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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968 Washington, DC |
150. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Bonn, June 9, 1966, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 30. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by McGhee and approved in S on August 12. The source text is marked "Part 5 of 11." Parts 6 and 8 are printed as Documents 151 and 152. Part 2, a discussion of French and NATO issues, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 176.
SUBJECT
Loan PrepaymentPARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary of State
Ambassador George C. McGhee
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large
J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, European AffairsFRG
Chancellor Ludwig Erhard
Gerhard Schroeder, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ludger Westrick, Minister for Special Tasks
Von Hase, Press Chief
Karl Carstens, First State Secretary, Foreign Office
Horst Osterheld, Foreign Affairs AdviserThe Secretary made some humorous introductory remarks to the effect that the U.S. was often in the position of asking its friends for help. Now, because of our balance of payments difficulties, we are asking the Germans to prepay 214 million dollars on the GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) and Marshall Plan Loans. Our balance of payments had been bad for the first quarter.
He realized that the Germans had balance of payments problems of their own; however, he hoped that they would give careful consideration to this request. The Chancellor replied that the Germans, of course, had balance of payments problems of their own--more serious, he considered, than those of the U.S. Their deficit would, over the next three years, average a billion dollars a year. It was, however, in keeping with our friendship that the Germans consider any proposal we make.
151. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Bonn, June 9, 1966, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 30. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by McGhee and approved in S on August 12. The source text is marked "Part 6 of 11." Parts 5 and 8 are printed as Documents 150 and 152. Part 2, a discussion of French and NATO issues, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 176.
SUBJECT
U.S.-German Relations
PARTICIPANTS
[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 150.]The Chancellor would like to ask one thing--that we not talk about acute issues between us in public. He referred specifically to the question of whether there would be a reduction of American forces in the absence of full offset payments. The German press is unfortunately not yet mature. It tends to distort such issues. In fact, he would prefer no public discussion at all of such matters.
The Secretary replied that he would report what the Chancellor had said to the President. To be quite frank, we have not yet discovered ourselves how to keep Government officials from talking. The President greatly values the friendship of the Chancellor, and would not wish to do anything that disturbed him. Secretary Rusk thought it would be desirable for the Chancellor and the President to correspond with each other more often--particularly if they are troubled by important matters. He knows this to be the President's wish.
152. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Bonn, June 9, 1966, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 30. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by McGhee and approved in S on August 12. The source text is marked "Part 8 of 11." Parts 5 and 6 are printed as Documents 150 and 151. Part 2, a discussion of French and NATO issues, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 176.
SUBJECT
Viet-NamPARTICIPANTS
[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 150.]The Chancellor assured the Secretary of continued German support of American policy in Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk replied that the President greatly appreciates the Chancellor's support on South Viet-Nam. He could tell the Chancellor that opposition is growing in America to U.S. policy in South Viet-Nam--however, not for a weaker but for a strong line.
The Chancellor asked whether China is likely to come into the conflict. Secretary Rusk replied that he was unable to give a direct answer to this question. He did, however, want to point out that it was a question not applicable only to one side. All the Secretary could say is that we are committed to doing what is required in South Viet-Nam.
The Chancellor asked whether South Viet-Nam will eventually be able to organize itself politically to carry on the conflict. The Secretary replied that there are many divisive and conflicting interests within South Viet-Nam. They are, however, united in the determination not to be defeated by the Viet Cong. There is every prospect now for elections in September which will result in the creation of a body which could represent all the various elements in South Viet-Nam seeking the defeat of the Viet Cong.
153. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, June 14, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. No time of transmission is on the source text; the telegram was received at 3:06 p.m.
1160. Department pass Bonn 991 immediate from Berlin./2/ Reference: Department telegram 3392./3/ Department eyes only Secretary; Bonn eyes only Sutterlin from Ambassador McGhee.
/2/A note at the end of the source text indicates that the telegram was not sent to Bonn.
/3/Telegram 3392 to Berlin, June 12, expressed concern with press misreporting of pledges allegedly made by Secretary Rusk to Erhard. (Ibid.)
1. I can understand your surprise and concern that Chancellor Erhard would attribute to you a statement in your meeting with him held on June 9th which you did not in fact make. The almost verbatim minutes of this meeting which I sent you clearly indicate that you made no statement on the level of US forces or the relationship between this level and German offset payments. Despite this the official transcript of Chancellor Erhard's press conference June 10 states as follows: "I specifically received yesterday in my talk with the American Secretary of State the assurance that the presence of the American troops in Europe, and particularly in Germany, is in itself an obligation and task which cannot be directly linked to German purchases of weapons in America--no matter how desirable such purchases naturally are, particularly in light of the burdens which the US must bear because of the war in Viet-Nam."
2. The substance of this statement was reported to the Department on June 10 (Embtel 4095)/4/ and it is this statement which was quoted by the New York Times article of June 11. This article was carried by the European Saturday-Sunday edition under a Reuters byline rather than Tom Hamilton's. In my own background briefing after your meeting I made it clear to the American press, particularly in response to questions by Hamilton, that the troop level issue had not arisen; no one raised the question of linkage and I did not volunteer it. Hamilton's story of the 9th was well within the guidance and did not attribute to you the remarks referred to by Erhard.
/4/Not found.
3. I can offer no explanation for Erhard's action except that he and his government have consistently sought to put the best face possible on the question of troop levels and any possible linkage with the offset. Since you have consistently been quoted as denying that there would be any substantial reduction in US forces (your press conference of May 27)/5/ and have not confirmed the offset linkage either when approached by Amb Knappstein in Washington or when the question was raised by the Chancellor in your meeting of June 9, the Chancellor apparently felt that he was at least expressing your views in quoting what you in fact did not say at that time. This is of course not cricket, however, I don't believe it results from any Machiavellian type of gamesmanship on the Chancellor's part. He values his relationship with the US and particularly with Pres. Johnson and with you too highly for this. He does, however, have a problem which arises from the constant spate of news stories emanating from Washington threatening troop withdrawal of various counts including a proportional withdrawal if the offset is not made. It has become generally known that Sec McNamara made such a statement to Von Hassel during their recent meeting, though this has never been confirmed by any other high US official or publicly by McNamara even in his statement of June 11th./6/ The closest thing to an official denial is that reported by Under SecDef Vance in his background press conference June 9. (USCINCEUR 092105Z)/7/
/5/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 13, 1966, pp. 918-925.
/6/For text, see Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 1966, vol. 7, p. 2363.
/7/Not found.
4. Quite frankly, I don't think that anything can be done about this issue until we can come up with one US policy on the offset. It is not credible that there be a separate McNamara policy on such an important issue. On the other hand, the fact that McNamara has such an attitude continues to boil up in the German press, creating embarrassment for the German Government and handicapping us in the excution of our overall policy here.
In fact, the McNamara statement of June 11 is precisely what the Chancellor asked that we not do, i.e. continue to air the question in public--which assures that it will be reverberating in the press here just as the Germans start their critical bilateral talks with the French on the troop issue.
5. It is one thing to put strong pressure on the German Government to meet the offset privately, which in the past has been reasonably effective. The President should of course do this when he sees the Chancellor in July or August, although I would hope that he would, as in the past, stop short of threats of proportionate reduction if the offset is not met. It is quite a separate thing, however, to make threatening or critical public statements focusing on what is, from the German standpoint, such a vital issue. McNamara's statement of June 11, although it does not contain the direct threat of proportional withdrawal, certainly falls into this category--particularly the statement "I never consider the termination clause until we are ready to invoke it." You can be assured that this statement, which has no relevance to the offset issue as I understand it, will be with us for some time. The lead article in Die Welt today, which is being reported separately is "McNamara's heavy hand."
6. As regards the level of US forces here, I believe that we should all stick with your statement of May 27 to the effect that "Our forces will remain there as long as they are needed and wanted" and that--"We do not anticipate withdrawing any major units from NATO." We should not, I believe, elaborate on this or give any impression of impending change--unless or until a final decision for such change is made.
Calhoun
154. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 16, 1966, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 10. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Puhan. The meeting was held at the White House.
SUBJECT
President's Conversation with Dr. BarzelPARTICIPANTS
The President
Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President
Mr. Francis M. Bator, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Alfred Puhan, Director, Office of German Affairs, State Department
Dr. Rainer Barzel, First Deputy Chairman, CDU/CSU Party, Germany
Heinrich Knappstein, FRG Ambassador
Mrs. Geithner, Interpreter, German EmbassyThe President welcomed Dr. Barzel and hoped he would enjoy his stay here.
Barzel expressed his gratification to the President for seeing him a second time./2/ He explained the purpose of his current trip, namely to give some lectures at the German Embassy today and in New York tomorrow. He said he had good meetings also with Jewish organizations.
/2/See Document 97.
The President referred to the observations Dr. Barzel intended to make on German reunification and said he had asked his staff to give them careful study. The President assured Barzel of his deep concern for the continued security of Europe and the success of the German people. On NATO, he wanted Dr. Barzel to know that we are concerned, but that we are not picking a fight with de Gaulle; we viewed de Gaulle's actions more in sorrow than in anger. The President said he looked forward with great pleasure to seeing Chancellor Erhard again.
Dr. Barzel said he had received a telegram from Chancellor Erhard asking him to convey warm greetings to the President. The Chancellor said in his telegram that he too looked forward to the meeting with the President. The Chancellor wished especially to discuss with the President the offset problem and would be bringing with him some definite proposals of his own. The Chancellor also hoped that discussion of this subject could be kept out of the public domain.
The President said he agreed, that it was not right to try one's case in the newspapers. He would do his part to see that such matters not leak and hoped that Chancellor Erhard would do the same.
Barzel referred to his comments regarding the Great Society, made when he saw the President in 1965. He noted with approval the trip of the FRG Minister of Health, Dr. Schwarzhaupt, to the United States and Secretary Udall to Germany. He said we should undertake more cooperative efforts like this.
The President expressed his appreciation for what the Germans had done in the domestic field, commenting on the Peace Corps and the achievements in the material resources field. He said he would like to see some of the fine German virtues transplanted to other countries. Their contribution to the shaping of our society had been great. The President referred in this connection to his own grandmother of German stock from whom he had learned the virtues of prudence and thrift. He said he didn't want to tell Secretary McNamara this, but if he succeeded in balancing the federal budget, he would attribute this success to his own grandmother.
Barzel said the Germans recognized and understood fully the big job the United States was doing. Germans valued the U.S. keeping its commitments. Barzel said Berliners appreciated this in particular and would like to tell the President so personally in Berlin.
Mr. Rostow commented that Dr. Barzel had earlier attributed the growing moderation in Asia and Latin America to what we did in Viet-Nam.
The President said we thought the fruits of our efforts in Viet-Nam have been, are and will be reflected in the attitudes and conduct of other nations. He referred to what an ambassador of a powerful country had said to him recently after seeing Castro. The Cuban dictator saw no point in exhausting his treasury to undermine the rest of the Americas if the Russians run out on him as they did over missiles, while the Americans do what they did in the Dominican Republic. The President hoped other aggressors or would-be aggressors get the message. The President said we would have been guilty of deceit and hypocrisy if we had allowed North Viet-Nam to swallow South Viet-Nam and Thailand and Malaysia. We have served notice that we intend to stop aggression. We would like the Germans and Britons to take note of that and say so. We would like moral encouragement from our friends. The President said he thinks others ought to stand up to be counted.
Barzel said he was greatly impressed with the President's remarks. He said Germans did want to make a greater contribution in the humanitarian field.
The President assured Barzel that we would keep our commitments. He stated that while he did not share the Chancellor's and the general German view that, for the common defense, we need all the troops we now have in Germany, he appreciates the psychological factors involved in cutting back. He thought, moreover, that Erhard was tough enough to convince him to leave them there, but added that the Germans must reimburse us for our military foreign exchange expenditures. We have an agreement--we will keep it; the Chancellor has an agreement--we have no doubt he will keep it. And we should not waste too much time talking about it.
Barzel promised to carry the President's view to Erhard and to help Erhard in Parliament so he could cope with this problem.
The President reiterated his great confidence in the Germans, in their understanding of financial matters and of U.S. problems. He asked Barzel to tell Erhard it was easier for him to get a boy back home than a dollar.
The President concluded by saying that he wanted Barzel to reassure Erhard that Erhard would always be kept well informed about any U.S. plans which touched German interests. The President said he would continue to share his confidence with Erhard as long as he represented the U.S. government.
155. Letter From Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson/1/
Bonn, July 5, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Germany, Chancellor Erhard, vol. 3. Confidential. The source text is marked "Translation."
Dear Mr. President,
Recently we had the visit of Secretary of State Dean Rusk./2/ I had a long talk with him and found to my great pleasure that full agreement was discernible concerning the big political issues. Herr Schroder also told me about the very good co-operation that existed between him and Mr. Rusk at the Brussels NATO Conference./3/
/2/See Documents 149-152.
/3/See Document 148. A summary of the Rusk-Schroeder discussions was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 48 from Brussels, June 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GER W-US)
In this difficult phase I feel that it is of decisive importance for the fourteen NATO partners who want to continue the alliance in its present integrated form to take a clear and firm position. Only then we do have a chance, as I hope, to come to satisfactory results with France although I do by no means underestimate the difficulties of the forthcoming negotiations. The decisive point is--and this, I believe, is the view of all NATO partners--that France should undertake clear commitments for an emergency regarding her troops stationed in Germany.
In respect of the question of the future development of East-West relations the German and the United States Governments also hold the same views--which, incidentally, appear to be shared by the French Government as well as far as we are able to gather from reports available so far on the talks conducted by the French President in the Soviet Union. We should seize every reasonable opportunity to improve relations with the east European countries. In this connexion, however, I wish to assure you that any European talk without the decisive co-operation of the United States will be neither conceivable nor acceptable to the Federal Government.
Our peace note of 25 March 1966 is an attempt to prepare the ground for an understanding. We are happy to note that our NATO partners and many other Governments have shown a very positive attitude towards it. The reaction of the east European countries is, as could be expected, predominantly a negative one, although there are indications that some of them, including the Soviet Union itself, are interested in our proposal to make declarations on the non-use of force.
The disarmament negotiations in Geneva which have been resumed meet with our interest and full attention. We believe that the efforts to achieve a non-proliferation agreement should be continued, but that--as is provided in the American draft--the possibility must not be excluded of building up in the future a joint integrated nuclear force among those partners of the NATO alliance who are prepared to do so.
Finally I talked with Mr. Rusk about the Kennedy Round and the foreign exchange offset for the U.S. troops stationed in Germany. I am pleased to note that the preparations for the Kennedy Round have made good progress at the latest Council meeting in Brussels. The Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community has now issued mandates to the Commission concerning all hitherto open sectors of the industrial field.
The offset problem undoubtedly confronts us with difficult questions. We shall, however, do what is possible for us to find a solution acceptable also to the United States. In this connexion, however, consideration should also be given to payments and services other than the mere purchase of weapons and military equipment. In my view, which I hope is shared by you, this set of problems should, however, not be linked up with the question of the future presence in Germany of U.S. troops. This would all too easily give rise to an approach that would not do justice to the friendship between our two countries and to our common task.
I also spoke with Mr. Rusk about a meeting with you/4/ and told him that I shall be happy to see you again. In view of my own plans a date around 8 September would be most convenient to me, but, needless to say, I shall accept any other date which you may suggest. I know only too well--and I feel with you--what heavy responsibility rests on your shoulders just at the present time.
/4/A memorandum of the portion of their conversation dealing with this question is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 30.
m.p.
With best friendly regards,
Yours very sincerely,
Ludwig Erhard/5//5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature and an indication that Erhard signed the original.
156. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, July 7, 1966, 1835Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Secret; Limdis.
286. For the Secretary, Under Secretary, and Asst Sec Leddy. Subject: The German agenda. In preparation for the forthcoming meetings between Sec McNamara and DefMin Von Hassel scheduled for July 23-24, and between Chancellor Erhard and President Johnson probably on August 24-25, I believe it would be helpful to review the principal outstanding issues between the Germans and ourselves--in order to establish how they might best be dealt with.
1. Offset.
The present single greatest source of friction between ourselves and the Germans, which could be even greater in the future, is the offset agreement. Although the Germans have a year remaining to complete their agreed payments for the current two-year period (i. e., ending July 1, 1967) they are behind on pro-rata payments, even including the promised DM 1 billion pre-payment, and badly behind on orders. This has led to a natural apprehension on the part of responsible officials in the US Govt, whose consequent actions have been construed by the Germans as casting doubt on their commitment to meet their current obligations and as attempts to force them to buy weapons which they consider unnecessary. Strong German press attacks have been made against Sec McNamara and strong political attacks against Von Hassel and even Chancellor Erhard. The current issue of Stern has an article entitled "Why don't you retire, Mr. Minister?" CDU Deputy Birrenbach told Amb Foster on July 2 that this issue could bring down the Chancellor's government./2/
/2/For McGhee's comments on William C. Foster's visit, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 183.
Our immediate objective in this circumstance should, I believe, be to utilize the two meetings in such a way as to:
A) Reestablish an easy working basis of confidence and rapport between us such as existed at the time of the McNamara/Von Hassel Washington meeting of June 1964. For our part we should, I believe, be willing to make it clear that we have confidence that the Germans will meet the current payments offset. We should urge the Germans to include provision for the offset in their 1967 budget and continue our efforts to find weapons that the Germans will be willing to purchase without undue pressure. We should in public statements on this subject concentrate on the harmony and constructive aspects of our defense relationship, which are indeed very great.
B) We should, at the same time, lay the groundwork for the negotiation of a new offset agreement, since the beginning of a new orders period is only some six months away. We know that the Germans will attempt to better the present agreement, certainly through the inclusion of other than military items and possibly through a scaledown of the total. Under the assumption that the US has postponed action on a multilateral offset approach we should, I believe, determine as a matter of policy how far we are willing to go to meet the German desires and initiate negotiations. These should, however, be conducted at least at the Ministerial level since they will involve matters of great political sensitivity--considerations going beyond those which have in the past been discussed at the Sullivan/Kuss level.
My more complete views of the future of the offset are fully set forth in Embtel 4160,/3/ which I consider still relevant.
/3/Not found.
2. US troop levels.
We should, I believe, during the forthcoming meetings, make very clear US policy on the level of our forces in Germany and Europe, both with regard to any possible US unilateral withdrawal or as a complement to some future Soviet withdrawal. German doubts on the former have always been with us. Uncertainties concerning the latter have lingered since Sec McNamara's testimony before the Senate Committee on June 21./4/ My full views on this question are set forth in Embtel 165./5/ In short, since there is to the best of my knowledge no present plan to reduce the level of US forces, we should continue to state this clearly. We should also point out that, although we hope that some day we will be able to reduce US force levels in Europe, complementary withdrawals are at present a moot question. Any Soviet withdrawal would have to be analyzed carefully by NATO itself, both in its political and military context, before we could determine what complementary action if any could be taken.
/4/See U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, The Atlantic Alliance, Part VI (Washington, 1966), pp. 186-219.
/5/Telegram 165 from Bonn, July 5, commented on reciprocal troop withdrawals from Europe. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 US)
3. ANF-MLF-non-proliferation.
We should, I believe, also take advantage of these meetings to make it clear to the Germans that we do not wish to remove forever the possibility of a "hardware solution" to their nuclear sharing problem. The discussions we have had with other governments, however, since Chancellor Erhard's meeting last December with the President,/6/ together with the development of Congressional attidues in our own country, make the prospects for such a solution look very dim. We hope, therefore, that the Germans will be content for the foreseeable future with participation in a successor organization to the McNamara Committee. My own views with respect to how this issue can best be handled are fully developed in Embtel 083./7/ In essence, I believe that a new committee of limited membership should be formed--with broad powers in planning and decision--recommending, including not only NATO nuclear forces but our strategic forces. If this change of emphasis can be accomplished there is, I believe, some chance that a non-proliferation agreement, which I consider a very important objective, can eventually be achieved.
/6/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 119.
/7/Dated July 2. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO)
Otherwise, the Germans may some day find themselves in the embarrassing position of being the principal "hold-out" to a non-proliferation agreement.
4. US financial demands on Germany.
My views in this regard are fully set forth in Embtel 221./8/ In short, I believe that we should set a strict and co-ordinated priority on the demands we make on the German Govt with respect to the use of their funds. Our priorities should, I believe, be as follows: a) offset agreement; b) pre-payment of US loans; c) suitable overall level of aid budget and new obligational authorities; d) only in rare cases should we press for specific changes in German aid allocations to particular countries or international institutions. These priorities should, I believe, guide our discussions on related issues during the upcoming meetings.
/8/In telegram 221 from Bonn, July 6, McGhee expressed concern about U.S. demands for financial support. (Ibid., FN 12 GER W-US)
5. NATO crisis.
There is at this time little if any difference between the Germans and ourselves as to the actions which will have to be taken by the NATO as a result of the recent French initiatives. At some stage, however, there could well be a difference as to how to deal with French troops in Germany. When this negotiation comes to its "crunch," which will presumably occur in Paris between the 14 and the French, Erhard will be under strong pressure from within the CDU/CSU to keep the French troops here under almost any conditions. One key issue in the negotiation will hinge around the question of the "automaticity" of French troops coming under NATO command. We should, I believe, in both upcoming meetings, stiffen the Germans against this eventuality. We should point out the danger to the integrity of NATO and its integrated command--in the event the French are able to retain their privileges without assuming clear obligations. We should point out that if there were to occur a disintegration of integrated planning and command, we would have to re-examine our NATO commitment to station troops in Europe. We will amplify our views on this question in a subsequent telegram./9/
/9/Not further identified.
6. German reunification.
I do not believe that there is any chance that a reunification initiative would have any hope for success at this time. Our views as to how to handle the situation should the Germans raise the question are still as stated in our memorandum of September 27, 1965./10/ We should, I believe, in the upcoming meeting between the Chancellor and the President, make clear to the Germans our continued interest in reunification and our willingness to consider at any time any proposal they might wish to make. We will be glad to see Four-Power (Western) discussion of the subject initiated--perhaps in a new forum created for this purpose. We will be glad to consider the possibility of a Four-Power commission of experts (including Soviets) plus German observers, which could be used as an umbrella for mixed (GDR-FRG) commissions. We can, however, offer the Germans no hope that this or any other proposal would be accepted by the Soviets.
/10/Attachment to Document 130.
7. Eastern Europe.
The German peace note of last March was symptomatic of their perceptible movement to the formulation of a more positive policy toward Eastern Europe. There are hopeful signs that the FRG intends to follow up this initiative: it plans to raise again the proposal for an exchange of declarations with the USSR on renunciation of force, and, according to Carstens (Embtel 4302),/11/ is seeking a way further to soften its position on the Munich Pact. In order to keep up the momentum, we should encourage action on these two points during the Chancellor's visit to Washington. In particular we should urge the Germans, without being too specific, to soften their present facade on the Oder-Neisse and Heimatrecht-self determination issues. We will amplify our views on this question in a subsequent telegram.
/11/Not found.
McGhee
157. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, July 13, 1966, 1815Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, Moscow, Paris, and London.
549. Subj: Berlin clause. Refs: (A) Bonn 3978; (B) Bonn 3865./2/
/2/Telegram 3978 from Bonn, June 1, reported further on the German desire to reopen the Berlin claims discussion. (Ibid.) Telegram 3865 from Bonn, May 23, reported German officials' desire to open this issue. (Ibid.)
1. The FonOff (Deputy Assistant Secretary Ruete) yesterday called in the DCM's of the three Embassies to present a memorandum/3/ revising last year's German proposal for a negative Berlin clause. Ruete said that the proposal should not be considered sacrosanct as it now stands. He hoped that the three powers would study it carefully and present their views on it to the FonOff within a reasonable period of time.
/3/Transmitted to the Department of State in airgram A-58, July 15. (Ibid.)
2. Ruete explained that the same reasons which had led FonMin Schroeder to present the negative Berlin clause proposal at the Quadripartite NATO dinner on May 10, 1965/4/ still applied. The unfortunate leak of the proposal to the press had caused the FonOff to delay a year before pursuing it. However, the Germans had had indications from various East European Communist countries that, while a specific Berlin clause was unacceptable, Berlin could de facto be included in trade agreements and possibly other agreements as well. In view of these indications, the FonOff thought it worthwhile to attempt to bridge the gap between the German requirement of a specific Berlin clause and the Communist inability to accept one by the device of the negative Berlin clause.
/4/See Document 111.
3. The German proposal as redrafted makes the following recommendations.
(A) The govts of the Three Powers and the Allied Kommandatura (AK) Berlin would agree by amending BKC/L (52) 6 of May 21, 1952/5/ so that, even without a special Berlin clause or an appropriate declaration, Berlin is in principle considered to be included in any international agreement concluded by the FRG with another state.
/5/For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 372-374.
(B) This would not affect the right of the AK Berlin to object in individual cases to the inclusion of Berlin in international agreements. In order to safeguard this AK right in theory and practice, the Germans suggest:
(1) Where time permits, each agreement be submitted through the Senat to the AK in the same way as has hitherto been done under the provisions of BKC/L (52) 6. If the AK objected to the inclusion of Berlin, the Fed Govt would make a statement to the Contracting Party (the depository power in the case of multilateral agreements) to the effect that Berlin was not included.
(2) When time does not permit the use of normal procedure, the Fed Govt would, upon conclusion of an agreement, make a special declaration reserving the right to declare later that the agreement should not apply to Berlin.
(3) Obviously the normal procedure is preferable in the case of Communist states. However, if the Fed Govt should need to conclude an agreement on short notice, the govt would send the text of the proposed agreement to the three Embassies in Bonn whose concurrence, if obtained, would be binding on the AK.
4. Elsewhere, the memorandum rejects the idea of a German declaration, negative or positive, to be made upon the conclusion of an agreement stating that it shall apply to Berlin. However worded, this procedure would in all likelihood be resisted by a Communist Contracting Party with the result that the dissent would come to light.
5. Full text of the memorandum follows by priority airgram.
Comment
6. Obviously, the German proposal will require careful study before a decision on it can be reached. In our view, an overriding consideration in any such examination should be to attempt to find a way to accommodate the German desire to move ahead in its Eastern policy which is now stalled over the Berlin clause issue. We feel we should defer to the German estimate that this procedure may be implicitly acceptable to the European Communist countries who, by letting it pass unchallenged, could hope to reap the benefits of trade and other agreements with the FRG which are now denied to them.
7. On first heading, it appears to us that the German proposal meets the requirements of Allied sovereignty in Berlin except possibly in respect to para 3 B (3) above. We are dubious about this proposal which will require the AK to accept, without examination, decisions made by the three Embassies under extreme time pressure.
8. It is apparent that if the Communist countries take issue with this procedure, it will have to be dropped as a false start. However, even if the Communist countries let it pass, the British in particular are likely to question whether the procedure really reflects the intention of both Contracting Parties to allow an agreement to apply to Berlin. We know from previous conversations with the British that they are opposed in principle to any procedure for applying treaties to Berlin which smacks of automaticity. Nevertheless, it seems to us that the Communist countries will always have the option open to them of declaring that they do not intend an agreement to apply to Berlin. If they fail to exercise this option, we can reasonably argue that in fact they do not object to the application of an agreement to Berlin, particularly if in informal soundings during the course of negotiations the Germans have determined that a specific Communist country is willing to accept the de facto application of the agreement in Berlin.
9. We agreed with the reps of the other Embassies that Bonn was the most suitable locale for discussion of the proposal. We suggest, therefore, that Berlin comment on the proposal upon receipt of the full text while we shall await the Dept's views before commencing tripartite discussions here./6/
/6/In telegram 13901 to Berlin, July 22, the Department of State replied that it concurred with the Embassy recommendation, adding: "German memorandum sufficiently sensitive to Allied requirements to serve as basis for tripartite discussions." The telegram gave a positive evaluation of the "negative Berlin clause." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B)
McGhee
158. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 27, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 10. Secret. A note on the source text reads: "Fr. Secy of Defense. Recd Pres. ofc 7-27-66, 7 p.m." A handwritten "L" on the source text indicates that the President saw the memorandum.
Here are some of the points of special interest that emerged from my conversations with Defense Minister von Hassel in Paris on Monday and Tuesday:/2/
/2/July 25 and 26. McNamara was in Paris for the Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Working Group. A report on the meeting is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 189.
1. German budget. The German cabinet on Monday apparently decided on a 1967 defense budget of 18.5 billion DM, an amount almost 2 billion below the Ministry's original estimates of requirements. The austerity of this figure results from the combination of an apparent inability to increase revenues and political pressures to devote more expenditures to social welfare. (This 18.5 billion is totally inadequate to finance the qualitative improvements in the German forces which are required if they are to be relied on to fight alongside us; it follows, too, that the 18.5 billion is totally inadequate to cover the German-US offset for 1967. Germany--which spends about 5 per cent of her GNP on defense as compared with our more than 8.5 per cent--made an almost 50 per cent increase in military expenditures between 1961 and 1963, but has leveled off since then. Taking account of inflation, military expenditures for 1966 will be one-eighth lower than in 1963; and expenditures in 1967 may not be much more.)
2. German-UK offset. The British are trying to get a full offset of their roughly 1 billion DM foreign exchange drain attributable to their forces in Germany. The Germans now cover 300 million, 100 million of which is in non-military purchases. The Germans do not propose to accede to the British request. They are proposing that a UK-German team find ways to cut the fat out of the British deployments (perhaps 10-15,000 men). Among the measures to be considered is basing of UK aircraft in Britain instead of in Germany. The Germans think that by such savings, the British can cut the 1 billion DM drain to perhaps 660 million. The Germans offer to cover half of that remainder--i.e., roughly what they are covering now.
3. German-US offset. The Germans state flatly that they cannot agree to a full US offset for 1967-68. Von Hassel was talking in terms that sounded very much like their proposal to the UK (above)--of an undertaking to offset 50 per cent with best efforts made to buy more than that. It was clear that von Hassel was under instructions from the Chancellor and that he was expecting the Chancellor, with his small military budget already in concrete, to settle the offset matter with you in September. Until the "French problem" in NATO is over, the Germans will not be ready to propose to us one thing they proposed to the UK--the establishment of a US-German team to see how US forces in Germany can be cut without affecting combat capability. (I made clear that the United States does not want Germany to buy anything from us that they do not need or that they can buy better or cheaper elsewhere, but that it was perfectly clear that Germany needs a good deal of equipment to bring their forces up to proper standards. I also said we would be ready when they are to join in joint efforts to trim our forces in Germany.)
4. "Hardware." The Germans want to keep on talking about hardware, but specifically suggested, in connection with hardware as an item on the agenda of the "McNamara Committee," that discussion of that subject come "later."
5. "McNamara Committee." The Germans support making permanent the small "McNamara Committee" of Defense Ministers to discuss nuclear planning matters. They want to avoid getting crosswise with their allies with respect to limiting membership on the Group however, and they want to avoid a "constitutional" clash with the French when the North Atlantic Council must act on the proposal. They obviously favor continuation of such a Group.
6. "Unprovoked attack." Von Hassel reported a conversation with French Defense Minister Messmer which took place during General de Gaulle's visit to Bonn. According to Messmer, the French would be "with us" in the event of trouble in Berlin. In the event of "escalation of the war in Vietnam," Messmer thought the Soviets would be deterred by NATO power from attacking in the West; but, if the Soviets did attack in such circumstances, the French would decide at the time whether to participate.
7. French troops in Germany. The Germans believe that the first problem is to find a mission for the French forces in Germany and that this should not be difficult "since five of the six brigades are in reserve status anyway." Despite the fact that it has been made clear to them that France will not join in the "presumption" that she will be with the Alliance in case of war (see above), the Germans want the French forces to remain in Germany. Von Hassel said it would be "a great shock to both countries if the French troops left." He concluded that his own view was that the French forces would remain in Germany.
Robert S. McNamara
159. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 28, 1966, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 9. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A notation on the source text indicates the memorandum was received at 11:45 a.m. and that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
These two [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports on German politics give a pretty clear picture of what Erhard is up against./2/
/2/Attached but not printed are two July 12 reports.
1. Both Strauss and Barzel are out to remove him, soon or late.
2. Strauss is trying to push Erhard and Schroeder into a Moscow trip in which they will fail. He then would like to see Germany look to "Europe"--which means France, essentially--for greater nuclear status.
3. Barzel, on the other hand, looks to inflaming the German unity issue and using Erhard's inability to make progress as a way of forcing him out. He, too, looks to a reduction in U.S.-German relations and an intensification of Germany's relations with the French.
All such reports tend to present a somewhat unbalanced view of a politician's position. In my view, neither Strauss nor Barzel would, in fact, radically reduce the U.S.-German connection. But they do suggest the rise of assertive nationalism in Germany already evident in the way they are handling the offset issue.
These reports should also be read against the background of rising strength in the Social Democratic opposition to the Erhard coalition.
We shall, of course, take readings on Erhard's political position closer to the time of his visit. These reports are an interim picture of the kind of trouble he has in his own political family.
Walt
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