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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968 Washington, DC |
90. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, January 23, 1965, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR E-EUR W. Secret. Received at 11:25 a.m. and repeated to Berlin.
2761. Subject: Memorandum from GovMayor Brandt to Sec Rusk. In my meeting with Chancellor Erhard yesterday, which centered mainly on his discussions with General de Gaulle at Rambouillet being reported separately,/2/ he raised with me the question of the memorandum on relations with Eastern Europe which Governing Mayor Brandt of Berlin had submitted to Secretary Rusk./3/ Erhard had before him in German translation what was presumably a copy of this memorandum, which had just been called to his attention, dated August [garble], 1964. Erhard did not raise the question, nor did I, as to whether or not the memorandum had been requested. He did ask, however, in what capacity Brandt had written it and what status it had vis-à-vis the US Government.
/2/Telegram 2755 from Bonn, January 23, reported on the discussions, which dealt with European unification and the MLF. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 6)
/3/Attachment to Document 67.
I replied that it was my understanding that Brandt had, during his last visit to America, volunteered certain views during his meeting with the Secretary with regard to a policy for Eastern Europe--which he had followed up with a written memorandum. I did not know in what capacity he wrote it. The Secretary and other high American officials, of course, receive as visitors opposition leaders from many countries, and are willing to listen to what they say and read memoranda they submit. This did not however, mean that the proposal made by Brandt had any official inter-governmental status between the US and Germany. We understand full well that this subject is beyond Brandt's competence as GovMayor of Berlin, and we would discuss such a matter in an authoritative way only with the Federal Government. The Chancellor asked me if I had any objection to his quoting what I had said. I replied that I did not.
I then advised the Chancellor of the recent démarche made to the Embassy by a representative of another party in Germany (although I did not say so, he understood that it was the FDP since their proposal has become known publicly) who wished to send a delegation to our country to discuss a further reunification initiative./4/ I had advised them that although we would receive their delegation at a suitable level and listen to what they had to say, we would not undertake to discuss with them authoritatively or negotiate with them concerning a reunification initiative. This, again, was a matter in which we could deal only with the Federal Government or its designated representatives. I had given the party in question no assurances that their delegation would be received by the President--indeed, I had attempted to discourage them from going at all.
/4/Reported in telegram 2710 from Bonn, January 20. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER)
McGhee
91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, January 23, 1965, 7:24 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR E-EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by Tyler and Rusk and approved by Rusk. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.
2086. Reference Bonn's 2750./2/ While we are aware that fuss and feathers in Bundestag on the issue of Brandt's memorandum represents largely domestic political in-fighting, there is nevertheless a question of principle involved which should be upheld. Pending final solution of the German problem, the three Western Powers retain certain clear and onerous responsibilities with regard to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, which place them in a special position. The US Government cannot accept the thesis, either explicitly stated or implied, that it may not receive the views of a Berlin official on matters relating to matters of common interest. Obviously the US Government has not and will not negotiate on such matters and will follow its practice of full consultation with the FRG on Berlin and German questions.
/2/Telegram 2750 from Bonn, January 22, reported that release of a copy of the memorandum that Brandt had given Secretary Rusk had sparked Parliamentary debate. (Ibid.)
Request you take early appropriate opportunity to remind and caution Schroeder along above lines and to express firm hope that FRG will do what it can to squelch further debate on this issue, which can only be unprofitable for all concerned./3/ FYI--We must not, by easy stages, be led into position that we consider West Berlin a part of FRG to the detriment of our responsibility as occupying power. End FYI.
/3/In telegram 2771 from Bonn, January 25, McGhee suggested that the U.S. approach on this issue be "low key." (Ibid.)
Rusk
92. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, January 26, 1965, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol 6. Top Secret; Exdis.
2787. Subj: Helicopter flights over East Berlin. I was pleased to learn in CINCUSAREUR's JCS 003943 J3/2/ that the policy governing helicopter flights over East Berlin is being reviewed and evaluated by the SecDef as to the military factors involved and that further flights will, in the meantime, be deferred until further notice. I have in several communications (Embtels 870, 904, and 970, Bonn A-780, Oct 27, 1964) and in letters to Amb Thompson dated Sept 24, 1964/3/ expressed strongly my views with respect to these flights. I discussed them with Amb Thompson during my recent visit to Washington. If necessary in order to obtain a change in existing policy I recommend that you talk about this matter with Sec McNamara personally.
/2/Not found.
/3/Telegram 870 from Bonn is Document 68. In telegram 904 from Bonn, September 6, 1964, McGhee expressed doubts regarding the utility of helicopter flights over the East Zone. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-10 GER E) Telegram 970 from Bonn, September 11, reported on former Foreign Minister Brentano's visit to Bonn. (Ibid., POL 6 GER W) Airgram A-780 from Bonn, October 27, 1964, reported on U.S. helicopter flights over the East Zone. (Ibid., POL 28-4) McGhee's letter to Thompson was not found.
I strongly recommend this because I consider these flights provocative--indeed, the only really provocative thing we now do in Berlin. It is quite clear that this type of flight was never envisaged under the original agreements. The flights have nothing to do with the maintenance of freedom of air access to Berlin in general, which is done hourly by commercial overflights. Their intelligence function is of course obvious to the Soviets. They do not in my opinion represent a show of strength or determination on our part, indeed quite the reverse, since we carefully gauge the flights on a hit-and-run basis to get out before the Soviets can locate them. The Soviets have given ample evidence that they consider them objectionable. They consistently vector fighters to find them and have threatened to "take care of them." If these fighters do find them and precipitate an incident, either by attempting to buzz them out or shoot them down, we would be faced with the very difficult question of whether or not to abandon the flights in the face of force. I have looked into the matter carefully and am convinced that the intelligence gained is very meager and by no means worth the risks involved.
I frankly would be in favor of abandoning the flights altogether. However, if we want to maintain some theoretical right of helicopter flights, which we did not, apparently, consider worthwhile until the Wall, I recommend that we send a flight over very infrequently, say every six months to a year, over some non-sensitive area, rather than over prime intelligence targets as at present.
McGhee
93. Letter From Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson/1/
Bonn, February 4, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 GER W-US. Secret. The source text is marked "Unofficial Translation."
Dear Mr. President:
In your address on the occasion of your inauguration to the high office of President of the United States,/2/ you have described the great tasks which confront your country in the interest of maintaining peace and freedom in the world and you have stressed the heavy burdens which your country is prepared to carry toward that end. That you may be granted to come closer to these high aims through a successful policy which serves peace is my sincere and cordial wish for your new term of office. On the occasion of your solemn inauguration you have expressed your desire to cooperate and to stand together with the free peoples. I am happy to be able to tell you that it is my firm conviction that my discussions in Rambouillet have also been useful in the sense of furthering the political unity of Europe, but also with regard to a close cooperation with the United States in the framework of the Western Alliance.
/2/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 71-74.
I have already informed your Ambassador about the course of my discussions with President de Gaulle./3/ I have received the impression that we are well on our way to reestablish a firmer basis for the vital questions of the Western Alliance.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 90.
It gave me particular satisfaction to note the very positive remarks of the French President with regard to the reunification of Germany and the readiness of the French Government to discuss the German problem on the level of the Western Powers together with the Federal Republic and to examine if and in what way the Soviet Union might be prepared to find on a Four Power basis progress or solutions in all questions concerning divided Germany.
General de Gaulle concurred with me in recognizing that the preservation of peace and the protection of Europe cannot be guaranteed without the immense military potential of your country. France, he said, was adhering to the alliance with the United States and was faithfully supporting the Western Alliance. I noted these very remarks with particular satisfaction.
As far as the European questions in particular are concerned, the consent of the French President to preparing until summer of this year a conference of Heads of States and Governments of the EEC-countries is certainly a good beginning in the direction of a political unification of Europe.
I very much hope that your plans to come to Europe in the near future will soon take shape and I am sincerely looking forward to the opportunity then to continue our exchange of views on the most important political questions. A renewed greater clarity, certainty and consent in all questions of common policy of the Western world seem to me highly desirable if not indispensable in the interest of peace.
With my good wishes for a very early and complete recovery of your health, I combine my cordial greetings and respectful regards for Mrs. Johnson.
m.p.: In friendship,
sincerely yours,
Ludwig Erhard/4//4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
94. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 9, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 7. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on February 15.
SUBJECT
Message from Chancellor Erhard to the PresidentPARTICIPANTS
The President
Heinrich Knappstein, German Ambassador
Berndt von Staden, German CounselorWilliam R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary
After mutual introductory compliments, the Ambassador referred to the Chancellor's most recent letter to the President./2/ The Ambassador said that the letter was in a sense in response to the President's oral message conveyed through the Ambassador some weeks ago at the time when certain other Ambassadors were presenting their credentials (see attachment)./3/
/2/Document 93.
/3/Not printed. According to the memorandum of conversation of this discussion, the President told Ambassador Knappstein that he would keep Erhard fully informed of any conversations he had regarding Germany and stressed the need for the two nations to work in concert.
The Ambassador said that he was under instructions to amplify the Chancellor's letter in the following respects:
(1) De Gaulle's statements on international monetary affairs in his February 4 press conference/4/ had been made without prior consultation with or the knowledge of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Ambassador said that his government felt strongly that the United States and the United Kingdom must participate in any discussions on international monetary matters.
/4/For text, see Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, vol. 4, pp. 325-342.
(2) The Ambassador said that he was under instructions to bring to the President's attention a certain growing concern in Germany with regard to increasing United States capital investments. The German government was not at all opposed to US investments in Germany which were beneficial to the industrial and economic health of the country. However if investments increased beyond a certain point, a situation could arise in which German offset military purchases became in fact a form of partial financing the deficit caused by massive exports of capital into Germany by the United States. For this reason, the German government hopes that further measures could now be taken to reduce the volume of US private capital exports. The Ambassador then cited the figures of $4.3 billion in 1963 and $3.9 billion in 1964 for US export of capital. He also mentioned the sum of $1 billion as the price paid by the US Ford Company when it bought up the UK Ford Company.
(3) With regard to German reunification the Ambassador said that his government was most grateful for the President's Georgetown speech in December and for his State of the Union message as well as for subsequent statements by the State Department in support of reunification. It was gratified that de Gaulle had "at last" come around to supporting discussions on ways of moving toward an initiative in reunification. At this point the President asked whether de Gaulle really wanted to go it alone as seemed to be the case from what he had said on February 4. The Ambassador stated with emphasis that Germany considered reunification to be a Four Power question, at least at this stage and for the foreseeable future, and felt strongly that a US role was indispensable. The President said that if Germany and other Europeans want to discuss reunification by themselves, this was something that he would not have difficulty with. He said he had a close feeling for Chancellor Erhard and valued the US-German relationship, but he didn't want this to stand in the way of progress toward reunification if Germany thought it could be better discussed independently of the United States. The Ambassador referred to a statement issued by the French government after de Gaulle's press conference clarifying what de Gaulle had said so as not to exclude a role by the United States. He said that this French statement had been made as a result of the strong German feeling on the subject which had been conveyed to the French government. He said that de Gaulle is now willing to participate in Four Power talks and that this was a success for Erhard.
(4) The Ambassador summarized certain aspects of the talks at Rambouillet between de Gaulle and the Chancellor on the nuclear question. He said that de Gaulle envisaged Germany's role as being limited to participating in planning of strategic nuclear targeting. The Ambassador stated emphatically that his government considered an Atlantic nuclear force to be necessary in order to prevent the gap between nuclear and non-nuclear powers from increasing to the point where it would create grave psychological and political difficulties. He said he wished to tell the President frankly that some people in Germany had felt last December that the United States Government had gone too far in apparently dissociating itself from a commitment to move forward toward an Atlantic nuclear organization. Even if the United States Government felt that it had been exerting too much pressure before this, the fact remained that the impression now was in Germany that the United States had moved too far in the opposite direction.
The President said that when Prime Minister Wilson and he had talked,/5/ the Prime Minister had questioned just how strongly any European government was in favor of moving toward an Atlantic nuclear force. The Prime Minister seemed to feel that such favorable views as had been expressed in Europe had been colored by US insistence. The President said that we didn't agree with the British assessment on this, and suggested that they take the matter up themselves and talk with the Germans and Italians and other countries, and that they would find that those countries would say the same things to the British as they had said to us. Then the British could come back to us after they had concluded their discussions and we could all move forward together again. The President said that we had told the British that an Atlantic nuclear force was the best means we knew to relieve the British of their national nuclear burden. It was likely that with a small majority and certain other pressing problems, the British Government might be glad to find a solution to their nuclear difficulties. We had suggested that they undertake these talks and then we could discuss the whole thing further. The President said that our position represented no advancement and no retreat from the position we had previously taken.
/5/Records of these discussions, held in December 1964, are in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Documents 58-61.
The Ambassador said that nevertheless the December memorandum/6/ had been widely misinterpreted as reflecting far-reaching disaffection by the United States.
/6/Reference is to NSAM No. 322, December 17, 1964, Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 65.
The President said the important thing was for the British, the Germans and the Italians to get together, rather than that we should appear to be telling our European friends what they should be thinking. The quicker they brought their positions closer to each other the easier it would be for us to move ahead with them.
In conclusion the Secretary asked the Embassy to tell the Chancellor that he appreciated the Chancellor's letter. He said he was happy with the relationship which existed between them. He wanted the Chancellor to feel that he had the support of the United States government for efforts to make progress toward reunification. He said we were ready to participate in discussions whenever our responsible allies were. The President said he was pleased that de Gaulle and Erhard were in agreement on further moves in the field of European unity. He said that he looked forward to full exchange of views with the Chancellor when he goes over to Europe.
Finally the President and the Ambassador agreed on what the Ambassador should tell the press about their conversation. Subsequently the following statement on the visit by the Ambassador was issued by the White House:
"Ambassador Knappstein and I have had a good talk this morning. He delivered a message from Chancellor Erhard which reaffirmed the deep community of interest between the Federal Republic and the United States. I told the Ambassador of the full and continuing support of the United States for serious progress toward the reunification of Germany, and I expressed my clear agreement with Chancellor Erhard that the struggle for the reunification of Germany requires the interest and active participation of all of the responsible powers."
95. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 18, 1965, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Drafted by Puhan and approved in U and G on March 10 and in S on March 16. The source text is marked "Part 1 of 4."
SUBJECT
French Views on German QuestionPARTICIPANTS
French
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
Mr. Charles Lucet, Director General, Political Affairs
Ambassador Herve Alphand
Mr. Claude Lebel, Director, Press & Information Service
Mr. Jacques Beaumarchais, Director of the Cabinet
Mr. Bruno de Leusse, Minister Counselor, Embassy of the French RepublicAmericans
The Secretary
Under Secretary George W. Ball
Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, S/AL
Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen
Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
Ambassador Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. David H. McKillop, Director, WE
Mr. Richard I. Phillips, PMr. Alfred Puhan, Director, GER
The Secretary asked what French views were on the German reunification question since the Erhard-de Gaulle talks at Rambouillet and the press conference of President de Gaulle.
Couve de Murville referred to the Rambouillet meeting, saying that as de Gaulle had pointed out, in the long run the resolution of the German question was the resolution of the European question ending in European unity. If the Iron Curtain disappears, then Germany too may be reunited. The Germans, according to Couve, were pleased to be told that their problem was a European one. They realized that German reunification was a long process, but had asked what would be done to give the impression that the West was not disinterested. The Germans had left the impression that it was better to be turned down on an initiative than to make no effort at all. Couve said Schroeder had asked him what would be the best procedure for getting another initiative underway and had asked about the advisability of using the Ambassadorial Group. Couve had told Schroeder he thought this would be useful. An alternative suggestion made by Couve to Schroeder was to meet in Bonn. Couve preferred Washington because the Ambassadorial Group was accustomed to dealing with the subject, and would not be as exposed to the German press.
The Secretary stated our preference for the Washington Ambassadorial Group.
Couve said that Erhard had suggested a meeting of the Foreign Ministers, but this had not been followed up by Schroeder. He added that he thought the Germans would have to take the initiative, and pointed out that thus far nothing had happened.
The Secretary confirmed that we had received no communication from Schroeder requesting a meeting.
Couve raised a question whether we should do something or wait for the Germans to act.
The consensus seemed to be that we would wait for the Germans to ask for a meeting.
The Secretary said we were ready to join in some sort of German initiative.
Couve asked if this meant saying something to the Soviets.
The Secretary said if we agree to an initiative, we should all recognize that there may be consequences flowing from it which we would have to take into account. We cannot count forever on the raising of an initiative on Thursday, a Soviet rejection on Friday, and forgetting all about it on Saturday. He asked what the consequences would be if the Soviets bring up the status of Berlin. He wanted to be sure that in case of a Soviet reaction to discuss, we would be all together. He pointed to the possibility of a fresh crisis arising out of a German initiative. He added that he doubted such a crisis would arise, but wished to be sure everyone was aware of the possibility. He said he gained the impression that the Germans wished to talk about reunification, but that was about all. The Secretary continued, saying that we agreed with the French that the German question must be resolved in terms of resolving European problems. He did not expect any dramatic development. He did not think anyone wanted to fight a war over German reunification. The real problem, the Secretary said, is what can we do in the face of real and understandable German requirements.
Couve asked whether the Secretary agreed with the French that the only real solution lay in the opening of Eastern Europe. The real problem, as he saw it, was to isolate the GDR in Eastern Europe, place it where it would have no relations with the West.
The Secretary agreed. He added that he sometimes contemplated the report that Malenkov and Beria in 1955 had been prepared to do something about Germany.
Ambassador Bohlen thought Malenkov would have been favorably disposed toward Germany.
The Secretary said that Malenkov and Beria had even raised this thought, gave plausibility to the possibility that some day there might be a combination of German arrangements, disarmament and trade to warrant the Soviet Union going along with a united Germany.
Ambassador Bohlen thought the evolution toward this end might be speeded up somewhat if an island of Stalinism in the form of the GDR finally became unacceptable to the Soviets.
The Secretary asked whether the GDR would not become more important to the Russians if the Soviets pulled back their twenty-two divisions out of the GDR. The Secretary said he had tried to explain to our people why we treat the Eastern European countries differently from the GDR. He said this has compelled us to say things at times which were unpleasant to the Soviets. He referred to a speech which he had made that had had that effect. He concluded, however, that the Soviets have apparently not objected too much to our Eastern European policies.
Mr. Tyler made allowance for the possibility, however, that the Soviets did view our efforts as divisive.
The Secretary spoke of the extraordinary changes which had occurred in Eastern Europe.
Couve agreed and pointed out that of course the Eastern Europeans were not all Slavs and also economically don't rely on the USSR. Couve also referred to the Hungarian Peter as a "nice Calvinist Bishop".
The Secretary thought it important to continue to improve our relations with Eastern Europe. In this regard, he said we were studying carefully with Congress our regulations and laws governing trade with Eastern Europe.
Mr. Ball pointed out that the US had never had much trade with the Eastern European countries. More of this had traditionally taken place with Western Europe.
Ambassador Thompson referred to the efforts of Berthold Beitz to develop cooperative German-Polish enterprises.
Couve mentioned the growing tourism to Eastern Europe. The Secretary saw possibilities for greater tourism to Eastern Europe from the US. All agreed that this was an important element in developing better relations.
The Secretary asked again if the French were prepared to support a German initiative in the Ambassadorial Group? Couve answered in the affirmative and thought the British would do so also.
The Secretary said it was his impression the British would go along, but he had not yet talked to the new British Foreign Secretary about this.
Ambassador Alphand asked if we waited for the Germans to make the initiative?
The Secretary and Ambassador Thompson answered in the affirmative.
Ambassador Alphand inquired whether we mentioned to the Germans the possible consequences of an initiative.
Ambassador Thompson thought that this would depend upon the kind of initiative suggested by the Germans.
Mr. Tyler mentioned the need of the Chancellor to do something before the German elections.
Ambassador Thompson saw two choices as to the type of initiative raised by the Germans. The first, which would be turned down immediately by the Soviets, would call for free elections. The second might be some interim step like the setting up of humanitarian commissions.
The Secretary related how he had after the December talks in Paris raised with Gromyko in a most tentative way the possibility of German unification. Gromyko, according to the Secretary, turned out to be a good Western politician. He said that there was no chance of the reunification of Germany at this time, and that he did not see what the Soviet Union had to gain in making it possible for FRG to create the impression that it was making progress in this field. The Secretary added that he would have to point out to the President that there always existed as a result of any conference with the Russians on a German initiative the possibility of a renewal of the 1958 and 1961 crises which cost us so much money and time. The Secretary wanted to be sure that we would be together if this happened, and that he would not feel so lonely as he had so often in the past.
Couve said that the Soviets would try to find a solution which would give no satisfaction to the Germans.
The Secretary asked Couve when the British were going to Paris./2/
/2/April 2-3.
Couve replied that although the date had not been fixed, it could well be April 1.
Mr. Tyler asked if there were any possibility of doing something on May 8, the 20th anniversary of V-E Day.
Ambassador Bohlen thought that this was a rather tricky problem.
Couve asked whether the Russians had said anything about May 8. The answer was "no". Couve thought the Russians would be delighted to do something with us, which would be unpleasant for the Germans.
The Secretary saw no great profit in doing something with the anniversary. Mr. Tyler suggested that much attention would be paid to the date on a worldwide basis and that the Russians should not be allowed to hold the center of the stage.
The Secretary asked whether the Russians had made any suggestions to Paris. Couve replied in the negative.
96. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 18, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Confidential. Drafted by Rusk.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE
FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER COUVE DE MURVILLE
At our luncheon today I drew Couve de Murville aside and commented quite specifically about President de Gaulle's reference in his recent press conference to his view that the question of German reunification is a "European question". I pointed out that the United States has a deep and vital interest in that issue, that our interest in it stemmed from World War II, and that I would like to know from Couve de Murville whether President de Gaulle's remark implied any diminution of the American role as an essential participant in all matters affecting German reunification and Berlin. He stated categorically that no such implication was present or was intended, that France fully recognizes the United States role in the settlement of such matters.
DR
97. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 24, 1965, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GER W. Secret. Drafted by Puhan and approved in the White House on February 27. The meeting was held at the White House.
SUBJECT
Dr. Barzel's Call on the PresidentPARTICIPANTS
Germans
Dr. Rainer Barzel, CDU/CSU Floor Leader in the Bundestag
Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy
Mr. Kusterer, InterpreterAmericans
The President
Mr. Alfred Puhan, Director, GERAfter an exchange of cordial amenities, the President said that he liked the German Chancellor very much. He said that he had enjoyed two visits with him, and that he had enjoyed no other visit with any other foreign statesman more than that of Chancellor Erhard. He added that he liked the Chancellor's flexibility, vision and fairness. He thought that never in our history were the American people more interested in Germany, or liked the Germans more than they do today.
Dr. Barzel said he was glad to hear that. He realized that there were some problems. He said that he had called Bonn today and had found out that one of these problems, the extension of the statute of limitations for Nazi crimes, would be decided favorably. Dr. Barzel also said that he was glad that Ambassador Harriman had gone to Israel,/2/ and that the Federal Republic would be grateful for any help he could give them there.
/2/Harriman visited Israel February 23.
The President said that he was very pleased with what the Chancellor had done in connection with Israel./3/ He said he was sorry that there had been a bit of flare-up after both sides had agreed to a "no comment" on the arms deal with Israel. The President felt that it was unfortunate that not all elements of the German Government were apparently together on this. He thought that the von Hase statement had not been very helpful. But, the President added, his admiration for Chancellor Erhard far outweighed any lapses from good teamwork.
/3/Reference is to Erhard's February 17 statement to the Bundestag on Near Eastern policy. Excepts are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 479-481.
The President said he had told Chancellor Erhard during his last visit that as long as he was President, when America would make any move of significance, Chancellor Erhard would know as soon as he would. The President said that this is why he sent a special emissary to inform the Chancellor of the decisions reached during the visit of Prime Minister Wilson.
The President said that on the MLF question, the British had come here after a tough election and forming a government with a small majority. They had raised the question whether the Germans were speaking their own minds, or saying what we wanted them to say. The President said that he had told the British that the Germans were able and eloquent spokesmen and did not need us to speak for them. He had suggested to the British that they discuss this issue with the Germans themselves. Since that time he had learned from Ambassador McGhee that the question could probably not be settled before the German elections. Since that was the case, it would be better to have British-German talks. The President said that he felt strongly about this matter. The President went on to say that as for US troops in Europe, while we might not need every soldier over there, there was no doubt that so long as the Chancellor and the Germans felt they needed us, we would be willing to stay.
The President repeated his admiration for Chancellor Erhard, saying that he found him to be a very understanding man, who got along well with Americans. He said that he knew that the Chancellor was under criticism at home, adding that he had experienced that himself. He said that no doubt as long as Erhard was Chancellor, we would form a good team.
The President said that he had heard good things about Dr. Barzel too and his future. He said we needed young men to take place of those that are getting older.
The President next said that the FRG Ambassador had our complete admiration, respect and friendship. The President was sorry that Dr. Barzel could not come later when the President would have invited him to the Ranch. The President spoke of his personal interest in Germany, his training in German through the third grade, and the fact that when one picked up the party line at the Ranch, one heard more German than English. The President told Dr. Erhard to tell his people in truth that whatever we do will be done together, that Dr. Erhard had his complete confidence and Germany has our absolute and unequivocal support, that we would do all that is humanly possible to bring about the reunification of Germany. He repeated that he never thought it was necessary to have all of our troops there, but since the Germans wanted them, we would keep them there. He expressed pleasure over the fact that the Chancellor did not require much time to explain this need to his people. He said that we wanted to see the German nation advance and continue its recovery. The President in turn expressed his appreciation for German help with the offset.
Dr. Barzel stated that he was very happy to hear the President's remarks. He was pleased at this indication of our friendship, something the young generation also had very much at heart. He said he would not take the President's time to discuss the German question--that he would take this up with the Secretary of State and his officials--but that he had one question. He said that it had occurred to him after reading the President's State of the Union message, why don't we develop the idea of the Great Society not just for the US, but for the entire free world. He thought it was a great idea which could find application in its various aspects (vocational education, inland waterways, housing, town planning, agriculture, structural problems) in other countries of the free world. He said he was not thinking of more aid from the US, but rather of a mutual exchange of experiences, from which we all could learn. Dr. Barzel thought that this would show the future was with the free world and not the Communist world. Such cooperation would also help dispel some of the dangers inherent in ideas stemming from the 17th and 18th Centuries.
The President expressed agreement. He pointed out that in some sectors we were already doing something like that. He mentioned in this connection the Alliance for Progress in this hemisphere as well as recent conversations some of our Senators had with officials of Mexico about health problems, cancer, heart, stroke and high blood pressure. He thought that perhaps we ought to have more of this sort of exchange with the Germans too. It might be a good idea, the President thought, that certain Bundestag members could meet here with our own Congressmen to discuss such exchanges.
The Ambassador said that the Germans had a great deal of experience which they would be willing to make available.
The President said he would talk to leaders here about this next Tuesday. Perhaps some sort of meeting could be arranged with twenty-five on each side, possibly meeting one year in Germany and the next in the US at some resort.
The President autographed a photograph of himself and gave it to Dr. Barzel.
98. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler)/1/
Washington, March 20, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GER W-US. Secret.
SUBJECT
Germany: March 19651. Lonely and Unfairly Treated. If the object of U.S. policy is to make Germans feel closely bound to the West and fairly treated, events have conspired to produce at this time a rather extreme version of the opposite. In twenty years of following the cycles of German sentiment, I do not recall as acute and generally felt a trough as that I found in a week of intensive contacts in Bonn, Frankfurt, Freiburg, and Rheinhartshausen./2/
/2/Rostow reported on his discussions with German leaders in telegram 3474 from Bonn, March 14. (Ibid.)
This mood arises from a convergence of specific frustrations, large and small, from many directions over recent months:
--The simultaneous Israeli pressure on three fronts: military equipment, restitution, and the extension of the statute of limitations on war criminals, plus, of course, the confusions and burdens of the hasty German decision to recognize Israel.
--The threatened Arab rupture of the Hallstein Doctrine plus the burning of German embassies, which is not taken with the sang-froid which we and the British have developed.
--The (recently somewhat corrected) sense that the U.S. got them into trouble in the Middle East and then stood back.
--The Danish protest against the appearance in Denmark of German soldiers on joint maneuvers.
--The threatened removal of the German Peace Corps from Tanzania (now probably in hand)./3/
/3/All German assistance was withdrawn following Tanzania's recognition of the German Democratic Republic in February 1964.
--The feeling that, in the face of the Wall and recent economic improvements, a kind of local identity and pride may be developing in the GDR.
--What appears outside the government as a U.S. dumping of the MLF in the face of British, French, and Russian pressures--to some extent shared in the government even by those relieved that they don't have to face a confrontation with de Gaulle before the election.
--A more general sense that the domestic interests of the U.S., combined with our Southeast Asia problem, have made us draw back from Europe in general and the German unity problem in particular.
--The hardening policy of Moscow on Germany since Khrushchev's departure from power and a bafflement as to how to mount a national German unity policy in either the short run (a pre-election gesture) or in the long run.
--A consciousness that even the most promising recent development--a European agricultural policy--was bought at a high cost to Germany in order to limit one--but only one--element in de Gaulle's blackmail and veto leverage over Germany; that is, de Gaulle's threat to break up the EEC./4/
/4/Reference is to de Gaulle's accusations that the Commission presidency was exceeding its powers.
All this is compounded by a sense that Erhard's leadership is infirm.
The upshot is a feeling I can only describe as follows: Here it is a generation after the war; everything we try to do on the world scene fails; and it fails because others exploit systematically our war guilt; and, in the clutch, our only potential real friend, the United States, places the interests of Britain and even a disruptive France ahead of the interests of Germany, and ahead of the collective policies it espouses.
2. Stabilizing Factors. The mood, its intensity, its generality, and its causes are unmistakable. Its seriousness we will neglect to our peril--a judgment shared by Jean Laloy, Jack Nicholls, Michael Palliser, Jens Boyesen, and others in APAG, as well as by our country team in Bonn. But all is by no means lost. The roots of the German commitment to a policy of European integration and the closest possible ties to the U.S. go deeper than this painful interval. The response to my Frankfurt and Bonn speeches was: please lead us in just those directions. More important, the plea from Schroeder, Erler, Birrenbach, and Carstens, was in the same sense. Men like Barzel and Walther Casper are by no means despairing of European and Atlantic progress over the longer pull. Distinguished journalists like Georg Schroeder and Bruno Dechamps are a bit bloody but unbowed. Men like Eric Blumenfeld and Stefan Thomas are optimistic about a policy of enlarged contacts with the East and the long run implications of trends in Russia and Eastern Europe. The German youth appears more interested in contacts with East Germany than in the Hallstein Doctrine. Germany's extraordinary continued prosperity is a substantial (but insufficient) cushion to those shocks and strains. Above all, the bilateral military tie remains strong; Von Hassel treasures his tie to Secretary McNamara; and there is only fear at the thought of U.S. troop withdrawals. But there is widespread anxiety that, without U.S. leadership that moves things forward again, even modestly, de Gaulle will gain in power. There is little attraction for leadership by Paris. It is well understood that de Gaulle cannot defend Germany and he opposes German unity and serious European integration. But, if things do not improve, I would predict the outcome will be a stronger and more nationally assertive German government, Gaullist only in the sense that it will imitate de Gaulle in a more forthright use of German national bargaining power vis-à-vis Washington, Paris, and Moscow.
The Germans by and large would prefer a policy of cooperation rather than a squeaky wheel operation; but that's the way they are likely to go unless things look up a bit.
In this connection, perhaps the most interesting, if faintly ominous, moment of the APAG meeting was Muller-Roschach's measured warning that if the Alliance cannot mount a concerted, even if modest, policy of movement on the German unity question, Germany will move towards the view that German unity is a domestic rather than an international question.
3. Six Steps in German Policy Between Now and November. The long-run answer to this problem is clear enough and old enough in our policy: to sink German nationalism and its national vulnerability in collective enterprises of Europe and the Atlantic; to engage Germany widely and, if possible, collectively on the world scene outside Europe; and, against this background, to mount a long term, pacific policy looking toward German unity and a European settlement. I can perceive no alternative to that policy that meets U.S. interests. And a week in Germany in March 1965 is most instructive; because under present strains the shape of the alternatives can be lucidly perceived, even if now far from dominant. They are all, at best, ugly and, at worst, lethal.
But, of course, if our German policy is to move forward starting right now, it can only move forward within two powerful constraints: General de Gaulle's policy; and the German election period. I believe American leadership can be exercised in this situation. I have come (under the Secretary's prodding) to this definition of U.S. leadership: the achievement of an objective in the U.S. interest, at U.S. initiative, by a combination of example, persuasion, and pressure when:
a. U.S. example, persuasion, and pressure make the object achievable at all;
b. when the advantages of achievement outweigh the costs.
Right now what we can achieve at all is narrowly limited by de Gaulle and the September election; but I do believe a modest policy of movement is possible and inexpensive, if we put our minds to it.
Specifically, we can do the following six things, the first four of which are placed in a wider setting in paras. 4-6, below:
--Generate in the Quadripartite Group, round about May, an allied policy statement in support of German unity.
--Start some quiet bilateral talk, on an informal basis, on German unity at the Council of Foreign Relations, if the Germans are not ready for deeply buried planning talks, while preparing ourselves for some serious talk after September.
--Maintain some quiet forward movement on the ANF/MLF in the Paris Working Group, while continuing to make clear publicly our interest in a collective Atlantic solution to an inescapable Alliance problem, and awaiting the outcome of the September election.
--Use the Under Secretary's forthcoming trip to Paris and the May Ministerial meeting to press for regular regional sessions at the U.S. Assistant Secretary level of interested countries, covering: East Europe; Africa; Middle East; South Asia; Far East; and Latin America. If this doesn't work at NATO level, offer it bilaterally to the Germans as well as the British.
--The President might pick up Barzel's (really Casper's) suggestion that we extend the Great Society concept through an Atlantic conference (or conferences) to compare and exchange views on efforts to improve the quality of our respective affluent societies: e.g., air pollution; traffic; education in an automated age; pockets of poverty (U.K., France and Italy have them, Germany extraordinarily little); the social problem of the small, inefficient farmer; wage guidelines problems; mental health and retardation; etc. After an initial kick-off at highest level, these could give the OECD some extra life, give vitality to some unexploited strands of common interest in the Atlantic, and project to the rest of the world our common concerns with the qualitative margins of our life. (Sarge Shriver is probably the man to take this on.)
--The greatest of all short-term measures would be, of course, a Presidential trip this summer to Germany. In a microscopic way, I could perceive what it means in Germany to have a live, visible American stand up and say out loud what our policy is. Georgetown and Cleveland speeches are basic; but inevitably distant and abstract. I believe a Presidential trip against the background of the other five measures suggested above, would put Germany in a mood to go forward with confidence after September on the right lines and help get men elected who are faithful to the integrationist cause in Europe and to the Atlantic connection.
4. A Strategy for German Unity. Beginning with the question of German unity, what now follows merges conclusions drawn from the APAG meeting and my talks with Germans. The APAG meeting, at its formal sessions, centered, in fact, on two matters, extensively discussed also in my bilateral contacts with Germans: an alliance strategy for German unity and the coordination of alliance policy in areas outside NATO. The third major issue of German concern was discussed privately at Reinhartshausen with the British and the Italians; that is, the Paris talks on the ANF/MLF until September and prospects post-September. These three issues are now discussed in turn.
Muller-Roschach pressed the German question strongly in manner but temperately in substance (fortiter in modo, suaviter in re). And he evoked what was certainly the best APAG discussion yet of this matter. I would summarize it as follows, indicating along the way the emphasis of various members (and various Germans) where relevant.
(i) It is not safe for the Alliance, for the stability of Central Europe, or for the peace for us to accept passively the split of Germany and Europe.
(ii) The urgency of creating an Alliance strategy is heightened by the possible decay of the Hallstein Doctrine which will force the Germans to move in one way or another. And an Alliance strategy is the preferred course.
(iii) The achievement of German unity must be peaceful--via historical process, negotiation, and persuasion. No one can tell when it will be achieved. What is important for Germany and the Alliance is a policy which involves some action in concert. Neither accepting the status quo nor waiting for the anonymous forces of history to restore unity to the German people will suffice.
(iv) Aside from the Hallstein Doctrine, the major headings for an Alliance policy looking towards German unity are the following:
--declaratory statements
--a treaty proposal
--policy towards the GDR
--policy towards Eastern Europe
--policy towards the Soviet Union
--arms control
(v) Declaratory statements have a role in Germany, in the Alliance, and vis-à-vis the Russians and the rest of the world. But if not accompanied by forward movement, they wear thin. They should be used, but sparingly. (APAG didn't discuss this but, as indicated above, I believe between now and September is such a time.)
(vi) A treaty proposal to be effective must meet complex criteria:
--Given the present Moscow position on Germany, it should not be designed to be acceptable now; but it should contain features (security and boundary) which will hold out some attraction for Eastern Europe and, perhaps, for Russia in the future, although not necessarily final Western positions. As Nicholls said, a treaty proposal must be regarded as part of the historical process itself.
--The security issues must be dealt with in a way that, while holding out promise to the East, does not give the Russians an excessive initial bargaining position and does not set in motion neutralist forces in the West (Boyesen, Laloy, Rostow).
--Since immediate Soviet acceptance is not expected, the proposal should be put into negotiation in a way that leads, if possible, to protracted Austrian Treaty-type discussions, rather than a dramatic show-down with Moscow.
The advantages of a treaty proposal, if it can be devised, were judged to be these:
--It would reassure the Germans of Allied seriousness while forcing serious thought in Germany about what unity entails.
--It would dramatize to the East and to the world the pacific features of a German settlement.
--It would permit smaller steps to be taken as part of a large mosaic, so that they would appear less ad hoc and insignificant. (As our country team in Bonn emphasized, and I can now attest, this view is held by many thoughtful Germans.)
No one was confident that a proposal of this kind could be devised; although the technical success of the 1959 package led, on balance, to optimism. All agreed it was worth thinking about now and working on after the September election.
(vii) As for the GDR, it was agreed that in the matter of intra-German contacts, Bonn should be the judge of the proper balance; all agreed that Allied recognition of the GDR was ruled out; as for Allied contacts with the GDR, the Belgians and Danes explained their problems with the strongly reiterated (Carstens as well as Muller-Roschach) German policy of denying Allied contacts with the GDR and isolating and focusing the Soviet zone on West German relations. Since the TTD (East German travel documents) issue was being discussed elsewhere in NATO, the matter was left. (Both Schroeder and Carstens expressed the need for more West German contacts with East Germany; and Carstens revived tentatively the old proposals for mixed commissions. The pressure for more contacts with East Germany is clearly rising in West Germany.)
(viii) As for Eastern Europe, there was general agreement (with some familiar Dutch scepticism) that the forces at work in that region could be turned to Western advantage in general, and to assist the process of movement towards German unity in particular. A higher degree of concert in the Alliance in orchestrating policies towards Eastern Europe was generally approved. (Schroeder spoke in some pain of his difficulties with the credit-limit issue and with French egoism in its Eastern European policy; but agreed that identity of policy was not necessary on issues other than credit.) The central argument in APAG was that the loss of Moscow's control over and diminution of its ideological stake in Eastern Europe would, along with other factors, hasten the day when responsible men in Moscow might think the advantages of a European security agreement outweighed the costs of surrendering ideological control over East Germany. (With respect to Eastern Europe, Vaes reported Rapacki's discussion with Spaak on the advantages of first disengagement, then Germany unity. Laloy was wonderfully lucid and vigorous in dealing with both Rapacki and Spaak. Vaes privately agreed and deplored Spaak's vulnerability on this issue. In the formal meeting he was somewhat inhibited--not by the presence of foreigners but by the presence of Spaak's son-in-law, Michael Palliser.)
(ix) As for policy towards the Soviet Union, (leaving arms control to section x, below), it was accepted that in talking about the peaceful unification of Germany we were talking about a basic shift in the character of the Soviet Union and its view of the world scene--a transition from ambitions to lead a global ideological system to a mature acceptance of its considerable but limited role as a nation state among many. Forces were at work tending to press Russian policy in this direction, but clearly the day had not come. Nor could anyone predict when it would come. It followed, however, that everything we did on the world scene to discourage Soviet hopes that the expansion of its ideological power was possible and everything we did to dramatize the place of dignity awaiting it as a nation state was relevant to the problem of German unity and a European settlement. At the present time, given the case of Communist policy, this bore on what we did and failed to do as an Alliance about Communist policies in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. And it bore also on our capacity to continue to demonstrate the cohesion of the West in defense and other matters.
(x) With respect to arms control and a European security settlement, it was agreed that the relation between these somewhat separate theologies ought to be looked at closely for three reasons. First, it is possible that at a moment when Moscow would be willing to contemplate German unity it might also be prepared to contemplate an effectively inspected arms control system on a world basis: both go to the heart of the transition from a Bolshevik view of the world in Moscow to a more narrowly national view of the world. Second, given the changes in military technology since 1959, it may be more rational for Moscow, as well as the West, to conceive of a European security arrangement in broader terms than has been traditional in German security negotiations; perhaps, for example, embracing nuclear weapons systems and delivery capabilities outside Germany, from Western Russia to the Atlantic. The rational outcome might be a NATO-Warsaw Pact arms control agreement rather than a piece of surgery on Germany alone--indeed, a good piece of the total problem of arms control. Third, in general arms control negotiations the problems of allied policy towards German unity should be kept clearly in mind. They should, if possible, help move towards German unity and a European security settlement, rather than away from it.
(xi) Although these were the elements in an Alliance policy for German unity and a European security settlement, and, although all of us bore a responsibility for contributing to policy-making and action to bring it to pass, Germany had a double responsibility: it had to make concrete policy suggestions under these headings, and German political leadership had a responsibility for creating a political and psychological environment in Germany which could accept the German unity problem in these wide-ranging terms.
I have two final comments on this generalization of what transpired on my trip concerning the German question.
First, it struck me with great force, in talking with Germans, that there was a gap between the classic Adenauer position (formalistic statements on German unity plus the Hallstein Doctrine) and how Germans thought and talked in private--not merely in talks with me alone, but in pretty large groups. The headings under which we considered the problem in APAG did not greatly differ from how Germans, in and out of the government, considered the matter (except one Herr Theo Loch of the Rheinische Merkur, who said he didn't want any Prussian provinces in Germany and was content to rely on the force de frappe for protection. But this is the view of a tiny German minority.). In short, it is my impression that after the German election, it may well be possible for a German government to talk honest sense on the unity issue.
Second, there emerged in APAG a quite strong sentiment to enlarge the role of NATO on the matter of German unity and a European security settlement. The Italians, Canadians, and others spoke of their dissatisfaction with the monopolistic role of the Quadripartite Group. The dilemma is familiar enough: it is tough enough to get unity in the Quadripartite Group; but, in fact, the most vital interests of the whole Alliance are engaged in these matters and, as Mario Mondello and Arnold Smith pointed out, the cost of the present system is that those outside the Quadripartite Group feel no responsibility for the German unity question.
My impression at the moment is this: If we can get anything like agreement over the next year on an Alliance strategy towards German unity and a European settlement, either in the Quadripartite Group or as among the UK, Germany, and U.S. (and I am confident this is possible), we ought to widen parallel discussions in NATO--notably on the strategy as a whole and the non-treaty aspects of that strategy (e.g., policy towards Eastern Europe).
5. Consultation. There was much talk of consultation--between Germans and myself and within APAG. I was alerted to the cutting edge of the problem by a widespread German view which is this: OK, we consulted with the Americans on the Middle East; we agreed to carry some of the White Man's burden with the tanks for Israel; we were assured that our position with the Arabs wouldn't blow; it blew; for quite a while the Americans were out to lunch; they finally helped with courage and fraternity; but the lesson for Germany is--no consultation, just a nice, straightforward policy of narrow national interest. With Germans I tried to turn this around, arguing that the Middle East was a very tough area where you could easily meet yourself coming through a swinging door; successively, there was Suez, Lebanon-Jordan, the U.S. miseries over Yemen, the current German miseries. On each occasion one or two of us felt extremely lonely, while the others moved in gallantly to pick up the commercial change and to represent Western interests. Moreover, we felt damned lonely in Laos and South Viet Nam; the Belgians and we were lonely in the Congo; the British and Germans pretty lonely in East Africa; etc. The lesson was that the serious interests in the Middle East and elsewhere were common interests; namely, to keep the regions tolerably pacified, to strengthen the hands of the moderates, and to keep Communist influence within bounds. The answer was more sustained, wider, and more responsible consultation, not less.
There was, on the whole, a German willingness to listen to this argument, although they will be shy about weapons and soldiers outside Germany for quite a while, except as part of a completely integrated NATO force. (As Barzel put it to me, better than his reported statements in Washington, what if they turned up one ex-Nazi sergeant in Cyprus or South Viet Nam?) If we move rapidly on consultation, I am convinced the Germans will play either multilaterally or even bilaterally, notably in economic and political matters.
Against this background, conscious of the Under Secretary's impending mission to Paris, and after some preliminary talks the first night at APAG, I put in a paper entitled (after Jack Nicholls' suggestion) "The Resolution of Reinhartshausen." It was designed to dramatize the urgency of regular consultation at the one critical level where consultation does not now systematically exist; namely, that of the U.S. Assistant Secretary with operational (rather than planning) responsibilities. Its critical passage was the following:
1. They should engage government representatives who bear direct operational responsibility for the conduct of policy in the area concerned.
2. They should be regularly conducted, whether crises exist or not, with provision for extraordinary meetings.
3. They should be open to all NATO members interested in the area and prepared to attend.
4. The Secretary General, or his representative, should preside; and the Council should be informed of the results.
5. With respect to diplomatic proposals for German unity and European security, the three Western occupying powers bear a special responsibility. But, in respect to other matters, the objective should not be to yield total uniformity of action by NATO members, but rather to produce:
a. a common understanding of the problems involved and of the common vital interests at stake;
b. collective or individual policies designed to reflect that understanding and those interests, with the subsequent conduct of each member to be determined by the special character of his limitations and possibilities for action in the area.
I knew Jean Laloy could not sign on and he understood exactly the purpose of the exercise, which we discussed. The substance of the message was broadly agreed, after various statesmanlike reservations, and, of course, not in the form of a resolution. It will be incorporated in some anodyne form in the Secretariat report to the Council; but, more important, it will be taken home to the various capitals.
My recommendation is this:
a. The Under Secretary should make a strong pitch for systematic consultation along these lines at NAC at the end of the month;
b. The issue should be pressed at the May Ministerial meetings;
c. If there is no agreement, we should beef up and make more systematic our bilaterals with Great Britain and Germany, perhaps bringing the three of us together in tune with the Canadians (now hooked in Ceylon and Tanzania), the Italians, and any other interested parties, on an ad hoc basis.
In this matter of homely, practical responsible consultations on dirty, difficult problems, we should not let a French veto frustrate us. I suspect we could get agreement to consult regularly in Washington.
6. ANF/MLF. This matter was not discussed formally in APAG. I talked with Scheske and Carstens at some length. Also, at their initiative, with Nicholls and Palliser; and then, at his initiative, with Farace.
The upshot is the following.
a. The Germans will file, I believe, a paper replying to our questions about the UK position.
b. The German anxieties about the British position are: the scale of the MLF component; the proportionate shares (which they want equal and not distorted by assorted British nationally manned hardware); the assignment to a new commander rather than SACEUR; the Italian pressure for a European clause more explicit than they or we want and the British insistence on no European clause; and their (the German) desire to avoid any further nuclear-denial commitments outside a German settlement.
c. Carstens, at least, is clear that all these matters are negotiable with the British, given the underlying U.K. position (see below).
d. What the Germans want right now is: a U.S. initiative to get the Paris talks going; a U.S. position that helps narrow the gap quietly in Paris so that motion is maintained and things are more nearly ready by September; some high level overt statement of the continuity of the U.S. interest on an integrated settlement with a substantial MLF component to supplement the statement at the Ranch.
e. On the critical question--whether the Germans would be willing to face a confrontation with de Gaulle after September on the MLF--I got various answers which I reported by cable. The Foreign Office view is clearly (from Carstens as well as Scheske) that this is a matter of German national interest; and that de Gaulle cannot and should not have the right both to a force de frappe and a French veto on German participation in a collective effort. So far as German unity is concerned, Germany's nuclear role must, evidently, be considered in a general settlement. But one should not forego doing what is right in the West in the vague hope of a German settlement, when none is in sight. It is, however, correct to make a change in Germany's nuclear role explicitly a part of a German settlement, and to signal that fact in an ANF/MLF treaty. Carstens would not predict the position of a German government after September.
Another view is, simply, that Erhard is dominated by a desire to be elected in his own right. If the present political constellation is returned to power, he would cheerfully face down de Gaulle on this and other matters--notably since de Gaulle's threat of breaking up the EEC is no longer credible.
There is general agreement, right or wrong, that a grand coalition of the CDU/SPD would have no problem with de Gaulle and the MLF; and this is a possible and widely hoped for result.
What I would add to my cabled view is that the posture of the U.S. on the short run issues laid out in para. 3, above, may significantly determine what kind of German government we get in September and what its policy will then be. We should try to behave in such a way as to strengthen the Atlanticists in the German election, while we move quietly in Paris to bring the UK, Germany, and Italy together, so that we can move or not move promptly when we know the constitution and temper of the new German government.
f. As for Nicholls and Palliser, they report the following. The present UK government wants a settlement. The MLF component, the financial shares, the command issue are all negotiable. The European clause presents political difficulties in Parliament, although a weak European clause is not ruled out. (Strangely, this may prove the toughest issue.) They are primarily concerned with: whether a new German government would face down de Gaulle; whether a new British election and the return of a Conservative government would throw the thing off the track again, for a while; and about the tendency of the Conservatives, having carefully analyzed the strong pro-European content of the Liberal vote, may turn to a loose European deterrent, notably in the face of what they regard as weak U.K. leadership in this matter. In general, they want almost precisely what the Germans want out of Paris: U.S. leadership in getting the Paris meetings started; U.S. leadership in quietly narrowing the UK-German positions so that we are tolerably prepared by September; an interval to assess the temper of the new German government in this matter; then rapid diplomatic movement to button it up.
g. Although others in the Italian Foreign Office are probably more knowledgeable, Farace drew me aside to ask what we thought should and could be done in the Paris meetings. I told him that Washington was in the process of evaluating the Wilson-Erhard visit when I left. I did not know what would be decided in Washington about the Paris talks; but it was my personal view that the British and German and Italian views were not as far apart as might appear; that we should use Paris quietly to narrow the gap between now and September; and then we would see. And, indeed, that is my recommendation.
99. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 22, 1965, 2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw and approved in S and G on April 2. The source text is marked "Part 1 of 4." The meeting was held at the British Embassy. Stewart visited Washington March 21-24.
SUBJECT
German ReunificationPARTICIPANTS
UK Side
Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart
Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office
Michael Stewart, Charge d'Affaires a.i., British Embassy
R.S. Crawford, Asssistant Under Secretary, Foreign Office
Michael Hadow, Counselor, Foreign Office
J.N. Henderson, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary
John Harris, Special Assistant to the Foreign SecretaryUS Side
The Secretary
Ambassador Bruce
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
Willian R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, NEA
J. Harold Shullaw, Director, BNAThe Secretary said that the Germans want some initiative on reunification but are reluctant to get into a consideration of borders and security arrangements. We are prepared to be helpful but are not clear what can be done. We have picked up the idea of a statement on May 8, but this has been somewhat downgraded by premature publicity. The problem is that if we make proposals to the Russians they may come back with counter proposals for a free city status for Berlin and we could find ourselves back in the crisis atmosphere of 1961. We have no desire to see a repetition of the Western disarray of that period when we found very little support among our allies, with the exception of the British. The Secretary said that we have a preliminary draft of a May 8 statement and it is up to the Germans to say whether or not it meets their needs.
The Foreign Secretary said that while electoral considerations are prompting the Germans to urge a Western initiative at this time, a further motivation results from the difficulties they are experiencing with the UAR and other Arab states. The Federal Republic is concerned at the prospect of further recognitions of the East German regime and hopes to discourage such action by a Western declaration. Mr. Stewart said that there is no immediate prospect of getting anywhere on reunification and this means that a Western statement can be hardly more than a series of platitudes. Ambassador Thompson said that our draft statement emphasizes four-power responsibility, but the Germans would like to include a reference to negotiations; this causes problems since there is no agreed Western position; the Germans say that it is impossible to get their political leaders to focus on the problem until negotiations are about to begin. Sir Harold said that Gromyko had emphasized that disarmament would have to be a precondition to reunification. The Secretary noted that security arrangements and disarmament would have to be a part of an agreement on reunification. The Foreign Secretary replied that reunification cannot be achieved without the agreement of the Russians and that is not in prospect. The Secretary said that in December Gromyko had suggested that there might be some point in resuming bilateral US/Soviet talks and he did not exclude the possibility of injecting some new elements in the discussions. The Secretary recalled that the previous bilateral talks in 1961 were limited to the problem of Berlin. He said that we are not enthusiastic about resuming these talks without knowing what our allies think.
The Secretary said that in the course of the German election campaign, we can anticipate agitation on the question of the Eastern territories and public statements requiring a reaction from us. Mr. Stewart said emphatically that there is no prospect of the Germans recovering the lost territories and they should be in no doubt on the score. A reunified Germany within present borders is what is required. Ambassador Thompson said Germany would like some minor border rectifications, for example in the Stettin area.
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