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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968 Washington, DC |
40. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, May 18, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret. Drafted by Ausland on May 20 and approved in S on June 3.
SUBJECT
Mayor Brandt's Call on Secretary RuskPARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
GER--Mr. Creel
BTF--Mr. AuslandFRG
Mayor Brandt
Ambassador Knappstein
Minister von Lilienfeld
Senator Schuetz
Mr. Egon BahrThe Secretary opened the discussion by noting that it was important, as we deal with Berlin and German questions in the next few years, not to allow them to become a partisan issue either in the U.S. or in Germany. If they become partisan issues in Germany there will be an attempt to draw the U.S. in. The result would only help the Soviets. The Secretary asked Mayor Brandt what the prospects on this were in Germany. Mayor Brandt replied that he was not sure how the situation would develop. At present the coalition in Bonn on foreign policy is different than that on domestic questions. He pointed out that he had no influence on developments within the CDU or the CSU. There were some difficulties there, but he didn't know how far they would go. The Secretary recalled that at a dinner several years ago in Bonn he had referred to bipartisanship. This had produced amused reactions on the part of some of the Germans present and he was not quite sure what this meant. Mayor Brandt said he thought it was important to link the question of German unification to decisions on other long-run problems. It would be undesirable if the impression were created that they were not linked. He noted that the Test Ban Treaty had not yet been approved by the Bundestag. Mayor Brandt added that he had spoken to Schroeder just before he went to The Hague. He thought they had an understanding that there must be a common front.
The Secretary said he was very interested in the change taking place in relations between the Federal Republic and Eastern Europe. The effect was to isolate Ulbricht. He heard from time to time talk from Germany that any move toward a détente would be bad unless it were linked with the German problem. He wondered if there were an effort to apply a double standard. For example, some Germans had objected to the U.S. selling wheat to the Soviet Union when the U.S. trade with the Soviets is only a fraction of European trade. Mayor Brandt said he thought those who follow such things closely understand that the German question cannot be inserted at every point. In his travels around Germany he had found considerable support, particularly among young people, for Atlantic unity, peace between Germany and its neighbors to the East, and partial solutions along the lines of the Christmas pass agreement.
The Secretary said he would like to say directly to Mayor Brandt that the U.S. is not negotiating with the Soviets on European problems behind the back of the Germans. His last talk with the Soviets on Germany had been in Moscow at the time of the signature of the Test Ban Agreement./2/ He had emphasized the importance of allowing the Germans the right of self-determination. However, he got nowhere. Khrushchev seemed preoccupied with other problems and maintained that no one in the West was really interested in German reunification. Mayor Brandt commented that if we should move from peripheral questions we should consult the German Government.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XV, Document 204.
The Secretary said he got the impression that the Soviets were preoccupied with the Chinese and internal problems and were not interested at the present time in serious discussions with the West. This does not mean we may not want to take some initiative because we can never tell when this might be desirable. Khrushchev was blaming the British and American elections for our inability to get ahead but this may be an excuse.
Ambassador Knappstein said he would like to comment on the question of linkage between unification and relaxation of tensions. The Federal Republic was not opposed to measures which were world-wide in nature, such as the Test Ban Agreement, or bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It did, however, feel that it had a direct interest in such measures as the Rapacki and Gomulka plans./3/
/3/For the portions of Rapacki's October 2, 1957, address calling for creating a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 512-513. For text of his March 28, 1962, proposals on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 201-205. For text of Gomulka's 1964 proposals, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 1086-1087.
The Secretary said he was sure the Soviets would be happy if we pursued their idea of agreement by mutual example. For example, if we were to withdraw troops from Germany, Khrushchev would probably follow suit. We can't do this, however, until the German problem is settled. The Secretary added that he didn't believe relaxation of tension harmed the prospects for unification. After all, tension had not moved us toward German unity. (At this point both Schutz and Bahr murmured agreement.) On the other hand, the Secretary added, we can't assume that relaxation will lead to German reunification.
Mayor Brandt said he thought it might be desirable to concentrate on steps within Germany. He referred in this regard to statements in the Adenauer policy statement of 1963/4/ and the Erhard policy statement regarding the desirability of improving the situation in East Germany./5/ The Secretary commented that this was an interesting line of thought. Adenauer had mentioned to him the desirability of the situation in the Soviet Zone being improved. The Secretary said he thought it would be desirable to do things which remind the Germans that they belong together. The Federal Republic should also assure the Eastern European countries that they have nothing to fear from Germany.
/4/Apparently a reference to Adenauer's April 25, 1963, statement to the Bundestag. For text, see Adenauer, Bundestag Reden (Bonn, 1967), pp. 336-340.
/5/June 11. For text, see Europa Archiv, 1964, vol. 2, pp. 318-323.
Mayor Brandt then turned to the problem of the border with Poland. He noted that the Poles were in the incongruous situation of wanting to recognize two German states, but asking the one with which they did not have a common border to guarantee the border with the other state. It might, however, be desirable to think in terms of some kind of qualified nonaggression arrangement which gave the Poles some assurance that the Federal Republic was not thinking in terms of a violent solution. The Secretary commented that this was an interesting idea. He was not sure of the Soviet reaction, since it presumes a common frontier between the Federal Republic and Poland. He then asked Mayor Brandt what he thought would happen after Ulbricht disappeared from the scene. Mayor Brandt replied that he didn't know. There were more differences within the leading group in the GDR than there were a year ago.
The Secretary commented that Khrushchev has serious problems. He was not sympathizing with Khrushchev's problems but merely noting them. From the Communist point of view Peking was probably right in saying militancy is necessary to maintain Communism. The East Germans may appear to the Soviets like the boy with his hand in the Dutch dike. If the Soviets pull their divisions out of East Germany they may lose all of Eastern Europe. The Secretary added that he thought, however, that the more isolated Ulbricht is, the better. Mayor Brandt agreed.
The Secretary asked if Mayor Brandt had any idea why the East Europeans are not jamming our radio as much. Brandt replied he thought this was because they needed the equipment to use against the Chinese. The Secretary expressed surprise at this and asked Mr. Creel to get him a report on this./6/
/6/No report was found.
Ambassador Knappstein said he thought it would be good if we could convince Khrushchev that the disappearance of the GDR would not destroy their position in Eastern Europe. The Secretary asked if the Ambassador could say this with conviction. Ambassador Knappstein said he thought there was a difference since the other Eastern European countries were national states, whereas the GDR was not.
The Secretary said that in view of Khrushchev's remark to the Danish Prime Minister about responding to an American move against Cuba in Berlin, he thought he should say frankly to Mayor Brandt that the situation in Cuba was very explosive at present. We are continuing our overflights. The Soviets are training the Cubans to handle surface-to-air missiles and turning them over to the Cubans. The Cubans may be more nervous than the Soviets. This could lead to an explosive situation. He did not think it was an immediate matter but it could take a turn for the worse sometime in the future. We may be able to replace our overflights with other methods in time, but for now we must be sure there are no missiles in Cuba. The Secretary added that the situation in South Viet Nam is also very dangerous.
Ambassador Knappstein asked if it would be possible to replace U-2s with satellites. The Secretary replied, not for several months. There was the problem of orbiting and satellites were much more expensive than U-2s. Ambassador Knappstein asked if it were possible for U-2s to fly off the mainland. The Secretary replied that in this case they could only make adequate photographs 5-6 miles inland. There may be alternative means available some months ahead.
The Secretary noted that Mayor Brandt in his speech to the Foreign Policy Association/7/ spoke of joint projects with the East. Mayor Brandt said that he did think it would be useful for us to make proposals to the East, such as to build highways across Europe. The Secretary said he was interested in this because we have discussed within the U.S. Government the possibility of technical cooperation with the Soviets. We might locate, for example, some technical institute on the autobahn. He added that moving the UN to Berlin would be difficult, but that the location of some UN agency there would be acceptable to us.
/7/For a summary, see The New York Times, May 14, 1964.
41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, May 20, 1964, 4:17 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Confidential. Also sent to Berlin and repeated to Paris, Moscow, and London.
3283. Washington visit of Mayor Brandt May 18-19 went off smoothly and effectively in cordial atmosphere throughout, and on departure yesterday evening Brandt expressed himself as extremely well satisfied with visit. High point was 45-minute private talk May 18 with President, followed by luncheon for 50 guests (including Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Generals Taylor and Clay, Dean Acheson and John McCloy) hosted by President. Following schedule which left him virtually no free time, Brandt had separate talks with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Mrs. John Kennedy, Attorney General, Senator Fulbright, McGeorge Bundy, Rostow, Ambassador Thompson, President's Scientific Advisor and officers of EUR, GER and BTF. Program also included luncheon speech to Overseas Writers Club, two receptions and various background briefings for correspondents. Senator Schuetz and Bahr accompanied Brandt to most appointments.
Substantive discussions covered wide range of subjects. Among highlights were following:
1. Emphasis placed by Brandt at every opportunity, as expected, on his advocacy of step-by-step approach to alleviate division of Berlin and Germany and introduce some new movement into German situation. He said he supported FonMin Schroeder's policy of "knocking at the kitchen window" (i.e., at Ulbricht's flanks and rear in Eastern Europe) but felt that at same time efforts should be made to "knock at the front door" (i.e., in Berlin). While expressing hope in rather wistful way that Allies could be "somewhat less neutral" on complex of problems centering around Passierschein issue, he expressed confidence Germans in Berlin and Bonn could work out common position for new pass arrangement, to which he hoped Allies would be able lend their full support. (See septel)/2/
/2/Not found.
2. Brandt's indication to Rostow that he was now prepared give his full support to MLF.
3. Brandt's low-key suggestion to Secretary of possibility some sort of non-aggression agreement between FedRep and Poland.
4. Strong plea by Brandt that RIAS be left untouched in event any curtailment USIS operations in Europe owing budgetary stringencies.
5. Repeated mention by Brandt and Schuetz of political need for further strengthening of ties between FedRep and West Berlin, with particular reference to Globelgesetz.
6. President's luncheon toast/3/ stressing constancy of US purpose to bring about a united Berlin within a united Germany on basis self-determination and in peace and freedom, and fact that "until this objective is achieved there can be no real and lasting peace in Europe or, indeed, in the rest of the world."
/3/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book I, pp. 694-695.
7. Conversation with Secretary McNamara highlighted need for better public understanding in FRG of danger posed by communist aggression in Viet Nam, political and military value of MLF as means of bolstering NATO solidarity, US determination to maintain six divisions in FRG as long as needed and as long as US able finance foreign exchange costs, and fact that FRG military forces once built up to NATO force levels will be minimum necessary in order meet communist threat to NATO.
Detailed memcons follow./4/
/4/A memorandum of conversation between Brandt and Secretary Rusk is Document 40. A memorandum of Brandt's conversation with Bundy, May 18, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Brandt Visit 1964. A memorandum of conversation between Brandt and McNamara, May 19, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Memoranda of his May 19 talks with Walt Rostow are ibid., POL GER W-US, and ibid., DEF (MLF).
Rusk
42. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, May 21, 1964, 10:17 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by McIntyre; cleared by EUR, GER, AID, BTF, Thompson, and Klein for the White House; and approved by Rusk.
3307. Bonn's 4223./2/ At your meeting with Erhard May 22, in addition to letter of May 4, you may convey orally following message from President:
/2/Document 38.
1. Express to Chancellor President's appreciation for Chancellor's letter of May 8/3/ and President's pleasure that he and Chancellor are in close agreement on important problems discussed in their exchange of correspondence.
/3/Document 36.
2. FYI. Agree it would be desirable to convey to Chancellor message from President regarding reunification. With respect to your suggestion, however, that we advise Chancellor of what our attitude will be in Ambassadorial Group, we shall need to know more what British, and Germans as well, have in mind regarding a possible Four Power Council and what its relation to German paper might be before we decide what position we will take. End FYI.
You should tell Chancellor President has followed personally discussions of German initiative on reunification particularly those which have taken place most recently at The Hague./4/ He feels that frank discussions which our representatives have had have helped us to understand more fully each other's point of view and preoccupations at present time. These discussions have made clear complexities of any initiative and importance for us to have most careful consideration and groundwork laid. President wants to assure Chancellor of his personal interest in goal of reunification through self-determination and his view that we should continue to consider jointly with our Allies what we may realistically do to make progress in this area.
/4/See Document 37.
3. Tell Chancellor we most appreciative of his cooperative attitude during Secretary McNamara's visit/5/ regarding both continuation of military offset and expression of FRG support for our policy in South Viet Nam. We believe these are matters of great importance to both of us. We hope that FRG will be able take early action to provide medical unit or other concrete demonstration of support for Viet Nam.
/5/See footnote 6, Document 38.
4. Chancellor's letter of May 8 demonstrates how close is our common view of importance of aid to developing countries. Germany and US are donors of aid in more countries than any other contributor. Special reasons exist, therefore, for our governments to work closely together on development assistance. Accordingly, President will wish to discuss problems and prospects of our respective aid programs during Chancellor's forthcoming visit to Washington. In meantime consortia on India, Pakistan and Turkey will be meeting and it is our hope that the FRG will do its best to improve amounts and terms of its pledges to these three countries which are showing way in mounting major self-help efforts.
5. President's message on Israeli tanks follows in separate telegram./6/
/6/Telegram 3308 to Bonn, May 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER)
Rusk
43. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, May 23, 1964, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Top Secret; Exdis.
4318. In my meeting with Chancellor Erhard today, at which other subjects were discussed which are being reported separately,/2/ I gave him orally the message from the President concerning his exchanges with Chairman Khrushchev,/3/ which was contained in Ambassador Thompson's letter of May 4, received May 15./4/ I had discussed the delivery date with Ambassador Thompson who agreed that it was best to wait until the Chancellor's return from his Tegernsee vacation.
/2/Telegram 4310 from Bonn, May 10, reported the Chancellor's views regarding German foreign aid levels. (Ibid., Central Files, POL GER W-US)
/3/Document 34.
/4/Not found.
After the Chancellor had heard the message, he said that he welcomed the fact that the President had such a clear attitude toward the security of the German people. It was, moreover, not just a question of Germany. There was also involved the security of all the NATO countries, as well as the countries of Central Europe. It was easy to recognize what was behind the Soviet proposition. Any withdrawal of their forces would be only for a short distance, say two hundred kilometers, and would have no effect on the military balance. A withdrawal of US forces would be for a distance of 6000 kilometers. Under such circumstances, it would be a delusion to believe this would not upset the military balance.
Reduction of forces in Central Europe would be possible only in connection with general disarmament measures resulting, under controlled conditions, in a decrease in the military forces of all countries, not just those of the two great powers. He would welcome further discussion of this subject when he meets the President in Washington on June 12.
Comments: The Chancellor was obviously pleased to be taken into the President's confidence in such an important matter. Although he disclaimed any doubts whatsoever, the disclosure should serve to assure the Chancellor that the exchanges between the President and Chairman Khrushchev do not deal with subjects vital to Germany behind Germany's back or at German expense.
McGhee
44. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the Ambassador at Large (Thompson)/1/
Washington, June 1, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret. Copies were sent to Tyler, Davis, and Ausland.
SUBJECT
German Unity Proposal1. We face an eventual need to put forward a proposal regarding German unity which will meet three tests:
(a) It will not be wholly implausible in terms of negotiability with the Soviets and will not damage East-West relations.
(b) It will meet German domestic political needs, so as to strengthen moderate German leadership against Strauss et al.
(c) It will be a proposal that we could live with, if the Soviets accepted it.
2. I doubt we can, until after the German 1965 elections, get German agreement to a substantive proposal on unity which meets the first test, i.e., which is at least as good as the revised Western Peace Plan./2/
/2/For text of the Western Peace Plan, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 624-629.
3. Nor is a proposal for convening a Four Power Conference on Germany likely to get us very far. The Conference would almost certainly fail, as the Geneva 1959 Conference failed; this would not be helpful in terms of either East-West relations or of German domestic needs.
4. I suggest we propose, instead, creation of a standing Commission on Germany and Central Europe, which would serve as a form for discussion of these issues, year in and year out, until they were ripe for settlement. The analogy of the Austrian State Treaty discussions may be relevant.
The Commission might be opened, like the Geneva Disarmament Conference, with Foreign Ministers (or Deputy Foreign Ministers) in attendance for the first week or two. Then it would descend, as the Disarmament Conference did, to the Ambassadorial level.
Vienna might be the site. It is more a symbol of successful negotiation (Austrian State Treaty and IAEA) than Geneva, which has become a symbol of deadlock. Vienna might be attractive to the Soviets, and it would symbolize the Central European focus of the group's work.
The US, UK, France, and USSR would be members of the Commission. The USSR would probably want East (and West) Germany represented on the same terms as at Geneva in 1959. Perhaps this could be somewhat blunted by including Germany's four neighbors--Poland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Holland--in the same "observer" status.
The terms of reference of the Commission should be broad enough and vague enough to satisfy the Germans that it was going to talk about German unity, without forcing the USSR to acknowledge the four occupying powers' responsibility for unification.
5. What would the Commission actually discuss? I suppose at first the West would run through the virtues of the Western Peace Plan, and the USSR would say that German unity was for East and West Germany to decide.
But perhaps the Four Powers could then agree to talk about the security provisions that would be appropriate to a peace treaty with a united Germany--leaving aside the question of how unity came about. Through such discussions we could try gradually to get the Soviets to see that German unification could be hedged about with sufficient safeguards to assume [assure] their security. This might be helpful if and when the time came (e.g., against the background of a succession crisis) for the Soviets to consider seriously the possibility of German unification.
The Commission could also talk about Berlin; safeguards against war by accident and miscalculation in Central Europe; and other topics related to stabilizing this area.
6. But the proposal's merit is not tied to the view that any of the above would be on its agenda. It lies rather in the fact that:
(a) The Commission's existence would help to assure German opinion that the German question was still on the front burner.
(b) It would offer the Soviets a forum for talking out some of their concerns about security in Central Europe.
(c) Over time, its deliberations might be one more factor working for gradual constructive evolution in Soviet attitudes and East-West relations.
45. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, June 1, 1964, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Berlin.
4418. Subject: Preparations for Erhard visit; US-FRG relations. On the general state of US-FRG relations, I would not suggest that there is at present anything resembling a crisis in confidence. There is not. All essentials are in place. At the same time, a certain uneasiness has developed in recent weeks over the manner in which our alliance is operating. The Germans have gained the impression that they are becoming the object of mounting demands from us.
The following is by no means a complete list of the things we have officially asked the Germans to do in recent months which require effort or sacrifice on their part: increase their aid to underdeveloped countries; speed up formation of their peace corps; send troops to Cyprus; send aid and a medical unit to South Vietnam; give aid to Zanzibar; give aid to Turkey; extend the offset agreement; increase their military budget; make concessions to Yugoslavia; support our position on observation posts and other disarmament matters; liberalize their restitution program; give arms aid to Israel; increase American imports. Since many of these requests have been made on the occasion of visits by high American officials, their acceptance has often appeared to be the result of pressure.
This does not mean that these requests should not have been made, although with regard to timing and emphasis perhaps we should in the future pay a little closer attention to their cumulative effect. It is logical that Germany come under increasing pressure for requests of this type because: 1) increased prosperity in Germany makes it possible for her to do for the first time things she could not have done in the past, indeed creates an obligation on her part (as the second or third free world economic power) to do so; 2) Germany's interests have been, up to this point, largely centered in Europe and she must be persuaded to play more of a world role; 3) despite the offset, we still pay budget-wise for the 7th Army here, which should provide us considerable leverage in asking favors of the Germans; 4) Germany has many problems, such as reunification, for which she needs assistance from us and other free world countries, hence she must be prepared to help us with our problems.
It is moreover to be expected that it is we, as the residuary legatee of the free world's problems, who, on most occasions, must ask the FRG for help. The Germans, during this period, have asked for little that is new (perhaps because we already do so much), but even in the few matters of minor importance which they have put up to us, e.g., Bavarian coal, they have had little success. We have, of course, shown consideration in certain instances, such as delaying the withdrawal of Roundout and Long Thrust forces, and retaining the extra strength of an augmented battalion in Berlin. In the one matter of capital interest to them, however, for which they have sought our backing at the highest level, i.e., their initiative on reunification, we are still hesitant.
Sensitivity with regard to seeming pressure from the US is particu-larly great in the FedRep because of the still recent experience of occupation. The reaction often takes the form of criticism of the Federal Government for a lack of backbone and an independent policy. This creates internal pressure on the government to demonstrate its independence which, in turn, could lead to serious problems for the government and possibly to actions that are contrary to our, or even to their, interests.
In addition, there is at present the special and important circumstance that Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder have embarked on the difficult task of pursuing a more "flexible" foreign policy toward the Soviet Union--which is entirely in accord with US policy and in opposition to strong forces within their own party. If they are to retain public support and ward off attacks from their opponents, they must not appear to be acting under US pressure. The attraction of Schroeder's efforts to achieve an improvement in the Federal Republic's position in Central and Eastern Europe through trade agreements and missions and cultural exchanges is that it is considered to be a German initiative. If it should come to seem only a reflection of US policy, it would become far more vulnerable to attack by the group around Adenauer and Strauss.
With this in the background, it seems to me important that we draw the following two conclusions from recent developments in our relations with the FRG:
1. Whenever it does not run contrary to our vital interests, we should welcome, and, when possible actively encourage FRG foreign policy initiatives. In this way we can assist the FRG to establish an independent identity for its policy and thereby (paradoxically) make it easier for the FRG to follow our lead on matters where US vital interests are concerned. This is one reason why I have long hoped that we could support the FRG initiative on reunification. With success on this score, the FRG would be in a stronger position to cooperate with us elsewhere.
The current question of the FRG-ChiCom relations presents some of the same opportunities and hazards for us as the reunification initiative. Looking at the problem from Bonn, there could be advantages to an FRG trade agreement with the ChiComs if it includes a Berlin clause; it would, from current indications, not go much beyond the "private" trade agreement of September 1957/2/ and would not involve a politically more significant exchange of trade missions; yet it could effectively serve to isolate the Pankow regime further and make Ulbricht's personal position more difficult. It would tend to improve the FRG position in those non-aligned countries where ChiCom influence is considerable; it could cause further dissension between Moscow and Peiping; and it might give the FRG an additional lever in future dealings with the USSR. There are obvious disadvantages from the US point of view, possibly of such a compelling nature as to force us to continue to dissuade the FRG from such a step. However, we may at least wish to consider the desirability of the FRG having somewhat more latitude in their China policy.
/2/Reference is to the agreement signed in Beijing, September 27, 1957, between the Eastern Trade Committee of the West German Federation of Industry and Commerce and Chinese for the Promotion of International Trade.
2. We should avoid placing the FRG in a position where it seems, publicly, to acting as a result of US pressure. I realize that in view of our position and responsibilities there are times when we must exert pressure. We should, however, do so sparingly and privately if possible, giving the FRG every opportunity to convey the impression of taking independent action and to receive whatever credit may be derived therefrom. We should avoid any appearance of "lecturing" to the FRG. The period when this could profitably be done has long since passed.
I would cite our recent approach on South Vietnam as a case in point. From what we have heard, our handling of the matter at Bonn and The Hague/3/ left the Germans with the impression that they were being pushed too openly. This occasioned some resentment in government circles, and a cool, often critical, press reaction.
/3/Conversations in Bonn were reported in telegram 4246, May 19, telegram 4341, May 26, telegram 4393, May 29, all from Bonn. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) No record of discussions at The Hague meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers was found.
In view of the various items which we shall probably be pursuing with the Chancellor during his Washington visit, I would particularly urge that we avoid any appearance that new FRG concessions to US policy (such as grain price) result directly from the meetings. My suggestions for treating specific points which may arise during the conversations will follow in separate telegrams.
McGhee
46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, June 10, 1964, 9:03 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GER W. Confidential. Drafted by Charles K. Johnson, cleared in EUR, and approved by Creel. Repeated to Munich.
3547. Subject: Strauss Visit. CSU Chairman Strauss concluded five-day visit in Washington yesterday and departed for Chicago where he will receive honorary degree (De Paul University). Strauss commented before departing that his Washington visit, which he said had been for "informational" purposes and not the main objective of his trip to US, had been most satisfactory. His Washington schedule included appointments with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Rostow, Tyler, Gerard Smith, Schaetzel, Creel and GER/BTF officers. On Capitol Hill he met with Senators McCarthy and Fulbright, who escorted him to Senate floor during civil rights bill debate. Understand Strauss also had conversations with Dean Acheson and Walter Lippmann.
In general Strauss' approach was one of friendly reasonableness. On several occasions he expressed himself in basic agreement with US policy on Germany and East-West relations as outlined to him. On another he commented that the last thing in the world he wanted was to be considered in any way as anti-American. Highlights of substantive discussions, during which he came down heavily and repeatedly on theme of no real détente without solution of German problem, included following:
1. "Détente"--We stressed that range of US-Soviet agreements thus far very small; all big questions, such as German problem, still remained unresolved. We were concerned that any feeling of détente might cause Europe to relax prematurely. Strauss asserted that détente policy should be looked upon as political weapon, not as "chance to go to sleep." Furthermore he would be strongly opposed to any détente based on nothing more than series of concessions to Soviets. He stressed that there was no way to solve German question short of general change in political structure in Eastern Europe; thus no isolated solution of German problem possible.
2. Eastern Policy--Strauss said he favors active eastern policy if undertaken in realization there has been no change in basic principles of Communism and that we make use of changes taking place to strengthen centrifugal forces in Eastern Europe. Strauss also said he favors trade relations and exchange of FRG trade missions with Eastern Europe but only provided they are used to strengthen nationalist tendencies in Eastern Europe and to endeavor reconcile those countries to establishment of a united Germany.
3. Reunification--We told Strauss that while we do not think it helpful deliberately to maintain tensions over issues which can be settled with Soviet Union, we are convinced that a permanently divided Germany cannot be reconciled with our basic security and national interests. No one in Washington believes it possible to shove German problem under rug, but on other hand there is no indication that Soviets are prepared to agree to reunification on terms compatible with Western security. Strauss replied he had no doubts or basic reservations about US policy on reunification as outlined to him.
4. MLF--CSU will support MLF but may suggest two conditions: (1) MLF should not lead to nuclear disengagement from continental Europe; and (2) US should be prepared at some future point to turn MLF over to a European sovereignty if prerequisites therefore are met.
5. European Integration--Strauss sees no chance of progress in framework of Six and suggested consideration of European confederation as halfway step to federation, with only three or four member countries if necessary.
6. Southeast Asia--We stressed to Strauss world-wide nature of Communist threat and potential threat to Europe (including Germany) posed by any deterioration our position in Viet Nam. Strauss took line that Germans were inhibited from accepting greater commitments in world at large by unhappy memories of their past history as a world power.
Detailed memcons follow./2/
/2/Memoranda of Strauss' conversations with Secretary Rusk and Assistant Secretary Tyler, both June 9, are ibid., POL 1 EUR, and ibid., POL 32-4 GER, respectively. Memoranda of his conversations with Rostow and Creel are ibid., POL 21 EUR E-EUR W and POL 32-4 GER. A memorandum of the Strauss-Schaetzel talk is ibid., POL GER W-US. No records of conversations with McNamara or Smith were found.
Rusk
47. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 11, 1964, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Confidential. Drafted by Lejins and Kent and approved in S on June 19. The meeting was held in Rusk's office. Schroeder accompanied Chancellor Erhard on his June 11-13 visit to the United States. McGhee commented on these meetings in At the Creation of a New Germany, p. 148.
SUBJECT
The German QuestionPARTICIPANTS
Germans
Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder
Baron Herbert A. von Stackelberg, Minister, Embassy of Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Weber, InterpreterUS
The Secretary
Ambassador George C. McGhee
Mrs. Lejins, Interpreter(At the beginning of the meeting, the Secretary and Mr. Schroeder met alone for approximately 30 to 40 minutes.)
The Secretary reiterated certain points discussed by him with Mr. Schroeder pertinent to the German question. He said that the US was willing to explore whether the Poles, Rumanians and Hungarians might possibly be interested in a permanent German settlement. There was no doubt that Khrushchev was under pressure from the other East European countries. There was growing anxiety in Moscow for a number of reasons. The President's talk,/2/ for instance, had been well received in the other East Bloc countries although it had an unfavorable reaction in Moscow. Perhaps it would be possible to build in Eastern Europe an interest in a permanent German settlement, which was not necessarily in the interest of Moscow.
/2/Reference is to President Johnson's May 23 speech at Lexington, Virginia. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book I, pp. 708-710.
Mr. Rusk said that we had received an intelligence report to the effect that the Soviets might announce the withdrawal of 15,000 men from somewhere in Eastern Europe. It was uncertain whether this might be from Hungary or Eastern Germany. It could well be that the Soviets would then say this is what we have done; let this be an example and do likewise. The US has said repeatedly, however, that this type of procedure is no basis for us to use.
The Foreign Minister said he felt that the possibility that the German trade commissions and their contacts in various Eastern European countries would lead to desirable political consequences was very remote and limited. In any event, developments would be slow and take a long time. The first persons sent to these countries by Germany were eating bitter rice. However, eventually something might come of it, and these trade contacts were useful. There was no objection on the part of Germany to the efforts of the United States in this direction. When the situation was right, the Germans would follow through. After all, the Minister said, that was the whole purpose of establishing trade relations. It was not Germany's primary objective to make the Eastern European countries happy economically.
The Secretary then suggested that talks with the small Eastern European countries be undertaken only after the possibility of talks with Russia had been made public. If talks with the other countries were undertaken without such preparatory moves, there might be a severe reaction in Moscow. But if such talks were preceded by a public announcement, as indicated above, pressure might well be applied on Moscow by the other countries.
Foreign Minister Schroeder then reverted to a point previously discussed with the Secretary, concerning possibilities of action with reference to the question of German reunification. He briefly set forth four points: (1) A proposal might be made by Germany, which would then have the support of the three Western Powers. (2) A four-power commission could be established with a mandate; the exact nature of such a mandate to be the subject of discussions. (3) A plan might be submitted to Moscow by the three Western Powers. This, however, would be the most difficult line of action. (4) A point could be chosen at which the three Western Powers would reconfirm vis-à-vis Germany their intention and responsibility for the reunification of Germany. A very opportune occasion might perhaps be the signing of the pending Friendship Treaty. In any event, opportunities must constantly be sought for the three Western Powers to show their responsibility for reunification and to express their will to carry it out. This must be kept a live issue, and the Foreign Minister has urged Chancellor Erhard to discuss this with the President tomorrow.
The Foreign Minister continued that it was perfectly clear that unless this was done the Germans would get the impression that the question of German reunification had been placed into a psychological icebox, and that those who carry on the discussions with the other side were no longer interested in this issue and might even fear to state their stand on the German problem vis-à-vis the Soviets. This impression had very undesirable implications among the German people.
The Secretary strongly emphasized that, while he was aware of this German reaction, he did not know how he could do more than he had actually been doing in this respect. It was a fact that in all his talks with the Soviets he had spent at least two-thirds of his time speaking about Germany and the German problem.
The Foreign Minister quickly pointed out that he did not wish to be misunderstood and that what he had said should not be construed as a complaint. He felt, however, that everyone had to look ahead and had to gauge possible reactions to whatever would be undertaken, in order to avoid bad reactions both on the international and the national scene.
The Secretary then said he felt that it might be possible to put together several different things into one package; for instance, a declaration might be forthcoming from the Federal Republic of Germany, made publicly to all four powers. This might be followed by a thoughtfully prepared Three Power declaration in the nature of a Western response, aimed at the Soviet Union. All this should be done publicly. Then it would be up to the Soviets to pick this up and do something with it or not. That might be the occasion that might point toward the opening of discussions.
The Secretary stated that it was his impression that the Soviets do not speak about reunification in the sense in which we see it. They constantly come back to it as a problem to be settled by the two Germanies.
The Secretary raised the possibility of turning this to advantage, though he indicated he realized that Ulbricht was not the man to try this on. Did the Foreign Minister think that the established trade contacts might possibly lead to some opportunities in this respect?
The Foreign Minister indicated that he viewed the political results of the trade relations in Eastern Europe skeptically. These countries of Eastern Europe were interested in improving their economies; they were not interested in the German question. They were interested in throwing off Soviet exploitation and in improving their economic ties with the West. The question of German unity did not enter into this, as far as they were concerned. They were interested solely in the economic aspects and it gave them a feeling of independence. The Foreign Minister felt, however, that they could not and would not be allowed to go very far in either respect. The Soviet Union was the controlling and dominating power, which would not permit any developments in the long run that were not in the Soviet interest. The small Eastern European countries were well aware of that.
48. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 12, 1964, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2413. Secret. Drafted by Johnson and approved in S on June 19. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary's Conference Room. The source text is marked "Part I of IV."
SUBJECT
East-West RelationsPARTICIPANTS
Germans
Chancellor Erhard
Foreign Minister Schroeder
Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
State Secretary Ludger Westrick, Office of the Chancellor
State Secretary Karl Carstens, Foreign Office
State Secretary Karl-Guenther von Hase, Federal Press Office
Assistant Secretary Franz Krapf, Foreign Office
Horst Osterheld, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of the Chancellor
Karl Hohmann, Assistant Secretary, Office of the Chancellor
Berndt von Staden, Counselor, German EmbassyAmericans
The Secretary
Governor Harriman
Ambassador George C. McGhee
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State
Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State
Robert C. Creel, Director, Office of German Affairs
Charles K. Johnson, Office of German AffairsThe Secretary began by welcoming Chancellor Erhard to Washington and assuring him that the United States wants to do all it can to make his visit useful. Chancellor Erhard expressed his pleasure at being in Washington and said that these talks were taking place at an appropriate time, particularly in view of the treaty between the USSR and the "GDR."/2/
/2/For text of the Soviet-East German treaty of friendship, mutual assistance, and cooperation, signed at Moscow on June 12, 1964, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 867-872.
Erhard continued that although this treaty would give rise to a feeling of insecurity among some people, it would certainly not upset the West German government. US/FRG relations are unshakeable and through a strong NATO, peace and security will be guaranteed. Erhard then remarked that inevitably some people in Germany will ask whether the treaty is not the fruit of a policy of détente. As far as Erhard is concerned, Khrushchev is making a treaty with himself which may serve the purpose of giving some compensation to Ulbricht. Nevertheless even though no spectacular consequences can be anticipated from the treaty, the German Government must take into consideration that there will be a certain increase in uneasiness. Thus the Chancellor felt that his meetings in Washington were most opportune. He felt that the statement at The Hague on German reunification was a very good one, but still there will be questions raised in Germany asking when there will be action on the German problem. There will be questions as to why in an atmosphere of relaxation one cannot do something or take an initiative on the German problem. Chancellor Erhard said that he would be happy if these questions could be answered. He said that he had in mind a statement that could be issued today.
Secretary Rusk replied that we do not regard this treaty as a helpful step and that it will undoubtedly raise anxieties within the West. He said our commitment on German reunification is clear. As far as a détente is concerned, we do not feel it has gone very far. We see two immediate dangers at this moment. One relates to Cuba where the Soviets are turning over to the Cubans surface-to-air missile sites. If the Cubans shoot down our overflights, we will have to shoot back hard. There is clearly a very explosive situation involved in having Cuban fingers on the missiles. The other explosive situation exists in Southeast Asia where there are gross violations of the 1954 and 1962 accords by Hanoi and Peiping. The United States is not going to get out of Southeast Asia. The situation there does not smell of détente but of great danger.
The Secretary said that we are interested in Erhard's impressions of important moves now going on which are affecting the status quo. How do they relate to the German question and what long-range trend can result from improved relations between the FRG and Eastern Europe? What is the significance of Ulbricht's nervousness stemming from his isolation in Eastern Europe? Concerning reunification, there is no problem for US policy in view of our commitment to the objective of self-determination for the German people. We are prepared to take a hard look at this matter to see what we can do to meet the Chancellor's needs. Our main concern is that whatever we do, we do together; that we not start something on which we are going to separate once we get started. We are prepared to work hard on German reunification.
The Chancellor said he did not think that the USSR-"GDR" treaty will affect Berlin since that would contradict Khrushchev's policy of reducing tension. What has gone on so far is no real détente. Our policies must move toward the core of the problem. At the same time, the FRG did not want to pursue a single-minded interest in the German problem to the exclusion of other critical problems in the world such as the Cuban situation. The Chancellor then said that the policy of neutralization in Indo-China initiated by de Gaulle was not possible./3/ He questioned whether the Chinese could be won over and whether they would be prepared to withdraw from Southeast Asia if they were admitted to the UN.
/3/Reference is to de Gaulle's June 24 speech welcoming Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia to France. For text, see Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, vol. 4, pp. 217-218.
With regard to Eastern Europe Erhard said he was convinced that Khrushchev was concerned about the movement toward greater independence by the Eastern European countries. He then referred to the Seebohm speech/4/ as a "somewhat unpleasant episode." He said he had done his best to make his government's position clear: Hitler had torn up the Munich Agreement and the FRG has no territorial claims against Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless the speech had been a "great blow" to the FRG since it had raised new doubts in the Eastern European countries about the FRG. He asked for understanding for the German position on this matter.
/4/Apparent reference to a May 13 speech at Nuremburg in which the Minister of Transportation attacked Czechoslovakia over its treatment of Sudeten Germans and implied the validity of the 1938 Munich agreement.
On the German reunification initiative, the Chancellor said he would welcome it if the Ambassadorial Group could work out something which could be implemented at an appropriate time. He acknowledged that this effort must be coordinated and that each side had its own problems to consider. The important thing is to act together. He said it was regrettable that elections in both our countries would give rise to certain unfortunate statements. Nevertheless he felt there would be great continuity in both countries. He said he would be happy to see all the elections over. Secretary Rusk said that Khrushchev seems to have the impression that nothing can happen until our elections are over even though we have tried to make him understand that we are still in business.
49. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard/1/
Washington, June 12, 1964, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Erhard Visit, June 1964. Secret. No drafting information is on the source text, which was prepared on June 15. The President and Chancellor met privately in the Oval Office until 12:40 p.m. when they joined the two delegations (see footnote 6 below).
OTHERS PRESENT
Mr. Weber
Mrs. LejinsAfter the President presented the Chancellor with a number of gifts, Mr. Erhard expressed his pleasure at being in the United States again. He said despite a few discordant notes heard from time to time German-American friendship was firm and lasting. He considered the cooperation of the United States and Germany in NATO the guarantee for the maintenance of peace and freedom in the world. U.S.-German friendship went beyond bilateral considerations. It was a major element bringing North America and Europe together.
He expressed concern about the great inflationary trend presently at work which could break up Europe. But it was Germany's task--for political, economic and social reasons--to guarantee the stability of Europe. The Chancellor felt his trip was very timely. Although he did not want to sound dramatic about the latest arrangements between the Soviet Union and East Germany, this most recent development could cause considerable concern and unrest. Therefore, the present visit and discussions could do much to allay fears in Germany.
Chancellor Erhard was sure the President was aware that the German press (although this did not, of course, affect German official policy) was asking when, in all the efforts being made to achieve a détente, the time would come to deal with the most important question which lay at the heart of everything--the German problem. Such discussions in Germany and their effect should not be underrated. Nine months after the U.S. elections, Germany also would be facing elections. At that time, the Chancellor would have to answer some of these questions. He certainly would not want to be disloyal to himself or his friends. But he would have to discuss these matters. Therefore, it would be most advantageous if something could come out of the present talks which could put German fears at rest and suppress certain nationalistic voices making themselves heard. He added he could not hide the fact that Goldwater's statements had been a real shock to much of Europe and had awakened voices which had to be muted. But he wanted to make it clear that it was not the aim of his visit to bring about or set off any specific set of actions. Germany had been satisfied with the results of the NATO meetings at The Hague. All he wished at this time was that discussions continue so German concerns could be met.
There were other problems, too. Chief among these was the future course of certain NATO developments, and particularly the MLF. The German attitude on this had not changed. Germany considers the MLF desirable and necessary. Since taking office, the Chancellor had visited almost all the capitals of Western Europe and discussed the MLF. While he did not find widespread enthusiasm for the MLF, all seemed to realize that in the final analysis it was necessary to accept the MLF and to make whatever contributions were necessary. Unless this was done, De Gaulle might try to use the force de frappe, not as a military weapon, but as a political instrument to pursue his own independent European policy.
Then there was, too, the question of Israel and the Arab world which the Chancellor described as "a very hot one." This represented a very delicate problem for Germany. Germany had done very much for Israel. There were the reparations and military assistance. But by the same token, Germany had to proceed very carefully because of possible adverse Arab reaction. The coming conference of the non-aligned nations in Cairo could take a very strong negative position (possibly recognize East Germany) which in turn could complicate the prospects for a German solution. Germany's relations with the Arab world were very good. Germany was not burdened with a colonial past and there were no present disputes with the Arab states. Germany had a good name and great prestige in the Arab world. Consequently, Germany could not do too much too fast as far as aid for Israel was concerned. The Chancellor therefore felt that Germany had found a good way of solving the problem of supplying Israel with tanks. Germany was going to ship the tanks to Italy where they would remain for a while and be equipped with weapons and ammunition. Later, they would be sent on from Italy to Israel--the connection would not be immediately or readily visible, although the end result would be the same.
The Chancellor wanted the President to understand that Germany was not only thinking of her own problems. Other nations had theirs, too, and Germany shared these problems and was interested in them. He understood two of the President's major problems--Cuba and South Vietnam. In the case of Cuba, Germany followed U.S. desires and broke off her trade with Cuba and would continue to do so. In South Vietnam, Germany stood ready to do all that could be done economically, politically and financially. Germany was also considering what humanitarian contribution it could make, such as perhaps sending a hospital ship to the area. These were questions, however, that should be discussed at another level.
With regard to Red China, the Chancellor did not envisage diplomatic recognition on the part of Germany. Matters of this sort would be carefully coordinated with the United States. Trade relations with Red China were very limited. No expansion would be undertaken without advance consultation with the United States, both as to time and substance. Moreover, Germany did not anticipate the establishment of any trade commissions.
These were all the items the Chancellor wanted to take up with the President.
The President thanked the Chancellor for his visit. He expressed the high esteem in which the Chancellor is held in this country. As the Chancellor had said, Germany's problems were our problems, too. The United States did not intend to act in any of these important questions, including matters pertaining to the Communists, without carefully reviewing them with the Chancellor, if at all possible. The President was happy to hear what the Chancellor had said concerning the recognition of and trade relations with Red China. Talk of more trade with Red China would create very serious alarm among the American people. The President had not yet recovered from the shock he had suffered as a result of the British bus sales to Cuba.
(Note: Part of this discussion submitted separately.)/2/.
/2/See Document 50.
The President stated that it was important that the Chancellor recognize the problem in the Middle East. He wanted to congratulate him and encourage him with respect to what he had said about the tank deal via Italy. The United States will give all possible aid in these matters. But the next 90 days will be critical ones for the United States and therefore Germany's help in working with Italy is most helpful and gives the United States great satisfaction. The President felt sure that it would be a long time before the true nature of the deal was recognized. In the meantime, it would be possible to extend a certain degree of aid to both Israel and the Arabs. This was the only intelligent way to handle the problem. Of course, the President indicated, this was only a drop in the bucket compared to the $300 million, in terms of which Khrushchev had spoken to Nasser.
One matter of great concern to the American people was whether the German defense budget and planned foreign assistance would be adequate. Rumors had it that there might not be enough money to permit carrying out the McNamara-von Hassel agreement/3/ and certain matters discussed and agreed upon in the context of offset purchases which had been discussed at the Ranch in December and which were needed to help us maintain our six division presence to which we were committed. The President expressed the hope that these matters would not present a problem, because they would create very grave difficulties for us. Consequently, he hoped that these rumors were false.
/3/See footnote 6, Document 38.
The President indicated that no one could understand better than he matters of psychological pressure. Everyone was down on him at the present time because of the 15,000 men stationed in Vietnam. He would not yield, however. Instead of bringing them home, as he was asked to do, he would increase their number. He could understand the problem created for the German people by the new treaty. Justified or not, he realized there would be a psychological reaction. This would not, however, weaken American determination to help solve the German problem and U.S. friendship and loyalty toward the German people. He had already instructed his people to work closely with the Chancellor's people on how to help the German psychological situation.
The President reverted to one matter about which the Chancellor had spoken earlier--the MLF. The President appreciated what the Chancellor had said on this score and hoped it would proceed satisfactorily. The President then indicated that it might be better to join the others in the Cabinet room. He had expected to speak with the Chancellor only for about 15 minutes, but his desire to have frank and useful talk with the Chancellor had prompted him to lengthen this into more than an hour. The President expressed the hope that the Chancellor would have the opportunity during the further course of his visit to discuss matters of trade with Governor Herter,/4/ matters pertaining to the treaty with Secretary Rusk (with whom the President had already discussed this problem), and matters pertaining to offset problems and tanks with Mr. McNamara./5/ The President himself would be glad to discuss anything else of interest to the Chancellor.
/4/See Document 55.
/5/See Documents 53 and 54.
The Chancellor then indicated that the offset agreements previously discussed should create no problem whatsoever. The Germans were ready to go through with what had been agreed upon and assume all responsibilities growing out of the U.S. presence in Germany. However, Germany did not want to discuss these matters too loudly. Germany feared that others, notably the British, would then approach Germany on the same score and it would be difficult to refuse them. The German trade balance was so excellent at the present time and there was such a surplus of orders that the Chancellor had already given the word that purchases should be carried out in the United States as agreed upon. Consequently, there was no cause for concern.
The President then, half-jokingly, raised the question of meat and indicated that he might have to ship some Texas steer to Germany if Australia and New Zealand continued their dumping tactics in the United States.
The meeting was then adjourned to the Cabinet room./6/
/6/According to a memorandum of conversation, the President and the Chancellor joined Rusk and Schroeder at 12:40 p.m. The President outlined the discussions with the Chancellor. Secretary Rusk and Erhard then discussed the public handling of the announcement of the Soviet-East German treaty before the Chancellor departed for a lunch meeting with Congressional members. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W-US)
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