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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XV Germany and Berlin DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

50. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 12, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File: Germany, Erhard Visit, June 1964. No classification marking. No drafting information is on source text. The discussion took place during the Erhard-Johnson meeting that began at 11:30 a.m. (see Document 49).

CONFIDENTIAL PART OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THEPRESIDENT AND CHANCELLOR ERHARD

on June 12, in the presence of Mr. Weber and Mrs. Lejins

The President indicated that the U.S. found itself presently in a very critical period. The first six months of Mr. Johnson's administration had been extremely difficult ones. Leading Republicans, such as President Eisenhower, Nixon, Scranton, Romney and Senator Goldwater all were criticizing the part the United States plays in world affairs. They were apt to assume a martyr complex, complaining that no one loves us. The President assumed that this was only natural after 20 years of post-war efforts. Last year President Kennedy had asked Congress for $5 billion in foreign aid and there had been a terrible fight and a great deal of criticism. This year the President was asking for much more.

The struggle in Southeast Asia had been going on for ten years by now. In the last few months, alone, there had been three governments in South Vietnam. Although it was perfectly obvious that the Communists were striving to swallow up Southeast Asia and that this was of concern to the entire world, the United States were the only ones who were really attempting to do something about it. It was our men who were being killed and our planes that were being shot down.

We had been forced to greatly increase our national debt limit. Over $100 billion of all this money had gone into rebuilding other countries since the war. At the same time, France was causing great problems in Southeast Asia which also affected our own Cuban problem. The recognition by France of Red China was creating problems not only for the U.S. Government but was creating problems between the President and the American people.

Americans, to a degree at least, understand the British. England is sort of a mother country of us. Nevertheless, it is hard to swallow England's shipping materials to the Communists, selling busses and railroads to Cuba.

The President said he had a greater understanding now for Mr. Erhard's poultry problems. Australia and New Zealand are flooding the country with meat, with a resultant drop from 30 cents to 15 cents per pound and from $300 per head of cattle to $150 per head. Consequently, all cattle breeders are mad at the President, complain of Australian etc. dumping and consider us stupid. They act as though this were the only problem the country is faced with and consider themselves a particularly abused and special class of martyrs; and the Republicans, of course, exploit this to the hilt.

In all, the President felt he could tell Mr. Erhard the American people were ready to see someone else come to the rescue on the world scene and offer to carry some of the burden the United States had been carrying for these many years. This attitude would, of course, be reflected in the votes on certain issues in Congress, such as foreign aid. It also would be reflected in the coming elections.

The President indicated that he had recently met with Republican leaders and told them his problems./2/ He had indicated that he would need more money to carry out U.S. policies in Southeast Asia. They had answered by asking him what other nations would help carry the burden. Therefore the President felt encouraged by what Mr. Erhard had said in this respect and his indication that Germany was willing to help in Southeast Asia. This would be advantageous not only for Southeast Asia, but also for U.S. morale. The President indicated that he would remain, of course, resolute and firm is his convictions and actions. But he could not deny the fact that Mr. Goldwater was the one who would gain from any and all dissatisfaction arising in the United States. Anyone who had a complaint of any kind would join up with Goldwater.

/2/Not further identified.

The President then indicated that he felt very close to Mr. Erhard and that he had never told a similar thing to another statesman. He felt that both of them were fairly new at their jobs, having assumed their responsibilities at about the same time. These responsibilities were very heavy ones. Mr. Johnson presently saw his chief problem in an attempt to unite the American people, and he was not at all sure whether he was the person to do it.

Very confidentially, he indicated that many decisions would have to be made within the next 60 days which would greatly affect the confidence of the people of the world. He would try to keep in touch with the Chancellor whenever it was possible on many of these questions. However, much of what needed to be discussed was as yet very unclear and very indefinite, and the President hoped that Mr. Erhard would consider any discussions of this situation as extremely confidential. He would then discuss further with him some of the problems of the United States.

The Chancellor thanked the President for his show of confidence and friendship and indicated that he very much shared the President's feeling. He did not feel as close to any other statesman, either. Perhaps part of the explanation was that both of them, before very long, faced elections and both of them stood a pretty good chance of being re-elected. This, the Chancellor felt, was a factor greatly contributing to the stabilization of the world and of the further course of NATO developments in particular. The Chancellor indicated that he could well understand the feeling of bitterness which the President felt in view of the fact that the United States had done so much to re-establish and maintain order in the world and to assist the reconstruction of many countries--both morally and materially--without getting much thanks of any kind. But that is life, the Chancellor felt, and creditors are never very popular. Once those who have been given help get back on their own feet they like to forget those who helped them. However, the Chancellor stated, he wanted it to be understood most emphatically that Germany would never forget what the United States has done on her behalf. This memory would never be wiped out. It formed the basis of Germany's loyal friendship for the United States, a few occasional false voices notwithstanding, who would make it appear as though there existed in Germany a de Gaullist party and a North Atlantic party in opposition to one another. This was not true. Germany was convinced of the fact that Europe itself had to build the strength of Europe and the German Bundestag was convinced of the fact that the alliance with the United States was a matter of life and death without which the German problem can never be solved. At the same time, Germany realized that this was the only way of achieving a solution and that it was a matter of slow process.

The Chancellor then stated that he wished to express surprise at the fact that the President did not view the matter of the coming elections with more confidence in his power to win. The Chancellor stated that all over the world, certainly in Europe, there existed the expectation that Mr. Johnson would win and such victory was unquestioned. The Chancellor had found out, of course, that it was not an easy job the President had. In addition to being the head of a Government--like the Chancellor himself--the President was also the head of the state. Although it was none of his business, the Chancellor was of the opinion that Mr. Johnson had greatly strengthened his position since he assumed office; that his leadership was undisputed and that the results of the elections were for all practical purposes assured.

The Chancellor had spoken with Mr. Rockefeller yesterday,/3/ whom he has known for many years. Mr. Rockefeller had expressed horror about the state of Republican affairs, and had indicated that in his opinion a Goldwater nomination would assure Johnson's victory and guarantee a split in the Republican party. The Chancellor felt obliged to say that recent Republican events had revived certain feelings in Europe that should long since have become a thing of the past. In any event, the impression created in Europe as the result of recent Republican developments was not a good one.

/3/Governor Rockefeller called on Erhard at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel after the Chancellor's arrival in New York.

The President fully agreed and indicated that he had been much saddened by the course of recent events. He disagreed, however, about the Chancellor's evaluation of election prospects. He felt that it was too early even to tell who would be in the running, much less what the results would be. Only today Governor Scranton had announced his candidacy. Mr. Johnson had not yet made any announcement. Even if one assumed (and this was no foregone conclusion by any means) that Senator Goldwater and President Johnson would be the candidates, it would be extremely difficult to predict the outcome.

The Chancellor stated that it was not possible to win elections with such a negative approach. Only a positive approach could achieve results. Both of them were experienced when it came to elections and the Chancellor had 16 years of experience in this area. He admitted that frequently things do not look too good in advance, but as an election comes closer people begin to change their minds and to get sense and vote as they should.

The President stated that he hoped the Chancellor understood his uncertainties with reference to the U.S. elections and even the matter of candidates. He urged the Chancellor to keep this discussion completely confidential since he had not even mentioned some of these misgivings to his own Cabinet members.

The Chancellor assured him that he would.

(END OF SPECIAL CONFIDENTIAL SECTION)

 

51. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 12, 1964, noon.

/1/Souce: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Erhard Visit, June 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Creel and approved in S on June 19. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text is marked "Part 1 of 4." Memoranda of conversation dealing with the French attitude toward NATO and internal German politics are ibid. A memorandum of conversation dealing with the Soviet-GDR treaty is Document 52.

SUBJECT
Trade Relations Between the Federal Republic and Communist China

PARTICIPANTS
Germans
Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder
Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy
State Secretary Ludger Westrick, Office of the Chancellor
State Secretary Karl Carstens, Foreign Office
State Secretary Karl-Guenther von Hase, Chief, Federal Press Office
Assistant Secretary Franz Krapf, Foreign Office
Assistant Secretary Karl Hohmann, Office of the Chancellor
Deputy Assistant Secretary Horst Osterheld, Office of the Chancellor
Deputy Assistant Secretary Dankmar Seibt, Aide of the Chancellor
Mr. Hermann Kusterer, Counselor, Foreign Office (Interpreter)

Americans
The Secretary
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President
Ambassador George C. McGhee
Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
Mr. George Reedy, Press Secretary, White House
Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, GER

While the President was in a private meeting with Chancellor Erhard,/2/ the Secretary suggested to Foreign Minister Schroeder that they make use of the time to continue their discussions of June 11.

/2/See Documents 49 and 50.

The Secretary said he had gathered from his conversation with Schroeder yesterday/3/ that the West Germans were considering entering into some sort of trade agreement with Peiping at the governmental level. He had received the further impression that the Germans were thinking of doing this fairly soon. He would like to explore further Schroeder's ideas on timing. For our part we were concerned over any action which might be construed by Peiping as a go-ahead signal for continuing their present line of conduct.

/3/Apparently during the private conversation that preceded their 4 p.m. discussion; see Document 47.,

Schroeder replied that, as he had indicated yesterday, this idea of increasing trade between the Federal Republic and Communist China and formalizing this trade in some way was not a new one. It was of course true that the Germans had less freedom in their actions now because of de Gaulle's recognition of Peiping. What particularly appealed to the Germans was the possibility of being able to secure a Berlin clause in any such agreement along the lines of those already included in trade agreements with countries of Eastern Europe. The Germans had no exact ideas on the matter of timing. All contacts thus far with the Red Chinese on the matter had been at the second level; there had been no real contact thus far at the government level. If developments indicated a definite interest on the part of the Red Chinese, then maybe something could be done "in the not too distant future". There was no particular time pressure, but in the interest of maintaining momentum the Germans were thinking of trying to settle the matter "in the course of this year". Trade agreements with a Berlin clause had already been signed with the countries of Eastern Europe except for Czechoslovakia. In this latter case conclusion of an agreement had already been unduly delayed, owing primarily to adverse reaction from Sudeten German groups.

Schroeder said the Germans did not want to do anything which would create a difficulty for the United States. However, they hoped that over the next two or three months there might be some easing of our problems in Southeast Asia. In any case the Germans would like "to settle things if possible this year", because otherwise momentum would be lost and they would "lag behind the optimum".

The Secretary expressed the hope that we could keep in close touch on this matter. It had a direct bearing on the current serious crisis in Southeast Asia. At the time France recognized Peiping, it had asserted that it had not been able to take this action earlier because of the unhelpful attitude of Peiping during French difficulties in Indo-China and Algeria. At the time the French did take action to recognize Peiping, we were ourselves suffering serious casualties in Southeast Asia. He wished to stress that any action which would encourage the Chinese Communists to believe they were on the right course would make things more dangerous.

Schroeder replied that the Germans were aware of this point. He said they were not particularly keen over increased trade in itself but they were keen over having a Berlin clause, particularly in the light of the Soviet-GDR treaty signed in Moscow today. He felt that such a development would strengthen our common position against Ulbricht.

 

52. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 12, 1964, noon.

/1/Souce: Johnson library, National Security File, Country File: Germany, Erhard Visit, June 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Creel and approved in S on June 19. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text is marked "Part 2 of 4." Memoranda of conversation dealing with the French attitude toward NATO and internal German politics are ibid. A memorandum of conversation covering the discussion of German-Chinese relations is Document 51.

SUBJECT
Soviet-GDR Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance

PARTICIPANTS
[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 51.]

At Foreign Minister Schroeder's request, the interpreter read a report on the speech made by Ulbricht in Moscow today at the signing of the Soviet-GDR Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation./2/

/2/Not found with the source text. Extracts of the joint communiqué are printed in Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 872-875.

Schroeder said he wished to draw particular attention to the passage in which Ulbricht had stated that German unification was possible only through negotiations between the two German states, but that in such a case the treaty could be revised. Schroeder wondered whether this was part of the treaty itself or merely an interpretation of it by Ulbricht. If it were the former, then maybe it could be regarded as a sort of alibi on the part of Khrushchev for not taking any action on German reunification.

The Secretary said we had just received a report from Ambassador Kohler in Moscow on the delivery of the oral démarches to the Soviets about the USSR-GDR treaty that had been agreed on in Washington yesterday./3/ The US, British and French démarches were being delivered separately in Moscow today. The three démarches did not include the sentence which had been suggested by the Secretary rejecting Soviet charges of German revanchism. The British in Moscow had objected to this sentence on the ground it was superfluous. The Secretary said that even so we could get this sentence back in the picture in our oral statements on the matter.

/3/Telegram 3740 from Moscow, June 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 21 GER E-USSR) For text of the U.S. statement on the Soviet-East German agreement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 536.

The Secretary continued that, with regard to Ulbricht's statement about "the only path to reunification", he wondered to what extent this mention of reunification had been considered necessary by Ulbricht from the standpoint of East German public opinion.

Schroeder said that in the past East Zone leaders had for many years claimed to be the champions of German unity. It was true the theme had been neglected for some time but they now seemed to be reactivating it. Possibly this was being done for the benefit of the young people in East Germany.

The Secretary said we should be prepared for any follow-up on this assertion of "GDR sovereignty". We should have the Ambassadorial Group review the situation and check our intelligence as to whether the agreement contemplates making any new difficulties on the Autobahn, for example in connection with the scheduled July 1 meeting in Berlin of the Bundesversammlung.

Schroeder said he felt that what was needed at this moment was a demonstration of a common position by the Three Powers. He pointed out that the démarches in Moscow had been delivered separately/4/ and that the Three could not agree on the admirable sentence suggested by the Secretary. It was important that there be some sort of joint declaration by the Three that no impairment of Berlin access could be accepted. It might be desirable to move quickly since Pankow might wish to test Western resolution. The Three Powers would have to make quite clear that no changes in the Berlin situation could be accepted.

/4/For text of the démarche, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 869-872.

The Secretary said that after we had a chance to study the text of the treaty, there should be consultation among all four of us very quickly to consider the issuance of a joint statement. Such a statement might also be helpful in meeting the German problem about support for reunification.

Schroeder said he felt such a statement should be made on June 15 or 16. The Secretary agreed, but pointed out the difficulty of transacting business over weekends./5/

/5/For text of the three-power statement, released on June 26, see Department of State Bulletin, July 13, 1964, pp. 44-45.

State Secretary Westrick referred to the passage in the Ulbricht speech describing West Berlin "as an independent political unit". It would be a good idea for any joint statement to take issue with that statement, which was always coming up from the Communist side in the pass negotiations and other ways.

The Secretary said we might have some problems with our Allies on this.

Westrick said he could not imagine any real problem with the Allies, who had never said that West Berlin was an independent unit. Schroeder said he thought that we had already had formulas on this point that we could refer to. He agreed with Westrick that we should take a position on it. It would also be helpful for there to be a joint Allied statement about reunification. There had not been such a statement for some time.

The Secretary inquired if Schroeder attached any significance to the distinction between this treaty and a peace treaty. Schroeder replied in the affirmative. He said that a peace treaty would involve important arrangements in the field of European security, and these could not be undertaken as long as Germany was divided. The present treaty seemed to be a substitute, at least for the time being, for a peace treaty.

Westrick inquired whether Dobrynin had stated to the Secretary that the present treaty was not a peace treaty. The Secretary said that Dobrynin had only read an oral démarche and had added no comment./6/ He had not said that this was not a peace treaty or not to take it seriously.

/6/A memorandum of their June 8 conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV.

Westrick said he had been referring to the report in this morning's New York Times. Schroeder said this was probably just speculation. The Secretary said that maybe the Soviets had intimated something of the sort to the press in Moscow, but Dobrynin had intimated nothing at all to him beyond the oral démarche.

 

53. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 12, 1964, 3:40-4:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files, Lot 66 D 110, CF 2413. Secret. Drafted by Gilman and approved in ISA on June 24. The meeting was held in Secretary McNamara's office. McGhee discussed the offset negotiations in At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 143-145.

SUBJECT
Secretary McNamara's Meeting with FRG Chancellor Erhard 12 June 1964

PARTICIPANTS
German Side
Chancellor Ludwig Erhard
Minister for Foreign Affairs Gerhard Schroeder
Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
State Secretary Ludger Westrick
and others

United States Side
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) John T. McNaughton
Robbins P. Gilman, Department of State

1. Offset Agreement

Chancellor Erhard opened the discussion by referring to the offset agreements on military sales. He requested that the US not insist upon strict accounting and a balance sheet type of agreement signed by both parties. Such a rigid formula might become public and would cause others, for example the UK, to claim similar treatment. The Federal Government was perfectly willing to assist the US in its dollar balance difficulties. The Chancellor stated two reasons for this. First, the FRG balance of trade this year was favorable so that no difficulty was encountered on that score. Secondly, in light of the booming economic conditions in West Germany there were positive anti-inflation benefits to be gained by placing orders in the US. The Chancellor stressed the offset agreements were in the interest of both countries.

Secretary McNamara agreed that the offset arrangement should not be made public, nor should they become a cause for FRG embarrassment vis-à-vis the UK or other countries. He questioned, however, the remarks of the Chancellor as they affected actual performance. While the US Government was grateful for past purchases of the FRG, he was afraid that the size of the current FRG defense budget would not permit the purchase of a sufficiently large quantity of defense material to meet the need fully. The Chancellor replied that some purchases overlapped from one year to the next. Some years the amount might be more and some years less. It could be managed somehow so that the agreed amount of purchases were made. Secretary McNamara said, "You have said you will do it and that is all we want. We don't have to have a written agreement."

2. Viet-Nam

Secretary McNamara expressed his appreciation for the German support for US policy in Viet-Nam. Chancellor Erhard said he had been impressed by the seriousness with which President Johnson had spoken to him on the questions of Southeast Asia and Cuba. Mr. McNamara said that these questions were not only important for the US but also for Germany and Western Europe. The danger lay in the loss of this area to the Communists. The reliability of the United States to carry out its treaty obligations and the danger to adjacent countries in that part of the world was also at stake. Chancellor Erhard agreed that this was a bastion of the free world and that it would not be a good alliance if each partner were only concerned with those matters affecting its immediate geographic area. If freedom were threatened anywhere, the Chancellor said, it must be the concern of all members of the alliance. He was aware that freedom could easily be lost in Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Secretary McNamara said that he appreciated the medical unit which the Federal Government had said it would provide. The Chancellor noted, however, that this matter was still under consideration. The Secretary emphasized that the next few weeks would be very important in Laos and Viet-Nam. Our planes had orders to fire if fired upon, and since we expected group fire, some exchange was inevitable. The Chancellor asked about the morale in Viet-Nam. The Secretary replied that while the bulk of the populace was still under the control of the Government, they have suffered heavy casualties in the past nine years, they were fatigued and concerned about the future. The Viet Cong had made substantial progress since October. Taking everything into account Vietnamese morale was quite good.

The Secretary said that more substantial action by the United States might be necessary in the months ahead. The Chancellor asked whether Secretary McNamara felt anything could be gained from negotiations. The Secretary said, "No," and the Chancellor quickly agreed. Secretary McNamara felt all was not black, however, since the Chinese Communists and the Viet Cong had problems of their own.

Secretary McNamara noted that Hanoi has been silent with respect to the recent aircraft incidents, Peiping has not threatened force and delicate pressure should prevent further aggression.

In closing, the Secretary said that while the US would not expect military assistance from the Federal Republic, we would like to feel that we had support of the Germans for our policy in Southeast Asia. To this the Chancellor assented.

 

54. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 12, 1964, 4:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Erhard Visit, June 1964. Confidential. Drafted by C.K. Johnson. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

SUBJECT
USSR-"GDR" Treaty; Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Germans
Chancellor Erhard
Foreign Minister Schroeder
Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
State Secretary Ludger Westrick, Office of the Chancellor
State Secretary Karl Carstens, Foreign Office
State Secretary Karl-Guenther von Hase, Federal Press Office
Assistant Secretary Franz Krapf, Foreign Office
Karl Hohmann, Assistant Secretary, Office of the Chancellor
Horst Osterheld, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of the Chancellor
Herman Kusterer, Counselor, Foreign Office (Interpreter)

Americans
The President
The Secretary
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President
Governor Herter
Ambassador McGhee
Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State, EUR
Mr. George Reedy, Press Secretary, White House
Mr. Angier Biddle Duke, Chief of Protocol, Department of State
Mr. Charles K. Johnson, Office of German Affairs
Mrs. Nora M. Lejins, Interpreter

The first portion of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of the communiqué to be issued at the conclusion of the talks./2/ After agreement had been achieved on the final text, Chancellor Erhard remarked that we had now received the full text of the USSR-"GDR" treaty and asked what our reactions were.

/2/For text, see Public Papers of the President of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book I, pp. 771-773.

Secretary Rusk replied that after a first reading of the text, the treaty appeared to be what we expected--an attempt by Khrushchev to give something to Ulbricht without getting into the complexities of a peace treaty. He remarked that he was happy to see the language contained in Article 9 of the treaty./3/ On the other hand, the Secretary said, we need to watch the situation carefully to see that no steps are taken on the basis of the treaty which might tend to reduce Allied rights.

/3/It reads: "The present treaty does not affect the rights and commitments of the sides under the bilateral and other international agreements which are in force, including the Potsdam agreement."

Secretary Rusk then stated he would like to express our concern about the situation in Cyprus./4/ As Foreign Minister Schroeder would recall, at the recent NATO meeting in The Hague it was agreed by all parties that war between Greece and Turkey was an unthinkable eventuality. The situation has now become more dangerous; the Turkish Cypriots seem to be in a more critical position. The Greek Government appears to fear employing its maximum pressure on Archbishop Makarios out of concern that Makarios will turn to the Soviet Union. The United States has been making representations to both sides. Our clear position is that there must be no war between the Greeks and the Turks, and that both sides must exert every possible influence to maintain law and order and find an agreed solution promptly. We had had a very tight situation recently when the Turks were at the point of intervening militarily. Under Secretary Ball's mission had been undertaken in order to insist in both capitals on moves to stabilize the situation. In view of this situation, we believe it is important for all NATO members to make clear in both capitals the nature of their concern. Secretary Rusk said that we will keep in touch with the FRG on this situation. We hope that the FRG will insist firmly in Athens and Ankara on the idea that peace must be maintained.

/4/Reference is to the mobilization of Turkish forces following the outbreak of intercommunal fighting.

Chancellor Erhard expressed his agreement with what Secretary Rusk had said and asserted that the FRG will make further efforts to make reason prevail.

 

55. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Posts in European Economic Community Capitals/1/

Washington, June 13, 1964, 5:36 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-GRAINS-EEC. Limited Official Use. Drafted and approved by Greenwald. Pouched to posts in EFTA capitals.

2339. Following is resume of points made by Herter in discussion with Erhard June 13 in response to question: "Does the United States consider that a unified grains price decision in the EEC now is indispensable to the success of the Kennedy Round?":

1. A unified grains price decision now is not indispensable as far as the United States is concerned. We believe that negotiations on industrial products, agricultural products other than grains, and even on grains, could be carried right up to the concluding stage in Geneva without a unified grains price decision, if the EEC negotiator were in a position to negotiate on these matters.

2. In the view of the United States, the problem seems to lie therefore not in Geneva but in Brussels. It seems to have become an indispensable element in the internal bargaining situation with the EEC that the unified grains price decision be made now and that in the absence of such a decision the EEC representatives will be unable to enter into negotiations on virtually any matter in Geneva.

3. Unless the capabilities of the EEC to negotiate on industrial products and on agricultural products including grains is restored in one way or another, the timetable and even the final results of the Kennedy Round could be put in serious jeopardy. The preparations for the tabling of exceptions lists (which in the view of the United States must be done simultaneously for industry and agriculture) must be resumed at the latest by the end of the summer holidays if we are to meet the target date of November 16. In view of the already serious delays in the past, such further delays in the progress of the Kennedy Round would seriously endanger the negotiations. That would create a situation where the negotiations might well fail or at best be seriously impaired.

4. As far as the United States is concerned, the question of a unified grains price can in any case not be seen in isolation. While the United States wishes to see the lowest possible grains price in the Community, it is clear that any such price now being considered is so high as to require assurances for the maintenance of grain imports.

Full report of conversation follows./2/

/2/A memorandum of the Erhard-Herter conversation was transmitted in airgram CA-13427, June 22. (Ibid.)

Rusk

 

56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/

Washington, June 15, 1964, 12:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted and approved by Creel and cleared by P and EUR. Repeated to Berlin.

3590. Prior Chancellor Erhard's departure from Washington June 13, Secretary handed him following message from President:

"Dear Mr. Chancellor:

As you leave Washington, I want to tell you how much I have appreciated even this brief opportunity to renew our friendship. Our talks on the problems which confront us have been as always most helpful to me, and I am convinced that they have further strengthened the firm bonds of friendship and understanding between our two countries.

I am mindful of the fact that a few days from now, on June seventeenth, you will be commemorating in the Federal Republic the Day of German Unity. As I told you here, it is a fundamental objective of American foreign policy to help bring an end to the unjust division of the German people, because otherwise there can be no real and durable stability in Europe. The Day of German Unity--June seventeenth--has therefore come to assume a special significance as we look forward to the day when German unity will become a reality. I take pleasure in sending you special greetings on this occasion.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson."

Federal Press Chief von Hase was told there would be no objection to publication of letter, with timing to be left to Germans.

Request Embassy check with von Hase to ascertain when Germans plan publish letter in order similar release may be made here.

Rusk

 

57. Memorandum for the Files/1/

Washington, June 16, 1964.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, PPV 7 GER W-US. Confidential. Drafted by Tyler. Copies were sent to the White House and to GER.

SUBJECT
Article by Bonn Correspondent of the Washington Post dated June 15, 1964/2/

/2/Entitled "Bonn Balks at New U.S. Germany Policy."

Following a call from Mr. Klein at the White House, I told the Secretary of State that President Johnson was greatly disturbed by this article and by the fact that, according to information from our Embassy in Bonn (Bonn's telegram 4666)/3/ it was based on a briefing by the Federal Press Office. The President wanted someone to call Ambassador McGhee and ask him to go to see the Chancellor right away, expressing the President's concern at the origin and effect of this article, and asking if the German Government could set the record straight right away. The Secretary then read the article and agreed that I should call Ambassador McGhee along the foregoing lines.

/3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, PPV 7 GER W-US)

I reached Ambassador McGhee at about 10:15, apprised him of the situation and dictated to his secretary the most important and obnoxious passages of the article in question. The Ambassador, who had not seen the text of the article, expressed his dismay and concern that such an article could have been published at all, let alone the fact that it purported to reflect official German views. He said he would ask to see the Chancellor immediately. I also asked the Ambassador to tell the Chancellor that we would like to publish the President's letter to him of June 13 and the Chancellor's own message to the President of the following day./4/

/4/See Document 56. Erhard's reply is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. The exchange of letters was not published.

WRT

 

58. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, June 17, 1964, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Berlin, vol. 1. Secret; Limdis.

3801. Department telegrams 3650 and 3651./2/ Emb had hoped that public knowledge of tripartite démarche in Moscow in advance of announcement of Soviet-GDR treaty as well as President's letter to Erhard endorsing reunification/3/ as major Western policy objective would have satisfied FedRep need. Obviously latest FedRep initiative in Ambassadorial Group indicates Bonn believes further action required to cope with internal FedRep political pressures.

/2/Telegram 3650 to Moscow, April 9, reported on discussions with British and German officials regarding the Kennedy Round. (Department of State, Central Files, FT 13-2 US) Telegram 3651 was not found.

/3/For text of the démarche, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 869-872. For President Johnson's letter, see Document 56.

We would hope that in deciding form and content of response due consideration would be given to elements in Moscow picture which account in large measure for Soviet handling of Ulbricht visit, including particularly unorthodox private "reassurances" to Western Three as to significance of Sov-GDR treaty. At risk of seeming to plead Moscow's case, we would point out that Sov behavior could be rationalized as calculated effort to reconcile internal pressures within own camp with desire to maintain impetus for improving relations with West, including FRG. Specifically, Moscow may have regarded treaty of friendship as relatively safe maneuver which would in part satisfy East German pressure for cashing in on Khrushchev's 1958 ultimatum/4/ (confirming GDR frontiers, restating refusal countenance FRG proprietary interests in West Berlin) and at same time, by its confirmation Quadripartite responsibilities, avoid triggering Allied reaction resulting in crisis situation which Moscow obviously wished avoid. Moscow would undoubtedly find it difficult to maintain this posture of "restraint" if further Allied moves effected in such way as to compel vigorous rejoinder. In context struggle with Peiping, Sovs cannot afford to appear soft toward West and FRG and weak in defense of a socialist ally. ChiComs apparently have already started flogging Moscow on issue and Soviet concern is reflected by Izvestiya June 16 attempted rebuttal of ChiCom charge that treaty did not change "one iota situation of GDR." We not in position judge East German reaction to visit but entirely possible that ChiCom attack based on evidence unhappiness of Ulbricht and others with results of visit.

/4/Reference is to Khrushchev's November 10, 1958, address. For extracts, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 542-546.

In circumstances if action required to reassure West German public, we would share British preference (Deptel 3663)/5/ for some form public declaration, which reaffirms our understanding of situation in unprovocative terms requiring minimum response from this government. Time for protest, it seems to us, will come if Soviets choose draw some legal consequences from paragraph in treaty about West Berlin being separate entity.

/5/Not found.

Stoessel

 

59. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (Kitchen) to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow)/1/

Washington, June 19, 1964.

/1/Source: Department of State, German Desk Files: Lot 76 D 170, Pol 32-4 Ger. Secret. Copies were sent to Ball, Harriman, Johnson, Thompson, Tyler, Hughes, Creel, and Klein at the White House.

SUBJECT
The US and German Unity: A Policy of Movement

The discussion at the Secretary's Policy Planning Meeting/2/ of the S/P paper/3/ causes us to offer the following comments and suggestions for consideration in any revision of the paper.

/2/Secretary Rusk's appointment books indicate he met with the Policy Planning Council at 9:17 a.m. (Johnson Library)

/3/The paper, entitled "The United States and German Unity: A Policy of Movement," April 2, is not printed. It was initially presented to an April 9 meeting of the Policy Planning Council. (Department of State, German Desk Files: Lot 76 D 170, Pol 32-4 Ger),

The Secretary asked why we could not take advantage of frequent Soviet statements (the most recent of which appeared in the USSR-GDR Treaty of Friendship of June 12) that reunification is an internal German problem and let the East and West Germans sit down and work things out for themselves. This points to one specific area in which the paper might probe more deeply; the options available to US policy.

As the Secretary pointed out, we must attempt to find some way for the West Germans to talk with the East Germans without allowing the vexing recognition issue to arise as an immediate impediment. We know the East Germans would immediately seek to use negotiations as a vehicle for obtaining recognition. In this connection the question of whether the Federal Republic will deal with the Ulbricht regime or with a more appealing leadership that might emerge from an internal liberalization process is not really relevant. At least for the immediate future, no East German government can abandon or relegate to secondary position, the objective of obtaining co-equal status with the Federal Republic in any bilateral talks.

A way to break out of this vicious circle, and to give more substance to the policy of movement in a manner acceptable to the West Germans, would be to establish a Four Power aegis under which East and West Germans could meet. As you know, the Ambassadorial Group has for some time been considering a West German Initiative on Reunification. One aspect of the German proposal is the creation of a Permanent Council of the Four Powers, the principal task of which would be to work out a plan for phased reunification accompanied by corresponding measures in the field of European security. The Council is also to prepare in cooperation with "German agencies" an electoral law and to deal with "further measures" regarding the German question.

We suggest considering the desirability of proposing to the Germans--and the British and French--modifications to the plan whereby the subjects to be discussed by "German agencies" under the aegis of the Four Power Council would be expanded to include an agreed "list of issues" such as you suggested at the Planning Meeting. I believe a mandate from the Four Powers would largely remove the sting of the recognition issue from such East-West German discussions and would, therefore, be more palatable to the West Germans than the direct talks we are urging upon them. It would also serve to reaffirm the basic responsibilities of the Four Powers for reunification.

At least two elements add to the urgency with which this should be considered. As we read the USSR-GDR Friendship Treaty, one of its purposes is to reinforce the division of Germany and enhance the prestige of the East German government preparatory to possible new GDR initiatives vis-à-vis the Federal Republic. It would therefore be desirable to launch an initiative soon (the form in which this is done, i.e. as a tripartite document, is far less important than the substance of the move) and to pre-empt anything Ulbricht may have up his sleeve. The fact that this is an election year in West Germany increases the odds that he will want to add fuel to a political campaign in which the reunification issue will inevitably come to the fore. The second element making for urgency is that quadripartite action on the German initiative has been slow. Ambassador McGhee has pointed out it is possible that the French and British may go along with the German initiative and that we may be saddled with the onus of obstructing it.

We have, of course, no assurance the Soviets will agree to form such a Four Power Council. However, since they have been urging us to agree to joint East-West German discussions on reunification, they might find acceptable a proposal to bring about such discussions under Four-Power auspices. If they reject it, we have lost nothing. In addition to being responsive to the Secretary's desire to take them up on their past statements, we would (a) have buttressed our position vis-à-vis the West German Government by going along with its wish for action in the reunification field; (b) be in a favorable position to put the Soviets on the defensive on the German issue; (c) have placed the Federal Republic in a better position to reject GDR overtures that may come soon. If the Soviets accept, we will have brought East and West Germans together in a manner acceptable to the Bonn Regime and one that would not embarrass it in the eyes of the electorate.

While this proposal would give substance to the policy of movement vis-à-vis East Germany and fit in with our "détente" policy in a manner consistent with German objectives, we should also explore the possibilities of a West German policy of movement vis-à-vis the Eastern European satellites other than the GDR. It is important to distinguish between these two policies, though we do not consider them to be mutually exclusive. Rather, we regard them as complementary. The purpose of a policy of movement vis-à-vis the EE satellites would be to stimulate polycentrist tendencies within the Bloc and to alienate the GDR from the satellites. This is essentially Schroeder's policy and we should examine the desirability of pushing the Federal Republic further along this road. Already there has been some success in the economic agreements concluded between Bonn and some of the satellites. To the extent these contain "Berlin clauses" they directly contravene the political claims of the GDR in the Berlin question.

Any revision of the S/P paper might also examine the question whether a modification of the Hallstein Doctrine toward greater flexibility vis-à-vis EE satellites (other than the GDR) would not be in our and the Federal Republic's long range interests. Similarly, a non-aggression pact between Bonn and Warsaw might go some way toward reducing Polish fears of West German revanchism and further isolate the GDR. The West Germans might thereby succeed not only in driving a wedge into the Warsaw Pact; the more isolated the GDR feels, the more telling West German pressures might become in the afore-mentioned East-West German dialogue.

In sum, we think the question is not whether a policy of movement is more desirable than the other two alternatives posited in the paper (Stabilization or Force Majeure), but what our options are within the policy of movement and where they would lead us.

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