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90. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 16, 1965, noon. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Popper, initialed by Leddy, and approved in S on July 6. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS US UK Lord Hood stated that his previous conversations with the Under Secretary and with Mr. Leddy had disclosed broad agreement on our analysis of French intentions./2/ Both governments felt that we should use the rest of this year to prepare for steps we might have to take if and when the French acted, after the December Presidential election. We both considered that the implications of the French position for NATO were serious but not fatal, and that what the French might do with respect to NATO and U.S. facilities in France was more serious than what they could do through withdrawal of their forces from NATO commitment. We agreed that NATO could make alternative arrangements if it must, but that these would be less satisfactory than those we now had. /2/Memoranda of the conversations with Ball and Leddy on June 15 are ibid., POL US and DEF 4 NATO. Accordingly, we must try to deter de Gaulle from moving, if possible. Bribery and threats would be counter-productive. The right approach was to: (1) continue acting on the assumption that NATO would go on as an institution; (2) synchronize statements by allied leaders supporting NATO principles; (3) let it be known that we were taking the necessary precautions to meet possible French actions; (4) continue the momentum on NATO programs such as stepping up political consultation, the NATO Force Planning Exercise, and so forth, while maintaining an open door for the French; and (5) consider carefully any specific proposals made by the French. Generally, it was in our interest to seek to gain time by this largely declaratory policy, and against our interest to precipitate a crisis. Lord Hood continued that if this approach were correct, the next step would be to put the matter to certain of the allies. This could best be done when the Under Secretary went to Paris early next month for the special NAC meeting. The Germans, Dutch and Italians were most important in this respect; Lord Hood asked whether the US and the UK should not approach them jointly. The Secretary thought this would be bound to lead to leaks and would heighten the impact of the conversations; furthermore, it would provoke a reaction from those allies not jointly approached. He did not think we should engage in joint US-UK talks with others at this time. The Secretary noted that the French attitude created insecurity and nervousness, because of doubts regarding the status of the North Atlantic Treaty after 1969. He wondered whether it would not be advantageous for a number of us to state at the December Ministerial Meeting that we did not intend to avail ourselves of the privilege of denouncing the treaty. He asked whether such a step would provoke de Gaulle. Lord Hood thought not, depending on how it was done. He recalled the 1954 Nine-Power declaration at London,/3/ in which the French participated, declaring that they regarded the North Atlantic Treaty as being of indefinite duration. /3/For text of the Final Act of the London Nine-Power Conference, October 3, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. V, pp. 1345 ff. The Secretary then asked whether there should be any more precise or more formal discussion with the French at this time. Lord Hood was inclined to think not: the French would hear of the exercise on which we were embarking, and we would stand ready to bring them into any discussions on NATO problems if they desired--as was the case in connection with the Select Committee of Defense Ministers. The Secretary agreed. Mr. Leddy explained that we planned to compare US and UK talking papers which could be used for exploratory bilateral discussions with other allies. He did not expect that there would be any substantial difference between the two papers, though difference of emphasis might later appear as to the time and occasion for a confrontation with the French. This might be particularly true after the German election, when we might desire to move forward on ANF/MLF negotiations even though that might produce a strong reaction. The matter could be left open for the present, however. Mr. Leddy added that FRG Vice Chancellor Mende had expressed the opinion to him that de Gaulle might be taking such a hard line on NATO in order to obtain a stronger French position in the organization./4/ It was agreed that there was no real sign that giving the French more of the important jobs or more authority would have any substantial result. /4/A memorandum of Leddy's conversation with Vice Chancellor Erich Mende at 10:15 a.m. on June 16 is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Lord Hood suggested, and it was agreed, that we would exchange lists of actions we thought the French might take vis-a-vis NATO. It was also agreed that when the Defense Department study of the possible relocation of U.S. and NATO facilities in France had been completed, it should be discussed with U.K. experts. A meeting of legal experts in Washington might consider the legal problems which could be created by French action, and a regularly scheduled public affairs experts meeting in London, now scheduled for the second week in July, could look at the problem of public affairs policies on the French and NATO. The Secretary asked what it would be wise to say if the press inquired about rumors that contingency plans were being made for a French withdrawal from NATO. The consensus was that one could take the line that "contingency planning" was too dramatic a term, but that naturally statements made by the French required us to give some thought to the problems which might arise. Finally, the Secretary asked when and where the Winter Ministerial Meeting should meet in view of the French election. Lord Hood thought that the locale should remain Paris, but that the date might be changed. He suggested that the Under Secretary might discuss the matter with Secretary General Brosio in Paris next month, at the same time explaining the purpose of our bilateral contacts on the French problem. Mr. Schaetzel noted that we were seeking advice from Ambassadors Bohlen and Finletter on the subject. In the course of the conversation the Secretary asked how we should handle the problem of the new SHAPE Headquarters building. Mr. Schaetzel explained that our failure to send instructions to USRO, stating that we were preparing to move ahead with it, was holding up the development of a situation in which the French would be the only opponents of constructing a new building. The Defense Department now seemed to be ready to agree. Mr. Leddy believed that it would be useful for the situation to unfold in this way, so that we could make it clear that we were continuing a business-as-usual policy in NATO. Lord Hood agreed.
91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/ Washington, June 21, 1965, 9:19 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Ball. 6571. For Ambassador from Under Secretary. Ref: Embtel 7218./2/ I do not contemplate imprudence. /2/In telegram 7218, June 21, received in the Department of State at 10:50 a.m., Bohlen "seriously" hoped that Ball would be "very prudent" in his bilateral discussions on the state of the Alliance during his presentation to the North Atlantic Council in July. The Ambassador also expressed his feeling that the United States might not be far enough along in its own thinking to have profitable discussions. (Ibid.) We had a useful first conversation with Lord Hood with regard to NATO problems and he expressed a willingness to meet me in Paris for further conversation. I hope to have exploratory and totally non-committal conversations with other representatives who may come from other capitals for the meeting of the NATO Council. I shall also tell Couve, if I see him, that we are of course looking forward to any proposals the French Government may put forward regarding the revision of NATO although I understand the government is not expecting to make such moves until next year. The position of the United States Government at the moment is that we do not have definitively formulated views but are simply soliciting the suggestions of other governments in a very preliminary manner. I do not expect this matter to get into the public domain to any great extent. In the NATO session we held last March we were successful in maintaining a high degree of security./3/ If, however, the French Government hears rumors that we may be talking about the Alliance, tant pis. /3/Documentation on Ball's presentation to the North Atlantic Council March 31-April 1 on various international problems is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2484. On basis our talks today with UK, German and Italian Embassies here and with Brosio through Finletter, probability is that NATO meeting will take place on July 13 instead of July 7; bilaterals would be scheduled for July 12 and possibly morning of 14th. This might enable participation of Schroeder and Fanfani at NATO discussions, which important in its own right. I have definite impression that both Foreign Ministers wish handle bilaterals themselves. Rusk
92. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State/1/ Paris, June 29, 1965, 2000Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Repeated to the NATO capitals. Polto 1875. Select Committee (SC) proposal. Following highlights informal PermReps plus one meeting Brosio's office June 29 discuss creation SC. (Brosio felt it essential have such informal meeting smoke out others, particularly French on SC and make available more detailed suggestions than made at DefMin meet.) For this purpose I prepared statement (being forwarded by pouch) based on Dept Topol 1707 and Circs 2443 and 2412,/2/ which was passed out at meeting. /2/Circular telegram 2412 is Document 87. Circular telegram 2443, June 7, discussed the size and composition of the committee, France's participation, its relationship to other NATO bodies, a timetable for its organization, and its terms of reference, but added that the Department of State and Defense were just beginning to discuss what substantive questions the committee might want to address. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) Topol 1707, June 17, elaborated on the problems that the committee might consider, but again stressed that U.S. thinking was "preliminary and certainly not rigid." (Ibid.) Before reading paper I mentioned fact that many PermReps had approached us to obtain more details SC proposal and therefore at suggestion SYG I prepared informal statement in effort be helpful, emphasizing meeting and paper both informal, that we did not wish to establish SC as new NATO institution but was merely a mechanism see how could obtain suggestions for better nuclear consultation. Also emphasized desire to [hear?] suggestions from others and hope that SYG would continue follow through in order expedite matter. Following are informal comments after paper read: Canada (Ignatieff) welcomed SC suggestion since Canada desired further discussion nuclear matters for long time and it essential come to grips with implications of Athens and Ottawa decisions. While all hope deterrent will work, must recognize this depends on the will to employ which means must consult in detail ahead of time to avoid misunderstanding and to know how and when weapons should be used if necessary. While suggestion SC will be helpful, NAC should continue nuclear consultations and any suggestions by SC must be subject to NAC approval. Ignatieff raised following points: 1. Not sure why it implied SC should only report to Ministerial meetings rather than regular NAC. 2. SC should probably be composed three nuclear and three non-nuclear powers. 3. SC should not be institutionalized. 4. What would be frequency of SC meetings and locale and the role of SYG in SC? 5. Nuclear consultations should build on Athens and Ottawa agreements. Ignatieff then suggested following topics for SC discussion: 1. Coordination of tactical weapons assigned NATO commanders. 2. Coordination use SAC weapons. 3. Coordination use future nuclear weapons systems, tactical or external. 4. Role of NAC in emergency situation in relation to above nuclear weapons. 5. Elaborate on Athens guidelines. 6. Improved communications. 7. Increase Allied roles in strategic planning (e.g. greater NATO role SAC, wider role SACEUR nuclear deputy, permanent consultative role Nuclear Committee). 8. How provide for greater role NATO governments in nuclear matters. (Ignatieff later circulated paper covering points--being pouched.) Belgium (De Staercke) agreed generally with Canadian points and welcomed SC suggestion. Endorsed idea meetings should be informal since wished make sure not reduce role of NAC which must make final decisions. He thought suggestion DefMins or regular Ministerial meetings would be only ones to discuss SC's suggestions incorrect, since this gave impressions NAC being denigrated--"There are not two councils, only one, and at some of its meetings FonMins present." He asked for clarification what we had in mind in setting up working group and/or panels since it obvious DefMins will not be able to do detailed work. Expressed hope SYG would keep countries not on SC informed of developments and questioned suggestion US paper that SC have MC consult regarding purely military matters. De Staercke felt entire question although military was definitely more political than military and did not like give impression SC and military would make suggestions without full consideration by NAC as political body. He also asked how SYG hoped handle question. UK (Shuckburgh) welcomed SC and supported US statement which refined and defined McNamara's suggestion but made it clear that proposals were basically limited. Therefore he not sure whether Canadians' and Belgians' suggestions regarding broad questions to be discussed by SC were its role. He envisaged SC making procedural suggestions and not being a permanent body. Adding if SC only made basic procedural recommendations would not be difficult agree on limited membership, otherwise problem most difficult. SC would only make recommendations while NAC in permanent or Ministerial session would make decisions. Italy (Alessandrini) agreed with colleagues but felt his government would insist upon NAC as ultimate decision body and he wished to know what role SYG would be re SC. Germany (Grewe) welcomed SC proposals and remarked pleased hear US paper suggested working group or panels since obviously DefMins would not have time work out detailed suggestions. Recalled both Athens and Ottawa meetings were combined FonMin and DefMin meetings and underlined any consideration SC suggestions should be by NAC or combined Ministerial meetings. He wondered how limited suggestions of US paper could be reconciled with wider suggestions on SC made by Canada and Belgium but in any event he certain FRG would want to be sure NAC involved in any decisions and thought that before final SC suggestions submitted December Ministerial meeting draft they should be considered by NAC as political body. Netherlands (Boon) welcomed McNamara's initiative since discussion nuclear matters can come only if nuclear powers so desire. Thought it important first to draw up mandate SC. Said it essential make sure NAC has final decision and pointed out Alliance had never before used special category of Ministers other than FonMins to make decisions for it and therefore any final suggestions should be presented to Council meeting rather than DefMin meeting. He glad committee open-ended and his government will decide whether they would like to be on committee after mandate established since Dutch not convinced such important matter should be studied just by few. He too wished to know position SYG and hoped there would be no changes in usual NAC operations in connection with establishing SC. He closed with statement saying he welcomed these discussions and Dutch would decide later what final position would be. Greece (Palamas) welcomed suggestions, reiterated decisions must be by Council but gave green light to any agreed arrangements to work out procedural suggestions of SC. US (Finletter) expressed gratitude for responses and stated he agreed with most suggestions but felt personally that narrow interpretation given by UK was more in keeping with our suggestions than those raised by Canada and Belgium. He too impressed with the apparent unanimity expressed by others that paramount role of Permanent Council should be protected since it was a unique organization and should not be deprived in any way of its authority. France (Schricke) merely thanked us for further details but stated had no instructions. He added odd statement that Athens and Ottawa meetings were meetings of FonMins and not combined FonMin-DefMin meetings. No one commented./3/ /3/On June 10, Finletter reported that the French seemed "generally favorable" toward going ahead with the committee, but subsequent conversations indicated their position would be determined on the specifics of the proposal. (Polto 1790 from Paris; ibid.) On June 30, at a lunch given by Brosio, the French Permanent Representative attacked the idea of the committee discussing the improvement of communications (beyond the competence of the Defense Ministers) and the use of nuclear weapons (a political question also beyond their competence). While Finletter argued that both questions should be studied by the Defense Ministers, he concluded that the final French position was still unclear, but the rest of the Alliance should be prepared to prevent the French from blocking the work of the committee. (Polto 1883 from Paris; ibid.) SYG summed up by stating further informal meetings PermReps plus one discuss SC will take place after NAC meetings on July 7. He recorded general concern of all on paramount authority of NAC. Re role SYG, felt as chairman NAC, he should also chair SC meetings. Re Canada-UK dilemma suggested SC would study narrower aspects and make suggestions while broader problems brought up by Canada should be discussed in NAC. Finletter
93. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, July 6, 1965, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Givan on July 19, cleared by Popper and RPE, and approved in U on July 22. The meeting was held at the Department of State. The source text is labeled "Part II of II." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS United States Under Secretary Ball Italy The Ambassador thought Mr. Ball might be interested in a telegram he had received from Rome giving an "objective evaluation" of the EEC crisis. According to the message as read by the Ambassador, all institutions of the EEC, and all member governments except the French, had agreed on the package proposal of the Commission re: CAP, financing through a common external tariff and increased powers for the European Parliament. All had held fast to that position except Spaak who said Belgium could not accept new commitments as long as they had a caretaker government. A revised transitional arrangement proposed by Italy was supported by the Germans and Dutch but rejected by the French. It was true that the EEC Council had failed to meet the June 30 deadline as the French had wished, but this date had no "final value." Nevertheless, according to the Foreign Office telegram, despite the pessimistic atmosphere created by the French, the Brussels discussions had been useful and had provided a basis for continuing activities in the Commission and the Council. The GOI wishes to continue these activities and all the more so since Italy has succeeded to the chairmanship of the Council. The GOI therefore hopes the other members will act according to a European line of conduct. Commenting that the telegram provided a "less dramatic" interpretation than did the press of events in Brussels, the Ambassador asked what the Under Secretary thought of French intentions. Mr. Ball replied that he assumed the French intended to forestall any supra-national elements from developing in the EEC./2/ Confronted with the January 1 deadline for a weighted-majority voting system, the French wanted leverage and calculated that this was as good a way as any to get it. In response to the question whether he thought the French were prepared to destroy the Common Market, Mr. Ball said the matter had now reached the poker game stage. It would seem that the French are counting on the other five to draw back. The Ambassador said he agreed and, speaking personally, he thought the French had the easier position. They can threaten to destroy the Common Market, which Italy and Germany are not free to do./3/ /2/In a memorandum for the Secretary of State's staff meeting on July 7 Leddy reported: "The current crisis in EEC relations came to a head over a technical agriculture question but the real issue is supranationalism. When the EEC Commission interjected the latter issue into the forum, the French seized it for their own purposes. "The current internal EEC struggle is likely to last through this year with the end result of De Gaulle getting about what he wants. Meanwhile the outlook for the Kennedy Round has been adversely affected by this development because of the inability of the EEC to proceed with its planned agricultural offers. "We are maintaining a public posture of non-involvement in this dispute." (Ibid., ORG S) In a 1-page memorandum to President Johnson for his evening reading on July 7, Rusk gave the same summation and indicated that the Department of State was "sticking to a 'no comment' line." (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164) /3/On July 8, French Ambassador Alphand informed Secretary Rusk that the EEC crisis was serious and that since France had made concessions in the agricultural and industrial policy areas, it could not accept new and unanticipated conditions giving control of funds to the commission and supervisory authority to a parliament that represented no government. France would not seek to undo the progress that had been achieved up to June 30, but would freeze everything as it was, and Alphand offered no timetable on how long it might take to resolve the crisis. Rusk did not comment on the crisis except to say that press reports that it had been manufactured by the United States and the United Kingdom were "absolute nonsense." (Telegram 147 to Paris, July 9; ibid., Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC)
94. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, July 6, 1965, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Spiers. The meeting was held in the Pentagon. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Secretary McNamara Ronald I. Spiers, Deputy Director, RPM Carl W.A. Schurmann, Dutch Ambassador Ambassador Schurmann said that he had a series of questions to ask about the Select Committee proposal which Secretary McNamara had put to NATO May 31. First, what exactly did he see as the task of this committee? Ambassador Schurmann recalled that initially the U.S. had emphasized the technical aspects of communications, but this emphasis may now have changed. Secretary McNamara said the objective was to determine how the desire for greater participation in nuclear affairs by other members of the Alliance might be met. In spite of all the discussion of this problem, none of the other members of NATO have come up with specific proposals, and all initiatives--he cited the Omaha liaison arrangements, the Athens Guidelines, the MLF and various papers analyzing strategic and military problems--have come from the United States. Apart from the French, who desire to see no changes made, no concrete suggestions have come forth. He accepted the desire for a greater degree of participation as bona fide. Unfortunately, however, there had been no effective forum for discussion of these problems. Every time these issues came up, there were fifty or sixty people around. Out of a discussion among a limited number in the Select Committee, plans for achieving a greater degree of participation may evolve. This was the primary objective of the Select Committee suggestion. The Committee would make recommendations to NAC and would not take decisions on its own. He did not want the discussion limited to technical aspects, but these aspects were important to begin with: unless the technical problems could be resolved, there was little point in further discussion. Ambassador Schurmann asked if the Select Committee would not infringe on the MLF Working Group. Secretary McNamara replied in the negative. The MLF Working Group was only concerned with this one narrow subject. There is no discussion in the MLF Working Group of the basic issue of how greater Alliance participation in nuclear affairs is to be achieved. This group is simply concerned with one facet of the approach to the problem. Even if the ANF/MLF comes into existence, it will not fulfill all of the needs in this area. The Select Committee and the ANF/MLF were complementary, not conflicting or mutually exclusive. Ambassador Schurmann asked about the French attitude on the Select Committee. Secretary McNamara said it was "positive, so far." He had been pleased and surprised at the French reaction. Some people welcomed it whenever the French took a negative position, but he was not among these. We gain by unity, not division, in the Alliance, and he very much hoped the French would accept the proposal, which does not run counter to any of France's objectives./2/ /2/McNamara's hopes were not realized. At a North Atlantic Council meeting on July 7, the French Permanent Representative stated that France saw no useful purpose in the Select Committee. However, at that time France did not indicate whether that meant it would not participate in the committee or would attempt to block its establishment. (Polto 29 from Paris, July 7; ibid.) On July 12, Finletter reported that Couve de Murville had elaborated on this position, saying France would not object to the committee proceeding, but would object to Secretary General Brosio having any part in it. (Polto 47 from Paris; ibid.) Ambassador Schurmann asked what we would do if the French refused to participate. Secretary McNamara said in this event he would wish to go ahead with the Committee anyway. We should not dissolve the Alliance because France refuses to cooperate, nor deny ourselves the gains which can accrue to the rest of us from cooperation. Ambassador Schurmann asked if we had heard that the French will approve the Select Committee if the ANF is abandoned. Secretary McNamara said we would not accept such an exchange. These are unrelated questions. Ambassador Schurmann asked if the Committee would be ad hoc or permanent. Secretary McNamara said it would be purely ad hoc. Ambassador Schurmann asked whether it would meet in July. Secretary McNamara noted that there had been some talk of a meeting July 27-28, but it was premature to make final decisions, since preliminary questions had not been settled. Ambassador Schurmann asked about US views on composition. Secretary McNamara said membership was a matter for NAC to decide. We assume that the US and the UK will have to be members, since we are the ones that have the basic nuclear information. We hope France will join. There is a case to be made for German membership because of their majority military role in the Alliance. Our main hope was that the Committee will be kept small. So far we have been trying to work in far too large a group. Ambassador Schurmann noted that Italy and Canada had been mentioned as possible members. Secretary McNamara said that no Canadian authority had said anything to him about such an interest. He noted we were not in favor of an "open-ended" Committee. Secretary McNamara said he thought the Select Committee was the best way to determine just what the interests of the other countries were as regards participation in nuclear affairs and how to go about meeting these interests. He alluded to the MRBM problem and the problem of nuclear decision-making as representative questions. The MRBM problem has remained unsettled for three years, and he thought this was "disgraceful." We have got to find a forum and a method to deal with problems such as these. We must get down to informed discussion. He emphasized again that it would not be the Select Committee's business to settle these questions but only to make recommendations to NAC. Ambassador Schurmann asked if we would be willing to discuss nuclear assistance to such countries as France. Secretary McNamara said he would be happy to see this placed on the agenda of the Select Committee. This was a perfectly legitimate subject to discuss. The basic point was that the US should not have to assume responsibility for all tough decisions, such as whether there should be MRBMs in Europe. "It's not my soil and not my money." He felt the Europeans had a perfect right to ask the US for more information as a basis for more intelligent discussion. The Select Committee could serve this purpose. After that, the next step would be discussions and decisions at a higher level, perhaps in the Nuclear Committee. NATO, he felt, had so far been too heavy on procedure, and too light on substance. Secretary McNamara said there is a host of important questions that NATO is not acting on, partly because it is not organized to do so. The Select Committee can help. Ambassador Schurmann asked whether we would object to having a rotating member. Secretary McNamara said this could be useful if the Committee's life were extended. Some countries--the Scandinavians and Portugal--do not appear to want to be on the Committee; others may wish to participate, and rotation may be a way of meeting this desire without too much enlargement of the Committee. Ambassador Schurmann asked how we felt about Brosio's chairing the Select Committee. Secretary McNamara said he would be delighted and saw considerable merit in this. Ambassador Schurmann raised the question of the Defense Common Market. He asked whether we had "practical means" in mind to give effect to this idea. Secretary McNamara said we did not, that initially it would have to be worked out on a bilateral basis. He felt that if each NATO member could accept the principle of buying arms from the source of highest quality and lowest cost, "we would shortly develop" a common market. Another aspect would be to work out joint financing of major development programs, such as the US-FRG main battle tank program, which is a step forward and in which others may ultimately wish to join in. These programs can lead to standardization of major weapons systems within the Alliance. A common market would also involve freedom from duties and avoidance of artificial restrictions on development and production. Ambassador Schurmann asked if this concept would imply a larger share of the market for Europe. Secretary McNamara noted that Europe is not now competitive, and it will have to reorganize itself. There is no inherent reason why European countries cannot meet the "highest quality, lowest price" principle with proper organization and salesmanship. The problem now is that individual countries are attempting too broad a spectrum of production. This increases costs beyond competitive levels. European countries will have to specialize. We do not intend either to exert pressure or to subsidize on our own behalf, but we will compete. He felt European countries can become more competitive if they act correctly and that they will then naturally get a larger share of the market. We offer the advantages of the US mass market. However, painful economic and politically costly adjustments will be required, as was the case in the UK in canceling the TSR-2. Ambassador Schurmann asked if this will be worked out multilaterally. Secretary McNamara said he had given up on effectively approaching these problems through multilateral action. Mr. Leddy noted that after these questions had been worked out bilaterally, they can be taken to NAC and formalized. Secretary McNamara agreed.
95. Editorial Note On March 25, 1965, Under Secretary of State Ball sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy and Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara stating that he had for some time felt the need for a fresh look at U.S. policy toward Western Europe. To this end he asked Ambassador John H. Ferguson to organize a study of the problem. On July 9, Ferguson, who had been assisted by officials from the Departments of State and Defense and the White House, transmitted his 87-page report, "Europe and United States Policy," to Bundy, McNamara, and Rusk. (Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR W-US) The report recommended the following courses of action with respect to collective defense: "A. Since France was likely to require that all integrated commands and combat forces not under French command be removed from France, the United States should consult at once with its other allies to make the necessary transfers in an orderly fashion. "B. The United States should proceed without delay in changes in NATO's structure beginning with military planning beginning with steps that were not subject to French veto. "C. Discussions of NATO strategy had taken up an inordinate amount of time at all levels of the alliance without narrowing the difference between Europe and the United States. Because of this the United States should inform the rest of the alliance that it would be prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons to prevent the loss of NATO territory beyond a limited area along its borders. "D. The problem of an alliance nuclear force was up in the air until the German elections had been held, but even following the elections neither the Federal Republic nor the United Kingdom was likely to take the initiative on this question. Therefore, in the fall the United States should hold private conversations with London and Bonn to reach agreement on the terms of some arrangement based on the principle of giving Germany an equal place to that of other European nations in whatever arrangement was decided." On the matter of an integrated Europe, the United States should support steps that led to further coordination in political and defense fields, as well as those in monetary and production fields that would further integration. Finally Ferguson addressed the problem of Germany. In this part of the report the Ambassador stressed that finding an equal and adequate place for Germany in the Western structure was crucial. This included support for West German proposals for reunification.
96. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Finletter) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Paris, July 12, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Dear Dean: I paid a farewell call on Couve this morning and it lasted much longer than I had anticipated. I have already reported by telegram on Couve's views about the Select Committee./2/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 94. Couve roamed over a great many subjects. He asked what I thought was the basic difficulty between France and the United States. I said it was lack of communication. I said that the reserved and austere attitude of the General made it extremely difficult if not impossible to have full and frank interchanges of views. We then agreed that there were certain basic differences between France and the United States despite the overall, and we both hoped overriding, considerations of respect of the two countries for each other and the real liking between them. Couve acknowledged that it was extremely difficult to have the kind of full and free interchange with the General which was necessary. In this connection, however, Couve was distinctly negative on the idea of a meeting between the President and De Gaulle, implying his doubt that there could be any useful communication between the two men. Then coming down to the immediate issues, he said that the basic one was the nuclear issue. He said that the General had chosen the nuclear issue as the point on which to differ basically with NATO and that there was no possibility of a solution to this difference in points of view. He said that the problem centered on Germany. He said the United States believed that by the MLF device or something like it Germany's ambitions for nuclear arms would be controlled. He said France did not agree with that. France was more on the side of the Russians in that argument. France believed that once the Germans got an undivided joint interest in nuclear weapons, that would be only the first step toward the building of a German force de frappe. I replied that the most likely way of getting a German force de frappe was to deny her any joint and indivisible interest in nuclear arms, in which event as a matter of national pride she would be compelled to go out and get them on her own somehow. Continuing on this question, Couve volunteered that France did not intend to agree to any European nuclear force, jointly and severally owned, with Germany in it. France was logical, and if she did not think it would work in the Atlantic she did not think it would work in Europe. I then said what are you going to do about the German ambitions for nuclear weapons? Do you really think that Germany will continue to be the only country in the world which has relinquished its right to have such weapons? He said he thought that they would have to be obliged to accept this. He then continued that he felt the future lay in an arrangement between France and the UK which would set up a joint nuclear force. I asked him what he meant by that and he said he meant joint arrangements to consider strategy and possibly some joint institutions of two national forces de frappe: one British and one French. He said that he did recognize that there was the danger of a Rapallo deal by the Germans with the Russians. On the other hand, he was not badly worried about it because he felt that the Russians were never going to let any Germany, unified or not, have atomic weapons and that therefore we need not worry at all about a true Rapallo which would put an atomic Germany on the side of the Russians. I said wouldn't this leave things in a rather unsolved state? And wasn't it possible that a Germany denied by its Atlantic Allies and denied by its European Allies the right to have atomic weapons might become a very difficult customer to deal with? He said that he recognized this but there were certain questions which were insoluble. With best regards. Sincerely,
97. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State/1/ Paris, July 13, 1965, 2000Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Repeated to the NATO capitals. Polto 63. Subject: Bilateral discussions on French policy toward NATO. This is round-up on Under Secretary's bilateral talks on France and NATO with British, Germans, Dutch, Italians, Belgians and NATO SYG Brosio held on July 12-13./2/ No talks were held with Canadians in view inability FonMin Martin to come to Paris. Questions raised during bilaterals on subjects other than NATO-French issue are being reported by separate telegrams. Participants listed at end of cable. /2/Ball was in Paris to brief the North Atlantic Council on the Dominican Republic crisis and U.S. policy toward Vietnam. Records of these briefings, papers prepared for his trip, and background papers for the meetings are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2523. Under Secretary outlined preliminary US thinking, emphasizing that USG has not arrived at definite conclusions and before doing so wishes have views of other allies. Accumulating evidence available to us through various sources, including direct statement to us by de Gaulle and Couve de Murville, indicate that it virtually certain France will at some stage make proposals or take further specific steps designed to weaken or destroy NATO, especially its integrated military arrangements and political machinery. This French attitude toward NATO must be taken seriously, even though it is difficult to understand. Two world wars have demonstrated conclusively importance of creating an integrated military structure and forces in being in time of peace as means of preventing war. France of all countries should understand this. Nevertheless de Gaulle seems to want to replace NATO with series of old-fashioned bilateral military alliances. US of course has no interest in purely bilateral military commitments with France. An integrated NATO is important to the security of the US, but a bilateral commitment from the French outside of such an integrated Atlantic military structure would be of no value to us. In our judgment it is probable that the French will not make any serious move before the end of the year. It is uncertain when or how they will move, but given de Gaulle's broad objectives it is most important that the other allies engage in timely preparations for whatever may come. It is probable that de Gaulle's timetable for moving against NATO has been stepped up and that he may begin to take specific actions in 1966 rather than waiting until 1968 or 1969. He may put forward formal proposals for a drastic revision of NATO or he may take a series of steps designed to accomplish the same result piecemeal. The French have already blocked a NATO decision for a new SHAPE building in France. Other steps might be a request of the US and NATO to move NATO and US facilities out of France, including some or all of the US air base complex and some of communications. These actions could be taken simultaneously with other piecemeal policies such as using the French veto to prevent constructive developments in NATO, or increasing pursuit of the empty-chair policy. The French have tried to make it appear that 1969 calls for a basic review and reform of NATO. However, this is not the case. NATO continues indefinitely. The only significance of 1969 is that it is a date after which a member may withdraw. In short, it is not a NATO problem, but a problem of French policy toward NATO. The US is now engaged in thorough technical studies of what would have to be done if US and NATO facilities were to be removed from France. It is our best military judgment that NATO could continue as an effective and credible military deterrent even if the French should withdraw. Existing facilities in France would in this event, of course, have to be moved elsewhere, which would require specific agreements on physical arrangements with other NATO countries, including probably at least the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. The US has no wish to provoke a confrontation with France on NATO. The best possible solution would be for France to decide to continue in NATO and to participate fully once more in carrying forward NATO objectives. If France weakens its ties with NATO, or withdraws from it, that will be the result of a unilateral French policy to isolate itself. Question of timing and tactics to be followed by the other allies in response to possible French moves is of great importance. If the French present to NATO specific and definite proposals for changing the structure, they should be considered carefully and on their merits. If, on the other hand, the French should make certain limited proposals, such as the removal of specific facilities from France, a decision would have to be made on whether this should be an occasion for requesting the French to explain their over-all objectives. The US is carrying forward the present bilateral discussions on an entirely private and informal basis. No doubt the French would learn of these talks. If they inquire, they should be candidly informed that the other allies are necessarily studying what they should do against the day when France might act to carry out objectives which it has made known publicly and privately in many ways. The US hopes that the other allies would study these questions and that in the fall, after the German elections, it would be possible to resume bilateral discussions. By that time the US would have completed its own studies on the military aspects. The foregoing presentation was used in each of our bilateral talks. Following are the observations on major points of the other countries concerned: [Here follow a summary of the British view, described as in substantial agreement with the U.S. assessment, the German position, described as in complete agreement with the U.S. presentation, and the Dutch ideas about four possibilities that France might choose; a report that the Italians and Secretary General were extremely concerned not to provoke the French, while the Belgians were generally in accord with the U.S. position; and a list of the foreign participants in the bilateral conversations.] Finletter
98. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, July 15, 1965, 1:47 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Hinton and Leddy, cleared by Schaetzel, and approved by Leddy. Sent to Bonn, Brussels for the Embassy and USEC, The Hague, London, Rome, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, Luxembourg, and Geneva. 72. In response to any official inquiries regarding the position of the US on the Common Market crisis and European integration generally, you may privately draw on the remarks of Under Secretary Ball (Polto circular 2)/2/ in discussions with Foreign Minister Luns July 12 to the effect that the US is not talking publicly or privately about the Common Market crisis; that it is taking the position that this is an internal matter for the Six to handle; and that there should be no question that the US, after fifteen years of vigorous advocacy of a consistent policy, is abandoning its well known position on European integration. /2/Dated July 13. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2523) Rusk
99. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy)/1/ Washington, July 26, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 6 MALTA. Confidential. Drafted by Vest. SUBJECT The U.S. position is that NATO membership for Malta is not practicable because of the deep-seated objection of several of the Allies/2/ and associated membership is undesirable because it would introduce a second-class status for which there is no provision in the treaty. Therefore our objective has been to persuade NATO to work out arrangements which would involve Malta in continuing close relationships with NATO and NATO countries. This is desirable because of the existence of the NATO base there and also, from a long-range point of view, to inhibit the development of an irresponsible non-aligned posture in Malta which could facilitate Communist designs. /2/Leddy wrote in the margin at this point: "Why do they object?" From August 1964 until this spring we pushed our NATO Allies towards this end without success, primarily because of the objections of France and the Scandinavians. After Prime Minister Borg-Olivier intimated to Brosio that he might be content with something along the following line, we took the lead, acting through Brosio, to persuade NAC to agree to a draft resolution which: (a) affirms the deep interest of the members of NATO in the security of Malta, (b) expresses the willingness of its members to consult with GOM whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of Malta is threatened, and (c) confirms the readiness of NATO members to examine at the request of GOM the possibility of establishing future arrangements with Malta. The Maltese now seem to want to haggle. Regardless of their attitude, it is most unlikely that NAC will agree to anything much more substantial than this particular resolution for the indefinite future. [Next documents]
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