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| FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES1964-1968
|
30. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, April 23, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 2. Secret.
McGB--
SUBJECT
Schroeder, the German Reunification Proposal, Etc.
Without over-dramatizing any particular piece of information, it seems increasingly clear that Schroeder is not as much in control of Germany's foreign policy as we expected or he hoped he would be after Adenauer's exit. In fact, under continuous attack from the right (Adenauer, Strauss, Krone, et al), distrusted by segments of his own party, lacking Erhard's full support, having no personal political following, and losing foreign policy initiatives to Willy Brandt, Schroeder's performance for the past months has been halting, ragged and unimpressive. He seems less confident, more intimidated and increasingly concerned about his political future than during the last days of the Adenauer government or even the Erhard visit to Texas.
Going from the general to the specific--Schroeder went off skiing when the pass issue reached a critical point; he seemed perplexed and a little annoyed by the Secretary's expression of concern at Germany's relations with Yugoslavia; he turned down a suggestion that Thompson and Tyler discuss with him--during a Miami stop-over next week--the knotty German reunification plan; and now according to McGhee (see attached)/2/ he insists that this plan, despite its problems, be submitted to the Soviets as a Western opus "for German internal political reasons" and expects four-power agreement on this when the Foreign Ministers meet at The Hague in mid-May.
/2/Telegram 3824 from Bonn, April 22, not printed.
The German proposal in its present form is not only uninteresting and unsatisfactory; as a Western initiative, it would be the wrong kind of proposal, in the wrong form, at the wrong time. It has nothing of interest to the Soviets and there is nothing to indicate that the Soviets would be receptive to such a gesture. Its potential mileage is absolutely zero. And despite this, Bonn has been unyielding in insisting that the plan had to remain substantially intact as now constituted.
We cannot push the reunification plan aside so long as the Germans insist upon it. However, despite Schroeder's apparent reluctance to handle this as a German creation with allied endorsement--that in effect says this is a worthy cause which we are prepared to consider sympathetically--this in fact seems to me the only way we can deal with it. As an allied proposal, it makes almost no sense. As a German product, we could pass it off as a Bonn initiative, sympathetically supported by the allies, which the Soviets, in turn, could treat for what it was worth.
In any event, this is an issue to which we are going to have to face up in the next weeks and some decisions will be necessary.
DK
31. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 25, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential. Drafted by Finn and approved in S on May 5.
SUBJECT
German Initiative
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Richard B. Finn, Deputy Director, GER
Germany
Mr. Georg von Lilienfeld, Minister, German Embassy
Mr. von Lilienfeld came in at his request. He distributed a message dated April 24, 1964 from Foreign Minister Schroeder to Secretary Rusk stating that the Federal Republic has come to the conclusion that an approach to the Soviets on the German question should be a collective step by the Three Powers and not a German initiative supported by the Three Powers. (The Foreign Minister's message in translation is attached.)/2/
/2/The message, dated April 24, is not printed.
Mr. von Lilienfeld commented that the Foreign Minister had come to this conclusion only after considerable discussion within the German Government. The Foreign Minister had decided that it would be preferable to have full identification of the Federal Republic's allies with any peace initiative. The Foreign Minister had been concerned that the press might misconstrue a unilateral German initiative as lacking allied support. Mr. von Lilienfeld added that Foreign Minister Schroeder hopes that the Ambassadorial Group can develop a satisfactory paper, perhaps within six to eight weeks. The Foreign Minister will want to talk to Secretary Rusk about this at The Hague.
Regarding the content of an allied initiative, Mr. von Lilienfeld said the Germans realize that more will have to be put into the paper than would be included in a purely German initiative.
According to Mr. von Lilienfeld, Foreign Minister Schroeder was also mindful of the US elections. The Foreign Minister felt, however, that an allied initiative could be explained to the press as a restatement of the US attitude on the German question and not as a sensational new initiative. Mr. von Lilienfeld added that the Foreign Minister thinks the French will come along, once the importance to the Federal Republic of this initiative is made clear and when the French appreciate that the US and UK fully support it.
Secretary Rusk said that if the allies make a proposal along these lines to the Soviets, the Soviets might come back and say they have already made clear their position that there should be a peace settlement on the basis that there are two Germanies. The Soviets might then propose that both the allied proposal and the Soviet position be discussed. The Secretary asked whether the Federal Republic would be willing to see discussions with the Soviets conducted on that basis. He said the same problem would apply to the French. Mr. von Lilienfeld said he did not know the answer to this question.
The Secretary commented that a number of far-reaching questions are involved, such as European security; it is essential to have clear positions on these matters. Mr. von Lilienfeld suggested that it might be useful to work out the various points that should be included in an allied initiative and devise language to cover them.
Secretary Rusk commented that further consideration of the German proposal will in any case smoke out positions on the Oder-Neisse line.
The Secretary concluded that he would be talking to UK Foreign Secretary Butler about this general subject in the next few days and that he would look forward to seeing Foreign Minister Schroeder at The Hague.
32. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 27, 1964, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Judd and approved in S on May 2. The source text is marked "Part 1 of 8." The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.
SUBJECT
German initiative
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson, S/AL
William C. Burdett, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary
Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA
UK
Foreign Secretary Butler
Lord Harlech, British Ambassador
Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Undersecretary, Foreign Office
Denis A. Greenhill, British Minister
John Henderson, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary
Continuing the conversation of the previous day,/2/ Mr. Butler asked what points he should mention to Schroeder. The Secretary then gave him the following five points:
/2/A memorandum of conversation is ibid., Central Files, POL 32-4 GER.
1. What is our primary objective to be--to bring about negotiations with the Soviets or to keep attention focused on German unification?
2. If it is to bring about negotiations, are the Germans (and French) prepared to make important additions to the German draft?
3. When would the Federal Government propose that a tripartite proposal for negotiations be made to the Soviets?
4. How are the Soviets likely to respond to a tripartite proposal and how would the Federal Government propose that we meet this response?
5. Electoral problems--U.S., UK and Germany.
This was followed by a general discussion of how the initiative should be handled and its prospects, covering the same ground gone over the previous day.
Mr. Butler said he would leave to us the question of Erhard going to Moscow. The Secretary said we would not want to make too much of a point of this with Schroeder. We wouldn't want the Germans to think we were pressing.
33. Editorial Note
On April 18, 1964, President Johnson granted an interview to the German magazine, Quick. The interview together with a photo spread on the President was published in the May 3 edition (pages 8-12, 138-142). The President's comment that he had told Chancellor Erhard to put himself in the Soviets' shoes when dealing with West German-Soviet relations generated considerable press commentary in Germany. The President responded to a reporter's question regarding the remark at his May 6 press conference. For text of the Johnson comment, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book I, page 621.
Commenting on the controversy, Bundy wrote President Johnson: "There is nothing wrong with the statement as a statement, particularly here in Washington. In Germany it carries a little different connotation and is bound to have some boomeranging effect, particularly with Germany's almost paranoic concern about the ramifications of our contacts with the Soviets." (Memorandum from Bundy to President Johnson, April 29, 1964; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 3)
34. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chancellor Erhard/1/
Washington, May 5, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, vol. 4. No classification marking.
Dear Mr. Chancellor:
In recent correspondence which I have had with Chairman Khrushchev concerning the reduction in the production of fissionable material for military purposes,/2/ Mr. Khrushchev raised some matters which I would like to report to you. I am most anxious that my correspondence with Mr. Khrushchev remain entirely confidential, but Mr. Khrushchev raised matters directly concerning your country and I want you to know in the strictest confidence what he has said and what I have said in reply.
/2/Seven communications exchanged by President Johnson and Chairman Khrushchev between February 22 and May 1 regarding the reduction of fissionable materials are in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Documents 11, 15, 18, 23, and 26.
In a letter to me in the middle of April, after a discussion of our separate decisions to cut back in the production of fissionable material, Mr. Khrushchev turned to the subject of our troops in Europe, in the following passage:
"This is not a disarmament measure. However the very fact that we have succeeded in undertaking certain practical steps as a matter of mutual example--I have in mind both the present agreement and mutual reduction of military budgets--shows that this approach can also be applied beneficially in a number of other instances.
"Why, for example, do we not attempt to agree in the same manner on the reduction of foreign troops on others' territories? I am familiar with the declarations to the effect that the U.S.A. intends to withdraw from Western Germany 7,500 soldiers and officers transferred there additionally in 1961. We welcome this step of yours. If you would be prepared to go farther and proceed to the reduction of those American troops which are permanently stationed on the territory of the FRG, then I can say right now: we in that case will also be prepared to reduce our troops stationed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic with the provision, naturally, that the reduction of your troops would not be compensated by the further increase in the number of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany itself. It is no secret that recently the West German Bundeswehr is swelling quickly. Your Minister of Defense declared recently that the number of NATO troops in Europe already exceeds the number of troops of the countries of the Warsaw Pact and we understand that this on the whole is directly connected with the rapid growth of the West German Army. All this we must naturally take into consideration.
"I would be happy to know your views on this score."
From time to time in other messages, Mr. Khrushchev had commented on similar matters in a more general way and I had made no comment in my replies, but the rather specific character of the remarks I have just quoted led me to make the following comment in my answering message:
"You refer to the problem of the reduction of troop levels, especially in Germany. I am sorry to have to tell you that I do not think this subject is one on which we can expect to make progress by private discussion between us at this time. The American forces in Germany are there for entirely defensive purposes, and their presence is a matter of great importance for the people and government of West Germany. For there to be any substantial additional reduction in the level of the U.S. forces in Germany there would have to be changes in the situation which would make it possible for the Germans and others in Western Europe to feel secure in other ways. In the meanwhile, I hope we can continue to cooperate in reducing the level of tension in Central Europe.
"The problem of the future of Germany is a most important one, and nothing could be better for the peace of the world than a real settlement. We on our side remain ready for such a settlement, which could serve the legitimate interests of the German people as well as the other peoples involved, including your own."
I have had no further comment from the Chairman on this matter, and I assume that he will understand from what I have said that the United States is not interested in making arrangements about Germany that do not take full account of the interests of the German people, and of the Federal Republic in particular. It remains true, as you know from our talks in Texas,/3/ that I am determined to miss no opportunity for honorable agreements which truly serve the cause of peace.
/3/December 28-29, 1963. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XV, Documents 248-256.
In the light of the close and frank relations which you and I have with each other, I want you to know exactly what the Chairman recently suggested and how I have dealt with it.
If you have any views to express on these matters, Ambassador McGhee will report them to me most privately. Let me merely repeat in closing that the privacy of these exchanges with Chairman Khrushchev is a matter of the greatest importance to me, and that I therefore hope that this message may be treated as a matter entirely between the two of us.
Sincerely,/4/
/4/Printed from an unsigned copy.
35. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, May 8, 1964, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, and Berlin and passed to the White House.
4100. Dept also pass White House. Subject: FRG reunification proposal. Embtel 3953 and 4099./2/ Chancellor Erhard, during my meeting with him today, raised with me a question which he said was of great importance. He hoped that I would convey his views to the President before Secretary Rusk departed for the NATO Ministerial Meeting in The Hague./3/ It concerned the German reunification proposal now before the Ambassadorial Group.
/2/Telegram 3953 from Bonn, April 25, reported that Schroeder expected to discuss reunification issues at the Quadripartite meeting and outlined possible U.S. responses. (Ibid.) Telegram 4099 from Bonn, May 8, reported on discussions with influential Germans regarding the Federal Republic's reunification initiative. (Ibid.)
/3/May 10-14.
As a result of rumors to the effect that the FRG proposal had not been well received by the other three and that they had suggested that the proposal be presented by the FRG on its own, he had experienced increasing pressures from within his party which he found difficult to hold down. If there is no agreement on the basis of the FRG proposal, or if it is not put forward jointly but the FRG is forced to present it alone, it would appear to all that ground had been lost in the solution of the German question. This posed not only a general problem but an acute internal German political problem. If it should be suspected that it was the US which had blocked agreement on a proposal which France would have accepted, he would find it extremely difficult to control the pro-French group, which was small but very powerful.
The Chancellor expressed his firm conviction that the presentation to the Soviets of a suitable agreed proposal by the three powers in conjunction with the FRG would not bring about a deterioration of US or Western relations with the Soviets. He pointed out that the Russians continued to put forward their proposals on all German and Berlin matters and that there was no reason why the West should not do the same. He favored the policy of seeking limited understandings with the USSR as he and the President had agreed in Texas. Indeed, the FRG had just made it possible for the Bolshoi Ballet to appear in the FRG and West Berlin and it would probably accept an exchange of West and East German newspapers. However, the German people would not understand it if efforts to seek agreement were limited to peripheral issues, since they would conclude that the reunification issue had been forgotten.
The Chancellor understood there was little likelihood that anything put forward at this time would be negotiable with the Soviets. It was necessary, however, from both a psychological and political point of view, to put forward something concrete. The Chancellor urged strongly that the President discuss this matter with the Secretary before the latter's departure for The Hague. He urged further that every effort be made to reach Quadripartite agreement on a proposal which could be presented to the USSR by the three powers in association with the FRG.
I replied that at the last Ministerial Meeting we had readily agreed to consider an FRG proposal. Since that time the German draft had been discussed, and in some instances modified, in the Ambassadorial Group. Other differences in view were still under discussion. We understood the German preference for a plan which the three powers could sponsor in association with the FRG. The question of whether the three powers should make the proposal to the Soviets or whether the FRG should put it forward alone depended principally on whether a quadripartitely agreed proposal could be achieved. It was not a question of whether we all support reunification. I recounted efforts to this end made by the Kennedy administration shortly after it first came into office when a crisis arose over Berlin.
The main problem about the FRG proposal as it now stood and as it might be modified, was not whether it was negotiable with the Soviets but whether it constituted a credible Western position. It would be counter-productive if a position were put forward which represented a retrogression from previous positions or was so patently unrealistic as to have the appearance of a purely propaganda exercise. We were earnestly seeking a reasonable proposal in the Ambassadorial Group. If such a proposal could be formulated, I was sure we would be willing to associate ourselves with it. I would, however, convey the Chancellor's concern to the President immediately so that it could be taken into account by Secretary Rusk in his discussions with FonMin Schroeder and his British and French colleagues in The Hague.
Comment: The fact that the Chancellor has raised this question as a matter of urgency, with the suggestion that his comments be passed directly to the President, indicates the importance he attaches to it. He has apparently come under increasing pressure from the Adenauer-Krone-Strauss-Guttenberg group on this issue. It may well be that the French, who we understand are really more lukewarm on the FRG proposal than we, are hinting to this group that it is the US which is blocking the FRG plan. I am not sure that Erhard, or even Schroeder, fully appreciate the repercussions their proposal might have. They do, however, feel strongly that the present situation calls for some new Western initiative on reunification for which they would like, because of internal political considerations, to obtain credit. The Germans have clearly gained the impression from the Ambassadorial meetings and from other information which has reached them that the Americans are not enthusiastic about a new initiative. They seem to feel that our approach is overly influenced by the possible effect which such an initiative might have on our relations with the Soviets, including our ability to negotiate additional bilateral agreements. The Chancellor emphasized twice that what he proposed would not, in his judgment, exacerbate our relations with Moscow.
This is not a critical issue from the standpoint of the Chancellor's overall position, which, following the Baden-Wuerttemberg election, is now stronger than ever. It could, however, determine whether Schroeder can in the future merely survive as Foreign Minister--and possibly only until the 1965 elections--or whether he can play an important role, commensurate with his ability, in the making of German foreign policy.
I recommend strongly that this matter be discussed by the Secretary and the President prior to the Secretary's departure and that insofar as possible we take a positive position in discussions on this question at The Hague. As the Dept is aware, the Embassy in Embtel 3953 submitted a suggestion for an alternative approach in the event agreement along the lines proposed by the FRG is not feasible. This would have the effect of deflecting the FRG proposal into the creation of a four-power standing committee on the German problem. I am submitting by separate telegram a summary of views expressed recently by Kuhlmann-Stumm and Majonica, foreign policy leaders in the FDP and CDU respectively, which would indicate the acceptability of such an approach in FRG political circles (see Embtel 4099).
I believe there is a temporary malaise in our relationship with the FRG, some of the aspects of which are being dealt with in a subsequent telegram. While I do not believe this is serious, I feel it justifies a little greater effort now than we might otherwise make along the lines proposed by the Chancellor in order to provide convincing evidence that we have not lost sight of the German reunification objective in our efforts to achieve more limited agreements with the USSR.
McGhee
36. Letter From Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson/1/
Bonn, undated.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. The source text is marked "Unofficial Translation." A notation on the source text reads: "Rec'd 5/9/64."
My dear Mr. President:
I would like to thank you sincerely for your letter which Ambassador McGhee transmitted to me on the 6th of March./2/ Your thoughts have been very interesting to me and I would like to assure you that it is my sincere desire to remain in permanent close contact with you.
/2/Document 15.
I noted with particular satisfaction the large extent to which our opinions coincide with regard to the relations between a united Europe and the United States of America. The points of view of the United States and the EEC concerning some important aspects of the Kennedy Round have already been harmonised. I am glad about that and believe that the difficulties still to be expected, particularly in the field of agriculture, can be overcome in the course of negotiations concerning specific proposals and objectives.
The solution of the Cyprus question appears to me to be extremely important for the unity of NATO. As the original peace plan could not be put into the effect we have contributed financially to the peace-keeping action of the United Nations. It appears also to me that the re-establishment of peace on the island is an essential precondition for a political solution which is to be prepared for the United Nations by the Finnish mediator. We are, however, aware of the difficult task of the mediator. My government follows with great concern in particular the efforts of the Soviet government to exploit the discord among our NATO Allies over the Cyprus question and to draw Cyprus into their sphere of influence. I think it is necessary to keep in mind this threatening aspect in any political settlement and to bring it to the attention of our NATO Allies directly concerned.
I fully share your view that in the present situation South Vietnam cannot be abandoned by the West. Neither do I see in a plan for neutralization an appropriate solution to the problem, for nobody can ignore the danger that such a neutralization could open the way towards a future seizure of power by the Communists. In that case Thailand and Malaysia would be threatened directly and thus forced to politically reorientate themselves. A severe undermining of the Western position in the whole of East Asia would result. Therefore, we shall support within our given possibilities the United States in their efforts to maintain South Vietnam as a bulwark of the Free World in South East Asia. We shall continue our assistance for South Vietnam in the political, economic and cultural fields.
As you well know, the Federal Government is prepared to support strongly the efforts of the United States which aim at lessening the Cuban-Communist threat to Latin America. Neither among the Cuban population nor in the other parts of Latin America should under any circumstances as a result of action by the Western countries the impression be created that Castroism is profitable. Within the scope of our legal possibilities we shall continue therefore in our endeavors to keep trade with Cuba on the lowest level. In particular, we shall continue to refuse government guarantees for exports to Cuba.
The support of the developing countries is also in my view necessary for the creation of stable conditions in these countries; this is in the best interest of the Free World. The aid to developing countries will therefore be a very important task for a long time to come. Our future budget plans will significantly reflect our efforts in this field. Intensified efforts in the field of public relations endeavor with increasing success to win over the German people for this attitude. I am, however, certain that I can count on your understanding that our respective annual efforts will have to be in proportion to our economic growth and in particular to our other obligations as, for instance, our defense needs and our obligations in the field of social payments.
Equally I follow the disarmament conference in Geneva with interest and hope; I regret that, in spite of your constructive proposals/3/ no substantial progress has been achieved since January. I am glad, however, that it was possible to find among the Allies a common basis with regard to the project of the ground observation posts, and thus to provide a constructive contribution to the Geneva talks. This was brought about thanks to the close consultations with our friends and their preparedness to examine and take into consideration our proposals and our concerns. Regarding the freezing of strategic nuclear carrier weapons--which for the time being is probably the most important and far reaching armaments control proposal--consultations are taking place at present, which in my view should be as extensive as possible to thoroughly explore all aspects of the problem, as e.g., the difficult question of inspection. I share your hope that a slowing down of the arms race rather than an escalating arms race will contribute towards overcoming the partition of the German people.
/3/For text of the U.S. proposals of January 21 and February 13, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 1012-1028.
I have appreciated it very much that the American representatives in the Washington Ambassadorial Group endeavor to support and to further quadripartite deliberations concerning a Western initiative for the reunification of Germany. I think that the preparation of such a document is particularly important since it is imperative that we are prepared at all times to take steps vis a vis the Soviet Union in the question of Germany. Such a policy is also of importance because it could counteract the still existing assumption of Moscow that on the Western side a generally passive basic trend prevails with regard to the German question. This false assessment could anew cause Soviet misinterpretations and it could again lead towards an aggressive policy of the Soviet bloc in the question of Germany and Berlin.
Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that the German public expects the West to take steps in the question of Germany. This the more so as almost five years have gone by since the West has last undertaken an initiative namely with the last Western peace plan of 1959.
I am in agreement with you that the stationing of American Armed Forces in Germany in unreduced strength continues to be imperative for the common defense of the alliance. The question of the balance of payments, resulting from the military expenditures of your country in the Federal Republic of Germany is also of greatest importance for my government. The agreements concerning the years 1961 and 1962 having been fulfilled to their full extent I have no doubt that satisfying arrangements can be reached in the discussion between Mr. McNamara and Herrn von Hassel. You may be assured, Mr. President, that I shall support all endeavors to achieve constructive results.
A few days ago Mr. Shriver called on me and gave me your kind letter of the 22nd of April./4/ I deeply appreciate this renewed expression of your friendship and I have asked Mr. Shriver, with whom I had a very pleasant and interesting conversation, to convey to you my heartfelt thanks and my best personal regards.
/4/A copy of the President's message suggesting coordination between the German Development Aid Service and the Peace Corps is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Germany.
I also like to think back to my visit to your ranch, to our open talks in the spirit of friendship, and to all the considerateness which Mrs. Johnson and you showed me. My wife and I sincerely return your kind wishes and send Mrs. Johnson and you our warmest regards.
I am very much looking forward to seeing you again in June.
With sincere appreciation, I remain,
with warmest greetings,
Ludwig Erhard/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Erhard signed the original.
37. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/11
The Hague, May 11, 1964, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2397. Secret. Drafted by Ausland on May 13 and approved in S on May 24. The meeting was held at the British Ambassador's residence.
UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRTY-THIRDMINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
The Hague, Netherlands, May 12-14, 1964
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Tyler
Mr. Ausland
France
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
Mr. Lucet
Mr. Beaumarchais
Mr. de La Grandville
United Kingdom
Foreign Minister Butler
Sir Peter Garran, Ambassador to the Netherlands
Lord Hood
Mr. Barnes
Federal Republic of Germany
Foreign Minister Schroeder
Mr. Carstens
Mr. Krapf
Mr. Lilienfeld
Mr. Oncken
SUBJECT
Initiative on Germany
Following the dinner, Mr. Butler said that he considered this meeting a follow-up to the one held in Paris last December/2/ and the work done by the Ambassadorial Group in Washington. He said he would like to hear first from Schroeder, particularly whether Schroeder thought the initiative should be a declaration or designed to bring about negotiations.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XV, Document 245.
After expressing gratitude for the work of the Ambassadorial Group, Schroeder said he would like to see the three Western powers take a step vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This should contain the basis for negotiations. For the Federal Republic to take a step at this time would be too theoretical. Schroeder emphasized that he did not have in mind propaganda or merely quieting certain quarters back home. The Germans felt that the struggle with the Soviet Union would continue and that ground would be lost if the position on Germany were not made clear. He did not agree with those who said that a step at this time would lead to deterioration in relations with the Soviets. Although he was not optimistic about a positive Soviet response, he thought that the idea of a Four Power group might interest the Soviets. In any event, the step would not cause a negative Soviet reaction. He proposed, therefore, that the work of the Ambassadorial Group be condensed in form and content and presented to the Soviets by the three Western powers either jointly or in a parallel manner.
Butler asked Schroeder if when he spoke of the Four Power council he thought that it would take up the question of German unification at the outset. Schroeder noted that the German paper was rather comprehensive regarding the tasks assigned to the council. The Secretary remarked that the Four Power council would only meet if the Soviets accepted the over-all proposal.
Butler asked Schroeder what he thought were the chances for negotiations on the basis of the German plan. Schroeder replied that he thought there probably would be no full acceptance, but at least the unity of the West would have been demonstrated.
Mr. Butler asked Schroeder if he thought a tripartite initiative would have any effect on the effort of the Federal Republic to improve its relations with the satellites. Schroeder replied that he thought the two policies were quite compatible.
Butler then raised the question of European security. Schroeder emphasized that it would be a mistake to make any concessions now in view of the uncertainty regarding whether the Soviets would engage in negotiations.
Couve de Murville remarked that he understood that Schroeder wanted to keep the reunification question alive. He noted that the German proposal had been discussed in Washington at length. General agreement had been reached on the German paper. The question of how the German paper would be endorsed, however, was not really discussed. Now Mr. Schroeder had new thoughts. He wanted the three powers to take an initiative. He asked Mr. Schroeder to give his thoughts on this change in procedure.
Schroeder replied that Couve's statement proceeded from a wrong assumption. There had not been a change in the German views. The German Government had always been flexible on procedure. What it mainly wanted was an agreement on ideas. Finally, after considering the various alternatives, the German Government had decided on a tripartite initiative. He did not preclude some changes in the German paper, provided they did not touch the substance. Couve remarked that Schroeder then wanted the Three to propose negotiations on Germany.
The Secretary then asked Schroeder why the Germans felt that unification had moved into the background. Schroeder replied that there is a feeling in Germany that as the West reaches agreements with the Soviets it may come to the conclusion that only the Germans block further agreement. This was the line taken by Gromyko last year in New York. The West, therefore, should put its position on Germany forward. He felt that if it didn't, there would be serious consequences.
The Secretary said that we would like to meet the German needs. He felt there was no problem on substance. He noted, however, that there was no common basis at present for negotiations with the Soviets. The Secretary reminded the others that he had spent a great deal of time in the past few years trying to find a basis for negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin and Germany, but without success. Now he thought the Soviet position may have worsened, partly because of the Federal Republic's policy toward Eastern Europe and its success in isolating East Germany. He noted that Ulbricht was complaining about liberalization in Prague and the trade treaty between the Federal Republic and the Eastern European countries. The Secretary added that he understood that Malinovsky during his recent visit to East Germany, had told Ulbricht that he should forego for now a separate peace treaty. The Secretary said that he had no difficulty with the idea of a declaration which made the position clear on Germany. He noted that he and other American officials had regularly made the attitude of the U.S. on German unification clear in speeches. The Secretary emphasized that we are under no illusions about any so-called détente with the Soviet Union. He asked Schroeder if the Germans felt that we should not talk on any subject with the Soviets unless it were linked to German unification. The Secretary also noted that if we made a proposal for negotiations or a lengthy declaration we will be asked questions about security and such problems as territorial boundaries on which at present we do not have agreed answers. He concluded by saying that he thought the present German paper contained too much to be a declaration and too little to be a basis for negotiations.
Schroeder noted that many formal offers have been made to the Soviet Union on Germany, beginning in 1954./3/ He did not think that the Germans wanted to link all problems to unification. The Germans had not objected to American wheat sales to the Soviet Union/4/ but thought they should have been linked to political concessions. (The Secretary remarked that Europe had traded ten times as much as the United States with the Soviet Union without asking any concessions.) Schroeder added that the trade agreements with Eastern European countries were not linked with unification because this must come from the Soviets. Schroe-der emphasized that there should be no concrete proposals on security before negotiations took place. The question of territories, on the other hand, could be discussed in the Four Power council. We should make it clear, however, that these discussions should be based on the right of self-determination. Schroeder concluded by asking: if the others were prepared to accept the German paper as a basis for a declaration why were they not prepared to submit it to the Soviets as a basis for negotiations?
/3/For texts of Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty, February 1, 1954, for the neutralization of Germany and for a treaty of collective security for Europe, both February 10, 1954, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 411-416.
/4/For text of the announcement of the U.S.-Soviet agreement, October 9, 1963, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 525-526.
The Secretary remarked that if we join in a proposal and get a "no," he thought the American people would look upon this as a defeat at the hands of the Soviets. Schroeder said he didn't want to question the Secretary's estimate of the American reaction, but that he doubted that many Americans would consider a "no" a defeat, in view of the large number of "no's" the Soviet Union had already given the United States.
Butler said that the British Government liked the idea of a Four Power council. He would like to see consideration given to making a proposal for a Four Power council privately to the Soviets. He would also like to have separate study given at the same time to a briefer declaration.
Couve said that his only worry regarding the German paper concerned security, on which the German paper is vague. He thought this should be discussed a little further. He said that he would make no secret of the French attitude on this question. If Germany were reunified, something would be needed regarding European security, and this should not be linked to the neutralization of Germany. Couve said he understood Schroeder's situation. Couve emphasized that he wanted by all means to avoid any impression that there was disagreement following this meeting.
The Secretary then proposed that Ambassador Thompson, Lord Hood, Mr. Carstens and M. Lucet meet the following day and continue the discussion. Schroeder said he thought this was a good idea and perhaps these four could submit some proposals to the Foreign Ministers.
Schroeder said he would also like to say something tonight as well as something in the NATO communiqué./5/ After some discussion, agreement was reached on the following guidance regarding the meeting for press officers:
/5/For text of the communiqué, released on May 15, see Department of Stare Bulletin, June 1, 1964, p. 852.
"On 11th May 1964 the Foreign Ministers of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States met at The Hague.
"They discussed the question of Germany and reaffirmed their conviction that a just and peaceful solution to the problem of Germany will have to be found on the basis of the right of self-determination.
"They agreed that each opportunity should be seized to bring the German people's wish for reunification in freedom nearer to realization.
"The Ministers wish to give further thought to the different possibilities and to consult their governments. Discussion will be resumed in the Ambassadorial Group."
Ambassador Thompson, Lord Hood, M. Lucet and Mr. Carstens agreed to meet at the American Embassy at 3:15 on May 12./6/
/6/A memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 NETH (TH). Ambassador McGhee reported on German reactions to this meeting in telegram 4191 from Bonn, May 14. (Ibid.)
38. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, May 16, 1964, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret; Limdis. Passed to the White House.
4223. I do not wish to raise any question with respect to the wisdom of the Dept's policy, up to this point, of not supporting the German reunification proposals made to the Ambassadorial Group. I fully understand that broader considerations are involved including our current relations with the Soviets. The fact is, however, that before the recent NATO Ministerial Meeting at The Hague ForMin Schroeder made a strong appeal to us (Embtel 3824)/2/ for support, and the Chancellor a similar strong and direct appeal to the President (Embtel 4100)./3/
/2/Telegram 3824 from Bonn, April 22, reported Schroeder's comments on German reunification proposals. (Ibid.)
/3/Document 35.
I will see the Chancellor on May 22 to convey to him orally the message accompanying Ambassador Thompson's letter to me of May 4,/4/ just received yesterday. It would be very helpful if I could present to him at that time, also orally, a message from the President giving the rationale behind our negative reaction to the German proposals, and, if possible, advising what our attitude will be during the reconsideration of these proposals in the Ambassadorial Group, as agreed upon by the four Foreign Ministers at The Hague.
/4/Not found.
I believe that we must keep in mind that we have hit the Germans very hard in recent weeks, at the highest levels, for a number of relatively important things we want them to do, i.e. the offset implementing agreement, and assistance to South Vietnam, to which they responded favorably, as well as the subject raised here May 6 by Komer and Sloan,/5/ to which they may not. There has, as a result, been a perceptible reaction here in the last few days, both on the part of officials and the press, to our recent requests. I would hope, therefore, that the Presidential message would, in addition, express appreciation for the offset agreement and the strong German support to our policy in South Vietnam contained in the McNamara-von Hassel communiqué,/6/ as well as for the subsequent German efforts to respond to McNamara's request for a medical unit.
/5/No documentation on this meeting was found.
/6/McNamara visited Germany May 9-11. For text of the communiqué released at the conclusion of the talks, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 531-532.
I believe we should, moreover, delay for the time being any further new requests of the Germans involving any substantial contributions or sacrifices on their part. It is for this reason that I do not believe a visit by AID Director Bell to press for additional development aid, although normally quite a desirable thing, would be so at this time. This is particularly true in view of the fact that next year's budget is now so frozen that we could not realistically expect it to be changed.
McGhee
39. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 16, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Brandt Visit, 1964. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Your meeting with Mayor Willy Brandt, Monday, May 18, 12:00 noon/2/
/2/No record of the May 18 meeting was found, but see Document 41.
The German election campaign for 1965 is already under way and Mayor Brandt's visit here on Monday, just as Erhard's in June, is an important element in that campaign.
Brandt is bright, easy, and affable, but is very leaky. You can count on the substance of your private conversations with him reaching the German press in relatively short order. And since he is running hard against Erhard for the Chancellorship, he is not above using the substance of his talks with you for firing broadsides against Erhard. Therefore what we say to him must be the things that will not bounce back on us while he leaks them.
The two principal controversial issues between Brandt and Erhard now are (1) the question of passes which would permit West Berliners to visit East Berlin (at the present time, West Germans can visit East Germany but West Berliners cannot enter East Berlin), and (2) tactics in the German struggle for reunification.
In connection with the passes, Erhard has admitted frankly he is bothered by Brandt's exploitation of the issue and has made it clear he will not permit the Mayor to continue to exploit it for the benefit of the Socialists. In dealing with this problem you might remind the Mayor of your statement on the 15th anniversary of NATO in which you said, "We did not make the Iron Curtain. We did not build the Wall. Gaps in the Curtain are welcome, and so are holes in the Wall, whenever they are not hedged by traps."/3/ The point that Brandt should take away with him is that although we feel every effort should be made to "humanize" the Wall, the means for accomplishing this should be worked out jointly by Bonn and Berlin, in consultation with the Western Allies, who continue to bear responsibility for the security of Berlin.
/3/For text of the April 3 speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book I, pp. 433-436.
There is essentially the same kind of problem in dealing with reunification. The Erhard government is now wrestling with an unsatisfactory plan for which allied endorsement is being sought, while the Socialists are looking on in amused silence. Your own position on reunification was made quite clear both during your meetings with Erhard at the Ranch and in your NATO anniversary speech in which you said, "We continue to believe that the peace of all Europe requires the reunification of the German people in freedom." The point that should be made with Brandt here is that the United States is prepared to support any sensible proposal which truly advances and does not undermine the cause of reunification, and will work closely with its British, French and German allies to this end. This will probably be used by Brandt to show that we are for realism on these matters--but so we are, and it doesn't hurt to have it known.
Brandt's advance agent, his press secretary Egon Bahr, has indicated that the Mayor also intends to ask you specifically what the Germans should do to meet the Soviets part way to allay legitimate concerns about Germany and facilitate the achievement of a détente. To encourage him without giving him, too, ammunition with which to bludgeon the Bonn Government, you might cite as an example of what the U.S. Government has in mind the recent German effort to establish useful and constructive working relationships with Eastern Europe (trade missions in Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Czechoslovakia). This is a helpful move in the right direction. It is our hope that the Germans will continue to take every reasonable step to reassure the Eastern Europeans of Germany's peaceful intentions and carefully consider all reasonable proposals to this end which do not threaten the freedom and security of West Germany and West Berlin.
Further points which may arise in the meeting with the Mayor are covered in the attached briefing paper prepared by the Department of State (Tab A)./4/
/4/Not printed.
McG. B.
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