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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XV Germany and Berlin DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

70. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/

Bonn, October 6, 1964, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, CINCEUR, USAREUR, USELMLO, USNMR, and SHAPE.

1340. Subj: Berlin's relationship to the FRG. Although we have dealt with the German proposal to hold a Cabinet meeting in Berlin on an essentially ad hoc basis,/2/ the British, French, and we agree that this action is likely to be only the first in a series of attempts to modify certain aspects of the existing relationship between the FedRep and Berlin. FonOff representatives have on occasion frankly stated that during the present period when significant progress toward reunification is not possible, the best that can be done is to strengthen further the ties between Berlin and Bonn. This one way, in German eyes, to prevent solidification of the status quo and to counter Soviet and East German contentions that West Berlin is a third German political entity alongside the FRG and the GDR.

/2/In telegram 1197 from Bonn, September 26, McGhee reported that Carstens had informed him of the decision of the Erhard Cabinet to hold a meeting in Berlin on September 30. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 5)

In an electoral year, steps toward a closer integration of Berlin in the FRG will be good politics for the govt. It will help to steal some of the thunder which opposition leader Willy Brandt can still command as Governing Mayor of Berlin, and at the same time move in a direction consistent with the German theory that Berlin is legally a part of the FedRep, subject only to certain reservations imposed by the Western Occupying Powers.

It was perhaps inevitable, once Soviet pressures on Berlin had relaxed, that the Germans would attempt to resume the process of creeping amalgamation of the Western sectors with the FedRep which had characterized the years between 1950 and 1958. During this period, the US generally advocated a permissive policy on the part of the Occupying Powers and was prepared to accept virtual de facto absorption of Berlin within the Bonn system.

We have learned since, through our experience during the crisis years 1958-63, that the consistently formalistic and restrictive French approach, while extreme, had certain advantages. Apart from preserving the purity of our legal position vis-à-vis the Soviets, it tended to maintain a system of Western occupation control which could provide the operative basis for the kind of modus vivendi on Berlin which seems to have emerged after nearly five years of intense diplomatic crisis and struggle over the future of the city.

The Dept will recall that our differences with the FedRep over the status of Berlin last came to a head in the autumn of 1961, during Ambassadorial Group discussions following the submission of a German memorandum on the subject (reproduced as BQD 53)./3/ It became clear at the time that the opposing views could not be reconciled on the level of logical argument and that both sides could agree to disagree. It was felt better to let the issue remain dormant, since the FedRep was not then pressing for any specific actions which challenged the Allied view. It has proved feasible to operate quite successfully on the basis of this tacit agreement to disagree. We doubt if the FRG would wish at this point to push so far as to destroy this modus vivendi. The German objective is to achieve the maximum show of unity with Berlin without destroying the position of the Allies in Berlin--particularly of the US--on which they know the security of the city depends. The Allied requirements, on the other hand, would seem to depend on legal substance and power rather than show. Our primary interest is to prevent jeopardy to our de jure position or doubts as to our intention to remain in, and defend, Berlin.

/3/Not found.

It is within the context of these differing but not necessarily incompatible German and Allied objectives that we believe the three Occupying Powers should examine with some care the various courses of action open to the FedGovt and prepare considered responses so that they will not be caught by surprise when specific proposals are made.

There are broadly two categories of action which the FedRep could propose:

1. Further demonstrative gestures such as Cabinet meetings, which have no basic effect on the legal position of Berlin but which highlight the activities of the FedGovt in the city. A proposal for the resumption of Bundestag meetings in Berlin would fall in this category.

2. Changes which could be interpreted as affecting the legal structure of relationships between the FedRep and Berlin. In this category would fall proposals for the direct election of Bundestag members from Berlin, giving free voting rights to Berlin members of the Bundestag, or the substitution of a Globalgesetz procedure for the existing Mantelgesetz procedure for the adoption of Federal legislation in Berlin.

At this point, we are inclined to think that we could swallow occasional Bundestag meetings in Berlin. We would have greater difficulty in accepting proposals requiring formal changes in the existing structure of law. In the latter category, we could perhaps most easily permit direct election of Bundestag members from Berlin who would continue without voting rights in the Bundestag. In any event we believe we should think our way carefully to a final position, and would as a start appreciate receiving Berlin's comments./4/

/4/Not found.

McGhee

 

71. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/

Bonn, October 15, 1964, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 GER. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, London, and Berlin.

1481. Ref: Moscow's 980 to Dept./2/

/2/Dated October 5. (Ibid., POL 38-6)

1. In Moscow's 980 to the Dept Amb Kohler has raised important questions concerning relations between Moscow, Bonn and Washington as they revolve around Berlin and the German question. In Embtel 1340,/3/ which pouched to Moscow unfortunately crossed Moscow's reftel, we also alluded to the FRG's policy with regard to Berlin. Although we raise virtually the same issue as Amb Kohler, our tentative conclusions are somewhat different. We will therefore, in the present message, comment further in order to respond to Amb Kohler and to cover the problem in fuller scope.

/3/Document 70.

2. Neither the FRG nor any one of the three major political parties in West Germany regards acceptance or solidification of the present status quo in Central Europe as desirable. They do not, however, wish to bring about a change by force, indeed, they are so committed. We have, for example, seen in time of crisis in Berlin that they are prepared to move in the direction of accepting the status quo if under serious pressure from the Soviets. When, however, this pressure is no longer present or the Soviet threat less credible--a condition which they now consider to exist and estimate as likely to prevail for at least several years--the Germans revert to their underlying desire for progress on the German question. As noted in Embtel 1340, it is this desire which motivates the FRG in seeking a greater show of unity with Berlin through Cabinet meetings and the like.

3. It is significant that the steps which the FRG has taken or contemplates taking are not new. The recent Bundesversammlung meeting in Berlin should in fairness be accepted entirely as indicative of a trend, since it has never met anyplace except Berlin and its timing is determined by the Constitution. Certain other possible steps, moreover, e.g. Bundestag meetings, automatic application of Federal legislation, direct election of Bundestag representatives, were either in practice or had been sought before the Berlin crisis began in 1958. The Allies, under certain conditions, had actually approved the enactment of a "Globalgesetz" providing for the general application of Federal legislation. What we are now witnessing is, in our judgment, merely a resurfacing on the German side of a strong current temporarily forced underground by the prolonged Berlin crisis.

4. We believe that the desire for progress toward reunification will be a continuing and basic motivation of German foreign policy regardless of which party is in power. This is another way of saying that the FRG will not under foreseeable circumstances be prepared to cooperate in accepting or solidifying the status quo in Berlin or East Germany. Whether the United States or all three of the Western Occupying Powers are satisfied with the present state of affairs is therefore in the long run not likely to be the determining factor. We will, of course, continue to seek specifically U.S. objectives, and for various reasons we shall not always be able to support the Germans. But we must recognize that, given the overall position of the FRG in the Western Alliance, there are very definite practical limits to the possibility of our forcing or persuading the Germans to accept a policy which is repugnant to them.

5. A factor which we need always to keep in mind is the complexity and delicacy of the problem which the FRG faces in seeking to bring East and West Germans closer together in the interest of preserving the concept of their nationhood. There have been a whole series of examples recently: the pass agreement, the Hof Bridge settlement, rail path negotiations, etc. In each case the East German objective quite clearly has been to achieve either increased recognition or at least a public indication that the FRG is prepared to come to terms with the GDR as a lasting if unattractive reality. The West Germans must in each case decide to what extent they should accept East German terms in pursuing precisely the contrary objective of bringing German reunification closer. While recognizing that the FRG has frequently been inept in dealing with the East Germans, we should nevertheless not forget the difficulty of the problem they face. No one at the present time can be absolutely sure whether the pass agreement, for example, is a step more toward reunification or toward recognition of the GDR. Given this situation, it would hardly be surprising if the FRG should seek some extra insurance on at least part of its position by forward steps in its relations with West Berlin, where it is dealing with friends rather than foes.

6. The Germans are looking for such insurance elsewhere as well. The Berlin clause is a major attraction of the trade agreements with Eastern European countries and which the GDR may eventually seek with Communist China. The Chancellor will certainly seek some recognition of the special ties between Berlin and the FRG during Khrushchev's visit. This is the most they hope for, and I have found no real optimism among those who determine German policy on the prospects of achieving even this limited aim. State Secretary Carstens has told me that he does not expect a Soviet concession on the Berlin clause question.

7. Contrary to the impression conveyed by Ambassador Groepper in Moscow, Erhard has consistently cautioned in both public and private statements against any great expectations from the talks with Khrushchev. There is, it is true, among the business community and some politicians a tendency to think that it will be a salutary and revealing experience for Khrushchev to see at first hand the economic strength and political stability of the FedRep. To this extent there is perhaps wishful thinking in the FRG. But even among these circles we have seen no recent signs of a belief that reunification can be bought through economic concessions. I am convinced that those Germans who will be planning the Khrushchev visit--Schroeder, Westrick, Carstens, and Krapf--have no illusions about a changed Soviet attitude on the German question as a result of the Khrushchev visit. The FonOff is closely following statements emanating from Moscow such as the Pravda editorial cited in the reftel. The Chief of the FonOff Soviet section (Kutscher) quoted to us the Suslov GDR anniversary speech as an indication of how little could be expected from Khrushchev's journey to Bonn. The Schwirkmann case has also hardly contributed to an optimistic atmosphere in the FRG.

8. With specific relation to Berlin, although I have not always found the FRG's timing or method of presentation of proposed actions as adroit as it could be, I believe we would encounter serious problems if we failed to understand the strong current of German thinking which their Berlin policy represents. Equally serious problems would of course be encountered on the side of the Allies if the Germans should ever come to underestimate the importance of maintaining the Allied position in Berlin inviolable. I am optimistic that the present satisfactory understanding on this question can be maintained, however it may require some re-thinking--and some yielding on less important issues--on the part of the Allies. It was the objective of Embtel 1340 to analyze where it might be possible for the Allies to "give." We may have to restrain the FRG at times, but we cannot on the other hand allow the Soviets or the East Germans the right of defining what is or is not provocative. It is often the East Germans or the Soviets themselves (as in their military parade in East Berlin on the 15th anniversary of the GDR) who commit the most flagrant provocations.

9. I would like particularly to emphasize that if we give the impression of pushing the Germans to accept the status quo in Germany--whether this be related to Berlin or to broader aspects of the question, we shall be in for trouble. The Germans do not have any real hope at the present of achieving a satisfactory solution of the German problem within the foreseeable future. They do, however, hope and expect that their Western Allies, particularly the United States, will stand with them in keeping the issue alive and probing for modest progress, even though the effort may be futile. In some respects, and this involves both the personal practice of FonMin Schroeder and the general posture of the Erhard govt, the appearance of effort may be more important than the substance of real progress. But the appearance of effort there must be, especially in an election year, if the govt is to preserve the allegiance of its supporters. For this reason, we could not expect that they could accept the Soviet-GDR Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance of June 12, 1964 without a strong reaction.

10. I have not detected any significant "Rapallo" thinking in the Fed-Rep. This includes the Ruhr industrialists with whom I maintain fairly close contact. The alternative to the Atlantic partnership usually cited by those in Germany who are looking for an alternative is not an arrangement with Moscow but closer cooperation with France. Any suspicion that the US is not prepared to support German reunification encourages, illogical though it seems, Gaullist thinking in the FedRep. In the future this could transform itself into a nationalist approach conducive to Rapallo thinking. This is only likely to arise, however, if we fail to take fully into account the depth of German feeling against acceptance or solidification of the status quo.

McGhee

 

72. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/

Bonn, November 17, 1964, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential; Exdis. McGhee commented on relations with Adenauer in At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 157-159.

1950. Secretary and Under Secretary. During the past week a number of reports of former Chancellor Adenauer's current views have come to our attention, each confirming that he has moved towards virtually complete acceptance of the de Gaulle position, combined with an anti-American bias and a suspicion of US motives which lead him almost automatically to oppose what he conceives to be the position of the US. The report to this effect contained in Embtel 1924,/2/ based on a conversation between Adenauer and Henry Kissinger, while stark, is probably reasonably accurate.

/2/Telegram 1924 from Bonn, November 17, reported on Henry Kissinger's meeting with Adenauer. (Ibid., POL 3 EUR W)

In a conversation with FonMin Schroeder yesterday at luncheon, he commented on how difficult Adenauer was making life for him by his repeated attacks. There was now a complete lack of rapport between himself and Adenauer. He could no longer talk with Adenauer about serious subjects. It may be of interest that Schroeder confided that he had not intended to attack Adenauer recently, as it appeared in the article he had given to a Mainz journalist just prior to Adenauer's visit to Paris. The journalist had not only released the article prematurely, before rather than after Adenauer's visit, but attributed background comment on Adenauer directly to the FonMin, contrary to their understanding. The FonMin felt, however, that on balance he had gained more through acquiring the reputation of a fighter, than he had lost through the mishap.

Former High Commissioner McCloy, who has been here as head of the American delegation to the fourth German-American conference, reports that, while he was in Berlin, von Eckhardt (for many years the former Chancellor's chief information officer and now Federal plenipotentiary to Berlin) stated that Adenauer was hopelessly anti-American. He had been this way since his first visit to the United States during the Kennedy administration. He had developed a distrust for President Kennedy and certain of his advisers. According to Von Eckhardt, Adenauer felt that he had not been treated with proper respect during his visit. It was shortly after his visit to the US, while he was still under the influence of his disenchantment with the United States, that he had made his famous visit to France/3/ and had been taken in completely by President de Gaulle. Adenauer was further alienated by President Kennedy's policy of seeking limited agreements with the Soviets, which he strongly opposed.

/3/Adenauer visited France December 9, 1961. See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIV, pp. 659-660, for Adenauer's report to Kennedy on the meeting.

In the meeting which he had with Adenauer later in Bonn, McCloy reports that Adenauer labeled Schroeder a dunce (Dummkopf) and then went on to apply the same epithet to all Germans. He told McCloy that Americans simply didn't understand de Gaulle or what was happening in Europe. The great danger, which the US did not comprehend, was that de Gaulle might be forced to go to the Soviets. He referred admiringly to de Gaulle's library, giving the impression that his respect for de Gaulle derives from the fact that he represents the best in French culture and civilization, to which Americans presumably do not measure up. He expressed doubt that the US was capable of world leadership. Adenauer further felt, he stressed to McCloy, that the US would not defend Germany in a pinch. The recent NATO Fallex exercise had convinced him that we would not use nuclear weapons against the Soviets until it was too late.

During a luncheon conversation yesterday with McCloy and the DCM, Minister for Special Tasks Krone expressed somewhat similar suspicions of US nuclear policy. (He had personally participated in the Fallex exercise, and is probably the source of Adenauer's information on this subject.) Krone protested the suggestion that the Chancellor and those who agreed with him were anti-American or that their pro-French policies were the main threat to the preservation of valuable postwar institutions. Krone did say that, if he were forced to make a choice, and he hoped it would never come to that, he would have to choose the US in preference to France.

Comment: Our policy here has been to keep in contact with Adenauer. I have had him to lunch privately at the Residence every three or four months, on which occasions he is relatively congenial and responsive. He attended our last Fourth of July reception. However, we are somewhat at a loss to know how to go about changing his attitude toward the US. He has apparently reconstructed in his own mind the entire course of postwar history to justify his own policies and those of President de Gaulle as against those of the United States. He still professes his basic friendship for the US, as he did to a group of US participants in the German-American conference yesterday. He probably thinks he is being sincere in this, although in practice his friendship amounts to little more than an empty formula. On any given point of conflict he will always end up defending the French position.

At this stage of his life Adenauer seems to be most affected by his strong positive or negative reactions to personalities, as well as by the quality of flattery he receives and by the cultural level of the environment which is provided him. We obviously cannot seem to reward him on this point, especially just after he has received the French honors of the Academy. One possibility which I should like to think about and comment on further is that he be invited to give a series of lectures at a leading American university, perhaps Harvard, from which he received an honorary degree. This might provide the kind of environment that would favorably impress him--and an opportunity for organized flattery and blandishments.

Without wishing to exaggerate Adenauer's influence, he is nevertheless a serious problem for us. When the controversies he stirs up are brought out into the open, either in the Fraktion or before the public, he often has to backtrack. All the same, he can still get a group of some 60 or so Deputies in the CDU to follow him on most issues. He is fortified by public opinion polls which show him as "the best Chancellor Germany has had," and will continue to have a disruptive effect on the efforts of the Erhard government to move ahead on policies which we favor./4/

/4/In telegram 1964 from Bonn, November 18, McGhee suggested again that Adenauer be invited to lecture at Harvard University as a means of dealing with his anti-American bias, adding, "The effort may be basically hopeless . . . but it might still be worth a try. His capacity to do damage to our interests here is still considerable." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W)

McGhee

 

73. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 23, 1964, 2:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Finn and approved in S, U, and G on December 1. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary's Conference Room. The source text is marked "Part 2 of 3."

SUBJECT
Initiative to Soviets on German Question

PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Ambassador George C. McGhee
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
Mr. James L. Greenfield, Assistant Secretary, P
Mr. Alfred Puhan, Director, GER
Mr. Richard B. Finn, Deputy Director, GER

Germany
Foreign Minister Schroeder
Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
Dr. Hans Ruete, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Georg von Lilienfeld, Minister, German Embassy
Dr. Ulrich Scheske, NATO Desk Officer
Dr. Klaus Simon, Personal Aide
Dr. Jeorg Kastl, Press Secretary of the Foreign Ministry
Mr. Wolfgang Behrends, First Secretary

After a discussion of East-West relations,/2/ the Secretary said that he had talked to UK Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker about a quadripartite meeting in Paris before the NATO meeting./3/ The Secretary said that he had suggested that such a meeting would be useful in order to exchange views about the Soviet Union. A meeting of the four Foreign Ministers might be preceded by a meeting of the experts.

/2/A memorandum of this part of the conversation is ibid., Central Files, POL 15 USSR.

/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 43.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said he thought this a very good idea. A preliminary meeting on December 12 would be very useful. However, in the view of the Federal Republic, an effective presentation of the need for German reunification depends on the United States. The US is the only power which can really accomplish anything with the Soviet Union. It is of the greatest significance, therefore, that the position of the US on the German unification question be kept constantly before the people.

The Foreign Minister said that it would be most useful if the President could mention this subject in his State of the Union speech. He noted that President Kennedy had discussed the need for German reunification in one of his first speeches and this had been useful. The Foreign Minister observed that he had no doubt about US policy but felt it important to restate it.

Mr. Schroeder commented that there are recurring rumors in Europe about negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union. One rumor has it that 140 letters have been exchanged. It is important to counter these rumors. The Foreign Minister said that he would comment on this subject in his talk to the National Press Club on November 24. He would make the point that US talks with the Soviet Union are an essential prerequisite for peace in central Europe. The Foreign Minister reiterated that the Soviets also have an interest in a solution of the German question, and therefore the Federal Republic is happy to see this subject taken up in official statements. It is important to prevent poisonous mistrust of US intentions from arising in Germany.

Secretary Rusk said that the matter of an initiative will doubtless come up at the quadripartite meeting. The Secretary said that he would like to make a distinction between substance and procedure. He commented that our problem was really more on procedure than substance. The Secretary said that the US would be reluctant to take the initiative, then look around and ask where is everybody. He commented that it had taken three years to reduce the Berlin crisis and that this had been done without any French participation.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said that this matter had not been recently discussed with the French but that the French have always argued that the time has not yet come to approach the Soviets. The French say that it is up to the Soviets to reduce tension. Foreign Minister Schroeder agreed that it is important to have Four-Power unanimity and that this would impress the Soviets even if no agreement is worked out with them.

The Foreign Minister referred to the proposal made some months ago in Moscow by then UK Foreign Secretary Butler./4/ This proposal (for establishment of a Four-Power council) had met with a complete Soviet rejection. The Foreign Minister wondered, however, whether this proposal should not be pursued further.

/4/Butler visited the Soviet Union July 27-August 1.

He commented that the Berlin situation is calm now but that the problems remain--the Four-Power responsibilities, access, etc. Perhaps some procedural progress could be made. The Foreign Minister reiterated that the new Soviet regime has not been sounded out on this matter and that the Soviets have an interest in a solution. The Foreign Minister said that he thought it would be useful to renew the Butler proposal and that in any case this should be discussed in Paris.

The Foreign Minister commented that a US clarification of its position on the German question has an important influence on the uncommitted powers, as well as on France and the UK.

Secretary Rusk said that he was not so much concerned that the Soviets would say no to an Allied proposal, but rather that they might say maybe and then ask questions where there were no agreed answers. The Foreign Minister said that if a Four-Power approach should be made to the Soviets, there should be previous preparation, perhaps in the Ambassadorial Group. He thought that questions like this should be discussed at the forthcoming talks in Paris. The Foreign Minister stressed the desirability of sounding out the reaction of the new Soviet leaders on the German question and commented that it should not be necessary to have a complete program at the very start.

Secretary Rusk suggested that other initiatives for separate stages of action might be considered. For example humanitarian commissions under Four-Power auspices might be considered.

The Foreign Minister said that the FRG is prepared to return to these ideas. He commented that such ideas were well worth exploration.

Secretary Rusk asked about Ulbricht's position in the GDR. Mr. Schroeder replied that there was a lot of talk about changes in the GDR. He commented, however, that Ulbricht is a "superprefect" who can adjust to every change that comes along. The Foreign Minister commented that Willi Stoph is a different type: he is a German Communist rather than an emigre Communist like Ulbricht. It may be possible that future leaders of the Soviet Zone will feel more like Germans and less like Communists. The Foreign Minister also commented that East German youth do not appear to react favorably to all the pressure put on them by the Zone authorities, and that proximity of West Germany also has an effect in reducing the attractiveness of Communism.

In any discussions with the Soviets about reunification, Foreign Minister Schroeder thought it important to stress that the Soviets would not lose the economic benefits they now derive from the Soviet Zone. It should be made clear to the Soviets that the type of agreement the West has in mind would take into account the economic interest of the Soviet Union. Any Western program on the German question must be flexible. The Foreign Minister commented that there are independent trends developing in the West as in the East, and that similar factors are at work on both sides.

 

74. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, December 9, 1964, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 16. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. The source text is marked "Part IV of VII." Gromyko also met with President Johnson; a memorandum of conversation of their meeting, which included a brief discussion of German issues, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV.

SUBJECT
Germany

PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Ambassador Kohler
Mr. Tyler
Mr. Akalovsky

U.S.S.R.
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
Ambassador Dobrynin

Mr. Smirnovskiy, Chief, American Section, Foreign Ministry

Mr. Gromyko stated the Soviet Government attached the greatest importance to a German peace settlement. Until that problem was resolved, the situation in Europe would be explosive and could not be characterized as normal. This matter had been discussed between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on a number of earlier occasions, and on some points the positions of the two sides had become closer. It would be only logical to continue discussion of those points. The Soviet Union was prepared to continue discussing all the points which had been discussed earlier, with a view to arriving at a conclusion. The Secretary had mentioned that he wished to consult the allies./2/ The Soviet Union recognized that this was only natural and in fact it also consulted its own allies. However, the Soviet Union believed that discussion could be continued now on the same basis as before.

/2/The discussion took place on December 2 during a meeting at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. A memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

Mr. Gromyko said that one of the crucial points was that of the presence of Western forces in West Berlin. In earlier discussions, the Secretary had raised the question of access, and the Soviet Union had stated its views on this matter. The discussion on that point had not been conclusive at that time, and the Soviet Union was prepared to continue it. If this matter were dealt with, both sides would put forward their considerations and perhaps there would be a greater chance for understanding. Of course, the questions discussed in earlier conversations were interrelated; they were those of Western forces and access, borders, non-aggression pact, GDR sovereignty, subversive activities in West Berlin, denuclearization of the two Germanys.

The Secretary said there were two roads along which we could proceed. First, we could seek a final and historically satisfactory solution of the German problem, a solution linked to major steps in organizing European security and leading to a final conclusion of security arrangements by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Such a solution would open vast prospects for disarmament in Europe and North America, for trade, etc. As far as we were concerned, we did not see how a final conclusion could be arrived at without the wishes of the people concerned being taken into account. Of course, we were talking about a vast number of people living in Europe and North America, and we did not believe that the choice of 70 million Germans should be an obstacle to the development of our relations. Next year would mark the 20th anniversary of the end of World War II, and perhaps that would be a good time for a bold and radical solution. On the other hand, perhaps the time for such a solution was not yet ripe and we should see what could be done for the ordinary people living in the immediate area. Some progress in this respect had already been made. There had been some improvement in the relations between the FRG and East Germany, and some steps had been taken to alleviate the humanitarian aspects of the situation. For example, the U.S. was happy about the pass arrangements which had been recently developed. Also, trade between West Germany and Eastern Europe, including East Germany, was increasing steadily and importantly. Perhaps some additional, important steps could be made to make the life of the people in the area more secure. However, the Secretary said, he wished to reiterate that he did not see--and this was not a cold war view--any permanent solution unless the German people had their full say in it. Unless these elementary considerations were taken into account, there would always be a chance for manipulation and for a demagogue calling for a course no one wanted to see the Germans take. The Secretary said he would see his colleagues in Paris and get in touch with the Soviet side thereafter. He wanted to ask Mr. Gromyko directly whether in his view there was a possibility of having a solution based on the judgment of the people living in West Germany and East Germany.

Mr. Gromyko responded that he did not think the term "judgment" was the right one in this context, although he knew what the Secretary meant. The fact was that there were two German States. The division between them was most profound and almost impossible to overcome. Thus, the only possibility of working for reunification was through disarming the two German States and through mutual understanding between them. Mr. Gromyko said he wished to reiterate Soviet readiness to include in any understanding among the Great Powers a provision stating that the Great Powers would make efforts to facilitate reunification. However, the method of reunification should in no way be imposed from the outside.

The Secretary said there was no question of imposition of a solution "from the outside". The U.S. was ready to accept the choice made by the German people. If the Germans should express the desire to remain as they were now, that would be all right with us.

Mr. Gromyko commented the Secretary was proposing to mix the Germans together and to ask them to make their choice according to U.S. concepts. The Soviet Union's view was that there were two German States.

The Secretary noted the Soviet Union claimed that only the leaders of the East German Government could speak for the people, whereas we said the people should have their say. He also said he was not quite sure what Mr. Gromyko meant when he said that we wanted to mix the Germans.

Mr. Gromyko said he meant that the Germans would be mixed at the polls.

The Secretary said he had in mind separate polls.

Mr. Gromyko rejoined that the people in East Germany had already voted. In any event, the idea advanced by the Secretary was unrealistic and smelled of mothballs. What we should do was to let the two German States get together and discuss their problems.

Commenting that he realized Mr. Gromyko was not a spokesman for East Germany, the Secretary wondered what Mr. Gromyko would say if he were the East German representative and if he, the Secretary, were the West German representative in such discussions.

Mr. Gromyko responded that he would say the two countries should improve their relations, and that this was the only way. He said he knew the U.S. and West Germany did not like it, but the fact was that this was the only realistic way. Sooner or later, East Germany would be recognized, for it was a fact that there existed two separate and sovereign German States.

The Secretary stressed that if there were to be a psychologically stable solution, the German people living in the two parts of Germany would have to have their say in it. If there were separate votes in West Germany and East Germany and if the people in East Germany did not wish reunification, we would respect their desires, just as a decision in the opposite direction should be respected.

Mr. Gromyko repeated that this was subject to an understanding between the two German States. He said he wished to stress that the further the rearmament of West Germany and the plans for the MLF went, the more difficult a solution would be. No solution was possible without disarmament. Indeed, even for an understanding between the two German States, it was necessary for them to be in the same position, i.e., both of them should be disarmed. He said many opportunities had been lost in the past, and what had been possible yesterday was not possible today.

The Secretary said he wished to comment on the relationship between the German problem and disarmament. If one asked broadly for what purpose the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were maintaining such huge forces today, the reply was that they did so because of each other. But then, what would the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have to fight about? As we saw it, it was almost only over the German problem. Thus, if the German problem were resolved, the way towards disarmament would be open. The Secretary recalled his earlier remark to Mr. Gromyko that Stalin had made a tactical error; had Stalin maintained a quiet repose for 10 years after World War II, there would be no need for discussing disarmament today, because the U.S. would have disarmed on its own. The reason we had rearmed was the German problem. The Secretary pointed out the solution of the German problem and disarmament could go together. He said he knew that this was not as simple as it might sound; however, he was convinced that nothing would be so far reaching as the solution of the German problem, with the consequential dramatic possibilities for disarmament.

The Secretary also recalled his earlier remark to Mr. Gromyko that the U.S. had not been the Soviet Union's ally in World War II against the Nazis in order to fight a third world war over the German question. That would be foolish. The U.S. was concerned about Germany, but we were confident that the present generation in Germany and its leaders wanted peace. Yet nobody could know what was going to happen in 20 or 30 years from now either in West Germany or East Germany.

Mr. Gromyko said he agreed that reunification was not possible without disarmament. However, it was not possible without an understanding between the two German States either. Nevertheless, he believed that some aspects of a German peace settlement could be resolved without disarmament in Europe and without denuclearizing the two German States.

The Secretary observed that from Mr. Gromyko's remarks, he gathered that the Soviet Union wanted the solution of those aspects to be conditioned on the acceptance of its views on the main problems, such as recognition of the division of the German people.

Mr. Gromyko said that East Germany should be recognized, reiterating that a solution of the German problem could be possible only on the basis of improved relations between the two German States. If one proceeded on the basis of hate and of all kinds of incidents, it was impossible to think of a solution of the German problem.

The Secretary pointed out that as far as we were concerned, the idea of reunification was subject to the will of the German people. Mr. Gromyko had spoken of the differences between the social systems in the two parts of Germany. We did not know whether that factor would influence the decision of the German people. Personally, the Secretary said, he thought that the national feelings would prevail just as he was sure they would prevail if the Soviet Union or the United States were in a similar situation.

Mr. Gromyko inquired whether discussion of the German problem could be resumed after the Secretary's return from Paris.

The Secretary replied that he didn't know and that he would be in touch with Mr. Gromyko after he had discussed this matter with his colleagues in Paris./3/

/3/See Document 78.

 

75. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, December 13, 1964.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret.

SUBJECT
Initiative on the German Problem

At the experts meeting on December twelfth,/2/ I gave a fairly full account of your discussions with Gromyko,/3/ including hint of Soviet willingness to resume dialogue with us. The only thing I omitted was the indication that the Soviet intention was to begin with troop presence in West Berlin and the question of access. There was general agreement that the Soviets would not be receptive to any proposals on the German problem which were couched in traditional terms of Four Power responsibility for reunification based on self-determination, all-German elections, etc. The German side nevertheless put forward three versions of an "initiative," the texts of which are attached./4/ Number one calls for the establishment of a "Standing Council of the Four Powers for Germany," in order to reduce tensions and achieve reunification. This is the type of broad language which would run the risks you have already foreseen in the unlikely event the Soviets indicated initial acceptance and then asked what should be discussed. The other two were generally agreed by the British, French and ourselves to be completely unacceptable to the Soviets because of the references to elections, reunification and self-determination. The German side maintains that some form of initiative is necessary to maintain the faith of East and West Germans in eventual reunification and that a proposal to the Soviets along the lines submitted would accomplish this result even though it would be rejected by the Soviets.

/2/A memorandum of conversation is ibid.

/3/See Document 74.

/4/Not found with the source text.

After considerable discussion, the following four points were agreed to be suitable for discussion at the Quadripartite dinner Monday night:

1. Is an initiative along the lines proposed by the Germans desirable even though we recognize that the Soviets would promptly reject it?

Comment: We feel that it would be a mistake to submit such obviously unacceptable proposals to the Soviets. The contents of the more detailed proposals would be rejected and we feel that the rejection and almost inevitable accompanying counterblast would make the proposals appear as a routine exercise having no serious objective and, as such, might have negative repercussions on East German opinion. Moreover, it would do nothing to improve Western relations with the Soviets on the Berlin problem; on the contrary, owing to the generally accepted view that Russian policy in Germany is immobilized by internal considerations, it could harden existing Soviet policy on Germany. However, if the Germans insist on the necessity of making a proposal to the Soviets, the language of any proposal would have to be worked out carefully--and should be remitted to the Ambassadorial Group in Washington.

2. Should the proposal be reworded to try to make the establishment of Four Power machinery acceptable to the Soviets, by omitting reference to reunification, and assigning it some such task as handling current points of friction with the thought it might eventually gradually work into dealing with more substantive problems?

Comment: What the British apparently have in mind is to build on a small base--possibly the current Soviet moves to get together in Berlin. Such machinery could start with consideration of day-to-day problems in Berlin and then gradually spread its umbrella over more important matters such as humanitarian problems, trade and economic matters, and, after a substantial period of time, political problems leading to unification. This is such vague proposal that it should be considered in more detail at a later time by the Ambassadorial Group.

3. Should Western substantive positions on the German problem and European Security be reexamined?

Comment: All four Western powers agree that the Soviet internal situation rules out Soviet acceptance of any new Western substantive proposals. At the same time, the Soviet proposals for reactivating a Quadripartite dialogue in Berlin (or at least in Western Berlin) suggests the Soviets wish to open the door by a crack. We feel we should do nothing to discourage the Soviets in this direction, particularly if it turns out that the Soviets are willing to re-emphasize Quadripartite responsibility for Berlin as a whole. We see no need for re-examination.

4. Timing of any initiative.

Comment: It is interesting to note that even the Germans, although pushing the idea of an "initiative" doggedly, are not in a particular rush to do anything. They recognize the aura of political uncertainty now prevailing in the East and they note the Moscow meeting of Communist leaders just scheduled for March first. We will also need to define clearly what we are proposing to negotiate before we agree to a proposal to negotiate. Thus it is unlikely that we will have anything before mid-March or April.

The question could also put to Schroeder whether it would not be wise to await further Soviet response to the query which the Germans have put to the Russians whether the projected visit to the FRG will be picked up by the new Kremlin leadership.

It might be argued that no new German initiative should be undertaken until after the international meeting of Communist parties has taken place (the latest information is that a preparatory meeting will convene on March first although no information about place, participants, or terms of reference is now known).

The French are likely to cite the current MLF negotiations as another reason for delay.

 

76. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

US/MC/8

Paris, December 14, 1964, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret. Drafted by Spiers on December 15 and approved in S and G on January 19, 1965. The meeting was held at the Chancery. The source text is marked "Part III of III."

PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Thompson, G
Mr. Tyler, EUR
Mr. Spiers, EUR/RPM

Germany
Foreign Minister Schroeder
Ambassador Grewe, NATO PermRep
Mr. Scheske, Foreign Office
Mr. Rute, Foreign Office
Mr. Kusterer (Interpreter)

SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin

Foreign Minister Schroeder said that he had been disappointed with Saturday's Quadripartite discussions./2/ While he recognized that Butler and Rusk had both informally raised the idea of a Four-Power body on Germany with Gromyko, there was no reason not to approach the Soviets more formally with the idea. He recognized the chance of acceptance was practically nil. However, this was not a criterion. The question for Germany is, would such a reminder of Four Power responsibility be useful? His answer was yes. It would counter the ever repeated Soviet thesis that the problem of Germany is for the two Germanys to settle. It was an urgent German requirement that this be put forth officially and jointly to the Soviets. He did not feel that this should depend on the prior working out of a complete plan on Germany and the security problem. The latter would be difficult and take at least 6-12 months. The French would not cooperate at this point. But this does not make impossible a move such as Germany now wished. If the Soviets show interest in the idea then Western talks can proceed, and it is not necessary to answer all the possible questions ahead of time. He personally could see no risk in making such a move. If the Soviets do not accept the proposal there would be no harm in having made it. However, there is harm if nothing is done. "My very serious and frank request to the United States is to be cooperative in this project." There is a much bigger risk in Germany and for international public opinion if discussions continue as at present with the Soviets on marginal subjects. (He noted he had no objection to these discussions if they did not touch on vital German interests.)

/2/December 12; see Document 75.

The Secretary asked why it would take 6-12 months to agree on answers to questions which might be put to us in negotiations with the Soviets. Schroeder said that he was speaking about coming to an agreement on a complete and detailed plan for European security which would settle the status of Germany, the problem of alliances, defense, etc. This would take even more than a year if it could be done at all. Trying it could only have a negative effect among the allies without changing the actual international situation one bit. Development of such a plan was completely out of the question as far as France was concerned and maybe even for the UK and US. Nothing could be worked out which was realistic in terms of acceptability to the Soviets.

That is why Germany favors the most modest starting point: an appeal to Four Power responsibility. Let the Soviets reject this. The West would have put up a proper reminder and German public opinion would gain the necessary impression of Four Power desire to deal with Germany as a whole. Such a move could be made very soon, within 4-6 weeks.

Ambassador Thompson noted that timing was a problem of some moment. The new Soviet Government was working out new lines of policy which could be unfavorably influenced by a Western initiative of this nature. Schroeder disagreed, noting that the reaction of the new Soviet Government can be anticipated. They will not need to think very much before reacting. In the meantime, we would have the reminder of Four Power responsibility and we can await the changes in the international situation which are required before a realistic plan can be developed. Since such an appeal would be within the "framework of the Western thesis," there should be no far-reaching consequences.

The Secretary noted his understanding that it would be advantageous to German public opinion in the pre-election period to talk generally about reunification, and that there would be disadvantages in talking about frontiers, arms control or security guarantees. The trouble is that discussions with the Soviets cannot be so limited. President Johnson will ask him what the Soviet reaction will be to any course of action we recommend. The Soviets may make counterproposals or ask questions, "a, b, c and d." Are we ready to deal with these on an allied basis? We are not now prepared to deal with the consequences of what we may initiate.

Schroeder said he thought there is an answer to these observations. The high probability is that the Soviets will reject an appeal. On the other hand, there is nothing they could say which we would not know how to answer. Unless there is something sensationally new in favor of the West from the Soviets, we have answers to all possible Soviet questions. These have all been agreed in the past year. What Germany wants is nothing more than repeating the Western position in some suitably diplomatic form, such as a Three-Power note containing a proposal to the Soviets.

Ambassador Thompson asked if it were really in the interest of the German public to court an abrupt Soviet rejection. He was surprised at Schroeder's view that this would be helpful. Schroeder agreed that it would be necessary to discuss the precise formula to be used. It may not be necessary to refer explicitly to "reunification." We could talk in terms of a Four-Power body to deal with "Germany as a whole." The FRG was extremely grateful for the President's Georgetown policy speech/3/ but we now need to make a visible attempt to bring about discussion with the other side. He said that if the US were forthcoming, the French and British would come along. That is why he strongly hoped to be able to rely on U.S. support.

/3/For text of the December 3 address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, pp. 1632-1635.

 

77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/

Washington, December 18, 1964, 1:19 p.m.

1/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 6. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk.

773. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. In view of Bonn's 2324/2/ I want you to get a little personal view of the core of the problem as it appeared at our quadripartite dinner on the subject of an initiative on German unification. The big question the other three had to examine was whether the German attitude toward an initiative was serious from an international point of view or was merely a somewhat empty international gesture designed to meet the internal political requirements of the present government in Germany. Quite frankly, I had the impression that during the period before the election the Germans wanted to be talking about reunification but were adamantly opposed to talking about the inevitable accompanying questions such as frontiers, security arrangements in Europe, disarmament and such other issues as would inevitably arise in discussing unification. From my point of view there was another issue involving particularly France. In 1961-62 I spent almost two years talking with the Russians to ascertain whether there was any basis for negotiation and at times found myself almost alone because of the French attitude. If there is to be a public diplomatic initiative, I want to be sure that the French mean it and are prepared to stay on board; else I should be looking around and asking "where is everybody."

/2/Dated December 17. (Ibid.)

As I have just told you I will be seeing Gromyko on Saturday and will try to find out whether they have any interest in informal four-power talks on the German question, without agenda, in order to explore whether some progress might be made. I shall keep you informed and would want you to keep in prompt touch with Schroeder so that he will feel that we are trying to work as closely with him as possible.

Ball

 

78. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

SecDel/MC/46

New York, December 19, 1964, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 21 and cleared in S on December 30. The meeting was held at the Secretary's suite in the Waldorf Towers. The source text is marked "Part III of IV."

SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
Ambassador Stevenson
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Akalovsky

U.S.S.R.
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
Ambassador Dobrynin
Ambassador Fedorenko
Mr. Sukhodrev

The Secretary recalled Mr. Gromyko's remark to the President/2/ that he did not exclude the possibility of new elements in the Soviet position. He wondered whether there was anything Mr. Gromyko could say now.

/2/See footnote 1, Document 74.

Mr. Gromyko confirmed he had made such a remark to the President with respect to Western forces in West Berlin. However, no exchange of views on the problem was now taking place. Indeed, on the basis of the Secretary's remarks on the German question, he did not see much prospect for progress. The Secretary had been referring to such matters as unification, disarmament, etc., and it was difficult to imagine movement on that basis.

The Secretary pointed out that the three governments on the Western side were necessarily involved in the German problem. As a result of World War II, the U.S., the U.K., and France have specific responsibilities and rights. It would be difficult to have discussions on a bilateral basis because we did not know what new elements the Soviet Union had in mind and also because we did not know whether we could deliver anything that might be agreed upon in the absence of the other parties concerned. In any event, there was a range of matters on which further movement should be possible. We were pleased with the Christmas pass arrangement and perhaps the four parties could sit down informally and see what could be done to move further in that direction. Of course, our approaches to the German problem were different, but perhaps it would be useful to discuss, without any agenda, the whole range of questions involved in it. The Secretary said he would advise against such discussions as could produce crises, of which we had had enough already. He also pointed out that he was not proposing anything formally. He had not been instructed to do so, but he thought perhaps it would be useful to look at the whole range of questions and see where progress could be made. The Secretary said he could not make any formal proposal to this effect until he knew Mr. Gromyko's reaction.

Mr. Gromyko said the Soviet Union was ready to enter into discussions, but he wished to stress that to tie reunification, disarmament, and other problems of that magnitude into one knot was unrealistic, and it would be difficult to have discussions on that basis. Discussions should take place on a realistic basis and the Soviet Union believed that there were possibilities for understanding on some of the points discussed earlier. The Soviet Union had come to this conclusion on the basis of previous talks, but to have talks on a new basis would be difficult. The Soviet Union was prepared to have discussions, but what would be their purpose?

The Secretary said that to take the least, perhaps progress could be made in the humanitarian area, such as reunion of families, expansion of cultural exchanges, etc. Frankly, he did not believe that such discussions would lead to a final solution of the German problem. However, some progress could still be made.

Mr. Gromyko suggested that humanitarian aspects could be worked out and agreed upon between the two Germanies, as had already been done in certain areas. However, such understandings did not move us towards the solution of serious problems which still remained unsettled.

The Secretary wondered what level Mr. Gromyko had in mind in suggesting bilateral discussions. He personally would be quite busy over the next several weeks in connection with preparations for the President's State of the Union message and other matters. Did Mr. Gromyko have in mind our Ambassadors or perhaps some other level?

Mr. Gromyko said the U.S. should inform the Soviet side when it was ready to start discussions. We had two capitals and perhaps discussions could rotate between them. The Soviet Union was prepared to have discussions on a realistic basis at any time, and it was up to the U.S. to decide when. The problem of European security was very important to the Soviet Union; it concerned the Soviet Union's own security as well as that of its allies.

 

79. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/

Bonn, January 5, 1965, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 6. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

2484. Pass to the White House for the President. Subject: Meeting with Chancellor Erhard.

1. Message from the President.

I saw Chancellor Erhard this morning at 9, just before he went into a Cabinet meeting scheduled for 9:30. I advised Erhard that I had just returned from the US where I had seen President Johnson at his Ranch./2/ The President had asked me to extend his warm greetings to the Chancellor. He had recalled his very satisfactory meeting with the Chancellor at the Ranch and had asked me to tell the Chancellor that he looked forward to a return visit with him in Bonn. The President had also reaffirmed his continued interest in German reunification, and had asked me to point out to the Chancellor the reference he proposed to make to this in his State of the Union Message./3/

/2/According to President Johnson's Daily Diary, he met with McGhee at the LBJ Ranch from 10:45 a.m. to 11:15 a.m. on December 30, 1964. The two men also talked by long distance telephone on January 3 when McGhee called from Middleburg, Virginia. (Ibid.) No record of either conversation was found.

/3/For text of the State of the Union address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 1-9.

The Chancellor expressed appreciation for the President's greetings and statements. The President's presence in Europe was badly needed. There had been many bilateral visits in Europe, i.e., he was visiting both de Gaulle and Wilson soon./4/ However, only a visit by the President could serve to ease the "tensions and difficulties" that now exist in Europe. He welcomed the President's statement on a European visit as contained in his State of the Union Message.

/4/January 19-20.

2. Reunification.

Since today's Cabinet meeting had been called mainly to discuss the alleged change in US policy regarding an initiative toward reunification arising out of the "backgrounder" held in Washington on December 30,/5/ I dealt next with this subject. I explained that there was no change in US policy or tactics towards an initiative on reunification. What had been stated in the backgrounder conformed to what the Secretary of State had told FonMin Schroeder during his recent visit to Washington/6/--indeed, what he had been saying in all discussions on this subject for many months. It is not a question of our desire to seek reunification by all feasible means, but what could be expected to be accomplished by a particular initiative at this time.

/5/The text of the Secretary's comments was transmitted to the Embassy in telegram 1876 to Bonn, December 31, 1964. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER)

/6/See Document 73.

I referred to the references to reunification in the President's Georgetown speech and in his State of the Union message. I gave orally from the verbatim text of the backgrounder the statements made as to the importance of a solution of the German problem. In the light of his experience, however, the Secretary was convinced [that] before a serious initiative could be undertaken, answers on an agreed Four-Power basis must be found to certain questions which the Soviets might raise. This did not mean answers to all questions at the outset, but at least enough so as not to be caught off balance by the Soviets. I pointed out that the US, through a series of discussions by President Kennedy, President Johnson, and Secretary Rusk with Soviet FonMin Gromyko, as well as by our Ambassadors in Moscow, had been pushing for an opening for an initiative almost continuously since 1961.

The most recent discussions in this series had been held as recently as early December, between the Secretary and the President, and Gromyko./7/ Both had probed deeply with Gromyko, however, Gromyko had made it clear that he had no desire to talk about reunification--only subjects such as Western troops in West Berlin, security of the Soviet bloc, borders, non-aggression pact, thin-out, denuclearization of Germany, and sovereignty of the GDR--subjects which the Germans and we had no desire to speak about. I was sure that the Germans did not have in mind a mere propaganda effort, i.e. the floating of a proposal which would immediately be shot down in front of the German people. Such a maneuver would be so patently transparent that it would unquestionably create an adverse popular reaction.

/7/See Document 74 and footnote 1 thereto.

The Chancellor confirmed that this was not what the German Government had in mind. He referred to reports that we had, in the backgrounder, inferred that we did not wish to support the present CDU government politically through the making of an initiative. I said that no such inference had been given. I recalled to the Chancellor the fact that in the Four-Power discussions preceding the recent NAC meeting,/8/ the US and Britain had agreed to the strongest statement on a reunification initiative that had yet been considered by the Four, only to have it turned down by the French. The Chancellor asked why in our judgment the French had turned it down. I replied that it appeared to have been the result of a momentary reaction by the French FonMin to the position the Germans had taken in the NAC on the MLF./9/

/8/See Documents 75 and 77.

/9/McGhee's response appears to have been based on the summary report in circular telegram 1152, December 20; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 66.

As evidence of the sincerity of our desire to see reunification pushed ahead, the Secretary had authorized me to propose to the FonMin, which I had already done in a preliminary way last evening:

1) that Four-Power discussions as envisaged in the agreement which was under discussion in Paris be resumed, if acceptable to the other three, in Bonn by the Bonn Group.

2) that Schroeder himself join the Secretary, the French FonMin, and the British FonSec when they gather in New York for the UN meeting, for further discussions on the initiative.

I emphasized that nothing should be said publicly about those proposals since agreement had not been obtained from the British and French. However, if the Germans agreed we would undertake to obtain their approval.

3. MLF.

The Chancellor asked the significance of the announced abandonment of the MLF organization within the State Department./10/ What was the American attitude toward the MLF? Do we think there is any chance of getting the French to participate? Will we proceed without the French? Using guidance contained in NSAM nr 322, Dept Circular 1158,/11/ I advised the Chancellor that we have not lost interest in the MLF. We, the Germans, and certain others had developed a position on the MLF, concerning which the British and others had raised certain questions. Since we seek a solution to the question of nuclear responsibility within the Alliance on as broad a basis as possible, we are willing to abandon our initial position in moving toward a broader consensus, which we hope will come out of the meeting planned this month between the interested nations. In arriving at this consensus we do not wish to assert pressures or create deadlines. We insist that any arrangement take care of the legitimate interests of Germany, as well as those of the other European states involved. Our position toward the French, I continued, was that we did not wish to do anything directed against them and wished to advise them fully of what we proposed to do. If they are not willing to participate now, we wished to leave the door open for them in the future. Although we do not expect them to join, we have some basis to hope that they will in the end acquiesce in whatever arrangement is made. When the force de frappe is operational the French have indicated that they will be willing to coordinate in some way its planning and targeting.

/10/Reference is to a James Reston article in The New York Times, December 21, 1964.

/11/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 65.

4. Bloc credits.

The Chancellor said with some feeling that he had once had hopes that the Germans could make a contribution to their relations with the Soviets and to reunification by offering large-scale assistance to the Soviets in return for political concessions. This was now no longer "politically realistic," since Germany's allies were offering credits to the Soviets.

I replied that I assumed he did not include the US Government, which has not offered such credits. Minister Westrick indicated, however, that there was a possibility that the American firms supplying East Germany with a synthetic fiber plant might offer credits on a private basis. I said that I had seen no evidence to this effect, however, I would look into the matter and advise them. I pointed out that US law, as well as government policy, prevented the granting of such credits.

5. Review of policy.

The Chancellor said that he wished to discuss with me further, when there was more time, what he termed as a "balance sheet," which he could use in his forthcoming discussions with de Gaulle and Wilson. He would, for example, like to discuss further the question of the MLF. He thought it significant that de Gaulle had now postponed his press conference until after the Chancellor's visit. His implication was that de Gaulle was thereby putting pressure on him to be more accommodating during his visit.

Comment: I saw the Chancellor immediately upon his return from a vacation at Tegern See, to which he will return for three more days on Thursday. He had had only a few moments to be briefed by Westrick, however, he appeared quite relaxed about the reunification initiative issue which has been boiling in the German press. I believe that what I told him will enable him to cope with the questions raised in his Cabinet meeting. I also believe that the government will now feel itself in a position to take action to dampen down press discussion of alleged changes in US policy on reunification. Federal press spokesman Von Hase will be holding a press conference later today. I will myself hold separate backgrounders with both the German and American press.

What is not yet clear is how Erhard and Schroeder will themselves come through this latest flurry. Apart from some SPD murmurings about the lack of an imaginative government approach, the Chancellor and his FonMin have so far escaped much direct criticism because of concentration on US policy. The next phase might, however, bring some shift of emphasis to the inadequacies of Bonn policy which have brought about the present situation.

In connection with the Chancellor's suggestion for a discussion leading to the creation of a "balance sheet" for his forthcoming meetings, the Embassy will put forward to the Department suggestions as to the positions we should take on the various outstanding issues. The Chancellor was particularly heartened by the indication given in the President's State of the Union Message that he would be visiting Europe soon.

McGhee

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