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100. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read)/1/ Washington, August 19, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Leddy. SUBJECT Following is a summary of the discussion at the luncheon of particular relevance to EUR: In response to the President's inquiry, Mr. Leddy said that a major problem facing us in our European relations was how to deal with de Gaulle's attacks on NATO. It was almost certain that de Gaulle would move on this reasonably soon. The Department is preparing a position on how to deal with de Gaulle, which we would be presenting to the President very shortly. Once a position was established we would need to talk it over with our major European allies, other than France, after the German elections September 19. Our other allies will stand with us on NATO but it is important to have full consultations. Mr. Leddy also suggested that it might be useful to convey a kind of warning message to de Gaulle fairly soon. He noted that Under Secretary Ball planned to accompany Secretary Fowler on a trip to Europe early in September and suggested that perhaps the Under Secretary could call on the General and deliver a message from the President which would be "a shot across the bow." This would come just prior to the General's press conference. The President said he would look at these matters when they came to his attention. Continuing, Mr. Leddy said that our position with respect to collective nuclear arrangements in Europe is unsatisfactory. US policy has gone up and down on this, and it was essential that a solid position be established in order to move it forward, which would take somewhat more time. The President made a general observation applicable to the nuclear as well as to other problems discussed at the luncheon dealing with the fact it was very important to assure Congressional support for important US policies before they were crystallized and carried forward. He felt that much more work needed to be done on this by the Department on the Hill and that otherwise we would find that we do not get our policies through. The President underlined the importance of effective public presentation of US policies and US successes. He felt the State Department was not doing a good enough job in this respect. The President welcomed diversity of opinion and viewpoint both within the Department and among the Agencies in arriving at a policy. Once the policy had been established, however, everyone should carry it out loyally and not seek to undermine it.
101. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State/1/ Rome, September 1, 1965, 0420Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Paris and London for the Ambassadors and passed to the White House. 533. For President and Secretary from Under Secretary. Following NATO portion of my August 31 discussion with General de Gaulle:/2/ /2/On August 25, President Johnson had written to President de Gaulle informing him that Ball was going to visit Europe and asking de Gaulle to receive him. (Telegram 865 to Paris, August 25; ibid., POL 7 US/BALL) At the conclusion of our discussion of Southeast Asia,/3/ I told General de Gaulle that I would like to review certain problems that we foresaw in connection with the Western Alliance. /3/A report on the discussion of Southeast Asia was transmitted in telegram 532 from Rome, September 1. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) The American people had made a very serious commitment with regard to NATO. This was a commitment both to the treaty and the organization. The United States had become an active participant in NATO because of our reading of the lessons of two world wars. The first lesson related to the Alliance. Many Europeans--including members of General de Gaulle's government--had remarked that the United States had come too late into both world wars. We agreed with this statement. Had the United States been clearly committed to the defense of Europe in advance both of the First and Second World Wars, neither conflict might have occurred, and the world would have been saved two major catastrophes. But our commitment had not been clearly defined and the aggressor had, therefore, not been forced to take United States power into account. As a result of this experience the American people had made a great national decision. They had thrown aside the isolation that had marked a hundred years of our national history. They had made a commitment in peacetime to defend Europe from aggression. The second lesson from the two world wars was, in our view, that an alliance could not be effective unless it was reenforced by a combined or integrated command, by common planning, and by forces in being. After all, in the First World War it had taken four years to achieve the appointment of Marshal Foch as combined commander. In the Second World War the allies had suffered greatly from the lack of effective collective preparation. The American people would not, therefore, be able to understand a solemn commitment such as their commitment to NATO if that commitment were not reenforced by arrangements that gave reality to common defense. For that reason the NATO Treaty and the NATO organization were, in our view, inextricably linked, and it was very important that this point be clearly understood. This did not mean, of course, that all the arrangements were perfect or immutable. We were prepared at any time to consider any changes that might be proposed by any member of the Alliance. We recognized that conditions changed, and that it might be necessary from time to time to revise arrangements in order to accommodate to evolving conditions. General de Gaulle replied that we did not have time today to go into all the details of NATO. Anyway, the matter was not urgent. The treaty ran until 1969 and there was no reason to move quickly to change the organization. France and the United States were allied and it was natural that they should remain allied so long as the Soviet menace persisted. In his view, this menace would last for a considerable time to come. If the Soviet Union attacked France--or conceivably attacked even the United States--France and America would be in the war together. The French Government certainly did not intend to break up the Alliance. There would be a de facto understanding for common defense between the United States and France even if no signed treaty existed. The organization--as distinguished from the Alliance--was a different question. The organization had not existed at the time the treaty was signed. And since it was established, two major changes had taken place. The first change was the advent of atomic weapons. In 1949 there were no Soviet atomic weapons. But with the development of such weapons the United States could not be sure--nor could its allies--as to what the United States would do in the atomic field in the event of attack. The second change had been the vast transformation of the nations of Western Europe. They had moved from positions of weakness and dependency and were now reasserting their national personalities. France, for example, was no longer prepared to accept the principle of subordination--which was what was meant by integration--or the control of "foreign authority", however amicable or friendly. General de Gaulle said that, so far as he was concerned, the Alliance would remain, but the organization was no longer suitable. It must be reexamined. He hoped this could be done in concert, but the United States should understand that France was not alone in this field. Other countries were beginning to feel the same way. The Germans, for example, were beginning to see, in the future, the need for an alliance without subordination. So far as France was concerned, he wanted to make it clear that there could be no foreign forces on her soil except those under French command. The French Government was making no proposals now. Later on it would not make proposals but it would lay down conditions. Those conditions would be made by discussions between the two governments--the United States and France. Such discussions would not involve Germany or the United Kingdom. The conversation had been running for a long time and I did not wish to protract it unduly. I stated, however, that I must make clear the position of the United States. We were not interested in domination. We were interested in efficiency. We wanted to make certain that the West would be defended effectively. The problem that preoccupied us was how we and our allies could organize our common defense in the most efficient manner. We felt that history had made it crystal clear that, to have an effective common defense, a consolidated or integrated command was necessary. Of course, the atom had brought about significant changes and we were deeply concerned about the unfinished business of how to prevent the proliferation of atomic power. We would be as disturbed as France by the development of a German national nuclear capability. But this did not mean that the problem of atomic management could be disregarded. In our view, nations that had historically played a great role in world affairs could not be expected to accept forever a situation in which they had no part in their own atomic defense. Yet the option was clear enough--either we permitted such nations to develop national nuclear systems of their own or we provided some kind of collective approach which would permit them nuclear participation without the need to develop their own national systems. With this in mind, we had proposed a collective arrangement in which the non-nuclear powers of Europe could participate, in the form of a multilateral force. Within the next few months it was going to be necessary for us to resume consideration of this matter. We were not wedded to any particular collective formula, but it seemed to us that some collective solution was necessary. All of this, I felt, had an obvious relevance to the NATO organization. I made it clear that we were prepared to discuss with France and our other allies any proposed changes that might make that organization more effective. If there were to be such a discussion we saw efficacy in not postponing it too long, since the operation of the present organization could be seriously impaired if too many unresolved questions were left pending. General de Gaulle replied that he felt the efficiency of an alliance would be seriously impaired if some members felt subordinated to others, which was the present situation of the NATO Alliance. So far as Germany was concerned, he must express a note of caution. We all knew that the Germans were a great people. Because they were a great people it was not possible to tell exactly what they would do. France had been prepared to sign a treaty of friendship with the Germans and to join with the Germans in the organization of Europe. But this did not mean that Germany could be accepted on the same basis as other nations with reference to nuclear matters. France had suffered from German invasions. Germany had been vanquished in the last war. German participation--whether partial or indirect--in the control of atomic weapons would certainly ruin any possible contacts with Soviet Russia or Eastern Europe. Germany, he insisted, was not in a "normal situation". Therefore, it should not be involved in atomic matters. Such involvement would affect not only the Russians but also the French. France could not forget the past. I replied that we clearly had a difference of view as to the safest method of dealing with Germany in relation to the destructive power of the atom. I must point out that, in our view, the history of the last fifty years had demonstrated that German aggressiveness was stimulated by German isolation--by the feeling that Germany was not an equal member of the Western community--and that any discrimination or sense of grievance or inequality would play into the hands of demagogues. In our view we should try, in dealing with Germany, to eliminate any sense of discrimination and to provide the Germans with the feeling that they were equal members of the Western community. We should try to forestall the emergence of a drive for a German national nuclear system by giving the Germans effective participation in some kind of collective nuclear arrangement. I said further that while it was too late to discuss the question today, I must make it clear that the problem of atomic management remained unresolved. It was a problem of great concern to the United States and we would certainly feel it necessary to have further discussions with the French Government in regard to it at some future date. I thanked General de Gaulle for the courtesy he had shown and for the observation he had made. He concluded the interview by remarking that great powers have to choose between great difficulties. The United States was a very great power, and our choices, therefore, were exceptionally difficult. He wished President Johnson to know that France had sympathy for the United States and for him in the problems which they faced./4/ /4/Following his visit to Rome, Ball returned to Paris, and on August 6 he paid a courtesy call on Couve de Murville. After discussing the situation in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, Ball and Couve talked about NATO along lines similar to the conversation reported here. Ball transmitted his account of the conversation in Secun 3 from Paris, September 6. (Ibid., ORG 7 U) In a September 1 memorandum to Bundy for the President's evening reading, Executive Secretary Read characterized the conversation as follows: "On the Atlantic Alliance we see no daylight. The Under Secretary made an effective and full presentation of our views regarding the need for continuing effective NATO machinery, including an integrated command system. De Gaulle's responses indicate no hope that he is likely to change his basic views. He merely offered the possibility that there would be no hurry in bringing about the changes that he wants. He was perhaps clearer and more emphatic than ever before in saying that there could be no foreign forces on French soil except those under French command, and that Germany should not be involved in atomic matters." (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 74 D 164) Reinhardt
102. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, September 10, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8. Secret. Copies were sent to McNamara and Ball. 1. In his farewell conversation with Harlan Cleveland yesterday,/2/ the President made a few comments on nuclear arrangements in Europe which remind me that we have unfinished staff work in this field. /2/No other record of this conversation has been found. 2. Harlan opened the conversation by saying that he thought the most important element of his new job was to work on problems on nuclear sharing. The President cut in and said he had two particular concerns here--(1) that he did not wish to pick a quarrel unnecessarily with the Russians, and (2) that he did not wish to get pinned into any position which would not have Congressional support. He made it clear that before we adopted any new proposal or returned to any old one, we should be sure that we have a position which is understood and supported on the Hill. 3. We are evidently a long way from having any such position today. The general language which we have used since last December will not be sufficient in October. In the light of the President's opinions, I doubt if we can return--at least without very careful preparation--to anything like our MLF position of 1964. 4. For these reasons, it seems to me essential that we have an early and thorough discussion of this matter, and I will give you a ring to see how you think we should go about it. McG.B.
103. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, September 23, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret. Drafted by Baker. SUBJECT /2/The Hillenbrand Study or Report, transmitted to Under Secretary Ball on September 21, comprised a 12-page memorandum on the Atlantic nuclear problem and a 41-page paper on the nuclear problem of the Alliance with an annex and summary conclusions. A copy of the study, which is summarized in this memorandum, is ibid., DEF(ANF). I have the following general comment on the Hillenbrand study: The implications of a number of statements, in their collective weight, give the paper a tone and cast that I consider to be misleading with regard to the possibilities of some combination of ANF and MLF as a major component in a solution of the Alliance nuclear problem. Specifically: 1. The statement that the President has doubts about the ANF/MLF arrangement should be considered against the different tone of all official statements of policy approved by him--the December 8 Comments paper, NSAM 322, and the press conference of January 16./3/ /3/The December 8 paper is the Attachment to Document 61. NSAM No. 322 is Document 65. For a transcript of President Johnson's press conference on January 16, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 54-60. 2. The statement that Congress has voiced serious objections should be considered against the background of virtually no Congressional briefings on the NATO nuclear problem as it stands today. 3. The weight of references to opposition by de Gaulle and the Soviets should be qualified by a realization that these objections go to the root and principle of the idea of a stronger NATO rather than to any specific plan. 4. The statement of U.S. policy as one of firm opposition to mixed-manning of submarines is at variance with the NSAM 322 policy statement that it is not precluded. 5. The statement that the "ANF/MLF approach is incompatible with certain of our major objectives stated in Section II" is not documented and in my view not necessarily true in the case of any one of these objectives. In tone and emphasis there are other features of the study that tend in the same direction--specifically: 1. "Consultative" solutions are treated on the same plane as participation in weapons systems. This seems to me to overlook the fundamental distinction that consultation cannot be equated in its political efficacy with meaningful responsibility and that meaningful responsibility involves, as a minimum, a right by Europe to veto the use of a significant part of the Western deterrent if its proposed use is too much at variance with European concepts of timing, strategy or targeting. This inevitably means hardware. And, equally inevitably, it means a segment of hardware less than the whole U.S. deterrent, which we could not responsibly subject to such a veto. A consultative solution relating to the entire deterrent, however ingenious, is incapable of meeting these criteria. 2. Some of the specifics of tactics and timing, insofar as they follow from the premises I have criticized, seem likewise to downgrade the most promising approach to that of least promising. There is mention of a possible decision to "let the ANF/MLF concept die on the vine or keep it in reserve while moving ahead on some other arrangement". There is mention of giving priority to overall aspects as compared to nuclear sharing. In my view both the Select Committee and the Paris Working Group should proceed in parallel with equal emphasis and with a business-like pace and purpose. Adjustments to overall tactics should be in timing of their reports, not the pace of their work. There is no danger that either group will run out of problems to consider. These relatively specific objections should not, however, obscure the fact that this study gives support to many of the major themes and ideas which have needed to be said by an interdepartmental panel. With only minor points of wording or clarification we could, for example, accept all of the summary conclusions as stated at the beginning of the paper. Its emphasis on German expectations regarding ANF/MLF will make good reading in other agencies, its stress on the need for U.S. leadership at the proper time is salutary; its stress on inter-relationships to the Common Market crisis, the UK financial crisis, and strategy on France and NATO is useful; its emphasis on a variety of parallel approaches as opposed to a single solution is realistic, as is its conclusion that no single preferred course need be decided now. Even in most specifics the judgments expressed are those this Bureau agrees with (utility of sharing R&D, need to deepen consultation on specific nuclear problems, doubtful value of European land-based MRBM's or US-based systems for political purposes, undesirability of new NATO strategic command, desirability of a NATO Defense Minister, desirability of a "political umbrella"). Most cogent of all, perhaps, is the support the study gives to US-UK-FRG talks to develop an overall approach as regards both substance and tactics on the inter-related economic, political, and military aspects of the Alliance problem at this juncture. In short, the report represents a useful contribution to thinking on the problem. My own tentative and general conclusions as to a course of action on the basis of a first reading of the Hillenbrand paper and the staff study prepared in the Department which you sent to Mr. McNamara on September 22,/4/ are as follows: /4/Not found. 1. First priority should go to scheduling and preparing for a series of US-UK-FRG bilateral and trilateral meetings on overall strategy and the inter-relationships of Alliance problems along lines set forth in my memorandum to you dated August 19, 1965 (copy attached)./5/ We should seek approval of a scenario and schedule before the end of the month. /5/Not attached, but a copy is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). 2. Suitable machinery (not too cumbersome) for preparation of positions should be worked out at an early stage. EUR might assume responsibility for development of positions within the Department and for coordination as appropriate with other departments. 3. The examination of positions and alternatives should include a hard look at mixed-manning of UK submarines as the key element in breaking the log jam on sharing and a German financial contribution to UK submarines. A breakthrough on this point could enable us to see our way through to practical prospects for a solution of at least the "hardware" component of the complex, and that is the central one.
104. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/45 New York, September 27, 1965, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. Secret. Drafted by Ford and approved by S on October 25. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. The source text is labeled "Part 3 of 4." Memoranda of conversation on NATO, the EEC, and a Dutch request for military and nuclear technology are ibid. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION
OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. Dutch Luns asked the Secretary whether the U.S. was still keen on MLF. The Secretary recalled that MLF was an attempt to respond to an initiative taken in Europe in 1960. Our temperature with regard to MLF largely depends on the current attitude in Europe. While there are those who say that we should take the lead, we can't lead if others are not willing to follow. Luns said that he still felt that if Germany were given possession of a nuclear deterrent we would be on the brink of war with the Soviet Union. The Secretary said that giving Germany a nuclear deterrent would also serve to break up NATO. He mentioned in this connection the fact that De Gaulle is seeking to keep Germany in a secondary position in Europe. Luns said he believed that MLF should not be abandoned. He looks upon MLF as a means of holding NATO together. The Secretary replied that MLF or something close to it is certainly necessary. He pointed to the long-range trend in German attitudes. Even Brandt had recently talked about not having a second-class industry. Given the attitude of de Gaulle on Germany, we would invite another Hitler in another ten years. The Secretary mentioned also that the leaders in certain European countries must consider nuclear weapons from an operational point of view or they will lose touch with reality. He mentioned the fact that some of these leaders tend to think of nuclear deterrent without giving any thought to what would happen to the areas which they are trying to defend in the process of nuclear exchange. Luns said that under no circumstances can we give the Soviets the impression that we will not use nuclear weapons but that there we must draw the line. The Secretary said it must also be remembered that the nuclear decision is probably the last decision which leaders in North America would ever make. The assurance lies in the megatonnage which exists in Germany. In this respect the Athens guidelines seem very realistic. Luns concluded that the MLF is a political instrument which will both aid us in preventing proliferation and serve to strengthen NATO.
105. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals/1/ Washington, October 26, 1965, 12:42 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 7. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Julius W. Walker (EUR/RPM), cleared by Vest and EUR, and approved by Spiers. Also sent to USRO. CA-4576. Subject: NATO Secretary General Brosio's Visit, October 5-6, 1965. The following summary is based in part on uncleared memoranda of conversations. It is for information only and its contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. This airgram summarizes the principal subjects discussed during the recent visit to Washington by NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio. Mr. Brosio met with the Secretaries of State and Defense. He also met with other Departmental officers, including Under Secretary Ball and Assistant Secretary Leddy, and he stopped briefly at the President's office to exchange greetings after a talk with McGeorge Bundy./2/ The basic issues for discussion included: (1) France and NATO, (2) Nuclear Sharing, (3) Select Committee, (4) Infrastructure, (5) NATO Force Planning, (6) NATO Personnel, (7) Vietnam, and (8) the December Ministerial Meeting. The recurrent themes of the visit were France-NATO and the nuclear problems. /2/Memoranda of Brosio's conversation with Leddy and Ball on October 5 are ibid., DEF 4 NATO. Memoranda of his conversations with Rusk in New York on October 7 are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. No records of the conversations with McNamara, Bundy, and the President have been found. In contrast to last year's visit which was his first to the United States as NATO Secretary General, this was a "working" visit with few formalities. 1. France and NATO Secretary General Brosio said he felt the French attitude had changed recently. It has been generally known before that the French were ready to stay in the Alliance, although they were dissatisfied with the organization. His impression was that France was now disturbed by the German position. The French had offered the Germans reconciliation and had felt they, in return, deserved German support, particularly for the force de frappe. When it became clear such support was not forthcoming, the French turned to the Soviets. The Secretary General was uncertain whether the approach to the Soviets was meant to put pressure on the Germans or was actually the first step for uniting Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. He said the Alliance could not wait for France but must move forward where possible. In conversations with Mr. Leddy and Mr. Ball, the Secretary General was worried that the French would try to keep US-French differences over NATO in the bilateral channel. It was made clear to him that the U.S. considered this to be a France-NATO problem and not solely a bilateral one. When the French make their proposals we would want to consult other NATO members at an early stage and work out with them how to handle the problem. He was told in general terms of the U.S. tentative studies and of our preliminary conclusion that it would be feasible to relocate facilities in the low countries, backstopped by bases in the UK, if this should become necessary. It would, of course, be expensive and take about three years to accomplish. There would have to be intensive consultation with our Allies before any moves could be undertaken. He was urged to look into contingency steps for facilities and activities under his own responsibility. Brosio asked to be kept informed of the progress of U.S. contingency plans and was assured he would be kept up-to-date. Mr. Brosio was glad to note the U.S. position remained that we would try not to provoke a confrontation with the French but were planning in order to be prepared for all contingencies. He was told we are ready to wait until the French wish to make suggestions. He replied that we would continue to press the French to come forward with their ideas. 2. Nuclear Sharing Secretary General Brosio sought reassurance that the U.S. had not abandoned the ANF/MLF concept and asked our views on its relationship to the Select Committee. He emphasized nuclear sharing was a central problem for the Alliance. He was concerned about the "German problem," making clear he was convinced that Germany must share nuclear responsibility within a NATO framework, otherwise she would in time wish to develop her own capability. He was assured that we recognized that the NATO nuclear problem would not go away. We see ANF/MLF and the Select Committee as two activities, independently valid and parallel. We are still interested in the ANF/MLF or whatever variation will satisfy our Allies, particularly the Germans. We expect to know more about the situation after Erhard's visit to the United States. We agreed with Brosio that if the FRG did not have more of a voice in nuclear affairs, it would in time be driven toward a national nuclear force. In this connection, Brosio brought up the question of non-proliferation, saying there was no danger that either the U.S., Russia, or France would disseminate nuclear weapons information, that it would be easy for Russia to sign a non-dissemination pact as she had no intention of disseminating anyway. The problem thus was not one of dissemination but rather of inducing the Third World of non-nuclear states not to acquire a nuclear capability. Meanwhile all that non-proliferation could do would be to give the Soviets a chance to press to weaken the Alliance. 3. Select Committee This was discussed primarily with Secretary McNamara. Mr. Brosio stated his belief that the Select Committee would have to be constituted on a larger base than originally anticipated. He wondered if he should not chair such an "open-ended" group, although this might cause trouble with the French. In any event he believed the French would not participate. Mr. McNamara suggested that, in order to avoid a problem with the French, it might be better for the Secretary General not to chair the meetings. He suggested as an alternative a rotating chairmanship from among the Ministers of Defense. Brosio thought he would probably not attend but would rather send a member of the Secretariat to observe. He thought the French might just possibly attend Select Committee meetings if the ANF/MLF were not discussed. To this Mr. McNamara replied that, although we have no objection to the French being there, the agenda should be for the other members to decide and he could not agree to restrict discussion in order to bring the French in. Mr. Brosio agreed with this position. He urged that the U.S. come up with specific proposals to ensure that the first meeting would be a success. Mr. McNamara said the U.S. would work on an agenda and be ready for a meeting in the second half of November./3/ /3/On October 4, Rusk discussed the Select Committee with Canadian Foreign Minister Martin, who wanted to know how it might work. Secretary Rusk said that while the committee was not the ideal instrument for solving all nuclear problems, it would be useful in exploring some elements. Speaking frankly, Rusk then went on to address the state of the Alliance. NATO was, he said, "made up of minority governments, fragile coalitions, and brittle configurations. The governments of NATO are too weak to lead and too weak to follow. The United States has welcomed the election results in Germany not out of any favoritism for the political parties involved but because the German Government has been strengthened." (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files, DEF 12 NATO) 4. Infrastructure Brosio said he was having great difficulty in getting Europe to accept a larger share. He stated he did not think the U.S. should go below 25% in its support of NATO. He believed it would be impossible to persuade the Allies to agree to a formula which would give us less. He said if he could be assured we would not seek to go below a flat 25%, he would undertake to squeeze the British and the Germans and try to get acceptance of such a solution. This question was left to be worked out further in Paris between Ambassador Cleveland and Brosio. 5. NATO Force Planning Brosio noted that there are two questions--what the Ministers should decide in December and what the Allies are heading toward in the future. Mr. McNamara thought that force goals for years had been fictitious, particularly with reference to the logistical support aspect. He did not plan to raise the point at the December Ministerial Meeting that the BRAVO goals cost too much. His preference would be to change the goals to make them more realistic; an alternative would be to label them "Tentative Objectives" and to complement the statement of tentative objectives with the recommendation that the nations should report their plans to meet the goals in the qualitative as well as quantitative sense. Then Ministers could act on the data in May. Brosio defended the responsibility of the NATO military authorities to make honest recommendations which would naturally be more than what countries would spend. Furthermore, he pointed out that NATO does not have the political power to decide on goals other than those recommended by the military authorities. He asked about the relationship between the contingency studies and forces. Mr. McNamara said that the studies may show that the goals are not right or that the configuration of forces is not right. In his view, NATO plans were not adequate and he did not want studies limited to the flanks. The DPWG was doing important work and it should continue its contingency studies. 6. NATO Personnel Brosio asked that the U.S. and U.K. resolve between themselves which should provide the next Assistant Secretary General for Production, Logistics and Infrastructure. He pointed out that this was a key senior staff position which he needed to settle so he could fill a number of important secondary posts as well. He hoped the U.S. would consider filling the secondary post of Deputy to the ASYG for Political Affairs which he thought was one of the most influential on the International Staff. He was told that we thought ours the better candidate and that we would discuss the problem with the British. 7. Vietnam Brosio was worried by the attitude of Europeans toward the American effort. He said his position was clear, that Alliance members should support the U.S. and that he intended to go on stating this position. He expressed concern at rumors that the U.S. might escalate the situation in Vietnam before long. He suggested it could be helpful to have further NAC discussions on this subject. This suggestion was welcomed, but with the proviso that there be no question of submitting American decisions in this area for NAC approval or veto. He was assured of U.S. willingness to discuss Vietnam at any time--on brief notice. 8. December Ministerial Meeting It was suggested that traditional arrangements for Ministerial Meetings wasted some of the Ministers' time and that it might be worthwhile for Defense Ministers to have private sessions while the Foreign Ministers review the international situation. Brosio said he would consider this suggestion. As for the general approach to France in the course of the meeting, he thought he and the Americans were in agreement. No one wanted to act in such a way as to invite a confrontation with the French and everyone, including the Canadians themselves, thought it would be undesirable to continue with the Canadian State of the Alliance initiative. Rusk
106. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 8, 1965, 11 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Vest and approved in U on October 15. The conversation was held in Under Secretary Ball's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Defense State JCS White House NSAM A draft NSAM is attached which incorporates suggested changes as explained below./2/ /2/On October 4, Ball transmitted to Bundy the texts of a draft NSAM on France and NATO, dated September 25, and a 22-page paper entitled "France and NATO," also dated September 25. Except for the changes noted in this memorandum, the September 25 draft NSAM is the same as the approved text attached here. (Ibid., POL 1 EUR W-FR) The draft was scheduled for discussion with the President on November 11, but he did not approve nor circulate it as U.S. Government policy. (Memorandum from Leddy to Rusk, November 9; ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265) Mr. McNamara thought that the NSAM should begin with a basic statement of objectives which would make it clear that any French actions taken against US installations in France or against NATO are in fact an issue between France and the rest of NATO and not between France and the US. It was particularly important that guidelines for the press should reflect this basic premise. Paragraph one of the attached NSAM embodies this idea. Mr. Bundy objected to the statement that we would consider Article V of the Treaty no longer applicable if the French ceased to participate constructively in the Alliance. He thought this was an empty threat and that we might as well face the fact that the French will assume that they have our protection regardless of what we say. If the situation deteriorates sufficiently, an Article V decision would be taken later at the top in the light of the circumstances; it should not be stated now, and perhaps appear in The Times. Mr. Ball thought it would be most useful to question the applicability of Article V since this was one of the few areas which might have some effect on the French people. He knew the Secretary felt strongly about this point. It was only reasonable that the French should not profit from Article V if they failed to live up to their NATO commitments under the other articles. The others mostly agreed with him, especially Mr. McNamara who said that if France no longer contributed troops, support facilities, etc., we should not be required to be on record as prepared to defend her. He would have considerable problems with Congress under such circumstances. Ambassador Bruce suggested alternative language which was acceptable to all and is paragraph four of the attached NSAM. General Wheeler was worried about the possibility that nominal foreign command might be accepted as a principle. This works very well in areas where the local people wish to make it work, for instance in Portugal, but the situation in France would be different and difficult. He accepted Mr. Ball's suggestion that the phrase "multilateral or formally bilateral" be added to paragraph 5c to cover the point. At Mr. Bundy's suggestion the phraseology in paragraph 6 was changed slightly for the sake of clarity to read "the United States should not make the first move in anticipation of possible French actions against NATO . . . ." Mr. Bundy said that although language should not be added to paragraph 8 at this stage, he assumed that the President would want to add something concerning his own responsibility for timing and tactics. The President is determined that France should not be allowed to push the US around, but he will want to play the large cards with France himself; particularly he will want to control what is said to the French and when. Mr. Leddy said he assumed that the language to be proposed by Mr. Bundy would relate to discussions with France and would not prevent discussion of contingency planning with others. Mr. Bundy confirmed this. With these comments the group approved the NSAM and the France and NATO paper. Force Effectiveness Mr. McNamara was worried that de Gaulle might force us to adjust to a peacetime arrangement which would endanger our wartime capability. He thought there needed to be more studies to check the degree of impairment which might result. There was still time to work on this. Mr. Ball said the most recent estimate is February for the French to lay down "conditions" and then offer to discuss them with us. General Wheeler mentioned that General Ailleret had told General de Cumont that the French want to retain NAC and the MC and an integrated command in Germany but abolish SHAPE and veto its establishment elsewhere, with the timing early next year. Mr. McNamara said that unquestionably the French attitude and actions would end up in a weakened NATO ability to exercise a conventional option. This is not logically required because even today, if Germany were attacked we would not fall back into France but would have to use nuclear weapons fairly soon. It would be useful to study and see if there are tactical situations in which the FRG is not an automatic shield between France and the Soviets. We can fight a war without France, but the prospect will lead people more and more to accept the likelihood of a "trip-wire" situation. General Wheeler agreed that, although it is militarily acceptable to think of NATO without France, this would have its effect on military concepts. Germany Mr. Ball suggested that de Gaulle would increasingly make the point that NATO does not apply to Berlin and would exclude the 1958 Ministerial Council decision./3/ The NATO-Berlin relationship needed to be looked at more carefully. Mr. McNaughton asked whether French troops in Germany are there as a result of World War II or of NATO arrangements. He felt that the legal factors here needed to be pinned down too. Mr. Bundy said that obviously the French would play their cards on the theory that the troops are in Germany as a result of the war since this is compatible with their ideas of independence, national sovereignty, less integrated NATO activity, etc. They seemed not to care about the effect their position would have on the Germans. /3/For text of the North Atlantic Council declaration on Berlin, December 16, 1958, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, p. 560. Bargaining Assets Mr. Bundy observed that we seem to have a very skimpy bag of assets with which to threaten or bargain with the French. Mr. Ball agreed and recalled de Gaulle's viewpoints: We are natural allies; France does not need nuclear allies because he does not believe that today there is a threat of nuclear war; also he does not need allies with conventional forces because he considers France automatically protected by German geography. Mr. McNamara thought, since there was so little bargaining power in the military side of the Alliance, we should look at the European economic relationships for levers. Messrs. Ball, Leddy and Bator saw little chance. There might be disadvantageous counter-effects if the US tried to push into the EEC situation. The best hope was to attempt to stiffen Erhard's spine. Mr. Bundy expected that de Gaulle might try to blackmail the Germans by offering them a moderately acceptable EEC settlement if they would agree to diminish NATO relationship. Mr. Ball saw no sign of it yet. Ambassador Thompson said that although nobody could be sure how our allies would react as the pressures increased, one thing is certain--their disposition will be to try to keep France in the Alliance at a considerable cost, probably under terms which would be very difficult for us. Mr. Bundy said that, in dealing with our allies, we were going to have to probe delicately to find out what our real choices are, to discover whether the Belgians, divided as they are, are really going to be ready to accept new NATO responsibility in the face of French pressure. The Netherlands would be stronger as a government, but poorer geographically. Mr. McNamara reminded that one way to get Belgian support was money; i.e. to pay the Belgians for support services, to buy Belgian meat, etc. Mr. Bundy questioned whether the FRG is truly ready to look at the issues and make cold, hard decisions. Mr. McNamara thought it would be important to make it clear to the Germans that the result of French actions might be to weaken the NATO military setup so that the US would find it increasingly difficult to maintain the present level of US forces in Europe. In other words, the problem is not merely that the US may be pushed out of France and into Germany but rather that the conventional NATO strength would be so substantially weakened in the next two years that it would no longer be reasonable for the US divisions to stay in Europe. Mr. Bundy commented that, in spite of the military weakness which might emerge two years hence, he thought all the factors, political and otherwise, would lead the US to continue its present policy toward Europe. Tripartite Talks Ambassador Bruce asked how in the period ahead the US should try to exercise its power and with whom. He thought we would make no headway in the European context until we had worked out clear understandings with the UK and the FRG to which the other NATO members could subscribe. Mr. Bundy agreed and thought there should be another meeting of the group in the following week to go over the proper subjects for such tripartite discussions./4/ /4/No record of another meeting of the group has been found. Mr. Leddy suggested that the subjects should be: (1) the long-term financial problem (pound support and troop maintenance); (2) the collective nuclear problem; (3) non-proliferation; (4) NATO and France; (5) East-West relations; and (6) German reunification. We would first sound out Stewart and Erhard. Then he envisioned high-level talks backed up by technical teams for each of the major subjects. He recognized there would be a problem of publicity. Timing should be sometime late in the winter. Mr. Bator suggested two other items for the list: (1) an Atlantic Arms Market and (2) the Liquidity Problem. Mr. Bundy said we should work out clear-cut US policies toward each of these areas in advance, something we do not yet have. We also have to keep in mind the cosmetic effect of this activity, which means there should be solid, hard talks separately with both the UK and the FRG before we go into triangular talks. Mr. McNamara approved trilateralism as a substitute for NATO as a means of concerting power. He thought we should try to use this technique wherever possible. He had already revised his ideas about the Select Committee in this regard, and was prepared to have any number join but use a tripartite group to coordinate and run it behind the scenes. Mr. Leddy warned that we should be prepared for problems with Italy. Mr. Bundy said he assumed we would be trying to carry through tripartite efforts in real terms while appearances would be played down as far as possible to take account of the pride of the other countries. Mr. Ball said that the UK Foreign Minister would be here for talks the following week. He and Mr. Leddy would see our Ambassadors from the NATO countries on October 25-26. Thereafter we would have papers prepared to get ready for tripartite conversations. Mr. Bundy said that it would be useful to have clear in our own minds in what order we wanted to talk about the various subjects. Then we could inform the Germans quietly before they came here. He particularly was interested in going further into the nuclear problem. Mr. McNamara suggested that Messrs. Ball, Bundy and himself should meet sometime in the following week on the nuclear problem. At Mr. Ball's request, Mr. Leddy explained a proposal which he thought might prevent a German national nuclear force and might also be acceptable to Congress. This would include a tripartite statement of principles presenting a collective nuclear force as part of an overall approach to non-proliferation, etc. The nuclear force would be commonly controlled, financed and operated, that is, mixed-manned. The weapons group would include the V-Bombers (mixed-manned), some US and the UK submarines (mixed-manned when no security risk would be involved) and a provision for mixed-manned surface ships in principle but with implementation to take place only when it is agreed surface ships are effective and relatively invulnerable. The force would be commonly financed, but if the necessary mixed-manning were not achieved in a given time, there would be a sliding scale for a reversion of costs. He agreed to send a brief paper explaining this idea to both Mr. McNamara and Mr. Bundy. Attachment/5/ /5/Secret. DRAFT NSAM SUBJECT This NSAM provides the framework and guidance for further discussions with our Allies in dealing with prospective French actions against NATO. 1. The basic premise in the US consideration of this problem is that any French action taken against US installations in France or against NATO is in fact an issue between France and the rest of NATO and not between France and the United States. 2. The United States remains committed both to the NATO Alliance, as embodied in the 1949 Treaty, and specifically to NATO as an organization. 3. The US will not be willing to substitute for an integrated NATO a system of bilateral security commitments incorporating the substance of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. 4. If France should cease to participate constructively in the organization and activities of the Alliance, the US security commitment given in Article V will obviously have to be re-examined by the President, so far as it relates to France. 5. The United States, while remaining prepared to examine French proposals for reform of NATO, will develop its contingency planning with the other thirteen NATO Allies. In this regard, the objectives of US policy are: a. To carry on the common effort with the remaining Allies in NATO regardless of French willingness to participate fully in Alliance activities or French actions which would substantially impair NATO effectiveness. b. To maintain the defensive capability of NATO forces, including the viability of the "Forward Strategy", and to achieve the optimum military posture attainable in light of French actions. c. To preserve the concept of integration, particularly integrated command and combined planning, in NATO. Modifications in existing relationships, multilateral or formally bilateral, which may be proposed by the French should be considered on their merits; however, the US will resist proposals which significantly impair the peace-time or war-time military capability of the Alliance. d. If forced by France to abandon facilities on French soil, to relocate those forces and facilities essential to the defense of NATO territory. e. To facilitate the ultimate return of France to status of full participating member of the Alliance. f. To achieve a common position through consultation with our Allies before any steps are taken in response to French action against NATO or US forces and facilities in support of NATO. g. To make clear to the other Allies that in addition to the defensive measures set forth in this NSAM the US is prepared to explore and cooperate in affirmative actions which strengthen the Alliance. 6. The United States should not make the first move in anticipation of possible French actions against NATO or US facilities in France, but should seek through continuing consultation with our Allies a common appreciation of French moves looking toward collective action when and if a confrontation with France becomes unavoidable. In these consultations we should be careful to make it clear that we are not endeavoring to organize the other NATO countries in a campaign to isolate France or to initiate action against France. 7. Priority should be given to examining contingency alternatives with our other Allies to determine how and when we should jointly respond to French moves. The primary purpose of Allied consultation should be to establish a consensus among the 14 that the French threat is real and that an understanding must be reached in principle now on the necessity for meeting this threat, if it develops, on a collective basis. Further specific discussions should be held on relocation problems with our Allies, with special attention to those countries most directly affected, e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, the UK and Italy. 8. The Department of State is responsible for coordinating US Government efforts on this problem.
107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium/1/ Washington, October 21, 1965, 7:31 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BEL-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Robert Anderson and Jay P. Moffat (EUR/WE) and approved by Leddy. Also sent to USEC in Brussels, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, The Hague, London, Rome, Bonn, and Luxembourg. 490. Following highlights of Spaak-Secretary meeting of Oct 19 are based on uncleared memorandum of conversation/2/ and should be considered Noforn: /2/A copy of this 5-page memorandum of conversation is ibid., ECIN 6 EEC; separate memoranda of conversation on NATO and NATO and France are ibid., NATO 3 and DEF 4 NATO. EEC--Spaak said principal objective now is to get French back to table. Oct 25-26 Brussels meeting of Five and Commission is first step. Purpose of meeting, in Spaak's view, is to make sufficient technical progress on agriculture to persuade French to reopen discussions. Not possible at this meeting to develop positions on questions of majority rule and Commission's powers as French have not made specific proposals on these political questions. Principal dilemma, Spaak said, is that Five do not know what de Gaulle has in mind. Spaak believes French will agree to meet, but not before 1966. In meeting with French, Five must present them with "reasonable proposals"--i.e., modified proposals on agriculture and willingness to explore in depth any French proposals on majority voting and role of Commission. If French decline to cooperate on this basis, Five should react and, difficult as it might be, proceed with EEC of Five. Spaak did not think, however, this eventuality would arise. NATO--Spaak said that again no one knew what de Gaulle had in mind, and that it important for Fourteen not to leave initiative in his hands, but rather ask French in responsible but firm manner what changes they envisage for NATO. Spaak questioned policy of waiting for de Gaulle to present proposals as one might conceivably have to wait for 3 to 4 years and Europe cannot hold together that long. (Davignon mentioned on another occasion that Spaak was thinking of asking about French intentions in terms of forthcoming December Ministerial Meeting.) The Secretary stated that NATO must continue with or without France, that US has been working on detailed studies on feasibility of proceeding without France if this is found necessary, that he hoped consultations on this subject with our allies could begin in November. The Secretary also pointed out the US has no interest in a series of bilateral defense arrangements as substitute for NATO and that we have so informed French./3/ In this connection he said that Congress and American people would not approve of any such arrangement as in US view European nations together are of interest from a defense standpoint, but France alone, for example, is not. /3/On October 19, Rusk informed Bohlen that the United States had no interest in a bilateral treaty with France and that while the United States opposed West German acquisition of a national nuclear deterrent, the Federal Republic of Germany must be accorded equality within the Alliance. (Telegram 1711 to Paris; ibid., POL 15-1 FR) Bohlen made these points in a conversation with Couve de Murville on October 21 (telegram 2182 from Paris, October 21; ibid., DEF 4 NATO) and in a brief discussion with de Gaulle during a luncheon at Rambouillet on October 28 (telegram 2337 from Paris, October 28; ibid.). Memcon being pouched. Rusk
108. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, November 8, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Leddy. A copy was sent to Ball. SUBJECT From my recent talks in Germany/2/--with Westrick and Majonica among others--and with Birrenbach this morning,/3/ I have no serious doubt about the real desires of the new German government regarding a "hardware" solution to this problem. (detailed memo attached)/4/ /2/Leddy visited Europe at the end of October and early November to participate in a regional officers' meeting and discuss nuclear sharing arrangements. /3/A 10-page memorandum of Kurt Birrenbach's conversation with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Bundy, and Leddy is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. /4/Not printed. This 3-page memorandum listed recent statements by German leaders on the hardware solution to the nuclear problem. They want Germany to participate, multilaterally with the US, the UK and as many other Europeans as they can get, in the common ownership, management and operation of a substantial strategic nuclear weapons system targeted on the Soviet strategic weapons aimed at Western Europe. They do not in fact believe, whatever we say, that "consultative" arrangements, whether through the Special Committee of Defense Ministers or otherwise, are enough. Their primary argument is that common ownership and management of a weapon will give them more real influence on United States nuclear decisions in Europe--even though they fully agree we should retain our veto--than any possible consultative arrangement which can be devised. I think they are absolutely right on this. I also think that giving the Germans, along with the Dutch, Italians and such others as will join, this enhanced participation in nuclear decisions regarding Europe, is the most prudent, safest course we can pursue in an uncertain future. Mac Bundy seems to be dead set against this course of action, notwithstanding the many earlier statements to the Germans by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and yourself that we are ready if they are. I suspect that Mac is mainly concerned about irritating the French. This is reflected in his memos on the subject. But the emerging French policy toward Germany (and toward NATO) is disastrous. If successful, it would destroy the concept of collective effort and restore nationalism as the norm. The worst thing we could do would be to let the French threaten us into following their own policies of division instead of cohesion. The French may flirt with the Russians in order to try to bluff the Germans out of a nuclear arrangement; but that is all. And the Russians will pull out the propaganda stops but in the end will be guided by a cold view of their national interest. Your position on this issue will be crucial. I know that you stand firmly on avoiding any commitment in a non-proliferation treaty which would preclude a collective nuclear force with German participation. But more than this is now required. In my judgment the understanding resulting from the Erhard visit will either make or break the collective nuclear project; and the decisions on the United States position may well be taken this week in Texas. I strongly hope you agree that the creation of a collective nuclear weapons system within NATO is in the long-term national interest and that you will take this position in discussions with the President and Secretary McNamara.
109. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 12, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Fina. SUBJECTS PARTICIPANTS Deane R. Hinton, Director, EUR/RPE Thomas W. Fina, Officer-in-Charge, EUR/RPE 1. U.S. Policy Toward Common Market and EFTA Ambassador Lemberger said that he wanted a clarification of U.S. policy in the light of the proposals made by Congressman Reuss and by Senator Javits to re-examine U.S. policy toward the European Communities and the European Free Trade Area. He recalled that during his tenure in Brussels, he had found U.S. Ambassador Butterworth a warm supporter of the EEC but somewhat reserved about EFTA./2/ However, following the French veto of United Kingdom accession to the European Communities, Ambassador Lemberger thought the United States had become a little less ardent supporter of the European Communities. While the European Communities were still the United States's preferred vehicle for the attainment for European unity, he thought Ambassador Tuthill was more open-minded about the EFTA than his predecessor. Therefore, he wanted to know: 1) whether there had been any change in United States policy with respect to European integration, and 2) whether the United States felt that the Kennedy Round might have to be put off for a year or so. /2/W. Walton Butterworth was U.S. Representative to the European Communities August 1961-October 1962. Mr. Hinton replied that there was no change in fundamental United States policy with respect to the European Communities, the European Free Trade Area or the Kennedy Round negotiations. On the other hand, our views did evolve realistically as the objective situation changed. It was clear that General de Gaulle did not share United States views on the type of Europe that we wished to see created. It was General de Gaulle's rejection of this type of Europe that had led to the present Common Market crisis. For tactical reasons, the United States had remained publicly silent and had taken relatively little private diplomatic action. This by no means meant a change in U.S. policy toward the European Communities. It was a matter of what tactic was best to avoid giving General de Gaulle an opportunity to exploit our support for the Communities. Statements by members of Congress do not necessarily express the views of the Administration. In the case of Congressman Reuss, the State Department had already replied to him saying that we did not share his appreciation of the situation and had very serious questions about the advisability of his proposed changes in policy. As for Senator Javits' speech in London, it seemed to mark somewhat of an evolution from Senator Javits' position three or four months ago. The most important aspect of Senator Javits' speech seemed to Mr. Hinton to have been that he now felt that the first priority for the United Kingdom was to seek membership in the Common Market at an appropriate moment. It was only if this renewed effort should fail that Senator Javits favored a return to his original proposal for a broad free trade area embracing the United States, United Kingdom and others. 2. Kennedy Round The Kennedy Round negotiations could by no means be written off. Mr. Hinton said that he had been optimistic about concluding them successfully when Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky had been here./3/ His views had not changed. There were a number of signs from the French Government that it was interested in a successful Kennedy Round. One could never be sure, of course, that these signs were conclusive. But there were sound economic reasons that might well lead France to conclude at least a modest Kennedy Round. The great unknown was the attitude of General de Gaulle. There was evidence to support the view both that he would or that he would not favor a successful negotiation. This uncertainty remained even after our recent discussions with Sir Richard Powell. The UK view, otherwise, was also optimistic. /3/Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky visited Washington October 21-22. The United States very much wanted successful conclusion to the Kennedy Round and we believed that there was some chance of achieving this goal whether or not the French return soon to the Common Market. If the French did return, it seemed quite certain that Germany and the Netherlands would insist upon a commitment for a satisfactory Kennedy Round conclusion. If France did not return soon, there was increasing readiness on the part of the Five to proceed to conduct Common Market business on an empty chair basis awaiting the French return. Since one of the first major issues that the EEC would have to face would be the Kennedy negotiations, there was some chance that the Five might proceed were they obliged to do so. In conclusion, while the French boycott of Community institutions had made the negotiations infinitely more difficult, they had not become impossible and the game would have to be played to the end. 3. EFTA Ambassador Butterworth certainly, accurately reflected the attitude of the U.S. Government toward EFTA. The U.S. was never enthusiastic about it, while it saw a great potential in the Common Market. The U.S. realized that the United Kingdom and Sweden conceived of EFTA primarily as a response to the EEC. It looked to the U.S. like a discriminatory trading block offering no compensatory political advantages. We thought then, and still think, that United Kingdom membership in the EEC was highly desirable and it was evident today that various members of the EEC who were once lukewarm to UK accession, now realized that it would have been highly desirable. France would never have been able to put the whole existence of European integration into doubt had the United Kingdom been a member of the European Communities accompanied, as was likely, by Norway, Denmark, Ireland and possibly Portugal as well. The United States never thought that states unwilling to move toward political unity should be members of the Common Market. It seemed, therefore, inappropriate for either Switzerland or Sweden to join. But the United States always recognized that Austria occupied a special position, had special problems, and deserved some special form of association. The passage of time had caused an inevitable evaluation in our thoughts about EFTA. First, the Seven had made such important progress toward reducing their duties that one could not easily contemplate a re-imposition of duties among them. Second, thus far the United States had enjoyed greater commercial benefits from EFTA than it had suffered commercial disadvantages. We still feared, however, that these disadvantages would become fully apparent only when EFTA had eliminated its final internal barriers. The United States and Austria have had similar economic problems vis-a-vis the Common Market. That was one reason that the United States was so interested in an early and successful Kennedy Round. Third, the United States was also fully aware and deeply appreciative of the excellent support which the EFTA member states have given the Kennedy negotiations. Their success would be best not only for the EFTA and United States, but for Japan and the developing economics as well. A purely European trade solution would be contrary to our interests and would not have our support. Ambassador Lemberger asked whether the United States still expected any of the political benefits from the Common Market which it had originally foreseen. Mr. Hinton replied that the United States Government's view, if there were one, would be that it was too soon to know. The play of forces in Western Europe was far from over. We should have to wait and see the eventual result. Speaking personally, however, he recalled that the principal reason for U.S. support of European political unity was in order to find a lasting solution to the problem of Franco-German relations and to the problem of German relations to the West as a whole. We felt that it was essential to give a democratic Germany a viable alternative to a return to nationalism. We felt that tying Germany to Western Europe could help to foster loyalty to a European ideal in place of a national one. The European Communities provided just such an opportunity. They continued to symbolize and to work in this direction. The obstacle to the successful pursuit of these policies was France. This was first evident in its veto of UK accession. The United States always felt that the Community structure tended to moderate nationalistic excesses. Until today, it had no proof of its hypothesis. But now that General de Gaulle wanted to free France of its Community obligations, to get rid of the pro-European leaders of the Community institutions and to change the system of majority voting, we had all too convincing proof that our contention was well founded. European political unity was not close. But we were not prepared to conclude that simply because of the French attack upon it, the objective had become unattainable. We had seen that the Five remained loyal to the Treaties and that they wished to keep the Community institutions alive. Of course, there were differing views on how this should be done. Whether the Five would attempt to do so by making concessions to de Gaulle now in the hope that France will mend its ways after his departure, or whether the Five would proceed without France would be seen in the next 6 to 9 months. The Kennedy negotiations and other commercial issues had given the impression of U.S. differences with the Common Market. But this was inevitable and in no sense suggested that our confidence in or support for these European institutions had at all diminished. The fact that the Kennedy Round had been delayed by the inability of the Common Market to negotiate did not reflect upon the Community institutions but rather upon the Government of France. We saw the Kennedy Round as a test of the liberal nature of Community trade policies. We were being patient and were waiting for the EEC to resume meaningful negotiations. We knew that the Government of France was in default of its obligations to the EEC partners and to its partners in the Geneva negotiations. But we were not walking out of the negotiations. We were waiting and hoped to be able to resume the negotiations in adequate time for their successful conclusion. Ambassador Lemberger agreed that one of the principal justifications for the EEC had been the achievement of Franco-German rapprochement. But he felt that the European Communities had shown, during the last 2 or 3 years, that they had exactly the contrary effect. The more closely the French and Germans were obliged to work on questions within the European Communities the more friction seemed to develop as the Germans felt compelled to make concessions, especially on agriculture, as the price of increased integration. It appeared to him that these frictions arose because of the Community. Mr. Hinton could not entirely agree. The friction within the Community seemed to him to stem from the decision made by the French to pursue a policy of strident nationalism. The cause for the friction was not the institutions but rather the unwillingness of one of the members to work easily with the others for the common good of the Communities. There has been an unfortunate breakdown in "Community spirit". 4. EFTA and Economic Union Ambassador Lemberger said that EFTA fulfilled one of the major conditions that the United States sought in a European grouping that it was outward looking in its commercial policy. He felt that EFTA would not lead to political unity as this was not one of its objectives. But he did believe that it was moving toward economic union. The members had discovered that the removal of tariffs alone would not suffice. They were being obliged to follow the example of the Common Market in working for the harmonization of other factors, e.g. drawbacks, agriculture and standardization. At the same time, the EEC was moving away from its political goals. As a result, he thought that EFTA and the EEC were moving closer together and perhaps toward a common structure. Mr. Hinton agreed that the EFTA was evolving in this sense. He thought that greater EFTA policy coordination on technical questions was necessary. The case of the United Kingdom surcharge was a good example. But when experience had shown that the Six had great trouble in attaining this harmonization even when they were committed to it, motivated by a shared political vision, and had institutions to accomplish it, he doubted that the Seven could hope to do better. He doubted that the Seven had enough in common to achieve economic union. He thought the experience with United Kingdom's surcharge was fairly convincing evidence that the Seven were still very far from being ready to coordinate their policies. The case of Yugoslavia seemed to confirm this assessment. The U.S. welcomed the development of closer Yugoslav ties with the West and with EFTA, but if EFTA brought in Yugoslavia, would it not be more than ever difficult to go beyond more than loose policy coordination? If EFTA would achieve economic union, the U.S. would be delighted. But, it seemed to him that the limited type of economic policy coordination that was likely to be feasible for the Seven was far better suited to achievement within the OECD. The matters on which coordination might be attained--such as border taxation, standardization of nomenclature, patents, etc., were broader than EFTA. They were a matter of concern not only for all of the OECD countries but some of the Eastern European states as well. The U.S. had a very direct interest in these questions. Therefore, he felt that they could be more successfully dealt with in a larger forum. In resume, the U.S. was prepared to give its full support to genuine political or genuine economic union in Europe but if the relationship among the member states were to be a loose one, then he would hope that it would be at the Atlantic or free world level. 5. EFTA and Yugoslavia Ambassador Lemberger said that he expected the United Kingdom and Switzerland to push for favorable action on the Yugoslav approach. While Yugoslav relations with the EEC were stalled because of Yugoslavia's quarrel with West Germany, there was no such obstacle in EFTA. Although the official response from the Copenhagen Ministerial Meeting was not very forthcoming, this was primarily because the session was principally concerned with EFTA-EEC bridge-building. Ambassador Lemberger suggested that Sir John Coulson might be ready to explain EFTA Council thinking on the Yugoslavia question during his visit next week./4/ /4/EFTA Secretary General Sir John Coulson visited Washington November 18-19. Memoranda of his conversations, primarily devoted to the new Secretary General's getting acquainted with Mann, Herter, Leddy, and other U.S. officials, are in Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EFTA and FT 13-2 US. As for Austria, it had excellent relations with Yugoslavia and important commercial relations. There were neither political nor frontier issues between Austria and Yugoslavia. Austria was, therefore, very receptive to the Yugoslavia approach. 6. Austrian-EEC Association Mr. Hinton asked whether Ambassador Lemberger's observations about the EEC should be interpreted to mean that Austria had lost interest in association with the Common Market. Ambassador Lemberger said that Austria was still interested but that its negotiating partner was in limbo. In the absence of the French no meaningful negotiations were possible although Austria would continue to go through the motions. [Here follow 3 paragraphs of discussion on the choice of a new Secretary General for the OECD.] [Next documents]
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