribution to this movement, the Secretary called upon Mr. Ball to outline current American thinking on this important subject. /2/A memorandum of the conversation at the White House at 11:30 a.m. is ibid., President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217; a memorandum of a second conversation with the President at 5 p.m. on April 21, during which Johnson reaffirmed his wish to be of assistance in fostering European unity, but also expressed his desire to avoid telling Europeans how to run their lives, is ibid. Mr. Ball reviewed the reasons why we have encouraged the principle of European unity as a means of assuring a strong, stable, peaceful Europe, with the capability, in an age of interdependency and indivisibility of defense, to play an effective role as an equal partner within the Atlantic Community. He commented on the appeal of de Gaulle for a more national approach to European problems, which the General dramatized in his press conference of January 1963. Since that time, the drive for European political integration has been checked by Gaullist concepts and tactics. Should they prevail, the achievement of a unified Europe and a dynamic Atlantic Community would be indefinitely postponed. On the positive side, Mr. Ball referred to the steady but less dramatic progress made in the economic field by the European Communities. This progress may lead eventually to the creation of European institutions needed to make the political decisions arising as a consequence of close economic integration. Mr. Ball referred to the existence of serious Atlantic problems, especially the threat of French withdrawal from NATO or proposals that would radically alter the basic NATO structure in favor of looser and less effective arrangements. He stressed the importance of an eventual solution of the problem of nuclear military sharing in the Atlantic Community, stating that the MLF proposal had been based on the collective approach. We believe such an approach is the safest as well as an equitable means to avoid proliferations of national weapons programs. Conceding that no real progress is possible in this field until after the German elections, Mr. Ball said a "hard look" at the problem would have to be made in the fall. This delay in the time-table, however, should not be regarded as a slackening of American interest in finding a solution to the problem of mutually satisfactory nuclear arrangements with the Atlantic Community. Concluding his remarks, Mr. Ball stressed the fact that an effective, strong and closely knit Atlantic Community is premised upon European unity. The Secretary stated he wished to make several observations. In considering any proposals the French may make for the revision of NATO, possibly even before 1969, it should be kept in mind that NATO has enjoyed freedom from attack only because NATO strength has been able to persuade Eastern Europe that an attack would be suicidal. Secondly, in any alternatives to the NATO countries working together in their common defense, which the United States thinks is the best approach, we will never agree to remaining in an alliance where we would continue to commit armed forces to Europe but where Europe would make military decisions involving these troops independently of the United States. The Secretary admitted there are vital, unavoidable problems before the Alliance that must be considered in an appropriate forum and before they become unmanageable. We must all be prepared to probe deeply into these problems and consult each other on our future defenses. The Prime Minister said that the Italian Government agrees completely with our views, including the vital role of NATO and the necessity of close ties with the United States. The French position has created uncertainties and problems for NATO, which should be vigorously tackled. NATO cannot be left to drift in the hope that things will arrange themselves. Italy will continue to search for solutions since the future of Europe and the world is dependent upon NATO unity. The related question of European unity has also been affected by the French attitude. But Europeans should not become discouraged or falter. They must continue to study the problems and hope that growing economic integration will held lead to unity. Italy has felt that informal consultations such as the proposed Venice meeting would be helpful even though the French have rejected the idea. As for the MLF or some form of common nuclear defense arrangements, the Prime Minister agreed that there can be no real progress until after the German elections. He said he would welcome our views as to whether we should push the MLF concept even if it meant great disruption and possible French withdrawal from NATO. He said that despite these prospects and domestic complications reflecting British views and fear of German predominance, the Italian Government accepts the MLF in principle. It, too, wishes to avoid new national nuclear capabilities, which would also help to allay domestic fears. Nevertheless, the French position should be studied and the repercussions considered since they could be fraught with political and psychological dangers. The Prime Minister wondered if these problems might be profitably considered at the May NATO meeting. The Secretary commented that our trouble with France dates back to our rejection of General de Gaulle's directorate proposal in 1958. We had done so because we could not accept the attempted direction of our other European allies without their consent. Now the General claims it is too late for a common policy and seeks a special position in Europe based on the force de frappe. The United States has overwhelmingly greater nuclear power than the French can ever dream of mustering, yet we do not claim a special position but rather hope for agreement on a common strategy. The Secretary doubted that the forthcoming NATO meeting, before the German elections and a clearer indication of French intentions, would provide much of an opportunity for going into these matters in depth. We have tried to sound out the French as to their specific intentions but so far unsuccessfully. He pointed out that we are not against change in NATO, but we do not yet know what the changes might be. We should, however, try to fix our ideas before confronted by a major crisis. As for French hostility to the MLF, our attitude does not depend upon French views, but we recognize the need of a broad consensus of support from the other important members if progress is to be made. The Secretary suggested, therefore, that we remain in close touch on this subject.
81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/ Washington, April 29, 1965, 11:20 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Spiers on April 22; cleared by G/PM, GER, S/P, Schaetzel, and DOD; and approved by Thompson. Repeated to Paris Topol. 3289. German Concern over US Views on NATO Strategy. Dept fully agrees with central point Embtel 3887/2/ that main element of German concern on strategy, of which there have been increasing signs lately, is that in event of all-out Communist attack on central front US would not authorize use of nuclear weapons before aggressors have overrun large area of Germany. Agree also that concepts embodied in "flexible response," etc., are taken as representing US disinclination to allow use of nuclear weapons to prevent FRG suffering severely. In view of some, US strategic thinking results in reduction deterrent effect Western military posture. /2/Dated April 7. (Ibid.) We believe these difficulties stem in part from FRG's extreme dependence upon US nuclear strength for its security combined with its relatively limited influence over US defense planning, in part from feeling that geographic differences in US and German position inevitably lead to differences in judgment on questions such as timing for use nuclear weapons, and in part from insufficient realization that effectiveness of deterrence very much depends upon demonstrable ability to mount a plausible defense if deterrence were to fail. We have grave doubts that this situation can be substantially improved by further hortatory assurances. New statements of US determination or reiteration present commitments unlikely to contribute basically to easing of German anxieties. Present record already includes following: 1. US has, in Athens Guidelines and series of US-FRG strategy talks, made it clear that US intent is to meet Soviet nuclear attack with nuclear response and to meet massive conventional attack with whatever means necessary to repulse it, including nuclear weapons. 2. SACEUR's defense plans, which German officers participate in drawing up, accord with this basic concept and are not based on postponing use of nuclear weapons to last possible moment (as Krone suggested is US wish). 3. We have told Germans in recent talks that their ideas on question of nuclear weapons in limited zone should be studied carefully in connection with defense planning activities, although we have certainly not signed on to them. 4. We have always operated on basis that as objective matter US security is inextricably involved with that of Europe, and that loss of significant portion of European territory to Soviets would so tip balance of power that vital US security interests would be automatically involved. FYI: Fact remains, however, that it is impossible and indeed undesirable, in our view, to define with precision point at which nuclear weapons would be used in various contingencies (and even were we to do so, doubts would probably remain). We recognize our present inability to be absolutely precise either as to use of nuclear weapons in less than all-out attack with nuclear weapons or as to size of conventional option we believe appropriate for NATO, or as to precise changes we would like to see accomplished in present NATO force posture, contributes to fundamental difficulty we have with FRG. End FYI. Although we recognize US bears a primary responsibility for having initiated debate on strategy, we have come to conclusion that less we argue about abstract strategic question, the better. In our view, it is preferable to concentrate on practical aspects of NATO defense and to deal with underlying reasons for FRG anxiety as far as possible. Following are examples: 1. Defense Planning Activities. By focusing on concrete questions of NATO defense problem, as in present NFPE, we can, over time, hopefully secure a force posture that gives NATO wider range of defense options in Europe. This particularly so since we believe this objective need not entail significant increases in European defense expenditures, which we know will not be forthcoming in present political circumstances. Important improvements can be achieved by rationalization of forces even within present budget levels, giving NATO heads of government substantially greater flexibility in crises in choosing type of force to use in range of situations, all of which are not now foreseeable. Accordingly, US strongly supports NFPE activities, will seek its future strengthening and will in meantime continue to avoid "confrontation" or generalized debate on problems of strategy. 2. Improved Consultation Procedures. We hope forthcoming Defense Ministers' meeting will be first of series and, when supplemented by NFPE effort and by continued bilateral DefMin meetings, will lay basis for more intimate and wider-ranging exchanges of views on defense issues among principal Alliance members. This will be helpful in giving DefMins common background of information as basis for more convergent perspectives on defense matters. We hope it will be possible to follow up in months ahead on US December 8 proposal for restricted DefMin meetings at which highly sensitive subjects could be thoroughly and frankly discussed. 3. Nuclear Sharing. We continue to view as highly important measures for giving Germans and others confidence that NATO nuclear forces of adequate size are organized, used and deployed according to plans which they have large degree of influence in drawing up. These measures can result in wider sharing of nuclear planning and operating responsibilities and we would hope that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] such wider participation in planning and operating would reduce allied apprehensions re alliance nuclear problems. Present hiatus in ANF/MLF in no way indicates a reduced US interest in bringing allies more fully into nuclear planning and sharing process. We have solicited allied views on how this process might be given effect and we are ourselves constantly studying particular proposals to this end. However, we anticipate Germans and others will not want to pursue intensive discussions in this area until after September. Dept believes it is in material progress in areas such as these rather than in further repetitions of US avowals to defend Europe that will, in due course, serve as best, and indeed only basis for effectively dealing with underlying German concerns. Nevertheless, in further effort to meet problem, request your views on desirability of arranging for Secretary McNamara to talk with highly selected Germans during visit to Bonn. We would suggest you arrange restricted informal meeting of senior German officials (Luebke, if appropriate, Erhard, Krone, von Hassel, Schroeder, et al), at which Secretary McNamara could informally discuss problem as he has done with number of German visitors to Washington. Conceivably Secretary McNamara and von Hassel could meet with such group in guise of making report on their May talks. It is our feeling that this kind of authoritative and first-hand account could be far more valuable than many pages of written exegesis. We are also considering whether communique which might be issued after McNamara/von Hassel talks should include brief reaffirmation of US intentions to help defend German territory by all necessary means in event of Communist attack. We are also, as you requested, looking at various public and classified statements issued on this subject, although we feel these statements of policy should be reasonably well know to senior German officials. Request your comments on above suggestions, which are tentative and would receive high-level consideration only if you strongly endorse them./3/ /3/On May 4, McGhee replied strongly endorsing the idea of McNamara discussing NATO strategy during his May visit to Bonn and the proposal for a McNamara-von Hassel communique. (Telegram 4351 from Bonn; ibid., DEF 1 NATO) Rusk
82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium/1/ Washington, May 1, 1965, 12:29 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(ANF). Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Schaetzel on April 30, cleared by McKillop and Popper, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Paris Topol and repeated to Bonn, London, Rome, and The Hague. 2200. Reftel Polto 1570, repeated Brussels 83; Deptel 2173 to Brussels April 26./2/ Spaak will of course wish to determine himself how best to handle the state of the Alliance and in particular de Gaulle's April 27 speech. In view of de Staercke's inquiry on behalf of Spaak you may say that I intend to deal with the matter in the following fashion: /2/Polto 1570, April 29, reported that Spaak was concerned about the effect of de Gaulle's April 27 speech and wanted to know what Rusk believed should be done about it. (Ibid.) Telegram 2173 informed the Embassy in Brussels that if Spaak confirmed his desire to launch an initiative at the NAC meeting in May for a reorganization of NATO forces, he should be told that the time was not right since the NATO force planning exercise begun in 1963 was just beginning to bear fruit. (Ibid., NATO 3 UK(LO)) For text of de Gaulle's speech, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 434-436. A public attack on or specific refutation of April 27 speech might well have the effect of strengthening rather than weakening the theses propounded. We note that press comment has been generally unfavorable. The most effective response to de Gaulle's statements will, in my view, be found in the clearest possible statements of what policies we and the Europeans favor. We expect to issue a high level statement on May 7./3/ Further, the meeting of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe in Berlin on May 8th and 9th, with Erhard attending the second day, should result in a further strong reiteration of the goals of European integration and Atlantic interdependence. Through authoritative restatement of these constructive policies, which clearly enjoy broad support in Europe, both officials and the general public, will draw appropriate conclusions. /3/On May 2, the Department of State asked the Missions in Rome, Paris, London, Bonn, and Moscow for recommendations on the content and temper of a statement that the President might make on the anniversary of VE-Day, May 7. (Telegram 2542 to Rome; Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR-US) The replies all stressed the importance of such a statement and the need to reiterate U.S. support for and commitment to Europe. (Ibid.) For text of the President's address, in which he outlined six pieces of urgent and unfinished business in U.S. relations with Europe and stressed the need to build a Europe reaching across the Atlantic, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 506-509. We have all been sensitive to the difficult situation confronting the German Government and have attempted to meet their desire to minimize direct confrontations with Paris. We intend to do our best to help the Germans on this score. With this in mind I do not expect to initiate at the London meeting a detailed analysis of the State of the Alliance. However, I believe that we cannot put off such an examination beyond the December Ministerial Meeting. At that time we should take specific actions looking toward modernizing and strengthening NATO. As indicated reftel we would take preliminary step in this direction at London; propounding certain questions for consideration in December and suggesting small expert group. You and Finletter should draw on the foregoing as you see fit. Rusk
83. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/ Paris, May 4, 1965, 2015Z./2/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bonn and London. /2/Beginning in May 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. 3238. NATO. When I asked General de Gaulle if his thinking on NATO had remained the same as he had expressed to the Secretary and me last December,/3/ particularly in regard to timing, de Gaulle answered that his views had not changed; that he believed it would be necessary in 1969 to reexamine the North Atlantic Treaty. He said that he was in favor of an alliance with the US, with Great Britain and with Germany (he did not mention other NATO members), but whether in the same form as the present treaty he could not be sure at this time. He said for example he would have to "look at" the question of a council as he was not quite sure what a council would do. He then stated very clearly and definitely that any form of integration would have to go when the time came to review the treaty. He said that in France there would be no longer any troops or military installations not under French command, but that of course if Germany wished to have American and British troops this was their right. He mentioned that for other reasons France would probably wish to maintain some forces in Germany. He emphasized however again that all forces and installations on the territory of France would be under French command and French command alone, with the clear implication that there would no longer be any foreign troops on French soil. He said these changes in the NATO structure would not certainly be made this year and in any event, while not committing himself to any specific time except before 1969, that other allies including the US would be given plenty of warning and time to consider the French suggestions. /3/See Document 64. I asked the General, since he had fought in two world wars, if he did not think that the allies, particularly in World War I, had not suffered a great deal from the absence of unity of command. He said possibly, but pointed out that in World War I the British and subsequently American troops had fought in France but, as he put it, had been under French law, i.e., that France had been in control of all actions on her soil. He said there would be no objection to various plans drawn up by headquarters to be put into effect when hostilities start, assigning one sector or another to different commanders, but he said that integration would be finished. I told him my impression of the NATO set up was that most staff planning was for future contingencies, and he waved this aside and said no, and under US control. Comment: While de Gaulle said nothing particularly new he was much more explicit in regard to the total elimination of any integrated structure in France. I had never heard him before state so flatly that all foreign military installations would leave the soil of France or else be under total French control./4/ /4/Before discussing NATO, Bohlen and de Gaulle talked briefly about the differences between the United States and France on the future of Europe. President de Gaulle said that they were really not a matter of principle but of time. (Telegram 6237 from Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER) Bohlen
84. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/ London, May 9, 1965, 1103Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 UK(LO). Confidential; Limdis. Passed to the White House. 5415. For Secretary from Popper. Recognize that considerations of highest importance must have led to your decision to postpone your departure for NATO Ministerial./2/ Nevertheless, news will be received by most other delegations with disappointment and by some, including Secretary-General, with deep dismay. /2/Because of the crisis in the Dominican Republic, Secretary Rusk initially told the U.S. Delegation to the NATO Ministerial meeting that he would not be able to attend the session. Rusk flew to London when the crisis eased, arriving on May 12. We know of course that Under Secretary will present US case on matters we wish to handle in NATO with fullest effectiveness. That is not the problem. It is rather that this sharp break from precedent comes at a time when the Alliance is under attack and when therefore Alliance morale is especially sensitive to what may seem to be signals of changing attitudes. Our friends in NATO take comfort and gain conviction from your presence and your presentation. Their private exchanges of views with you have a tonic effect. Conversely, your absence will inevitably be used in some quarters to support view that our interest in Alliance is diminishing. In future other Ministers may be impelled without the same justification to absent themselves from Ministerial meetings. Next year or two may be critical for NATO; it would be most unfortunate time for such a trend to gain ground. President's May 7 speech/3/ has been extremely beneficial with our friends in Europe. To build on that foundation, hope you can plan a quick trip to attend as large a part of Ministerial meeting as possible, or at least make a brief appearance. It would be most helpful if the Under Secretary had some reassuring word from you to this effect which he could pass on to Secretary-General when they meet at noon Monday here./4/ /3/See footnote 3, Document 82. /4/Telegram 5416 from London, May 9, transmitted a letter from Secretary General Brosio to Rusk saying that he understood the "weighty reasons" that would keep the Secretary in Washington. At the same time, he stressed the great importance that Rusk's personal appearance would have, especially since the present situation in the Alliance was subject to misinterpretation by "ill-intentioned parties." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 S) On May 10, Under Secretary Ball met with Brosio to discuss the forthcoming meeting. Ball told Brosio that while it was not a good time for a searching discussion of the future of the Alliance, he did plan to raise the issue and suggest that a fuller discussion take place at the December meeting. Ball also told Brosio that the United States wanted Vietnam and the Dominican Republic mentioned in the final communique, and Brosio in turn reviewed the Cyprus situation. (Secun 4 from London, May10; ibid., NATO 3 UK(LO)) Amb. Finletter concurs. Bruce
85. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ London, May 14, 1965, 10 a.m. Secto 19. Following summary of Secretary's conversation May 13 with NATO SecGen Brosio is uncleared. Noforn and subject to revision: /1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2505. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Vest and cleared by Popper. Repeated to Paris Topol and Bonn. 1. Ministerial Meeting. Brosio thanked Secretary for coming and said his presence on second day was decisive factor in making meeting successful./2/ In response to Brosio question about US tactics on communique paragraph re Vietnam,/3/ Secretary said that French policy now so broadly recognized as peace regardless of consequences that neither US nor Asians much concerned about French attitude Vietnam. /2/Records of the public, closed, and restricted sessions of the 35th meeting of the North Atlantic Council May 11-13 are ibid., Central Files, NATO 3 UK(LO). Copies of these records, delegation background and briefing papers, memoranda of conversation, and telegrams to and from the U.S. Delegation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2503-2512. /3/For text of the final communique, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 439-440. 2. NATO Nuclear Committee. Secretary explained that US slowed down activity MLF Working Group as accommodation to FRG and not to de Gaulle or Russians. Germans don't want to push subject before September elections and all interested participants want to keep discussions going in meantime. Brosio said he considering parallel activity, discussions of nuclear policy in NATO Nuclear Committee in June. Some NATO countries desire meeting and he thought France willing to participate. It would initially examine information available since discussions of 1962. He hoped US could contribute useful information. Secretary cautioned Nuclear Committee meeting might raise serious problems between Paris and Bonn and suggested most important that Schroeder be in full agreement before initiation such sensitive meetings, especially in light of possible talks between French and Gromyko on nuclear matters about which we and Germans have not been filled in. Brosio admitted that at moment Germans less keen than others, but had objected only on basis of possible conflict with ANF/MLF Working Group. Popper warned US has no great new array information available for presentation at a June meeting. Secretary referred to analysis of Peking possible second nuclear explosion, which would be reported NAC in any case. Secretary suggested that alleged differences on strategy between major NATO countries is more matter of politics and budgets than true military question. He did not despair that quietly over time apparent differences might be resolved. Brosio said it was for this reason he would shortly see Messmer about forthcoming Defense Ministers' meeting. He hoped in time common ground would evolve although not optimistic much more would emerge from DefMin's meeting than agreement for studies to continue. 3. State of Alliance. Brosio referred to Mr. Ball's suggestions for more intensive study of state of Alliance and asked how urgently we viewed problem. Secretary explained that last December de Gaulle had said French would make proposals for Alliance reorganization, probably in 1967 in anticipation of 1969 date. He now had impression French might be advancing timetable. Question therefore is do we wait and see what de Gaulle suggests or do we try to see what remaining members want. For example, do Europeans want to organize defense together with US or separately. In spite of prosperity, Europeans show no signs of being ready to pay for own separate defense. Finletter cautioned that, although we must prepare for serious French surprises, he doubted whether the Permanent Council was at this stage right arena for raising substantive discussion of state of Alliance. Secretary observed that when husband and wife talk of divorce, it is already too late. US does not want to push far-reaching over-hasty fundamental discussions but does wish to begin preparations where possible. Brosio thought his and Secretary's approach much the same. He agreed it was desirable to prepare the ground; however, it was better not to pin ourselves down too firmly about time and type of activity at this point. 4. Cyprus. Secretary said Greeks and Turks continuing to meet bilaterally and working on location further talks with Greeks preferring New York and Turks Paris. Brosio said Costopoulos/4/ claimed Makarios had agreed to accept whatever two sides agreed upon and Secretary cautioned against over-optimism on Makarios. /4/Greek Foreign Minister Stavros Costopoulos. Rusk
86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/ Washington, May 21, 1965, 7:53 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by McKillop and approved by Richard H. Davis (EUR). Repeated to London, Rome, Bonn, Paris for USRO, Brussels, The Hague, and Moscow. 6051. Following is based on uncleared summary of conversation, FYI Noforn and subject to review: Calling at his request May 21, French Ambassador Alphand and Secretary had tour d'horizon in which Santo Domingo, Southeast Asia, ChiCom nuclear weapons and NATO were discussed along familiar lines. Alphand's remarks about French attitude toward NATO and its European neighbors of particular interest. Replying to Secretary's query re significance of Couve's remarks on NATO to Foreign Affairs Commission of National Assembly May 20, Alphand said General de Gaulle had told him that time would be ripe "next year" for discussion of revision of NATO. Secretary remarked that last December de Gaulle had mentioned 1967 as time for such discussion, which perhaps indicates French are accelerating time schedule. Alphand stated he hoped consideration of NATO revision could be handled by "silent diplomacy" and that agreement on changes could eventually be reached quietly and undramatically. Secretary pointed out GOF continues to stress NATO no longer corresponds to existing needs and world situation but does not state specifically how NATO should be revised to make it conform with changed circumstances. Secretary said it would be most helpful if GOF could give us its more detailed thinking on this subject. Alphand pointed out France in 1958 had put forth proposals for reorganizing the Alliance but had been rebuffed. Secretary smilingly commented that if France were able to obtain acceptance of its neighbors for those proposals, US would have agreed. Alphand retorted France different from its neighbors in two important respects: namely, it is a world power and has nuclear weapons capability. Secretary said he hoped emphasis France places on nuclear capability as status symbol would not encourage proliferation. Alphand said France hoped its neighbors would not achieve nuclear weapon programs for long time to come but in long run, proliferation probably inevitable./2/ /2/On June 3, Ambassador Bohlen transmitted a lengthy telegram summarizing de Gaulle's intentions toward NATO. He suggested that in response to statements about France's unwillingness to propose specific revisions, de Gaulle would demand early in 1966 a firmer commitment by the United States under Article 5 and revision or deletion of Article 9, which provided for the North Atlantic Council. Since France expected these proposals would be unacceptable to the rest of the Alliance, de Gaulle would be given an excuse to terminate the treaty. Bohlen added that it was also clear France intended, by 1969 at the latest, to have no forces or installations on French soil that were not under French command and subject to French law. (Telegram 6843 from Paris; ibid., POL 1 EUR W-FR) In concluding talk, Secretary said he wished to stress we are in no way contemplating use of nuclear weapons in SEA; nevertheless we feel we cannot make commitment never to be first country to resort to nuclear warfare. In case US was faced with fighting 800 million people, use of nuclear weapons could be necessary to avoid being bled to death. Secretary emphasized however that we do not wish war with ChiComs nor do we seek excuse destroy Chinese nuclear capability. Rusk
87. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals/1/ Washington, June 2, 1965, 7:27 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Spiers; cleared by Popper, Schaetzel, G/PM, and DOD; and approved by Davis. Also sent to Paris for USRO and to CINCLANT for POLAD. 2412. Following points constitute guidance re "Select Committee of Defense Ministers" as proposed by Secretary McNamara at May 31 NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in Paris:/2/ /2/Records of the NATO Defense Ministers meeting, held at Paris May 31-June 1, are ibid., DEF 12 NATO. For text of the communique issued at the end of the meeting, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 440. 1. Question of composition, terms of reference, time and place of meeting are matters for discussion among PermReps and Brosio in Paris. U.S. has suggested that composition be limited to four or five DefMins, since group will be unmanageable if too large. However, U.S. does not want to establish firm position on these points until suggestion has been considered by others and U.S. has had opportunity to study their comments and proposals. Committee would be ad hoc, not a permanent body. 2. Group--as suggested by U.S.--would have two principal agenda items: a) Examination of possible means of improving and extending Allied participation in planning for use of nuclear forces, including strategic nuclear forces. In course of its study, Committee would presumably examine present procedures, established after Ottawa meeting in May 1963, whereby non-U.S. officials participate in planning for use of nuclear forces committed to Alliance and make recommendations as to how these procedures could be improved; b) To work out technical means for fast and secure communications among NATO governments so that consultation is practical possibility in event of crisis in which use of nuclear weapons may be contemplated. Agreement that such consultations should take place is already established in Athens Guidelines of 1962./3/ /3/For text of the communique issued at the conclusion of the Athens North Atlantic Council session, May 6, 1962, see ibid., 1962, pp. 541-543. 3. Purpose of new proposal is to study how to provide greater degree of participation in nuclear planning for those desiring to participate, in line with general tendency of Allied thinking since Athens Ministerial Meeting in 1962. As McNamara stated, this is additional to whatever action may be taken re ANF/MLF proposals, not in substitution. Hence, Select Committee would not impinge on work of Paris ANF/MLF Working Group. 4. Select Committee will examine problems and make recommendations; it will not make "decisions" in its own right. Recommendations would presumably be considered at government level by all NATO members and might be discussed at future Ministerial Meeting of Alliance. U.S. recognizes that a committee composed of less than total membership of NATO would not take action binding on others not represented in it. Rusk
88. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 4, 1965, 12:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217. Secret. Drafted by Obst and Kent and approved in the White House on June 29. The conversation was held in the President's Office. The source text is labeled "Part three of nine." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS US German /2/Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder visited Washington June 2-4 for talks on topics of mutual concern. Other memoranda of conversation and papers relating to the visit are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2520 and 2521. The President reaffirmed the determination of the US to keep the Alliance intact. He asked the Chancellor if he was familiar with the statement he made on May 7/3/ in which he had made clear the determination of the US to support its Allies in Europe and had assured them that they could depend on the US. The President stressed that the US will stay in Germany and in Europe as long as it is needed. /3/See footnote 3, Document 82. The Chancellor thanked the President for his May 5 and May 8 statements./4/ He affirmed that he and the German people agreed entirely with these views. The President said more in those two statements than General de Gaulle has said altogether. /4/Neither of these statements has been further identified. The Chancellor said that he would have to meet with General de Gaulle next week. There were serious differences between Germany and France on many issues, and, except for the EEC, they had virtually no common positions at this time. The President said he understood the problem and assured the Chancellor that he understood his difficulties with General de Gaulle. He said that he thought both the US and Germany should make their positions very clear to the General. The Chancellor replied he did not want a public quarrel or confrontation next week. The President affirmed that the US could rely on Germany more than any other partner of the Alliance. De Gaulle must be asked exactly where he stood, but the President agreed that this question might better be asked after the elections in September. This issue could not be postponed indefinitely, however, and especially not until 1969. The US was determined to preserve the Alliance, and, although it hoped that France would remain in it, at worst the Alliance could continue without France. The Chancellor said de Gaulle was very well aware of the Chancellor's position. De Gaulle did not really want a European Europe, but he knew that the Chancellor would not agree to anything that would disrupt NATO. The Chancellor repeated his view that a confrontation should wait until after the elections and assured the President that Germany would not be afraid to use hard language with de Gaulle. One problem was that there were still groups in Germany sympathizing with de Gaulle because of the Adenauer-de Gaulle friendship. In the past de Gaulle could always be certain that Adenauer would follow whatever he suggested. The President could be assured--and de Gaulle also knew this very well--that the Chancellor's attitude now was quite different and that this Chancellor would not just do what de Gaulle desired. Chancellor Erhard also assured the President that he was not at all worried or impressed by de Gaulle's bluff of flirting with Moscow. The President replied that the Chancellor was enduring de Gaulle just as reluctantly as he did, but that it might be wise to be patient until after the elections. After the elections it should be made clear to de Gaulle that NATO would continue with or without France. The President told the Chancellor he should bring forward any ideas he might have to further German reunification and any approaches that he might think feasible. He could be assured such suggestions would be listened to sympathetically.
89. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals/1/ Washington, June 10, 1965, 7:58 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-5 FR-US. Secret. Drafted by Leddy and Schaetzel; cleared by Ball, Thompson, and Kitchen; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Paris for USRO and POLADs SHAPE and EUCOM, Rome for Burris at Naples, and Bonn for Parelman. 2484. There have been repeated rumors that French may shortly ask US in effect to vacate certain military facilities in France. While we now suspect that such a request will be postponed until after the French elections in December we cannot be sure of this. The following guidance is therefore being sent against the contingency that the request will be made within the next few weeks or months. A French request of the US to vacate certain or all military facilities in France or place them under French command would be consistent with emerging policies of Elysee, and would probably be preliminary step to subsequent French move, which likely take place after French elections, to disengage France from NATO organization and specifically from integrated NATO military activities. Premature reaction (i.e. by pressing for immediate across-board confrontation on French intentions re NATO) to early French request to withdraw from certain military facilities could be harmful to our interests and to NATO. It could permit French to argue it was we and not they who were taking initiative to exclude France from NATO community, and thus to break up the Alliance. A reaction of this kind would also prevent us from engaging in essential systematic and intensive consultation with our allies to ensure that Alliance responds effectively to any French political attack, and emerges without unnecessary loss of strength. Moreover, while internal study already underway, US Government will need some time to study effect and cost of various ways in which we might act. (FYI. At later stage we may well wish use French request for removal facilities as basis for general confrontation, depending on timing, tactics, public presentation, etc. End FYI.) Accordingly, our present plan is to respond along following lines to any early official inquiry about US reaction to French demand, if made, for withdrawal of some or all American military presence from France: 1. Naturally we shall give careful consideration to any French request, with specific reference to: (a) the effect of withdrawal actions on the defensive capabilities of the Alliance and on NATO itself; (b) the relevant provisions of the legal arrangements under which the facilities in question are established in France; (c) the military effects and the cost of removing facilities from France and making the necessary alternative arrangements; (d) the consequences of any substantial change in the US military establishment in France as regards NATO as a whole. 2. The US would respond to a French request only after a careful review of these questions, and after such military and political consultation as might be required particularly with allies dependent upon supplies and services now furnished through France or allies whose territories might be affected by alternative arrangements. FYI: DOD study on LOC and other US facilities in France and their possible relocation is now underway. Conclusions this study available in several weeks. Only then could consultation with allies begin as a necessary precondition to relocation. Consequently, immediate or hasty response to any French request for withdrawal infeasible on practical as well as psychological grounds. End FYI. 3. Our allies should be left in no doubt that US commitment to NATO and determination to provide full political and military support remains unimpaired. Rusk [Next documents]
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