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190. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State/1/ Paris, July 29, 1966, 1536Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 FR. Secret; Exdis. 1461. NATUS. Personal for the Secretary. 1. As we deadlocked in negotiations with France on French troops in Germany this week, I took some soundings among my colleagues as to why the French had in the end assumed so unyielding a position in the face of our efforts to establish a political basis for Lemnitzer-Ailleret talks. 2. The first reason given by everybody was Chancellor Erhard's performance during the General de Gaulle visit to Bonn. He was evidently so anxious to please his guest and to have something that looked like a political success after a disappointing provincial election, that he must have given de Gaulle the impression that the Germans would never invite the French troops to leave, no matter what. As long as de Gaulle thinks he has the Germans hexed, he is entitled to assume that he does not need to permit serious discussions with the Fourteen about such issues as the mission of those forces, command arrangements in wartime, coordination in emergency alerts, and cooperation in peacetime exercises. 3. In these circumstances, I think it is important that this subject be promoted to a pretty high priority in the President's discussions with Erhard during the latter's visit to Washington next month. If we can help with the staff work to this end, I hope you will let me know. Cleveland
191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations/1/ Washington, August 6, 1966, 2:25 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 FR-US. Secret. Drafted by Beigel; cleared by Getz, Stoessel, U, and OASD/ISA; and approved by Vest. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 23304. NATUS. Ref: Paris 1801./2/ You should inform next meeting of 14 of status US bilateral discussions with France along following lines: /2/Telegram 1801, August 5, asked for a summary of the status of U.S.-French bilateral talks. (Ibid.) (1) Two meetings have been held at sub-ministerial level to identify problems relating to withdrawal of US forces and materiel from France. US indicated that while it did not accept deadline of next April 1 for such withdrawal, it nonetheless is planning removals as rapidly as feasible. It was made clear, however, that a period beyond April 1 will be required to complete removals of logistics facilities. These discussions are to continue as US relocation plans are completed. (2) Two meetings have also been held at ministerial level regarding right of re-entry by US forces and materiel into military facilities in France at time of a NATO alert, or in other circumstances such as Berlin crisis. French side made clear no US military personnel or stocks could remain in France in peacetime. They will seek clarification whether exception could be made for pipeline operation. Couve further made clear that his instructions were that no re-entry would be possible except after declaration by war by France. He was willing to seek clarification whether France might agree to re-entry on occasion of NATO alert in which France participated. This will be subject of further discussion in September. US indicated that it would wish utilize certain airfield, depot and communication facilities as well as pipeline in time of emergency so they would be fully operational in event of hostilities. Rusk
192. Letter From Foreign Minister Schroeder to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Bonn, August 8, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential; Nodis. Translation. The German language original is attached to the source text. Dear Dean, I am writing to you today about certain press reports alleging that the United States Administration intends to reduce the number of American forces in Germany. Some of these reports are said to stem from background information given to journalists by American officials, reference being made among others to a talk between Mr. McNamara and Herr Gillesen of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. I do not know whether such conversations actually took place, and even less whether their contents have been accurately reproduced by the journalists, nor is there any need for me to tell you that my own judgment has not been influenced by these press reports, but I have the feeling that these apparently quite numerous background talks about American troops in Germany do not do American-German relations any good. It is inevitable that such statements, however carefully phrased, are given a sharper and more sensational accent in the press, which of course has a particularly detrimental effect on a matter of such delicacy. Meanwhile, Herr von Hassel has told me about his Paris talks with Mr. McNamara who, I was pleased to hear, dissociated himself from the press reports and stated in particular that the 15,000 or so troops withdrawn from Germany would be replaced by the end of the year. But I wonder all the more whether it would not be better to refrain altogether from giving to the press such intensive background information on the question of American troops in Germany, since it is obviously not possible to achieve the right and intended effect by means of such talks. In my opinion this matter can only be dealt with satisfactorily if our two Governments exchange their views very frankly and confidentially in as small a group as possible. I hope that the Chancellor's visit to Washington at the end of September will offer an opportunity for it. I am, dear Dean, very much looking forward to seeing you again on that occasion./2/ /2/On August 8, Rusk sent a short 2-paragraph reply in which he expressed appreciation for this letter and said that the subject of American troop levels should be discussed during the Chancellor's forthcoming visit to Washington. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272) With kind regards, /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Schroeder signed the German language original.
193. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 11, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 10. Secret. Another copy of this memorandum is dated August 12, 12:45 a.m. (Ibid., Papers of Francis M. Bator, Meetings with LBJ, 8/24/66, Box 17) SUBJECT You will recall that you instructed George McGhee to acknowledge Erhard's letter (at Tab A)/2/ and to say that you would need time to study it before replying in detail. (Before deciding on how to reply on offset, it made sense to see how the Chancellor's rocky politics and economics shaped up.) /2/Not printed. There is now a case for an extended answer, but your advisers differ on what kind of a pitch we should make on offset, and what we should say about the nuclear sharing/non-proliferation issue. The differences reflect basic questions concerning our objectives in Europe which only you can decide. Issue No. 1: Nuclear Sharing vs. Non-proliferation Erhard's letter implicitly asks you to reconfirm that we will not exclude "establishing in the future a joint integrated nuclear force" in order to buy a non-proliferation agreement. A full-dress reply which does not explicitly do that, would almost certainly result in another Erhard inquiry within 48 hours. On the other hand, unless you have made up your mind to stay with the present policy on non-proliferation, you will not want to repeat the assurance he wants. You know the positions of your advisers on this. Secretary Rusk, Ball and Rostow would vote for a strong reconfirmation of our earlier position. (Walt will file his own views in detail.)/3/ I do not know how Bob McNamara would vote. (In the past, he has been against the so-called European clause, but not against keeping open the option of a joint force with a U.S. veto.) Moyers/4/ and I would vote against reconfirming the present position until you have decided whether to test the Russians in Geneva (though Bill and I would differ somewhat on tactics). My suggestion would be that we avoid this issue by not sending a full, extended reply--except perhaps on offset--but rather a short note saying that you plan to discuss the various points raised in Erhard's letter in September. /3/Not found. /4/Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President. Reaffirm previous position (hardware option to remain open)/5/ /5/None of these options is checked. Issue No. 2: Offset The tactical question is whether (1) to send Erhard a hard warning now that we will have to cut back troops if he does not come through with a new 100% offset deal (to follow the present one, which runs out in June 1967); or (2) simply to ask Erhard not to foreclose a renewal of the full offset before his September visit, and ask him, in the interim, to explore with us and the British a modified version of offset which would avoid the payments drain but give the Germans some extra options (buying goods other than weapons, and perhaps even buying long-term U.S. securities). The tough language on offset at Tab B is McNamara-Rusk product,/6/ which, however, predated some of the recent evidence of Erhard's political difficulties. McNamara still wants to go ahead with it. George Ball and George McGhee are against. I do not know about Secretary Rusk. /6/Not printed. The tactical issue hinges on a fundamental question of our objectives: 1. Do we want to use financial pressure to maneuver the Germans into asking us to cut troops? If this worked, it would permit us to shift to a more economical military posture (dual basing, airlift, etc.), with minimum resistance from the Chiefs and their allies on the Hill. 2. Or, do we prefer to try for an arrangement which would: (i) give us the time needed to work out with the Germans and the UK an agreed position on what kind of a reduction in U.S.-UK forces in Europe would make sense in military terms; (ii) avoid large-scale U.S. troop cuts during the interim (perhaps 2-3 years), and minimize British troop cuts; (iii) still protect our balance of payments (though somewhat less so than sharp troop cutbacks). In general, sending a tough letter now along the lines of Tab B, corresponds to the "get the Germans to invite us out" strategy. Sending a gentler one fits with the second "trying to work it out" strategy. The Line-Up Bob McNamara and Joe Fowler would vote for a tough letter. I would surmise--you will want to get his views in person--that Bob believes the best way out of big, unnecessary troop commitments in Europe is to insist on a 100% weapons-offset, regardless of German politics. This would maximize pressure on the Germans to build up their forces (using weapons bought from the U.S.). And if the heat gets too great, and Erhard refuses, we will have set the stage for a cutback. On tactics, Bob would argue that the only hope of getting to Erhard in time to affect his '67 Defense Budget is to hit him now. (If the economies the Chancellor plans are carried out, it is clear that he will not have the money to keep offset at present levels after June 1967, either for us or the UK.) Ball, Rostow, McGhee--and, Ball believes, the Secretary--would vote for a gentler letter. So would I. --We do not believe there is an appreciable chance of getting Erhard to increase his defense budget this summer. He is in the middle of a major parliamentary fight for an anti-inflation/spending-reduction program. (By next winter, if inflationary pressures ease, he will be in a much better position to raise some extra money for defense.) --More fundamentally, we believe that major shifts in U.S. security policy in Europe should be based in the first instance on political/military factors. To base such shifts on money would confirm the impression that NATO is falling apart, that de Gaulle is right in saying that the British and Americans are unreliable and care more for their pocketbooks than for the safety of Europe. Further, unilateral U.S. troop cuts would reduce our assets for an eventual mutual-withdrawal bargain with the Soviets. Most important, it could seriously unsettle German politics--with unpredictable results. (Erhard is already in trouble, mainly because of his inflation problem. Latest poll results show his unqualified support down from 44% in April to 30% in July.) There is no question that the gentler strategy would delay a shift to more economical troop deployments, and it might bring on a tougher battle with the Chiefs when we do shift later. But it would avoid the appearance of the financial tail wagging the security dog, and avoid hitting Erhard when he is down. Moreover, we do not believe that the gentler strategy means giving up on a serious offset deal. There are good alternatives to a straight weapons offset. Additional Bator Comments. Underlying my own strong vote in favor of the softer strategy are two further judgments: 1. If we are going to take risks with German politics, I would vote that we do so in connection with nuclear-sharing/non-proliferation, rather than with offset and U.S. forces in Europe. I do not believe we should risk frustrating the Germans on both counts. Frustrating them on either one is risky--George and Walt would say much too risky. I think it worth trying to get Bonn to give up on hardware in order to test the Russians on non-proliferation--though I would do it more slowly and gently than I think Bill Moyers would. But I entirely share the Ball-Rostow view that a harsh strategy on both fronts would lead to really serious trouble in Germany. 2. It would be a very poor trade for us to take serious risks with the stability of German and alliance politics, and hence with our security position in Europe, in order to make marginal gains on our balance of payments. Given time, I think the gentler Ball-Rostow-Bator strategy would lead to a broader version of offset, good enough to protect our balance of payments. But even if that is wrong, and the result is a marginally greater balance of payments drain, that is a risk that, in my judgment, is worth taking in order to protect our basic security and political arrangements in Europe. By taking more of a chance on our balance of payments--and on the UK balance of payments, so as to hold the British in Europe and East of Suez--we very marginally increase the chance that, in the end, we will face a run on gold. As you know, I do not share the view that such a run would be the end of the world--as long as it is not within a few months of an election. Far from it. The present international money rules place a preposterous burden on the U.S. By moving with speed and skill, following a stoppage of U.S. gold sales, we could, within a few months, negotiate new rules which would make far more sense all around. Because of our economic strength and trading position, our negotiating leverage would be enormous. This is not to recommend that we stop gold sales tomorrow. It does suggest that we should not take serious risks with the stability of the Atlantic security system, and the so far successful effort to build Germany into the Western community, in order very marginally to reduce the chance that we will have to stop selling gold to the French at $35 an ounce. Choices Alternative 1: Wait with this decision--and with any extended reply--until you, Rusk, McNamara, and Rostow are all back in town and can talk it over. (Bob would worry that the delay would reduce the chances of influencing Erhard's budget. The rest of us do not believe there is a chance of any letter causing Erhard to pull apart his anti-inflation package in the middle of a tough parliamentary fight.) Alternative 2: If you decide now in favor of the tough (McNamara) strategy, we will send up a cleared draft reply incorporating the offset language at Tab B. (Before making that decision, you may wish to talk to Secretary Rusk, George Ball, and Walt.) Alternative 3: If you have doubts about the tough strategy, but do not wish to wait with a decision, you will wish, before finally making up your mind, to hear out Bob McNamara as well as Rusk and Ball. You could have a small meeting tomorrow (Friday)--Bob leaves at 3:00 for a week. Or you might telephone Bob. Wait/7/ /7/This option is checked. At the end of Alternative 1, Bator wrote: "We will gamble on waiting. Draft letter asking him to be ready to discuss in Sept. and to sit on budget." Next Step If, after having heard out McNamara, you decide against a tough letter it is important to start a State-Defense-Treasury-White House exercise to prepare an alternative strategy on offset and troop strength for use in U.S.-UK-FRG talks. Approve/8/ /8/This option is checked. FB
194. Letter From Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson/1/ Bonn, August 11, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Secret. Translation. The German language original is attached to the source text. Dear Mr. President: Although the United States Embassy in Bonn has already been given a detailed report on President de Gaulle's visit to Bonn/2/ I am anxious to give you my personal impressions. As you know, I had two rather long talks alone with President de Gaulle, as well as a discussion in a wider group. /2/De Gaulle visited Bonn on July 21. We dealt with questions concerning his visit to the Soviet Union, the German problem and European affairs. However, our exchange of view naturally centered on the Atlantic Alliance and especially the consequences which France's decision last March to withdraw her troops from NATO command has for us all. On this point General de Gaulle said that France wanted to remain the ally of her allies. Nor had he, he said, left any doubt in his discussions in the Soviet Union that France will remain on the side of the West. She simply wanted to withdraw from integration and wished to regain her complete freedom of decision. She would, however, fulfill her commitments, especially those flowing from Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. France would fight on the side of her allies in the event of an attack on a partner of the Alliance. President de Gaulle felt that in order duly to prepare for any such joint operations, the French General Staff should elaborate with the NATO-Headquarters plans for all conceivable cases of possible military co-operation. Whilst confirming that these problems would have to be resolved not bilaterally but within the framework of the Alliance, he nevertheless repeatedly underlined the fact that the decision regarding the use of French troops in an emergency would have to be taken by the French Government. As regards the presence of French troops in Germany, President de Gaulle repeatedly stressed that he would leave French troops in Germany only if that was what we wanted. He would withdraw them at any time we wished, whether now or later. On the matter of the legal questions involved in the stationing of French troops in Germany, we agreed to continue the negotiations already begun. It was clear from our talks that de Gaulle rejects any automatic commitment in the event of military operation, but he wishes to remain in the alliance of the free nations of the West. On the other hand, he stated that he would in any event leave his troops in Berlin, thus maintaining the joint responsibility for Berlin. On all these points I explained the German standpoint, with which you are familiar, and again impressed upon President de Gaulle the reasons why we wish to preserve integration and our close ties with the United States. To sum up I would say that our talks helped to clarify our mutual positions, which, I hope, will have become even more distinct by the time I come to Washington at the end of September. Then we shall be able to discuss this matter thoroughly, and also any other questions of particular interest to the United States and Germany. May I say that I am very much looking forward to our meeting, and that my thoughts are often with you in this troubled period you are going through. With the expression of my high esteem, /3/Printed from a copy that indicated Erhard signed the German language original.
195. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State/1/ Brussels, August 19, 1966, 1536Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 17-1. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, The Hague, London, Paris for Crawford, Rome, and Luxembourg. 850. NATUS. 1. Perusal of Paris 2209 and 2266,/2/ the latter reporting on a lunch-eon session at which assembled acting PermReps went to work on their Belgian colleague to convince him that GOB "not doing right by SHAPE", compels me to refer addressees' attention to Brussels 763 and 765/3/ in which I reported a conversation with PriMin Vanden Boeynants re SHAPE relocation. /2/Telegram 2209, August 17, reported that the relocation of NATO had become a political rather than technical issue within the Alliance. Telegram 2266, August 18, summarized a meeting of Permanent Representatives at which the majority took the Belgian Representative to task for not being more forthcoming on the question of relocating SHAPE. (Ibid.) /3/Both these telegrams, August 12, reported complaints by Belgian officials about the manner in which the relocation of SHAPE was being handled, especially by the military. (Ibid.) 2. In particular I wish to refer to Vanden Boeynants clear warning of serious consequences should Belgium's allies support at govt level positions expressed to date by SACEUR and other military officials and which in Belgian eyes are not essentially based on military considerations. 3. I also wish to highlight PriMin's statement to me that he and Belgian FonMin Harmel, in conversation held in PriMin's office on Saturday, June 4, had clearly and unequivocally informed NATO Secretary-General Brosio that while Belgium willing to host SHAPE, Brussels and immediate Brussels area would be excluded as relocation site. 4. I believe the GOB can be faulted for not having offered more than one site for SHAPE and for having demonstrated a rigidity, and perhaps an inordinate stubbornness, following early reports of SACEUR's dissatisfaction with Casteau site. The Belgians likewise have, I think, tended to minimize communications problems related to the establishment of SHAPE in the Casteau area, and not adequately to recognize this as a valid military consideration. I understand de Kerchove in his discussions at Paris today will indicate that the GOB would be prepared to offer a second site but that this could not be in the Brussels or other urban areas. If, in fact, the Belgians do put forward an alternative site to Casteau, I believe it would be out of recognition that their position has been unduly rigid. 5. I might add that, in my view, the rigidity which Belgium has shown in sticking thus far to the Casteau site for SHAPE can to a degree be related to a feeling within the govt that its views on the location of other headquarters (AFCENT and EUCOM) are not being given serious consideration. They believe events are justifying their fear that the military preference will in each case be supported from the political side. 6. What I do not quite understand are the suggestions emanating from meetings in Paris that, in refusing to agree to a location for SHAPE in the Brussels area, the Belgians are in some way guilty of bad faith and are being arbitrary and politically weak-kneed. The PriMin's unequivocal statement to Brosio should have made clear to all concerned that the Brussels area was out. FonMin Harmel made this point also in reporting to Parliament following the June NAC Ministerial on Belgian agreement to host SHAPE. The Embassy has consistently reported this as a fact of life here. Knight
196. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Chamcook, New Brunswick, August 21, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Smith and approved by the White House on August 30. The meeting was held at the Rossmount Inn. The source text is labeled "Part 6 of 9." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS United States Canada (The President met with Prime Minister Pearson on the occasion of his participation in a cornerstone laying ceremony at the Roosevelt Campobello International Park on Campobello Island, New Brunswick. He was the luncheon guest of the Prime Minister at Rossmount Inn in the little town of Chamcook, N.B. The lunch was preceded by approximately an hour and a half of serious conversation in a parlor of the Inn set aside for the purpose.) At one point in the conversation, the Prime Minister asked the President how he was handling DeGaulle, to which the President responded with a smile, "I get out of the box when he starts winding up. I'm betting on outliving him." The Prime Minister commented that Canada was anxious that nothing be done which will make more difficult the ultimate establishment of better relations with France. The President responded that he himself had been very careful never to respond in kind to DeGaulle. In fact he had never said one unkind word about DeGaulle and he stopped American bureaucrats from doing so whenever he caught them. He added, however, that when we are told to get out, we simply have to get out. The Prime Minister agreed, noting that this had been particularly hard for the Canadians to swallow, especially since Canadian forces would be moving to Germany. The special historic relationship which the Canadian nation had with France and the memories of Canadian involvement in the two wars against Germany made this an especially hard blow. Nevertheless, emotion was no basis for policy, although at one point he had not resisted the temptation to say to the French, "Do you want us to move out our hundred thousand dead, too?" In sum, the Canadian Government believes we should not make it easy for the French to pull out of NATO. The President remarked that he could understand and appreciate the special feeling Canada had for France. The Prime Minister went on to say that, looking to the future, he believed the Europeans should do more themselves. They should carry a greater share of the burden of their own defense. The President did not take direct issue with the Prime Minister's observation, but asked who among the Europeans will do more? Wilson? Erhard? The Italians? They simply won't. What worried him most is that we might do less and they won't do more. This would be frightening because, by tempting the aggressor, we could cause World War III. In any event, he was not going to try to dominate the Alliance. The Prime Minister responded that he had not been suggesting that the US should pull out wholesale. He noted that Canada had had an opportunity to pull out when the French had asked them to leave France, but the Canadians had resisted this temptation. He was only suggesting that the British, for example, could involve themselves more in the defense of Europe and ought to give up trying to play the role of nineteenth century imperialists.
197. Briefing Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 23, 1966, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Francis M. Bator, Meetings with LBJ, Box 17. Secret. Attached to an August 23 memorandum of transmittal to the President and to a memorandum suggesting how the meeting at 6:30 p.m. might be organized. The meeting was not held on August 23, but the following day at 6:30 p.m. A last minute memorandum from Bator to the President and his indecipherable notes on the meeting are ibid. No other record of the meeting has been found, but Document 198 indicates what happened. SUBJECT We need your instructions on two related issues: 1. What should we do to dissuade the British from rushing ahead with sharp cuts in their forces in Germany (men and stocks) in a way which would probably start an unravelling process in NATO and increase domestic pressure on us to follow suit? (So far, our stance vis-a-vis the British has been: (i) you must not cut; (ii) we wish you luck with your offset with the Germans.) 2. What should we do about our own offset with the Germans? The present arrangement runs out in June 1967. We owe Erhard replies to his recent letter on his talk with deGaulle,/2/ and also to his earlier letter which asks that we not connect troops and offset, and that payments for other than weapons be counted./3/ /2/See Document 190. /3/Dated July 5. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272) (If we send Erhard a full reply, you will also need to decide how to respond to his implicit request for a new U.S. pledge that we will not exclude "establishing in the future a joint integrated nuclear force" in order to buy a non-proliferation treaty. A full-dress reply which does not explicitly give him that reassurance would almost certainly result in another inquiry within 48 hours.) Issue No. 1: What do we do to slow down British troop cuts? There is agreement among your advisers that it would be useful: --for George Ball and Cy Vance to go to London later this week to make the case against hasty cuts; --perhaps to offer marginally to increase our stationing expenditures and weapons purchases; --offer to join the UK-FRG "mixed commission" of foreign/defense/finance ministers which is supposed to prepare a report on UK troops and offset. Hopefully, the above steps will delay a final decision on UK cutbacks at least for the next several weeks. And they could be used to rebut newspaper talk that an unravelling of NATO is certain and imminent. But they are a stopgap. If we are to stop the unravelling, the key lies in our management of our offset issue. Issue No. 2: The U.S. Offset Specifically, are we willing to change our "no weapons offset/no troops" tactics and offer to: --put our offset renewal on the agenda of the "mixed commission?" (An offer to join to discuss only the UK offset is likely to be regarded as patronizing rather than helpful.) --explore with the UK and the Germans a modified version of offset which would protect our payments but give the Germans some extra options (buying extra goods other than weapons, and, most important, buying long-term "offset-bonds", perhaps in the context of some multilateral defense payments arrangement)? The tactical issue hinges on our choice of objectives: 1. Do we want to use financial pressure to maneuver the Germans into asking us to cut troops? If this worked, it would permit us to shift to a more economical military posture (dual basing, airlifts, etc.), with minimum resistance from the Chiefs and their allies on the Hill. 2. Or, do we want to try for an arrangement which would (i) give us time to work out a US-UK-FRG bargain on cheaper deployments (and perhaps FRG increases) which make military sense; (ii) avoid large-scale U.S. troop cuts during the interim (perhaps 2-3 years), and minimize British troop cuts; (iii) still protect our balance of payments (though somewhat less so than would sharp troop cutbacks); (iv) set up a multilateral defense payments club where finance ministers will confront foreign and defense ministers on a regular basis. (This would partially bridge the unhealthy gap in Europe between people responsible for money and those responsible for defense and foreign relations.) In general, staying with our present tactic of threatening to cut back troops if the Germans don't come through with a new 100% weapons offset corresponds to the "get the Germans to invite us out" objective. Putting our offset on the agenda of the mixed commission and offering to explore a multilateral offset arrangement, with more options for the Germans, corresponds to the second "trying to work it out" objective. The Case for Staying with the Present Tactics: The quickest way to cut unnecessary U.S. troops in Europe is to insist on 100% weapons offset, regardless of German politics. This would maximize pressure on the Germans to build up their forces, using weapons bought from the U.S. And if the heat gets too great, and Erhard refuses to renew the offset at the current level--as is now almost certain--we will have set the stage for a cutback. This would enable us to shift to a more sensible military posture, save us budget money, and protect the balance of payments. The Case Against Present Tactics: In achieving the above objectives, the current line will maximize the international political costs: --The Germans will not agree to another 100% weapons offset at the present levels. If we make the threat, we will have to carry it out or back down. (Erhard is in political trouble. The latest polls show his unqualified support down from 44% in April to 30% in July. He is not going to be able to pull apart his anti-inflation package in the middle of a tough parliamentary fight to increase his defense budget enough to cover a 100% weapons offset.) --U.S. troop cuts, explicitly for financial reasons--and on top of BAOR cuts--will be seen as evidence that NATO is falling apart and that deGaulle is right in saying that the British and Americans care more for their pocketbooks than for the safety of Europe. --We will have given away some of our assets for an eventual mutual withdrawal bargain with the Soviets. --Most important, there would be a serious unsettling effect on German politics, with unpredictable results. (It is not at all inconceivable that peremptory U.S. cutbacks could topple Erhard, perhaps leading to a Gaullist German Government.) --Over a couple of years, we could be faced with a disintegration of our postwar security arrangements in Europe, a hostile France, an alienated and deeply neurotic Germany, a bankrupt and isolated Britain, and a rising tide of Gaullist hostility to the U.S. A Possible Way Out: There is a reasonable chance that we could shift to more economical deployments and provide acceptable protection for our balance of payments without taking such large political risks. The key lies in taking the time needed to make the shift by consensus rather than fiat. To achieve this, we need to set in motion a process designed to produce U.S.-UK-FRG agreement on an allied defense posture in Europe which will provide deterrence and the insurance of a reasonable conventional option. Our joining the "mixed commission" would be a very good start. At the same time, we will continue to need balance of payments protection. For the time being at least, that means no sharp cut in German offset money. The key to that--at least a necessary condition--is to give the Germans more options--enlarge the number of ways in which they can provide offset. This does not mean that we should reduce our pressure on them to buy weapons--for good military reasons. It does mean that, in addition, we must find ways to ease the political strain on Erhard of raising offset money (e.g., allow the Germans to purchase long-term offset bonds, perhaps financed outside their budget). In my judgment, the multilateral payments union proposal, which has been in staff preparation for some time, is the most promising possibility. Procedure Before making up your mind, you will wish to hear the views of all your advisers. (In the past, McNamara has been in favor of staying with our present hard line on offset. Ball has been for a shift. I do not know about Secretary Rusk.) As is clear from the above, my own vote would be for a shift in tactics to the second, "trying to work it out" option. If you should decide that way, you might wish, at the end of the meeting this afternoon, to instruct us as follows: 1. Ball and Vance should go to London and tell the British that we are prepared: --to join the "Mixed Commission"; --to put our offset renewal on the agenda; --to try to work out with them and the Germans a scheme which will enlarge the ways in which the Germans can provide offset, yet protect both UK and US payments. 2. We prepare a letter from you to Erhard, thanking him for his report on deGaulle and, on offset, telling him the same things Ball-Vance will say to the British. (We could say nothing about nuclear sharing/nonproliferation, and say that you plan to discuss all other outstanding issues when he is here in September. Or, if you have so decided, we can give him the reassurance he wants. This would tend to lock us in on nonproliferation.) 3. A group consisting of Deming, Solomon/Leddy, McNaughton/Enthoven, and Bator should get to work on a multilateral payments plan which would both widen the Germans' options and protect U.S. and UK payments. This group should initially report to Secretaries Rusk, Fowler and McNamara. FB
198. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret; Nodis. A typed note at the top of the source text reads: "President sent following message to Prime Minister August 26." Another copy of the message indicates that it was sent to Bruce for his information in telegram 37597, August 30. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272) I have become increasingly concerned during the past few weeks about the dangers of an unraveling in NATO which could easily get out of hand. With your urgent need to save foreign exchange in Germany, Erhard's budgetary and political difficulties (not to speak of his problems with his brass), my problems with our German offset and with the Congress on troops in Europe--all against the background of the General's antics--there is danger of serious damage to the security arrangements we have worked so hard to construct during the last 20 years. To you, I don't have to spell out the possible political consequences, especially in Germany. And while I would not think it likely that our Russian friends will develop itchy fingers, one cannot rule it out. In any case, it would be foolish to run down our assets vis-a-vis Moscow without some quid-pro-quo. It seems to me that the essential step, if we are to hold things together, would be for you, the Germans, and ourselves to get to work immediately to find a solution that would be equitable, meet our respective political requirements, and fully cover the defense needs of the Alliance. I propose to write to Erhard this afternoon/2/--before his budget meeting tomorrow--to suggest that the U.S. join the FRG and the UK in an initial exploration of this entire range of issues: force levels, deployments and the sharing of the foreign exchange burden. I would think that such an exploration should involve our Ministers of Finance, as well as of Foreign Affairs and Defense. And, of course, it would have to be followed by thorough consultation with all our Allies in NATO. /2/The message to Erhard was actually sent on August 25. (Ibid.) I know that not all of your decisions can await the outcome of such a tripartite exercise. But I very much hope--and I will put this hard to Erhard in connection with his budget--that we will all try to avoid any decisions during the next several weeks which would unduly narrow our choices. David Bruce will be in touch with you about this proposal in the near future. In the meanwhile, I hope, my good friend, you are having a good rest on your island. After some strictly nonpolitical speech making in the West, I hope to spend Saturday and Sunday at home in Texas observing, as I told the press yesterday, the results of 58 years of very pleasant existence./3/ /3/In his August 29 reply, Wilson stated that he shared the President's concern and would be happy to agree to tripartite talks. Because of his "major concern" to safeguard sterling, however, he wanted to reach an agreed Anglo-American position so the Germans could not play one country off against the other. (Ibid.) With warm regards, /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
199. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (MacArthur) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, September 1, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by MacArthur. The source text bears the notation "for Pres Evening Reading." Copies were also sent to Ball, Leddy, and Johnson. SUBJECT /2/For text of the Mansfield resolution (S. Res. 300), August 31, see The Congressional Record, 1966, Senate, p. 21442. Senator Kuchel: I had a good personal talk with Senator Kuchel this morning regarding the Mansfield resolution, explaining that we had not been consulted on its contents, timing, or indeed its introduction on the floor of the Senate. I said the resolution was a very bad one and would create major problems for us in NATO which was already suffering from General de Gaulle's withdrawal. Furthermore, it would cause difficult problems for Chancellor Erhard who would be visiting the US later this month. I explained that for several months at closed NATO meetings, you and other US representatives have been stressing the theme that there cannot be a double standard whereby the US is expected to meet agreed force goals but other NATO members need not meet theirs. The introduction of this resolution would most certainly be exploited by the Gaullists to prove their contention that the US was not dependable and also lead to charges of unilateral US action that further undermined NATO. Finally, the resolution would not be a helpful backdrop for the talks you would be having with Gromyko in New York later this month at the UN General Assembly./3/
/3/At his September 8 press conference, President Johnson addressed the question of troop strength in Europe, saying that he was aware of the sense of the Senate on this issue, but that it could not be solved by Senate resolutions. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, pp. 998-999) With respect to Senator Mansfield's suggestion that the resolution be put on the consent calendar with no committee hearings, I pointed out that the April 1951 resolution, calling for the sending of troops to Europe,/4/ had been considered by the Senate Armed Services Committee and that there were over 800 pages of published testimony of those Committee hearings. I summarized by saying that the resolution was damaging to US national interests. While under any circumstances it would be damaging because of its timing, the resolution was even more harmful because it made absolutely no reference to NATO consultations or to a reciprocal reduction of forces by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. /4/S. Res. 99, 82d Congress. Senator Kuchel said he agreed and did not like the resolution. He thought it absurd that the sponsors had not mentioned NATO consultation and also required the Soviet Union to reciprocate by reducing their forces in Eastern Europe. He said that while the Department might not have been notified by Mansfield, he had assumed from what Mansfield said while introducing the resolution that the President had been fully consulted and had not disapproved. I said that while I could not undertake to speak for the President, I personally felt certain that the President had not been consulted on the contents or the timing of the introduction of the resolution. Senator Kuchel said that it was also absurd for the sponsors to ask that the resolution be put on the consent calendar. It was particularly nonsensical to suggest that this resolution, which was one of great import, did not need to be examined by committee when as a general practice the Senate referred the most trivial resolutions to committee and the original 1951 resolution had been thoroughly aired in committee. The Senator said he wanted to help and asked whether on a personal and private basis there were any Administration papers or remarks that I could pass to him without attribution. I replied that my conversation with him was personal and that while there were no papers that I could give him, I did want him to know our views because of the serious damage to our national interests that passage of the resolution might entail. Senator Kuchel said he fully understood and appreciated very much my call. He was determined to see the resolution be sent to committee and he would try to be helpful in defeating or modifying it. He suggested that we have another talk the middle of next week if there were any new developments. Senator Dirksen: I also talked to Senator Dirksen along the same lines as I had talked to Senator Kuchel, stressing the damage that the resolution could do in our relations with NATO and the Germans and the comfort it could give to the Soviet Union which would not fail to exploit it along with other elements unfriendly to the US such as the Gaullists. Senator Dirksen said he agreed. He had met with his Republican colleagues this morning on this subject and enjoined them "to stay off this resolution" and not to hold any press conferences on the subject. He would renew this advice. [Next documents]
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