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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968 Washington, DC |
180. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, September 27, 1966, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 11. Confidential. Drafted by Obst and approved by Bromley Smith of the White House on December 2. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text is marked "Part 3 of 3." Part 1 is Document 179. Part 2, dealing with educational exchanges, is not printed.
SUBJECT
Southeast Asia and Viet-NamPARTICIPANTS
Chancellor Ludwig Erhard
President Lyndon B. Johnson
Walt W. Rostow (intermittently)
Hermann Kuesterer (German interpreter)
Harry Obst (American interpreter)The President brought up the subject of Indonesia./2/ He outlined the situation there and the scope of American assistance and emphasized how much was at stake. What had happened there was a great victory for the West but had not been sufficiently publicized by the news media. One reason why the US government had not emphasized the success too much was that there had been some uncertainty if the improved situation was definitely there to stay. Because of this uncertainty it was extremely important for the Free World to assist in any way possible. This might tip the scale in their favor. The US would aid Indonesia to the tune of several hundred million dollars. He asked the Chancellor if the German government could find a way to help the Indonesian government through such measures as the sale of machine tools on favorable credit terms.
/2/Reference is to the suppression by the Indonesian army of a Communist-inspired coup.
The Chancellor said he agreed that this was an important area. The attitude of the FRG toward Indonesia had changed since the disposal of Sukarno. He would see what he could do in this direction.
He assured the President of his great admiration for his handling of the crisis in Southeast Asia, that the President had gone to the limit of his possibilities unhesitatingly, which showed his great courage and firmness to support the cause of freedom all over the world and stem the Communist tide.
He emphasized that the results of the Vietnamese elections had been a very good thing./3/ It had answered those critics that contended that the United States was defending South Viet-Nam against Communism against the will of the South Vietnamese.
/3/The elections were held September 11.
The President said there were some hopeful signs in Southeast Asia. He mentioned the Manila Conference which he was going to attend./4/ He said the solution of the Viet-Nam conflict would greatly enhance not only his own image and prestige but also that of the Chancellor who had been giving the American side his warm support.
/4/October 24-25.
The President then suggested that the talks be continued on the flight to Cape Kennedy and the communiqué issued later in the day./5/
/5/Johnson and Erhard left the White House by helicopter at 2:24 p.m. for Andrews Air Force Base and then flew to the Kennedy Space Center in Florida where they arrived at 3:36 p.m. The President and Chancellor participated in a motorcade and tour of the space facility. They returned to Washington at 8:55 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) For text of Johnson's remarks at the Space Center, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 1074-1077.
The Chancellor agreed.
181. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 10, 1966, 10:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 11. No classification marking. A notation on the source text reads: "Rec'd 10/10/66--11 a.m."
Mr. President:
In connection with our position on non-proliferation, this [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report, which I take to be accurate, should be read.
It shows clearly both the German commitment to non-proliferation and the problem they would have if we tried to jam down their throats the sort of agreement now proposed to us by the Russians.
In particular it shows that we will have problems, which I believe are surmountable, if we make explicit in a treaty our position on the veto.
If we go beyond, with the Soviet language, I think we have a better than even chance that the Germans would not go with us.
Walt
Attachment/2/
Washington, September 23, 1966.
/2/No classification marking.
[2 paragraphs (7 lines of source text) not declassified]
The following is a position paper on the problem of nuclear non-proliferation prepared by the CDU/CSU Bundestag Fraktion Committee for defense and foreign policy. The draft, which is dated 29 June 1966, was prepared by the Committee after presentations made by the German observer in Geneva, Ambassador Schnippenkoetter, on 15 February and 19 April. The drafting committee consisted of Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Theodor Baron Von Und Zu Guttenberg and Dr. Werner Marx.
The Committee recognizes the decision of the Federal Government to support in principle non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, i.e., not to put these at the disposition of the national authorities of non-nuclear powers.
The Committee doubts whether a global agreement, as sought by the nuclear powers, is the most practical method to achieve non-proliferation.
The Committee is working on the assumption that none of the powers now in possession of nuclear weapons has any intention of giving such weapons to other states. In view of the special structure of the Warsaw Pact, this hypothesis is considered to be particularly valid for the Soviet Union.
The Committee notes that the Federal Republic surrendered the right to manufacture nuclear weapons when it signed the Paris Agreement of 1954./3/ The Committee therefore expects other states whose status is comparable to that of the Federal Republic to make a similar renunciation before the Federal Republic is asked to offer additional concessions.
/3/For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 425-434.
The Committee views an unqualified ban against proliferation as tantamount to a division of the world into nuclear and non-nuclear powers. Such an arrangement, chartered as it would be in international law, could prejudice the security and the political roles of the non-nuclear powers for an unforeseeable future. It would have a particularly negative effect on a united Europe of the future.
It is the opinion of the Committee that a non-proliferation accord must be reached within the wider framework of a disarmament agreement. Such an agreement should provide for a step-by-step reduction of nuclear weapons and carriers currently in the possession of the nuclear powers, make arrangements for appropriate controls, and ensure that the strategic balance of power both on the European continent as well as in the world as a whole is not disturbed. This requirement appears to the Committee all the more necessary because the non-nuclear powers of Europe obviously feel themselves threatened by the more than 700 Soviet medium-range missiles emplaced along the Western frontier of the Soviet Union.
The Committee sees a decisive difference between a waiver to the right to possess nuclear weapons which is made to an ally and an agreement involving a third power such as is proposed in the present drafts. The latter would make the Soviet Union the arbiter over the nuclear structure of the Western Alliance.
The Committee is firm in the belief that the Federal Republic should participate in a non-proliferation agreement if the following conditions are met:
a. That the possibility for an agreement providing for the shared control of nuclear weapons among the powers of the Atlantic or European areas is neither excluded nor prejudiced.
b. That an agreement is reached which safeguards the interests of the Federal Republic and of the other free nations of Europe.
c. That the international situation of the Federal Republic and especially its objectives in respect to all-German policy should not be prejudiced in either a formal or a substantive sense as a result of its participation in an agreement to which the Soviet Union is also a signatory.
d. Within the context of Section V, Item 1 of the German Peace Note of 25 March 1966,/4/ the above signifies:
/4/For an extract of the note, see ibid., pp. 914-918.
1. That the Federal Republic's claim to be the only legal representative of Germany is fully recognized in the agreement.
2. That the regulation of the military status of Germany, the implementation of which is reserved for an all-German Peace Treaty, should not be prematurely applied to a divided Germany.
End Report
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
182. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 13, 1966, 6:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential. Drafted by Puhan on October 14 and approved in S on October 19. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The source text is marked "Part 2 of 2."
SUBJECT
The President's SpeechPARTICIPANTS
Georg von Lilienfeld, Minister, German Embassy
Berndt von Staden, Counselor, German Embassy
Secretary Rusk
Alfred Puhan, Country Director for GermanyVon Lilienfeld said Carstens had also asked him to present the following German observations on the President's speech of October 7 before the editorial writers in New York./2/
/2/For text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 1125-1130.
The German Foreign Office had noted the President's speech with great interest and regarded it as significant. They welcomed the President's avowal of American responsibilities vis-à-vis Europe and the emphasis he placed on the interdependence of the Atlantic Alliance as well as the affirmation of the partnership between the United States and a united Europe. The Germans also welcomed the desire, expressed by the President, to arrive at an understanding with the East. The Germans noted with satisfaction that President Johnson adhered to the view that peace in Europe was not assured as long as the cruel division of Germany was not removed. The Germans, finally, welcomed the remarks by the President that troop levels in Europe would be determined by the assessment of the threat and that a reduction of Western troops would be made contingent upon a lowering of troop levels on the side of the Soviets.
Von Lilienfeld reported that Carstens wished to point out, however, that he had noted in a number of places deviations from formulas used in the past. He did not want to exaggerate the significance of these new formulations, but could not help but express some concern that the Soviets might conclude from these new formulations that we had decided to opt for the status quo in Europe. Carstens referred to three subjects in this connection.
The first concerned the German question. While noting with satisfaction that the reunification of Germany remained, as before, the objective of American policy, the Germans had got the impression from the speech that the reunification of Germany was seen by the United States no longer as an issue which would be realized simultaneously with the relaxation of tensions but was viewed rather as the end result of the détente. The Germans noted further in this connection that the President's speech did not touch upon Four-Power responsibility for German reunification nor the right of self-determination on the part of the Germans. They noted also the absence of the formulation that the Federal Republic was the sole representative of all Germans.
In connection with the frontiers, Carstens wished to point out that the American Government until now had consistently repeated the view that the final determination of Germany's borders would have to await a peace settlement involving all of Germany. Carstens noted that it was not possible to tell from the remarks of the President whether this continued to be the view of the American Government.
The third German concern entailed the question of priorities in security matters. The Germans noted that the confrontation between the Warsaw and Atlantic Pacts could only be overcome on the basis of the status quo, if progress in resolving the German question was not made a condition. This gave the Germans concern. In the German view the two were irrevocably linked.
The Secretary promised to study the German observations and in due time give them our comments. In the meantime he wished to make the following immediate comments:
1. He thought the President had placed unusual emphasis on German reunification.
2. On the question of the reunification of Germany and the relaxation of tensions between East and West, he noted that we were simply agreeing with our European friends who have been telling us all along that German reunification cannot be obtained until after a détente had been achieved. He noted in this connection that Europeans generally, including the Germans, were out in front of us in seeking relations with the Eastern Europeans.
On the subject of what was omitted from the speech, the Secretary simply wished to note that the President had made a short speech which could not be complete in every respect. He reiterated however that he would give a more detailed reply to the Germans in the near future.
183. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, October 20, 1966, 1555Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-USSR. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, USAREUR, CINCEUR, and USNMR SHAPE for POLAD.
528. NATUS. Subj: Brandt-Abrasimov meetings/2/ as seen from both sides of the Wall.
/2/The Mission reported on Brandt's October 12 discussions with Abrasimov in telegram 494 from Berlin, October 14. (Ibid.) Brandt discussed the meetings in My Life in Politics, pp. 159-161.
1. In seeking to assess the Brandt-Abrasimov meetings one cannot but be impressed with the degree of mutual interest that lies behind them and that suggests their continuation.
2. From Abrasimov's viewpoint there are important long and short-term advantages which seem to outweigh the disadvantages. An important long-range gain for the Soviets is the establishment of direct contacts and continuing discussions with a potential German government leader at a time when the ruling parties in Bonn appear to be in some disarray. This offers the Soviets both a certain assurance for the future and a shorter-term prospect that the present Bonn government might feel itself compelled to initiate new policies of its own toward the East, from which the Soviets may benefit. Continuance and expansion of the Brandt-Abrasimov relationship therefore offer possibilities for (A) giving further impetus to the SPD inclination, marked since the Dortmund Convention, to undertake new approaches toward the East; and (B) nurturing suspicion and friction between the principal parties on the domestic political scene, between Berlin and Bonn, and between Brandt and the Allies in Berlin.
3. On Berlin matters, Abrasimov will undoubtedly be considering ways in which the Soviets can capitalize on Brandt's desire to give Berlin a new role in East-West matters. By encouraging Brandt in thinking that certain of his Berlin projects might get Soviet support he may see a means for obtaining Brandt's backing, or at least tacit acceptance, of an increased Soviet presence and role in West Berlin. Direct dealings with Brandt as GovMayor would give substance to the Eastern thesis that West Berlin is a "special political entity," they would tend to weaken the link between Berlin and the Federal Republic, and they would promote a de facto Quadripartite status in West Berlin alone.
4. The principal disadvantage for Abrasimov is the effect of his association with Brandt on his relations with Ulbricht. Ulbricht is certainly anything but pleased at the prospect of a continuing--and perhaps expanding--dialogue, since this reinforces the overriding role of the USSR as the most useful party for West Germans to talk with on all-German matters. It makes clear that the Soviets intend to maintain as many channels as possible for dealings on the German and Berlin problems. It undermines somewhat Ulbricht's own efforts to foster "negotiations" in various channels with the FRG and the West Berlin Senat. Although the dialogue thus raises certain doubts and fears among the East German leaders, they certainly are aware that they cannot effectively prevent it. The Soviets doubtless know this too and will therefore want to press ahead without too much concern for East German anxieties and misgivings.
5. From Brandt's viewpoint the dialogue with Abrasimov is another step forward in the SPD's effort to open new avenues of approach to the East, an effort in which Brandt has himself taken the leading role. In domestic political terms he has seen the opportunity to build up his own prestige nationally by demonstrating imagination and initiative on East-West matters shortly before important elections in two West German Laender. In a broader sense he has achieved greater maneuverability for himself vis-à-vis the GDR and has undercut to some extent the latter's hoped-for role on all-German matters. While the immediate political benefits are important to him, it is our belief that he conceives of his new relationship primarily as offering a hope for eventually breaking through the impasse that has characterized the German problem for many years, and regarding which he and many other Germans have concluded that the Allies are not going to create movement.
6. In West Berlin political terms these meetings mark a new phase in the post-Wall history of the city. Only about a year ago such encounters would have been criticized whereas now they are generally accepted and even widely approved. Brandt not only perceived this trend but helped to create the conditions that made such talks possible. While his primary interests are undoubtedly broader than Berlin, he sees the dialogue also as a step forward in his efforts to improve Berlin's position in a changing East-West situation. He sees opportunities, moreover, for going around Pankow and establishing a direct line which can be helpful in getting the GDR to agree to improvements in the Berlin situation. Brandt may regard his contact with Abrasimov as being favorable to Allied interests as well, or at the least, he may consider that certain of his Berlin interests can be moved ahead without running into direct conflict with Allied rights and responsibilities.
7. It is in this area that the most difficult problems arise for the Allies. The Soviets, for example, might be led to believe that they can achieve certain objectives in Berlin regardless of Allied objections by dealing directly with Brandt. So long as Brandt sincerely pursues interests which are shared by the Allies and the Senat and so long as he is forthcoming with us about his talks, they may be advantageous to both. If, however, he established arrangements for a continuing dialogue with the Soviets, the contents of which may not be fully revealed to the Allies and which may touch on Allied interests, this could lead ultimately to an undermining of the Allied position in the city. In the past Brandt has been mindful of Allied interests and realistic in his handling of them, but it may be necessary for him to be reminded occasionally that he cannot deal with the Soviets officially and with commitment of matters relating to Berlin which affect Allied rights and responsibilities. In the most recent meeting (October 12) Brandt discussed certain specific Berlin problems which have heretofore been handled by the Allies and suggested continuing Soviet-Senat contact on them. This represents a departure from his earlier comments (September 29) to Abrasimov that such matters were for discussion with the Allies. As indicated in Bonn 4735/3/ an Allied approach to Brandt on this aspect of his talks is presently under consideration by the Bonn Embassies./4/
/3/Dated October 19. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-USSR)
/4/In telegram 70626, the Department of State commented that while it objected to receiving short notice of these meetings, they might be of advantage to the Allies and, in any case, "There is little we can do to keep Brandt from seeing the Soviet Ambassador whenever he wants to." (Ibid.)
Calhoun
184. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, November 2, 1966, 1803Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GER W. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Brussels, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, The Hague, and USUN, and passed to the White House.
5393. Subject: Implications of a new German Govt/2/ for US policy.
/2/On October 27 the FDP members of the Erhard Cabinet resigned. The CDU/CSU agreed on Kurt Georg Kiesinger as their candidate for Chancellor on November 10. Following an accord between the CDU/CSU and SPD on a "grand" coalition on November 27, Erhard handed in his resignation on November 30.
1. While the Embassy will continue to report significant day to day developments affecting the current German governmental crisis, it may be useful at this point to attempt some assessment of the overall implications insofar as US interests are concerned. The still fluid situation in Bonn as to the precise contours of the next govt brings with it both opportunities and dangers in our relations with Germany. At this juncture, the latter will probably predominate.
2. There is reason to think that Germany has reached a watershed in its postwar political development. In retrospect, it may well appear that the Erhard govt was the last govt of the postwar era. There are, of course, objective limits within which German policy must develop. However, the postwar era was also marked by many self-imposed limits. Some of these will now disappear, regardless of the composition of the next govt. This will become especially notable if CSU leader Strauss, as appears likely, should occupy an important position in a new govt; however, it is basically not a matter of personalities. A trend toward greater self-assertion and closer attention to specific German interests has, of course, been evident for some time. It has not yet markedly affected German foreign policy, mainly because the Erhard govt tended to respond more to the traditional postwar influences than to the new demands for greater German assertiveness. The next govt will, we believe, cease to operate in this postwar framework, which was characterized inter alia by a disposition on the part of the German Govt to look to us for guidance on almost any given issue.
3. There is a natural German tendency for French influence to fill any vaccum left by a diminution of Germany's ties with the US. The momentum toward closer relations with France will probably continue for some time. Although it is unlikely to result in basic policy changes, since the French have in the final analysis little to offer the Germans, the new govt will doubtless try to give the public impression of a better "balance" in its relations with the US and France.
4. On the other hand, the impending change in govt will also bring opportunities for us as well as Germany. While the new govt which finally emerges from the transitional period will almost certainly be more difficult to deal with than its predecessor, it will also be a more strongly led govt, more willing to play an active role. It will be better able to fulfill its undertakings. Although the new govt will not proceed from the assumption that there is a virtual identity of US and German interests, it can be expected to recognize that there will remain a large area where our mutual interests are sufficiently close to permit fruitful cooperation. After all, Germany must continue to rely on us for its basic security.
5. During this transitional period, we shall obviously have to proceed with great caution. There is a tendency, although fortunately not expressed widely or forcefully, to put some of the blame on us for the demise of the Erhard govt. President de Gaulle's press conference statement of Oct. 28/3/ was undoubtedly meant, with deliberate intent, to be the coup de grace for Erhard as the man who had spurned cooperation with France in favor of a close tie to the US. Fortunately for us, however, there are so many obvious reasons why Erhard must be replaced, and the view that he must is so universally held here, that we may get off lightly.
/3/For text, see Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, vol. 5, pp. 96-117.
6. What should we do in the meantime? Some of the immediate consequences are obvious, and we do not wish to belabor them. We must lean over backward in order to avoid the impression that we are in any way interfering in the present crisis. We can probably live with any govt that emerges--no matter who is Chancellor or what form the coalition takes. There will be a tendency here to look closely for indications of US intervention, and every statement we make will be combed over with this in mind. During the period in which we must wait for the formation of the new govt we should, through our normal foreign policy pronouncements do what we can to create an atmosphere which will work in our favor in its selection and orientation. The following issues appear to be relevant.
A. The offset.
Any concessions made now to Erhard under the current offset would appear to be an intervention in his behalf. The best we can do is to maintain a neutral stance, and stand ready to enter into discussions with any government that emerges on how the current German undertakings will be fulfilled. It will continue to be difficult for us to grant concessions at this stage, even if we so desired, since it would be hard to explain why we offer to a new Chancellor what we withheld from Erhard. A forum now exists in the Trilateral Committee for discussion of future offset agreements, which obviates the need, for the time being, for us to make any new statements on this issue.
When the new government is ready to deal with this problem, it is conceivable that we may be confronted with a firm German proposal, with Parliamentary backing. We do not, at this juncture, believe that such a proposal would seek to renege on the current commitment to pay DM 3.8 billion--or necessarily to seek a moratorium; however, it may affect the mode of payment. Any proposal on a longer range offset in the Trilateral Committee will probably correspond closely to that made by Erhard in Washington.
B. Trilateral talks.
Little progress can be expected on the broad policy aspects of the Trilateral talks until a new German Govt has had time to determine its policy toward the issues involved. Earlier actions to induce the Germans to accept decisions--especially on troop withdrawals which they will probably oppose strongly--should be avoided. If the Germans get the impression that vital security objectives are being sacrificed because of US-UK financial requirements, they may seek an alternative--such as a closer bilateral understanding with the French--which would be damaging to the Western Alliance.
C. Détente.
During the last year German opinion on Eastern policy and reunification has been developing quite favorably from our point of view. However, the process has been slow and uneven and these issues remain among the most contentious in German politics. During this transitional period we will, therefore, want to exercise great care in interpreting our own policy on these issues. The central theme of such interpretations should be to emphasize that we have no intention of jettisoning our fundamental postwar policy in Central Europe. Our basic position on Germany's Eastern frontiers, and of active support of German reunification by whatever peaceful means are available, remain unchanged. On the other hand we would not wish to negate the basic Eastward-looking impact of the President's speech of Oct 7.
D. Presidential visit.
Until Erhard's fate is determined, it would of course be inappropriate to say anything about a possible Presidential visit to Germany, resulting from the invitation Erhard recently extended in Washington. Soon after a new Chancellor takes office, we will undoubtedly wish to invite him to Washington. If on this occasion the new Chancellor should issue a new invitation and if the European situation as a whole is appropriate, I would hope that the President could respond favorably.
E. Non-proliferation.
We should not, during this period, take any decision to make important substantive changes in our draft non-proliferation treaty, especially if they effect options on a NATO or European nuclear arrangement. After a new government is formed, careful consideration should be given as to how consultations on this issue should be handled. Since there is much apprehension here that we will present the Germans with a fait accompli on this issue, we should take every opportunity to reassure them that they will be fully consulted.
8. The foregoing views must necessarily be only tentative and subject to revision in the light of what is a rapidly changing situation. We should, however, be fully aware that an important turning point has now been reached in Germany, and be ready to take advantage of any opportunities favorably to affect the attitude of a new government. Forbearance may, however, at a given point be just as important in this connection as speedy action.
McGhee
185. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, November 12, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret; Exdis. There is no time of transmission on the source text; the telegram was received at 10:45 a.m.
2207. State 83455./2/
/2/Telegram 83455, November 11, reported on a meeting with Carstens in which the Germans discussed the proposals for troop withdrawals they intended to send to the Soviet Union. (Ibid., POL 28 GER B)
1. During my farewell call on DepFonMin Semenov,/3/ I asked him on purely personal basis, and stressing I not making any proposals, whether Sovs still interested in ideas we had considered in our earlier discussions on German question and European security, such as reduction US and Soviet troops in Germany, exchange of observers, etc.
/3/Kohler left Moscow on November 14. Llewellyn Thompson presented his credentials on January 23, 1967.
2. Semenov, whose previous comments made it clear Sovs want preserve status quo in Germany, responded in very guarded manner. He said it was difficult for him to comment as these questions had recently been overshadowed by others and were outside scope Soviet attention. However, he expressed view all those questions were not dead; they had not arisen by accident, and would have to be reverted to at some point if peace in Europe to be strengthened. Citing non-proliferation as example, he also noted that those questions might again arise in somewhat different form.
3. While Semenov's remarks seem indicate continued Sov interest in some form of limited disengagement in Europe, I do not believe Sovs would be interested at this time in any formal arrangement re mutual troop reductions. For one thing, in view publicity this question in Western press they probably assume that US-UK troop levels in Europe would be reduced in any event. Also, they would not wish to substantiate ChiCom charges re US-Soviet collusion by entering formal agreement which could be interpreted as allowing transfer US forces from Europe to SEA. What concerns me most, however, is that FRG suggestion, apart from its own inherent complications, would inevitably involve us in discussions with Sovs on broader aspects of German problem, including Berlin and Oder-Neisse questions, which at this time could not be profitable and could only disturb present quiet on that front./4/
/4/In telegram 6197 from Bonn, November 22, McGhee commented that while agreeing with Kohler's view that the Soviets would not agree to force reductions, he believed the United States had nothing to lose in joining Germany in a joint approach on the issue. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6)
Dept repeat elsewhere as desired.
Kohler
186. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, November 29, 1966, 1445Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 11. Secret; Exdis.
6452. Personal for the Secretary from Ambassador McGhee. Subj: Berlin voting rights. I am sending this telegram to you personally because I know of your interest in this matter. Since I consider it very important that our position in the matter be made at the highest level in the Dept., I would appreciate a personal reply.
1. As you know, the issue of voting rights for Berlin Bundestag Deputies has again arisen in connection with the current governmental crisis in Berlin. A so-called mini-coalition between the SPD and FDP which was at one time seriously considered could only have been viable on the basis of the Berlin votes. When the three Allies, according to plans approved in the three capitals, reiterated in response to press queries that the Allied position on voting rights had not changed, Brandt and Mende of the FDP reacted sharply. In fact, it is obvious that if the Allies at this critical point had changed a position dating from 1949, as a favor to one German political party in resolving a political crisis in its favor, it would have been tantamount to Allied intervention in German domestic politics. State Sec Carstens, in a Quadripartite Berlin meeting yesterday, agreed fully that the three had no other choice.
2. The likelihood now is that a grand coalition between the CDU and SPD will be established in the formation of which the Berlin votes will have no importance. The immediate urgency of the issue has, therefore, probably passed. I believe that it is quite possible, however, that after the new government is in office, it may seek a change in the Allied position because of (A) the public discussion that has been renewed on the matter, (B) the SPD long-range interest in having its strength in Berlin accrue to its strength in the Bundestag, and (C) the likelihood that the new government will pursue a more active policy on Berlin and all-German questions. This will be particularly true if Brandt becomes FonMin.
3. I therefore believe that it is necessary to consider now what the US position should be if faced with such a request. Before the Tripartite position was made clear by the three Embassies, Brandt appears to have been acting on the assumption that Washington would not insist on the maintenance of the reservation on voting rights. He still appears to detect a cleavage on this issue between the Embassy and the Department. This matter is of such importance that, in my opinion, an established US position is required which can serve as guidance in our discussions--either locally or in Washington--with representatives of the new government.
4. In formulating our position, I believe that we must have a clear understanding of the political and legal consequences for our presence in Berlin which could result from the voting of Berlin Deputies. First, let us take a look at the legal background. The issue of the voting rights of the Berlin delegates in the Federal legislative bodies lies at the very heart of Quadripartite agreements defining Berlin's special status. For the purpose of exercising their occupation rights in Germany, the four powers agreed in the London Protocol of September 12, 1944,/2/ to divide Germany into four Occupation Zones and to create a special "Berlin area." Greater Berlin was not at any time part of any of the four Zones of Occupation. For this reason, the three Allies have repeatedly rejected the Soviet claim that Berlin is "in" or "a part of" the GDR. By the same token, the three Allies have taken the position that Berlin may not form a part of the Federal Republic.
/2/For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 1-3.
5. In accordance with these principles the Military Governors, in May 1949,/3/ took action to ensure that Berlin was not incorporated into the organization of the Federal Republic as originally contemplated by the framers of the Basic Law. While permitting "greater Berlin" to participate "in the federation," the Military Governors withheld from Berlin representatives the right to vote in these bodies and also decreed that Berlin may not be governed by the federation.
/3/For text, see ibid., pp. 260-262.
6. If Berlin Delegates were to exercise full voting rights in the Federal legislative bodies, this would mean that the Berlin population and Land Berlin through their representatives would participate in an essential function of government in the Federal Republic like the rest of the West German population. Voting membership of the Berlin Delegates in the Federal legislative bodies thus would mean de facto membership of Berlin in the Federal system, contrary to the Quadripartite agreements. The membership would likely become increasingly de jure as the Federal Government would probably follow up this step with other measures which would logically flow from the granting of voting rights to the Berliners. While this development would not nullify the right of the three powers to be in military occupation of Berlin, which stems from the defeat of Germany, the exercise of the right could become legally precarious.
7. Viewed from the political point of view, the argument can be made that we can dispense with the legal formalities defining and arising out of Berlin's special status so long as an Allied military presence is maintained there. It is certainly true that this presence, not international agreements, is the final deterrent against Communist encroachments. However, I believe that the crisis of 1958-62 demonstrated the great value of maintaining the integrity of our legal position. In their November 1958 "free city" proposal, the Soviets took pains to attempt to demonstrate to world opinion that they were promoting a reasonable solution to West Berlin's anomalous situation, based on allegedly defunct Quadripartitie agreements. Our ability to rebut this latter line helped much to expose the falseness of the Soviet rationalization and the aggressiveness of Moscow's intentions.
8. The same is true with respect to access by the three Allies and the German population to Berlin. The right of the Allies to unrestricted access to Berlin is an essential corollary to their right of occupation. The Soviets however may contend that the arrangements concluded to enable the Allies to exercise this right were affected by the abolition of the separate status of Berlin. A blurring of the status of Berlin would work to their advantage if they chose again to make access dependent on GDR permission.
9. I would emphasize that such an effort on the part of the Soviets is, in the Embassy's view, not to be expected as an immediate result of the granting of voting rights. The immediate Soviet response would probably be more in the nature of propaganda than of action. The Soviets show no inclination at present to rock the boat in Berlin and would probably confine their reaction to protests and to the final incorporation of East Berlin into the GDR administration. (They might also further stiffen their opposition to the inclusion of a Berlin clause in international agreements.) Even so, retaliatory harassment of access routes is obviously within Communist capabilities, and so we cannot exclude this possibility from any assessment of consequences.
10. A further consideration which causes me concern pertains as much to the Germans as to the Soviets. If the FRG increasingly assumes de facto governing responsibilities in Berlin, we could find ourselves in the future in the unenviable position of having formal responsibility for the security of Berlin but without having all the control strings firmly in our hands. For example, the FRG quite probably would undertake more frequent Bundestag meetings in Berlin if the Allies were not in a position to exercise restraints. The Bundeswehr logically could be expected to assume a role in Berlin. We would, of course, still be expected to resist Communist countermeasures. Similarly the Berlin Senat would accept a larger and more active Soviet presence in West Berlin if Allied control should weaken. Again the Allies would have to face the consequences. Given the potential dangers of any Berlin confrontation, this is obviously a situation we would want to avoid.
11. Looked at from the Allied point of view in Berlin, the desirability of keeping intact the present status of Berlin's voting rights is evident from the foregoing. But we must also recognize that a Federal Government in which the Social Democrats participate will be less likely to go along with this position than previous Federal Governments have been. The question therefore will arise whether in the light of our over-all relations with the FRG we can or should maintain a position which the FRG will consider outmoded and (by the Socialists) discriminatory. Given a determined stand by a German Government to alter the status quo, we would probably have to make the best of a bad situation by acquiescing in the move. Continued resistance on the part of the three Allies could seriously strain our relations with the new government and--in the end--might be fruitless.
12. These considerations have guided our contingency planning so far. The three Allies in consultation here agree that their position under present circumstances has been made clear and, consequently, there is no need for further action or statements at this time. If, despite the Allied stand, the Germans proceeded to count the Berlin votes in the nomination of a Chancellor, the three Embassies would not contest the move but would issue a public statement to the effect that our rights in Berlin are unaffected, and make a confidential démarche to the new government pointing to the pitfalls of this course of action. There is some disagreement, however, as to how strong this démarche should be. The British do not agree to a specific caution in this context against allowing the Berlin Delegates to vote on legislation. This is also the sense of the Department's current instructions to us (State 90602)./4/ I believe that such a caution would be highly desirable. Without committing ourselves to any specific course of action we should send a grave warning as to the consequences of this next step, which Carstens told us yesterday would surely follow.
/4/Telegram 90602, November 23, provided instructions regarding contingency planning for Berlin. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-2 GER W)
13. This leads to the consideration of the second and--as I have indicated--more likely contingency, namely, that the new government will not count the Berlin votes in naming a new Chancellor but will move at some later date to adopt a law validating the Berlin votes for substantive legislation. The new government would, I believe, approach the Allies before embarking on such a course but might well couch this approach as a decision about to be taken--rather than a request for approval. To cope with this possibility I believe we should seek agreement with the British and French to approach the FonOff--presumably to be headed by Brandt--shortly after the formation of the new government. The three Allies would take note of Brandt's previously expressed wish for consultations and of statements by SPD spokesmen indicating an intent to initiate new legislation to validate the Berlin votes. Without threatening, we would say that we oppose such a step for reasons which we would outline and that if it is taken unilaterally we would have to have a second look at our Berlin obligations. At the same time, in the spirit of consulting, we would state that we are prepared to consider the views of the German Govt if they wish to present them.
14. Such a démarche might have the effect of checking a German initiative before it became entrenched. Since we would preserve our freedom of action, we would reserve for the time our final decision in the light of the developing circumstances, including the degree of cooperation shown by the new government and the Senat in Berlin affairs and the attitudes of our British and French Allies.
McGhee
187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Berlin/1/
Washington, December 3, 1966, 3:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 GER B. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Puhan, cleared by Stoessel, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Bonn.
96238. From the Under Secretary to Ambassador McGhee. Subject: Berlin Voting Rights. This will confirm our telephone conversation regarding Berlin voting rights./2/ As I indicated to you, we would like the Germans to take the initiative, if there is to be any change in policy. We would like to have assurances from them that if they plan to make any change in policy they will consult us first. To accomplish this, you are authorized to make a low key approach to Carstens, or someone else of your choice, and convey to him our hope that the FRG would not change its position without prior consultation with the three. You may want to inform the British and French of this low key approach./3/
/2/No record of the conversation has been found.
/3/In telegram 6740 from Bonn, December 6, McGhee reported he had carried out the démarche. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 12)
As we discussed, any substantive discussion of this should be done tripartitely. As I said to you on the phone, the above reflects the Secretary's views and I shall talk to the Secretary earliest at greater length about this issue. You will receive instructions on the substantive position soonest./4/
/4/In telegram 97910, December 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 GER W)
Rusk
188. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, December 8, 1966, 1940Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 12. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, Brussels, The Hague, and Rome, and pouched to all other NATO capitals and Consulates.
6936. Subj: Meeting with Brandt.
1. I called on ForMin Brandt today at his request. This was his first official day at the FonOff and I was his first visitor. He had come into the office only briefly yesterday and had met with the Ambassadors at a reception this morning. Brandt received me cordially and warmly reciprocated my expression of pleasure, personally and on behalf of my govt, in working with him in his new capacity. He appreciated Secretary Rusk's message and looked forward to seeing him in Paris on Wednesday and Thursday of next week--also at the Quadripartite dinner. He was sorry that he could not meet him on Tuesday, as the Secretary had suggested, however, he was detained in Bonn by the Chancellor's statement of policy to the Bundestag.
2. Brandt then made a brief statement of the new government's foreign policy. He hoped that we would take it for granted that they reaffirm Germany's traditional friendship with and confidence in the U.S. They hope to add to what has been accomplished together in the past. There had been problems, particularly in the area now under discussion by the Trilateral Commission, however, he understands that progress is being made. There are a number of problems now facing the government which they look forward to discussing with us frankly, both in seeking advice and soliciting our ideas. He mentioned three particular objectives to which he attached priority:
(A) He was anxious to speed up the progress of the Kennedy Round so that its success could be assured.
(B) He was anxious to take up the problem of Eastern Europe, and to discuss it at an early date with the French.
(C) He hoped that progress could be made concerning the problem of Britain (presumably Britain's entry into the Common Market). He did not expect sensational changes to occur as the result of the government's efforts. However, he did hope to put more energy into the solution of key problems.
3. Brandt admitted that he was not too familiar with the detailed problems facing NATO. However, he hoped to inform himself prior to the forthcoming Paris meeting. In his statement to the Bundestag, Chancellor Kiesinger will express the hope to see President Johnson. He will not, however, make reference to statements the President has made in the past of his intention to come to Europe (presumably because it was related to Erhard's invitation). The new government will, of course, welcome the President if he does come.
4. I queried the FonMin as to what new impulses the govt might add to German foreign policy. Brandt replied that the discussions on foreign policy between the CDU/CSU and SPD, which had led to the formation of their coalition, revealed a high degree of common conviction on foreign policy, in particular, with respect to its presentation to the German people. The Germans need to be talked to as if they were grown up--as indeed they are. The government should not just say all is going well. The problems which Germany faces with the US and France must be explained to the people.
5. Brandt said that the new govt will attempt to make a new start with France. He did not know how far this would get. In his view the German-French Treaty had been more successful than de Gaulle had been willing to admit. This has been particularly true in the business field. Indeed, the treaty itself is only a skeleton--which must be fleshed out. He was glad that PriMin Wilson was going to Paris first, in connection with his talks on UK entry into the Common Market. This will enable Germany to use the apparatus of the German-French Treaty to precipitate long-range discussions with France on the subject--perhaps not immediately but certainly during the latter part of next year. Brandt commented as an aside that he believed the US and France had the same views with respect to East-West relations.
6. Brandt said that the new government was still considering how to approach the nuclear problem. It is clear that Germany does not want ownership of nuclear weapons. They hope that non-proliferation can be worked out so that the legitimate interests of non-nuclear powers can be taken care of. The new government will not take up the so-called "hardware solution".
7. Turning to all-German matters, Brandt said that both parties--the CDU/CSU as well as the SPD--were determined not to give up the legitimate aim of Germans to reunify themselves. They hope to develop technical instrumentalities to strengthen ties with the Eastern Zone in the humanitarian, cultural, scientific and economic fields. This would not, however, involve recognition.
8. It is not yet clear what the policy of the new govt will be toward Eastern Europe. He and the Chancellor agree that they should express the hope that the progress already made can be extended. They were prepared to normalize diplomatic relations if a formula could be found in accordance with German interests. They are, however, not yet ready to name particular countries in this connection. The Chancellor will, in his statement to the Bundestag, say something special about Poland and Czechoslovakia, something going beyond the German peace note of March 25. It will, for example, be more specific than the peace note with respect to the Munich Agreement. At the same time, the government would make a gesture to the expellees--including a clear statement that the govt does not approve of their expulsion. The Chancellor's statement will not mention the Oder-Neisse Line, but will talk of Poland's future role in Europe.
It will show sympathy and understanding for Poland's suffering as a result of its divisions and its desire for security. The Chancellor will say that, in connection with a peace settlement, Germany will be prepared for solutions that will not "be easy for them." No reference, however, will be made to the sacrificing of any specific vital interests--an indication will only be given of the general direction of German policy.
9. At this point I gave orally to Brandt, almost verbatim, the statement of policy which had been approved by the Dept (see State 98003 and Bonn 6525)./2/ To this I added the US policy towards emergency legislation, namely, that we, the British and French hope that legislation will be passed which would permit the lapse of Allied reserve rights to act in an emergency. We would particularly welcome legislation covering the monitoring of post and telecommunications which would enable the Allies to relinquish the rights and responsibilities they are now exercising in this field.
/2/Telegram 6525 from Bonn, November 30, contained the text of a suggested statement of policy. (Ibid.) In telegram 98003, December 7, the Department of State gave its approval to the overall tone of the statement, suggesting a series of additions and modifications in the wording. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GER W-US)
10. In response, Brandt expressed appreciation for the fact that we had prepared such a statement and for the specific statement with respect to German reunification and Berlin. Brandt thereupon raised the question of Berlin voting rights. He did not wish to revert to statements that he had made before assuming his present responsibilities. He did, however, think that the Embassy statement on this issue could have been expressed in a different way. He now wished to discuss this whole question with us fully. As a result of my approach to StateSec Carstens (see Embtel 6737),/3/ he had "taken care of the Parliamentary initiative (of the FDP)." "There would be no coup d'etat." He assured me that, although he has issues to raise with us, they would in no way be directed against the rights of the Allies.
/3/Telegram 6737 from Bonn, December 5, reported McGhee's discussions with German officials concerning voting rights. (Ibid., POL 14 GER W)
11. Brandt said that, as a matter of fact, he also wished to discuss with the Three Powers and the Senat a broader range of questions affecting Berlin, including its future economic situation. This was not with the objective of seeking new aid for Berlin, but rather advice as to how the city should proceed as had been sought after the building of the Wall.
12. I assured Brandt that we would be glad to discuss the voting rights issue or any other Berlin issue at any time. The Secretary hoped in particular to discuss this with him when he saw him in Paris. I did not wish to go into the details of the recent role of the Allies in this connection. I felt sure that if there were time to explain the situation from our viewpoint he would agree that we had no alternative than to take the course we did. I stressed that what we had done was a result of Allied positions taken in capitals. We had not made a statement but had responded to questions after a situation had developed which we felt necessitated the affirmation of our position.
13. Brandt stated that the new govt will, of course, fulfill its offset obligation. Also, it will in its discussions in the Trilateral Commission, seek to clarify its budget problems. (There was no time to clarify whether he meant this with respect to the present or only future offsets.) He expressed appreciation for our interest in the problem of the "technological gap." This will be appreciated by the EconMin Prof. Schiller. In the German presentation in Euratom with respect to the Polish proposal, they emphasized that the FedRep did not wish to break up the European cooperation which has been developed under Euratom. However, they hoped an agreement could be worked out with IAEA. Brandt expressed the intention of the govt to proceed with preparation of emergency legislation./4/
/4/McGhee provided further observations on his first talk with Brandt in telegram 6976 from Bonn, December 9. (Ibid., POL 15-1 GER W)
McGhee
189. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, December 12, 1966, 1955Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 12. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to the White House and Paris for the Secretary who arrived there from India on December 13, to attend the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting.
7031. 1. As you will have seen from Bonn tel 7002/2/ FonMin Brandt, in a speech in Berlin on Dec 10 at an open meeting of the SPD, repeated twice for empasis: "I have myself in the past week been prevented from acting in Bonn as a result of a combination of legal sterility and political malice." As indicated in reftel, while we have in accordance with existing instructions done nothing further, the British Amb became agitated over this issue and raised it today for tripartite decision so that the three Allies can speak to Brandt with a single voice when this issue is raised at the Quadripartite dinner in Paris on December 14.
/2/Not found.
2. Brandt is obviously still greatly piqued at the Allied position on this issue taken during the recent governmental negotiations, which had in his view the effect of blocking an FDP/SPD coalition which would have made him Chancellor. Almost all other political observers here believe, on the contrary, that this would not have been a feasible basis for a new govt in Bonn at that time. In any event I do not believe that Brandt's open attack on the Allies, in using such words, can go unchallenged. To do so would, I believe, invite trouble in the future--not only on this and other Berlin issues but in our relations with him as FonMin. If he elects to believe that the Allies are more tractable under public attack, our troubles have just begun. It is obvious that he has not yet become accustomed to the fact that he is FonMin, with the restraints on public speech which this position sometimes entails, and no longer Governing Mayor of Berlin for whom a major weapon has traditionally been an open appeal to public opinion.
3. Brandt's basic reasoning which was elaborated to me by Albertz on the evening of Dec 3 in Berlin, appears to be that the voting rights reservation is outdated and that an agreement should be made at once of progressively permitting Berlin Deputies full voting rights. I believe it could well be pointed out in response to such reasoning that there are some who will argue that so is the maintenance of an Allied presence in defense of Berlin outdated (which is precisely the argument the Soviets began making in 1958). If this dangerous argument based on obsolescence were accepted, the point could be reached where the Allies would be forced to reexamine their responsibilities which entail the most direct confrontation with the Soviet Union and ultimately the possibility of nuclear war.
4. As has been pointed out in previous tels we have sent on this subject, the demand that the restriction of voting rights be eliminated raises both the issues of Allied legal rights and Allied ability to control the situation involving the exercise of our responsibilities in Berlin. Of the two the latter may be perhaps more compelling than the former. If Berlin should become a political football, as we have seen it become in recent years in connection with the issue of Bundestag meetings in the city, a situation could arise wherein the Germans egged on by the political parties acting independently and not necessarily as a government could vie with each other in demonstrating the claim that Berlin is an integral part of the FRG. It is only reasonable to recall in this connection the interference with civilian access and jet buzzings of the old Reichstag building which resulted from the last Bundestag meeting there. These incidents--which resulted from a meeting which was not necessary--could easily have resulted in a confrontation.
5. If, moreover, the Germans were to act unilaterally in defiance of expressed Allied wishes, this might well be interpreted as an example of rising German nationalism and determination to "go it alone" in achieving her postwar aims. This could be pointed out discreetly to Brandt.
6. The best argument, however, that could be used by the three Foreign Ministers in Paris, I believe, is as we have recommended in Bonn 6452/3/ that if the Allies are faced with a fait accompli it might force them to have another look at their Berlin responsibilities. It could also be stated that there is good ground for holding that German action on voting rights without Allied consent would be illegal and in violation of the Paris Agreement of 1954, as approved by the Bundestag, and could be so declared by the Constitutional Court. Although we would not ourselves desire it, this could have the effect of calling into question the 1954 agreement itself.
/3/Document 186.
7. Our preference would be to have someone else, hopefully the French, take the initiative with Brandt on this issue, as the British have done locally today. In the Quadripartite dinner, we should, I believe, show solidarity with the others and, if necessary, take the initiative ourselves as spokesman on a Three-Power basis. As part of such discussion, it would be well to ask Brandt precisely what he had in mind in the remarks he made on Dec 10 in Berlin.
McGhee
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