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300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/1/ Washington, April 17, 1968, 2114Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 EUR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Baker and Robert Kranich (ACDA); cleared by G/PM, OSD, and JCS; and approved by Getz. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 148389. NATUS. Deliver Mr. Cargo by 9 AM., Thursday, April 18. Subject: Belgian Freeze Proposal. Refs: USNATO 2255; State 141484./2/ /2/Dated March 21 and April 4, respectively, these telegrams discussed various aspects of a Belgian proposal for an arms freeze in Europe. (Ibid. and ibid., DEF 6 NATO) 1. On basis preliminary consideration Dept has following general observations on Belgian freeze suggestion as regards relationship of freeze to Mutual Force Reductions Study, ceiling, floor, and verification aspects, and probable limits of progress that seem feasible by NATO Ministerial at Reykjavik in June. 2. Relationship Freeze Proposal to Mutual Force Reductions: We have reservations about Belgian proposal being very useful except as first step, largely conceptual, in developing models of and proposals for consideration in course of NATO MFR Study. FYI. In political climate of increasing detente when pressure in Europe is to reduce military forces, it seems unreal to focus much attention on establishing force ceilings. Fact that Belgians hope to realize domestic political objectives and have gone out on limb with Poles regarding topic does not alter this. End FYI. Prospects of converting "ceiling" to credible "floor" for NATO forces should also be related to development of models for consideration during study. Obviously, NATO can best induce reciprocity from East in direct proportion to extent it can convince East that it will not engage in unilateral reductions, and this proposition relates to consideration freeze as well as whole philosophy behind MFR. We therefore believe that Belgian proposal should not, standing alone, be considered as very promising proposal to limit forces when there is little real prospect of overall quantitative increase. Similarly, proposal should not be exploited for sole purpose of attempting establish floor for NATO forces as condition precedent to examination possibilities MFR. Main purpose of study is to evaluate political, military and economic implications of, and possibilities for, mutual reductions. Attention should not be diverted to consideration "floors" or "ceilings" to extent of preempting this main purpose. 3. Freeze as a Ceiling: We believe in any mutual force reductions proposal to East that may emerge from study, including features or concepts of Belgian proposal, ceiling on force levels should be quantitative (i.e., limited to number of men in active forces) rather than qualitative (i.e., relating to deployments, delivery vehicles, or nuclear or conventional weapons). We see no practical present possibility of qualitative stage such as Belgians appear to envisage as possible second step. Freeze ceiling should, in our view, include troops redeployed by US and UK and still committed to NATO. Any agreed ceiling should also in our view be over-all figure for NATO rather than separate national figures in order that better burden-sharing may be arranged, e.g., by increasing one country's force contribution to compensate for another's decrease. Similarly, ceiling should apply to whole NATO area and should not inhibit movements within that area, e.g., central front to flanks, as situations of tension may require. Nor should ceilings be stated in such terms as to inhibit reserve programs and mobilization capabilities either alone or in conjunction with reduction of active forces. We would wish to see any language proposed. Ceiling could at least in theory be based on any of three levels: (1) Force goal proposal level at any given time, (2) Force plan level for 1968-72 or 1969-73 or, (3) De facto level at time of offer or at time of acceptance of reciprocity by East. However attractive from force planning standpoint, do not consider offer of ceiling based on goals in excess of actual levels at time of its acceptance would be credible and provide NATO favorable image as seeking detente. Moreover, such an offer would prejudice chance of getting countries primarily interested in disarmament to accept a reasonable floor or base line from which to project possible reductions. On other hand, any freeze or reduction offer should not be so framed as to place limits on current efforts improve force posture prior to effective date of East-West agreement or mutual example arrangement. Thus priority task in NATO would continue to be to build adequate forces in being in time to be reflected in 1969-73 force plan to be acted on by Ministers in December 1969. Possibility continued NATO improvement in force level could in this way be reconciled with disarmament aspect of offer. 4. Freeze as Floor or Base Line: Unlike ceiling aspect of freeze, extent to which it would involve any agreed floor for NATO forces in event Warsaw Pact countries not responsive to MFR proposals is internal NATO matter which should not be subject negotiation or agreement by East. US attitude regarding base line should be consistent with statement by President following call by NATO Secretary General Brosio, February 19, namely "They considered the maintenance of NATO's strength, including the US commitment, as necessary to continuing stability and security in the North Atlantic area. This stability and security provides the basis for exploring with the USSR the possibility of mutual force reductions." While idea of clearly defined and firmly agreed NATO floor under forces would contribute substantially to strength and stability, we believe prospects for obtaining agreement this sort not better than in past in light of such factors as BALPA, competing needs for US troops in various parts of the world, Congressional and public sentiments on burden-sharing and existing US force levels in Europe, and pressures for budget cuts in several NATO governments. Although such floor may not be possible, one year commitment aspect of annual NATO force plans might, during period of any MFR offers to the other side, be reinforced at a minimum by official recognition by NATO bodies that strong and stable NATO is political imperative for successful negotiation. Corollary might be understood to be that no arbitrary or destabilizing changes in general commitments of forces would be appropriate. 5. Verification of Freeze: In view well known political difficulties of any attempt gain what Soviets call inspection without disarmament, believe one of questions which should be addressed in forthcoming MFR Study should be possibility of use unilateral means for verification for any freeze proposal as entity in itself or as first step in reduction proposal. Risks and possibilities should be objectively assessed in course study with US Del not endorsing Belgian idea verification unless conclusion of MFR Study clearly warrants. 6. Prospects: Despite apparently growing pressures for accelerated conclusions, we remain of view that Ministerial Meeting in December earliest practicable time for reaching conclusions on freeze and MFR. Even then, we cannot prejudge results of study to say whether finding would be that any specific proposal should be made at that time. It may well be possible at Reykjavik, however, to allude in some public way to Belgian proposal for freeze as one of models to be considered if this will be of assistance to Harmel. Rusk
301. Telegram From the Embassy in the Netherlands to the Department of State/1/ The Hague, April 19, 1968, 1800Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Immediate. Also sent to the Secretary of Defense and to the Mission to NATO and repeated to the other NATO capitals, Geneva, and USUN. 4939. From US Delegation to NPG. Subj: NPG highlights. 1. Meeting of NATO Nuclear Planning Group April 18 accomplished main US objectives. 2. Secretary Clifford's presence, obvious interest, active substantive participation, and bilateral conversations, all emphasized that US retains liveliest intention to share responsibility for nuclear planning with interested NATO allies. 3. Full consensus reached that "in light of current and foreseeable technological circumstances, the deployment of ABMS in NATO Europe is not at present warranted": but question kept under review in case "underlying factors" should change. 4. Greek ADM proposals were sidetracked in favor of a study of "time factors relevant to the employment of ADMs". This is agreed to be key area that needs to be sorted out before detailed military plans could be drafted for use of ADMs in Greece or anywhere else. Germans continue to be skeptical of ADMs for FRG. Greeks would still like ADMs but tacitly accepted stalling tactic. 5. The development of political "guidelines" for tactical use of nuclear weapons was the main focus at the one-day meeting. It is now clear all around that NPG will not try to write a one-time full-bloom "concept" for tactical nuclear weapons as a class: rather, Ministers will gradually develop what Healey called a "corpus of doctrine" by induction from the ongoing studies of specific systems and scenarios. For this purpose, NPG Ministers agreed to concentrate for the time being on the kinds of uses most likely to be considered as politically feasible by NATO governments: (A) demonstrative use, (B) clearly defensive systems (ADMs and air defense), (C) use at sea, and (D) selective use against battlefield targets in a limited conflict. These fields divided thus among the four permanent members for discussion leadership--(A) US, (B) Italy, (C) UK, (D) FRG. 6. The long-smoldering complaints about national govt participation in military nuclear planning are now effectively answered by NPG Ministerial endorsement of the Military Committee paper on the subject. 7. That other ancient issue, how host countries get enough influence on the use of nuclear weapons from or on their own territory, was nearly (but not quite) laid to rest by US endorsement of the second German paper on the subject. Ministers agreed to a general principle, sought by the Germans, that in nuclear consultation "special weight should be given to the views of the NATO countries most directly affected." 8. SecDef used occasion to state and advertise US view that NPT would not interfere with NPG. This was well received by continental Europeans. British agreed with this sentiment, and endorsed it in confidential minute, but resisted saying so out loud. 9. Texts of communique and agreed minute in septels. Fuller report of meeting will follow./2/ /2/The text of the agreed minute was transmitted in telegram 4923 from The Hague, April 19. (Ibid.) The text of the final communique was transmitted in telegram 4916 from The Hague, April 19. (Ibid.) The fuller report was transmitted in telegram 4931 from The Hague, April 19. (Ibid.) Tyler
302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland/1/ Washington, April 23, 1968, 1655Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Confidential. Drafted by Fina, cleared by Wells Stabler (AIS), and approved by Leddy. Repeated to 13 European posts. 151414. Subject: European Unification and the Neutrals. 1. Swiss Trade Negotiator Weitnauer called on Leddy, April 22, and posed series of questions centering on neutral relations with EC. Essentials of exchange follow. 2. What would be U.S. position if faced with purely commercial arrangement not clearly leading to membership between EC and UK? 3. Leddy judged this unlikely eventuality since UK probably not settle for less than full membership in view of its determination gain political role in Europe. This especially important to UK as East of Suez position being drastically reduced. US does favor full UK membership and not a preferential commercial agreement. 4. Decade ago US had two motives for favoring European unity--political and economic. Today, economic goal less important because of European economic restoration. Political goal remains and is even more important. We see no chance Europe play decisive and constructive world role unless united. And given present US balance payments situation, only major political component could counterbalance US opposition to expanded area of European commercial discrimination. 5. In this political Europe, is there a place for a truly neutral country like Switzerland or Sweden? 6. Leddy replied that he did not believe Switzerland or Sweden needed to be members or associates of the EC for economic reasons. Each could solve its problems on an MFN basis. If a neutral became a member of the Communities, progress to political unity would be halted. We cannot see how the existing European political situation could be improved by a commercial arrangement involving the UK or the neutrals. It seems to us best to wait with some patience to allow the longer term forces pushing Europe toward unity to have their effect. 7. Weitnauer, during course of his inquiries, made clear his belief that UK should accept EC commercial arrangement and strongly hinted Switzerland and perhaps other small EFTA states would urge this on UK at May 8/9 EFTA Council. He said that desired UK membership could be advanced simply by involving EC and UK in commercial negotiations. Rusk
303. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 30, 1968, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 EUR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Smith and approved in S on May 6. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS US Canada Mr. Sharp mentioned that the June NATO Ministerial Meeting at Reykjavik will coincide with the Canadian elections, and he feared that he would be unable to attend since his absence from the country at the time would be regarded in Canada, he thought, as "supreme arrogance." The Secretary turned the discussion to the possibilities of mutual force reductions in Europe. If both sides could come to see the desirability of reduction of military forces in Central Europe, a premise would exist for progress along these lines. If there is a chance of this kind, then it would help us in holding the line against pressures here to withdraw US forces from Europe. If there could be real signs of hope at the Reykjavik meeting, then the new President might not find himself confronted with over-whelming pressure on the issue. The Secretary went on to comment that with 650,000 men deployed in Vietnam, with the 7th Fleet, and in near-by areas, it was a near miracle that we had been able to resist pressures for substantial withdrawal from Europe. He therefore hoped that as the Canadian Government reviewed its own situation it would bear in mind that Canadian actions might well have a "multiplier effect" in the US. Even a move toward reduction by Luxembourg complicated our problem. The Secretary volunteered that he was not too hopeful that the Soviet Union could go very far toward mutual force reduction under present circumstances. He thought the Russians were very much concerned about what could happen in Eastern Europe. The Soviets also would have a political problem in taking steps which would appear to release US forces for action in Vietnam. Mr. Sharp inquired as to how deep the Russian concern is about Eastern Europe, and the Secretary responded that he thought their concern was very real, for example, with respect to Czechoslovakia. He suspected they were also under some pressure from Ulbricht.
304. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 1, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR W-US. Confidential. Drafted by Malin and approved in M on May 9. The source text is labeled "Part II of IV." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Member of German Bundestag Under Secretary Rostow Mr. Birrenbach said that his impression on coming here this time was that the United States was beset with a major land war in Asia, an internal racial crisis of mounting proportions, and a financial crisis. All this would lead to an agonizing reappraisal of United States foreign policy, and he expected the United States to conclude that it must limit its commitments in the world. If so, he hoped that the United States would give Europe first consideration in its scale of priorities. Mr. Rostow acknowledged the essential correctness of Birrenbach's appraisal, but said he was confident of the outcome, given the texture of our society. He ascribed the current mood to a popular unwillingness to abandon 19th Century attitudes, even though these could not be reconciled with the problems of security with which the United States had been confronted after 1945. He expressed confidence that, regardless of who was elected this year, the new administration would reaffirm the world position of the United States, despite the problems it faced. He stressed, however, that other nations must join us in fulfilling this task. Birrenbach said Germans understood this, but that to join the United States means to exercise independent leadership as well, and that this latter concept was what Kiesinger had in mind in opposing "an Atlantic imperium". Mr. Rostow also pointed out that it was of fundamental importance that there be no reduction in FRG troop levels. Birrenbach said that SPD, with detente foremost in its mind, saw this issue differently. Birrenbach said Europeans should show understanding for the enormous problems which the United States was struggling. For example, the FRG should avoid steps which clearly seemed to identify Germany with French policy. He said Kiesinger had asked him to tell the United States that there was no such identification. He mentioned the Chancellor's efforts to persuade de Gaulle to accept a preferential arrangement between the UK and EEC and the subsequent repudiation by other French officials of what Kiesinger thought had been de Gaulle's acquiescence. Mr. Rostow assured him that the FRG had no reason to be worried that the United States might misunderstand German moves. There was no anxiety here about the Franco-German relationship. In fact, we regarded this relationship as the foundation for the Europe of the future. Mr. Rostow asked why some Germans still doubted whether the United States endorsed German Eastern policy. He said the United States had no reservations over the German initiatives. Birrenbach attributed the beginning of such reports to former Chancellor Erhard. He said he personally had never heard Americans express such feelings. At the same time, the United States should be cautious on Berlin. He thought the German Government was giving too high priority to its Eastern policy. He feared it would raise unrealistic popular expectations for an early resolution of the German question. On Berlin, Mr. Rostow emphasized that the United States view on holding Bundestag Committee meetings in the city was that one should keep on holding those activities in Berlin that had been held there in the past.
305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/1/ Washington, May 9, 1968, 2018Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Irving G. Cheslaw (EUR/BMI), cleared by McAuliffe and EUR/BMI, and approved by Springsteen. Repeated to Bonn and London. 161093. NATUS. Subj: European Defense Cooperation. Ref: USNATO 2966./2/ /2/Telegram 2966, May 8, reported that Healey wanted to discuss some kind of European caucus within NATO on at least some defense matters. (Ibid.) 1. Following, based on uncleared memcon, is for your information, Noforn, and subject to revision upon review: 2. In course of call on Secretary May 7, British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean referred briefly to Healey's desire discuss European defense cooperation with Clifford and also to Embassy discussions with Department officials along lines reftel. 3. Secretary indicated to Ambassador that he supported greater cooperation among Europeans in this field and emphasized that related discussions should consider across-the-board arrangements rather than only particular issues such as offset, arms sales, etc. Rusk
306. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 10, 1968, noon. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by Johnpoll and approved in S on May 13. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Dr. Rolf Lahr, State Secretary, FRG Foreign Office The Secretary Lahr said that European cooperation and the EEC are not in good shape at the moment. The Germans had expected the British drive for immediate entry to cause serious problems, and as it has turned out, it had an even deeper and more divisive impact than had been expected. The Germans are trying hard to find expedients to bridge over the current difficult period while preparing the way for future British entry. The British themselves had caused some problems to the Germans in these efforts, especially George Brown. Stewart is more flexible, and, of course, there are great difficulties with Paris--it is becoming clear that de Gaulle dislikes anything resembling a rapprochement between the EEC and the United Kingdom. The Secretary asked Lahr what posture he thought we should adopt. We have felt that we should remain quiet and reserved, so as not to provoke de Gaulle into an even more rigid attitude. Lahr thought that the United States posture was about right. He thought we should avoid a show of activism, and that we should understand and sympathize with efforts to reach intermediate solutions. He thought we could show sympathy for the overall objective--an integrated Europe. The Secretary said that one tragedy is the fact that de Gaulle has failed to achieve his own goal, leadership of a Europe strong enough to enter into an equal trans-Atlantic partnership. De Gaulle has exercised his veto so often that no one asks any longer, "What does de Gaulle think?" Lahr said the Germans would gladly let de Gaulle step up front since the Germans have no national ambitions for European leadership. But his policies are mutually contradictory--he proclaims his desire for an independent Europe as an equal partner to the super-powers, but he has barred the development of such a Europe. De Gaulle has his own European theory--a small continental Europe led by France; but the other continental countries simply wouldn't accept it. He is isolated but doesn't realize this. The Germans don't think that de Gaulle can remain blind to the facts forever, and Chancellor Kiesinger is trying to open his eyes to the truth. The Secretary said it is tragic that France is absent from so much important international activity that is going on, and to which the French would have much to contribute: NATO, Geneva NPT talks, the United Nations where the French do not play a serious role, international monetary negotiations where they are a minority of one. We would like to see them take a useful part and see their talents utilized. Lahr wondered whether the fact that Paris had been chosen as the site for the Viet-Nam talks would have useful effects on United States-French relations. The Secretary replied that it might work the other way. We prefer Paris over Warsaw because all our allies have missions there. If de Gaulle interferes in the talks in a way detrimental to our position it would damage our bilateral relations. But that remains to be seen. Lahr thought that the French would not interfere gratuitously, but would wait to be asked. It is true, of course, that de Gaulle will be waiting eagerly to be asked. The Secretary said that de Gaulle does have a sense of propriety. Later, when we really get into the talks we'll see what the French do. The French press is hostile to us.
307. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Foreign Minister Harmel/1/ Washington, May 25, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. No classification marking. Dear Mr. Minister: Thank you for your thoughtful and interesting letter of May 15./2/ You are of course quite right that we are intensely interested in carrying out the mandate of the NATO Council's Resolution approving the Special Group's Report on the future tasks of the Alliance. Political developments during the last few months make progress in this direction more urgent than ever before. It is our hope that the June meeting will make constructive progress at least on arms control and disarmament proposals, and on the question of Mediterranean security. /2/A copy of this letter is ibid., DEF 4 NATO, attached to a letter of transmittal from Ambassador Ridgway Knight to Rostow, also dated May 15. We share your deep interest in the arms control question. Your letter came just at the moment that we ourselves were submitting to Belgium and other Alliance members our thoughts on the manner of dealing with the mutual force reductions question at the forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting./3/ Ambassadors Scheyven and De Staercke will probably have informed you by now of a draft resolution which we are suggesting for consideration in NATO. /3/The resolution was transmitted to the NATO capitals in telegram 167504, May 21. (Ibid., DEF 6 NATO) The draft was subsequently discussed at a North Atlantic Council Permanent Representatives luncheon on May 22 where reaction to the U.S. initiative was "unanimously" favorable, but reaction to the language of the draft was unfavorable, it being too formal and too much like a U.N. resolution. (Telegram 3173 from Brussels, May 23; ibid.) Further discussion produced a shorter resolution in line with the draft proposed by the United States, which was attached to the final communique of the June 24-25 North Atlantic Council meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1968, p. 75. We believe our suggestions would go far toward meeting the purposes you have in mind, although in a different form from that proposed by your government following the discussions between Belgium and Poland. With regard to the latter, we wonder if the specific Belgian suggestions might not best be examined as part of the detailed studies on regional arms control problems now being made in NATO. I understand that though progress is being made in these studies, they will not be completed in time for the Reykjavik meeting. In part for this reason we decided to put forward our suggestions for a general resolution which ministers might adopt at Reykjavik. We fully agree with your thought that our objective at Reykjavik should be to promote a meaningful dialogue with the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe, and not to score a polemical point in the field of propaganda. Our consultations should help to clarify and orient all separate talks with colleagues from Eastern Europe. I have discussed your letter with Secretary Rusk who shares your view of the importance of frank discussions among ministers in a relatively informal setting during the meetings of the North Atlantic Council. We believe that specific arrangements to facilitate the work of the ministers at Reykjavik can best be worked out through our Permanent Representatives, and I have therefore asked Ambassador Cleveland to keep in particular close touch with Ambassador De Staercke to pursue your suggestion. It is as always a pleasure to hear from you. I'm sorry we have not had a chance to meet for several months. Sincerely yours,
308. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 5, 1968, 3:50 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 7. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Katz and approved in S on June 15. The time of the conversation is from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Raymond Barre, Vice President of the Commission of the
European Communities The Secretary The Secretary welcomed Barre, saying we were always interested to know what was happening in the Commission and the Six. Mr. Barre replied he was happy to be here and have an opportunity to exchange views with State, Treasury and the Federal Reserve. Such a dialogue was necessary to achieve better mutual understanding. This was essential as we shared the burden of the world economy together. July 1 Tariff Cuts The Secretary, referring to press speculation, asked whether it was Mr. Barre's impression there would be no change regarding the tariff cuts scheduled for July 1. Mr. Barre replied he was certain there would be no change. Agriculture Minister Edgar Faure, at the recent EC Council of Ministers following agreement on the dairy CAP, announced there would be no objection to fulfilling the commitments including the external commitments. Despite the fact that the cost of settling the strike will be high, we have enough reserves, said Mr. Barre, to enable us not to modify our commercial and monetary policy. As a Frenchman, he said, I am hopeful this policy would be maintained. The Secretary said he had been nervous that the social costs of the events might lead to a modification of the July 1 commitments. Mr. Barre replied that in France there are protectionist forces, which as July 1 approached, began questioning the ability of France to face competition in order to change the economic structure. Perhaps if there are major political changes, the policy of liberalization may be changed. But if no such changes take place he was confident in France's adhering to its commitments. European Reaction to U.S. Tax Bill The Secretary asked if it was Mr. Barre's expectation that passage of our tax bill would be welcomed in Europe. Mr. Barre replied that he had said at the combined meeting earlier that day that, if the bill were passed, the international financial community, especially in Europe, would be confident that a crisis could be avoided. He said the impression in Europe would be that the U.S. has finally gained control of its balance of payments. This was very important for the international monetary system. UK Entry into the EC The Secretary asked whether Mr. Barre saw any possibility that the recent events, which, he emphasized, we did not enjoy, might make any change in the prospects of UK entry. Mr. Barre replied that he was not sure this was the case. In France and in other parts of Europe there was a conflict between emotions and reason when it came to UK entry. We are all confident, said Mr. Barre, that the UK will one day be admitted to the EC. But all feel, he said, that the UK cannot now assume the obligations of the Treaty. The situation is different from 1958 when the Six were entering a period of constructing the Community. Today the Common Market is built and it is difficult to conceive a situation in which one member would have a massive exceptional situation. Mr. Barre said he had agreed with the Commission on the need for consultations and negotiations with the UK. But the French government said one could not begin negotiating without knowing the end of the negotiation. Personally, he, Barre, regretted that the British were too quick to apply. If the UK had taken measures to restore equilibrium and confidence before applying, there would have been a more favorable answer. Elections in the West The Secretary pointed out that a number of NATO governments were in transition. The U.S., France, Italy, Belgium were all in the process of changing governments. He asked if Mr. Barre foresaw any difficulties for the Common Market because Italy and Belgium were without governments. Mr. Barre replied the Common Market was accustomed to having one or two countries without governments. He pointed out the recent agricultural decisions had been taken without a Belgian government. He thought it was possible to take some routine decisions this year. The big decisions pertaining to the second stage in the development of the Community--the creation of the economic union would be taken next year. But, he remarked, next year there will be German elections. The Secretary remarked that Khrushchev once said "someone in the West is always having those damned elections." Key Political Questions Facing U.S. The Secretary, after remarking that economic and technical issues would be discussed thoroughly in Mr. Barre's other conversations, asked what key political questions Mr. Barre's colleagues would be likely to ask on his return to Europe. He offered to try to answer any such questions Mr. Barre might have. But he could not answer the question who will be the next President. Mr. Barre remarked that he would not interfere in internal political questions. He said that on the political side there were two questions or rather hopes in Europe. One hope is that it will be possible for the U.S. to arrive at a satisfactory settlement on Vietnam. The second hope was that social and racial equilibrium would be maintained in the United States in the next months. He said that the friends of the U.S. in Europe believe that international equilibrium is linked to these two matters. U.S. Social and Racial Problems The Secretary replied on the second point that no clear solution was probable in a matter of months. These were not problems of stagnation but problems of movement. Progress in this field stimulates action and sometimes violence. However, while much progress has been achieved, the most difficult parts of the problem were not resolved. Those aspects depending on attitudes and personal feelings rather than on laws and personal feelings were most difficult and will take more time. But, he emphasized, these are problems of movement and, not of stagnation. Vietnam As for the first point, the Secretary said, much will depend on how the conflict in Vietnam will be settled. Many Europeans ask the wrong question, he said. They ask whether they should support the U.S. in Vietnam. It is easy to say that the U.S. is big and stupid, but no matter what happens U.S. power will insulate Europe from South East Asia. The Europeans should be asking two other questions instead. First, what sort of Asia is in the interest of Europe, i.e., in terms of hard national self-interest? Second, what is the interest of Europe in the fidelity of the United States to its security commitments? On the latter question, the Secretary said there is no theory of the master race in this country which says NATO--yes, Asia--no. Europe has a big stake in the answer to the second question. To settle Vietnam in terms which would signify abandonment would be tragic for Europe. Europe has a big stake in not seeing America revert to isolationism. Mr. Barre replied that as a Frenchman he understood our difficult problem very well. He had experienced this sort of problem in Indochina, in Tunisia, and Algeria. He understood that the U.S. cannot accept a settlement at any price. He expressed the hope that the U.S. would reach a settlement enabling us to maintain our cooperation with the rest of the world and not revert to isolationism. As he had told Ambassador Schaetzel, it would be a great danger if the U.S. should lose interest in the rest of the world. The Secretary said we must be interested in peace both in the Atlantic and Pacific areas. During World War II we first defeated Hitler, then we defeated Japan. The second task was accomplished without much assistance from Europe or resources from the European theater, which was an indication of how high a second priority this task was given in the U.S. We have alliances with many countries. We are concerned what Peking and the government of North Korea as well as the government of North Vietnam will feel about our reaction. As for the chances of a settlement, the Secretary continued, this remains to be seen. Unhappily, in the Paris talks everything is on the public record. We have tried to engage the North Vietnamese in private conversation, but they have so far refused. Nevertheless, we hope such talks could be started soon. Mr. Barre remarked it was always a lengthy tedious process to negotiate with the Communists. The Secretary pointed out it took one and one-half years to talk the fever out of the Berlin crisis. The Cuban missile crisis was an exception because by the nature of the crisis it had to be resolved quickly. Mr. Barre remarked it was a matter of considerable importance that the conversations had begun. The Secretary said that there now appears to be a broader understanding of the situation. About 78% of the territory and 90% of the population of North Vietnam are now free from bombing. Not one kilometer in South Vietnam is free from bombing and Hanoi will not tell us what will happen if we stop the bombing completely. They must tell us this and no one else is in a position to tell us. We hope they will someday, but they have not done so yet. Mr. Barre said there was considerable hope in Europe that the U.S. could solve this problem. Europe has had the problem of decolonization. It is not the same problem, but the two problems are confused in people's minds. That is why many in France favor a quick and drastic solution to the Vietnam problem. When he was in the French government during the Algerian war, there were plenty of people willing to give advice on how to obtain peace but when one actually looks for peace it is not so easy to attain it. The Secretary said he frequently points out to his European friends that if forty Communist regiments were operating in Bavaria, Denmark, and Turkey, there would have to be some bombing. Europeans readily understand this but cannot understand bombing in Southeast Asia. For us, he said, the problem is the same. Couve's Economic Policy The Secretary asked Mr. Barre what significance the switch of Couve and Debre had for financial, economic and monetary policy. Mr. Barre replied that the change took place just prior to his departure so he had no first hand knowledge. He said he thought the change was made because Debre had not been happy with the high cost of the social settlement. Furthermore, he had not been in good health. It was necessary especially now to have a finance minister with a cool mind. Mr. Barre and the Secretary agreed that this was a quality of M. Couve de Murville. Mr. Barre thought there would be no change in economic policy nor for that matter in foreign policy. Couve had always been interested in financial and economic policies, and in the reshuffle it appeared he was the right man for solving both internal and international economic problems. He will be calm, efficient and devoted to international cooperation. Speaking for himself, Mr. Barre said it was a source of great confidence to him to see Couve in that post because of his fundamental orientation toward liberalization of trade and payments and the maintenance of competition. Contagion of French Events The Secretary asked to what extent the French events could be regarded as being provoked by a virus which was contagious in Europe. Perhaps this was true of the students elsewhere in Europe, but what about other parts of the society? Mr. Barre replied that in France it was necessary to distinguish between a small minority of anarchist students and the vast majority seeking reform within a system of order. If we consider the social situation, the unions were favorable to a cautious economic rather than political settlement, but the workers were not. Union leaders now are cautious about the instructions they give the workers as they fear they may not be followed. However, in other countries, Mr. Barre said, there is little danger of contagion. One possible exception is Italy where a balance of political forces has not been reestablished. Mr. Barre hoped that by fall the Socialist party could come back to power. In Italy, the repercussions will be social and political rather than in the area of labor relations. Mr. Barre thought it was possible, barring a major political change which he did not foresee, and assuming the economy got back to work, that in France the social and economic consequences of this extraordinary crisis of anarchy and revolutionary romanticism could be minimized. It will, however, be necessary to make some changes in the French political scene. Frenchmen are not accustomed to a lengthy stability of government. France is witnessing many important and fundamental economic changes. Young people feel divorced from the establishment. The population is irritated with the stable and self-confident government with which they have no dialogue, Mr. Barre said. The Secretary pointed out that we are in an important transitional period with respect to our population. Half of our population cannot remember World War II or the events leading up to it. When he lectures in universities, the Secretary said, he realized that one half the students were in the fifth and sixth grades when he became Secretary of State. In Eastern Europe the young people have no interest in the ideology. Thus, when there are legitimate grievances these can spread. In this country, most professors make clear they regard their students as a nuisance and would rather be at an all-faculty institution such as All-Souls. In Europe in the universities, the traditional system under which the senior professors dominate the departments leaves no place for bright young men. These real problems spread into other areas and provide the foundation for frivolity. Youth and the Common Market The Secretary felt that young people should be more involved in NATO and other major international efforts. He asked, does the Common Market succeed in engaging the interest of persons 25 and 30 years of age in the problems of European construction? Mr. Barre replied that this question had been discussed in the Commission. He had pointed out that when he discussed Common Market problems in the universities, the older men discussed them in terms of self-interest. The younger people, while not having an ideology, do have a will to build a new society. In the transitional period in which we live, Mr. Barre continued, all values are being questioned. No system of spiritual, political and social values is immune. It is, therefore, essential for younger people to find new reasons for life. It was possible that, with new themes like European construction and aid to the developing countries, which appeal to the spirit of generosity of youth, one can orient them towards new achievements. British Youth and the EC The Secretary recalled that earlier in the conversation Mr. Barre had said the UK had acted too soon on its application. Some of his British friends were concerned that the younger generation, disillusioned by Britain as a world power, by Victorian Britain, and by the Britain of Churchill, were becoming disoriented. George Brown thought that by taking Britain into Europe, the government would give British youth a renewed elan and sense of purpose. He was worried that if the British youth would become disillusioned with the prospects for Europe they would not have anything. Therefore, the application was made sooner rather than later. There was a good deal of fear that otherwise the considerable support for British membership would erode. Mr. Barre replied that he had spoken with Brown and had advised him to build up support for entry into Europe more progressively. It appeared to many Europeans despite the considerable propaganda in the UK on Common Market entry, that no true conversion had been achieved. In Europe, he said, it was asked whether the British were really ready to become part of Europe. If there could be better preparation, British chances would be better. The Secretary remarked that in British tradition, the knight always slays the dragon. And this time Sir George did not succeed. Secretary to Call on Commission in December At this point the interview ended. The Secretary assured Mr. Barre that he and his colleagues would be welcomed here and hoped he would have useful talks. He said he planned to call on the Commission in December when in Brussels for the NATO Ministerial Meeting.
309. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 6, 1968, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 US. Secret. Drafted by Ingram. The conversation was held in the Madison Room at the Department of State. The source text is labeled "Part II of IV." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Foreign Minister of Denmark, Poul Hartling The Secretary Country Director George Mason Ingram The Secretary pointed out that Europe is living with the "miracle" of substantial US troop deployments there at the same time that the United States is compelled to maintain large forces in Viet Nam. There is great pressure in the Senate for a reduction in the size of US forces in Europe. Many issues, such as our balance of payments and budget problems, which might to the Europeans appear unrelated, are directly linked to the question of the U.S. military presence in Europe. In this connection, the Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister for the Danish decision to purchase US Treasury securities, and said this was most helpful in countering the U.S. military balance of payments deficit with Denmark. The Secretary said it would also be helpful if Denmark and Germany would join with the rest of the Fourteen to agree on the basis of NATO claims against France arising from the removal of NATO facilities and personnel from that country. The Secretary said that the exact timing of the approach to France could be decided later. The Foreign Minister said that he would look into the matter of NATO claims against France, and felt he could say that on this matter Denmark would not leave itself in an isolated position. The Secretary noted that the question of mutual force reductions would be before the NATO Ministers in Reykjavik. He doubted that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact colleagues would be particularly interested in holding discussions at this time. Events in Eastern Europe may mean that the Soviet Union will attach even greater importance to the maintenance of forces in East Germany. Also, the USSR would wish to avoid a charge, by Communist China, that it is permitting the US to release troops from Europe for service in Southeast Asia. However, NATO agreement that any troop reductions should be mutual will help the US hold the line against demands for a unilateral force reduction. The Foreign Minister responded with the observation that the US and Denmark are in agreement on the point that any force reductions should be mutual. [Next documents]
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