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320. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, July 25, 1968, 11:45 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meetings Notes File, Folder 7. Confidential. Drafted by Obst. The conversation was held at the White House. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND FINANCE MINISTER STRAUSS OTHER PARTICIPANTS US FRG The President, after an exchange of courtesies, expressed his satisfaction at the good relations between the United States and the Federal Republic and thanked the Minister specifically for the cooperation of the German Government in international monetary matters. Minister Strauss congratulated the President on obtaining a tax increase from Congress. He said that this represented a kind of psychological turning point which had contributed greatly to get many other matters settled in the financial field. He said he knew just how hard it must have been for the President to get this bill passed as he had had to increase taxes himself when he took office eighteen months ago. Mr. Rostow interjected that Minister Strauss had remarked to him during their conversation on the occasion of the Adenauer funeral that he found himself in a very uncomfortable position. Not only did he have to increase taxes but to lower veterans' and welfare benefits at the same time. The President remarked that there may be fields in which the Americans are the equal of the Germans and there may be fields where the Americans were better than the Germans, but the fiscal was certainly not one of them. He had always believed that whenever a situation arose that tended to separate the boys from the men the Germans could be found on the proper side and this had been true of fiscal matters. Minister Strauss said West Germany had been fortunate to have enjoyed 18 years of prosperity after the currency reform. Their first serious recession had come in 1966 and it had been a good thing that the FRG was able to overcome it fairly quickly as both Britain and France had suffered economic setbacks recently which would have led to a much worse crisis if Germany had still been near the bottom of its recession. These incidents pointed out the need for greater cooperation among the European countries. Maybe in four or five years or so the British and French may have to bail out the Federal Republic. The President stated he was hoping and praying for a united Europe. Until this could become a reality, it was essential that the United States and Germany work together closely in every field, and he was sure this would be the case. Minister Strauss replied that the FRG after the war had been provided economic security through the Marshall Plan and military security through the Alliance. Nobody appreciated this more than the Germans. However, Europeans today showed a greater and greater tendency to enjoy life in the shadow of the greater world conflicts, removed from exercising responsibility on world politics. They were content to let the United States do the job. On top of that, many raised their voices in criticism of the actions of the United States. It was extremely important to bring Europe back to a greater sense of responsibility and engagement. The President nodded agreement and said, "the whole world must be brought to exercising greater responsibility." Minister Strauss said he was often described as the "gang leader" of the Gaullists in Germany. He believed that in many ways de Gaulle was pursuing the right goals. He disagreed with de Gaulle, however, on two points: 1. He believed de Gaulle was wrong in flirting with Moscow as, for one thing, the Soviets would never regard him as their match. France was too small. 2. He also believed that de Gaulle's "constant resentful anti-American tune" was lamentable. It was not necessary to be anti-American in order to gain greater independence for Europe as the United States was not opposed to a more independent Europe. The President stated that the United States indeed favored a more independent Europe. He would not do anything that could promote such anti-American sentiments and he had always turned the other cheek when confronted with such statements. When the French found themselves in trouble, he was among the first to hold out a helping hand. Minister Strauss said he believed that this course pursued by the President was an extremely wise one. The President added that in extending a hand to France he had not only been guided by compassion and good statesmanship but that he had tried to act in the interest of the entire world and, also, because he could envision a situation in which France could be much worse off than under de Gaulle. Minister Strauss stated the present measures would not go far to cure the basic ills of France's social structure. France was lagging far behind its partners in industrial relations and the living standard accorded the working class. Minimum wages for construction workers were under $100 a month while prices were 50% higher than in the Federal Republic. With such conditions, nobody should have been surprised by the recent events in France. The President described to the Minister the plans for setting up a public affairs school in Austin, Texas, with the aim of taking outstanding students with BA's who had political interests and giving them the very best possible education in public affairs. He was trying to attract the very best of teachers and public figures to take part in this project. He, himself, having had only a limited education, was acutely aware of the benefits such an institution could render to aspiring political leaders. He would very much want to invite the Minister to come down sometime after the opening of the school next September for a few days of lectures and conversations with the students. Minister Strauss expressed his gratitude for the invitation and said he would be absolutely delighted to accept it. He said, moreover, that he found this to be a fascinating idea which the Germans should also take up as, if anything, they had an even greater need for well-trained and well-informed political talent. The President then described to the Minister the reasons that had influenced him not to run again for election, and pointed out that the major legislation he had been able to get through Congress recently would not have been possible if he had had to give undue weight to the political factors involved in running for office. He thanked Minister Strauss again for the good cooperation on fiscal matters and said he believed that this area was now in reasonably good shape. He hoped he would be able to rely on German cooperation also in the future. Minister Strauss said that he had had fruitful talks with Secretary of the Treasury Fowler and that there were no misunderstandings on financial problems separating the two. He recognized the great importance of the offset issue in keeping American troops in Europe and was ready to start negotiations on the long-term offset solution this fall. The President emphasized the great importance of such a long-term solution. He thanked the Minister for his visit and said he hoped to see him soon in Texas.
321. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State/1/ Brussels, August 26, 1968, 2146Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 NATO. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the other NATO capitals. 4381. Subj: Brosio views on post-Czech reassessments. 1. SYG Brosio and I had a general tour d'horizon today on the implications for NATO of developments in Eastern Europe. We agreed that while any NATO decisions would have to await outcome of current discussions in Moscow, it was probably true that the implications for NATO will be drawn primarily from events to date, i.e., the raw fact of the invasion itself. That is, the Soviets have demonstrated both a willingness to use force for political purposes and a capacity for political misjudgments and mismanagement which contrasts with the military effectiveness of their operation; this creates impression that political constraints on Soviet behavior are less than had sometimes been assumed. 2. On Kiesinger idea for a high-level meeting, we compared impressions that Germans were not taking any follow-up initiative on the subject here. I did raise on a personal basis the question of whether there might be a place in the fall scenario for a DPC meeting at MOD level, i.e., taking advantage of the fact that most key Ministers, including ours, would already be in Bonn for the NPG meeting on 10 October. Having an immediately preceding or following meeting of the DPC in Bonn might be a politically useful step if relevant decisions could be made ready by then. Brosio thought the idea interesting but wished to reflect further. 3. We also noted that the Military Committee was today discussing the notion of a collective no-reduction pledge (the text of MCM 68-68, 26 Aug 1968, is reported and discussed in septel)./2/ SYG Brosio felt this notion (that there should be no weakening of NATO pending a defense review of the new situation) was a good one and especially helpful vis-a-vis the Belgians. Comment: We are not clear enough here as to the state of play of various possible U.S. adjustments in the light of the Czech situation to assess what problems, if any, this would pose for us. But on the available evidence, it appears almost certain that such a "freeze" would be strongly favored by the British-- or, at least, by Healey--and by both the Germans and Italians. The Dutch, Norwegians and all others would also be favorable, so that there would be, in effect, unanimity if the Belgians and the Canadians (and, of course, the U.S.) found it palatable. See septel for our recommendation. End comment. /2/Not further identified. 4. In our discussion of a "defense review", we identified three separate elements: A. The package of problems dealing with warning, surprise, crisis management and consultation--which the Germans and Dutch will certainly want to review; B. The question of force levels and particularly qualitative factors and remediable deficiencies--which might initially be approached by way of a freeze on reductions and then improvements in the 1969-73 force plans which will be up for review in December; C. The continental mobilization--US-UK-Canadian reinforcement package, i.e., the "you mobilize--we'll reinforce" bargain suggested by Secretary Clifford's remarks at the last DPC meeting, Brosio felt that this might be the area in which the German proposal for a restatement of the NATO defense concept could find a productive application this fall. 5. Turning to the political side, our discussion also brought out the need for a parallel reappraisal ("Harmel revisited"). This, in contrast to the fourteen-nation defense review, in the DPC, would be handled in fifteen-nation NAC and POLADs. Brosio's instinctive feeling at this point is quite similar to our own, namely, that while the importance of the "defense" pillar has been heightened, the "detente" pillar remains valid, even though the process will be longer and harder than we had thought. SYG Brosio was concerned that questions might be raised about the status of ongoing work for the longer-term on East-West relations and MFR. He thought while we could anticipate increased resistance to MFR, it was still relevant to continue our homework, even if in somewhat lower key and over longer period. 6. In the next day or two, USNATO will be sending its further analysis of the substance of these defense and political reviews and how they should be related to each other, along with our ideas for a fall scenario. This package will be raw material for my consultations in Washington next week. 7. One substantive comment seems in order now: it is important to distinguish the question of posture and actions in direct response to the Czech situation on which, despite occasional sniping, there has been no responsible suggestion that NATO should have taken other than a "low profile" posture, from a kind of "malaise" which may adversely affect some elements of NATO's new strategic concept. Some Europeans are "discovering" that despite all the talk--especially from the U.S.--in recent years about crisis management, flexibility, mobility, mobilization, political waring, etc., the more likely kind of crisis is one like the present, i.e., internal to Eastern Europe, which makes it politically impossible for NATO to implement those concepts for fear of being provocative. Thus, the concepts themselves have tended to come under attack; and while we think there are some good rebuttals, e.g., on warning time (see USNATO 4364),/3/ the critics may have one valid point. Perhaps the most likely contingency directly threatening NATO would be a follow-on to tension within the bloc, i.e., where the Pact subsequently decided to whip up a crisis with NATO to obscure or bridge over an internal crisis. Here NATO might not be politically in a position to take full advantage of warning time and mobility, giving the Warsaw Pact--as things stand just now--a significant head start in operational readiness. This aspect can doubtless be explored in the defense review, with a possibility that future exercise (such as one involving the U.S. redeployed forces, and some selective mobilization or reserve activation) could be arranged against a scenario of the need for "non-provocative" readiness measures in an assumed high state of tension within the Warsaw Pact. But to avoid the malaise getting too much headway, especially in Germany and the Netherlands, it would seem worthwhile to us to try to work out some such international activity, even of a limited nature, in the near term./4/ /3/Telegram 4364, August 24, summarized the discussion at a North Atlantic Council meeting on August 23 during which the question of the time for a political warning was discussed. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 NATO) /4/After summarizing the discussion at a Council meeting on August 28, Cleveland reported that the Permanent Representatives and Brosio were still in the process of disengaging themselves intellectually from the Czech crisis, and because of this the process of focusing on the nature and scope of an assessment in its wake was just beginning. (Telegram 4427, August 28; ibid.) Cleveland
322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/1/ Washington, August 29, 1968, 2122Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Myerson, cleared by McAuliffe, and approved by Leddy. 229956. For Cleveland from Leddy. Subject: Strengthening NATO in Wake of Czech Crisis. In accordance with our conversation today on secure telephone,/2/ following are substantive portions of EUR's recommendations to the Secretary on steps to strengthen NATO. Please consider this strictly FYI and Noforn, for your personal background only. Septel contains our ideas for scenario which are appended to basic recommendations./3/ /2/No record of this conversation has been found. /3/Telegram 230009 to the Mission to NATO, August 29. (Ibid.) This scenario called for a special Presidential message to all the NATO Heads of Government and the holding of a special NATO Ministerial Meeting the week of September 22 to draft new guidance on force levels and other elements of a military/political work program. Begin text The principal aims of the draft Presidential messages are (a) to summarize briefly the main conclusions the US has drawn from the Czech crisis for Western and NATO interests; and (b) to propose a special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers for the week of September 22, 1968. As a result of the crisis a number of major issues will have to be reexamined intensively by the Allies. The Permanent Council and the NATO military authorities are already discussing some of them. Taking account of initial Allied reactions to the crisis, we believe the following matters might be indicated for Ministerial action at the September meeting: 1. We might aim at an interim freeze on NATO forces and lay the groundwork for establishing a floor under force levels for the longer term. We would, moreover, seek a demonstration of the Europeans' willingness to make increased efforts for their own defense. 2. Defense Ministers might give guidance for improving reserves, equipment and mobilization capabilities. We may wish to announce plans for exercises involving the return to Europe of our redeployed forces. 3. Ministers might give necessary directives on strategic questions. Our aim would be to seek Allied reaffirmation of the validity of the flexible response concept but with agreement to reexamine the doctrine of political warning time. 4. Closely related to the foregoing, Ministers could direct that the current study of NATO-Warsaw Pact capabilities be accelerated and completed in time for Ministerial consideration in December. 5. With regard to the Mediterranean, Ministers might direct the immediate activation of COMARAIRMED, the new command which is to coordinate aerial surveillance of the Soviet fleet. 6. On the political side, we may wish to seek agreement on a special declaration in which the member governments could reemphasize their support for the Alliance and the NATO security system in the wake of the Czech crisis. Such a declaration could also deal with the continuity in longer-term objectives for improving East-West relations. 7. In the declaration, or in the regular communique, we might also wish to make clear that the mutual force reduction proposal remains on the table for the longer term. 8. The most important Alliance political issue we may need to deal with, at least in preliminary fashion, is the Italian suggestion that member governments strengthen the Treaty by formal action to make clear their intent to refrain from exercising the withdrawal right for an additional period of years beyond 1969. While this subject may not be ready for discussion at the Ministerial session, we should give it serious internal consideration in any case. Greater assurance about the Alliance's future would have a favorable impact (a) on overall aspects of US-European relations, and (b) on various specific issues, notably the NPT. We must of course be prepared for difficulties with the French over at least some aspects of the Ministerial Meeting. It may be necessary, for example, to divide the meeting into two sessions with the Fourteen (DPC) first taking up military questions and the Fifteen (NAC) subsequently considering political questions. In our view, the advantages of an early Ministerial Meeting would clearly outweigh any difficulties. The invasion of Czechoslovakia has shocked European opinion to the point of creating a new, positive atmos-phere for NATO and for US leadership in tackling Alliance problems. We should take advantage of this atmosphere while it is so favorable./4/ End text. /4/On August 30, Cleveland cabled his general agreement with EUR's recommendations, but suggested the addition of a Defense Ministers' meeting in Bonn on October 9. (Telegram 4454 from Brussels; ibid.) Rusk
323. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meetings Notes File, Folder 7. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. Attached to a September 4 memorandum from Walt Rostow to President Johnson, which transmitted the order of business for a meeting of the National Security Council on that day. THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND THECZECHOSLOVAKIA CRISIS I. Introduction The Czechoslovak crisis has raised grave issues for the United States and its Western European allies. It has cast into question such matters as the future of detente, the defensive capability of Western Europe, and the future of Communism and the independent states of Eastern Europe. The purpose of this paper is to examine the issues and the current and prospective means for meeting these problems by the United States and its allies. II. detente The August 20-21 occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact provided a cold douche for the future of detente, or the progressive rapprochement of East and West. In the late Sixties, the achievement of detente had become an important objective in the policies of most Western European nations as well as the United States. It had become a key element in the work program of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But its assumed basis was seriously undermined by the Czechoslovak crisis. Most Western nations have reacted with strong expressions of disgust at, and disapproval of, the Warsaw Pact occupation of independent Czechoslovakia. There was almost universal support for the United Nations consideration of this problem and approbation for the resolution supported by the majority in the Security Council. To give further meaning to their disapproval, most Western nations undertook to limit contacts with the Soviets and the occupying powers of the Warsaw Pact, and cancelled plans or proposed visits in the political and cultural fields. As the repression of Czechoslovakia continues, with the possibility of the installation of a de facto occupation regime, the deterioration of East-West contacts may well continue. These relatively limited actions do not necessarily preclude the possibility of return in due course to the pursuit of detente. The present disposition of many European nations is to avoid actions which might impair the eventual resumption of closer relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. The positions of the United Kingdom and the Government of France on this score are particularly apparent. US actions have so far generally paralleled those of its Western European allies. For the time being we are seeking a balanced approach that will satisfy the immediate objective of expressing censure of Soviet action without destroying overnight our longer-range goals. [Here follow 9 paragraphs on actions to be taken in the cultural field.] III. The Defense of Western Europe The movement of Warsaw Pact forces into Czechoslovakia and the continuing occupation of that country has obviously affected the military situation in Europe. The status quo has been changed. There are larger military forces present in Central Europe than at any time since the post-war period. The military occupation of Czechoslovakia puts Soviet forces in a country where they have not been since World War II. There is no assurance as yet that the Warsaw Pact forces will soon return to their deployment where they existed six weeks ago. The changed East-West military situation in Europe is of significance to the security of the United States and its allies. In the light of these developments we are reviewing with our allies what the implications may be for existing arrangements to provide for our common security. The principal forum for this review will be NATO. Since the onset of the Czech crisis, the NATO posture has combined three essential elements: (a) vigilance by the NATO political and military authorities; (b) a low public profile while the spotlight was on the United Nations; and (c) intensified consultations among the Allies regarding implications of the situation for Western security interests. As a result of NATO consultations a number of issues require consideration. These are outlined below. A. Proposals for high-level NATO meetings Following a period of speculation and trial balloons--including Kiesinger's public mention of a Heads of Government meeting--the British on August 30 took the initiative. They have sought our views on two alternative proposals. Both take account of the fact that Defense Ministers of seven NATO countries are already scheduled to meet in Bonn, October 10-11, as the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The first alternative envisages postponing the NPG until the end of October or early November, advancing the date of the usual year-end NATO meeting to the end of October or early November, and holding both sessions in Brussels. The result would be a stock-taking meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers to consider defense and political matters arising from the crisis. Like the normal December meeting, fourteen countries would meet to examine defense issues while the French would join them later to examine political problems. In the course of the three (or four) day session, the seven-nation NPG would meet for a day. The second alternative involves simply broadening the presently scheduled (October) NPG meeting to include all Defense Ministers (except presumably the French). The British favor the first alternative on political, psychological and practical grounds. It would permit a maximum amount of business to be transacted and avoid a "nuclear affairs" meeting as NATO's first major response to the Czech crisis. A key question, in either case, is whether the necessary groundwork can be laid in time to permit Ministers to take substantive decisions. A meeting without concrete results could be disappointing for NATO as an organization and for public opinion. Another possible course would be to hold a special meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers towards the end of September to issue a new program of work for NATO. The usual year-end meeting would be held in December. A September meeting would have the advantage of an early public response by NATO to the crisis. B. General Alliance policy on East-West Relations In connection with any special meeting, Ministers would have to decide whether the Czech crisis--and Soviet and Warsaw Pact policies demonstrated by recent events--call for any changes in Alliance policy objectives as stated in the Harmel Report (on future tasks of the Alliance), the Reykjavik declaration on mutual force reductions, or other public pronouncements (such as on strategic concept) issued by NATO over the past two years. Our aim, and presumably that of all Member Governments (with France a possible exception) would be to seek a strong public reaffirmation of the Alliance--its defense and deterrent role--while maintaining the long-range commitment to improved East-West relations. C. Strengthening NATO by extending the North Atlantic Treaty Italy has suggested--although not yet by formal proposal--that Member Governments consider strengthening the Treaty by formal action to ascertain extended life for NATO. Such action would make clear the Allies intent to refrain from exercising the right of withdrawal for an additional period of years (say, ten) beyond 1969. (Article 13 provides that, after the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, a signatory state can withdraw on one year's notice.) The Allied Governments could act on this problem either by amending the Treaty or issuing individual declarations of intent to refrain from exercising the withdrawal right for, say, ten more years. Greater assurance about the Alliance's future would have favorable impact on (a) overall US-European relations and (b) specific issues, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This subject may arise in preliminary fashion, at least in the corridors, at any special NATO meeting held in the near future. Our current position is that the Alliance will continue and need not be subject to formal action. The Czechoslovak crisis raises issue of need for a more formal commitment. D. NATO force levels and planning NATO is presently considering an urgent Military Committee proposal that member governments defer any further force reductions or redeployments pending NATO review of the overall situation. This proposal gives the United States difficulty because of the current examination of further economies in our defense establishment in Europe. Beyond this immediate question, NATO must now reexamine its entire force posture and dispositions in Europe in light of such factors as what the invasion of Czechoslovakia showed about Soviet and Warsaw Pact operations and capabilities, and the fact that Soviet forces will probably be stationed on Czechoslovakia's western frontier for an indefinite period. Apart from other US objectives that may emerge as a result of study, we will want to seek increased European contributions to their own defense. This could include improvement of reserves, equipment, and mobilization capabilities as well as any changes in standing forces. E. NATO strategy, crisis and alert procedures NATO's present strategic concept based on "flexible response" and "forward defense" is unlikely to be altered fundamentally as a result of the Czech crisis. But certain aspects, notably the doctrine of political warning time, will have to be reexamined. The doctrine envisages that, prior to any overt Warsaw Pact action against NATO, there would be a period of heightened tension and warning permitting the Allies to take necessary reinforcement measures. Closely related to the foregoing, some at least of the Allies will want reexamination of the reinforcement times, strategic mobility for redeploying US forces in Europe, NATO alert and crisis procedures, and the efficiency of the early warning radar system covering the Central Front. F. The Mediterranean While the Czech crisis has focussed attention on the NATO Central Front, concern about Soviet pressures against Romania and Yugoslavia raises anew the problem of Mediterranean security. At the June meeting in Reykjavik NATO Ministers gave various directives aimed at improving command arrangements, stand-by naval force dispositions, and surveillance activities. These were directed primarily at the increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. Recent events may require review and/or speeding up of NATO work on security in the Mediterranean and on NATO's southeastern flank. G. The French attitude On all of the foregoing subjects, the French are in a special position for two reasons. First, they do not participate in most aspects of the integrated military system. Second, since the invasion of Czechoslovak, de Gaulle has reaffirmed his policy of opposition to "blocs". As a corollary, the French have been negative on the idea of special high-level western meetings--NATO, WEU, or European Community. In all probability, the French would, however, be represented at any Ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council. They would expect the Fourteen to meet without them for part of the session to deal with NATO military questions. The best hope for improving French cooperation in Eastern defense would probably be through practical steps--improved liaison with the NATO military or improvement of French forces in Germany. The Germans are probably in the best position to sound out the French on these questions. H. The key role of Germany The Federal Republic of Germany--on the Central Front with the largest land army of the continental allies--has been particularly hard hit by the Czechoslovak crisis. The actions of the Warsaw Pact aggressor states have thrown into question the German policy of seeking better relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. Moreover, the rapidity with which the Soviet Union, with little apparent warning, undertook this action, has shaken German confidence in the warning time principle of the NATO strategic concept. The Soviet actions have also caused a reexamination of the German attitude towards signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While no public decision has been made on this subject the issue is obviously one now being subjected to re-appraisal. The Germans feel that to sign the NPT--with its duration--might well jeopardize their future security. The German press is heavy with charges of "super power complicity" in the Czechoslovak crisis and expressions of uneasy doubts of the ability of the US and other of Germany's allies to stand up to the Warsaw Pact. In addition, there is the problem of Berlin. The actions of the Warsaw Pact aggressor states, following upon the June actions of East Germany against Berlin, raise doubts in German minds about the future of that city which they regard as an important part of Free Germany. The result is a general malaise through Germany. Kiesinger reacted to this feeling in his recent interview when he urged a NATO summit meeting as a means of putting new life in NATO. Germany is key to the security of Europe and to the effective functioning of the NATO Alliance. While the current malaise may be founded on emotionalism rather than fact, it remains true that Germany is uneasy and disturbed. Such an attitude can have a multiplier effect throughout Europe unless steps are taken now to reaffirm the solidity and efficacy of Western defense within NATO. In short, high-level review and reappraisal by NATO nations could well be an important ingredient in calming the German attitude. It could also be an important factor in the continuance of constructive US/German relations. [Here follows Section IV, "Communism and the Future of Independent States of Eastern Europe."]
324. Summary Notes of the 590th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/ Washington, September 4, 1968, 5-7:25 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. The source text bears no drafting information. U.S., Europe and the Czechoslovakian Crisis The President: The purpose of the meeting is to assess the impact of the Czechoslovakian crisis, to discuss how we can use the crisis to strengthen Western European defense and NATO, and to talk about our relations with the Russians and Eastern Europeans. Secretary Rusk will summarize the issues and possible ways of dealing with them. Secretary Clifford will talk about the defense of Western Europe and the new disposition of Soviet troops in Central Europe. Director Helms and Secretary Rusk will give us their views on the German reaction to the crisis. The press has already printed that the State Department was recommending additional reassurances to the Germans even before Secretary Rusk had made any recommendation to the President. Secretary Fowler will speak on the financial problems. If we speak out about a threatening situation and the situation does not develop, we are accused of over-reacting. If we don't speak out and a serious situation does develop, then we are accused of not having done what we should have done. This is what happened following an indirect mention of the Romanian situation in the speech of last Friday./2/ /2/For text of the President's remarks in San Antonio, Texas, August 30, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968, pp. 917-920. More meetings of the NSC should be held in the next few weeks so that all of the members may be fully informed on current foreign problems. All requests of political candidates for briefings are to be granted. Mr. Temple/3/ and Mr. Rostow are to clear Administration responses to requests for positions on foreign problems coming from candidates, advisors, task forces, etc. /3/Larry E. Temple, Special Counsel to the President. [Here follow more than 4 pages on the Czech crisis.] Secretary Rusk: The effect of the Soviet action on the policy of detente has been serious. NATO members must consult with each other and be seen consulting. High level NATO meetings will be necessary. As to the future of NATO, it may be necessary to extend now the life of the treaty beyond 1969. The problem is what can we do to reassure NATO members that the treaty will not disappear in 1969 which does not require Senate approval and does not commit the new President. The President: We must not forget that a large number of Senators not long ago favored a substantial immediate reduction of the level of U.S. forces deployed in Europe. Some wanted to reduce this number to 50,000. Secretary Rusk: The country will now have to debate again the amount of its resources which it is willing to commit to keeping peace in the world. There is some isolationism in the United States. As NATO was warned at its last meeting held in Iceland, fears of the Soviet leaders as they face a changing world create a dangerous attitude in Moscow. [Here follow 5 paragraphs on the Czech crisis.] Ambassador Cleveland: The Czech invasion was considered in Europe as a momentous event. Soviet troop deployments raised basic questions for NATO members. Shivers went through Europe when it became clear that a successful military operation was launched with such sloppy political preparations. Some European NATO members concluded that the Soviet invasion has upset the warning theory on which they had been relying, i.e., that strategic warning would come far enough in advance to allow the NATO countries to prepare for a military response. NATO agreed to lie low during the time the Czech case was before the UN. They now have issued a statement. (Copy attached) They have agreed to assess the implications of the Czech invasion for allied defense policy, particularly force postures. (Tab C)/4/ /4/None of the tabs is printed. In recent years NATO had followed a two-pillar policy. One pillar was the defense of Western Europe and the other was detente, including the concept of a mutual reduction of NATO-Warsaw Pact forces. The detente pillar had made it possible for liberal political groups in Western Europe to support NATO. There is uncertainty about what NATO now does. There is already an approved policy on not getting chummy with aggressors. There are proposals to hold a high-level meeting consisting of foreign ministers plus defense ministers. Some members favor a review of NATO strategy. Another proposal is to find a way, without amending the treaty, to give members assurance that NATO's life will go beyond the treaty date of 1969. Despite the Czech crisis, Europeans still favor talks with the Soviet Union on major world problems. Some Europeans think that US-USSR relations grow out of shared "atomic complicity" and the Yalta Agreement. Secretary Clifford: There are two views as to whether the deployment of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia has increased the threat to NATO. One view holds that the actual threat against European NATO members is actually less than before the Czech crisis, in part because Soviet divisions are farther away and in part because Romanian and Czech troops are no longer available to the Warsaw Pact powers. Therefore the total number of troops available to fight NATO has decreased. The other view is that the threat has increased because Soviet and Pact forces are on a higher readiness level. This readiness level, plus the partial mobilization which was necessary prior to the Czech invasion, along with the possibility that the loyalty of Czech and Romanian troops can be regained, produces a force more powerful than before the crisis. We must use the crisis to prompt NATO states to improve the quality of their troops and to improve their mobilization potential. We should push hard on the Germans to increase their defense budget. On offsets and other balance of payment problems, we should request more from NATO members. We do not know whether there is any possibility of the French rejoining the NATO military effort. NATO members should react by promptly calling a meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Staff to discuss the Warsaw Pact threat to Western Europe. The meeting should be held as early as September 20, even though little comes out of it, because there would be little value in a meeting later. A general communique at the end of the meeting would produce the desired result. We must use this opportunity to find out if our allies are really serious about carrying their fair share of the cost of the defense of Western Europe. Domestically, the crisis has ended the threat of passage by the Senate of the Symington Amendment. Senator Mansfield no longer is urging a major reduction in the level of U.S. forces in Europe. Secretary Rusk: Director Helms should call together an interdepartmental group to write a coordinated estimate of the change in the threat to NATO brought about by the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia. If there is a high-level NATO meeting, the first day should consist only of statements by each NATO member as to what each is doing in response to the Soviet action. Only then would members be allowed to say what others should be doing. We would need to be in a position to say that we would not withdraw additional U.S. forces without consultation and that the force rotation exercise scheduled for the end of this year would be announced now. The President: There hasn't been any shortage of NATO meetings. There should not be a hurry-up meeting. Our critics could accuse us of rushing ahead of other NATO members in the defense of Western Europe. We should be fully prepared before we go to a meeting. It should be recognized that all Presidential candidates will want to send advisers to such a meeting. First we should find out what each NATO member will do in the light of the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. They should speak up and be clear about specific actions. The results of the meeting cannot be such as to encourage the aggressors to think that we are not concerned by the Soviet invasion nor such as to lead some people to think that our reaction has been too weak. We should consult, especially with the military leaders, before any decision is made. In addition, we should not have a highly publicized meeting until we know what the other members are prepared to do. We should not reassure the Germans until they take action on some of the things we want them to do. There is no need to restate our commitments. Secretary Fowler: Even before the Czech crisis, the increasing deficit in our balance of payments, projected through 1972, was higher than we can accept. (The deficit figures are in the attached paper which was cited by Secretary Fowler.) (Tab D) The procurement of U.S. military supplies by European NATO members could have greatly helped our balance of payments problem. If such procurement is made, we can avoid the choice between withdrawing troops from Europe and facing an unacceptable financial risk. Many Europeans believe we are more anxious to defend Europe than they are. Unless we make it clear to them, they are likely to let us defend Western Europe with our resources. It is well to recall that the Berlin crisis led to the first agreement by a NATO member to offset our military expenditures in Europe. Any NATO meeting held now should include the Finance Ministers so that costs can be dealt with along with military and political problems. Treasury has listed several proposals it recommends in its paper. The President: We should first get the views of what NATO members are doing and will do in response to the Czech crisis. Unless we do, we might have a big meeting of Foreign, Defense, and Finance Ministers which could blow up without agreement. We should start by asking our Ambassadors to find out from Foreign, Defense and Finance Ministers what kind of money, marbles, and chalk the NATO states are prepared to put in to counter the Soviet threat. After they have this information, the Ambassadors might come here to tell us exactly what they have found out. General Wheeler: The threat to NATO is greater now than prior to the Czech crisis because: a. Warsaw Pact troops have been moved westward, b. the Warsaw Pact states have partially mobilized, and c. there are more Soviet troops deployed in the satellite states. The Soviets are on the alert and will stay on the alert. General Spivey/5/ reports from Brussels that NATO military leaders are alarmed and deeply disturbed by the Czech situation. They think NATO should pull up its socks and that a NATO meeting would help. /5/Lieutenant General Berton E. Spivey, Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The answer to the question of which NATO members would do something specific about strengthening the Alliance is: a. The Germans, the Italians and the Dutch have the resources needed to build up their military forces. The question is whether they have the will do do so. b. Possibly the Norwegians and the Danes would do more. c. The British attitude is uncertain because their current military power is being reduced. The President: We should have our Ambassadors go to the Germans, the Italians and the Dutch to find out specifically what they are willing to do now to strengthen NATO. Ambassador Ball: [Here follow 2 paragraphs on conversations in New York.] There should be no NATO meeting without knowing in advance what is to come out of it. As to the effect of a NATO meeting, it would have no affect on the Soviet leaders but in the world it would be taken as a sign that the cold war was starting up all over again. The Soviets could use this argument to bring back into line the European communist parties which fell away following the Czech invasion. Ambassador Thompson: A NATO meeting would be used by those Soviet leaders who opposed the invasion to show their colleagues just how much the Soviet action cost. There is no solid evidence on who favored and who opposed the invasion in the Soviet leadership. [Here follow 6 paragraphs on talks with the Soviet Union and 2-1/2 pages on Vietnam.]
325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/1/ Washington, September 6, 1968, 0243Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Leddy and cleared by McAuliffe. A typed note on the source text indicates that the White House was informed. 233633. Deliver to Cargo opening of business: Cargo is requested to convey to Brosio as soon as possible the following letter from the Secretary. Cargo should inform Brosio in strictest confidence that similar letters have been sent to the Foreign Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada. Begin text. "Dear Manlio: Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, we, like you, have been thinking deeply about the best response which the NATO Alliance might make, both in real terms and in relation to public opinion in Europe, America and around the world. In the early days of the invasion we felt that the uncomfortable spotlight of the United Nations on the Soviet action should be kept bright and that for the moment activity through NATO should be kept out of public view. This posture on the part of the NATO Alliance has in no way prevented intensive consultations in NATO on the military, intelligence and political levels and has well served its purpose. But we are now thinking, as you no doubt know, of the need for a more publicly active role for NATO as the UN debate dies down and the need grows for public opinion in the Atlantic Community to be assured that the Alliance remains in place and will continue to be effective despite any changes in the military posture or deployment in the countries of the Warsaw Pact. The problem as I see it is this. How can we best bring about a meas-ured reaction of the NATO Alliance so that it will be clear to its people that NATO continues with all strength to meet any challenge while avoiding a provocative NATO stance that could polarize the problem in terms of a confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact rather than between the Soviets and the rest of the world--including some of the Communist world. This is a difficult prescription and may contain within it some internal contradictions. It is indeed for this reason I ask your advice as Secretary General as to what you think we all ought to do. Our own thoughts at this moment are best stated, I think, by saying, on the one hand, that a visible NATO reaction this fall is required but that, on the other hand, it would be a mistake to call an urgent high-level meeting of Foreign, Defense and Financial Ministers of NATO merely for the purpose of issuing a declaration or communique without real content. Surely we have enough words on paper. Another reaffirmation of what we have said before runs the risk that it would be regarded as an empty gesture in both the East and the West. From these considerations we have formed the tentative conclusion that it would be best to have a series of intensive consultations on what each of the NATO countries might be prepared to do in terms of a positive contribution to the strengthening of NATO before we reach the point of calling for a full-scale NATO Ministerial meeting at a date prior to the normal December exercise. A possible procedure, to which we are giving thought and on which the President and I would very much like your views would be the following: We might begin with a special NATO meeting toward the end of September to which each member would send a Deputy Foreign Minister who would begin the process of consultation on the possibilities for real action later on. This meeting might be followed up by a meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers under your chairmanship, which could be held in New York between October 1 and 10 when many Foreign Ministers would in any event be present. The advantage of this locale is that it would not tend to have the drama of a Brussels meeting but would provide the occasion for consultation. The Foreign Ministers meeting in New York could then, if there were general agreement and it appeared that a full-scale NATO Ministerial meeting would be productive of concrete results, bring about such a meeting in Brussels, possibly in late October or early November--in short speeding up the December Ministerial Meeting in the light of the new situation created by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. We may have before us a period when it will be politically possible for each member to take steps that would provide the desired reinforcement of our NATO institution in a way which might not have been possible a few weeks ago. The opportunity should not be lost; but neither should we proceed in a way that would lead to insignificant results or could worsen an already dangerous situation. I think this problem needs our best thought. I would appreciate knowing whatever you may have to suggest on the best way to proceed. Sincerely, Dean Rusk"/2/ End text. /2/Cargo delivered the letter to Brosio at 9:30 a.m. on September 6. (Telegram 4585 from Brussels, September 6; ibid.) On the same day, Brosio sent through the Mission to NATO an interim reply agreeing with the general procedures outlined by Rusk. (Telegram 4599 from Brussels, September 6; ibid.) In a more extensive reply on September 9, Brosio reiterated his agreement and outlined the subjects and points that should be stressed in the several meetings. (Telegram 4637 from Brussels; September 9; ibid., NATO 3) Rusk
326. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, September 13, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Fried on September 14. SUBJECT Birrenbach told the President that the Chancellor had asked him to come here to describe German concerns over the situation in Europe following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and to get an understanding of United States thinking. He stressed the following: 1. The additional Soviet divisions on the German front and the threat they posed. 2. The clear evidence of the unpredictability of Soviet policy which he attributed, in part, to collective leadership--and the dangers this carried for the West. 3. The Soviet attacks against Germany, including charges that Germany was interfering in the East and had aggressive designs. 4. The specific Soviet references to Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, implying that they had a right to interfere in Germany. He said that it was necessary to strengthen NATO and outlined his helpful discussions with Secretary Rusk on what might be done and on the various possibilities for a NATO conference./2/ /2/Memoranda of Birrenbach's conversation with Rusk on September 9 and with Katz-enbach on September 10 are ibid., DEF 4 NATO and DEF 1 EUR. The President asked Birrenbach to give the Chancellor his best wishes and to tell him that he remembered with warmth the hospitality the Chancellor had shown him in Germany./3/ He said he believed that we had had a unique relationship with the Germans in the post-war period, and that he personally had great respect for the abilities and character of the German people. /3/President Johnson had visited Bonn in April 1967 to attend the funeral of former Chancellor Adenauer. The President said he believed that the future of Germany was largely in their own hands. Germany had made a phenomenal comeback since the war and was now in a position to take the lead in responding to the present crisis. The people of the United States had never been reluctant to discharge their obligations and responsibilities, but, if they were to get concerned about the present situation, they needed to be shown that the Europeans were concerned. The situation now was much more serious and dangerous than the average man believed. He had given much thought to how he could help to strengthen NATO before he went out of office. The elections in the U.S. were a complicating factor because any moves without substance could lead to accusations that he was meddling in politics. That was another reason why it was important for Europeans to take the lead. He pointed out the strength of feeling behind the Symington amendment. (Symington's views were all the more surprising since he came from a German community and had himself had experience in the Defense Department.) The Czech crisis had stopped this movement, but the proponents will be back in due time to chip away again. Nothing to damage NATO would be done in his Administration, but what would happen in the next Administration was another matter. It was essential, therefore, for Europe to take matters in its own hands. The time was ripe for a bold move to strengthen NATO and the key was what the Germans and our other NATO partners are prepared to do in terms of concrete actions. What happens here will depend on that. He said he realized there were advantages to having the top leaders get together to see what could be done, what the problems are and what solutions could be worked out. It was better for guidance to come from the top rather than for Foreign Ministers to report to their heads of government. But, if that did not prove possible, something could be done in a Foreign Ministers meeting in New York. Again the key was what the other nations are prepared to do. He said he asked that his Ambassadors in Europe discuss this specifically with European Governments and he was awaiting reports now. He would be very disappointed if the answer was only to tell us about their difficulties. We were faced with enough problems of our own: Our casualties and expenditures in Vietnam, our balance of payments problem, our deficit of $25 billion, the demands for aid. In the midst of this, he had been willing to make his statement on Rumania, showing where we stood. We will be ready to do our part. His schedule had been unusually heavy and he had cancelled appointments in order to talk to Birrenbach as Kiesinger's representative. He thought very highly of the Chancellor, of his moderation and of his ability. He wanted him to know that he believed this to be a very dangerous situation. But the first move must be by the people who are in the cone of the volcano. The American people are slow to awaken, but they cannot be expected to be concerned about people who do not show by concrete actions that they are concerned about themselves. Birrenbach said he understood the President's views and would convey them to the Chancellor. He knew very clearly that the United States understood the situation in Europe and he agreed completely that if we do not take advantage of the present situation we may not have another opportunity. He thanked the President for his statement on Berlin and he asked whether Senator Mansfield's statement on the future deployment of forces had a lot of support. The President said the situation was very acute. The leadership in the Congress had been strongly in favor of reduction of forces in Europe. He had been opposed and had fought hard to prevent reductions and he would be able to do so as long as he was in office. But before Czechoslovakia, support for troop reductions was so strong that as a compromise it might have been necessary to schedule reductions of 50,000 to 100,000 men. Birrenbach asked to what extent the offset question was in back of the drive for troop reductions. The President said it was an important factor but not the only one. It was a long time since the end of World War II and Americans felt they had a right to ask Europeans to do more themselves. The balance of payments problem on troops had to be solved but there also had to be other actions which showed that the Europeans were willing to open their pocketbooks and put their resources on the line for defense. The real question that the Europeans must face is what will happen in the next Administration. He felt that the Europeans were sleeping while Rome burns. Isolationist sentiment here was latent and becoming more serious. We have tried and will continue to work closely with Germany. He had told the Chancellor that he should try to work with deGaulle. He had also said that the flirtation probably would not work and that Germany would probably have to come back to the same old girl ultimately. He had himself avoided any confrontation with deGaulle and refused to be provoked by him. As far as the Russians are concerned, he had told them clearly that we were against aggression; that we have our obligations to the Germans and we mean to keep them. But we have problems to try to work out with the Russians from disarmament on down. And if we don't want war, we have to see whether it is possible to work out anything with them. The Russians were trying to catch us off guard before our elections. The President said he had been ready to talk to them about common problems, but Czechoslovakia had stopped that. But the problems didn't go away. The key was for the Chancellor and the other leaders of our European allies to say they believe that the Russian moves in Czechoslovakia have created a serious situation in Europe and therefore are going to do the following specific things. Armed with such a statement, the President said he could get support for actions the U.S. could take. He hoped that the Chancellor would tell Ambassador Lodge what his own ideas are and what he believed our other NATO allies in Europe could do. Birrenbach thanked the President for the opportunity to talk to him and said his visit here would help give the Chancellor a better idea of United States thinking and of the need for action that could strengthen our position in the present situation. Edward R. Fried/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
327. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 16, 1968, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 SP. Secret. Drafted by Smith and approved in S on September 26. The conversation was held in the James Madison Room of the Department of State. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Spain United States The Secretary said that no one regretted the exclusion of Spain from the European defense community more than the U.S. He said that we believe that this is due to the internal politics of three or four countries. The Secretary said he also understood the Spanish did not want to submit themselves to the scrutiny of other European countries. He said that the U.S. had made efforts on several occasions to have Spain included in NATO. The Secretary said that we had reached a point where Belgian Prime Minister Spaak had been willing to proceed, but then Spaak had left office. The Secretary said that in some cases the governments of the countries mentioned had no serious objections to Spanish participation but were afraid of domestic opposition and for this reason were unwilling to proceed. The Foreign Minister said he was grateful for the U.S. posture expressed not only by the Department of State but also by Congress. The Secretary said he would raise the question of Spanish membership in NATO with the NATO foreign ministers later this fall in New York and see what their reaction would be. The Foreign Minister interrupted and said that Spain was not asking for U.S. intervention with the NATO ministers nor for membership. The Secretary replied that he would not leave with any of the ministers the impression that Spain had raised the question, but he said he would try to discover if there had been any change in their attitude. He said that he understood fully that Spain was not applying for membership. Foreign Minister Castiella said that Spain asked only to be heard--not to be a member. He said there is a strong movement in Spain which favors a policy of neutrality. He cited the example of Morocco which, as a non-aligned nation, received aid from both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Secretary remarked that the problem was not as simple as that and said that he would like to have the opportunity to discuss sometime at greater length with the Foreign Minister the question of Morocco.
328. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/ Paris, September 23, 1968, 1910Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FR-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 21254. Summary. General de Gaulle carefully restricted conversation at today's 50-minute meeting to one issue, namely, Germany. Apparently de Gaulle is planning his own position for his meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger and he is reverting with singleminded concentration to his thesis that U.S. commitments to territorial integrity of Western European countries, especially Germany, are inadequate. It is this inadequacy which explains, in his mind, why the Germans are so disturbed and edgy. Despite his repeated suggestions that the U.S. was not sufficiently committed to European defense to allay West German worries, he repeatedly refused to give any indication that France would undertake any new commitments or make any new statements, public or private, bilateral or multilateral, for the security of the Western world. End of Summary. I. De Gaulle opened the conversation immediately with a question asking for our evaluation of the Czech invasion. I responded in detail utilizing the Department's 242962./2/ I emphasized that invasion had created new military situation which in turn required collective action as well as bilateral action by Western European countries to strengthen military deterrent as best antidote to possible Soviet recklessness. I referred specifically to need for larger conventional forces. /2/Telegram 242962, September 21, transmitted instructions on Vietnam and relations with the Soviet Union. (Ibid.) De Gaulle responded by stating that in his opinion the Soviets could be expected to continue and heighten their propaganda war against West Germany, that they would maintain pressure all along the line, psychological, military, diplomatic, that it was to their advantage to keep a fear of Germany alive in Europe and to utilize revanchism as an excuse for strengthening their position throughout the satellite nations. I noted that although the Russians were using alleged activities by West Germans in Czechoslovakia as an excuse for their own invasion, there was no evidence of any Western nation threatening Czechoslovakia. De Gaulle said that in his judgment the Russians were worried by the threat of a revitalized Germany joining with Czech and perhaps even East Germany, plus the Chinese, in joint actions against Russia itself. The Russians, he said, were not worried about the current situation in which there was nothing to justify such a massive action as the Russians had undertaken against Czech. Rather it was the spectre of China and Germany working together against Russia in the next five or ten years that was the real cause of their alarm and actions. He repeated that he anticipated further diplomatic, economic, psychological warfare by the Russians against the East Germans looking toward the day when having built a sufficient foundation, the Russians would invade Hanover or Hamburg. Whereupon he asked: if the Russians did invade West Germany if they did breach the western frontiers of Germany, what would the U.S. do? II. Responding to de Gaulle's questions I drew heavily on the Department's 241284/3/ affirming that the U.S. has always fulfilled its treaty responsibilities; that the President himself had reaffirmed our commitments to the Alliance in recent meetings with FRG; that we have informed the Soviets that we intend to keep our obligations to the Germans; but that our government would be greatly assisted by a show of determination and commitment from the countries of Europe. /3/Dated September 19. (Ibid.) De Gaulle responded by saying that no country in Europe had sufficient power to stand up to the Russians and that, in fact, even collectively the European countries do not have sufficient power. Thus, he said, the first question remained: what would the U.S. do? I repeated that the U.S. had a record of living up to its treaty obligations and that our country would do so in this case even if it meant war. De Gaulle asked whether or not the U.S. would be prepared to respond immediately with our nuclear power if the borders of Germany were violated, to which I responded that our country would probably not respond initially with nuclear weapons to an invasion by conventional forces. Rather, we would first want to utilize our own conventional forces together with those of our European allies, that we wished to avoid a nuclear holocaust. I pointed out that these were my own opinions, that I had no instructions from my government on this issue, but that since he had raised the question I would like to know from him what France's response would be if the Soviets invaded Hanover or Hamburg as he had suggested. De Gaulle responded that it was not a question of France's response because France didn't have the power to respond adequately to such an attack that France's response would be controlled by the U.S. response; but that if the U.S. responded with all of its power, France would respond with all of its power. I asked him if he would advise me in greater detail with his own opinion of France's response to an invasion of West Germany. He responded by saying an invasion of West Germany was not an invasion of France; that France had no common border with Russia; and that France must look to its own life and death and to its own future. He said explicitly that the U.S. would do the same and he made it clear that in his judgment the U.S. would not risk nuclear war for the defense of Western Europe. Apparently he believes that since France would not respond to a military invasion of West Germany by deploying all of its resources, neither would the U.S., and because the U.S. would not really make an absolute commitment of its military power both conventional and nuclear to Germany, the Germans are worried and will continue to be worried no matter what the French, English or Italians say or do. At three different points in our conversation I specifically asked de Gaulle to suggest what the U.S. could do, above and beyond what we have already done, to allay his doubts and the doubts which he says the Germans have. What could be done, I said, to convince you that the U.S. will live up to its obligations? De Gaulle was unwilling or unable to suggest any action, public or private. Moreover when I suggested that France might well consider enlarging its own commitments, intensifying its military cooperation with Germany, and reestablishing contacts with the military forces of the Alliance, he declined to respond either negatively or positively. Our conversation concluded with his observation that the subject we were discussing was immense and that we would have many additional opportunities to talk about it, that he welcomed this exchange of views and looked forward to seeing me again. He made no allusion to Vietnam and gave me no occasion to do so before he indicated his time had run out. Conclusion. De Gaulle appeared to be in good health and in a good frame of mind. He even smiled warmly and said "thank you very much" in English when, as I was leaving, I congratulated him for his courage and vision in supporting the new educational reforms proposed by Edgar Faure in which so much emphasis is placed on decentralization and reliance on youth. Shriver
329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, September 26, 1968, 0126Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret. Drafted by Katz, cleared by BMI and E, and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, Luxembourg, The Hague, Rome, and Brussels. 245249. Subj: UK Accession. 1. Leddy called in Minister Tompkins of British Embassy September 25 to make following points. A. We understand German package for September 27 EC Council meeting contains very vague language on UK membership. Germans, in attempt to respond to French positions, are not dealing squarely with problem of UK accession. German proposal now seems to have Italian, Belgian and Dutch support. Arrangement such as contemplated by Germans would give us trouble as it would be nothing except discriminatory trade arrangement with no clear progress on membership. B. Although we have made our position clear to the Germans and others we have thus far not injected ourselves actively into this discussion and thought HMG would agree that this was wise. Our policy not to intervene was based on our understanding that HMG shared our views against a purely commercial arrangement. We would welcome anything Tomkins could do to reassure us that HMG would not be interested in halfway house. 2. Tompkins replied that HMG has had discussions with Belgians and Dutch who are not enthusiastic about German proposals but want some negotiations to open. 3. Leddy pointed out there seemed to be possibility of trap if the four go along with German proposal. French may conceivably accept purely commercial arrangement. Such development would face HMG with difficult problem and cause us problems as well. 4. Tompkins replied as far as he could tell from cables trade agreement by itself unacceptable to HMG. He did indicate, however, that if there were unanimous agreement by Six on offer, HMG would have to look at it. He also said that much may depend on how other two points pertaining to Marechal study on technological cooperation and study on Community enlargement emerged. He thought, however, that these two points would not be of great interest unless UK were involved in the two studies from an early date. His personal view was that trade agreement would be unacceptable unless specific reference was contained to eventual British membership. However he promised seek assurance from London as requested by Leddy that British position has in fact not changed./2/ /2/On September 28, the Department of State reported further that the British would accept a commercial arrangement with the EC only if the offer were made by all six Community members and if it were clearly linked to full membership. (Telegram 246776 to London; ibid.) Rusk [Next documents]
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