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210. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State/1/ Paris, October 7, 1966, 1930Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 17-1. Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 5117. NATUS. Subject: NAC Relocation. 1. Long restricted meeting of the Fourteen under Brosio chairmanship today provided a first full dress discussion of NAC relocation. Full report will follow./2/ Highlights in this cable. /2/Telegram 5236, October 10. (Ibid.) 2. Meeting provided snapshot of present state of thinking of every member of Fourteen. A. US, Netherlands, UK, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Luxembourg and Iceland clearly favor a decision to move, and would be willing to have decision made at PermRep level. B. FRG, Norway and Portugal are ready to go along with majority; Norway is relaxed upon how decision is taken, Portugal leans toward and FRG favors a formal confirmation at Ministerial level in December. C. Canada and Denmark are not yet ready to make the substantive decision, and strongly favor decision taken at Ministerial level in December. 3. Arguments used by those who want to act soon were mostly familiar: need for propinquity to SHAPE and collocation with Military Committee; need for assured communication; need for decision before December to avoid undue political significance of having December meeting in Paris; need for NATO headquarters to flourish in simpatico atmosphere; need to maintain credibility NATO deterrent and determination vis-a-vis the Soviets. 4. One argument not previously stressed was high economic cost of further delay in deciding to move. Point (stressed by Netherlands, Norway and UK) was that if we stay in Paris after SHAPE, AFCENT, and other agencies move out, we will have to set up new communication channels which will then have to be duplicated by later move to Brussels. An early decision to move might obviate some of the duplicate expenses. 5. Next session on this subject will be Thursday Oct 20. Hope of SYG Brosio and most PermReps is that today's demonstration of overwhelming majority sentiment for relocating NAC will soften position of Canada and Denmark, whose representatives here do not yet even have authority to discuss the substance of the question. 6. We will continue to press for early decision to leave Paris and move to Brussels. (There is no objection to Brussels as new site, once decision to move is agreed.) We can then afford to demonstrate some flexibility in procedure whereby decision is somehow formally taken at Ministerial level. But meanwhile our interest lies in driving toward a consensus on the substance, reserving procedural flexibility for the moment when it is needed to bring the Danes and Canadians aboard. 7. My guess is Danes will be more impressed with the near consensus already reached to move than the Canadian Foreign Minister will be. If Chalfont heard Danish Prime Minister Krag correctly, there may already be the basis for softening the line in Copenhagen. In any case, it is now clear that Danes and Canadians are only real holdouts./3/ /3/By October 19, the countries in doubt had lifted their reservations of moving the North Atlantic Council, and one week later a draft resolution including the move to Brussels was accepted by the French. For text of this resolution as approved at the December NATO Ministerial Meeting on December 16, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 379. Cleveland
211. Editorial Note On October 7, 1966, President Johnson addressed the National Conference of Editorial Writers at their conference in New York. In commenting on the European situation, the President stressed that the United States and its European allies must move ahead on three fronts: "First, to modernize NATO and strengthen other Atlantic alliances. Second, to further the integration of the Western European community. Third, to quicken progress in East-West relations." The President then outlined what steps needed to be taken on each of these fronts. For text of his remarks on this occasion, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, pages 1125-1130.
212. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State/1/ Paris, October 22, 1966, 1444Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 FR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and to Manila for Secretary Rusk. 6007. NATUS. Subject: French forces in Germany. 1. Position on French forces in Germany is briefly this: A. French have clearly run out on the arrangement worked out between the Secretary and Couve de Murville, and confirmed by all fifteen Ministers, at Brussels in June. French now insist that talks on French forces in Germany be conducted only by military commanders; there is no indication they would ever (even after report from the commanders) be willing to negotiate in the Council the "mission" of those forces, which they regard as solely a decision for French Government to make. B. FRG has abandoned (without due notice to us, by the way) the joint strategy we worked out with them for a preliminary agreement with French in NAC. Germans are quite prepared for talks between SACEUR and General Ailleret, without any political preliminaries at all. C. The only conceivable way to budge French from their position would be for FRG to be clearly willing to invite French troops to leave Germany unless they are satisfactorily related to NATO. Erhard is clearly in no position to do any such thing, and said as much to de Gaulle at their last meeting--or so the French believe. D. There is no prospect that SACEUR can settle this matter with the French unless the Fourteen instruct General Lemnitzer to accept whatever General Ailleret has been authorized to offer, and that is not a position in which the Alliance should place its Supreme Commander. E. In these circumstances an agreement with France that gives these forces a NATO character, even tentatively and tenuously, is not achievable. 2. Our options are therefore in a very narrow range indeed. We can either a. Pretend that these troops might somehow be related to NATO even though the French won't say just how, in order to help the Germans pretend that they are not there as purely French national troops under French national control; or b. Do nothing in NATO, and thus invite a bilateral side agreement between FRG and France to keep the French troops in Germany anyway. 3. A bilateral agreement outside of NATO is so damaging to so many of our objectives in Europe, and regarded as so dangerous by all our allies, that let's pretend alternative a is the least worse. 4. I see no use at all in prolonging the agony at the political level. If we delegate the problem to the military commanders with instructions to report back to the Council, we will just have to recognize in a month or so (or perhaps at the December Ministerial Meeting) the facts of life as set forth above. Therefore, let's end these "negotiations" now. 5. There is a simple and effective way to do this. The Fourteen can draft a short instruction to SACEUR, saying in effect: a. We have listened carefully to what French representatives have told us, on several occasions, in NAC. b. We derive from these French statements the conclusion that the French troops in Germany might in some future circumstances be associated with NATO in the defense of Western Europe. c. In view of this possibility, SACEUR should maintain continuous liaison with the French military authorities for discussion of any plans and preparations which may be appropriate to the circumstances. 6. This would not require SACEUR to try to reach agreement with General Ailleret on any particular subject at any particular time. They would not be required to make joint recommendations to NAC. If General Lemnitzer felt the need for further political guidance on particular problems that might arise in his liaison relationship with the French Chief of Staff, he would repair to the Fourteen for such guidance. 7. The desire to get rid of the problem for this month, even if it has to come up again later, is now so great among the Fourteen that the procedure in paragraphs 5 and 6 may not be saleable at this stage. (It could also be used later on, if the military commanders first try and fail to arrive at an "agreement".) But in my judgment it is so much better than dragging on through a predictably humiliating non-negotiation, that I recommend I be authorized to try it on for size the next time the Fourteen take up French forces in Germany. If it cannot be sold at this stage, then there is no alternative to going ahead with SACEUR-Ailleret talks ad referendum to NAC, and I should be in a position as fallback to go along with the majority that already wants to take that next step. 8. Since Secretary was personally involved in the Brussels arrangement from which his French colleague has now "withdrawn", I am repeating this message to Manila for his attention./2/ /2/On October 25, in a telegram approved by the Acting Secretary of State, the Department of State agreed that there was no longer any use in prolonging the matter of French troops in Germany and authorized direct talks between Lemnitzer and Ailleret. (Circular telegram 72261 to Paris and Bonn; ibid.) Cleveland
213. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State/1/ Paris, October 22, 1966, 1700Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 6006. NATUS. Subject: McCloy briefing on trilateral talks./2/ /2/On October 11, the White House announced that the President had appointed John J. McCloy to be the U.S. representative to the trilateral (U.S., British, West German) talks that were envisioned in the Erhard-Johnson communique of September 27. For text of the announcement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, p. 1139. At meetings in Bonn October 20-21, McCloy, German State Secretary Karl Carstens, and British Minister George M. Thomson defined the organization and future work of the group and agreed to keep the NATO Council informed of the progress of their meetings. (Telegrams 4800 and 4827 from Bonn, October 20 and 21; Department of State, Central Files, FN 12 GER W) McCloy reported on the talks in telegram 4832 from Bonn, October 21. (Ibid.) 1. In informal atmosphere at Cleveland residence, McCloy gave candid informal account of his mission he has been given by President and of just-concluded two days of trilateral talks in Bonn. Present were Deputy SYG Roberts of Fourteen, and PermReps except Portugal and Turkey represented by Charles, as well as State Department Counselor Bowie. French PermRep was not invited. 2. Half hour of lively interchange that followed was carried by de Staercke (Belgium), Alessandrini (Italy), and Boon (Netherlands) by now, ghost of tripartite directorate has been exorcised, but exclusion from even ad hoc temporary tripartite group is clearly underlying cause of Italian pique. Main burden of complaint was that three, however worthy their motives--and candid persuasive McCloy presentation left no room for innuendos on this score--had constituted themselves a "self-appointed group" (de Staercke's phrase), without prior consultation, to do what all members of NATO had an interest in, and what NATO was created to do and was actively undertaking in current force planning exercise. Thus, action of three implied lack of confidence in NATO and their partners, condemned NATO force planning exercise to ineffectuality until results of trilateral talks were in hand, and all this quite unnecessarily since NATO if only it had been asked could either have done itself the job that the trilateral talks were seeking to do on an urgent basis, or could have established the group of three with a formal NATO blessing. 3. Grewe was most helpful in emphasizing that Germans could not have accepted decisive talks with US and UK on offset problems without also embracing broader issues of strategy and force levels. He challenged his colleagues to show what real alternative procedure there was to that chosen by three. Shuckburgh was more cautious, reiterating familiar UK points about need for quick conclusion of trilateral talks and for close ties between these talks and NATO work. He did, however, quietly counter Dutch argument that NAC could have done what trilateral talks are designed to do, by pointing out that UK this year has twice brought its financial and budgetary problems of troop maintenance into NAC without noticeable results either from "Callaghan study" or recent Annual Review committee study. 4. McCloy with help from Bowie good humoredly but firmly reiterated that US had launched trilateral talks to meet what it continued to feel was clear and pressing financial problem in US and UK with political overtones which ran real risk of producing extremely dangerous attrition of NATO defense posture and required extraordinary and rapid action to cope with it. They insisted that US and its partners in trilateral talks had need to clear their minds jointly and stave off possible unilateral or bilateral actions that would indeed present Alliance with fait accompli. Trilateral talks would be conducted with full opportunity for SYG to participate and SACEUR to make his voice heard, and results would be put to NATO as whole, beginning with report at December Ministerial Meeting. 5. Cleveland said he thought the comments by his colleagues on trilateral procedures (in meetings of Fourteen and at this informal session) had been clear and forceful, and had adequately registered the reaction of some of our allies, for future reference. But problem now was to get on with deciding just how work in NATO between now and December would be meshed with trilateral talks, and how results of trilateral talks would be fed into preparations for NATO's December Ministerial Meeting. He hoped that at meeting of Fourteen on Monday and thereafter further postmortems on procedures already adopted could be held to a minimum, in favor of practical discussion of what NATO is going to do about undeniably important and urgent matters of substance. 6. Most PermReps remained silent, letting Belgian, Dutch and Italian carry dialogue. (Canadian PermRep Ritchie made one brief remark along the same line.) But after meeting Kristianson (Norway), Palamas (Greece) and Reuter (Luxembourg) indicated separately that they thoroughly agreed we have had enough catharsis, and time for some accelerated force planning was already overdue. There were many expressions of great appreciation for McCloy's willingness to stop by Paris to conduct this briefing. 7. Comment: McCloy stop here was clearly a most valuable action. His full and detailed account of what he is doing for the President and what the trilateral talks will try to accomplish will be a reference point in future NATO discussions. He made it transparently clear that neither he nor US has any purpose other than to strengthen Alliance on basis of realistic assessment of current political-military situation and financial and budgetary possibilities. 8. Brosio will report to Fourteen October 24 and will undoubtedly introduce his resolution (Bonn 4814)./3/ While we should not take lead, I believe it would be wrong for us to raise any objection in principle to SYG's resolution, and we should go along with it if others find it useful. As result of Bonn meeting, trilateral talks have set their own schedules and procedures, and Brosio's resolution will in no way hamper us. Text on Bonn 4814 should be modified however to conform with hard-fought Bonn communique language/4/ to effect three "would report on their discussions", rather than "convey the results of those discussions" before December Ministerial Meeting. We would plan to support Brosio's alternative of making this a DPC resolution which would finesse question of French role in NAC on force planning. /3/The telegram and the text of the resolution have not been found. /4/Transmitted in telegram 4827. Cleveland
214. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/ Washington, October 28, 1966, 8:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Beigel, Vest, and Getz; cleared in L/EUR and EUR; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 75415. NATUS. Subj: NATO and France. For Ambassadors Cleveland and Bohlen from Leddy. 1. Now that we have been working out new relationship between NATO and France for the past eight months, I think it would be helpful to have agreed picture of situation. I would appreciate your comments on scene as we see it: NATO 2. De Gaulle has given clear instruction that France is to disengage from all NATO military activities with few exceptions such as early warning activities which he is willing to tolerate as sop to French military. He is willing to have General Staff talks between France and NATO military authorities as well as permanent French military liaison missions to NATO military components, which will be empowered to exchange information and arrange for communications but will not be empowered to enter into arrangements or undertake engagements which might compromise French ability to remain neutral if it so chooses in event of war. On political level France remains a party to the Treaty and member of Alliance represented on NAC and other non-military activities. For public consumption, it is "an ally of its allies," even though it has undermined the confidence of both its NATO and WEU allies in sincerity of its undertakings. This posture should be adequate to get French Government through next parliamentary elections without any serious domestic questions being raised on French relations with NATO. 3. Rigid French position has finally brought back to reality those Allies who put primary value on maintaining French association at whatever cost to Alliance. Thus pace of decisions has increased. Major steps taken or underway to date are: a) NAC will move to Brussels, SHAPE to Casteau in Belgium, AFCENT to Maastricht area in Netherlands. The Military Committee is expected to follow NAC to Brussels. b) French forces will remain in Germany. Germans clearly want them to remain and need multilateral cover for Franco-German bilateral on facilities. SACEUR and General Ailleret will discuss technical arrangements to relate French and NATO military activities and report to their Principals. France proved unwilling to implement pertinent portion of Brussels Ministerial communique of last June and was unwilling even to agree that, once it had declared war under Article 5 of the Treaty, French forces would serve in the NATO military framework. c) NADGE is major exceptional activity which Fourteen and France have preliminarily agreed to carry through. Fourteen want France's financial contribution. France wants early warning intelligence. Project would be operable without French stations. 4. There remain a number of areas to be clarified, negotiated or decided: a) The "constitutional question" of continuing French role in NAC and its subsidiary bodies, and how we deal with this at the short and medium term. Our general position has been to let French initiate own withdrawals (which being rapidly done) and, where they remain, to assert principle that France is not permitted to negate or stop work from which it has withdrawn. The Fourteen is now considering a proposal by which the DPC, without France, would have broad responsibilities as Board of Directors for NATO defense activities. b) Terms of French participation in certain NATO military support agencies such as NATO Supply Center, SHAPE Technical Center and SACLANT ASW Research Center. c) Possible relocation of those military support agencies now located in France such as Hawk NPLO, NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization, and AGARD. d) French financial participation in selected activities which fall under the military budget and future infrastructure projects. While France is withdrawing from such activities and projects, it has indicated interest in participating selectively. We have under consideration proposal to increase percentage price to French since they would be choosing only nationally useful programs. e) French financial liability arising from French unilateral abrogation of agreements, which forced US and NATO withdrawal from France. f) Overflights of French territory. France continues to permit these on monthly basis, but will give no firm assurance about policy in time of crisis. Fourteen agree it is better to proceed on this basis than to precipitate issue which might lead French to reduce degree of cooperation. 5. In sum, major relocations and decisions of principle have now largely been taken; there remain number of lesser points to be worked out, chiefly in liaison and financial areas. There will be no definitive overall France-NATO arrangement, but series of agreements and understandings is emerging which cumulatively and pragmatically have already clearly defined France's relationship to Fourteen as "neutral" nation which will not accept commitments of any nature which hamper its freedom of decision. 6. We expect that it will take good part of next year to wrap up loose ends. French actions since de Gaulle announced public withdrawals last spring have already resulted in more extensive withdrawals than originally anticipated by many Allies. This is particularly evident in such areas as French abstention from the Military Committee and French treatment of the problem of mission of French troops in Germany. We would expect in general that future actions by both France and the Fourteen will result in even more complete French divorce from the military side of the Alliance. Unknown, at this point, is degree to which France may restrict its own participation in non-military, and especially political, activities of the Alliance. French abstention from POLAD report on East-West relations may be straw in the wind. France-US 7. Bilateral discussions have been held with French regarding withdrawal from facilities in France during which (a) we have reaffirmed we do not accept April 1, 1967 deadline for withdrawals, (b) French have reiterated they are prepared recognize problems we have that will stretch out our withdrawals but ask that we inform them fully regarding our plans, (c) French have cooperated in enabling special measures and workers to be introduced to move stocks, and in allowing schools to complete this academic year with continuation of appropriate support facilities. 8. Separate bilateral discussions have been held between Ambassador Bohlen and French Foreign Minister in which French have made clear that: a) They are unwilling for any US equipment or military personnel to remain in France even under French control. b) They are willing to permit continued US use in peacetime including time of crisis of petroleum pipeline and telecommunications facilities under French management, and are awaiting our response to this offer. c) They can give no assurance regarding continued use of pipeline and telecommunications facilities, or re-entry into any other facilities in event of war. d) They willing to consult regarding possible re-entry into other facilities should new crisis arise. e) Any re-entry into facilities will depend upon French national decision at time of crisis or in event of war, and no assurance can be given regarding French position in advance. It is apparent French wish to be in position to exercise option of avoiding any involvement. 9. Although de Gaulle is not likely to revive notion of withdrawing from North Atlantic Treaty prior to March 1967 elections, he will continue to disentangle France from any bilateral or multilateral military relationship with US in order to retain maximum flexibility in exploiting Viet Nam situation, enhance French role in Europe at expense of US, and ensure full French freedom of action in event Viet Nam conflict develops into general war. French relations with US in private sector will continue on normal basis with constantly expanding trade, travel and other relations. French will seek correct and friendly government relations on all strictly bilateral questions. In military field, US expects to complete its bilateral reentry discussions with French and submit report to Fourteen during next month. Katzenbach
215. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, November 11, 1966. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 15. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified; under United Kingdom legislation, official records can normally only be made available 30 years after their creation.]
216. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson/1/ Washington, November 15, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Secret; Nodis. Bruce was informed of the message in telegram 85292 to London, November 15. (Ibid.) I am immensely heartened by your courageous announcement about joining the EEC. Your entry would certainly help to strengthen and unify the West. If you find on the way that there is anything we might do to smooth the path, I hope you will let me know. The report from John McCloy on the Trilateral talks is encouraging, despite the real difficulties we still face. Thomson made an excellent contribution./2/ I am hopeful that we can get a genuine return from this exercise--militarily, politically and financially. /2/The second round of trilateral talks took place at the Department of State November 9-10, with McCloy, Thomson, and Carstens again representing their countries. In this round they discussed questions of military capabilities, the defense burden, and the foreign exchange problems resulting from the stationing of troops in Germany. Summaries of the meetings were transmitted to Paris in telegrams 82537, 83122, and 83129, November 10. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF 1 EUR W) The text of an agreed tripartite minute, which outlined the steps necessary to deter aggression, was transmitted to Paris in telegram 83128, November 10. (Ibid., DEF 6 NATO) For text of the communique issued at the conclusion of the second round, see Department of State Bulletin, December 6, 1966, p. 867. The immediate snag, which Carstens confirmed, is the inevitability of delay on the German side. While they can fruitfully continue to work with us in the Trilateral Group, it would be impossible for them to reach a responsible government position on these matters in time to keep the present schedule. We should surely give the Germans a chance to get themselves a government. I know we agree that we must move together in order to maintain NATO as a credible deterrent and as a stabilizing influence, especially in Germany. Your presence in Germany is as important to us as your presence in the East, which I assume remains as we last discussed it. I understand, as you know, the importance to you of being able to justify a change in your announced program, in view of the pressures inherent in your difficult but promising policies of economic adjustment. Would it help if I placed in the United Kingdom in the near future $35 million in orders beyond those already agreed to? I think I could do so on assurance from you that you will stay with us and the Germans in completing this fundamental review of the military, political and financial basis for the US-UK presence in Germany, making no change in your troop and supply dispositions there until after the completion of the review, and then that you will concert with us on any such changes in the light of that review. This procurement would supplement the accruals of dollars to you associated with the recent shift of our forces and installations to Britain from the Continent. I may get some heat from Congress on this, and cannot move definitively until I have talked it over with some of my people on the Hill. I think I can persuade them to go along on the basis outlined here. McCloy and our government officials are working on plans to handle deficits that result from the presence of our troops abroad through a multilateral clearing arrangement that should help neutralize balances, and contribute to an ultimate resolution of the monetary problem. That may take some time to negotiate. If successful, such an arrangement should help to satisfy some of our critics in Congress, and move the Germans to accept their own proper responsibilities. I cannot stress too strongly the need for progress towards more equitable patterns for dealing with the various responsibilities we all bear throughout the world. As we both know, some of the criticism I get here on the subject is justified. And, as you can imagine, the new Congress will not be easier to persuade than its predecessor. I very much hope that the arrangements proposed here will help you to join us in keeping this exercise on the tracks. Let us keep in close touch on this./3/ /3/Printed from an unsigned copy.
217. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals/1/ Washington, November 18, 1966, 9:21 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 7. Confidential. Drafted by Myerson, cleared by Springsteen and Vest, and approved by Leddy. 87996. NATUS. Subj: Brosio Visit to Washington. 1. NATO Secretary General Brosio visited Washington Nov 16-18 for informal discussions. He met with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Under Secretaries Katzenbach and Rostow, Mr. McCloy and Assistant Secretary Leddy, among others./2/ /2/Memoranda of Brosio's conversations with Rusk, Katzenbach, and Eugene Rostow on November 17, and with Leddy on November 18, are ibid., DEF 4 NATO. A memorandum on his conversation at the Department of Defense on November 16 is ibid., DEF 12 NATO. A memorandum of a conversation between the Secretary General and Leddy on November 16, is ibid., NATO 3. 2. Following are highlights of discussions in Department based on uncleared memoranda of conversation, FYI, Noforn, and subject to revision on review. 3. Organization of December Ministerial Meeting. Brosio and US participants agreed appropriate arrangement of agenda items would be necessary so as to clearly delineate business to be considered by the Fourteen Ministers (meeting as Defense Planning Committee) and business to come before the full Ministerial Council with French present. Secretary Rusk expressed preference for following order: First half-day, the full Council for ceremonial opening and to begin traditional tour d'horizon; afternoon of first day and morning of the following day, meeting of the Fourteen Ministers as DPC; afternoon of second day and, as necessary, morning of third day full Council to resume deliberations. 4. Foregoing was discussed on assumption that Special Committee would meet in Paris just prior to Ministerial. One of main points emphasized by Brosio was the SPECOM report to Ministers should be addressed to DPC. He made clear his view that this procedure should be followed both on organizational aspects of SPECOM and on political consultation aspects growing out of Italian proposal. In Brosio's view it is important to watch the precedents now that NATO has found pragmatic solution to "constitutional problem" arising out of French withdrawal. Therefore he considered it important that DPC take decisions on Special Committee, leaving it up to French to raise any questions they wish in full Council. We expressed preliminary agreement with this view. 5. East-West Issues in NATO. Brosio repeatedly emphasized his belief that, while NATO powers should do what is possible to improve atmosphere of relations with Eastern Europe and USSR, NATO work on matters of interest to Germany should parallel further progress on detente. He considered this absolutely essential for stability of Europe and Atlantic area. 6. On specific matters now under consideration in NATO, Brosio noted that NAC consideration of POLADs report is now well advanced; that, in his opinion, UK proposed declaration on Europe is not apt to give significant results but also not apt to cause great problems. He indicated there would be problems with some of the Fourteen on a special Declaration on East-West relations, primarily because of French reservation. He thought more likely result would be a section in the regular communique. US pointed out that French might well reserve even on communique language in this area and that we did not wish now to foreclose possibility of a special NATO Declaration in December or subsequently. 7. France-NATO Problems. In addition to French attitude on East-West issues (which he regretted), Brosio also commented on general French policy. He expressed personal view that French policy is incompatible with spirit of the Alliance on two fundamental points: (a) its interpretation of Article V of the Treaty, and (b) de Gaulle's concept of "Atlantic to the Urals" which implies inclusion of USSR in Europe and exclusion of US from European affairs. He nevertheless stressed view that it would be most unwise and dangerous to push showdown on this point. Wiser course was pragmatic approach that has been followed to date. 8. On French forces in Germany, Brosio thought French Government was in no hurry and would be prepared to let Ailleret-Lemnitzer conversations proceed at leisurely pace. He did not believe this should be an issue at Ministerial Meeting. 9. NATO Force Planning. Brosio recalled that NATO had accelerated force planning. He expressed view that, given problems in trilaterals (notably German political situation), NATO should probably slow down its effort somewhat but in framework of present accelerated timetable; i.e. not returning to previous schedule. 10. On general question of force levels and defense burdens, Secretary Rusk and other US participants emphasized to Brosio the increasingly difficult character of our domestic political problem. Essentially two points were made: (a) especially at time when US is carrying heavy burden for free world in Vietnam, US Congress and public opinion is increasingly restive at European failure to carry its share of the load in defense of NATO area; (b) European governments seem to be speaking with two voices. Foreign and Defense Ministers are anxious for US to keep up its military strength. Finance Ministers and central bankers keep urging us to correct US balance of payments problem. There needs to be a better link in Alliance affairs between political-military issues on one hand and financial and monetary issue on the other. 11. Special Committee. Reviewing difficulties in deciding on composition of Nuclear Planning Group, Brosio said he had recently received reply to letter he sent Luns urging more flexible Netherlands position. Reply hinted at some give in Dutch attitude but was couched in such terms that Netherlands could move in any direction it wished at Ministerial. The Turks remained a problem because they wanted a seven-member NPG. In Brosio's view Canada was most difficult problem of all. Canada did not even accept the principle of four permanent members for NPG unless Canada were included. Problem in Brosio's view is essentially political and psychological. Despite validity of Canada's claim to play a significant role in NATO nuclear affairs, another European country is needed in NPG to build in balance to Germany. Rusk
218. Letter From John J. McCloy to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 21, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, U.S. Forces for the NATO Central Region, Box 39. Secret. Dear Mr. President: I have completed the review of our NATO policy which you asked me to undertake in your letter delivered to me on October 7./2/ I enclose my report herewith. /2/Not found. Within the time available, I have sought to obtain and analyze as much data and thinking in the Government bearing on the problem as I could. In doing so, I have had the full cooperation of the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the CIA, as well as many other officials of the Government who are charged with responsibilities related to the subject of my inquiry. They have made available many studies and reports bearing on my report, prepared in their Departments and Agencies. Members of their staffs have assisted in various ways, including preparing special studies for my benefit. I have been much impressed with the dedication of the staffs and the quality of their work. Without this help it would have been quite impossible to carry out the assigned task. For all of this assistance, I am very grateful. In the course of my studies, I have found unanimity among all the responsible officials that NATO is vital to the security of the United States, and I have proceeded on that assumption. In conducting my review, I have confined myself essentially to the strength of the ground and air forces of NATO for the Central Front as the question of United States force levels is related to such forces. Accordingly, I have not dealt with naval forces or those which have been committed to the northern and southern flanks of NATO. During my consideration of these matters, there occurred the collapse of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, an event which complicated an already complex task. Representatives of the German Government have continued to cooperate fully in an exchange of views and data, but the lack of a government in Bonn may delay our progress considerably. Insofar as any decisions by the Federal Republic bear on fiscal matters, it may, therefore, be some time before we can complete our tripartite review. Indeed, for the same reason, my own report to you on this aspect of our study cannot be as definite as it might otherwise have been. To present my thoughts to you as simply and briefly as possible--and in a manner that I trust will assist decision-making--I have led off with: Conclusions and Recommendations This section is backed up by six analytical sections/3/ which explain how and why I reached my conclusions: /3/None of the sections is printed. A. The Need for NATO B. NATO Strategy and Forces C. Military Effects of Force Changes D. Political Effects of Force Changes E. Balance of Payment Issues F. The British Situation From the many studies prepared for me by various agencies of the Executive Branch, I have selected six which I consider important enough to warrant your personal attention. They are separately bound as Annexes to this report:/4/ /4/None of the annexes is printed. Annex I: The Tripartite Report (Final) of Working Group I on Warsaw Pact Capabilities Annex II: The Tripartite Report (Draft) of Working Group II on NATO Capabilities Annex III: The Tripartite Report (Draft) of Working Group III on Balance of Payments Effects Annex IV: Special National Intelligence Estimate Annex V: Memorandum from Central Intelligence Agency Annex VI: Illustrative Concept for Brigade Rotation. To facilitate early consideration of this report, I am sending copies to the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Defense, with an additional copy to the latter for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I will be available, of course, to discuss the report whenever it suits your convenience. I trust that you are feeling well after your operation. Respectfully, Enclosure/5/ /5/Secret. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions: 1. NATO continues to be indispensable for European security and stability--interests vital to the US. (Section A) 2. The strategy of flexible response, backed by adequate conventional, as well as nuclear capabilities, is essential for balanced defense and effective deterrence under present conditions. (Section B) 3. Existing NATO conventional forces for the Central Region are adequate in size to support a flexible response strategy, though certain imbalances and deficiencies need correction. (Section B) 4. Any material reduction in US forces will probably trigger Allied force cuts. The cumulative effect could reduce substantially NATO conventional capability to support a flexible response strategy and lower the nuclear threshold. While the effect of such cuts on the deterrent cannot be assessed with precision, they could enhance to some degree the risk of Soviet pressures or actions at lower levels, especially in view of the growing Soviet strategic nuclear strength. (Section C) 5. With our existing capacity for deploying forces from CONUS to Europe, the time required to return any forces withdrawn to the US would make them much less effective than forces in place in Europe in terms of the flexible response strategy and the deterrent. The time required to deploy ground forces can be substantially reduced during the next several years by major expenditures for duplicate equipment, facilities, and necessary readiness. With such improvements, reinforcement would still take at least three weeks. (Section C) 6. Politically, any material withdrawal of US forces from Europe, in its present unsettled state, would seriously increase the risks of NATO disintegration and reduction of US influence in Europe. (Section D) 7. The extent to which Germany will be prepared to provide future offsets for US military expenditures in Germany will be uncertain until a new German Government gains a solid footing. The prospects for offsets should be improved by--(a) relating their amount to the net foreign exchange gain to the Federal Republic from the US military expenditures in Germany; (b) expanding the forms of offset to include non-military purchases, as well as neutralizing by financial means; and (c) relating the offset obligations to the state of the US and German balance of payments. (Section E) 8. The US has an interest in the continued maintenance of UK forces in Germany for their effect on the cohesion of NATO and the position of the UK in Europe. (Section F) Recommendations: 1. I recommend, for the political and military reasons outlined, that the US should not withdraw any significant forces from the Central Region in Europe under current conditions. 2. I recommend that the US explore with the Government of the Federal Republic new arrangements to neutralize balance of payments effects of US expenditures in Germany: (a) to the extent of net gains to the German balance of payments; (b) by means of military purchases, other additive purchases, and appropriate financial devices; and (c) subject to the general state of US and FRG balance of payments. 3. I recommend that the US explore with the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany how the UK can be enabled to retain on the Central Front its present level of forces. 4. I recommend that the US continue to encourage its NATO Allies to provide reasonable stocks, equipment, support and reserves for forces in conformity with a flexible response strategy.
219. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/ London, November 22, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Nodis. The source text bears no time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:08 a.m. 4243. For Secretary and McCloy from Under Secretary Rostow. 1. After day's discussions with British Ministers and officials ending in meetings with Callaghan/2/ alone and then with Wilson and Callaghan together in which all points in three messages between President and Prime Minister/3/ were intensively canvassed, Prime Minister authorized me to tell you that he accepts the President's proposal ad referendum to the Cabinet on the understanding (a) that "concert" means we move together but does not give us a veto, and (b) that Britain is now committing itself to a delay of about six months. Beyond that point Wilson insists that Britain would not settle for anything less than full coverage of its exchange costs in Germany. Wilson expressed hope US procurement would not be for petroleum--with its high import content--and Callaghan urged us if possible to put orders that would create employment in Britain. /2/James Callaghan, British Minister of Finance and member of the Privy Council. /3/The three messages are Document 216 and an exchange of messages on November 18 and 19. In his November 18 message, Wilson thanked the President for his offer of $35 million and suggested that since Rostow was visiting London the next week, he might be used to iron out the details. (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) In his November 19 letter, President Johnson agreed to having Rostow discuss the problem, but reminded the Prime Minister that any arrangement would have to be approved by Congress. (Ibid.) 2. I made clear US cannot promise that trilateral talks will come out with recommendation for troop and stock withdrawals. I expressed hope we could wind up the trilaterals within six months, but said that difficulties inherent in the talks made a strict timetable impossible. I warned Wilson it might be damaging or impossible to insist on 100 percent coverage. 3. Wilson said he could go ahead on this basis and would reply to President after Cabinet decision. We agreed this arrangement should be kept secret for present. US and UK should work out time and mode of announcement, which could well be made at NATO Ministerial Meeting next month. 4. Callaghan particularly helpful in final discussions. 5. Report on meeting with PM and Callaghan follows in separate cable./4/ /4/The detailed report was transmitted in telegram 4272 from London, November 22. (Ibid., Central Files, FN 12 GER W) Bruce [Next documents]
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