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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968 Washington, DC |
80. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 7, 1965, 12:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 6. Secret. Drafted by Puhan and approved in S on January 21. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. A memorandum of the portion of the conversation covering MLF issues is ibid.
SUBJECT
German Ambassador's Call on the Secretary
Part 1 of 2--German ReunificationPARTICIPANTS
Germans
Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy
Minister Georg von Lilienfeld, German Embassy
Mr. Berndt von Staden, Counselor, German EmbassyAmericans
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
Mr. Alfred Puhan, Director, GERAmbassador Knappstein said he was calling at his own initiative. He stated that he had two questions. The first was what do you consider we four do next on the German question? He said there was a strong and growing feeling regarding the reunification question in Germany. He cited an article by Zehrer in Die Welt entitled "The German Disquiet". According to the Ambassador this urge for reunification was becoming more and more a trauma. The feeling regarding reunification was no longer entirely rational, but approaching a state of hysteria. The Ambassador said he felt personally that after twenty years of frustration, there might be hot-heads who would lead demonstrations. He said that this brought terrible pressure on the government. The upcoming elections had also to be kept in mind. At the same time, according to the Ambassador, there was greater recognition on the part of the Germans that they would not get something for nothing. He spoke of a certain readiness to consider other matters in connection with the reunification question, mentioning the territorial and boundary questions. The Ambassador said this growing readiness to consider other questions was, of course, not to be confused with concessions. The Ambassador thought this is what the Secretary had in mind when he gave his backgrounder at the end of the year.
The Ambassador said that the recent blow the Germans had suffered on the reunification initiative was actually one of two blows, the other one being what he called the change on MLF policy, from the old MLF to a combination of MLF/ANF. He said confidentially that this change had resulted in a storm in the Cabinet against Foreign Minister Schroeder and that he had been reproached for pursuing a policy already buried by the Americans. The Ambassador's second question, therefore, was what do you envisage on the MLF?
The Secretary, referring to growing German anxieties, said that one can perhaps understand sensitivities without conceding they were justified. He added that we were growing sensitive about growing sensitivities in Germany. He said that we must understand that sensitivities create counter-sensitivities.
The Secretary said that on the reunification question, only the United States in the West had followed a clear, simple and persistent policy over the years. He pointed out that he had raised the German question in every serious conversation he had had with the Russians on any subject. He said that these attempts on his part to keep the question alive with the Russians had been made at least twice a year.
The Secretary said that there were two problems in this connection which bothered him. The first was that if we are to take an initiative, we must be serious about it. We cannot rely on a negative response from the Russians. We must be prepared for a Russian counter-suggestion. If the Russians seriously suggest that we get our troops out of Berlin, we would immediately have the crisis of 1958 with the concomitant expense of billions of dollars and tremendous expenditure of time and effort. The Secretary emphasized that we must be prepared to face the alternatives and the Four must be together on this. He reminded the Ambassador that he had been through this before. He reiterated that if we take an international step, we must be prepared for the consequences.
The Secretary said that his second observation on this subject was that reunification was very complex, having many parts. The most obvious problem related to reunification is the frontier question. The Secretary added you are really talking about a peace treaty when you are talking about reunification.
The Secretary said he had told Foreign Minister Schroeder that it was easy for him to envisage the first statement made by each of the participants at a reunification negotiation, but what he did not see as clearly were the second speeches on the second day. The Secretary said that he had had the impression during recent months that what the Germans wished to discuss was reunification in its narrowest sense, and that they had been reluctant to face the questions of frontiers, security arrangements and disarmament, elements which were inseparably linked.
The Secretary said that he would suggest for the immediate future that Chancellor Erhard, during his visit with de Gaulle, make sure that he have a private, serious and extended discussion with the General on the subject of reunification. The Secretary added that he was making this recommendation against the background of his own conversations with General de Gaulle.
The Secretary said that although he had not mentioned this to the British and French, he would see a point in having Schroeder come to New York some time during the United Nations General Assembly after Chancellor Erhard's talk with de Gaulle, and possibly meet with him and the British and French for further discussion of the subject. The Secretary said that Ambassador McGhee had mentioned this to Chancellor Erhard.
The Secretary said that he was interested in the Ambassador's observation, that there was now a readiness to look at substantive questions related to reunification.
The Ambassador repeated his belief that readiness is growing to discuss such topics. He referred in this connection to a recent speech by CDU Parliamentarian Gradl. He added that the difficulty was not reduced by discussion of the question by political parties in Germany during an election year. The Ambassador thought that CDU Parliamentary leader Barzel would discuss this subject when he visited the United States.
The Secretary said he had not had the opportunity to tell Foreign Minister Schroeder in Paris that questions raised by the Secretary with the Foreign Minister were really aimed at someone else. He reiterated the danger that if we joined in an initiative which provides the pretext for the USSR to return to its 1961 position, we would have to fly troops in and spend billions of dollars. He added that we were ready to do this, to face such an eventuality, but unless there was complete solidarity on the part of the Four the American people would question the Secretary's actions in bringing about a repeat of the 1961 situation.
The Ambassador asked the Secretary if he had detected any point of receptivity in his talks with Gromyko. The Secretary replied in the negative. He said that Gromyko appeared more completely negative on the reunification issue than at any other time. The Secretary speculated that the twenty-two Soviet divisions in East Germany were no longer there for the security of troops in Eastern Germany, but for all of Eastern Europe. He could visualize that if the twenty-two divisions left the Soviet Zone of Germany, all of Eastern Europe would join Western Europe. The Secretary said that Gromyko had said that he was willing to resume a discussion bilaterally of questions discussed last year--Berlin, US troops, etc. Gromyko, the Secretary added, had told the President that he did not discount the possibility that some new elements might enter the discussion. The Secretary concluded that when he probed Gromyko on this point, he received no clue as to what Gromyko had in mind.
The Secretary said he did not believe the Soviets were prepared to discuss reunification, or saw any movement in that direction. Gromyko had indicated to the Secretary that he was aware of the feelings in Europe on this question and saw no sense in creating an illusion there is movement when there is none. The Secretary allowed for the possibility that the Soviets might come back at some later date with something else.
The Secretary assured the Ambassador that despite what Gromyko had said, we were prepared to take an initiative if, as he had said earlier, it was serious and we were all aware of the consequences. He reiterated his strong belief that considerable advantage was to be gained in Franco-German talks in depth and detail in a relaxed atmosphere.
81. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, January 7, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 6. Secret.
SUBJECT
German Unity1. This memorandum suggests a US course of action regarding German unity, for the period immediately ahead:
(a) The Four Western Foreign Ministers would declare (perhaps when meeting at the GA in New York) that they favor, in principle, an initiative, such as the FedRep has in mind, for a Four Power Commission on Germany, which would provide an umbrella for mixed German commissions. The FonMin's would declare that they have directed a quadripartite working group in Bonn to staff out the proposal in greater detail.
(b) The Bonn Working Group would then be activated. Its labors could be made the subject of considerable public and press comment by the German government between now and the election. These labors would include consideration not only of procedures for the Four Power Commission and the inter-German committees but also of the substance of matters to be considered in that Council, e.g., German frontiers and other security aspects of German unity. (Prior to the German elections, it is obviously an open question as to how deeply the Germans in the Working Group would consider it feasible to delve into such matters of substance, since any leaks on these questions could and would be exploited by Strauss and Co. to the disadvantage of Schroeder and Erhard. Only time and experience can answer this question.)
(c) When the FonMin's met for the spring NATO meeting in London, they could review the Working Group's efforts and give it further guidance. This would be the occasion for another highly publicized communiqué stressing their intent to proceed re German unity.
(d) If the three Western FonMin's should then meet Gromyko in Vienna, to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty, they could discuss with him, in very general terms, the importance of progress toward German unity. They would not unveil the specific Four Power Council proposal. Ambassador Kohler's judgment, expressed on his recent trip, was that the Soviets would not accept any proposal on German unity before the German election, for fear of strengthening the CDU. But even very general exhortations by the Western FonMin's, in their discussions with Gromyko, could be made known to the press, with happy results in Germany.
(e) The specific Four Power proposal could then be put to the Soviets at such time, after the German election, as it had been staffed out in sufficient detail to be plausibly presented--and to be effectively executed if the Soviets should agree to set up the Council.
2. This proposal is designed to meet two needs:
(a) to generate further quadripartite Western staff work in spelling out the specific substance of a German unity proposal;
(b) to provide evidence of tangible progress which the CDU moderates could put to good use in repelling attacks by the German Gaullists.
The second of these needs is of crucial importance. The nationalists are clearly out to get, first, Schroeder (whose position is highly vulnerable) and then von Hassel. They would expect Erhard, if success crowns their efforts, to accommodate to the changed center of gravity in his party. If the CDU thus comes under increasing nationalist influence the SPD might be compelled to follow suit, in the degree that this commodity proved popular; the lesson of Weimar is that no major German political party can allow nationalism to be the monopoly of the opposition. Thus, the basic object of our postwar European policy--the maintenance of German moderate leadership--would be placed in some jeopardy.
3. The basic assumptions underlying this proposal are that:
(a) The German proposal for a Four Power Council and inter-German committees is the most promising basis on which to proceed with further staff work. No one can predict in advance whether substantive discussions in the Four Power Council would prove fruitful; this Council might turn out to be no more than a forum for rehashing past Western and Soviet positions. In this case, the Council (meeting, perhaps, rather infrequently) might prove important chiefly in providing cover for the inter-German committees, where useful work might well be done.
(b) Quadripartite staff discussion of the German proposal for a Four Power Council will only be useful, in the long run, if it gets into the subjects covered in your recent backgrounder, in its consideration of proposals to be advanced in the Four Power Council. We would have to make this clear to the Germans from the start (although, as suggested above, it may well be that the most serious staff work in this respect will only be undertaken after the German elections).
4. The French will have little incentive to go along with the course of action proposed in this memo. The main purpose of that course--the strengthening of German moderate leadership--is one that they do not share. They want to see Schroeder weakened, so that he can be replaced by a German Gaullist.
The French might be moved, however, if it were evident that the US, UK, and FRG were prepared to proceed with the public declaration and the necessary staff work, without the French, if need be. There may be inoffensive ways of intimating this to Couve in New York, before France's position is fixed. The French might well fear that continuing French isolation on this issue would place a heavy strain upon their allies in Germany: Refusing, day in and day out, to join in allied consideration of the issue which, more than any other, interests German public opinion is not the way to make the flowers of Gaullism bloom across the Rhine.
5. It may be useful to make our willingness to proceed along the lines described in this memorandum known to Erhard, before he visits de Gaulle. He will feel better able to stand up to Gaullist pressures and blandishments, in the course of that meeting, if he knows that the US is ready to back him strongly on the unity issue. It would probably not be useful for him to do more than stress the importance of the German unity issue and the need for further discussion of specific tactics among FonMin's in his talk with de Gaulle. If he unveils the details of the course of action proposed above, this might only trigger a premature French rejection--since he could hardly lay out what may be the most convincing pro argument: The fact that a possible Western willingness to proceed with further staff work without France, if necessary, cannot be wholly precluded. Furthermore, our suggesting to Erhard at this point that he propose this course to de Gaulle might tend to confirm German suspicions that the US intends to withdraw from a role of active leadership and leave the Germans to bear the main burden from here on out.
82. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, January 8, 1965, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, and Moscow.
2545. Subj: Reunification initiative. I called on FonMin Schroeder yesterday (Jan 7) at my request. I had spoken to him in a preliminary way on Monday, Jan 4, following my return from the US, at which time I had conveyed to him the Secretary's suggestion that he might wish to consider joining the Secretary, the French FonMin and the British FonSec, during the period they would be together at the UN, to discuss the question of an initiative on German reunification. I also indicated at that time that if it were agreeable to the British and French, we would be willing to initiate further Four-Power talks in the Bonn Group preparatory to such a meeting.
Schroeder said that his attendance at the proposed New York meeting on a unification initiative would depend on a number of factors: when it would be held, what the agenda would be, etc. The situation had been somewhat changed by the Departmental backgrounder given on this subject on Dec 30. It was always difficult for the German Govt to authorize the FonMin to go to New York during a UN meeting, since he would not be involved in the UN deliberations themselves. Moreover, to take such an unusual step under present circumstances might arouse undue expectations. He would, however, be willing to go if there were a chance of getting approval on the German Four-Power Council proposal. Otherwise it might be best to continue discussions between governments. He had not yet been able to reach a decision on the question of whether further discussions on reunification should be held by the Bonn Group. He could see certain advantages, however, there were also advantages in continuing discussions in the Washington Ambassadorial Group, where the American representative, who is the principal one concerned, would have better access to instructions.
The FonMin then went into the background of his recent espousal of the Four-Power Council concept. He had presented this idea in his meeting with Secretary of State Rusk on Nov 23,/2/ as well as during his subsequent meetings in Rome and London prior to the Paris meeting./3/ In his discussion with the Secretary in Paris prior to the evening Quadripartite dinner,/4/ he had obtained the impression that the Secretary would support the proposal. The evening meeting resulted in no specific agreement, but in the general agreement that representatives of the Four would prepare a draft communiqué.
/2/See Document 73.
/3/Reference is to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting at Paris December 15-17, 1964.
/4/Reported in telegram Secto 13 from Paris, December 15, 1964. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 GER W)
It was his impression that during this meeting the French pursued the tactic of attempting to get Sec Rusk and FonSec Gordon Walker to raise questions, to which they would then agree. During these discussions the Secretary had presented arguments very similar to those contained in the Washington backgrounder. Schroeder was at a loss to know who had given the impression to the press that the Secretary had been reluctant with respect to an initiative. The Germans had not done this. On Wednesday, it had been agreed that the Four-Power Council concept would be discussed further between governments. However, the French refused to sign the final communiqué because of the inclusion of the phrase "that the time had come to take appropriate steps to that end with the Soviet Union."
Although he had not discussed it with the French, it was Schroe-der's impression that they would still agree to discuss the Four-Power Council idea, although without any prior commitment to support it. However, no agreement had been reached in Paris as to the time and place of such discussions. In view of the backgrounder, and the Cabinet discussion on Tuesday, it was necessary that the entire matter now be reviewed, both within the Cabinet and with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag, which includes representatives of the other political parties. Since all concerned would be in Berlin together next week, an opportunity would be afforded.
Schroeder said that there was a difference between his original proposals and the version now being dealt with in the press. He did not propose putting forward a proposal to the Russians for a Four-Power Council meeting to consider reunification alone, which he knew would be turned down. Although he did not believe that a probable Soviet rejection was in itself a sufficient reason for not making a proposal, he agreed that any proposal made should be a serious one. He understood from what we had told him about Gromyko's meetings with the Secretary and the President that the Soviets would probably insist on keeping reunification separate from other issues. The Soviets would undoubtedly introduce many topics for discussion which the other three would prefer not to discuss.
Schroeder, however, still favors putting forward a proposal for a Four-Power Council meeting to consider the German problem as a whole. This would not be a new departure but would be based on the principle of Four-Power responsibility, which is still a reality with respect to certain problems. He would be willing for the Council to be called without a specific mandate. He did not consider it necessary for the Western Four to agree in advance on the answers to all questions that might be raised in the Four-Power Council. It should be possible to eliminate those Soviet proposals which we did not wish to discuss, just as they undoubtedly would seek to do with respect to issues distasteful to them. As a minimum the Council could create a series of Four-Power commissions, which might be able to make progress in their respective fields.
What, he asked, is the risk in making such a proposal, even if it is turned down? The basic question is whether the making of such a proposal would, in its overall aspects, be helpful or harmful. From a German viewpoint he believes it necessary to have strong statements made by the Allies on reunification, such as the President's Georgetown speech, and positive steps, such as his own current proposal, taken in common by the British, French and the US, even if the Soviets turned them down. He pointed out that the Sovs continually reiterate their own positions with respect to all-German questions. Why should we not?
I indicated to the FonMin that our position on the question of an initiative is the same as that which the Secretary had agreed to in Paris. We had made certain suggestions to the FonMin as to how we might proceed and would await his reply. Both were subject to approval by the British and French. He was familiar with the Secretary's views. Certainly he recognized that there are certain points of substance which must be agreed to before a proposal can be made to the Soviets. The Secretary has never said that the answers to all questions must be determined in advance.
Comment: As to whether in practice Schroeder's thinking on the issues which I discussed with him will correspond to that of the Dept, I do not know. I believe that the area of agreement can be determined only in terms of specifics--not through general discussion. My own feeling is that we would, in connection with any detailed consideration of the Four-Power Council proposal, not be far apart.
Tuesday's Cabinet discussion did not result in any decision as to the course the FRG will pursue on the initiative issue. I do not anticipate that we shall have any further reaction from the FonMin until the end of next week after the meetings in Berlin. In the meantime, if the Dept has any further guidance to give me as to our own stance at this juncture, it would be appreciated.
McGhee
83. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, January 11, 1965, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GER W. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Paris and London.
2558. Subject: Malaise in Germany. Germany is at the moment in a near crisis of confidence with respect to its external relations. As a part of this malaise a series of recent developments has, moreover, created a situation in our own relations with the Federal Republic which, at best, can be described as awkward. A typical view, conveyed to us last week by Jean Monnet's assistant, Max Kohnstamm, who has been seeing German officials in Bonn, is that the Germans are aware that their foreign policy has suffered a number of reversals recently and that nearly all have in some degree involved the United States. Most important, he claims, is the general interpretation given our much publicized National Security Action Memorandum,/2/ to the effect that the U.S. has abandoned the MLF and has thereby suffered a major political defeat at de Gaulle's hands. The net effect, according to Kohnstamm, will inevitably be to support the Gaullist group in the CDU/CSU and drive the Germans closer to the French.
/2/See footnote 11, Document 79.
I do not believe that this view dominates Erhard's thinking. I believe he still places highest priority on his relations with us. Schroeder personally does not have a French alternative, however, he has given me the clear impression that he feels "let down"--both in connection with the MLF and his proposal for a reunification initiative. Many German officials and party leaders go further in questioning whether their foreign policy has not run into a dead end and does not, therefore, require some radical revision. CDU/CSU Fraktion leader Barzel, for example, has recently expressed views of this kind, while FDP Vice Chancellor Mende has publicly called for more emphasis on German national interests in the formulation of policy. There are predictions of substantially closer German accommodations to the policies of de Gaulle during Erhard's meeting with him on Jan 19.
To recapitulate: Starting with the Paris meetings early in December, the Germans seem to have suffered one rebuff after another. Schroeder returned from Paris after a much-publicized failure to obtain Allied agreement on a communiqué stressing the desirability of an initiative on German reunification. Although the basic French responsibility for this has generally been recognized, there has also been much comment to the effect that the lack of U.S. enthusiasm played an important role. The public distortion of the backgrounder of December 30 has served to bring into question our basic attitude toward the whole concept of an initiative.
Although the German Government gained some stature from its hard decision on the grain price problem, there has been continuing criticism from farm groups that the government has sold out their interests, and from others for having acted too late or for having failed to exact anything substantial in return for German concessions. There is a feeling that despite the sacrifice Germany made on the grain price, it has earned nothing from de Gaulle--i.e., Schroeder's rebuff on the initiative came afterwards. The U.S. position in the grain price matter has, moreover, been interpreted as having contributed to their lack of success. We appeared to be encouraging them in the deal in making a decision which took away some of the returns they had expected.
Although now put in better perspective, the approval of the construction of a synthetic fiber plant in the GDR by an American firm was at one time widely interpreted as reflecting a change in U.S. policy toward the GDR. The Germans were mainly influenced by the size of the project in comparison with previous American trade with the GDR, and by the fact that we had not advised them in advance of its spectacular exposure by a German newspaper.
In addition to the widespread belief that the U.S. had in effect abandoned the MLF project, or is at least prepared to let it stagnate, there exists even in the Foreign Office a feeling that we have left the Germans to negotiate the matter out with the British, a task to which they do not feel equal. There is wide impression that the MLF is "dead."
As a reflection of German sensitivity, which is exceptionally acute at this time, there have even been expressions of uncertainty and dismay as result of the comments made by the Secretary in his TV interview with Mr. Abel/3/ concerning the conditions under which a review might be made of the size of our forces here. It seems significant to us that the German reaction to the news of French gold purchases has often been more critical of the United States than of France. A frequent theme taken up by both press and government officials is that the French purchases may do a service to the Western world if they lead to more vigorous American action to eliminate our balance of payments deficit. Many German editorials tend to view sympathetically the French concern over the continued flow of direct U.S. investment to Europe.
/3/For text of the January 3 interview, see Department of State Bulletin, January 18, 1965, pp. 62-74.
Erhard's failure up to this point to gain acceptance of his proposals for European political integration constitute another disappointment. He has on many occasions called publicly for increased efforts toward political unification and on Nov 3, 1964 put forward a specific plan./4/ It received, however, only a lukewarm reception and has been followed by an alternative Italian plan.
/4/For text, see Europa Archiv, 1965, vol. 2, pp. 562-572.
The French received the plan with little less than contempt and have, at least by implication, even after the favorable German grain price decision, continued to link it to the MLF. This is at least one setback in which we have not been involved.
The constant German preoccupation is to avoid "falling between stools" which they now feel in a sense that they have done. The government tends to feel that out of loyalty to us they have both endangered the Franco/German alliance and exposed themselves to the disagreeable infighting of the Gaullist minority in the CDU/CSU. On the other hand they feel that they have not been successful with us. They purport to see in recent events our having gone out of our way to make conciliatory gestures to London (on the MLF), to Paris (Rusk-de Gaulle and McNamara-Messmer talks)/5/ and to Moscow (State of Union Message), during a period in which they have suffered only setbacks.
/5/A report on the Rusk-de Gaulle talks, December 15, 1964, is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 64. The McNamara meeting under reference presumably was held during the NATO Ministerial Meeting at Paris December 15-17. No record of the conversation was found.
In theory the Germans would like to see us reach a rapprochement with France, which would take them out of the middle where they feel caught between us. In fact they are equally apprehensive that we will make a deal with de Gaulle, whom they think we really value more than they, and that they will be left out with no "stool." President Luebke stated publicly before the German Cabinet the other day (Embtel 2530)/6/ that the way to better German-American relations was to better German-French relations, i.e. presumably this will re-arouse our competitive instincts.
/6/Not found.
There is, therefore, a great incentive for Erhard--when he meets with de Gaulle on Jan 19--to attempt to avert further open attacks by de Gaulle and inside attacks by de Gaulle's German followers during the election period. In doing so he may be able to retrieve a small place in de Gaulle's good graces, and at the same time make us more receptive. In the final analysis the Germans, for both their Western and Eastern policies, have to lean on someone. If they should become convinced that we will no longer provide the political support, they would unquestionably turn toward the French as the next best.
In a following telegram/7/ I will attempt to analyze the issues that we face with the Germans on specific points, and to come up with a positive line on as many threads of policy as possible which can be presented to Erhard when I see him prior to his departure for his meeting with de Gaulle on the 19th.
/7/In telegram 2565 from Bonn, January 11, McGhee discussed the possibility of a separate German initiative on reunification. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER)
McGhee
84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, January 14, 1965, 7:42 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Tyler.
1978. Eyes Only for Ambassador from Secretary. In this message I should like to give you privately my own thinking about the various subjects discussed in your several cables of the past two days./2/ In doing so, I must confess that it is not easy to think about the FRG in the singular nor in terms of a coherent German policy. The Chancellor is facing the tiger which he himself created when he permitted Adenauer to keep the top Party position. I have not had the feeling that Schroeder personally has entered deeply into his job or the major issues of policy confronting the FRG. To the extent that he has done so, I have found him intelligent, reasonable and a good colleague.
/2/See Document 83 and footnote 7 thereto. In telegram 2569 from Bonn, January 12, McGhee provided further background on German views on major outstanding issues. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GER W-US) In telegram 2576 from Bonn, January 12, McGhee provided "guidance for meeting with Erhard." (Ibid.)
Beyond that, moderate and balanced judgments such as those expressed by Carstens/3/ and von Hassel, seldom break through to the surface. It is to be expected that the German press will be excitable in this preelection period and that there are limits beyond which one cannot hope to go in eliciting responsible public discussion of current issues. We shall, therefore, be dealing with a feverish friend during the next several months. It seems to me that we should try to do so calmly and with complete sympathy and friendship while, at the same time, keeping clearly in mind our own heavy responsibilities.
/3/McGhee reported on discussions with Carstens in telegram 2567 from Bonn, January 11. (Ibid., POL GER W-US)
The question of an initiative on reunification well illustrates the complexities of personal as well as political positions. Simply stated, the United States strongly supports the principle of self-determination for the Germans in the Federal Republic and in the Soviet zone of occupation. We in the West are committed to the answer reached by free plebiscite or some other means of honest consultation; that answer could be a divided Germany or a unified Germany; we think it would result in a unified Germany. Whichever answer would be reached, a settlement of the problem would require the most far-reaching security arrangements in Central Europe as well as some serious disarmament and a result could be expected to be a normalization of relations between Western and Eastern Europe.
Quite frankly, I do not feel that I know what the real British position is on reunification nor whether the present British Government would wish to see any progress or illusion of progress at the expense of the prospect for the SPD in the forthcoming German election. I feel quite certain that Paris is not interested in reunification except under circumstances in which Germany would be in a position clearly secondary to France.
Our response to the German suggestion for an initiative has been to say that we are ready to join in a move which is (a) serious, (b) agreed by the four of us, and (c) prepared as to substance. We say "serious" because we cannot rely upon the luxury of a public Western proposal made on a Wednesday, rejected by the Soviets on a Thursday, thereby leaving everybody happy on Friday. Making a proposal is to start something, and only the Kremlin can tell us just what. We already know that Moscow wishes to resume the bilateral talks on Berlin where they were "left off" in 1962. We already know that France won't play on that wicket and Schroeder made the mistake of telling me in Paris that such talks would lead to suspicions in Germany about American motives. I could not honestly recommend to the President a Western initiative on Germany without telling him that one result could be a return by the Soviets to their pressures for peace treaties with the two Germanies and a Free City of Berlin. You and I might guess that this would not be the result but the President would have to be prepared for whatever the consequence, including the possibility of a renewal of the Berlin crisis of 1961 which cost the United States many billions of dollars in our defense budget.
We have insisted upon a Western Four Power agreement precisely because we have had recent experience in talking the Russians out of a Berlin crisis while the French disapproved and stood aside, the Germans acted as extremely nervous spectators, and the British tried to push us to points in our talks with the Russians on which Western allied agreement would have simply been impossible.
On the substance of the issues which would arise in discussing reunification, there is a serious conflict between German electoral politics and sober international realities. For electoral purposes, the Germans would like to talk about reunification; but for the same reasons they do not wish to talk about frontiers, security arrangements or disarmament. The question "reunification of what?" will occur in the first five minutes. What disturbs me is that an effort will be made to add to the illusion of movement toward reunification the further and demonic illusion that Germany is somehow moving toward the frontiers of 1937 or the Munich frontiers of 1938. Some German leaders say privately that they realize that the present borders of the Federal Republic plus the GDR will not be changed beyond possible minor border adjustments. But none of them will apparently confront that issue publicly. I must tell you that I am deeply concerned about whether we ourselves can accept much longer the historical responsibility of silence upon a matter which is of such central importance to the peace of Europe and which is now being given unilateral agitation within the Federal Republic. The unwillingness of the FRG to enter seriously into these questions of substance lends an air of unreality to their proposals for an initiative. I am not talking about "advance concessions" referred to in your tel 2565./4/ We make no concession to the Russians in trying to agree among ourselves in the West. It is no concession for the Federal Republic to abandon what it does not have. I know of no other country in the world which would support the frontiers of 1937.
/4/McGhee had commented that the German dilemma lay in the fact that any proposal on reunification without substantial initial German concessions was likely to be rejected by the Soviet Union.
You may properly say that the above does not solve our present problem which arises from the present outbreak of recurring German malaise with which we have become all too familiar in the past twelve years. What would you think of telling Erhard and Schroeder, before Erhard's visit to Paris, that
(a) We are prepared to join in an initiative on reunification which is serious (i.e.: an initiative in which we believe ourselves as constituting a substantive approach to the problem, and not merely a procedural gambit undertaken for the purpose of placating domestic political pressures), agreed to by the Western Four and properly prepared.
(b) We believe that there is a major difficulty in Paris which calls for the fullest and frankest discussion between Erhard and de Gaulle. You might add that some of the points I made to Schroeder in Paris were aimed not at him but at Couve de Murville.
I do not believe that we should undertake to obtain British and French agreement to something worked out between us and the FRG, as suggested in your tel 2565. We simply cannot deliver Paris and might not be able to deliver London. Erhard ought to go after de Gaulle and try to find something on which the two of them would seek the agreement of the Anglo-Saxons. A United States-FRG agreement would bear the "kiss of death" in Paris.
One further word on reunification. During the past four years, I have raised German reunification in every serious talk I have had with Gromyko and in my talk with Khrushchev when I went to Moscow for the test ban signing. No other Western Foreign Minister or Chief of Government has raised the matter more insistently than have I. Upon my return from NATO, I raised with Gromyko the possibility of informal Big Four talks about the German question, making it clear that we would expect to raise reunification./5/ He rejected the suggestion out of hand. I would appreciate your comment on whether it would help to let it be known publicly that I took this matter up with Gromyko as a result of Schroeder's initiative in Paris, with the agreement of the other Foreign Ministers, and with negative results.
/5/See Document 78.
I hope that my letter to Schroeder on the MLF/ANF/6/ will have served to correct his impression that we have lost interest in the matter. The substance of my message will be sent as guidance to other Missions in order to enable our ambassadors to counteract any such impression which may exist in their area.
/6/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 68.
This message is not an instruction for you to discuss in these terms with any German. It does give you more detail on what is on my mind, and considerations which would affect my advice to the President. I would be glad to have your further comments.
Rusk
85. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, January 14, 1965, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, Moscow, Paris, and London.
2613. Subject: Four-Power Council on Germany. Ref: Berlin's 895 to Dept./2/
/2/Telegram 895 from Berlin, January 13, reported on government spokesman Von Hase's press conference. (Ibid., POL 15-2 GER W)
1. The decision taken yesterday in Berlin by the Cabinet to endeavor to bring into being a standing Quadripartite Committee (Gremium) on Germany would seem, in our preliminary judgment, to lead to the following conclusions:
A. For the whole complex of domestic and foreign policy reasons cited in Embtel 2565,/3/ the FRG and the governing parties have concluded that the issue of some new action on the German question cannot be subordinated in this election year.
/3/See footnote 7, Document 83 and footnotes 2 and 4, Document 84.
B. Despite the lack of Allied enthusiasm and the clear indications, known to the FRG, that the Sovs will not buy the idea, the FRG considers the Four-Power Council concept best suited to meet the situation it faces. From the tenor of comments emanating from official sources, the FRG is taking care to avoid any expectation of significant progress toward reunification. The general presentation is that despite Soviet intransigence, a committee should be proposed not for propagandistic purposes or in the hope of an immediate solution of the German problem, but because such a body, where the German question can be kept under continuing confidential study, is badly needed. A recurring observation is that with such a council in existence, FRG/GDR cooperation in humanitarian steps will be facilitated, moreover, the argument goes, even if rejected by the Soviets, a Western initiative will once again bring home to the world who is responsible for the continued division of Germany.
C. Having taken an official, publicized decision in favor of a council, the FRG will now have to continue to press the Western Allies for their agreement. Failure would expose the Chancellor to attacks for pursuing an illusory goal and would raise again the whole question of the degree of support the FRG can expect from its Allies.
It must be assumed that despite the setback at Paris in December, the Chancellor still considers it possible to gain Tripartite acceptance of an initiative of this type.
2. The Berlin Cabinet meeting has received prominent attention in German media, with the main focus today on the Four-Power Council decision. The other discussions in the various committee and Fraktion meetings have also highlighted Berlin as the center of German politics and policy-making this week. Thus the government's commitment to the Allies to avoid wide publicity in connection with the Cabinet sessions, while honored prior to the meeting, has perhaps unavoidably proved of little significance since yesterday. It was just this that the British advised against in the prior consultation on the Cabinet meeting (Embtel 2550)./4/
3. Editorial comment on the Quadripartite Council decision is so far limited to Welt, which views it skeptically. It comments that "if Erhard really has in mind more than keeping the German question alive--possibly because he feels under domestic pressure--then more substantial proposals which provide a realistic basis for negotations are needed." More editorial comment will certainly be forthcoming along this line but for the present the news coverage gives the impression that the FRG, while meeting in Berlin, has taken a positive step in the German question.
/4/Not found.
McGhee
86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, January 14, 1965, 10:39 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted in the White House and approved by Bundy.
1980. To Ambassador McGhee from McGeorge Bundy. For your private information, the President has read some but not all of your recent reports and also what Bohlen has reported of the view that Fontaine of Le Monde brought back from Germany./2/ He is not troubled by what the French say, but he does want you to know of his reaction to the German nervousness which you report. The President has made his position on Germany most amply clear on many occasions. He remembers how firm and clear he was with Chancellor Erhard at the Ranch./3/ He recollects the extended assurance and the full exposition in his Georgetown speech only a month ago. He recalls that at the request of the Germans he made a further and explicit reference to reunification in his State of the Union message. He recalls his own recent conversations with you at the Ranch/4/ in which further reassurances were given and in which you explained your conviction that the Germans would be greatly relieved by the President's shift away from pressure tactics on the MLF. The President does not now find it agreeable to have repeated and renewed German questions about the firmness of his purpose or the direction of his policy.
/2/Telegram 3922 from Paris, January 11. (Ibid., INF 7 FR-GER W)
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XV, Document 248.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 79.
I have discussed with the President the psychological and electoral causes of the reactions you have encountered as I understand it. He hears me but he would like you to hear him.
Rusk
87. Telegram from the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, January 15, 1965, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2622. For the Secretary. I appreciate your going to such length to describe the background of your thinking on the reunification problem (Dept's 1978)./2/ You portray very well the present confused situation here, which reflects in exaggerated form the normal suspicion and sensitivity of the Germans--derived from their basic feeling of insecurity, and lack of confidence in themselves and in their future. Despite the current attraction of de Gaulle, every German knows that his security rests only on the U.S. Even the slightest doubt about our position sends them into endless rounds of speculation and questioning. During each major period of upset, and I have gone through approximately six of them in the twenty months I have been here, every old doubt and fear is reexamined. The public reverberations reach a peak of intensity--and then die down and our relations become normal again.
/2/Document 84.
I realize that this is very vexing there in Washington. It is of course to us here. The Germans should have more confidence in us, as I told Schroeder yesterday./3/ However, we are not likely to see any change in their basic mood. If we hope to preserve and build on our alliance with them--as the second most powerful nation--in many respects--in the Free World, we must continue to be patient with them. We must continue to try to reassure them, to avoid apparent abrupt changes in policy on vital matters affecting them without careful preparation and explanation. When we do speak, particularly in public, we should I believe stick close to the "boiler plate" the Germans are used to and that we know will work. If we have serious questions about changing the policy it describes, we should first take it up quietly with the government.
/3/McGhee reported on his meeting with Schroeder in telegram 2610 from Bonn, January 14. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF (MLF))
Your backgrounder has in many respects had a healthy effect here. Most serious observers are in agreement with the basic points you made. There have been many favorable reactions in the German press. Most responsible people appear to accept the proposition that any new reunification proposal should be carefully thought out, and that certain agreed positions should be reached in advance. Indeed, Schroeder is embarrassed that he is being portrayed as proposing initiatives that are not serious.
With respect to the question of borders, you may be interested to know that Fritz Erler is reported in today's press as saying that Germany should discuss the Oder-Neisse border immediately with Poland. I myself have long been concerned at the German attitude toward borders, which I think is the one most disturbing subject of discussion here. I agree that the time may very easily come when we should speak out. I would not be willing, for example, to continue supporting an irridentist Germany. I would not be willing to see the 7th Army used as a pawn for Mr. Seebohm to take the Sudetenland. His formula of Heimatrecht plus self-determination is sheer aggression. If things get worse I think we might first threaten and then, if it continues, later publicly disassociate ourselves from any German hope of territorial gain.
It was not my intention in Embtel 2565/4/ to suggest that we work out something with the Germans on a reunification initiative following which we would obtain British-French agreement. What I intended to say was merely that we would be willing to sit down in a Four-Power meeting to attempt to work something out, i.e., as we do through the Ambassadorial Group.
/4/See footnote 7, Document 83 and footnotes 2 and 4, Document 84.
I am quite in agreement with your proposals (A) and (B) as to what we should tell Erhard and Schroeder before Erhard's visit to Paris. I would appreciate it, however, if you would confirm by immediate return telegram/5/ since I see Erhard at 4:30 our time, that you would be willing to include as a serious reunification initiative the Four-Power Council proposal as made by Schroeder, even though it is essentially a procedural proposal. Would your requirements for substance be met if the Four Powers could agree in advance of the proposal as to all of the variables which would be involved in the proposal itself, and at least the first and second round of questions the Soviets might put to the British, French and ourselves in the event the proposal were accepted, without necessarily bringing up to date a comprehensive substantive proposal such as the Herter Plan?/6/
/5/Instructions for McGhee's discussion with Erhard were contained in telegram 1977 to Bonn, January 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER)
/6/Reference is to the Western Peace Plan of May 14, 1959; see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 624-629.
I see no objection why you should not let it be known that you took reunification up with Gromyko as a result of Schroeder's initiative in Paris, with the agreement of the other Foreign Ministers and with negative results. Schroeder has been briefing the German Foreign Affairs Committee and the Cabinet here, using material from your meeting with Gromyko which we have supplied him with Dept approval. This fact has become known in the press. If you do not consider that it might tend to dry Gromyko up on the subject in future discussions with you, I believe it would be very healthy for you to see that this fact gets into the public domain.
McGhee
88. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, January 16, 1965, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Telegram 2652 from Bonn, January 16, transmitted a similarly worded message to Bundy. (Ibid.)
2651. For the President. I hope you will read our Embassy telegram 2643/2/ describing my meeting last evening with Chancellor Erhard on the eve of his visit with General de Gaulle at Rambouillet. I believe that this message will reassure you as to the state of our relations with the Chancellor and the German Government. The closing statement of the telegram quotes Erhard's assurances to you that "nothing in the German position has changed," that he "values his personal friendship with you," and that Germany would like to consider itself "our most faithful ally"--all of which I am convinced he meant in great sincerity.
/2/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 69.
I hope, therefore, that you will not allow the tempest which has been raging in German political and newspaper circles during the last two weeks to raise any questions as to Erhard's constancy and faithfulness. The atmosphere here is the worst I have encountered during my stay here of almost two years. It was set in motion by events emanating from the US, which led to a genuine misunderstanding of the US intention 1) to proceed with the creation of an MLF and 2) to support Germany in a reunification initiative. I see from the reports of my colleagues that this was not an exclusively German reaction but was widespread in Europe--and I believe even in the US.
Erhard's reaction to the change in our pace following the National Security Memorandum of Dec 17 was, as I predicted to you in Johnson City, to seek a delay in obtaining official Bundestag approval for the MLF until after the German elections next September. Although this is embarrassing to Schroeder and does to some extent play into the hands of the Gaullists here, it is warmly welcomed by the CDU party leadership as removing a source of tension between Germany and France during the electoral period. I assume that this is not, moreover, an entirely unwelcome development from our standpoint.
McGeorge Bundy has in your behalf advised me of your reaction to the recent German nervousness, and of the fact that you do not "find it agreeable to have repeatedly renewed German questions about the firmness of (your) purpose or the direction of (your) policy." I can understand a reaction to the recent German mood. Indeed, during these periodic flurries the Germans behave in a very irrational and immature way. This is, however, their present nature, derived from their basic insecurity and lack of confidence in themselves and their future. Since we are not likely to change them, and since Germany is so important to us as an ally, we must I believe be patient and wait them out. Usually, as in this case, the tide again turns. Fortunately, I believe that we now face the Rambouillet meeting with a decided upswing in our favor.
In any event I very much hope that you have not obtained from my reporting the impression that Erhard himself has not been constant. His position was deeply affected by the popular mood which prevailed here; however, he himself did not yield to it and he has now emerged, I believe, master of the situation here and, as ever, a faithful friend of yours and ally of the US.
McGhee
89. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Bonn, January 16, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
You will have seen our 2643/2/ dealing with my meeting on January 15 with Chancellor Erhard. I hope that you found the results of this meeting to your satisfaction, also how the question of a reunification initiative was handled following my telephone discussion with Bill Tyler prior to the meeting. I subsequently received your 1989/3/ which, I believe, reflects some misunderstanding of what I had in mind. I did not in my 2622/4/ intend to suggest that we give an answer to the Germans on any proposal by ourselves--any more than I had in my 2565/5/ to which it referred. Indeed, in 2622 I stated quite the opposite. "It was not my intention in the Embtel to suggest that we work out something with the Germans on a reunification initiative following which we would obtain British French agreement. What I intended to say was merely that we would be willing to sit down in a Four Power meeting to attempt to work something out, i.e., as we do through the Ambassadorial Group."
/2/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 69.
/3/Not found.
/4/Document 87.
/5/See footnote 7, Document 83 and footnotes 2 and 4, Document 84.
My position with the Germans on this question since my return has been entirely based on what you had agreed to in Paris, i.e., to be willing to consider the German Four Power Council proposal on a US-UK-French-German basis. I assume that we still are prepared to do this and was in my 2622 merely trying to clarify a question raised in paragraph A of Deptel 1978,/6/ merely that we were prepared to join only in an initiative "constituting a substantive approach." The Four Power Council concept is not in reality a substantive approach. This is the latest proposal that the Germans have put forward and one that we agreed in Paris that we would be willing to consider in a meeting of the Four (France, US, UK and FRG). Although I did not even commit us to this in my meeting with Erhard, I would appreciate it if the point could be further clarified.
/6/Document 84.
As to the general question as to whether we should support a German initiative at all, I still feel strongly along the lines of Embtel 2565 that we should. Many observers have been saying this--Walt Rostow among others for over a year. This assumes, as I am convinced, that the Germans are, following your backgrounder, now prepared to come to grips with the substantive issues concerned and help work out agreed positions. A Four Power Council proposal would not, on the surface, appear to require answers to all issues that would ultimately be raised. I hope that if we do agree to this, that we can do so with sufficiently good grace to permit us to get some credit. Up to this point, although we seem ultimately willing to consider a German proposal, the impression we give is that we do so very reluctantly.
I am convinced that the Germans are entitled to an initiative--that one is overdue whether this is an election year or not. If a man is sitting on you, you have every right to ask him occasionally to get off. I think that even if it is turned down by the Russians, that we have the right--indeed the obligation--to continue to point out to the world, the monstrosity in the 20th century of keeping 18 million people in neo-colonial bondage. I have personally never accepted the argument to the effect that the asking for an initiative would trip off another Berlin crisis. That is not what tripped off the last one. The Russians appear to want to keep the situation normal in Berlin. If we restrain ourselves in raising with the Soviets questions just because we fear an aggressive reaction, there will be little dialogue between us. The theory that we must stick rigidly to the status quo on the German and Berlin question or else the Russians will make things bad for us, does not give adequate consideration to the dynamics of the German people today. They are not content to sit still and will not. The question is whether these energies are vented through constructive action or by means which would disrupt the existing balance.
I know that the Germans can be very irritating at times in their excitability, indecisiveness and constant need for reassurance. But unlike the French under President de Gaulle, their basic policies in Western Europe continue to be along lines consistent with our own broad objectives. To keep them moving in this direction, we may sometimes have to accept their lead in making public gestures which alone we would find useless or even undesirable.
Sincerely yours,
George[Continue with the next documents]
