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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968 Washington, DC |
110. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/2
London, May 10, 1965, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 UK (LO). Confidential. Drafted by Creel on May 11. The meeting was held at the Chancery. Under Secretary Ball led the U.S. delegation.
UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRTY-FIFTH
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
London, England, May 11-13, 1965PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Under Secretary
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
Mr. Creel, Dep. Asst. Sec. EUR
Mr. Spiers, Dep. Dir. EUR/RPMGermany
Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder
Franz Krapf, Dep. Under Sec. German Foreign Office
Herr Simon, Personal Asst. to Foreign Minister SchroederHans Weber, Interpreter
SUBJECT
Status of Three-Power Declaration on GermanyThe Under Secretary said he regretted that international developments had prevented the Secretary from being here./2/ The Foreign Minister asked whether it was possible that the Secretary might arrive for the final stages of the NATO Ministerial meeting. The Under Secretary said this was a possibility.
/2/Secretary Rusk was participating in a meeting of Organization of American States Foreign Ministers on the situation in the Dominican Republic. He arrived in London on May 12.
The Foreign Minister said the immediate concern of the Germans was what happens tonight at the quadripartite dinner with regard to the Three-Power Declaration. He made reference to several recent events, including President Johnson's message to President Luebke on May 5,/3/ the "very impressive" speech to Europe by the President on May 7,/4/ and the statement on Germany by Foreign Minister Stewart on May 7./5/ He was disposed to wonder how worthwhile it would be to continue to try to get an agreed Three-Power statement, which would probably be weaker than what had already been said.
/3/A copy of President Johnson's message on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Federal Republic is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 249.
/4/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 506-509.
/5/For text of Stewart's May 6 letter to Schroeder, see Europa Archiv, 1965, vol. 2, p. 267.
The Under Secretary said that on this matter we would be guided primarily by what the Germans thought necessary from their standpoint. Our own views had already been stated by the President in what were in fact stronger terms than any text of the Three-Power statement we were now discussing. If, however, the Germans felt a Three-Power declaration to be important, we would try to get one.
The Foreign Minister said he had had no recent contact on the matter with the French and had no indication of what their present ideas are. The Germans for their part have no suggestions to put forward. If the French wished to talk about a statement tonight, the Germans would not object since there still would be at least some value to a Three-Power declaration. If on the other hand the French showed no desire to continue the discussions, then we should stand on what we already have and put the question of a Three-Power statement off to some later and more appropriate time.
The Foreign Minister said that in view of Ambassador Thompson's presence, he wished to make one further point: As far as the Germans were concerned, there had never been a situation where they felt they had reached full agreement with the French in the Ambassadorial Group on the basis of the French proposal. The Germans had welcomed the American draft when circulated. They were also glad to receive the French draft but they had never identified themselves with it. The Germans had fully supported the additional sentence proposed by the Americans which stressed Four-Power responsibility for the German problem and also the intention to continue to work actively for reunification. They did not wish to get into the position with the French of putting up a solid front against the Americans. He added that with regard to the idea of "Europeanizing" the German problem, no one could be more critical of this concept than he was himself.
Ambassador Thompson commented that the Germans had in fact put one specific formula to the French (that the phrase "of all European peoples as well as other peoples concerned" be substituted for the words "of all the peoples of Europe" at the end of the final sentence of paragraph 3 of the French draft).
Foreign Minister Schroeder agreed but said that he was not personally very fond of this suggestion. The French had not yet replied to it. It took away only a little bit of the concept of "Europeanization," which he reiterated he found a very dangerous idea. It corresponded to the concepts put forth recently by Gromyko. He asked, "Where would this lead if we have to talk with people who are not in the least prepared to change the status quo?" He feared it would result in the Germans having to make all concessions in advance while leaving Germany still divided.
Ambassador Thompson said that for our part we were prepared to accept any of four different variations in the text. Three of them had already been advanced in the Ambassadorial Group; the fourth was the one put by the Germans to the French, to which no reply had been received. It would be a pity if we were not able to reach agreement on a Three-Power declaration or at least on a passage on Germany in the NATO communiqué.
The Under Secretary commented that the two things were not quite the same. He tended to share Ambassador Thompson's reluctance to let the matter lie. It had become public knowledge that there has been an argument over this issue. An article in Le Monde this morning had referred to this as a reflection of further deterioration in US-French relations. If no agreement were reached now it would give the public impression of a greater amount of disagreement than probably in fact exists.
Schroeder repeated that the German point of view was to wonder about the utility of a Three-Power declaration which would be weaker than the statements already made. He was not particularly enthusiastic over this prospect. He said the real question was who was to take the initiative. The Germans would prefer to leave this to the French. The latter were not very happy over the situation in which they found themselves; this had been aggravated by pointed criticism in the German press over the French failure to make any statement on Germany on May 5. Maybe it would be possible to find a middle ground. This would be along the line that if there were no Three-Power declaration a statement could be included in the NATO communiqué, similar to that worked out at The Hague last year, which would stress Four-Power responsibility for Germany and the need for German reunification.
The Under Secretary suggested we leave it this way: Wait to see if the French take an initiative looking to a satisfactory agreement on a Three-Power declaration. Should they do so, we would go along. If they did not, we would have a statement on Germany in the communiqué.
111. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/5
London, May 10, 1965, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Drafted by McIntyre and approved in U on May 25. The meeting was held at Ambassador Bruce's residence.
UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRTY-FIFTH
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
London, England, May 11-13, 1965PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Under Secretary
Ambassador Bruce
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Creel
Mr. McIntyreFRG
Foreign Minister Schroeder
State Secretary Carstens
Ambassador Blankenhorn
Deputy Under Secretary Krapf
Dr. OnckenUnited Kingdom
Foreign Secretary Stewart
Lord Hood
Mr. Ledwidge
Mr. BarnesFrance
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
Mr. Lucet
Ambassador de Courcel
Mr. de Beaumarchais
Mr. de la GrandvilleSUBJECT
Quadripartite Working Dinner on Berlin and GermanyThe Under Secretary opened the discussions by asking what subjects the others wished to discuss. Minister Schroeder suggested three subjects: the situation in the Ambassadorial Group; the question of Berlin clauses included in agreements or treaties entered into by the FRG; and trade relations of Western countries with the Soviet zone of Germany.
With respect to the first of these three questions, Minister Schroeder noted that there was no agreement within the Ambassadorial Group on a Tripartite declaration on Germany. He also referred to the fact that various proposals regarding Germany had previously been tabled in the Ambassadorial Group and were still before that Group. Schroeder said the question arises as to whether we should discuss the Tripartite declaration in this evening's meeting. He said that the FRG had already indicated that it could agree to various compromise formulae which had been suggested.
Ambassador Thompson said that the United States could accept certain modifications in the final sentence of paragraph 3 of the French draft or could agree to drop the final sentence of paragraph 3 and the U.S. proposed sentence.
The Under Secretary said that it seemed to him that we were close enough on a text so that we should be able to arrive at agreement.
Minister Couve said that he had no difficulty with amending the final sentence of paragraph 3 of the French draft to read: "of all European peoples as well as other peoples concerned" rather than "of all the peoples of Europe."
Minister Stewart asked the deletion of the words "in conformity with the principles of international law" in paragraph 3 arguing that self-determination does not really exist as a principle of international law.
The Under Secretary added quickly, "Notwithstanding the fact that international law itself doesn't exist!"
Ambassador Thompson suggested that the word "assuring" be used in paragraph 4 rather than the word "guaranteeing." There was no objection to either the compromise language which Couve said he could support at the end of paragraph 3 or to the suggestions of Minister Stewart re deletion of the phrase "in conformity with the principles of international law" or to Ambassador Thompson's suggestion that the word "assuring" be used rather than "guaranteeing."
Since there seemed to be full agreement on the text, the Under Secretary read it aloud and there was full agreement. (See Secun #9 for Text.)/2/
/2/Secun 9, May 11, reported on the Quadripartite meeting on Berlin. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CR 2504)
Ambassador Thompson suggested that the best time for the publication of the text might be the afternoon of May 12 or on the morning of May 13 so that it could be endorsed in the NATO communiqué on May 13./3/ He suggested that Minister Stewart present the text at the NATO Ministerial meeting the morning of May 11. The others present at the meeting agreed that this procedure would be good.
/3/For text, including the annex on Germany, see Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1965, pp. 926-928.
Although Schroeder went on to say that perhaps publication of the Three-Power declaration should be delayed until after the NATO communiqué, Couve felt that prior publication and a reference in the communiqué to the declaration would be the best way of handling it. Schroeder said the NATO Ministerial meeting could "take note of" or "endorse" the Three-Power declaration.
Couve referred to the sensitivity of the NATO partners and the need to inform them. Ambassador Thompson reiterated the desirability of releasing the text the afternoon of May 12 and then picking up reference to it in the communiqué. The Under Secretary suggested that it be provisionally agreed to publish the text on the afternoon of May 12. The Under Secretary emphasized that nothing should be said to the press other than the usual bland statement.
Mr. Carstens wondered what the word "indefinitely" meant in the last sentence of the declaration. He wondered if it meant "Bis auf unbe-stimmte Zeit." There was general agreement that this was a satisfactory translation of the word "indefinite."
Schroeder suggested looking at the communiqué issued at The Hague on May 15, 1964/4/ which could perhaps serve as a guide for us this time. He thought that there should be mention in the communiqué of the declaration. Minister Stewart thought that perhaps working level people of the Four at the meeting this evening could meet, following the discussions in the Ministerial meeting tomorrow morning, and draft a formula for NATO communiqué language.
/4/For text, see ibid., June 1, 1964, p. 850.
Schroeder said that if the discussion on the declaration was completed, he wished to note that there were some proposals still before the Ambassadorial Group which had been tabled earlier. He said he would not have anything new to add to these proposals at this time.
Minister Schroeder then turned to the second large subject which he had suggested for discussion this evening, namely Berlin clauses in FRG treaties. Schroeder referred specifically to the problems which had been encountered by the FRG in negotiating trade treaties with Eastern European countries. Treaties had already been entered into with Berlin clauses included, with Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria. At the time these come up for extension, the question of a Berlin clause will again arise. Negotiations are presently pending for trade agreements with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Every time a Berlin clause is included in an FRG treaty, positive action is required by the Allied Kommandatura before the treaty becomes applicable to Berlin. Schroeder now wished to suggest a change in procedure from a "positive" to a "negative" Berlin clause whereby Berlin would be automatically included in FRG treaties unless the Allies took specific action to prevent this from happening. He stated that opposition from Pankow to Berlin clauses will continue but we should not let this deter us. In its relations with Eastern Europe it will be important for the FRG to include Berlin and a "negative" Berlin clause was preferable to a "positive" one.
The Under Secretary wondered whether this was meant to include all treaties or just trade agreements with Eastern Europe. Schroeder responded that all treaties could perhaps be included but that one can consider whether all treaties should have negative clauses or not. It would be difficult to determine right now to which ones a negative clause would be applicable and to which ones it would not be applicable.
The Under Secretary said we would want to study the question carefully. The implications of the proposal might go beyond the immediate question of trade agreements. It raises difficult questions. He did not think we could get a consensus on the general concept. The inconven-ience presently imposed by the existing procedure on Berlin clauses is not great.
Stewart pointed to difficulties with the proposal of Schroeder, including the difficulty of indicating publicly that Berlin is simply to be regarded as a part of the FRG as far as the treaties are concerned. Schroeder said he did not wish to suggest any change in the legal situation. It is only that the FRG is faced with certain practical difficulties regarding Berlin. He said the FRG could draft a paper and submit it to the Western Three so that they could consider the matter further. What is involved here are fundamental problems of relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Couve expressed some general reservations regarding Schroe-der's proposal, but agreed the matter could be studied further.
Mr. Creel recalled the difficult problems of a legal character which had been involved in 1952 in working out existing procedures for applying FRG treaties to Berlin./5/ He recalled his personal involvement in the efforts to arrive at an agreed formulation. Mr. Creel suggested that the Germans formulate their ideas in writing and with some specificity so that we could see precisely what types of treaties are involved. Schroeder said that the Germans would do so and have a memorandum on the subject at a later date. He suggested that the problem might be examined in the first instance by the Ambassadors in Bonn. The others present agreed to this suggestion.
/5/For texts of the declarations governing the relationship, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 379-383.
Schroeder then turned to the third subject he had mentioned earlier, namely, commercial relations of the Western Powers with the Soviet zone of Germany. He emphasized strongly that the FRG is not afraid of competition of Western trade with the zone. However, trade increases the status of the GDR and the more Western countries move into that market, the less the GDR is dependent on the FRG. Interzonal trade rests on the fundamental principle of making East Germany dependent on West Germany. The FRG regards IZT as domestic trade. IZT is an instrument to be used to insure access to Berlin.
Schroeder complained particularly about Western exports of machine tools and electro-technical equipment and also about credit guarantees by Western governments for trade with the GDR. He said that machine tools and electro-technical equipment traded by other Western countries is almost equal to the volume of trade of the FRG with the zone in such goods. The FRG is concerned for political, not economic, reasons about the rising trend of increased trade by Western countries with the GDR. He did not have any particular objections to privately financed trade but credit guarantees by governments are very objectionable. There is a great difference between trade with the zone and trade with Eastern European countries. Total Western trade amounts to $70,000,000. US trade in 1964 amounted to $24,000,000, and for the UK it was $37,000,000.
The Under Secretary said that as far as he knew there were no US Government guarantees for exports to the GDR. A great proportion of US exports to the GDR in 1964 was from wheat sales. Stewart said he thought that UK sales in the GDR had decreased over the past three years. Schroeder said it is the trend that is important. If we are not careful we will quickly reach the point where IZT will lose its significance and the East Germans will cease to be dependent on West Germany. It is true there has been an increase in Western German trade recently with the GDR but the fact that there has been an increase is not the real point that we are dealing with. The FRG wants the GDR to continue to be interested in those areas where they will be most dependent on the FRG. The FRG takes certain goods from the GDR that the GDR would otherwise have great difficulty in disposing of.
The Under Secretary referred to the Miller Committee/6/ report which will be taken into consideration in the formulation of legislation regarding trade with Eastern Europe. He noted that we have always differentiated in trade with the zone and the rest of Eastern Europe. We have no intention of changing our basic policy through increasing our trade with the zone. Further, we have no intention of extending government credits to cover zonal trade.
/6/Reference is to the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with Eastern European Countries and the Soviet Union, chaired by Irwin Miller, Chairman of the Board of Cummins Engine Company.
Schroeder said there were advantages of a common strategy vis-à-vis the zone in this matter. The zone for its part tends to play various Western countries against each other. What we need is "contingency planning" in this field. Couve asked if Schroeder was suggesting bilateral discussions or talks in some other form. Schroeder answered that it was perhaps useful to have discussions on a Four-Power level. NATO trade with the zone has been gradually increasing.
The Under Secretary thought that, since quite a number of Western countries are involved in trade with East Germany, we should perhaps consider discussing the question in a forum larger than a quadripartite group. Schroeder responded that the Western Three Powers, because of their special responsibilities for Berlin and its access as well as Germany, had a closer connection to the problem. Therefore, quadripartite discussions were preferable. He felt that other members of NATO would be interested in whatever was worked out with those powers with special responsibilities in Germany.
The Under Secretary thought there was not much point in getting the agreement of the Four if other countries are going to increase their trade sharply with East Germany. The United States is very much aware of the problems involved in efforts to restrict trade since we have had our experience, which has not been entirely pleasant, with trying to restrict trade with certain countries ourselves and found subsequently that others had increased their trade with the countries in question while we were limiting ours.
Schroeder said he knew of our experiences in this field but in dealing with the East Germans we are dealing with a very limited subject. Stewart thought there would be considerable difficulty in working out a common line on this question. In any case, he had the impression British trade was lower than it was three years ago. Schroeder said that in 1964 the British figures were slightly above the 1962 figures.
The Under Secretary said the United States is already following the policy which is now advocated by Schroeder. We would not object, however, to quadripartite discussions, or larger discussions if they were deemed preferable. Couve said that he would be prepared for bilateral discussions, quadripartite discussions, or larger discussions if they were desired. Stewart did not object to quadripartite discussions but said we will have to work at the question from the standpoint of our trade position. Schroeder suggested that quadripartite discussions take place in Bonn and this suggestion was agreed to by the other participants in this evening's meeting. In response to a question by Stewart, Schroeder agreed that Western German trade with the zone could also be discussed in such talks.
Schroeder expressed appreciation for the relative speed with which the questions he had raised this evening were dealt with.
It was agreed that the press guidance regarding this evening's meeting would be along the following lines: We discussed certain Berlin and German questions. Foreign Minister Stewart will report at the NATO Ministerial meeting on May 11.
112. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, May 22, 1965, 1919Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.
4633. Ref: Embtel 4626./2/ Subj: Erhard visit--political topics. In my meeting with him on May 21 (Embtel 4626), the Chancellor indicated a number of topics which he wished to discuss in Washington. From what I know of the arrangements, time will probably preclude the discussion of all of these subjects between the President and the Chancellor even though this is the Chancellor's desire. If there is not time some of the topics might appropriately be discussed between the Secretary and Erhard, or the Secretary and FonMin Schroeder, if they hold separate conversations, or with State Secretary Carstens.
/2/Telegram 4626 from Bonn, May 22, reported on the issues Erhard wished to discuss with President Johnson. (Ibid.)
I recommend that we attempt to focus the bulk of the conversation between the President and the Chancellor on certain major topics of broad mutual interest, namely, Franco-German relations, European unity, German reunification, the future of NATO, and economic relations.
In general, these are the topics in para (1) of the reftel./3/ The topics in paras 2 and 3/4/ should be subordinated, if indeed time permits their consideration. We should accommodate the Chancellor's wish for a statement of our attitude about the situation in Viet Nam and draw him out as to what increased support he is willing to provide on the non-military side. His support for our position can be helpful in any public statement after the talks.
/3/These topics were: "The current French attitude," French-Soviet relations, the Common Market, NATO, and "recent change in the Soviet attitude."
/4/These were: the Middle East, India, Pakistan, and China.
Comments on Franco-German relations, European unity, and German reunification are contained in this message. Separate messages are devoted to the defense and economic items.
1. Franco-German relations.
Of all the subjects proposed by the German side, none to my knowledge is more crucial at this time than the future course of action we should both take with regard to de Gaulle. As the Department is aware, the problem of Gaullism in Germany has been as much a question of internal politics within the CDU/CSU as of foreign relations strictly speaking. Because of this, there are still voices heard in Germany which maintain that the policy of deference to de Gaulle has been proved all the more correct by recent developments. Those who follow this line maintain that it is only because the FRG has been willing to go along with those who would frustrate de Gaulle, that he has taken a direction which seems more dangerous in German eyes. In particular his flirtation with the Soviets, which has worried even such a staunch advocate of close ties with France as Adenauer, is cited as evidence. This is not a majority view, but is held by a number of publicists and politicians. Their conclusion is that de Gaulle's recent actions (the "Europeanization" of reunification, the move toward the Soviets, the implied threat to NATO, etc.) make it all the more important to draw closer to de Gaulle in the future. De Gaulle will undoubtedly do all he can to stimulate this view during his visit here next month.
In spite of this view, which cannot be disregarded even though held by only a minority, I feel that there is a more important segment of German official and public opinion who have reached what might be termed a "watershed" in their thinking about de Gaulle. This group includes Chancellor Erhard and FonMin Schroeder themselves. Schroeder told me recently, as reported in Embtel 4348,/5/ that many of his adversaries were beginning to admit that he had been right about de Gaulle all the time. It is believed to be symptomatic, for example, that such an influential paper as Die Welt said recently that "de Gaulle has destroyed two of the main bases on which the Franco-German Treaty rests--the understanding that the FedRep would not return to Rapallo, and that France would not return to a policy of encirclement."
/5/See footnote 2, Document 108.
The domestic political considerations which have limited the freedom with which Erhard and Schroeder could handle relations with Paris may be in the process of becoming less significant as disillusion with de Gaulle grows. This being so, I feel that the degree of firmness we could expect from the Germans in any post-electoral confrontation with de Gaulle will depend in large part on our willingness to take a strong lead. We should make clear to Erhard and Schroeder, before the German leaders begin to formulate any new policy, that we are if necessary prepared, albeit reluctantly, to move ahead with Germany and other countries which may be so disposed, toward common goals even without France. We shall need to show that the Germans have an alternative to catering to France, and that alternative may well offer the best means of bringing France back into the fold, even if fairly rough sledding must be expected in the short run. We do not seek confrontations with France for their own sake, but in order to accomplish pressing NATO and other business which cannot await his retirement from the scene. It is hard to see how we could really offer Germany any kind of European unity without France; but we can offer the FRG continued security in NATO (which can still be effective even without France) and an honorable role as partner and ally in constructive Free World endeavors. We could suggest that the time may have come for the two of us quietly to think out together how to proceed in the event France withdraws from NATO. If effective planning is begun, de Gaulle can gain less leverage from threats to withdraw.
If the above points are made to the Chancellor during his Washington visit, they should serve to strengthen him in his meeting with de Gaulle the following week.
2. Reunification.
The Chancellor is not likely to put forward any new proposals in this area. Although the Chancellor like other German political leaders must give constant public evidence of interest and maximum efforts to obtain progress, essentially the Germans are not interested in defining their negotiation positions until there is some indication that the Soviets are prepared to enter serious negotiations. They recognize that this condition is not likely to prevail for some time to come. Nonetheless the Chancellor will certainly wish to be in a position to say that he raised the German question and that the two governments are in close agreement on the need for reunification.
He can be expected to express appreciation for the President's May 5 letter to President Luebke and May 7 speech and to indicate the importance he attributes to continuing Four-Power responsibility for a German solution. He may ask for continuing US support in combatting Soviet efforts to enhance the GDR and perpetuate the status quo.
We believe it would be desirable to state forcefully that the US has no intention of relinquishing its responsibilities in Germany; that we recognize the legitimate European-wide interest in a German settlement, but we cannot and will not accept any watering down of the special responsibilities borne by the Four Powers alone. In reassuring the Chancellor of our support vis-à-vis the Soviets, it might be well to caution against steps on the German part to change the status quo in Berlin or moves of a purely demonstrative nature which could induce strong Soviet reactions. It would be awkward for both of us if we were forced to choose between seeming to oppose the FRG or seeing some aspect of our position in Berlin jeopardized. Both of us can only lose from such a situation.
3. Soviet relations.
The state of Soviet/FRG relations has seldom been less promising than at the present. Moscow has taken every available opportunity recently to attack the FedRep and Kosygin has rebuffed the Chancellor's invitation to visit Bonn. This attitude is a concomitant of the Soviet determination to make the division of Germany as permanent as possible and is, in the foreseeable future, likely to continue. The FRG's only hope for improving relations lies in the trade field where the Germans have some leverage. Under the circumstances, the Chancellor will probably be mainly interested in the President's assessment of current Soviet overall intentions, and his estimate of the present Soviet leadership.
4. European unity.
Despite de Gaulle's clearly negative attitude toward European political integration, Chancellor Erhard continues to seek at least an appearance of progress toward unity. He has pushed for a meeting of EEC heads of govt and now has a "step by step" plan for European unity. As of now there appears to be little new or substantive beneath the Chancellor's public efforts. It is doubtful whether he will have any new approach to outline to the President. He will be looking mainly for encouragement and support. He undoubtedly recognizes that the prospects of progress on political unity are dim at present. It is understood that Erhard and de Gaulle during their June meeting will agree to postpone the heads of govt meeting until after September, since otherwise Erhard might well be confronted with a failure just before the elections.
The Germans are not interested in an integrated European defense policy as proposed by de Gaulle, so there can be no forward movement in this area. Only in the economic field is the process of European integration moving ahead.
In responding to Erhard on this subject we should, as in the past, express strong support for an integrated Europe as a partner in the Atlantic Alliance. The Chancellor can rely on our support in his efforts toward this goal. We should stress, however, that it is the Europeans themselves who must take the lead.
McGhee
113. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
SC 00692/65B
Washington, May 28, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 8. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence. Three photographs included in the report are not printed.
CHANGE IN EAST GERMANY
A kind of ersatz stability has been growing in the Soviet Zone, the so-called German Democratic Republic (GDR) during the last three years. Erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 was the turning point that forced the East German people to accommodate to Walter Ulbricht's regime. From this accommodation, the regime has gained enough security and self-confidence to enable it to satisfy pressures both from the outside and within for some relaxation of domestic policies and a general overhaul of the country's economy. With these developments a sense of national self-interest has begun to evolve. While the regime has as yet had no cause to regret these changes, it is still too early to be confident that it will not backtrack.
Popular Attitudes
The majority of East Germans remain anti-Communist but with decreasing emotionalism. The popular temper is no longer one of the potential revolt. Many of the really dissatisfied East Germans fled through the open Berlin border before the Wall closed in mid-August 1961. Among those who remain, there is a general attitude of acquiescence encouraged by the presence of 20 Soviet divisions, by the efficiency of the security apparatus, and by a few key concessions granted in the last year or so.
This new attitude is reflected in the slow but steady rise in the levels of economic productivity, and in a general decrease in the incidence of barn burnings and industrial sabotage. It is also illustrated in the surprisingly small number of pension-age East Germans who have opted to remain in the West since the regime began allowing them to visit relatives in West Berlin and West Germany last November.
With the relaxation of domestic tensions, East Germans have come to express their complaints openly. These center on the lack of personal freedoms--particularly the freedom to travel--a sense of being cut off from developments elsewhere in Europe, and the disparity between their standard of living and that of the West Germans. Even rank-and-file party members feel free to criticize and frequently deride official explanations of foreign and domestic political developments.
The regime's most significant shortcoming in the eyes of the people--a liability also recognized by the leadership--is its character as an unpopularly elected government running an artificially created portion of a Greater Germany. In a "poll" last December the central committee found that the people generally do not support or understand the party's ideological and political policies, particularly with regard to West Germany. To meet this problem, propaganda techniques were revamped.
Only the youngest generation, however, is likely to respond positively to the new approach. A poll conducted by the West Berlin Senat after the first Christmas Pass period reflected the first signs of a sense of national identity and consciousness among East German youth. To cultivate such sentiments the regime sponsored a nationwide youth convocation last May--the first of its kind in ten years.
Economic Reforms
Recent reforms in the economy grew out of the failure of earlier, quite unrealistic plans to "overtake and surpass" West Germany. Retrenchment brought obvious benefits in 1963-1964, reducing the backlog of unfinished investment projects, ending foreign trade deficits, and greatly easing inflationary pressures in the consumer market.
At the same time, Ulbricht pushed the development of a new program to create popular confidence and to reassert a sense of purpose, the so-called "new economic system of planning and management." Ulbricht set out to win over the technical elite--engineers, economists, and executives--who previously had been ignored by his planners and alienated by his economic policies. He offered them increased responsibility and greater incentives and, with their support, proposed to test the idea that the productive techniques of Western management can be blended into a planned economy.
The introduction of the "new economic system" began with the reorganization of the industrial associations into super-enterprises somewhat resembling major subsidiaries of a large Western corporation. Reforms in prices, planning, and banking are being introduced in stages. The "new economic system" has brought administrative order into the East German economy and seems to be working fairly well. But without more basic reforms it is unlikely to lead to any significant increase in the presently disappointing rate of economic growth.
Economic retrenchment and reform, however, have given some relief and encouragement to the long-suffering population. The process of easing inflation was painful--wage cuts and price increases for consumer goods--but produced welcome results. Daily necessities now can be bought without queuing and are generally affordable. There is renewed hope of further improvement in living conditions.
The regime has promised to improve the quality and assortment of consumer goods and the availability of services, and the first results have begun to appear, although the consumer is still far from satisfied. Without promising, the regime has also encouraged the people to look forward to a five-day work week within the next few years. As a result, although East Germans have no prospect of "catching up with" West Germans, they are conscious of being better off than at any time since World War II.
Travel Reforms
The regime has also taken the first steps toward alleviating the people's sense of isolation. Since last November, pension-age East Germans (65 for men, 60 for women) have been permitted to visit relatives in West Berlin or West Germany for up to four weeks a year. Three million of East Germany's 17 million people are eligible for these visits, and 1.5 million are expected to take advantage of the opportunity. Under the Berlin pass agreement, arranged initially for Christmas 1963 and renewed in 1964, West Berliners may make four one-day visits to relatives in East Berlin each year.
While the East Germans welcomed these programs, they were critical over the requirement that Berlin pass visitors must exchange a minimum amount of currency at an artificially low rate, and that pensioners must not accept the West German Government's grant-in-aid of 50 deutschemarks. These programs have increased popular pressures to further widen travel privileges.
Juridical Reforms
The regime also is trying to soften its reputation for hard-fisted justice by emphasizing "corrective treatment," imposing generally milder sentences, and resorting in many instances to restrictive measures short of imprisonment.
Last October, Ulbricht announced the regime's first large-scale amnesty which freed some 10,000 political and common criminals over a two-month period.
Before the amnesty, between July and September 1964, West Germany had been allowed to ransom between 800 and 1,000 political prisoners for payments in goods and cash. Another release-for-ransom deal involving 1,000 prisoners is currently under way.
Policy Toward Intellectuals
The regime's cultural policies have been ambivalent. Some of Kafka's works, once all banned, now are being published, partially in response to pressures from other Eastern European countries. Writers denied publication only a year ago now appear occasionally in the regime-controlled press, receive official recognition for controversial works, and are permitted to lecture publicly--even traveling to West Berlin to do so.
On the other hand, the regime has been fighting a rear-guard action to prevent artists and intellectuals from challenging the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism or its self-appointed role as cultural arbiter. Last April, Ulbricht convoked the Second Bitterfeld Conference for the purpose of urging a return to "socialist realism" under regime guidance. Addressing the party plenum last December, ideologist Kurt Hager sternly warned that the regime would not permit the watering down of its cultural policies at the behest of "revisionists" inside or outside the bloc, and that "bourgeois decadence and abstractionism" would not be tolerated.
The case of Robert Havemann, a professor at Humboldt University, illustrates the regime's ambivalent policy. A year ago he was ousted from the party and fired from the university for lecturing on the necessity of liberalizing Communism. In December, he was interviewed by a Western journalist, presumably with official knowledge. The interview, published in the West German weekly Der Spiegel under the title "Marxism Suffers From Sclerosis," urged fewer controls and claimed that the GDR had far to go in de-Stalinization. Nonetheless, he has not been imprisoned and is still allowed occasional contacts with foreigners.
Religious Policy
The regime has struck a bargain with the Evangelical Church, the major religious faith in East Germany. The basis of understanding is that organized religion will not be harassed if the clergy supports the regime's political goals.
After quiet and delicate negotiations last spring the regime released imprisoned clergymen. West Berlin Bishop Dibelius announced in October that, for the first time since 1933, no pastors were in prison anywhere in Germany. Church officials also report a rise in the number of baptisms, confirmations, and marriages, and a concomitant decline in the number of people apostatizing and undergoing secular regime-sponsored confirmations. The regime also is permitting church-oriented convocations, and allowing clergymen to travel abroad to international meetings such as Vatican II and the recent Pacem in Terris conference in New York./2/
/2/May 21.
A significant concession to private conscience was the creation last fall of labor battalions--unique in Eastern Europe--in which conscientious objectors could fulfill their military service obligation. The number of conscientious objectors now reportedly exceeds the total in West Germany.
Of course, the situation is still not ideal from the church's point of view. The six theological faculties and three church training centers provide too few graduates--about 85 a year--to staff the country's 4,500 pastorates. In the Saxony church district, for example, only 1,000 of the 1,350 pastoral offices are filled. Bishop Dibelius has warned that it would be "pure nonsense" to assume that the regime had embarked on a liberalization process.
The Party
In the last 15 months, Ulbricht has further rehabilitated and in some cases readmitted to party membership many of his real or imagined opponents of the past. These include former politburo member Paul Merker, former justice minister Max Fechner, "revisionist" economists Fritz Behrens and Arne Benary, and ideologue Wolfgang Harich.
The East German people probably are not convinced by the regime's continually expressed intentions to liberalize domestic policies, even though there are signs that this time the leadership means it. Rather surprisingly, Ulbricht referred favorably on two occasions in the last six months to the controversial critique of Soviet-directed Communism by the late Italian Communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti./3/ A dominant theme at the December plenum of the central committee and in the subsequent lower level party elections was that officials must be more sympathetic and responsive to popular opinion.
/3/Reference is to the so-called Yalta Memorandum, August 1964. For text, see William E. Griffith (ed.), Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 373-383.
The party is faced with the necessity of attracting technocrats into its ranks to help with economic reform. However, their admission--many of them are opportunistically rather than ideologically motivated--causes strains with the older generation of orthodox, militant Communist functionaries.
For the moment the basic power structure remains unchanged. Personal antagonisms among the top leaders are kept in check by the dominating figure of Ulbricht. Since the Wall, the aging first secretary has become something of an "elder statesman," a court of last resort, and has delegated more and more of his responsibilities to others. Relatively young experts like Guenter Mittag and Erich Apel exercise the power of immediate decision. Erich Honecker appears to run party affairs on a day-to-day basis as Ulbricht's undisputed deputy there. More recently, he also seems to have handled some governmental matters, normally the prerogative of Premier Willi Stoph, who after achieving that office last September suffered a period of eclipse until May Day this year.
Reasons for the Reforms
Pressures on Ulbricht to institute the past year's reforms have come not only from inside the GDR but also from the USSR and the East European countries. He had long been able to evade de-Stalinization by pleading that East Germany's exposed position on the bloc's western frontier demanded a garrison-state atmosphere. As a result, East Germany and its party were more and more turning into Stalinist fossils and becoming a source of general embarrassment to the bloc.
East Germany's vulnerable position was brought home to Ulbricht when the loosening of intrabloc ties revealed an increasing willingness on the part of brother satellites to ignore East German state interests. Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary in the last two years have signed trade agreements with West Germany that include West Berlin, which East Germany considers a separate political entity. There is some evidence that Pankow fears that Moscow might ultimately make a deal with the West at East Germany's expense.
The reforms are intended to improve East Germany's initiatives abroad. The economic reforms are also intended to make East Germany more competitive in foreign markets, both in the bloc and in the West by upgrading products and modernizing business methods. Steady progress is required if East Germany is even to hold its own in today's markets.
The reform program also is closely linked to the GDR's policy toward West Germany. For example, Pankow portrays the Berlin pass agreement, signed with the West Berlin Senat, as supporting the GDR contention that West Berlin is a separate political unit--one of the three German states, which can and must learn to work amicably with each other. Ultimately, the reforms seem designed to help establish an atmosphere conducive to direct East-West German negotiations and to take advantage of West Berlin Mayor Brandt's view that West Germany can ameliorate living conditions for the East German people in exchange for economic concessions.
From the standpoint of its internal policies, the Ulbricht regime apparently hopes that a measured degree of unorthodoxy and flexibility will enable it to win popular commitment to its objectives. The reforms so far enacted, however, have not greatly affected the lives of most East Germans. Their loyalties are still doubtful. But for the relatively few--e.g., factory managers and farm chairmen--whose support in the first instance is necessary, new incentives should prove efficacious.
Prospects
The reforms suggest that, even as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, a new and more realistic element of national self-interest is affecting East German policy. Responding primarily to pressures from the Soviet bloc, East Germany has embarked on a new course.
While there has been no retreat since Khrushchev's ouster, neither have there been new concessions. The regime now appears to be marking time, assessing the results so far. The central committee plenums in December and April were distinguished by an undertone of caution in all but economic policies. It appears doubtful that Ulbricht will carry through his promise to add duplicate candidates to electoral lists this year, to increase pensions, or to lengthen vacations.
However, the future of the present trend is not assured. There are strong conservative forces within the party opposing even those reforms already granted. There are several reports, for example, that the Ministry for State Security bitterly opposes the Berlin pass agreement and the pensioner visits. Ulbricht's incapacitation or death could serve to spark a conservative resurgence.
114. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 2, 1965, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 8. Secret. Drafted by Obst and Kent and approved in S, U, and G on June 23. The meeting was held at Blair House. The source text is marked "Part II of II." Part I, a discussion of Eastern Europe, is ibid.
SUBJECT
German QuestionPARTICIPANTS
US
Secretary Rusk
Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Leddy
Ambassador McGhee
Mr. Puhan
Mr. Obst, InterpreterGerman
Foreign Minister Schroeder
Ambassador Knappstein
Dr. Simon, Aide to Schroeder
Mr. Weber, InterpreterMinister Schroeder said that closer ties between East and West are a value in themselves. They might not always have a direct bearing on progress towards reunification, but that objective is always in German thoughts.
Ambassador McGhee observed that de Gaulle thinks that only by economic and some other closer ties can the reunification of Germany be brought about.
Minister Schroeder suggested that in approaching the German question in the future, the United States and Germany should first explore the matter bilaterally. Then these discussions could be broadened to include the others.
Minister Schroeder added that the talks should be kept highly informal.
Ambassador Knappstein emphasized that they must be kept absolutely secret.
Ambassador McGhee asserted that any suggestions prepared for the group of powers should have substance.
Minister Schroeder pointed out that the FRG attitude towards the Four Powers has not changed. The FRG knows the prospect for reunification is not good now. The German position is to continue to rely on the Four Powers for the settlement of the German question but initially to discuss bilaterally what is possible.
Mr. Ball said there should also be talks with the United Kingdom.
Minister Schroeder replied that he did not have exclusive talks in mind. The British could be included a little later.
115. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 4, 1965, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 8. Confidential. Drafted by Puhan and approved in S and U on July 8. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary's conference room. The source text is marked "Part 1 of 4"; memoranda of other portions of the conversation are ibid. A memorandum of conversation of the portion of the discussion dealing with France and NATO is Document 116.
SUBJECT
Trade with Eastern Europe and the ZonePARTICIPANTS
Germans
Dr. Ludwig Erhard, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy
Dr. Karl Hohmann, Assistant Secretary; Chief, Planning Staff, Federal Chancery
Dr. Horst Osterheld, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of the Chancellor
Dr. Dankmar Seibt, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Personal Aide to the Chancellor
Mr. Georg von Lilienfeld, Minister, German Embassy
Mr. Karl-Guenther von Hase, State Secretary; Federal Press Spokesman
Dr. Klaus Simon, Aide to Foreign Minister Schroeder
Mr. Jorg Kastl, Foreign Ministry Press Spokesman
Mr. Ulrich Bewerunge, Press Officer, Federal Press & Information Agency
Mr. Hermann Kusterer, Interpreter
Mr. Heinz Weber, InterpreterAmericans
The Secretary
Under Secretary George W. Ball
Ambassador George C. McGhee
Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, S/AL
Mr. John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Robert C. Creel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Alfred Puhan, Director, GER
Mr. Richard B. Finn, Deputy Director, GER
Mr. Harry Obst, InterpreterThe Chancellor spoke of his pleasure at being here. He said that he was certain the Secretary knew how keenly he felt about the Alliance. He referred to his upcoming talks with de Gaulle which he said would not be easy. They would concern not only the problems of the Six, but the problems of NATO. The Chancellor felt it was not necessary this morning to mention the German problem in particular. He was grateful, as the Secretary knew, for the recent statements by the President and other American leaders on the German problem.
The Chancellor said he had one question he wished to explore with the Secretary. He stated that one heard a great deal today about the relations of the West with the countries of Eastern Europe. De Gaulle, according to the Chancellor, had described the solution to the German problem in terms of a better relationship between the East and West. The Chancellor said it was his view that the Eastern European countries had their own identity, were national states whether Communist or not and that they threatened the FRG with giving equal treatment to the GDR. In the US, Chancellor Erhard said one hears more and more that commercial relations with these Eastern European countries are useful. He referred to an article in Life by Professor Brzezinski./2/ The Chancellor said the FRG was not hostile toward the Eastern European countries, but it was premature to speculate regarding diplomatic relations between these countries and the FRG. He felt the time for such action was not opportune. He thought that in view of the rupture of relations caused with the FRG by ten Arab states and the upcoming Algiers conference of Afro-Asian countries,/3/ any speculation regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations between the FRG and the Eastern European countries would only create an atmosphere of uncertainty.
/2/Not found.
/3/The Conference was held October 28-November 2. It ended without any agreements.
The Chancellor asked if all Western European countries grant long term credits to the Eastern European states, what will be achieved? Are we not basically deceiving ourselves into thinking that we may achieve German reunification in this way? He felt it would be difficult to explain such actions to the German people. He thought that even when viewed from a long range point of view, it was necessary for us to proceed with great caution. If everybody gives long term credits to the Eastern European states, what will they do with these credits? Perhaps they will increase their armaments.
The Chancellor asked if it was not to be expected that the Soviets would increase the pressure on the Eastern European countries as we are trying to develop better relations with them. The Chancellor asked, as an economist, when and under what conditions would these Eastern European countries be ready to repay the credits extended to them? He was concerned that the position of the creditors would in the last analysis be worse than that of the debtors. We would be forced to continue giving them credit in the hope of getting repayment. He warned that we could not give them the impression that we are doing this as a gift. He voiced the necessity for the development of an economic strategy in this field, a strategy based on a study of the results achieved. He asked if granting credits has resulted in greater readiness to move away from the USSR. Had the chances for German reunification actually improved? Or are these Eastern European states making use of these funds to undermine the Western position? Were they financing armies of liberation in other parts of the world? He said he felt ill at ease at these thoughts.
The Secretary replied we saw considerable advantage in more relaxed relations between East and West Europe, including improved relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Communist states of Eastern Europe. He believed important developments were taking place in Eastern Europe. The smaller Eastern European countries have achieved a considerable degree of national autonomy. This is decidedly to our advantage. The Secretary felt there was underlying nostalgia in Eastern Europe for greater association with the West in the cultural, intellectual as well as other fields. The Secretary said the role of the US in such a policy toward Eastern Europe is fairly restricted. US trade with Eastern Europe is only a small fraction of Western European trade with that part of the world. It was not easy for us to change this situation. There was legislation governing our trade with Communist states. Congress would want to look with great care into any change of this situation. Moreover, the attitude of Eastern Europe toward us cannot help but be affected by developments in other parts of the world--in Viet-Nam and Cuba, for example. Some Eastern European countries, the Secretary suggested, may stand aside in conflicts involving us with the Communists in other parts of the world, but a crisis like that of Viet-Nam imposes inevitably limitations on us to improve the atmosphere, the relations between us and Eastern Europe.
The Secretary expressed his full agreement with the Chancellor on the problem of credits to the Communist Bloc. He said that we and the Federal Republic had tended to view the problem in the same light, but that we have often been disappointed by the positions taken by other NATO powers. He felt it would be unfortunate if there developed in the West a policy of giving easy credit terms to Eastern Europe. He said when credits became aid, we were making a mistake in our priorities. We should obviously not increase the capacity of Communist strength until the prospects for much better relations with the Bloc looked brighter. The Secretary felt that the idea of a détente had gone far beyond the facts. He cited the nuclear test ban treaty as a stimulus to the notion that a détente had been reached. To prove that this was not so, he cited crises which had arisen since that time. He said there were indications the Soviets may press us on Berlin again. He reminded the Chancellor of Gromyko's suggestion that there be four-power talks on Berlin. Gromyko, he said, also tried to have bilateral talks with us on Berlin and our position there. The Secretary said he gathered Gromyko in Paris took up the German and Berlin questions, hinting that the Soviets were growing impatient. The Secretary added that we had intelligence reports concerning very large military maneuvers in Eastern Germany, suggesting that we might find ourselves again with very great pressure over Berlin. It was thus important for NATO to try to talk out in some detail the wide range of questions affecting our relations with Eastern Europe. He deplored the absence of a strong Western policy on this subject and the tendency to create confusion.
The Secretary said, in summary, we have noted a steady relaxation of tensions in Eastern Europe which made for better East-West relations. He said our role in increasing this better relationship would be somewhat restricted. He believed this subject should be discussed further in NATO. The Secretary asked Mr. Ball to comment further on this subject.
The Under Secretary referred to the difficulties which the Federal Republic had encountered when it sought to take the lead with Belgium in restricting credits to Eastern Europe to the Berne Union rules. Mr. Ball said we made our support of this position clear and tried to persuade our NATO partners to agree. The UK, however, would not make any distinction between credits to Eastern European countries and to others. As a result, a split developed within NATO with the UK followed by the French and the Italians going beyond the Berne rules. The result was that we had no common policy, which was a matter of great regret to us. Our suggestion to have the Berne Union rules accepted as a standard was taken up in the OECD. The British showed little sympathy for this suggestion. Subsequently, Mr. Leddy undertook to push this further, but I am not very sanguine as to what might be accomplished.
Mr. Leddy said the UK would go along with general rules applicable to all, but was afraid they would want to grant credits for as much as ten years. We feel it was appropriate to limit them to five years.
Mr. Ball added that as long as we have members of the Alliance who believe in no discrimination, it would be very difficult to develop a common policy.
The Secretary said he wished to add that it was important to draw distinctions between the smaller countries of Eastern Europe on the basis of the role they played in Communist conspiracies in other parts of the world. For instance, Rumania was quite inactive, whereas the Czechs were very troublesome.
The Chancellor said he would like to speak about the Soviet Zone of Occupation of Germany. He said we heard more and more about FRG trade with the Zone. In this connection, he wished to make it clear that interzonal trade was not a matter of choice for the FRG, was not engaged in for economic reasons. The FRG undertook originally to help Germans in the Zone when the FRG was literally the only source for aid. Now, he said, the situation had changed and the Zone can buy more from other countries which has altered zonal trade a considerable degree. If the GDR gets long term credits, it will in turn be able to offer credits to countries like the UAR (350 million marks) to Indonesia and Tanzania. By enhancing the economic status of the Zone, the West will in turn permit the GDR to enhance its political status with countries like those above by assisting them economically.
The Chancellor added he agreed with the Secretary in making a clear distinction between the Zone and the Communist Eastern European states. Referring back to trade with the Communist Bloc, Erhard said that even viewed from a businessman's point of view, it was a bad bargain. He urged that we look at trade with the Bloc from an economic point of view. He saw disaster ahead if developments in the trade field in this area were not kept under control. He noted there was already competition in Western European countries to grant credits to Eastern Europe, a ridiculous situation.
The Secretary said he did believe trade with the Zone represented a special case. He thought that this affected us very little since the volume of trade between us and the Zone was so small and so much less than that of Western European countries with the Zone.
The Secretary asked the Chancellor how he saw the so-called co-production schemes like those of Mr. Beitz in Poland. Would they involve long term credits?
The Chancellor thought the possibilities of anything coming of these schemes were rather limited. He envisioned no great opportunities for Krupp. He again suggested that it would be up to the OECD to achieve better coordination in the general field of trade with Eastern Europe. He suggested that these countries could offer mainly agricultural products only. The EEC was not in a position to expand its imports of agricultural products to any substantial extent. How were they going to repay the credits?
The Secretary assured the Chancellor that we had no intention of relaxing our limitations on credits to the Communist Bloc. The Chancellor warned that German industry would try to emulate the actions of other countries. He pointed to FRG trade with the Eastern Bloc as representing only four per cent of the total German volume. Before Hitler, German trade with the same area was twenty per cent of the total volume.
The Secretary asked Mr. Leddy if there were any possibility of getting neutral countries like Switzerland and Sweden to agree on credit terms if there was no unanimity in NATO.
The Chancellor interposed the suggestion he was skeptical that neutrals like Switzerland and Sweden, who were so sensitive lest they be accused of being drawn into Alliances, would be influenced by NATO decisions. He thought the most useful forum was the OECD where the situation could be discussed in sober commercial terms without openly mentioning the political angles.
Mr. Leddy expressed complete agreement with the Chancellor. He said that our efforts to achieve an agreed policy in NATO had made no progress. To get the neutrals in, you would have to proceed on a commercial basis. He agreed fully it was wise to pursue this in the OECD and to see how far we could get.
116. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 4, 1965, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 8. Confidential. Drafted by Puhan and approved in S and U on July 8. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary's conference room. The source text is marked "Part 2 of 4"; a memorandum of conversation of the portion of the discussion dealing with trade with the Soviet Bloc is Document 115.
SUBJECT
De Gaulle and NATOPARTICIPANTS
[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 115.]The Chancellor stated that as for de Gaulle's solution of the German problem in strictly European terms, this is entirely unacceptable to the Germans. The Chancellor wanted to emphasize that point.
The Chancellor said he had no objections to Gromyko's going to Paris. What was sought after there was a certain tactical effect.
The Chancellor stated that German reunification must be achieved by peaceful means. It was not possible for the Germans, however, to make advance concessions which would be cashed in by the other side without granting anything in return. He said the Germans would be ready to discuss substantive matters when serious discussions were in order, but there could be no advance concessions.
The Secretary said we pay no attention to de Gaulle's suggestion to solve the German problem in the European context. He said that we were not children, that we had important rights derived from our victory over the Nazis which we would not surrender to either the USSR or the French.
The Chancellor assured him that he never doubted this, but was glad to hear it from us from time to time nonetheless.
The Secretary asked if he expected in his upcoming talks with de Gaulle to get more specific information about the prospects for NATO./2/
/2/The Chancellor and de Gaulle met June 11-12 at Bonn.
The Chancellor replied that he was somewhat confident that de Gaulle would not reveal a great deal. De Gaulle may realize that he has gone too far. Erhard said de Gaulle had not kept his promises to him on the MLF, moreover he knows that his pawns in the Federal Republic, the Gaullists, have grown more skeptical. He said de Gaulle knows he is running the danger of losing the Germans. At the same time we were all in agreement that we should try to keep de Gaulle in the Alliance. As for the French elections, the Chancellor thought even de Gaulle cannot afford to show consistent stubbornness, disclose new and violent differences and still keep the French people behind him. The Chancellor said he was not ready to make concessions to de Gaulle and assured the Secretary that he intended to represent German interests. This involved standing by those who helped the Germans.
The Secretary said he had had interesting talks with Foreign Minister Schroeder about the timing of de Gaulle's moves against NATO. The Secretary said this was a vital matter. He cited as an illustration of the importance of this question the fact that de Gaulle had asked his people not to discuss with us the question of a new headquarters building for SHAPE.
Erhard suggested jokingly that we ask him after September 19, but said we can't face this issue now before the German elections. He said that the Federal Republic was the most loyal ally in NATO. He referred to a German poll which indicated that the German people had twenty-four times as much confidence in the US as in France.
117. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 4, 1965, 12:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 8. Secret. Drafted by Kent and approved in the White House on June 10. The meeting was held in the President's office. The source text is marked "Part Nine of Nine." A memorandum of conversation of the portion of the talks dealing with NATO is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 88.
SUBJECT
President's Summary of ConversationPARTICIPANTS
US
The President
Harry Obst--InterpreterGerman
Chancellor Erhard
Hermann Kusterer--InterpreterThe President concluded the discussion with the following summary:
1. He understood Erhard's problems with General de Gaulle. He believed Erhard was handling them right. They would continue to work together on this problem, and he would support the Chancellor as much as he could.
2. The NATO Alliance must be preserved. The American commitments were extremely solid and he would stand by them. NATO would continue with or without France.
3. The Chancellor should bring forward any ideas, suggestions and possible approaches on the question of reunification of Germany. The President assured the Chancellor these ideas would be warmly received and studied with care.
4. The President and the Chancellor should keep in touch on the Great Society and the Formed Society. They should continue their work in that direction.
5. The President appreciated the interest of the Chancellor in development programs for Asia. This subject should also be brought up at the United Nations.
6. The President assured the Chancellor he would do the best he could to solve the conflicts in Viet-Nam and in the Dominican Republic. He appreciated the Chancellor's sympathetic attitude toward these problems. The Chancellor could be assured that, if it came to defending Berlin, the US would also do the best it could and stand firmly by its commitment.
7. The President apologized for being unable to give the Chancellor more time for talks during this visit. This was partly due to the cancellation of the Shastri visit. The President hoped they would be able to continue their conversation at another date.
118. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 4, 1965, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 8. Secret. Drafted by Kent and approved in the White House on June 10. The discussion took place during lunch. The source text is marked "Part 2 of 4."
SUBJECT
EuropePARTICIPANTS
Germans
Dr. Ludwig Erhard, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy
Mr. Karl-Guenther von Hase, State Secretary; Federal Press Spokesman
Mr. Hermann Kusterer, InterpreterAmericans
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador George C. McGhee
Mr. John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. George E. Reedy, Press Secretary to the President
Mr. Harry Obst, InterpreterChancellor Erhard said the visit of the Queen/2/ had been a great success and that it refuted de Gaulle's thesis of a continental Europe.
/2/Queen Elizabeth visited Germany May 18-28.
Ambassador McGhee complimented Erhard on his compromise in the grain price conflict. He said this had pulled Germany out of a position of isolation in the EEC and had left de Gaulle in isolation on almost every point in the EEC.
Secretary Rusk said he had been favorably impressed with the attitude of the Labor Government in Britain towards Germany after the British elections. He had been concerned before the elections, but was happy with the situation now.
Chancellor Erhard commented that one problem with the French was that you never knew how long they would keep their promises. De Gaulle had agreed to the MLF, and one-half year later he almost broke the Franco-German Friendship Treaty. In Rambouillet he had promised him the chiefs of state would have a meeting on European political union, and four months later he declared the issue dead and said a meeting was impossible. No basic feeling of trust was possible with such a partner. De Gaulle's idea of Europe was French hegemony. He knew he could not bring this about alone, but needed Germany's support. Germany did not want that, nor did it even want Franco-German hegemony. He believed that de Gaulle felt he was running out of time and that he had to press the issue now. De Gaulle believed that if he could not bring about French hegemony, no one after him would ever be able to accomplish it.
119. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, June 21, 1965, 1630Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Berlin, vol. 3. Secret; Immediate. Also sent to the White House for Bundy. Repeated to Bonn, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, London, USNMR, USCINCEUR, USELMLO, USAREUR, USAFE, and Moscow.
1769. Subj: Current Sov/GDR moves on Berlin: motivation and prospects. Evidence of increased Soviet/GDR pressures on the West in Berlin has mounted in recent weeks. The current East German helicopter activity presents the most immediate problems, but there have been other indications: (1) The Bundestag harassments in April. (2) The action against the USMLM house in Potsdam./2/ (3) The arrests during the Eastern and Whitsun pass periods. (4) The tougher East German propaganda line on future pass negotiations. (5) The June 15 shooting./3/ (6) Indications of possible difficulties with civilian rail and barge traffic.
/2/Reference is to a June 1 demonstration of about 800 persons against U.S. policies in Vietnam. The demonstration degenerated into violence. The Mission reported on the incident in telegram 1674 from Berlin, June 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 GER)
/3/East German police shot two East Berliners seeking to cross the Wall into the West. One was killed.
These developments raise a number of broader questions--in addition to the practical problem of how best to counter this or that Eastern move. Are the current pressures the prelude to a new Berlin crisis of major proportions? If so, what is the likely form and scope of the new crisis? If not, what are the probable limits of the pressures? What is the Sov/GDR motivation?
Berlin Senat views:
Berlin Senat circles have for some time been advancing a two-fold explanation of what they see basically as a new hard phase of GDR--as distinct from Soviet--policy. First, it is said that hard-line elements within the SED have been winning out over more moderate elements who are prepared to seek accommodation with the West. Second, the GDR is said to have acquired a certain independence of the USSR since the fall of Khrushchev, including a certain freedom to mount pressures on the West on its own initiative.
Strength and limitations of Senat views:
Senat representatives have contacts of various kinds with the East German authorities--at the Korber level, through unofficial intermediaries such as the East Berlin lawyer Vogel, and through newsmen and other informal channels. They presumably obtain certain insights into the internal workings of the East German regime. Two reservations seem in order, however. First, the East Germans--and the Soviets--have an interest in trying to draw the Senat further into contacts and negotiation. On this view, it would make good sense for the East to give the Senat the impression that there are people on the Eastern side who are prepared to do business reasonably, that these people are involved in an internal struggle with hard-liners, and that the West should take this factor into consideration and in turn be prepared to be reasonable in order to make things easier for the moderates on the other side. This is an old approach. Second, Brandt has an equally obvious interest in trying to make the point in the West about the hard-soft struggle on the Eastern side. His policy of small steps and the larger vistas it holds out make much better political sense against a background of factional dispute within the SED than on the assumption that the East German leadership is united. Moreover, in the West German election context Brandt presumably fears that an actual sharpening of the Berlin situation would work in favor of the party in power. He has already shown sensitivity on this score./4/
/4/Brandt's concerns were reported in telegram 1698 from Berlin, June 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B)
Situation within SED:
So far as facts observed by the Mission go, there is little to support the Senat view. We have often asked Senat representatives to identify the supposed SED factions, but without result. The reason could be caution on the Senat's part about divulging sensitive material. It could on the other hand point to a lack of precise information. Without dismissing the first factor, we are inclined to give more weight to the second. East Berlin lawyer Vogel has also often talked to Mission representatives about hards and softs on the Eastern side, but he has been evasive and vague when pressed for details. The Mission is far from dismissing the possibility of factional dispute within the SED. In the post-Ulbricht period there may be important developments as the new generation jostles for position. We believe, however, that so long as Ulbricht continues in command, the chances are slight that differences will become an important practical factor in East German relations with the West.
Soviet-GDR relationship:
In the question of the relationship between the Ulbricht regime and Moscow, the Mission has previously expressed its belief that Ulbricht doubtless feels more comfortable now than he did before Khrushchev's removal. The new Soviet leadership turned away sharply from Khrushchev's somewhat experimental approach to the Federal Republic. Soviet efforts to muffle the Sino-Soviet dispute in the wake of Khrushchev's removal must also have been a relief to Ulbricht, and he has used the opportunity to improve his own relations with Peiping. In purely personal terms, Ulbricht--now an elder statesman of the Communist world--probably feels on more equal terms with the Brezhnev-Kosygin team than he did with Khrushchev. He must also realize his value to the post-Khrushchev leadership, confronted as it is with difficult internal and external problems it has--one with demonstrated ability to keep things together in East Germany in times of stress. Ulbricht's foreign policy successes, notably his visit to the UAR and Tito's recent visit to the GDR, and the modest recovery of the East German economy, have no doubt also given the East German leader added confidence which would be reflected in his relations with Moscow and in his public posture towards the West.
Nevertheless, it is a large step from these considerations to the proposition that the East German regime has a new-found freedom to run harassments on Berlin which would affect the Allies directly, and thus bring broader questions of Soviet-Western relations into play. Such a development would be contrary to what we have assumed--and what long experience has shown--is a basic Soviet interest, namely to keep Berlin matters affecting relations with the Western Powers firmly in their own hands. It is difficult to imagine that this interest is now in process of changing. In a period of apparent overall caution in Soviet policy toward the West, it would seem that the need for control of the Berlin situation would be more than ever necessary for Moscow. It will be recalled in this connection that the Polish defector Tykocinski was categorical on the point of Soviet control of any moves in Berlin which might affect their relations with the West.
Positive factors in current Soviet-GDR attitude:
In short, we believe the Senat's views are not in themselves altogether satisfactory in explaining the current situation. It is also relevant to note that the pressures on the West from the Soviets and the East Germans have been accompanied by some factors which point in the other direction. (1) The Soviets have moved with reasonable speed to repair the damage to the USMLM house. (2) The East Germans finally released the two West Berliners arrested at Easter, even though the East German who duped them and escaped to West Berlin with their identity papers was not extradited. (3) The East Germans have designated an official to conduct future pass negotiations. (4) The Reichsbahn position on rail tariffs seems not to be as hard as it was once thought to be. (5) US official civilian entry to East Berlin has been resumed without difficulty. (6) Ambassador Seydoux seems to have found Abrasimov in a fairly relaxed and uncombative frame of mind last week. (7) The GDR is apparently continuing to [garble] to the FRG through private lawyer channels. (8) There are no indications that the East Germans intend to stop or curtail pensioner visits. (9) The Allied and German civilian access situation is normal. (10) The FRG and the GDR have made progress toward settlement of various IZT problems.
Conclusions:
The Mission is inclined to see the following as the main factors in the Soviet-GDR position.
A. West German elections:
The elections have introduced a kind of pause in Soviet-GDR relations with Bonn and the Berlin Senat, in the sense that there is probably little point in taking positive initiatives until the new German government is formed. At the same time, policy tends not to stand still, and there is perhaps a disposition to believe that with the West German Government and Mayor Brandt increasingly swept up in the election campaign, the next few months can be used with greater impunity for increasing pressures. US absorption with Southeast Asia and Caribbean affairs is presumably also a factor on the Eastern side.
B. East German pressures on the Soviets:
The East Germans may be pressing the Soviets to let them try to increase their presence in Berlin, and it is Soviet policy also to enlarge the GDR role--with the proviso, we believe, that the situation brought about by any initiatives be relatively safe and capable of being brought under complete Soviet control should need arise. We could imagine the East Germans arguing with the Soviets that the attack on the USMLM house and the GDR helicopter flights over East Berlin and around the West Berlin sector-zonal borders would be safe yet politically useful. They could point to our past record of caution in retaliating against the Soviet Liaison Mission and guess that we attach enough importance to the USMLM that we would be prepared to swallow the Potsdam incident. As for the helicopter flights, the East Germans probably argued that these could be carried out with little risk. Perhaps the Soviets gave conditional approval to the flights, reserving the right to enter the picture if the Western reaction were such in their view as to warrant their intervention.
C. Vietnam:
The Soviet predicament with the Vietnam situation may have inclined Moscow to accede more readily to East German pressures for initiatives on Berlin. On this view, which has been most explicitly stated in Berlin by Boelke, the editor of Tagesspiegel, the current pressures on Berlin represent a kind of substitute crisis laid on in part to counterbalance US policy in Vietnam.
Theoretically at least, the Soviets enjoy a very wide range of options on Berlin as a "substitute crisis." They could go all the way to resumption of the direct Khrushchev challenge to Allied access. They know pretty well what difficulties this would bring on in the West. On the other hand, they also know from the Khrushchev period that it is difficult for them to go beyond a certain point in challenging the West without bringing on the risk of direct confrontation with all the uncertainties this involves. In this reading, pressures on the West on Berlin at the present juncture must seem attractive to the Soviets, yet they must also be aware of the political limitations.
It is difficult from Berlin to judge the present Soviet mood. We have the impression from recent Soviet and GDR statements stressing the need to observe the status quo in Berlin that the current Eastern attitude is not a radically forward one. Admittedly, the statements called on the West to observe the status quo without committing the East, but it seems worth noting in this connection that Tito during his recent East Berlin visit/5/ seemed to be calling on both East and West to do nothing that would increase tensions in Germany.
/5/June 8-13.
Prospects:
In summary, I would conclude that we are in for a period of increased probing in Berlin subject to careful Soviet control, in which--as always--the Western reaction at any stage will be an important factor for the Soviets in weighing further moves; that the Soviets will continue to be flexible and keep [garble] maneuver towards the GDR and the West in following any course of action; and that the evidence so far does not point to a Soviet-GDR intention of bringing on a crisis of major dimensions. A failure--which would be publicly apparent--on our part to react with firmness to probes, such as the helicopter flights, against established Allied rights could seriously mislead the Eastern leadership as well as the West Berlin leadership and populace. The East is apparently prepared to accept a measure of risk--not so far a very large measure--in carrying out the helicopter flights. It is difficult to see how the West can influence Eastern views without itself accepting some measure of risk.
Calhoun
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