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| FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES1964-1968
|
10. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 12, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Tyler. Prime Minister Home visited Washington February 12-14 for talks with President Johnson. Preparatory documents, briefing papers, and memoranda of conversation from the visit are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2368-2369.
SUBJECT
Berlin and Germany
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Mr. Tyler
Mr. Bundy
Prime Minister Douglas-Home
Foreign Secretary Butler
After the Secretary's dinner for the Prime Minister at Blair House, he outlined to the Prime Minister and to the Foreign Secretary the three-phase proposals on Berlin and Germany. He told them that he could not leave the paper/2/ with them because the proposals merely represented tentative ideas on a bolder approach to the problem, and could not be considered as a US Government position. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary expressed interest in the idea, but the Prime Minister said he strongly doubted whether the German Government would ever be willing to move decisively on the major issues, such as the boundaries question and security, which would be the condition for any Soviet acceptance of proposals by the West.
/2/No copy of the paper was found.
There was some discussion of how it might be possible to talk to Schroeder about this kind of approach without having the Germans go through the roof. Mr. Butler said he thought his personal relations with Schroeder were good and getting better, and that he might be able to talk to him alone (and he emphasized that this meant without anyone else being present) when they met again in March for the next WEU meeting. Another possibility might be for Schroeder to come to Geneva from his skiing vacation in Switzerland to see Mr. Butler when the latter goes there in another ten days. Mr. Butler said he would think the matter over.
The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary both lamented the negative state of mind of the Germans with regard to observation posts and said they hoped that some way might be found to bring them around to a more positive attitude. Mr. Tyler commented that the Germans probably saw in the observation posts proposal the thin end of a wedge which might lead to a reduction of forces and other types of "thinning out" in Central Europe before an acceptable political solution had been negotiated with the Soviet Union. He added that, in his view, any direct or implicit linking of observation posts with "thinning out" would merely confirm German suspicions and increase their opposition.
The Secretary said we should persevere in our search for a possible initiative on Germany. This should be done by the kind of discussion they were now having and should be very tightly held. These matters should not be dealt with in the Ambassadorial Group. The Secretary suggested that we go back over the last three years and take a look at all the ideas and suggestions which the Germans have floated at one time or another on the Berlin and Germany question, and which have not been subsequently followed up. He thought that proposals could be put together on such a basis, which would contain many of the elements in the package which he had just described to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.
Mr. Bundy, who had joined the group halfway through the talk, emphasized the desirability of examining every possibility of coming up with a peace initiative in the course of this year which would win widespread public support.
11. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, February 13, 1964, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to London, Rome, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, Moscow, Taipei, and Tokyo.
2882. (Conversation with Chancellor Erhard) (For Dept: Part I of IV)/2/
/2/Part III, telegram 2884 from Bonn, February 13, is printed as Document 12. Telegram 2883 from Bonn, February 13, dealing with German-Italian conversations on MLF, labeled as Part II, and telegram 2885 from Bonn, February 13, labeled as Part IV, dealing with Cyprus, Cuba, and the Communist Bloc are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. McGhee commented on these discussions in At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 138-139.
On eve of his departure today for Paris, Chancellor Erhard requested me to call on him for a general review of current problems, in which he ranged for an hour and a half over his forthcoming visit with President de Gaulle, French recognition Communist China, MLF situation, Passierschein problem, and a number of miscellaneous subjects being reported by separate telegrams. I took the opportunity to raise a number of points from our side, as indicated in Part IV.
Meeting with de Gaulle.
1. The Chancellor said that his visit to Paris should be regarded as one of the regular meetings agreed to under the Franco-German Treaty "to maintain contacts." He could assure me that no change of policy was involved on the part of the German Government (I assumed he meant particularly with respect to Communist China), nor any change in the loyalty and friendship of the German Government toward the United States. Dr. Westrick, who was present, added that the large number of the group accompanying the Chancellor did not signify anything with regard to the importance of the visit, but merely reflected the obligations under the treaty to consult at particular levels.
2. The Chancellor commented that I should not believe everything that the press was saying with regard to the visit. (Although I do not know precisely what he was referring to, it may have been the article in the international edition of The New York Times Feb. 12, to the effect that he was going to Paris in an atmosphere of "improved Franco-German relations" and of "increasing respect" for de Gaulle's policies. The article also appears to presage a change in policy on the part of Germany towards Communist China.)
3. The Chancellor assured me that he would much prefer to be going to the U.S. than to France. The Germans were in agreement with de Gaulle, he said, on the question of friendship between France and Germany and in all-German and Berlin matters. Looking at it broadly, however, he attached a great deal more significance to his relations with the U.S. and United Kingdom. He expected that de Gaulle would tell him in Paris that he seeks a Europe not controlled by the U.S. He would tell de Gaulle that he does not feel Germany to be controlled by the U.S., but indeed protected by the American Alliance. Referring to the de Gaulle press conference of January 31,/3/ the Chancellor voiced the opinion that de Gaulle had in fact said nothing new. The Chancellor had been shocked, however, at the hardness of de Gaulle's attacks against the UK and the U.S., which he construed as being more anti-Anglo-Saxon in their intent than pro-French.
/3/For text of de Gaulle's January 31 press conference, see Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, vol. 4, pp. 162-182.
French recognition of Communist China./4/
/4/France announced its intention to accord diplomatic recognition on January 14.
1. On the subject of Communist China, the Chancellor said that he felt de Gaulle's recognition of Peking was a dangerous act, the consequences of which cannot be foreseen. (He also had misgivings about de Gaulle's prospective visits to Latin America and South-East Asia./5/ He wondered what de Gaulle's motives were, since he could not increase his economic assistance to these areas without overstraining the French economy. The Chancellor foresaw additional problems that would be created by these visits.)
/5/De Gaulle visited Mexico March 16-19 and Latin America September 21-October 15. His East Asian tour took place in August-September 1966.
2. In response to his question about the consequences of French recognition of Communist China, I gave him my own interpretation in terms of (A) its effect on the nations of Southeast Asia and U.S. efforts to check Communist subversion and aggression there, and (B) the disruptive effects in the North Atlantic Alliance as a result of such an important matter not being discussed in the Council. The Chancellor added "not even with the Germans under the Franco-German Treaty,"/6/ and pointed out the adverse effect French recognition would have on the question of recognition of the so-called GDR.
/6/For text of the Franco-German Treaty on Organization and Principles of Cooperation, signed at Paris on January 22, 1963, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 834-838.
3. He asked what effect, in my view, this act of recognition might have on Chinese-Russian relations. Disclaiming any expert opinion in such matters, I expressed the view that it could be interpreted by the Soviets as an effort on the part of France to exploit the Russian-Chinese split. This was something we had scrupulously avoided doing, since the Russian reaction to such a move might well be to take steps to repair the split. Erhard wondered whether it could not have the opposite effect, i.e. if Western recognition and economic aid were given to Communist China, Khrushchev might consider this to be an attack on him and he might thereby be forced to talk to the West.
4. I gave the Chancellor the background leading up to the break in relations by the Government of the Republic of China with France on February 10, as given in Depcirtel 1479./7/ The Chancellor expressed regret that the break had not been at French initiative. I pointed out that in the light of the démarche by the French Charge in Taipei, which the Charge himself had interpreted as meaning that France intended to sever its relations with Taipei, the French really had taken the initiative.
/7/Circular telegram 1479, February 17, reported that the Chinese Nationalists had decided to sever diplomatic relations with France following French recognition of the People's Republic of China. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CHINAT)
McGhee
12. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, February 13, 1964, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, and USAREUR for POLAD.
2884. (Conversation with Chancellor Erhard) (For Dept: Part III of IV)/2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 11.
Passes to the East Sector of Berlin.
1. During a brief interruption in the conversation, when the Chancellor had been called away, State Secretary Westrick referred to the Berlin Passierschein situation. He said that the German Government had reached the decision that they did not wish to repeat the Christmas pass precedent. It was quite clear that the Communists were only trying to make political capital out of a renewal of the Christmas pass arrangements, and this the German Government wished to avoid. The East German radio had said that East German officials had actually performed consular type functions in West Berlin. The German Government was interested in a continuation of visiting arrangements only if conditions could be improved over those for the Christmas passes.
2. One possible improvement, Westrick said, lay in prohibiting East German officials from coming to West Berlin, by their granting the necessary authority to appropriate West Berlin officials. The fact that the East Germans resist this proves that what they desire is only a political result. The East Germans have proposed the creation of an office in West Berlin for the handling of hardship cases. The German Government has asked why passes in such cases cannot be granted by telegram. The Federal Government will not accept any new arrangements which will have the effect of advancing the "three state" theory, with the city of West Berlin as the third state.
3. Westrick reported a difference in views within the Senat with respect to future visiting arrangements. Senator Arndt had resigned, pre-sumably in expression of his own differences with the Governing Mayor. Senator Schiller also proposed to resign. (The British Ambassador informs me that Arndt has in fact resigned because of ill health, and Schiller is considering merely the carrying out of long-held plans.) The Chancellor had that day conveyed to Mayor Brandt the views of the German Government and asked him to come to Bonn next week to discuss the matter further. According to Westrick, Brandt himself may show a greater tendency than the FRG to compromise on issues with the East German officials. The difficulty lay in keeping a human problem from becoming a political problem. Westrick admitted that the FRG decision may have an effect on other existing arrangements, such as interzonal trade.
4. The Chancellor, who rejoined us at this point, added that the German Government was encountering considerable adverse reaction about the Christmas pass policy. Representatives of other nations (unspecified) had asked why they could not have relations with East Germany, since the West Germans themselves had established relations with East German officials in connection with the Christmas passes. The Chancellor said that he had that day told Mayor Brandt and Wehner, the deputy leader of the SPD, that Germany would be exposed to national disaster if the political parties were not able to agree on the question of further exchanges in Berlin.
5. In thanking the Chancellor for informing me about the latest developments, I said that, as at the time of the pre-Christmas negotiations, we had no wish to intervene in this matter, since in its present context we did not consider that it endangered Allied interests. As the FRG and the Berlin Senat were fully aware of the risks involved, as well as the opportunities, we had confidence that any arrangements they made between them would provide adequate safeguards.
McGhee
13. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 25, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret; Exdis; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Tyler.
SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Lord Harlech, British Ambassador
Mr. Tyler
Lord Harlech asked whether the Secretary had yet received a reply from Mr. Butler to his message./2/ The Secretary said that nothing had yet come in. He pointed out that any suggestion of an Anglo-Saxon combine on proposals for the reunification of Germany would be deadly. For this reason he wanted to be able to tell the truth when he said there had been no exchange of papers between the UK and the US Government. He was not going to give the Ambassador any document but would limit himself to discussing ideas with him. Otherwise we would certainly lose the Germans and the French.
/2/Rusk's message regarding an approach to the German Foreign Minister was transmitted in telegram 5244 to Bonn, February 19. (Ibid., POL 28 GER B)
The Secretary said he was concerned about surfacing the present German proposal. It did not have enough meat in it. It would risk "waking the sleeping dogs" and stimulating the Soviets at a time when we don't really have anything much in our position.
He said it appeared that Foreign Minister Schroeder felt that it would not be enough for him to make a speech on German reunification and that he needed, politically, to put forward some specific proposals.
The Secretary then gave Lord Harlech an oral outline of the "dream package." He said that the way to deal with the various elements of the proposals was on the basis of "building blocks," which could be discussed individually, e.g., European security, mixed commissions, and access problems pending reunification. He emphasized there should not be the slightest hint to the Russians that we had anything specific in mind. He and Lord Harlech agreed on the foregoing, and that no offer should be made which might hint that our thinking lay in the direction of a reunified but neutralized Germany.
There was then some discussion of the possibility of a reduction of forces in Central Europe by "mutual example." So far there had been no evidence of any pullback of Soviet troops even though there had been some reductions on the Western side.
Lord Harlech asked about a possible timetable. The Secretary said we should go right ahead and talk over the issues one by one, as he had already suggested, and we might eventually reach the stage where we found that we had the elements of a package. He thought there was a possibility that the Soviets might be planning to take an initiative. Also there was the possibility that the Germans themselves might feel that they must move. It was agreed that there would be further discussion in the Ambassadorial Group. Lord Harlech commented that he thought that the Ambassadorial Group machinery might make the process unduly long, and that the time might come when we would find it desirable to move in Bonn. The Secretary said we should go ahead with discussion in the Ambassadorial meeting and then perhaps we might have a quadripartite Foreign Ministers meeting in May before the NATO meeting. Lord Harlech said that if there was a hope of engaging the Soviet Union in talks some time this year, it was more likely that the Soviet Union would respond to a proposal in the form of a general agenda rather than of a detailed plan on which they would feel they must take a position right away. The Secretary said that if it were manageable it might be best to set up a Deputy Foreign Ministers group which would have some latitude in determining the course of the discussions.
Lord Harlech pointed out that the Germans were disinclined to get into too much discussion with the Soviets on peripheral issues, because in proportion as these were disposed of, the problem of Germany and Berlin acquired increasingly the character of a final obstacle to general agreement. He said he thought that any group that was set up should deal with the whole German problem. The Secretary repeated that the Russians might well be preparing their own proposals on this subject. He said that the time might come when the "satellites" might be in a position to play a role. They had a direct interest in the German question and their point of view might not always coincide entirely with that of the Soviets.
After the conversation with the Secretary, Lord Harlech told Mr. Tyler that HMG was thinking of the question of timing in relation to the holding of elections in the UK. The timing of the latter would be a factor in determining whether it would be too late to wait until May before coming forward with some proposals to the Soviets, or at least letting it be known that such proposals were in the wind.
14. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 28, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Imhof and approved in S on March 16. The source text is marked "Part IV of IV."
SUBJECT
Germany; Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Mr. William R. Tyler, EUR
Mr. Johannes V. Imhof, WE
Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Embassy
M. Pierre Pelen, Counselor, French Embassy
Ambassador Alphand, at his request, called on the Secretary at 3:30 p.m. on February 28 for a general tour d'horizon. One of the subjects discussed was Germany and Berlin.
Ambassador Alphand asked about our attitude toward the German peace plan. The Secretary said that he felt this plan should be further studied and discussed in the Ambassadorial Group.
The Secretary said that he felt the three Western powers should discuss the question of Berlin passes. It was important not to concede in easy stages that Bonn is responsible and competent on this issue. The Western powers have the ultimate responsibility for Berlin. Ambassador Alphand agreed and observed that the question of passes was becoming a domestic issue in Germany.
15. Letter From President Johnson to Chancellor Erhard/1/
Washington, March 4, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Germany, Chancellor Erhard, vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Bundy.
Dear Mr. Chancellor:
Ambassador McGhee had told me of his recent meetings with you./2/ I want to tell you how grateful I am for your thoughtfulness and candor in your discussions with him. As I mentioned at the Ranch,/3/ the Ambassador has my fullest confidence, support and trust, and your use of him as a channel of communication with me, I feel, is advantageous to both of us.
/2/In telegram 2993 from Bonn, February 20, McGhee reported on discussions with Erhard prior to and immediately after talks with de Gaulle. (Ibid., Country File, Germany, Berlin) See also Documents 11 and 12.
/3/Reference is to Erhard's December 28-29 meetings with the President at the LBJ Ranch in Texas. Documentation on the meetings is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XV, Documents 248-256.
In this spirit, Mr. Chancellor, I have asked Ambassador McGhee to deliver to you this letter giving you my thinking on some of the problems currently concerning us here in Washington.
At the outset, may I say how much I appreciate your continuing personal efforts for achieving an ever-closer relationship between a more cohesive Europe and the United States. As you know from our talks last December, we in the United States are following with sympathetic interest the efforts for strengthening European unity, and it is our sincerest hope that there will be a close identity of views between us all as we move into the very important Kennedy Round.
Among the more urgent issues occupying our attention these last weeks are Cyprus, Viet-Nam and Cuba.
I personally was pleased with the prompt attention you gave the question of possible German participation in the proposed peace-keeping operation on the embattled island of Cyprus./4/ Although our original peace plan has been set aside, we continue to believe, as we have from the outset, that in the first instance peace must be restored to the island. This is not only necessary for humanitarian reasons; it is an essential prerequisite for a political solution. The issue is now before the Security Council and we are hoping for constructive action there. Events, however, continue to move rapidly and I know we can count on your constructive support in dealing with this grave problem which involves three of our NATO allies.
/4/In his February 13 meeting with McGhee, reported in telegram 2885 from Bonn, February 13, Erhard stated: "He himself would have accepted the original proposal" for the employment of German forces. The plan had subsequently been modified. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W)
The problem in Viet-Nam remains difficult. We are firmly committed to assist the Government and the people of South Viet-Nam in maintaining their independence and freedom against externally directed and supported subversion and aggression. We believe this struggle can be won and that the new Government of South Viet-Nam under General Nguyen Khanh is capable of bringing this about. Clearly the fight is uphill and the situation serious. And it is for these very reasons we consider proposals for neutralization unfortunate and even harmful. They can serve only to create doubts among the Vietnamese people about the determination of the Free World to help them repel the Communist aggressors. I hope therefore that you and your Government will find ways and means to demonstrate your support for the Government and people of the Republic of Viet-Nam in their struggle against Communist aggression.
In connection with Cuba, I want to express my personal gratitude for the cooperation we have been receiving from the Federal Republic in limiting Castro's access to those Free World commodities which are so important to his economy. Given the nature of this continuing and complex problem, we will be looking to you and your Government for further assistance in attempting to make clear to our other NATO partners that increased trade and transportation ties with Castro's Cuba, as well as governmental guarantees for export and insurance credits for that regime, not only jeopardize our efforts to reduce the Cuban-Communist threat to Latin America; they also undercut our broader purpose of achieving an orderly and progressive development in Latin America.
In this connection, let me say how pleased we were to learn that the Federal Republic and France were considering enlarging their economic assistance to Latin America. This is a constructive gesture, and I hope we can so coordinate our programs that our combined contributions will make for a maximum effort there. In this connection, it has occurred to us that perhaps the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD might provide a useful mechanism for this purpose.
As for aid to the developing nations, I was glad to learn of the Federal Republic's increased contributions during 1963. I hope this contribution can be expanded in 1964. It is increasingly clear that such help is urgently needed for stabilization and growth in the developing areas, which, in turn, affect the Free World's political and economic interests.
At Geneva, where the resumed Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference has been meeting since January, there has been little significant progress thus far. But I do not feel there is any reason for pessimism or despair. On the contrary, I hope and think it likely that during the next months the Soviet Union will find it in its own self-interest to negotiate seriously on the basis of the proposals I set before the Conference on January 21. I firmly believe the proposals I made can lead to a reduction in tensions, and hope that the German Government will not only support our position but will also have additional proposals to suggest. In any event, we intend to continue to consult closely with you as we try to move forward in this very important area so vital to the security and political objectives of our countries. For there is no doubt in my mind, Mr. Chancellor, that, in the last analysis, a slowing down in the arms race is more likely to help us achieve a free and reunified Germany, than an uncontrolled arms competition which strengthens those elements in Eastern Europe determined to resist change and perpetuate the present division of your country.
Before closing, I should tell you also that I have had very much in mind our exchange of views at the Ranch on defense matters. I particularly appreciated your clear understanding of the importance to the United States--in adhering to its commitment to maintain six divisions in Germany as long as needed--of continued offset purchases of military equipment by the Federal Republic. This arrangement clearly is beneficial to both countries, and, without question, should continue as long as needed. It is a matter of major importance to both our Governments that offset arrangements produce German military orders and payments to the United States fully equal to the annual levels of United States dollar defense expenditures of benefit to the Federal Republic's balance of payments. I have been assured by my staff that discussions between our respective defense organizations for future military equipment procurement will be resumed during the next weeks. I also understand from Secretary McNamara that he will be meeting in May with Minister von Hassel to consider the results of these discussions and conclude agreements which will provide for full offset in orders and payments for the periods of 1963-64 and 1965-66. In this connection, Mr. Chancellor, I would personally appreciate your continuing support in this endeavor which is so important for the military security and financial strength of the Atlantic Community.
Thank you again for your kindnesses to Ambassador McGhee. I very much want to remain in touch with you and hope you will feel free to use Ambassador McGhee for this purpose.
Mrs. Johnson and I often talk about your visit last December which we enjoyed so much, and she joins me in sending personal best wishes to you and Frau Erhard./5/
/5/In a March 10 memorandum to the President, Bundy reported that McGhee had delivered this letter and received assurances from the Chancellor that he was "in complete agreement with all the points raised." Bundy added: "This exercise was a net gain for us in terms of German-American relations generally, and on the specific issues raised." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, vol. 2)
Sincerely,/6/
/6/Printed from an unsigned copy.
16. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 6, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret. Drafted by Tyler.
SUBJECT
German "Peace Plan"
PARTICIPANTS
Heinrich Knappstein, German Ambassador
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary
(Reference: Mem/Con dated March 5, 1964, by Ambassador Thompson)/2/
/2/Not found.
Ambassador Knappstein called to ask if he could have an informal talk with me about the German peace plan. He would have preferred our having a lunch together, but since I was not free for several days, he said he would like to come to my office and talk with me alone on a completely unofficial basis. To this I agreed.
He asked me what was my own view of the German proposals. I said that if they were to be plausible as a serious initiative on reunification, they would have to be much more specific, particularly in the field of European security. For example, what does Bonn mean by reunification on a basis of no change in the balance of power to the detriment of either side? The Ambassador did not think it was desirable to attempt to spell this concept out in detail in the proposals because if one did, the Russians would put any concession offered in their pocket and brush the rest of the proposals aside. He said that the French had from the start taken the position that it was, in present circumstances, impossible to arrive at an acceptable practical formula whereby Germany could be reunified without a change to the detriment of one of the two sides. The Ambassador said that the proposals must be considered as constituting one single package, whose component elements could not be isolated or extracted from the rest of the package.
The Ambassador went on to say that several factors had conspired to convince Bonn that proposals on German reunification should be made within the next few months.
First of all, five years had elapsed since the last round of talks with the Russians on reunification, and the general impression was gradually being created in the world that reunification was something which was no longer topical, or relevant to the present evolution in East-West relations.
Second, there had latterly been an increase in public pressures in Germany in favor of some initiative on the part of the government to bring reunification to the fore again. What was more interesting, he said, was that there was an unmistakable increase of interest in reunification on the part of the youth of university age, together with increasing criticism of the government for its passivity in this field.
Third, there was evidence that in the rest of the world, the impression was growing that unification was becoming progressively less important to the German government, and that it was therefore increasingly possible to recognize or do business with the GDR with impunity, witness: recent developments in Ceylon, Zanzibar, and increased activities and initiatives by the GDR in the LDC's./3/
/3/On February 14, the German Democratic Republic and Ceylon signed a consular exchange agreement. East Germany recognized the revolutionary government of Zanzibar on January 28 and exchanged diplomatic representatives in early February.
Fourthly, there was an increasing tendency, particularly since the Moscow Test Ban Treaty,/4/ for East-West discussions and negotiations to be concerned with matters other than reunification, witness: commercial and cultural relations, the ENDC in Geneva, talks about observation posts and other measures in the general field of security and disarmament, rather than political solutions of the causes of tension between the Soviet Union and the West, of which the chief in Europe is the problem of Germany and Berlin. Bonn feels it is essential, for the foregoing reasons, to put reunification back in the middle of the table so as to make it clear not only to the Soviet Union but to everyone that reunification of Germany remains, and will continue to remain a major Western goal.
/4/For text of the Test Ban Treaty, signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, and entered into force for the United States on October 10, see 14 UST 1313.
The Ambassador said he had recently been called by Reinkemeyer (In Charge of Soviet Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bonn), who had reflected some impatience with the slowness of discussion in the Ambassadorial Group, and had pressed to know when the next step would be taken. The Ambassador told him that the British and the French were awaiting instructions and that it was hoped to meet again early next week. Reinkemeyer had said that it was Bonn's definite hope that four-power agreement could be reached before the NATO meeting in early May.
I told the Ambassador that I was familiar with his talk with Ambassador Thompson yesterday. I wondered whether it was desirable to put forward proposals unless they were likely to appear convincing to public opinion as a sincere attempt to move forward toward a basis of negotiation with the Russians. There was also the question whether, if proposals were made now, the Russians might take the opportunity to uncork some counter proposals of their own which could stir things up in an unhelpful manner.
I asked whether the Federal Government was thinking of proposals in terms of their appeal to the Soviet government, or whether it wanted to make some gesture which would focus world attention on German reunification, and which would serve to refute any charge of inactivity in this field on the part of the Federal Government. The Ambassador said his instructions made it clear that the degree of appeal the proposals might have for the Soviet Union is, in the view of the FRG, of secondary importance. The primary objective is to counteract the present trend, to which he had already referred, of talking with the Russians about everything other than German reunification.
I asked whether Bonn had given any consideration to some kind of a manifesto or declaration on reunification which could be submitted to the four powers and publicized suitably, and which would serve the political purpose his government had in mind without incurring the possible dangers of putting forward an inadequate proposal which might complicate things for Germany and the West in general. I emphasized that I was not suggesting this and that I was speaking only for myself. The Ambassador said he did not know whether any such idea had been considered.
Toward the end of our talk the Ambassador came back to his central point of the need "to do something about reunification." He said we had doubtless noticed that in the present German proposals Berlin plays a minor role. He said this was because the FRG does not want to give prominence to a possible access agreement for fear that the Russians would again do what they did in Geneva in 1959, i.e.: concentrate on Berlin to the exclusion of the central issue of reunification.
In conclusion the Ambassador said he appreciated this opportunity of discussing the situation with me and he repeated that he considered our conversation as private and unofficial.
17. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, March 6, 1964, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and Berlin.
3170. Subject: FRG reunification plan.
1. As has been reported separately both Krapf and Carstens have urged during the past week that we move ahead energetically in considering the FRG reunification plan now before the Ambassadorial Group in Washington./2/ Both have quite frankly referred to the government's internal political need to show initiative in this field. This fits in with other reports which lead me to conclude that the FonOff, with some reason, fears that unless it can point to progress in connection with the plan, it will come under attack by the more conservative elements in the CDU/CSU (Guttenberg for example), the always experiment minded FDP, and the SPD.
/2/The Embassy reported the conversation with Krapf in telegram 3025 from Bonn, February 25. (Ibid.) No record of the conversation with Carstens was found.
2. With this in the background, I feel it would be wise to give the FRG some evidence of forward progress in reaching an agreement based on its proposal without much delay. Otherwise we can hardly expect it to accommodate us in our objective of reaching certain agreements with the USSR which, while desirable from an over-all Western point of view, are not likely to contribute directly to a solution of the German problem. A good case can also be made that the West should, in any event, keep up to date a basic negotiating position on reunification, whether or not there is any likelihood of its being accepted by the Soviets.
3. I recognize, as do the Germans, that anything within the general framework of the FRG plan will not be attractive to the Soviets as a negotiating document. In commenting on the plan earlier (Embtel 2513)/3/ we pointed out certain disadvantages to its official endorsement by the Allies or its presentation to the Soviets by them. As things are now developing in the FRG, however, I am inclined to feel that in the interest of progress in other areas of negotiation with the Soviets, and of our bilateral relations with the FRG, it will be difficult for us to withhold official support from some such plan indefinitely.
/3/Dated January 19. (Ibid.)
4. Elements of the FRG plan, from our point of view, provide an essentially sound basis for an Allied agreed plan. We have, in Embtel 2513, made various suggestions on possible modification and we understand that others are presently under discussion in Washington. We have been given to understand by the Foreign Office, moreover, that there is at least a limited flexibility in the relationship of the various parts of the proposal to the whole (para 3, Embtel 2465)./4/
/4/Dated January 14. (Ibid., POL 28 GER B)
5. One feature of the plan which might have attraction for the Communists is its reference to the possible extension of assistance to East Germany (para 6 of the proposal). Recent statements by FRG leaders would indicate the possibility of considering this together with the establishment of humanitarian commissions. We have commented in some detail on other positive aspects of the plan in the Embassy's A-587./5/ The establishment of the humanitarian commissions described in para 4 of the FRG proposal could eventually have favorable results from the all-German point of view, although the Soviets will probably reject the commission concept even if isolated from the rest of the plan since the commissions are described as working "by direction of the four powers." We cannot know for certain that they will be rejected, however, until the Soviets are tested, and, as the Secretary recently commented, it is not up to us to do the Soviets' negotiating for them. In any event, the putting forward of this plan, backed by the West, would put the FRG in a position of having taken an initiative in this area which would be helpful in view of the current efforts of the East German Communists to utilize the appeal of increased contacts for their own purposes.
/5/Dated October 4, 1963. (Ibid., SOC 14 E GERM)
6. I now feel, therefore, that it will be in our best interest to join with the other Allies and the FRG in developing some such plan, as appropriately amended through consultation, and if the FRG insists, in associating ourselves in some way with its presentation to the Russians. This latter could take the form of an FRG public initiative, which the three Allies could state was with their concurrence, or a tripartite note to the Soviets transmitting the FRG proposal as modified which the Allies would endorse. At the same time, we should make clear to the Germans our expectation that, as Chancellor Erhard agreed with President Johnson in Texas, they would cooperate with us in seeking other areas of possible agreement with the Soviets. This subject will be discussed further in a subsequent Embtel./6/
/6/In telegram 3190 from Bonn, March 7. (Ibid., POL 32-4 GER)
McGhee
18. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 9, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret. Drafted by Penberthy and approved in S on March 18.
SUBJECT
Initiative on Germany
PARTICIPANTS
British Embassy
Lord Harlech, British Ambassador
U.S.
The Secretary
Mr. William R. Tyler, EUR
Mr. Grover W. Penberthy, BTF
Lord Harlech said that he had received by letter Mr. Butler's views on what the Secretary had said on the above subject when Mr. Butler was in Washington./2/ Butler had hoped to see Foreign Minister Schroeder in Switzerland but had not and does not see any prospect that he will see Schroeder before the WEU meeting at Brussels on April 16-17. Moreover, on reflection, Butler does not care for the role of putting to Schroe-der such a far-reaching proposal for negotiations with the Soviets.
/2/See Document 10.
Butler agrees to all that the Secretary had said in their Washington meeting and is prepared to back whatever the United States is prepared to do. But for two reasons Butler thinks that it is up to the United States to decide if it is prepared to take the initiative that the Secretary had outlined: the Germans depend more on the United States than on the UK, and the United Kingdom has not been too successful with its relationship with the FRG lately. The UK is trying hard and does not want to prejudice their efforts.
The British believe therefore that we should continue the work in the Ambassadorial Group and see where we get to. Concerning timing the UK believes that the Soviets do not feel any pressure to do something but that the Germans, for domestic political reasons, do want to take an initiative on reunification. The British think that it would be unfortunate to take an initiative that would be half-baked. They hope that the Washington Ambassadorial Group can proceed quickly enough and that the discussion there can be conducted so as to turn the present document to something worthwhile, either as a diplomatic proposal to the Soviets or as a unilateral statement which the Germans could make and to which the Three Powers could appropriately refer.
In particular about the outline of the proposal which the Secretary had sketched at their meeting in Washington, Mr. Butler believes that the reduction of forces in the second phase would have to be wider than just Germany. He thought the European security arrangements should be based on the 1959 proposals./3/ He also thought it necessary to avoid a neutral Germany at all costs. As to the long-term-credits point, Mr. Butler wondered whether these were to come from the West in general or from the United States. The Secretary said that they would come most particularly from the Federal Republic. He recalled that Erhard had hinted that the Federal Republic would be willing to extend such credits although he had said nothing lately about this.
/3/For texts of the 1959 proposals exchanged by the Soviet Union and Western Allies on European security, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 558-601, 612-613, 618-639, and 655-664.
The Secretary asked whether the Foreign Secretary or the Prime Minister felt that the prospect of elections in the UK would stimulate a desire for an initiative. He said that as far as we are concerned there is not much steam just for an initiative. Lord Harlech said that likewise there would not seem to be much steam for it in the UK.
The Secretary thought that Khrushchev would be very skeptical of a Four-Power Council proposal made just before elections in the several countries. Lord Harlech said that, from a foreign policy point of view, the UK would like to move, not so much because the Soviets are in a mood to reach major agreements, but there is advantage for the West to take an initiative. It is unwise to leave the present situation alone for a long time and let the Soviets get the credit for being the only ones interested in taking an initiative. For the Western Powers the sine qua non is something serious to discuss with the Soviets. A Four-Power meeting with the Soviets is not an end in itself.
Lord Harlech said that the situation in Bonn does not look hopeful for getting an elaboration of the German plan. He wondered whether the Secretary or a personal emissary might take the matter up directly with Schroeder. If he would say this package is a non-starter as a proposal, we could all look at the thing again.
Mr. Tyler pointed out that the FRG is very sensitive to the charge of inertia on the subject of reunification. There is dissatisfaction particularly among the youth and press that there has been no progress on the subject in nearly five years. But the Government feels that discussion on disarmament and other issues than reunification tends to shunt reunification to the side and to make it appear to be something not of actual concern. The Secretary asked whether we should go back to the Germans, saying that this is their paper, that it mentions security and balance, and that now they must come up with ideas on what they mean. Mr. Tyler said that the Germans are afraid to put forward separately specific concessions that they might otherwise be prepared to make as part of a package. They fear the Soviets would put the concessions in their pocket and then refuse to talk about anything else.
Mr. Tyler wondered whether it is really necessary that proposals be put forward. If what the Germans want is to put reunification at the center of the stage and as the goal of the West, they might publish a manifesto, to which the Western Powers might subscribe. Lord Harlech said it depends on one's objective. Earlier on in the fall the situation in Germany and Berlin was quiet. Always before we had understood that one could not make proposals or even have talks in periods of tension. Here was a quiet moment which therefore was a good time to put forward proposals. He still thinks it is so, but it does not appear that the Germans are willing to go for anything. He wondered if the Secretary could have a blunt talk with them. The Secretary observed that he might have a talk with Schroeder as a follow-up to the Erhard talk at the LBJ ranch and said that he would give more thought to Lord Harlech's suggestion.
The Secretary said that he had suggested to Schroeder a long time ago that the initiative that the Germans have in mind might take the form of a major policy speech by Erhard or Schroeder to which we could make an appropriate response. But Schroeder had made it plain that that was not enough. The Secretary said he had cautioned Schroeder that the more the Germans talked of reunification the more the likelihood that they would face the question of reunification of what, thus raising the question of the Oder-Neisse line.
Mr. Tyler recalled that the Germans always revert to the Potsdam Agreement under which the disposition of the Eastern territories is to be left to the final peace conference. Lord Harlech said that this card that the Germans hope to play is getting steadily weaker. The Secretary observed that, as far as the Russians are concerned, it is not a card at all any more.
After it was noted that Ambassador Knappstein had not been able to give much of a background to the German thinking behind their initiative the Secretary wondered if we could get Carstens to come over and give more elucidation of what the Germans have in mind. Lord Harlech observed that Carstens is quite rigid and doubted that we would get much from him on Erhard or Schroeder's view on how far the Germans might go.
Lord Harlech thought that in as much as the British, French and Americans now have positions on the German proposal the discussion in the Ambassadorial Group might get down to another round of questions. The Secretary asked if the French had their instructions and Mr. Penberthy outlined them briefly as they had been given to him. It appeared to the Secretary that, if the French should make a presentation along the lines of the instructions just set forth and if the UK and US followed the views that we had expressed to each other, the discussions in the Ambassadorial Group would not be fruitful until the Germans could come up with something better.
The Secretary asked whether the Germans had asked us to slow down in coming to agreements in other areas because of their desire to come to some agreement on reunification. Mr. Tyler said no, but pointed out that the Germans are very depressed about Zanzibar and Ceylon. It looks to them as though the Hallstein Doctrine/4/ were weakening. The Germans are feeling politically vulnerable. Lord Harlech observed that the Germans have certainly showed no enthusiasm for OPs or nondissemination at Geneva but they have not said they are holding back, in order to get reunfication back to the center of the stage. Mr. Tyler noted that they have not said it but it is implicit in their attitude.
/4/Reference is to the 1955 statement by Foreign Minister Hallstein that Germany would not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state, except the Soviet Union, that recognized the German Democratic Republic.
The Secretary said that he thought we had better then go ahead with the Ambassadorial Group discussions and in the meantime he would be thinking over the suggestions Lord Harlech had made about blunt talk with the Germans.
The Secretary noted that Brandt and Erhard had agreed on the pass business and wondered what this meant. Mr. Tyler said they had had a meeting and had issued a communiqué which papered over their differences. The fact, however, is that there are elements in Bonn which see the prospects of increased contacts in a different light from Brandt. Brandt's February 28 TV program/5/ had angered people entertaining this view.
/5/In his address, Brandt called for West German authorities to reach basic agreement on policy regarding its approach to issues like the Berlin passes. The Mission commented on the impact of Brandt's statement in telegram 1123 from Berlin, February 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-10)
The Secretary then asked about the flurry that had occurred in Parliament when Wilson got home relative to the use of British forces under the UN. Lord Harlech said that this had been distorted out of proportion but that it had all blown over now. The Secretary noted that he had been embarrassed in his press conference about this, since we had been encouraging small countries like Sweden to put their military under UN control.
19. Telegram From the Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force in Europe/1/
Washington, March 10, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, RB-66. Secret; Immediate. No time of transmission is on the source text. The message was written by General William F. McKee, USAF. On March 10, Soviet aircraft intercepted and shot down a U.S. RB-66 airplane that was in East German air space.
Personal for General Disosway from General McKee. This message refers to the RB-66 incident which occurred this morning. The President wants you to know that he is deeply concerned. He does not understand how this could have happened, particularly in light of the recent T-39 incident. He further wants to know why we violate East German air space this frequently when the Russians appear to be able to prevent similar incidents with respect to our Allied air space. Or do they and, if so, how frequently? Immediate answer to the above needed./2/
/2/The U.S. Command in Europe provided an initial appraisal of the incident in a March 10 telephone report. A transcript of this report, provided to the White House, is included in a memorandum from Arthur McCafferty of the NSC Staff to McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid.) Subsequently, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force in Europe, provided a fuller assessment in telegram ECJO 655, March 16. (Ibid.)
It is imperative that you take action to prevent similar incidents in the future. Two incidents of this nature in a short period of time are cause for deep concern. Let me know action taken soonest.
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