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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968 Washington, DC |
140. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, December 20, 1965, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2571. Secret. Drafted by Obst and approved in the White House on December 30. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text is marked "Part III of III." A memorandum of conversation of the discussion of the Great Society and Space, "Part I of III," is ibid. The portion of the conversation on Vietnam is Document 139.
SUBJECT
OffsetPARTICIPANTS
US
The President
Ambassador Hand
Mr. Jack Valenti
Harry Obst, State Department interpreterGerman
Chancellor Ludwig Erhard
Heinz Weber, FRG interpreterThe President said he expected the FRG to make another payment under the offset agreement this month so as not to upset the quarterly balance of US finances and not to weaken the international confidence in the dollar.
The Chancellor explained that after the election he was forced to pare his budget by 10%. He had to resort to such extreme measures as the repeal of some laws already on the books. This was not to say that the FRG did not want to keep its commitments. The FRG would be willing to talk about this matter but at present it had considerable difficulties.
141. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, December 20, 1965.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Gift Collection (Record Group 200), Papers of Robert S. McNamara, Memoranda of Conversation, Germany, vol. 2, sec 1, tab 103. Secret. Drafted by McNamara.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND CHANCELLOR ERHARD, AFTER THE WHITE HOUSE DINNER, 20 DECEMBER 1965
The President asked the Chancellor for:
1. Instructions to his Finance and Defense Ministers to meet fully the terms of the Offset Agreement.
2. The deployment of a German medical company and construction battalion to South Vietnam.
The President went on to say "we favored the FRG's proposal for a nuclear force/2/ and would so state to the UK." Erhard replied:
/2/Memoranda of conversation regarding German nuclear sharing proposals are in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Documents 119 and 120.
1. The FRG will stand by the Offset Agreement but needs to discuss the terms and methods by which to accomplish this. He is not prepared to say that at such and such a date they would pay such and such an amount.
2. He is thinking of the possibility of sending medical personnel to South Vietnam through the Red Cross. He is not certain whether it would be possible under their existing legislation to send military units to Vietnam. "Perhaps it could be done on a voluntary basis--it can perhaps be undertaken--I think something can be done."
3. He would not object to a reference in the communiqué/3/ to the Federal Republic's support of U.S. efforts in support of freedom throughout the world.
/3/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 10, 1966, pp. 50-51.
RMcN
142. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, December 21, 1965, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 2571. Confidential. Drafted by Finn and cleared in S on December 29. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary's Conference Room. The source text is marked "Part I of II."
SUBJECT
Kennedy RoundPARTICIPANTS
Chancellor Erhard
Prime Minister Schroeder
State Secretary Dr. Carstens
Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
State Secretary Karl von Hase
Minister Georg von Lilienfeld
Assistant Secretary Franz Krapf
Assistant Secretary Karl Hohmann
Press Spokesman Jorg KastlSecretary Rusk
Secretary Fowler
Under Secretary Ball
Governor Herter, President's Representative
Mr. Donald Hornig, Presidential Science Adviser
Under Secretary Mann
Ambassador McGhee
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Leddy
Assistant Secretary Solomon
Ambassador Hand
Mr. William S. Gaud, Deputy Director--AID
Ambassador Roth
Mr. Bator--White House
Mr. Puhan--GER
Mr. Finn--GERSecretary Rusk opened by asking whether there were any points the Chancellor wished particularly to discuss.
Chancellor Erhard asked about US views on the Kennedy Round. He said the FRG was working for the full success of the KR and felt that there would be a great loss in cooperation between North America and Europe if the KR failed.
Governor Herter said he was delighted to hear this. Since May 1963 there had not been much progress at Geneva and things were now completely stalled. Governor Herter said that he did not see that the United States could do anything to disentangle the Common Market impasse and that, although there was talk of various possible alternatives to the KR, he could not see that they were equally viable. The United States hopes for a resolution of the current difficulties so that we can all move ahead.
Regarding the timetable, Governor Herter said that we have a year and a half ahead of us. Substantial or complete agreement on the KR must be obtained four or five months before this time elapses. Therefore by mid-March 1966 at the latest, the resolution of the Common Market nations to move ahead must be in evidence. Regular meetings must be under way by May 1966.
To get moving, Governor Herter said that it would be necessary for the Six to reach a commitment for the successful conclusion of the KR and especially that a flexible mandate should be given to the Common Market negotiators rather than faits accomplis. The US has made its position clear and reciprocal agreements on both sides are needed. Furthermore, progress must be made regarding agriculture, either by direct negotiations or by international agreements. On agriculture we recognize that the Common Market has an internal problem.
Governor Herter said that the Trade Expansion Act (TEA) expires in June 1967 but an agreement on the Kennedy Round must be signed before that time since a number of matters will have to be worked out before the Act expires. The Governor noted that protectionist forces may grow in strength.
Under Secretary Ball said he wished to emphasize that there would be enormous difficulties in obtaining any extension of time from Congress, even though we might be well down the road to agreement when the TEA expires. Under Secretary Ball said that the Congress would very carefully examine the results of the KR negotiations.
Secretary Rusk described the political background of President Kennedy's decision to ask Congress for the TEA. The Secretary said that President Kennedy had decided to press for far-reaching legislative authority to expand trade rather than asking for a one or two-year extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. President Kennedy had also asked Governor Herter to take charge of the program.
The Secretary noted that the spirit of Atlantic partnership had been strong at the time President Kennedy made this decision. Strong support for the TEA had been obtained. If we are still having major problems by June 1967, the idea of trade expansion will be in very serious straits. The United States therefore appreciates the efforts of Chancellor Erhard and the FRG to move ahead.
Chancellor Erhard said that he was fully aware of the great economic and political significance of the KR, noting that he had personally been involved when he was Economics Minister. The Chancellor said that the EEC has a mandate to continue negotiations on industrial items but that a Common Market decision is needed on agriculture. The Chancellor said that the FRG would be encouraged to take up new initiatives as a result of his visit to Washington.
The Chancellor noted that French views on agriculture are different from those of the FRG. The FRG is the largest importer of agricultural products in the EEC. The other members are not so interested in agricultural imports. The Chancellor stressed the economic and political importance of the KR and the significance he attached to it.
Foreign Minister Schroeder said that the EEC problem is linked directly to the present state of relations among the Six. He thought that it might be possible in January to get the French back to the negotiating table by a roundabout way--in Luxembourg. He noted that there are extremely difficult questions involved requiring major decisions.
The Foreign Minister said that a further mandate must be given on the basis of unanimity for KR negotiations. This will not be easy to obtain but the Foreign Minister was not pessimistic. He thought that problems with France would come to some resolution and that a mandate would be given. The Foreign Minister said the problem is up to the Six but he thought the US could give useful encouragement as regards speeding up the KR.
143. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, December 21, 1965, 11:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 2571. Secret. Drafted by Obst.
SUBJECT
GeneralPARTICIPANTS
President Johnson
Chancellor Erhard
Ambassador Hand
Mr. Jack Valenti
Heinz Weber, FRG interpreter
Harry Obst, US interpreterThe President asked Chancellor Erhard if he was happy with the communiqué as just agreed upon./2/ The Chancellor replied he was happy and thought it had been a good idea to include the passage on the Great Society and the Formierte Gesellschaft. He thanked the President for agreeing to the last minute changes suggested by his representatives and expressed his gratitude for the wonderful reception he and his staff had received, in particular the splendid dinner the night before.
/2/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 10, 1966, pp. 50-51.
The President remarked that he had read carefully the paper on nuclear sharing that the Chancellor had submitted/3/ and that he was in basic agreement with the ideas contained therein. He would talk to Mr. Wilson about it./4/ Erhard should also mention this issue to Wilson separately. After that they could look at it again in more detail. They should keep in close touch on the matter.
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 119, footnote 3.
/4/For text of President Johnson's December 23 letter to Wilson, see ibid., Document 121.
The Chancellor agreed to discuss the matter with Prime Minister Wilson and did not pursue the subject further.
The President again brought up the matter of offset payments. He pressed the Chancellor hard for a German payment of $100 million before the first of the year reiterating that only $50 million had been received from Germany since July while up to $300 million had flowed from the U.S. to Germany during the same period. The President said the payment was needed because of the balance of payments situation and in order to retain confidence in the dollar.
The Chancellor replied the Germans were honoring their agreements. The military were in the process of inventory and were not in a position to know what to order at this time. He did not think the President should look at this issue like an accountant from a short-term viewpoint, rather it should be looked at from a broader perspective. He again explained his own financial problems and said he would talk to his Finance Minister and the military to see what could be done. Mr. von Hassel and Mr. McNamara were also discussing this and the matter was not being neglected.
The President said he was aware of the Chancellor's problems. He asked the Chancellor if he understood correctly that the FRG would honor the (offset) agreement. The Chancellor nodded agreement.
The President brought forth a letter from Prime Minister Wilson in which the latter confirmed a higher British contribution to the Asian Development Bank./5/ He inquired if it was correct that the Federal Republic would contribute $50 million to the Bank.
/5/A copy of Wilson's December 17 letter is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, UK, vol. 2.
The Chancellor answered that he had been able to get only $30 million from his parliament at this time, but he repeated his private promise to the President to have this increased to $50 million at an opportune time. Right now he could not do more. The President asked if this was $50 million total over 10 years. The Chancellor verified this.
The President explained again his tremendous budget problems. He might have to ask for as much as $125 billion to keep the effort in Viet-Nam and the other programs going. He reiterated his request for 200 medical personnel and a construction battalion of about a thousand men as a German contribution to Viet-Nam.
The Chancellor repeated his remarks of the day before on this subject. He had no constitutional power to do this on his own. It would have to be done on a voluntary basis. He could therefore not make a firm promise, but he would throw his influence behind the matter and study it after his return. He would find some way of assisting.
The President asked the Chancellor what he could do for him, what he would like to take home with him for his people? The Chancellor replied he would like to repeat his invitation to have the President come to Germany for a visit in 1966. The President replied he was pleased by the invitation, but that he would be a very busy man in 1966 and did not know if he would be able to come.
The Chancellor asked the President what exactly he could tell his people and the press on this subject. The President said the Chancellor could tell them he had invited him, that the President was delighted over the invitation, that he would very much like to go, that however at this time he could not definitely commit himself. Mrs. Johnson had expressed great interest in going to Germany in 1966. She would like to go with Interior Secretary Udall to study city planning and beautification programs in Germany. Chancellor Erhard replied that Mrs. Johnson would be most welcome in the Federal Republic.
144. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
SC No. 00756/66BWashington, February 11, 1966.
[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 10. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 7 pages of source text not declassified.]
145. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 13, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-4 GER. Confidential. Drafted by Puhan on April 14 and approved in S on April 25. The source text is marked "Part IV of IV."
SUBJECT
German QuestionPARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Alfred Puhan, Director, Office of German Affairs
Dr. Rainer Barzel, German Parliament Majority Leader
Heinrich Knappstein, FRG Ambassador to US
Minister von LilienfeldCounselor Kusterer, Interpreter
Dr. Barzel said the Secretary must be aware of recent German efforts to get some movement on the German question, the question of reunification. He thought it was very important for the Germans to do something about this at this time where there is considerable dismay over the Franco-German relationship. He cited the German peace note of March 25, 1966,/2/ referred to the German proposals of February 1962 and September 1963,/3/ and asked if they could not be dusted off for another try at resolving the German question. In this connection, he said he appreciated the advice we had given Parliament President Gerstenmaier regarding the holding of a Bundestag meeting in Berlin,/4/ but he thought it was important to reexamine this question. He said some little progress had been made in the matter of passes, prisoner releases, etc. More was needed.
/2/For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 914-918.
/3/For texts of the February 21, 1962, German memorandum and the September 14, 1963, statement by Barzel, see Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 28-33, 55-56.
/4/The U.S. position was conveyed in an April 7, 1965, message to the Soviet Union. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 483-484.
The Secretary replied with three observations: (1) He would urge Dr. Barzel not to believe Viet-Nam diverted us from Europe. (2) We feel a policy of movement with respect to Eastern Europe has had a constructive influence and has reawakened in the states of Eastern Europe a nostalgic interest in Western Europe. (3) If we embark on a new approach to settle the German question we must be prepared to look down the long trail and make sure everybody will continue on it once we embark on it. He reminded Dr. Barzel that the problem of central Europe is virtually the only problem over which we and the Soviets could wage a nuclear war. It represented a tremendous outlay for us in terms of money and effort, over 5 hundred billion dollars since 1947. It represented an equally great expense to the USSR. In the main, we have carried the principal burden in the free world. France did not participate in the crisis of Berlin in 1961. The Secretary added he was not for giving away East Germany but he thought the time would come when what happens to 17 million Germans will not be the important question to a billion people that it is today. He said we were serious in resolving the question on the basis of what the 17 million East Germans wanted. It was futile and nerve-wracking, however, to stir up these questions without being able to solve them.
Dr. Barzel agreed that we must know in advance the steps which will be taken. He felt however the dynamics of the situation required some new attention. He thought the German peace note had been useful. He said if the Soviet Union asked what the reunified Germany will look like, we must be able to say what a reunified Germany will look like. On the other hand, the agreements of 1945 to settle the final borders of Germany were a promise both to the Allies as well as to the Germans. The problem was to get around the table and then we can come to terms on the frontiers.
The Secretary thought the question of the Soviet Zone may be more difficult for the Russians because of their fears that by losing it they would surrender all of Eastern Europe. He reiterated his principal point that we were prepared to work seriously with our Allies on the German question. We are most anxious to rid ourselves of this most dangerous and expensive question. He reminded Dr. Barzel that when he saw Gromyko, the latter warned him that even though the German situation appeared to be quiet, the German question remained for the Soviets also the most important outstanding unresolved question.
Dr. Barzel thanked the Secretary for his candid views.
The Secretary asked Dr. Barzel to convey his kindest regards to Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder. In parting, he emphasized again that the Germans must not exaggerate Viet-Nam and decide that it is the only thing we are talking or thinking about. We will keep our eyes on Europe.
146. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
SC No. 00766/66A
Washington, April 22, 1966.
[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 10. Secret. 7 pages of source text not declassified.]
147. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, May 9, 1966, 1850Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-USSR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, and Bonn.
1044. Subject: Meeting between GovMayor Brandt and Soviet Ambassador to GDR Abrasimov. Reference: Berlintel 1033 to Dept., 883 to Bonn./2/
/2/Not found.
1. Spangenberg has given us the following account of Brandt's conversation with Abrasimov at noon on May 8 in the home of Swedish Consul General Backlund. He spoke from a memorandum of conversation drafted by the Governing Mayor before his departure for Bonn. The discussion lasted two and a half hours.
2. Abrasimov opened the conversation by asking Brandt about the Congress in Stockholm Brandt had just attended, and subsequently discussed the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union which, he said, had mainly considered internal problems and was "unsensational." Abrasimov then contrasted the German and Soviet quests for peace. He described German policy as "hostile," especially as based upon the restoration of the 1937 borders. The FRG peace note, he said, does not serve the cause of peace. Brandt "energetically rebutted" this view and then brought up the subject of German unity.
3. Abrasimov said there are two German states that must strive to understand each other even though differences in their social systems make the degree of understanding necessarily limited. Brandt replied that there are not only differences in social systems but there are also differing views among the Great Powers (i.e., the West and the Soviets) on the question of German unity.
4. Abrasimov argued that it must be possible nonetheless for both Germanys to agree upon certain practical questions. He mentioned in this connection the prospects for an exchange of speakers between the SPD and SED, although he did not discuss this subject in detail. Abrasimov stressed "very pointedly" that the GDR is not a Soviet state. He said of himself that he could not dictate policy in East Germany. If he had attempted to do this, his removal would have been sought a long time ago.
5. Abrasimov described FRG/Soviet relations as unsatisfactory and said that in the field of trade the FRG must either improve its relations with the Soviets or find other trade partners to fill the gap now filled by the Soviets. At the party level, Abrasimov said that relations between the Soviets and the SPD are poor; Soviet relations with Socialist parties in other countries are far better. He regretted that the Communist Party is outlawed in the FRG.
6. Berlin was the theme of the final portion of this discussion. Abrasimov objected to the presence of Bundestag representatives and other FRG officials in West Berlin. He thanked Brandt warmly for the latter's remarks in recent biweekly broadcast about the valor of the two Soviet pilots who lost their lives in the Stossensee plane crash. Brandt seized this opportunity to complain about the sonic booms caused by Soviet jets. Abrasimov said these flights would be kept to a minimum.
7. Abrasimov deplored the poor state of relations between West Berlin and the Soviet Union in the field of trade. Without mentioning Starchinov by name, he asked why it has not been possible for the Soviets to open a small trade office in West Berlin. This office, he said, would deal not only with West Berlin firms but also with firms in the FRG. Brandt made no direct reply. He discussed the common ground on which the German currency and economic system is based as between West Berlin and the FRG, emphasizing that Berlin itself is not an area narrowly controlled in this respect by the protective powers. Brandt said that he would reflect upon how Berlin's portion of the whole of FRG/Soviet trade might be increased in the future.
8. Abrasimov said there should be more cultural exchanges between Berlin and the Soviet Union, suggesting that there be scheduled every three months a major Soviet cultural event in Berlin. He quoted each of the Allied Ambassadors as having told him that they had no objection in principle to this. Brandt asked whether it was not easier to increase such exchanges in a setting that is not government-to-government, to which Abrasimov agreed, saying these matters are more easily arranged through private agencies. He suggested that in cultural and sport exchanges, a city-to-city arrangement, such as Moscow to Berlin, would be desirable. Brandt said he would discuss these thoughts with those in Berlin responsible for such matters.
9. At the close of the conversation, Abrasimov asked whether a meeting such as this could be held again under the same circumstances. Brandt said he could not answer the question, but volunteered the statement that he could not accept an invitation from Abrasimov to come to East Berlin. Brandt then made it clear that he was talking to Abrasimov in the latter's capacity as a representative of one of the Four Powers responsible for Berlin and not as the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany.
10. Asked about the atmosphere of the talks, Spangenberg said Brandt had been very pleased. Abrasimov, he felt, was not talking as a diplomat but as a party man. It was possible for both of them to talk openly and in tough terms. Jokes had been exchanged. While this was not an atmosphere of confidence, it was not cool either. The mood was that of two political opponents having a frank talk.
11. Spangenberg said both participants agreed that it would be desirable to keep their meeting confidential and out of the press. He said that on the Senat side, only Senator Schuetz aside from himself knew of these developments.
12. Comment: The meeting went about as expected. Abrasimov sought to develop the anticipated themes and he endeavored to move toward a continuing contact with Brandt.
13. The account given us by Spangenberg leaves the impression of sparring and of feeling out mutual positions. It is hard to see how either Brandt or Abrasimov can expect much from the contact unless it is pursued, either in the same or in some other channel. Brandt's equivocal reply to Abrasimov's proposal for another meeting seems to suggest he would not be averse to continuing the contact himself.
14. It would appear that the next move is up to Brandt, either to approach the Allies regarding a further meeting or to let the matter rest. Spangenberg stated Brandt would elaborate on his personal reactions in a direct talk with the Allies./3/ We should then have a clearer idea of how he envisions the future of the relationship with Abrasimov, and hence what problems it may hold for us.
/3/The Mission reported Brandt's impressions of the talks in telegram 1089 from Berlin, May 24. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-USSR)
Day
148. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/3
Brussels, June 6, 1966, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL (BR). Secret. Drafted by Finn and approved in S on July 23. The meeting was held at the residence of the British Ambassador.
UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRTY-SEVENTH
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Brussels, Belgium--June 7-8, 1966PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of StateFrance
Foreign Minister Couve de MurvilleUnited Kingdom
Foreign Secretary Michael StewartFRG
Foreign Minister Schroeder(Other participants listed separately.)/2/
/2/Not printed.
SUBJECT
East/West Relations--German QuestionSPD/SED Debates
Foreign Secretary Stewart as host opened the meeting by asking Foreign Minister Schroeder about the forthcoming debates in Germany between the West German Socialists (SPD) and East German Communists (SED).
Schroeder said there would be two debates--on July 14 in Chemnitz and on July 21 in Hanover. There will be full press-radio-T.V. coverage. The safety of the participants will be guaranteed. The idea for the debates was initiated by the SED in February, obviously in an effort to win over the SPD and split it from the other West German parties.
Schroeder said that the SPD has no desire to establish common ground with the East German Communists. The hope of the SPD is to bring about greater freedom in the Soviet zone, to promote more exchanges of people, and possibly to win relaxing of the Communist order to shoot people at the Berlin Wall. The goal of the SED is to increase its prestige and promote the idea of two Germanys.
Schroeder thought that the debates would stir great interest in East Germany. He thought the humanitarian aspects are particularly important, as they have been in the case of the Berlin passes agreement. Schroe-der was therefore inclined on balance to see positive aspects.
In summary, Schroeder thought there were three main aspects: the moral and psychological effect in East Germany; the advantage to West Germany in maintaining contacts with East Germany; and the international effect in obtaining political support for the FRG.
The Foreign Minister said that the CDU, the ruling party in the FRG, had first doubted the advantage of these debates, but the government had given support from the outset, feeling that the socialists should receive its support.
Secretary Rusk asked whether there would be only two debates or would they be continued. Schroeder said that it is his impression they should be restricted to two meetings. He doubted that the exchange should be continued indefinitely or that useful results would be obtained from continuation.
Foreign Secretary Stewart thought that people outside of Germany would believe the FRG is taking advantage of an opportunity in these debates. He asked what other opportunities Schroeder saw at this time. Schroeder said that there would be some negative aspects to these debates, which would result in a certain upgrading of the East German Communists. He noted that there had apparently been close contact between the East German Communists and Polish Communists; he thought therefore there might be a certain side-advantage in Eastern Europe resulting from these debates. There might also be a lessening of rigidity in East Germany.
Secretary Rusk said that these debates would be watched with great interest and that their potential effect might be considerable. Couve thought the debates would have a useful impact in the FRG and in the so-called GDR. There might also be a connection, he thought, with developments in Poland.
Eastern Europe
Secretary Rusk asked Couve about his recent visits to Eastern Europe./3/ Couve said he had not got the impression of anything very new. The situation differs in the various countries he had visited--Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. He said there is little in common between these three countries. The Rumanians are not Slavs and do not particularly like the Russians; they have territorial problems with the Russians. Bulgaria is in a different position; it gets along well with the Russians and does not like Greece and Turkey, with whom it has a common border. Poland relies on the Soviet Union, as it must because of its geographical position.
/3/Couve visited Romania and Bulgaria April 25-30 and Poland May 18-21.
Couve said that changes are currently taking place in all of these countries by contrast with the situation 10 to 15 years ago. They are more relaxed politically. They are better off economically except for Poland, which has an agricultural problem.
Couve thought there was a drive in all of these countries to improve their relations with other countries. He thought that Poland in particular wanted to improve its relations with the U.S.
Secretary Rusk said he believed there is a sentiment in Eastern Europe for closer relations with the nations of Western Europe. He noted that minority groups in the United States also have a keen interest in Eastern Europe, particularly the Polish and Serbo-Croatian minorities.
de Gaulle Trip to Soviet Union/4/
/4/De Gaulle visited the Soviet Union June 20-July 1.
Foreign Secretary Stewart asked Couve about his next journey. Couve replied that he would accompany President de Gaulle to Russia for ten days, where they would visit Moscow and a number of cities including what is presently called Volgagrad. Couve said that as he had previously indicated to Foreign Secretary Stewart and as he would say at the NATO Ministerial Meeting, this visit is a stage in the French policy of developing more relations with the East in all fields. Couve said he was sure that nothing dramatic would happen on this trip. The French would expect to discuss the German question as well as other questions with the Soviets. The French would stress the need to develop relations between Eastern and Western Europe, thus creating a climate of détente. Couve did not think that an atmosphere of understanding could be created at this stage with the Soviets. The French would expect to discuss various problems and possible solutions that might eventually be reached.
Secretary Rusk asked whether the Soviet Union had said anything about the topics it would like to discuss. Couve said the Soviets had given no particular indication of this. He added that France would probably sign a consular agreement and possibly a space agreement with the Soviets. In response to the Secretary's question as to whether France would sign a communications satellite agreement with the Soviets, Couve said he did not think things would go this far.
European Security and Tension Between East and West
Stewart said that he thought it was good to make large and small scale approaches at these various questions outstanding between East and West but he wondered whether this approach got us any nearer to solving what the Soviets call the European security question.
Couve said this is a real question. If however we desire settlements by peaceful means, then we must seek a climate for discussions where the understanding of the Soviet Government can become possible.
Foreign Secretary Stewart agreed and said that it is more difficult for the Germans in this area than for the rest of us. Couve agreed that the problem of Germany is the real problem.
Foreign Minister Schroeder said the problem which confronts us is to determine in whose favor these various approaches to the East work. Each side seeks its own advantage. The Communists seek to consolidate the status quo. The question therefore is whether these approaches help to overcome the division of Germany and Europe or do they perpetuate the division of Germany and the status quo. This is the reason why the FRG is reserved on the question of Europe security.
Schroeder continued that it would be bad if the European security situation were abused to prevent solution of various outstanding problems. It would be useful if security considerations could progress in such a way as to help these other matters. The FRG feels that in public discussions of the security issue, it must be careful because of these various factors. He noted that the Soviets have put forth security proposals again and again since 1955 but not for the purpose of overcoming the division of Europe. The question now is whether a new beginning can usefully be undertaken or whether the same old controversies will continue.
Couve indicated that he did not think the Soviet suggestion for a European security conference/5/ was a serious proposal at this time. He said that a cautious development of relations could be useful and could lead to progress toward ending the division of Europe. France believes that ending the division of Europe is the only way to end the division of Germany. Couve then asked whether there is any alternative to this method. Foreign Minister Schroeder said that we are all agreed that we should try to have good relations with Eastern Europe and that this is useful. He said that the FRG has, despite its particular difficulties, established trade missions in Eastern Europe. He noted that the Rumanian Trade Minister had recently visited Bonn and been introduced to the Bundestag. Couve said that the French had not gone this far with a Communist Minister.
/5/For text of the May 17 Soviet proposal, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 395-402.
Schroeder went on to say that the crucial question is to keep alive in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union an interest in overcoming the division of Germany under suitable conditions. We do not want to arouse Communist hopes that tension will be removed without any effort on their part; then they would have no incentive. The difficulty is to work for good relations on the one hand but nevertheless to show the Communists that they have an interest in improving the status quo. Schroeder emphasized that the main problem is the Soviet Union.
Couve said he would like to make several points. First, tension has been characteristic of the past 20 years but France does not believe this is the way to bring about solutions. Second, we must be cautious and should not be led to believe that things can develop very fast even if we hope for rapid change. Third, developments now in progress mean that things will not stay where they are. We do not know where all this will bring us in relation to Germany. We do not know, for example, what will happen after the debates in Germany. Perhaps there will be a deadlock.
Secretary Rusk said that perhaps there are two elements of faith on which we can rely. First, in free competition between institutions our free institutions have nothing to fear. Our tendency should be to break down barriers. Second, the 17 million people in Eastern Germany will want to be associated with other Germans and under free institutions. The Secretary said he agreed that the existence of tension has not advanced German reunification.
The Secretary commented that although there is a formal appearance of status quo, the real situation can be changing rapidly. Changes are going on in Eastern Europe--in attitudes toward Germany, toward the economic institutions of Western Europe, and toward the institutions of the Communist countries themselves. The Secretary said that, for one example, he found it hard to believe that the Soviets could again resort to repression by armed force as they had done in Hungary. The Secretary added that no one is prepared to use force to change the situation. He said that tension has not helped German reunification and that we should give other things a chance. The Secretary cautioned that he was not talking about immediate changes or progress but at the same time he did not feel that we had to think in terms of decades.
The Secretary said that he was not always sure what was meant by "division of Europe" although he clearly understood the division of Germany. Schroeder said that in effect they are the same thing since Germany is in the middle of Europe. He said he doubted the validity of the argument that tension has not helped. In the past conditions have not been such as to bring about changes; problems between West and East Europe have been very difficult. Nor will basic problems be solved simply by creating better relations between Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the rest.
The decisive fact, according to Foreign Minister Schroeder, is that Soviet divisions are on the Elbe. It may not be pleasant for the Soviets to keep them there, nor is it pleasant for the West to have to maintain its defensive military efforts.
Schroeder said that Soviet interests will change and the Soviets may become interested in other arrangements acceptable to all concerned. He commented that the Soviets remain disturbed about the problem of Communist China. The Soviets have troubles in Europe and elsewhere. Schroeder felt that these problems had to be borne in mind when we talk about reducing tension.
The Secretary recalled Soviet threats over Berlin in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. He said there had been no Soviet change of heart toward the West. Tension had been created by the other side. The Secretary commented that there are those who say that if the Vietnam effort were abandoned, there would be better relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. We could do the same in Berlin; then we might have a temporary honeymoon with the Soviets.
Secretary Rusk said that we pursue actions to our own advantage. He referred to the moon treaty now under discussion; this falls in the pattern of the Antarctica Treaty. The Secretary also commented on the attitude in Congress toward East/West trade.
Couve said that discussions with the other side do not imply accept-ance of their conditions. For agreement to be reached it must be acceptable to all concerned, and all have to make concessions.
The Secretary added he was sure the Soviets are concerned about the problem of nearly a billion Chinese along their Asian border. Schroeder said that Khrushchev had been greatly concerned about this. Couve said the present Soviet leaders are also concerned.
East German UN Application
Schroeder said that an application for UN membership has been submitted in New York on behalf of East Germany and that we should give intensive thought to our strategy. Schroeder thought that Gromyko might also introduce a proposal on European security to the UNGA in its fall session.
Secretary Rusk agreed that our representatives in New York should discuss this. The Secretary thought this did not present as much difficulty as the proposal for a world disarmament conference. He noted that the Communist Chinese had said they were not interested in taking part in a world disarmament conference, but a number of other Communist regimes might be involved including East Germany.
Dr. Carstens said that East Germany may be aiming at observer status in the UN. The Secretary said that he did not think there was much interest in the UN in letting in East Germany.
The meeting ended at 11 p.m.
149. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Bonn, June 9, 1966, 10:25 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by McGhee and approved in S on August 12. The source text is marked "Part I of II." Secretary Rusk visited Germany June 8-9 at the conclusion of the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Brussels.
SUBJECT
OffsetPARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
Ambassador McGheeFRG
President Luebke
Karl Carstens, First State Secretary, Foreign Office
State Secretary BergerPresident Luebke opened by stating that in his judgment no great differences existed between Germany and the U.S. Germany had no issue to raise with respect to U.S. actions. He was, however, concerned about the offset payments. Was there some way this could be cut down? He had raised one question concerning the offset with Amb. McGhee (i.e. on June 7 concerning the overall U.S. favorable trade balance with Germany which he had been told was $800-900,000,000 a year. Embtel 4040)./2/ This had been answered the previous day in a letter from Ambassador/3/ showing a trade balance on the order of $200,000,000 in the U.S. favor.
/2/Telegram 4040 from Bonn, June 7, outlined discussions during the Ambassador's meeting with President Luebke. (Ibid.)
/3/Not found.
Secretary Rusk said that he would be discussing the question of the offset later with the Chancellor. He did want the President to know, however, that our efforts in Viet-Nam had resulted in an important worsening of our balance of payments. It was for the general good that the stability of the dollar be maintained, and this required us to improve our balance of payments. President Luebke replied that Germany would continue to have "trade problems" which limit its overall foreign exchange earnings. Perhaps part of the offset could go to financing assist-ance to developing countries in which the U.S. has an interest. (Luebke is believed to have been confused on this point. His proposal would not protect Germany's balance since we would expect payment for any assistance rendered.) Otherwise Germany must earn an additional 7 billion DM a year. (It is assumed that Luebke was referring to the approximate DM 4.0 billion estimated as the German current account deficit, plus the DM 2.6 billion offset, which would have to be compensated for by increased trade earnings if an overall balance is to be achieved.) The Secretary said in response that he hoped to be able to talk about how we could both deal with this problem in longer terms. The U.S. appreciates the prepayments which Germany has made on the offset. Both of our countries have balance of payments problems. We must roll up our sleeves and see what we can do about it.
President Luebke assured the Secretary that the Germans would seek for all possible solutions. He had one idea, for example, in the form of a new anti-tank weapon--which could perhaps be developed in the U.S. on a cheap, mass produced basis for the defense of Germany. Since the Soviets have 40,000 tanks, the alliance would have a very considerable problem in stopping them in the event of attack. At the moment there is little to counter them. The President suggested a new type of mine might be developed which could be sown to stop tanks. The Secretary replied that as a former infantryman he had an equal interest in stopping tanks. He would talk with Secretary McNamara about the possibilities that might be afforded. He referred to the light-weight rockets and missiles which had been developed in connection with our Vietnamese operations. This may open up new developments which could be applicable in Germany. Perhaps helicopters could be used for spotting tanks.
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