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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968 Washington, DC |
60. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/Bonn, July 6, 1964, 11 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 4. Secret; Nodis. A notation on the source text reads: "Bundy. No other distribution."
47. For the President, Secretary and Under Secretary only. I called on the Chancellor today at his request. I had been told that he wished to inform the President of the results of his meeting, held on July 3 and 4, with General de Gaulle./2/ The Chancellor prefaced his remarks by stating that what he had to tell me was of such a confidential nature that he would appreciate it if I could by some arrangement see that the message I would send the President was destroyed after it had been read. If any of his confidential revelations of what had taken place in his talks with General de Gaulle became public, it would be extremely embarrassing to him. Although I did not commit precisely to such a procedure, I assured him that special precautions would be taken.
/2/They met July 3-4 at Bonn to discuss European defense and cooperation.
The Chancellor continued that the talks had been "tough" ones. He had made it clear that he could not agree to de Gaulle's concepts. He had told de Gaulle that the decisive point for him was his relationship with America. He had said to de Gaulle that he (de Gaulle) seemed "to have the impression that we Germans are vassals to America. This is not true." De Gaulle had attempted to persuade him that the American policy of détente would lead to the abandonment by the U.S. of efforts toward German reunification. Erhard had attempted to persuade him otherwise. In a situation of tension there is less possibility that offers toward reunification would be successful. Without close ties with America, Europe has no protection. Germany would never renounce its ties with the United States.
De Gaulle proposed that Germany and France should together develop a European policy. The Chancellor replied that this is fine, but why should there be any insurmountable differences between such a policy and American policy? For that matter, the whole free world should have similar policies. De Gaulle had pointed out some of the existing differences in policy--making particular reference to China. Erhard had explained the current American attitude toward China, pointing out that the situation in South-East Asia, in which China was deeply involved, was a matter of "life and death" for America. Under such circumstances he felt that Germany must be loyal to its ally. De Gaulle had taken the line that the U.S. would inevitably become so involved in its contest with China, that we would seek an accommodation with the Soviets at the expense of the German problem. Germany must look to Europe for a solution to its problems.
Erhard had repeated that Europe could not get along without the United States. In the event the U.S. withdrew, the Soviets would be tempted to make some adventure in Europe. De Gaulle had not understood the U.S. and German objectives in seeking a détente.
The Chancellor then proceeded to describe General de Gaulle's real views as to how he felt European unity could be achieved, which was basically through the development of a much closer relationship (almost a union) between Germany and France with, he added as his own interpretation, "Germany as a vassal." Germany and France would take the decisions, presumably with little consultation with others, who would then be "forced to their knees." Erhard had asked de Gaulle how he could expect the smaller nations to accept such dictation. He pointed out that they would be in the same relationship to France and Germany that de Gaulle says Europe is to the U.S.
The Chancellor reported that his private discussion with General de Gaulle was often "dramatic." De Gaulle had said, "We can unite Europe if you will only take a decision favorable to France. This is not possible because of your ties with the U.S." Erhard had replied, "Germany must have an alliance with the United States. However, this is not directed against France." He pointed out to de Gaulle that de Gaulle himself had, in their previous meetings, stressed that the Franco-German treaty was not directed against the U.S. and that he, de Gaulle, had wanted an alliance with the U.S. Erhard said he had told de Gaulle that before Europe could act, as such, it must first unite. Germany and France could not act more closely in concert until they could reach a larger area of agreement on fundamental issues--such as NATO. France appears to favor a NATO composed of national armies, whereas Germany prefers an integrated force. He asked General de Gaulle how Europe could be defended without a NATO including the U.S.?
The Chancellor, in order to bring out de Gaulle's views, said that he had told de Gaulle that he assumed, after the U.S. election, de Gaulle would wish to meet with President Johnson. At this time he would have to discuss the NATO problem. What would he tell President Johnson? He characterized de Gaulle's reply to this question as the first clear expression he had ever heard of de Gaulle's real views. De Gaulle had replied that his concept involved the United States on the one hand, and a united Europe on the other strong enough to be an equal partner with the United States. An alliance would then be negotiated between the two providing for their mutual protection.
Erhard had replied that he was anxious to help in developing such a plan, but what, for example, were de Gaulle's concepts of the plan in its strategic, financial and other specific aspects? Would it mean, for example, that France and Germany will in the future supply arms to Greece and Turkey that are now being supplied by the U.S.? Does he imply that there will be equal nuclear strength in Europe and the United States? Present U.S. nuclear strength is much greater than that of the force de frappe. If Europe insists on making its decisions independently, it is not realistic to expect America to continue to defend Europe. What would be the position of Europe in the meantime? What would constitute its nuclear defense? Would the force de frappe be a European force, available for the defense of all of Europe, or a French force?
De Gaulle had replied bluntly that it would be a French force. The Chancellor had responded that he would rather be dependent on the U.S. than France for Germany's nuclear protection. Sensing that his reply had been too absolute, General de Gaulle had then sought to soften it, saying that perhaps the U.K. would also make its nuclear force available to Europe. Perhaps there would be a European government which would control its own nuclear force. The Chancellor had replied that de Gaulle's nationalistic approach precluded the creation of a European government. De Gaulle did not disagree with him.
At this juncture Minister Westrick intervened to comment that I should know that a Die Welt article, written from Paris just before de Gaulle's visit, was known to have been inspired by de Gaulle. This article had said in effect that all of de Gaulle's efforts up to this point to unite Europe had failed. Presumably this was Germany's fault. The purpose of the article had, according to Westrick, been to prove that the only remaining alternative lay in what de Gaulle had now proposed--a Europe based on closer German-French cooperation.
The Chancellor, in response to my question, said that he and de Gaulle had not discussed the Common Market nor the grain price question. This had been left for the Ministers concerned. The position of the U.K. had not come up either. If Wilson comes in, he anticipated that Britain would probably not apply for membership in the Common Market. Although it was not said, he assumed de Gaulle would oppose U.K. entry in any event. De Gaulle's ideas for the political unity of Europe seem to go beyond the Common Market. He seemed to feel that the group he was seeking could exclude some of the Six--and might include others outside the Six. Erhard confided that he himself had sometimes wondered whether it would be necessary to include all of the Six in a European political union.
The Chancellor admitted that the results of the discussions were meager. De Gaulle was not willing to take steps toward European political union along the lines Germany envisaged. De Gaulle was not thinking even in terms of a revived Fouchet Plan,/3/ but a French-German (with Germany as a vassal) hegemony over Europe. Erhard was, however, not yet willing to give up, and had agreed with de Gaulle that their FonMins would study the unity question further between them and produce a draft which could be reviewed at a later date. When de Gaulle had mentioned to him the desirability of their coordinating their foreign policies, he had said, "You say you want to work out common foreign policies, however, I hear of your policies only in the paper," mentioning de Gaulle's policy toward China, Israel and the Arab states, and Greece and Turkey. "You are asking me to sign blank checks."
/3/Reference is to a plan for a draft treaty of a "Union of European States" developed in 1961 by an EEC Committee headed by Daniel Fouchet.
The Chancellor then asked me rather abruptly whether we had any suggestions as to how we could improve our own relations with de Gaulle. He had been thinking that, after being rebuffed by him (Erhard), de Gaulle might as a tactic turn to the United States.
I replied that we would welcome an improvement in our relations with de Gaulle. President Kennedy had been disappointed not to have been able to meet with him following his visit to Germany. I felt sure that President Johnson would, after his election, be glad to meet with de Gaulle if it appeared that anything constructive could be achieved. Our impression, however, was that de Gaulle was so inflexible on so many points of policy diametrically opposed to ours, that it would be impossible to reach agreement with him short of abandoning our policies. I assured him, however, that we would never reach an understanding with de Gaulle at the expense of the Germans or agree to let de Gaulle speak for Germany or Europe.
The Chancellor speculated that de Gaulle's thinking might turn to a French-German-US-UK grouping, whose leadership he thought the other European countries would accept. There was no reason why this could not be accomplished within NATO. The Chancellor did not, however, appear to be proposing this himself.
Comment: Although some reports about the impasse reached in the discussions between Erhard and de Gaulle are circulating around Bonn, not even Foreign Office officials appear as yet to have a detailed version of what took place. One report, probably accurate, is that de Gaulle's relatively restrained attitude on Saturday morning was the result of his conversation with Adenauer, during which the latter asked that the French President take a less rigid and extreme position since adherence to the latter could only weaken that wing of the CDU/CSU which favored even closer Franco-German cooperation.
The President and Department may wish to consider a response to the Chancellor from the President, including as a minimum an expression of appreciation for his confidence. Such a response might, however, be utilized to convey substantive comment on some of the issues raised by the Chancellor from an overall U.S. viewpoint.
McGhee
61. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, July 8, 1964, 6:37 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 4. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted in the White House and approved by Read.
67. For Ambassador from McGeorge Bundy.
1. The President asks you to call on Chancellor promptly to express President's deep appreciation for highly confidential message conveyed in your 47/2/ and to convey following message in reply.
/2/Document 60.
2. President is most grateful for the Chancellor's confidence and will insure that there is no disclosure of the contents of his message, or indeed of its existence.
3. On substance, the President finds himself in full agreement with views expressed by Chancellor, and in particular re-emphasizes his conviction that it can never be useful for Germany to be forced to a choice between France and the United States. We are all members of the same alliance. The US continues to believe that interdependence of Europe and America is inescapable reality upon which policy of all must be based. President believes that de Gaulle's proposals to the Chancellor fly in the face of this reality, and that it is of highest importance that de Gaulle should learn to recognize the firmness and rightness of the position the Chancellor put forward. Thus although President regrets any argument among allies, he cannot but send his thanks to Chancellor for the position he stoutly and clearly set forth to de Gaulle.
4. You can reassure Chancellor once more that US would welcome an improvement of relations with de Gaulle and will always be ready for serious discussion with France. Moreover, US will not squabble publicly with de Gaulle. At the same time Chancellor can be quite sure, as you have already said, that the US will never make any private agreement with de Gaulle or anyone else at expense of Germans. Nor can US regard the General as spokesman for Europe.
5. President hopes that as time passes it may be possible to make new beginnings toward stronger partnership, always with room for France and never with any thought of exclusiveness. This is immediate value of MLF, and the President repeats his belief that it will be important to move ahead promptly with this major undertaking in the last months of 1964.
6. If there should be any fresh prospect of wider agreement among Germany, France, US, UK and Italy, President would gladly lead new and strong effort by all to move forward. Please note inclusion of Italy, whose solidity in Alliance needs constant attention.
7. The President values your prompt and comprehensive report of Chancellor's extraordinarily revealing conversation and sends thanks.
Ball
62. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, July 11, 1964, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 4. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
120. White House for the President and McGeorge Bundy; Dept for the Secretary and Under Secretary. The timely, clear and forceful message from the President, through McGeorge Bundy, contained in Deptel 67 (Nodis),/2/ has been most helpful. Although I have not yet been able to convey it personally to the Chancellor, whom I will see Monday afternoon,/3/ I did convey its content yesterday to Minister Westrick and in a meeting this morning with Westrick at which time we had a link with the Chancellor.
/2/Document 61.
/3/July 14. McGhee reported on his talks with Erhard in telegram 139 from Bonn, July 14. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 4) McGhee reiterated President Johnson's message, the two men discussed internal German political developments, and the Ambassador provided his analysis. McGhee commented on the Erhard-de Gaulle talks in At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 149-150.
The Chancellor's immediate reaction was to thank the President for his prompt response and to say that he was satisfied with it and felt more secure as a result of it. The message from the President will be of particular help to the Chancellor today as he prepares his critical speech for the CSU meeting in Bavaria tomorrow, and in his meeting with Barzel and other CDU party leaders Monday. The Chancellor expressed interest in the President's suggestion for increased emphasis on Atlantic partnership and prospects for an initiative by the President on a wider agreement among Germany, France, the U.S., U.K. and Italy. His immediate reaction was favorable, however, he would give thought to the matter and discuss it further with me on Monday.
Other information provided by Westrick may be of interest in put-ting together the fast-moving picture here. Westrick said that the Chancellor, who was in Denmark at the time, was greatly disturbed by the meeting between Strauss and Adenauer on Monday, despite the fact, as we know, that Adenauer really tried to calm Strauss down. The public did not know this, and the press subsequently built up the concept of an attack against Erhard by an Adenauer-Strauss-Dufhues grouping. This is why the Chancellor struck back even while still in Denmark, and why he saw Adenauer immediately upon his return Wednesday morning. He had found Adenauer in quite a conciliatory mood. Together they had, at Westrick's suggestion, called Strauss, with Adenauer telling Strauss not to "beat the drum." Strauss had replied indignantly that he had no intention of "beating the drum" and his speech in Munich (Munich's 24 to Dept)/4/ indicates that whatever his intentions had been he did not in fact do so.
/4/Dated July 10. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR)
Westrick said that the foremost point of irritation on the part of the French, particularly Couve de Murville, during the talks, seemed to be German support of U.S. policy in South Vietnam. Couve characterized German policy as a "satellite policy." The Germans had, however, remained firm on the basis of their loyalty to the U.S.
Westrick said that the Chancellor had, since his return, been provided ample evidence of the overwhelming national backing that he had in pursuing his present policy line. Yesterday the leaders of German industry, including Fritz Berg, head of the Federation of German Industries, and Dr. Schneider, head of the German Chamber of Commerce, called on the Chancellor to assure him of the support of the business community. According to Westrick, the group in opposition is now really negligible--and without Adenauer has no force.
Comment: Our comment and appraisal of the overall situation resulting from the de Gaulle visit will be contained in a separate telegram following the meetings on Monday. It is clear, however, that Erhard has won an important victory within his own party, which may have far-reaching effects, and that he has been reinforced in his determination to pursue European political unity on a broad basis--firmly within the ambit of Atlantic partnership with the U.S. The strong support of the President, as conveyed in his message, has helped Erhard greatly during this critical period.
McGhee
63. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Bonn, July 21, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GER W-US. Secret.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
When the Attorney General was here recently,/2/ both Erhard and Schroeder made a point of speaking to him about their interest in improving relations with Poland, and their hope that he might be able to put in a word for the Federal Republic while in Warsaw. They admitted that their difficulty with regard to the Poles lay in their inability to give assurances with respect to the Oder-Neisse frontier. The Chancellor said that the Germans could not hand over to the Poles the Oder-Neisse territory on a golden tray, since according to the Potsdam Agreement the 1937 frontiers were valid until the peace treaty was signed. The Chancellor added that it was implicit, however, that the new frontiers would not be the old frontiers.
/2/The Embassy reported on Robert Kennedy's June 25 visit to Bonn in telegram 4867, June 26. (Ibid., POL 32-4 GER)
As can be gathered from the press accounts (which is all that we have received), the Attorney General has done yeoman's work in Poland/3/ by his public references to the urgency of overcoming the division in Europe following from the division in Germany, and by intimating that in his opinion a way could be found to settle the frontier question satisfactorily. The Germans have been very grateful for this. It has been commented upon by the press, by officials to me personally, and by a number of high ecclesiastics who were at the Papal Nuncio's reception recently. It has set me thinking--indeed crystallized a feeling that I have had for some time--that conceivably we might, through Foy Kohler, be able in Moscow to do something toward the same end.
/3/Kennedy visited Poland June 27-July 1.
The question of whether we could do something--by quiet private talks, more or less directed towards planting a seed--is easier to answer than the question of what precisely we would put up to the Soviets. I have no illusions about the political and psychological difficulties which have brought about the impasse during the past 19 years. In essence the problem is whether there is anything which can be done which would lead Moscow to take a more friendly attitude toward Bonn.
I am well aware, for example, of the obstacles here to any significant actions by the Germans on their frontier problem, such as a relinquishment of the hypothetical legal claim to the Oder-Neisse territories which is still stubbornly maintained by all elements in Germany. I can easily imagine the questions about this and other issues that would confront Foy during his discussions in Moscow. All the same, the more I reflect about it, the more I am convinced that these people are still victims of a false perspective, a perspective which may have had some validity a dozen years ago, but with each passing year becomes more unrealistic--and that they will in time see this.
The Soviet leadership will undoubtedly continue to evaluate its relationships with "capitalist" countries in terms of Communist ideological and tactical considerations. This would presumably apply to the Federal Republic as well as to us. However, there have been indications in recent years that Khrushchev is willing to adopt a somewhat more flexible approach in his relations with certain key countries, without regard to whether these relations may seem entirely consistent with the long-run goal of establishing the Communist system throughout the world.
As you know, the Germans, despite their stress on the continuing Communist menace and the argument made by many that the Soviet Union rather than Communist China remains the primary menace to the free world, are quite willing to consider ways and means of improving their relations with the Russians. Erhard, for example, continues to toy with the notion that German economic resources can somehow be brought to bear in a favorable way to move towards the solution of the reunification problem. I know that the Department does not consider this feasible, but perhaps there is some hope in a step-to-step approach which might at least lead to a bettering of relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union and the end of mutual name-calling.
What I have in mind is that by a process of very careful exploration, by Foy in Moscow and by me in Bonn, we might plant the useful idea that the Federal Republic is interested in improving its relations with the Soviet Union, is even prepared to pay a certain price for this and that consequently, at least in part, the admittedly sincere Soviet fears of the Federal Republic might bear reexamining.
We might, first of all, attempt to persuade the Soviets that present-day Germany is not militaristic--nor in any way controlled by militarists. It might, for example, be suggested that the present agitation in the Federal Republic over its armed forces, precipitated by the Heye Report,/4/ is a healthy sign of both popular and governmental concern. Propaganda aside, the new German army is not simply a latter-day model of the old imperial or Nazi army. It places special emphasis on the role of the individual in a "citizen" army. They have a special institute and training in this concept. All German forces are fully integrated into NATO, and their role is conceived of as purely defensive. We are in a position to vouch for the fact that the Federal Republic has no aggressive intentions and that there is neither governmental nor popular support for any adventuristic policy.
/4/Reference is to statements in the annual report of the Federal Parliament's Defense Commissioner, retired Admiral Heye, criticizing "excessive elite consciousness" in the military.
It might also be pointed out that the Federal Republic continues to grow rapidly in economic prosperity and has become one of the foremost trading nations of the world. It is prepared to expand its trade relations, on a basis of mutual interest, with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It might be noted that there are obvious limits to what can be done here, but that the German attitude appears reasonable and does provide a basis for improved relations (we would not at this point, of course, want to get into the subject of long-term credits).
Another point which might be made is that the Federal Republic has renounced the use of force to effect any changes in national frontiers or demarcation lines. This, in our view, is a solid and lasting commitment, and propaganda implying that the Federal Republic is in the hands of militarists who are ready to spring at any moment is both unrealistic and self-defeating. Such propaganda cannot really be taken seriously as an estimate either of German capabilities or of German public opinion and the intentions of its leaders.
It might be stressed that a very convincing proof of the real attitude of the Federal Government to Germany's Nazi past is the fact that the Government has, in a spirit of contrition and reparation, sponsored programs involving the expenditure of many billions of marks in an effort to make restitution to victims of Nazi persecution. These programs continue up to the present and have recently been supplemented by new legislation.
I will, of course, be willing to do anything in Bonn which might be useful to supplement what Foy does in Moscow. I should welcome receiving any thoughts or advice you may have on the feasibility of this approach. I have taken the liberty of sending a copy of this to Foy, with the suggestion that he comment directly to us both.
With best regards,
George C. McGhee
64. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, August 7, 1964, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential. The telegram is summarized in McGhee, At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 150-152.
166. Eyes only for: the Secretary, Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary Tyler. From Ambassador McGhee. In my meeting yesterday with FonMin Schroeder at his vacation residence on the Island of Sylt, he asked that I convey to the Secretary his regret, not only because of the problems for the US but also for the added burdens for the Secretary personally, that have been created by the North Vietnamese attack on our naval vessels./2/ He wanted to assure the Secretary of his strong personal support, as well as that of the German Government.
/2/Reference is to the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, August 2-4.
In a long talk with the FonMin over much of the afternoon, he gave me some insight into his personal situation which might be of interest. Schroeder, who has since the de Gaulle visit of July 3-4 been under constant attack from the Gaullist wing of the CDU and CSU, advised that he had last week met with Chancellor Adenauer for two hours and had, he believed, made peace with him. Indeed, he feels that he is now in better graces with Adenauer than is Erhard, whom Adenauer has never ceased to disparage and undercut.
Schroeder did not consider that any issue of importance remained between himself and Adenauer arising out of the latter's views toward de Gaulle and France. He had assured Adenauer that he would, in his quest for European unity pursuant to the undertaking made during the de Gaulle visit, propose no development of supranational institutions--since he knows de Gaulle would never approve. When I queried him as to what he would propose he was not clear, but indicated some embellished form of the Fouchet Plan. Although he has not mentioned it to the Chancellor he is considering visiting the various capitals of the Six in order to determine what area of agreement for political unity exists before submitting his final proposals.
Schroeder feels that although basically orientated towards de Gaulle and France, Adenauer by no means follows slavishly all of de Gaulle's policies. Adenauer is, for example, still for the MLF. In Schroeder's view it is, however, most unfortunate that Adenauer was chosen as head of the CDU party, which greatly complicated his and Erhard's problems.
Schroeder feels that the French will step up their campaign against the MLF, seeking to persuade the Germans that they can rely on the force de frappe. He asked me, in this connection, to provide him convincing answers to the impressive arguments the Gaullist elements in Germany are presently using in favor of the force de frappe. I will take this matter up separately with Jerry Smith.
Schroeder expressed no particular concern over his relations with Erhard, although it is obvious that there is not very close coordination--perhaps not even much rapport--between the two. He had, for example, not been advised that the Chancellor had responded to the President's letter./3/ This is but one of many examples that we find that the Chancellery, run by Minister Westrick who has a tendency to handle matters himself, operates to a very large extent in isolation from the FonOff.
/3/President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard exchanged communications over the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, August 4 and 6, respectively. Texts are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Germany.
Calhoun
65. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee)/1/
Washington, August 13, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of Stare, Central Files, POL 7 GER W-US. Secret. A copy was sent to Kohler. A memorandum attached to the source text states that the letter was drafted by Creel.
Dear George:
We have read with interest your letter of July 21/2/ setting forth certain suggestions as to what might be done to try to help improve relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. We have also noted your supplementary comment in Bonn's 370 of July 29, and Foy Kohler's observations on the subject in Moscow's 364 of August 3./3/
/2/Document 63.
/3/Neither printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-USSR)
We definitely agree, of course, that an improvement in relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union is a very desirable goal and something which, within the limits of our resources, we should continue discreetly to work for. An important part of the problem, as you suggest, is to try to correct some of the misconceptions and misimpressions which appear to exist in the minds of the Soviets about the true state of affairs in the Federal Republic. The Adzhubei visit may well have, as you indicate, served a useful purpose in this regard, and the same might be true of a Khrushchev visit to the Federal Republic should this materialize.
As for what we can do ourselves in this area, I think there are certain limitations on our capabilities. I am impressed by the point made by Foy that in the final analysis the Soviets are not so much interested in what we might ourselves say or think about the Germans as they are in what the Germans say and do themselves. Furthermore, the extent of the Soviet commitment to Ulbricht & Co. will probably make it difficult for Moscow to move very far in the direction of conciliation with Bonn, even with Erhard rather than Adenauer as Chancellor.
Nevertheless, I agree fully with you that this is a subject of great importance and that we should continue, in our contacts with the Soviets and Germans, to do what we can to help improve at least the atmospherics in FRG/Soviet relations. I feel sure, for example, that there will be opportunities for improvement in East/West relations to which the Federal Republic could contribute, through collaboration with us and by initiative of its own.
I am happy to note that you and Foy will be getting together in the near future to talk, among other things, about the ideas set out in your July 21 letter. I shall await with interest the further views of you both.
Thanks also for your letter of July 25/4/ forwarding von Hassel's Tutzing speech.
/4/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 7 GER W-USSR)
Sincerely,
Dean
66. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, August 14, 1964, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-3 GER-POL. Confidential. Repeated to Prague, Moscow, Warsaw, Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, Stuttgart, Dusseldorf, and Bremen.
590. Subj: The Oder-Neisse Line. Ref: Embtel 2432, Deptel 2026./2/ The following represents our current thinking on the general question of Germany's eastern boundary. We have benefited from a discussion on this subject during the past few days with Ambassador Kohler. The Dept's study (Research Project No. 677 of April 1964)/3/ on the US position on the Oder-Neisse line is also most useful. We have read it closely and think it will be of continuing value. As a matter of historical interest, it might also be noted that President Kennedy, in his press conference of April 12, 1961,/4/ reaffirmed the view that fixing of the German eastern border would have to await a peace treaty.
/2/Telegram 2432 from Bonn, January 11, summarized German positions on the Polish and Czech border issues. (Ibid.) In telegram 2026 to Bonn, January 20, the Department of State commented on the German positions. (Ibid.)
/3/See footnote 7, Document 28.
/4/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 258-264.
In reviewing German developments on this matter since Embtel 2432 and Deptel 2026 in January, I think that events have supported the main conclusions of those messages, i.e. that Schroeder is trying to underplay the issue, that the German Govt will adhere to its position of not making unilateral concessions prior to a peace treaty (although there is no realistic expectation of Germany being able to negotiate more than marginal border adjustments and concessions), and that our best policy is to avoid public statements about the subject. At the same time, some political movements have occurred in this field, not all of it unfavorable. The past six months have in fact brought about two distinct but connected developments.
The favorable development has been the increased recognition and public discussion, primarily in intellectual and student circles, of the probability that Germany will not regain her former eastern territories. We should not, however, overestimate the impact of this trend in terms of a change in the German position. In the absence of reunification, a real change might well take close to a generation to evolve. In addition, the govt has clarified (as much as it is apt to) its position on the 1938 Munich agreement by acknowledging its abrogation by Hitler, and by disclaiming any territorial designs on Czechoslovakia.
The foregoing has not been an unmixed improvement, as it has set off a counteraction of expellee backlash. The extent of the latter is hard to judge, but its expression is harsh and loud. Minister Seebohm's statements in Nuernberg were a good example. The Embassy has also reported such recent moves as the proposal for a Sudeten "march on Bonn," warnings that the league of expellees is turning "soft," and disgruntlement with de Gaulle's position on the eastern frontier (Embassy's A-292)./5/ Despite this reaction, however, the current attention to the eastern border problem is not in my judgment, a major or growing factor in German national life.
/5/Airgram A-292 from Bonn, August 6, reported on resentment against Erhard on the part of Sudeten Germans. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 13 GER W)
With a close election in the offing, however, it could become, at least temporarily, a field of political rivalry which could adversely affect the growing German potential to influence the future course of events in Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, the problem posed by expellee unrest is most difficult for those German moderates who are our natural allies in trying to "defuse" it. Much of the animus of the current upswing, for instance, is directed against FonMin Schroeder, who has been suspect in expellee circles ever since June 28, 1963, when he delimited restoration of the right of self-determination "to our countrymen in the Soviet Zone." Expellee activity cuts across all three parties; the expellee leaders (Rehs and Jaksch) of the SPD are as impervious to party discipline on this score as are intransigents (Neuwir) in the CSU.
As for American policy, we can of course, hardly change our formal position on the Oder-Neisse line. It is now too deeply embedded, although the original ethnic and economic (foods and jobs) justification for our 1945 reserve/6/ about the line itself no longer obtains, there is in any event, little need for such a change, since our position is only procedural and does not bind us as to specific lines on a map. Although we might review the situation after the 1965 elections, there appears to be no room at the present for maneuver in this area. We can however, as we have since Secretary Marshall, give no new public impression that we envisage any specific territorial adjustments (nor should we deny this possibility).
/6/Documentation regarding the U.S. reserve is in Foreign Relations, 1945, The Conference at Potsdam, vol. I, pp. 744-745, and vol. II, pp. 208-215, 1491-1492. See also President Truman's August 9 statement in Department of State Bulletin, August 12, 1945, pp. 210-211.
What I would propose to undertake, with suitable caution, is to spread the idea in responsive govt and party circles that a moratorium on discussion of this issue would be desirable in the 12-month period before the elections. Although expellee agitation could not be totally silenced, it would still be worthwhile to stimulate govt spokesmen and major party leaders to soft pedal, or so far as possible to bury it, the issue during the forthcoming campaign. The election atmosphere could easily exacerbate the issue. Although it is a matter of primarily minority interest, this minority could potentially supply the 5-10 percent vote shift that the SPD or CDU are competing for.
Our line in achieving this might be as follows:
1) In explicit US statements, we would discuss reunification only in the context of the Zone. We would avoid any reference to or acceptance of the concepts of East and middle Germany.
2) We would avoid volunteering any public restatements of our formal position on the Oder-Neisse line. When queried we would express adherence to the Potsdam Agreement but in minimum terms and low key.
3) In private discussions:
(A) We would note that the formal US position on the line is procedural (i.e. negotiating it finally in a peace settlement) rather than substantive, and that in fact we are committed to support some "accession (to Poland) of territory in the north and west."
(B) Try to create a general atmosphere of discouragement that the Germans can realistically gain territory. We would emphasize the improbability of any substantial German recouping in the area beyond present borders, since force is ruled out and it is unlikely to be achieved through a voluntary Polish surrender. Emphasize that neither we nor anyone else would ever be willing to fight for return of this territory.
4) In private conversations, we should urge on the Germans a moratorium on domestic discussion of the issue.
5) Finally, we should emphasize privately that continued agitation on this question is a drag on German reunification policy. In view of the continued close Soviet/GDR connections, the best possibilities now are in the direction of expanding German influence in East Europe, and isolating Ulbricht in his own camp. Implications that Germany aims at crippling Poland or Czechoslovakia can only tighten Soviet ties with these two nations, which together with Pankow bond, would thus continue to provide an extensive framework for continued Soviet predominance over East Europe. It is, however the retirement of frustration of this hegemony by gradual and natural processes, which can provide the only conceivable basis for eventual reunification.
In advancing the foregoing, I would naturally be highly selective in conversation partners. There would be no suggestion of an official campaign, any press leaks of which could seriously backfire. In general we should try to be casual and conversational, and to the greatest degree possible endeavor to implant the idea in the other person in such way as to suggest that it accords with, or originated in, his own thinking. In spite of the sensitivity of the problem, it should be noted that there already exists a rudimentary awareness of the desirability of keeping the issue out of domestic politics, as evidenced by Brandt's proposal, which was accepted by the other two parties, that a three-party position should be taken with this aim on the Munich Agreement. There are thus good chances that some responsible political figures would be receptive, and I recommend that we try the approach since any gains in this sense would be positive in terms of our overall German and European objectives.
During his visit Ambassador Kohler inquired whether the Germans might be persuaded to offer the pledge that if they obtained reunification any future all-German govt would acquiesce in the present Eastern border in peace settlement. He pointed out such a move would permit a new relationship with Poland, and would focus energies and attention on reunification rather than the frontier question. I certainly agree that this would be the best interim solution, and it is furthermore likely, if any future German policy change occurs, that it would take just this form. There is, however no present party or governmental enthusiasm for the idea (which was first broached prominently in 1963) and it is too early to estimate the possibilities for such a step in 1966. Here again it becomes a question of quid-pro-quo. The Germans are reluctant to yield any bar-gaining power no matter how fractional, which conceivably could be of cumulative significance at a peace conference.
McGhee
67. Letter From the Deputy Chief of Mission in Berlin (Calhoun) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Berlin, September 4, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR E-EUR W. Confidential; Official-Informal. A copy was sent to McGhee.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
You will recall that during your talk with Governing Mayor Willy Brandt in Washington last May/2/ he indicated that he would try to put on paper some of his thoughts regarding Western relations with the countries and peoples of Eastern Europe. Mayor Brandt mentioned this conversation to me shortly after his return from Washington and has subsequently said from time to time that he was working on the paper.
/2/See Document 40.
Brandt has now forwarded this paper to me with a request that it be sent on to you and a copy retained by the Mission. I therefore enclose the original German text/3/ and the original and two copies of an English translation prepared by an officer in the Mission. The Governing Mayor said during our last conversation that he was not coming up with any new and startling ideas but that he hoped his thoughts might be useful to you. If there is any word that you would wish me to convey back to him, I shall of course be happy to do so.
/3/The German text was not found.
It was both pleasant and helpful for me to have a brief conversation with you in Washington during the day that I was there in early June./4/ I hope that there may be an occasion for a further meeting before too many months pass, although I realize that you are deeply immersed in many other more critical and urgent problems.
/4/Apparently June 11-12 when Calhoun accompanied the Erhard party to Washington.
Major General Franklin, the new US Commandant here, spoke with warmth and appreciation of his meeting with you and other high Department officials in Washington a few weeks ago./5/ He has now taken over officially and seems to be getting his feet on the ground very rapidly.
/5/Not further identified.
I am sure that our relations with him will be as friendly and mutually fruitful as they were with General Polk.
With warm personal regards.
Faithfully yours,
Arch CalhounAttachment/6/
Berlin, August 1964.
/6/No classification marking. The source text is marked "Translation."
RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND PEOPLES
I.
In increasing measure, Western political thought proceeds from the premise that the Eastern European Communist states can no longer be regarded as mere satellites of the Soviet Union. The effect of the Soviet/Chinese controversies, and the process of economic and ideological differentiation (not directly related to the first) are being observed with great interest.
Questions of communication with Eastern European states and peoples, of practical cooperation, and of appropriate political action, have begun to play a larger role. It may be assumed that the incipient union of free Europe, despite all difficulties and obstacles, has exercised a strong attraction, and that an all-European consciousness has survived or been revived in the peoples located between Germany and Russia.
In his Lexington speech of May 23, 1964,/7/ President Johnson spoke of an "all-European" perspective. President Kennedy told the Berlin students on June 26, 1963/8/ that it was "not too early to think once again in all-European terms;" the "winds of change," he said, are blowing across the Iron Curtain. The interests of French and British policy in this problem area are obvious. Thus, the French Foreign Minister observed on April 28, 1964 before the National Assembly that the countries of Eastern Europe had already made use of the Soviet/Chinese conflict in order to accelerate their already marked tendency towards emancipation.
/7/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book I, pp. 708-710.
/8/For text, see ibid.: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 526-529.
In his 1964 New Year's broadcast,/9/ General de Gaulle said that without engaging in illusions, one must be prepared for the day when in the Eastern European capitals the totalitarian Communist regime might undergo a gradual process of change. "Then perspectives would open up for all of Europe which would be in keeping with its means and capabilities."
/9/For text, Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, vol. 4, pp. 159-160.
On June 26, 1963 Lord Home declared in the House of Lords/10/ that there were numerous indications for the beginnings of a new mood: "Country upon country in Eastern Europe begins to question the right of the Soviet Government to dictate its forms of economic development . . . No one can foretell the future with certainty, but there is evident a possible development which will have to be observed with the greatest care."
/10/For text, see House of Lords Debs., 5th series, vol. 251, cols. 277-292.
In its Bonn declaration of June 1, 1964,/11/ the Action Committee for the United States of Europe (Monnet Committee) advocated that "the beginnings of communication with the nations of Eastern Europe should be strengthened through realistic endeavors."
/11/For text, see Europa Archiv, 1964, vol. 2, pp. 339-347.
This, therefore, is the theme: For the immediate future it appears desirable and not unpromising to engage the Eastern European states in the largest possible volume of communications.
II.
It is in the Western interest to support the autonomy of the Eastern European nations and not to curtail their maneuverability. However, it would be grotesque if certain centrifugal tendencies in the Communist world were to evoke an erosion of Western cooperation--in other words, if--to paraphrase a statement of Bismarck--a new "nightmare of bilateral or even multilateral constellations" should develop in Europe between decaying power and interest blocs.
Obviously it cannot be in the Western interest to permit illusions concerning the nature of the Eastern European regimes. On the other hand, it would be foolish to set ideological conditions as a price for communication.
Western policy will have to concentrate on measures in the economic and cultural realm. It will have to treat any Eastern European state as a full partner, but it will also have to take into account the military and ideological ties maintained by such states.
Over and above concrete forms of economic and cultural cooperation (which of necessity will have to remain limited, for the time being), it is of decisive importance to work toward good-neighborly relations. In this fashion evolutionary forces can be encouraged and furthered.
National consciousness in the Eastern European states, and their striving for greater autonomy find expression in growing self-interest. This tendency must be taken into account and should not be curbed by unnecessary generalizations or inappropriate over-all propositions.
Differentiation in development makes it necessary to evolve a different policy for each of the Eastern European countries. This aggravates further the known difficulties which beset efforts to achieve a coordinated Western position. However, it remains most desirable that the Western countries should agree to certain joint principles in their position vis-à-vis Eastern Europe, and that they should strengthen and systematize their exchange of information and experience. This should be done as effectively as possible and in a not particularly spectacular manner within the framework of existing European and Atlantic institutions.
The Common Market has had a liberalizing effect on economic thinking in all Eastern Europe. Modest but purposeful progress on the road to greater European unity and Atlantic partnership--as proposed by the Monnet Committee--would strengthen this tendency.
The regulations governing relations with third countries create a particular problem for the countries of the Common Market. A clarification of the political intentions of the EEC member-states is a prerequisite for closer relations with the Eastern European countries.
A formal relationship with the Common Market is dependent also on the capabilities of the Eastern European states and, not least, upon the "cohesion" of the Soviet-led bloc.
The West must demonstrate that it is working towards a framework of commercial policy in which also the national economies of the Eastern European peoples will be able to find a place. There are important reasons for allowing the countries of Eastern Europe to share in the liberalization resulting from the Kennedy Round. Objectionable political influences from the East would, of course, have to be avoided.
Economic facts of life in the Communist realm, and conditions in the West make it difficult at present materially to increase East-West trade. In order to achieve a substantial increase, the West will have to be prepared to grant far-reaching economic and financial supports, and the East will have to be ready to undertake far-reaching liberalization measures. The time is not ripe for either condition.
It might be useful to refer to the studies undertaken by the ECE in Geneva concerning questions of expanding East-West trade. This applies also to considerations concerning the question of introducing a multilateral payments and accounting system among the members of the ECE.
With respect to efforts to develop bilateral trade relations, however, it remains true, even under changed conditions, that the West is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis countries with a government monopoly on trade, when on the Western side there is unbridled competition among states and business firms.
It must be made clear over and over that the West is prepared, through practical cooperation, to promote economic progress and raise the standard of living for its own and for other peoples. This does not contradict the fact that the West must undertake no move which might jeopardize its security, and that it cannot consider unacceptable conditions. At present it no longer appears possible to find a unified solution for the problem of longterm credits. However, this remains an important problem.
Trade with the Eastern European states is not an end in itself. It must be evaluated and reviewed on a continuing basis within the over-all framework of Western policy. Wherever possible, economic agreements should be coupled with cultural agreements ("the more information, the more intellectual communication") and--whenever it appears indicated--with humanitarian arrangements.
IV./12/
/12/There is no section III.
The study and development of joint, major technical projects is of great psychological importance and, in the long run, also of concrete significance. In this field the self-interest of the Eastern European countries will have to be the starting point.
In the first instance, consideration should be given to endeavors within the framework of an all-European power-economy, as, for example, the merger of supply lines (oil, electric power). These endeavors might lead to a delivery union (Lieferungsverband vielfaeltiger Form) and promote an awareness of European unity and over-all responsibility in line with the principle of balanced, mutual advantage. As regards the trends to be observed in this process, preliminary studies in various fields by the ECE would be useful.
The Geneva declaration of September 16, 1950/13/ concerning construction of international main highways, to which nearly all Eastern European states subscribed, might serve as an example in the field of transport. At issue here are convincing possibilities for joint planning, with a view to future all-European transport needs which the EEC commission also emphasized in a paper of April 10, 1961: "Particularly in the field of transport, it will not be possible to solve certain questions exclusively within the framework of the Six." The European Conference of Transport Ministers, of which Yugoslavia is already a member, would probably be an appropriate body for long-range planning.
/13/Not found.
This is true also for the planning, construction, and improvement of waterways (Rhine-Main-Danube canal, Elbe traffic, Danube-Oder canal, and other connecting links). In this context, the Federal Republic of Germany will have to study whether or how it might participate in the settlement of questions concerning Danube shipping.
ECE investigations concerning European specific questions, such as gas problems and water supply, water and air pollution should be utilized. The establishment of new, and the improvement of existing, connections in the civil aviation network are of increasing importance. ("What is possible between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should be possible also between Western and Eastern Europe.")
V.
Cultural agreements should be based on the principle of reciprocity. Under the special conditions obtaining in Germany, participation by responsible non-governmental agencies should also be considered. Films, particularly television films, are of special importance. Artistically valuable films from Poland and Czechoslovakia already have proven to be an important contribution to better understanding, where Germany is concerned. In general, cultural agreements should include as many old as well as new media as possible.
The area of scientific exchange and cooperation could open up a wide field of bilateral and multilateral endeavors. Here one might argue persuasively: "If the Americans and the Russians can work together, why not the Europeans also?"
If full reciprocity cannot be achieved, it is in the interest of the West in some areas also to make use of limited liberalization. For instance, it is desirable that the Eastern European countries should open their borders to visitors from the West, even if these countries are not prepared to permit movement in the opposite direction.
Here, however, it is important that the Western perspective become clear and is not blurred. This means: As much cultural exchange as possible in both directions. This means further: We should do whatever lies in our power to open our borders also to the youth of the Eastern European states.
Over and above the useful activity of travel bureaus, consideration could be given to promoting low-cost tourism with the cooperation of the pertinent institutions and organizations, and with self-admini- stration for the exchange groups. This should not apply, however, to government-controlled propaganda trips. Furthermore, the agencies responsible for public health might consider an agreement concerning the mutual use of their facilities in spas and resort towns.
A "European youth organization," as proposed by the German Social Democrats would have to include, in whatever form, a youth exchange with Eastern European countries. Reference is made further to the proposal of German youth organizations to prepare a general youth festival. Special agencies of the United Nations (UNESCO ?) might assume sponsorship or lend assistance.
The present study is not designed to present detailed proposals for economic, technical, scientific, and cultural cooperation. That will have to be the task of experts. Their work will have to be based in part on carefully developed knowledge of the wishes and concepts of the various Eastern European states.
VI.
Within this framework the position and treatment of the Soviet Zone of Germany--the so-called GDR--constitutes a special problem.
It is a problem, in part, because Western policy in the German question (self-determination, non-recognition, safeguarding of the peace) must not be affected and jeopardized in this context. Secondly, the problem arises because the Ulbricht regime reacts, or, rather, must react, to developments in the Communist world in a manner which is diametrically opposed to the behavior of the Eastern European governments: Not more autonomy in relation to the Soviet Union, but rather additional evidence of "reliability."
Nevertheless, a German policy designed to wrest from the Ulbricht regime alleviations for the human beings affected by the division, and for the population in the Zone, is in keeping with the interests of the West. The Interzonal Trade between the two parts of Germany, based on Allied orders, must be viewed also in this context, in addition to its significance for Berlin access.
The possibilities for economic and cultural communication with the Soviet Zone are primarily a German problem, but the need for consultation and agreement with the three Powers is self-evident.
All in all, it may be assumed that more intensive communication between the Western and Eastern European peoples cannot and will not bypass the Zone. Already in preparing for this objective, we should consider how, for example, Soviet Zone youth might be brought into general youth events.
In multilateral economic endeavors it is not necessary to forego a priori the possibility of including the Zone, in third place, for instance. The equal status desired by the Zone regime could be avoided by the (West) German side by making the Federal German contribution through private business firms or business associations.
VII.
A flexible policy designed to achieve a high degree of communication with Eastern Europe requires appropriate preparation of the Western peoples. It must be made clear that such a policy is neither weak nor illusory, but that it proceeds from changing realities and is designed to bring about a better future--the objectives which President Kennedy sketched out in his speech of July 4, 1962. The conviction must be reaffirmed that the free society possesses greater vigor and vitality. Furthermore, there can be no doubting the fact that the free peoples cannot find salvation in bilateralism but, rather, in a meaningful, integrated and organized community.
On the basis of the so-called Jaksch Report, the German Bundestag resolved unanimously on June 14, 1961 "to make use of every opportunity to achieve a normalization of relations between the Federal Republic and the Eastern European states, without sacrificing vital German interests."
In his Government Declaration of October 28, 1963,/14/ Professor Erhard observed: "Within the limits of its ability, the Federal Government is prepared to expand the economic exchange with these countries. In the same manner it welcomes increased cultural contacts." In his New York speech of May 15, 1964,/15/ Willy Brandt urged: "Our wish to work together must be made visible also to the Eastern European peoples. It is time to recognize more clearly that Europe does not end at the Iron Curtain." In the same speech Brandt said: "We should propose joint projects to the peoples of Eastern Europe and make them understand that we do not fear but that, on the contrary, we desire a rise in their living standard to a level comparable to ours. This accords also with the original idea of the Marshall Plan."
/14/October 18. The portions dealing with foreign policy are in Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 63-66.
/15/See footnote 7, Document 40.
The Americans in particular have made clear the connection between European developments and the German question. In Berlin, Kennedy spoke about "the course leading to the re-unification of Germany and the restoration of Europe," which would not be an easy one. Johnson said in his Lexington speech: "It is our belief that the wise and skillful development of relations with the nations of Eastern Europe can bring closer the day on which Germany will be reunified."
It is in the joint interest of the West to guard against the stabilization of conditions which, by promoting the recognition of more than one state in Germany, would prejudice efforts to achieve an all-German peace treaty. This accounts in part also for the problems inherent in developing German trade missions in the Eastern European countries.
In the present interim phase we must insist, above all, that the ties between Berlin and the Federal Republic are respected. The differences which have become manifest in this area (between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and in the intermediate positions taken by the Eastern European governments) are of significance.
From the German point of view it is most important that agreements concerning economic and technical matters should be accompanied by an amelioration of human distress. It is obvious that on the German side, concern about the fate of German nationals and ethnic groups in Eastern Europe must play a special role. The question of family reunion also plays a significant role for emigrants and expellees of other nationalities.
In conclusion, the main issues at present appear to be:
1. In awareness of existing differences of opinion, to bring about a consensus of Western views on these questions, in order to find a basis for joint policy;
2. To inform the governments and peoples of the Eastern European countries about the prerequisites and possibilities for fruitful cooperation;
3. To convince public opinion in our countries that even minor progress can help to influence in a positive sense structural change in an important field of world politics and to advance, in the long run, the restoration of Europe.
68. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, September 4, 1964, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Secret; Exdis.
870. Personal for the Secretary. Of all of the potential points of friction or armed conflict between ourselves and the Soviets in connection with Berlin, the one that has concerned me most in recent months has been that of our helicopter flights over East Berlin. I was, accordingly, particularly interested in the telegram which the Dept sent to General Lemnitzer on the subject on August 29 giving approval for continuation of such flights (rptd to Bonn as Deptel 609)/2/ Because I consider this matter one of great sensitivity, and particularly since I do not know the extent of your recent personal involvement in this problem, I am taking the liberty of raising it with you directly.
/2/Dated August 29. (Ibid., POL 38-9)
You are aware of the general background of these flights. They were made only infrequently before erection of the Wall, but since then have been regularly programmed at four to six-week intervals. The Soviets have been objecting to the flights for some time, and they are now slowly escalating their threats. They have long referred to the helicopters as "air space violators." On June 24, the Soviets implied that the flight might turn into something like "the incidents of January and March"./3/ On August 3, the Soviet BASC controller said that "alert fighters will take the necessary measures." There is no evidence that fighters were in fact lofted on this occasion, but we now have certain indications (concerning which I am asking CIA to brief you),/4/ that actual countermeasures might be taken against the next flight, possibly up to an attempt to shoot the helicopter down.
/3/Reference is to the two aircraft shot down by Soviet fighters over East Germany; see Documents 8, 19, 20, and 21.
/4/No record of the briefing was found.
After looking into this matter very carefully, I have concluded that our justifications for continuing these flights, in order of priority, are (1) the old Berlin maxim that you never give up a right which you have successfully exercised; and (2) that through air photography from the helicopter, we are able to ascertain information about potential jamming devices which could threaten our utilization of our navigational aids.
It is obviously important to maintain the right of unhindered flight within the Berlin Control Zone under 10,000 feet. We have interpreted the right to include helicopter flights over East Berlin, and having established this interpretation through practice, I would agree with the Dept that we should continue the flights. I believe, however, that we should not equate the principle of maintaining unhindered utilization of the Berlin Control Zone with the maintenance of a particular frequency or pattern of helicopter flights.
I have been briefed on the intelligence justification for the helicopter flights, but am not fully convinced that the information could not be obtained by more conventional methods, i.e. by photography from normal aircraft. At any rate, due to the relatively static situation re Soviet installations, I do not think that the helicopter flights are required for this purpose as frequently as they now occur. The interval, in my judgment, could be increased to several months.
General Polk, the Commandant in Berlin who has just been relieved, is strongly in favor of a continuation of these flights at their present schedule, as are presumably other high military officials here who would be concerned, i.e. General Freeman, USAREUR, and General Disosway, USAFE. They can be expected to oppose any change in the present schedule. Indeed, the message to which I referred (Deptel 609) indicates that the Dept itself, after a recent interchange on this subject, has decided against any change.
Although I am not often more cautious in Berlin matters than the Dept, I question whether the advantage to be achieved, during the period intervening before the American elections on November 3, is worth the risk of being openly challenged by the Soviets with the possibility of their shooting down our helicopter. The shooting down of a US helicopter would inevitably result in a most serious confrontation between ourselves and the Soviets, with the possibility of further escalation. Since this would result from quite a different situation from that which occurred when our T-39 and RB-66 aircraft were off course and technically in the wrong we would be committed by prestige and principle to react strongly.
The Commandant in Berlin is expected to recommend a regular flight within the next few days. According to my instructions, he must first submit his plan to me for approval as to suitability of the timing in terms of the broader German and world situation. Any decision for an extended delay, however, in light of the DOD and Departmental interest should, I believe, be made in Washington.
In the circumstances, I recommend that the next flight be deferred until mid-winter. This will not give up the right, nor for that matter will it dispose of the problem, since the Soviets could shoot the aircraft down as easily then as now. Postponement would, however, preclude disturbance during a delicate period in our country, and could presumably be done without any serious derogation of our intelligence interests.
I believe this matter is of sufficient importance that you may wish to discuss it with Secretary McNamara, and possibly even the President. Until hearing from you, I will in any event delay approval of any further flights.
McGhee
69. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, September 23, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Berlin, vol. 3. Secret.
McGB--
SUBJECT
Berlin Pass Agreement/2//2/On September 23, the West German Cabinet approved an agreement between the Government of the City of West Berlin and East German authorities that permitted West Berliners to visit relatives in East Berlin.
You and the President should know that tomorrow in Berlin the long negotiated pass agreement will be signed. In addition to the signing ceremonies, there will be a series of public statements--by the West Berlin Senat, the Government of the Federal Republic, the Allied Commandants, as well as an Erhard-Brandt exchange announcing support for the agreement, and defining the political implications of the action to limit distorted Communist claims of political significance.
The agreement will make it possible for West Berliners to visit relatives in East Germany four times a year--the last part of October, between Christmas and New Year, at Easter time, and at Whitsuntide.
In reaching agreement, the Socialist dominated West Berlin government had to haggle, not only with the Communist East Germans, but also with the Christian Democratic government of the Federal Republic. At times the dialogue with the Federal Government was more difficult than with the Communists. In fact, the Federal Government only yielded at the very end to avoid bearing the onus for collapsed negotiations.
This morning, after much soul-searching, the Federal Cabinet found enough in the agreement to justify endorsing it. With that step, the way was open for signing ceremonies tomorrow and first visits in mid-October.
On balance, the West will gain more from this agreement than the Communists. The Communists will get themselves a safety valve to lessen tensions in East Germany; the West will be able to reestablish relations with the isolated East German population and build bridges to it.
DK
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