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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968 Washington, DC |
190. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, December 14, 1966, 1550Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Warsaw for Ambassador Gronouski and passed to the White House.
7104. Subj: Relaxation of tensions in Central Europe. For the personal attention of the Secretary, Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary Leddy. This message was initiated during my visit with Amb. Gronouski in Warsaw and has been the subject of subsequent exchanges between us. It represents my views and those of Amb. Gronouski, based on draft studies in both Embassies, on how relations between Poland and the FRG might be improved and the cause of European stability thus advanced. While certain revisions in this draft have been occasioned by the FRG policy declaration, which was given subsequent to my latest consultations with Amb. Grounouski, I believe that this message corresponds to the substance agreed. He may, however, wish to make additional comments.
1. A resolution of the Central European security problem is essential to a lasting peace in Europe. A key to this resolution is the development of an improved relationship between Germany and Poland. Poland, of all the Eastern European countries, retains the greatest fear and distrust of Germany. Between the two countries there exist the most specific, unresolved conflicts remaining from World War II:
(A) The division of Germany and German determination to achieve reunification;
(B) The failure to achieve final agreement on the Western boundary of Poland;
(C) Poland's fear of German access to nuclear weapons;
(D) Poland's fear of a possible Soviet-West German deal which would result in reunification without resolving the security of its Western territories;
(E) Germany's fears of aggression by the USSR through and with the support of Poland; and
(F) The plight of the German minority in Poland.
2. The absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries is a factor resulting from and contributing to the prolongation of these conflicts. Only in the fields of trade, culture and in the exchange of persons has there been any concrete improvement in relations between Germany and Poland in recent years. However, even in these fields progress has been hobbled for political reasons.
3. The proposal: President Johnson's October 7 speech, particularly his remarks on German reunification and European boundaries, opened the door to new ways of thinking and working towards a resolution of the Central European problem. Considering the conflicts listed above against the background of the President's speech, the best possibilities for improvement appear to lie in the following steps to be taken on German initiative:
(A) Announcement by Germany of its intention to accept the Oder-Neisse Line, this action to be legalized however only when German reunification is achieved in the context of a final peace settlement. Such a step would greatly reduce Poland's fear that Germany might attempt to seize the territory east of the Oder-Neisse by force. It would eliminate Polish dependence on the USSR as sole guarantor of the Polish territories east of the Oder-Neisse. By prior agreement, this action could also result in the establishment of Polish-German diplomatic relations.
(B) Concurrently with and supporting the action in (A), and as a consideration for a more liberal Polish policy permitting an increased rate of resettlement in Germany of Germans still living in Poland, Germany would renounce the claim of Heimatrecht (the right to return to one's homeland) for German expellees from Poland, except insofar as this can be achieved by a free negotiation with Poland. This would also make the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse boundary more acceptable to the Germans.
(C) At the next extension of the German-Polish trade agreement, increased levels of trade and credit terms more favorable for Poland would be negotiated.
4. German relations with Poland would, of course, also be greatly enhanced if Germany would adhere to a general non-proliferation agreement and would publicly renounce a hardware solution of the nuclear sharing problem, including a reiteration of its oft made denial of any intention to possess nuclear weapons. These issues arise, however, within a broader context and it must not be expected, therefore, that their resolution can be made to coincide with the other steps recommended herein.
5. Comment: (A) There is evidence that Poland may be willing to enter into diplomatic relations with Germany on the single condition that Germany recognize the Oder-Neisse Line. It is difficult politically for any German Government to do this until a peace treaty is achieved as stipulated in the Potsdam Agreement. Few Germans realistically expect to regain territory; nevertheless, many influential Germans feel that advance recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary would cost them one of the few bargaining counters they have for reunification. The formula proposed in 3 (A) above might be acceptable to Poland and Germany as a compromise.
(B) The often but ambiguously expressed claim to Heimatrecht made by some Germans, particularly when linked with a subsequent right to self-determination, is particularly offensive to Poland. Since the Germans have renounced the use of force, it is a claim which can be realized only through bilateral agreement. By renouncing the territory beyond the Oder-Neisse and Heimatrecht, the German Government would lose considerable support among expellees. This would, however, be offset somewhat by permitting greater freedom of movement of Germans to and from the Oder-Neisse territories (para 3 B).
(C) Since there is no real possibility for agreement at the present time on German reunification or--on the other side of the coin German recognition of the GDR--the Germans and Poles would ignore these points--agreeing to disagree. Although there is evidence that Poland will insist on FRG recognition of the GDR as a condition prior to eventual "normalization" of relations, it would not be required for the establishment of diplomatic relations.
(D) In his policy declaration before the Bundestag on December 13,/2/ Chancellor Kiesinger had the following to say about relations with Poland: "Large sectors of the German people very much want reconciliation with Poland whose sorrowful history we have not forgotten and whose desire ultimately to live in a territory with secure boundaries we now, in view of the present lot of our own divided people, understand better than in former times. But the boundaries of a reunified Germany can only be determined in a settlement freely agreed with an all-German government, a settlement that should establish the basis for a lasting and peaceful good-neighborly relationship agreed to by both nations." The new govt thus continues to adhere to the position that settlement of the boundaries will have to await a peace treaty.
/2/For extracts, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 935-941.
At the same time Kiesinger emphasized the desire for reconciliation with Poland--and expressed greater understanding for Poland's desire for secure borders. This could conceivably lead to a decision by the govt to grant--as proposed in (3)--what is essentially de facto recognition of the existing borders to be followed, upon a final settlement, by de jure acceptance.
(E) Tact and patience will be required in dealing with the Germans on this issue, however, I am inclined to believe that the present grand coalition may offer better prospects than the previous govt for tangible progress toward a German-Polish settlement. For one thing, it can make certain concessions without fear of exploitation by a major rival party. Moreover, the SPD has been a consistent proponent of a more flexible Eastern and nuclear policy. While not explicitly endorsing the recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line, a number of speakers at the June 1966 Party Congress--including FonMin Brandt--hinted that Germany must reconcile itself to the loss of the territory east of the Line. (Brandt said: "Many people act as though we have the territories east of the Oder-Neisse. They also act as though friendly states had committed themselves to mere legal reservations, when in fact some had not even done that . . . therefore our demand for working out the basic elements of a peace treaty settlement.")
(F) The new German Govt has stated that it seeks "neither national ownership nor national control of nuclear weapons." While vague, this language would not rule out the type of development foreseen in para 3.
6. Tactics: (A) The US is not believed to be in a position either openly or officially to propose the course of action described in paras 3 and 4. To do so might put the German Govt on the defensive, and would represent an assumption of responsibility for Germany's future which we are in no position to take.
(B) I propose, however, that I be authorized to suggest such a course privately to Chancellor Kiesinger and FonMin Brandt. I would propose to do so in separate personal conversations with each--"unter vier Augen"--on an appropriate occasion. I would present the ideas expressed in this telegram both as a personal reaction from my trip to Poland, and as steps which I knew the US Government would approve and, when appropriate, support.
(C) In stating the case, I would congratulate them on the forward-looking approach they are taking toward all the East European countries. I would express the hope that the Federal Republic will be able to make progress in improving its relations with all the countries of East Europe, not just Poland. I would avoid any definition of what I understood the Oder-Neisse Line to cover. There would be no suggestion that Poland need be the first country tackled or that German initiatives should be limited to Poland. Indeed, once Germany has decided to breech the Hallstein Doctrine, Romania, which demands no conditions, may be the most logical country to begin with.
(D) Amb. Gronouski would seek to encourage and guide the Polish Government's response to any German initiative along these lines--as appropriate.
McGhee
191. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Paris, December 14, 1966, 8:30 p.m.-12:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 109. Secret. Drafted by Hirschfeld on December 20 and approved in S on December 26. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay. Brandt commented on the Paris talks in My Life in Politics, pp. 156-158.
UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRTY-EIGHTH
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
PARIS, DECEMBER 14-16, 1966SUBJECT
Quadripartite Dinner Discussion of East-West Relations; Berlin; The German QuestionPARTICIPANTS
United States: The Secretary
United Kingdom: Foreign Minister Brown
France: Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
Federal Republic of Germany: Vice-Chancellor Brandt
(Appended is a guest list of other participants)/2//2/Not printed.
1) Germany and the "German Question"
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, as host, opened the meeting by welcoming Brandt as the newest member of the group and asking him to begin. Brandt began by saying that he wished to discuss "the German Problem." He was interrupted by Brown, who objected to the term, "German Problem," saying it was rather a "European problem." Brandt, nevertheless, continued saying that he had been at a similar meeting eight years ago "in this house" after the Khrushchev ultimatum,/3/ when, after he had made his presentation on Berlin and was dismissed, Dulles took his hand and told him not to be worried--the allies would not let him or Berlin down.
/3/Reference is to Khrushchev's November 10, 1958, speech and the subsequent Soviet note to the Western powers regarding the status of Berlin. For texts of these documents and of the Four-Power response, December 14, 1958, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 542-546 and 552-560.
He reminded the group that these gatherings related to the responsibilities that the three powers have in Germany as a whole to which "they were kind enough to invite the German Foreign Minister." He added that he saw no sign that the USSR was more willing today than last year or even the year before that to discuss the German problem, i.e., reunification.
Brown interrupted at that point saying that if that was the German problem, then it was not a German problem but a wider European one. Brandt said that if reunification was not the German problem, it was certainly the heart of the matter. Brown asked what his "priorities" were, and Brandt answered that he would come to that. In considering the German problem, Brandt continued, the Russians concentrate on three difficult questions: (a) German possession of, or access to, nuclear weapons; (b) the question of frontiers; and (c) recognition of the Soviet Zone. Nevertheless, there still may be useful areas of discussion on subjects besides trade and culture. There may even be limited areas of discussion with the Soviets on security matters. In this connection, he mentioned the FRG's "Peace Note" of March 25, 1966, which contained offers to exchange declarations on the non-use of force with Eastern European states. He suggested (without elaboration) the possibility of somehow including the problem of divided Germany in such a declaration.
Brandt had the impression that there was a distinct difference in attitude and behavior between the USSR and the East Zone authorities toward Berlin. Soviet representatives in East Berlin seemed to feel that broader Soviet interests made it desirable not to have trouble in Berlin. The recent decrease of shootings on the Wall, and lack of other provocations, were attributable to Soviet pressure on the East German authorities. Furthermore, the USSR was now more willing to accept Berlin "into trade and other arrangements" linking Berlin and the Federal Republic.
Brandt, therefore, wanted to talk with the "Three" in Bonn on new plans for West Berlin. He wanted their "political advice" the same way as Berlin had needed allied advice in setting up the "viability program." He stressed that he was seeking political advice and not economic aid. If there were no Soviet interference with Berlin for a certain period, then new plans might be formulated for Berlin to bring the city into West Germany's "context, with other parts of Europe."
Brandt said he would not raise Berlin voting rights, noting that the question was now before a Bundestag committee. It was not a good idea "to mix up the rights of the Three with the rights of the Sovereign Parliament." Nothing would be done in this area without prior consultation with the allies. Discussion might take a year or two.
Brandt again contrasted Soviet behavior with that of the East German authorities, saying that the USSR was at least interested in doing something in the humanitarian field. As an illustration, Brandt mentioned a special office (not further identified) that had been reopened in Berlin (apparently under Soviet pressure) that permitted persons with emergency family situations to pass quickly into the Zone.
On the other hand, Brandt admitted that there was no agreement this year on Christmas passes for Berliners. Nevertheless he thought that this would not create unreasonable problems for the people of Berlin. On the whole, the pass program had worked, and had made it possible for 5.5 million individual visits to date.
The Soviets were not interfering very seriously with FRG efforts to normalize relations with Eastern Europe. The USSR was trying, however, to push the FRG into recognizing the East Zone, and the GDR in turn wanted to prevent normalization of FRG relations with Eastern European states.
2) GDR Internal Situation and Relations with the Zone
Brandt said he had little to add beyond what is generally known on the internal situation in East Germany. Economic programs are developing despite severe trade conditions imposed on the Zone by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he said, the East German managerial class worked hard to fulfill their trade obligations to the USSR in the hope of being able thereby to develop additional Western trade.
The Germans now may have reached the point where they would have to differentiate between the East German regime and the population of the area. It cannot be in the German interest to insist on isolating these people. True, there were problems even in trade and cultural exchanges. There were, of course, more serious problems in any efforts that were tinged with politics. The abortive attempt at an SED/SPD speaker exchange of last year was an example. As for the Zone's own policy, Brandt noted that the GDR was no longer pushing the confederation idea; on the contrary, it had been dropped on the ostensible grounds that the FRG was unworthy.
Actually, Brandt thought that we would have a clearer idea of East German attitudes after the SED Party Congress in March. Reports from the Zone did not suggest any clear picture as to who might emerge as Ulbricht's successor. The Zone, like the FRG, has a "problem of generations," but not perhaps in the classical sense--the new generation in the Zone was developing, surprisingly enough, not necessarily a commitment to the Communist system but rather a sense of identification with the GDR qua state.
The approach of the new (Federal) German Government, Brandt said, was not to think that reunification had first priority and therefore not to use the word quite as often. He did not wish to suggest to the German people that reunification was just around the corner. This meant modified language in public statements and greater concentration on personal links in a divided country through science, cultural efforts, trade and sports. The FRG intended to create an office for intra-German problems in Bonn. Perhaps a similar office might be established in the Zone. (He did not indicate how such an office would relate to the existing Ministry of All-German Affairs.)
On trade, Brandt noted that "certain EEC countries" had bypassed the FRG in the volume of trade with and the value of credits to the Soviet Zone. The FRG would not fall behind, and would compete on the same basis as the Allies with trade and credits. It was difficult, he said, for the electrical workers in West Berlin to understand why they could not compete with Western financed plants in the Eastern part of the City. He also mentioned a plan, on which he did not elaborate, about developing a system of "travellers checks" which would have the effect of equalizing the currencies in Germany.
On recognition, the FRG would "go on as before"--they would not recognize the GDR, but below that level, the FRG would go "beyond where we are up to now in dealing with the regime in Pankow." What the FRG aimed at was "organized togetherness" for the German people which in turn contributed to internal German and, by extension, to European détente. Naturally the GDR would resist this process and, for this reason, the FRG would be grateful if the three powers would "underline previously taken positions" (presumably on self-determination) and support and understand FRG efforts to counteract the effects of an artificial division on the German people.
The Secretary asked if the links which might open up with the Zone were being thought of as intra-German activities only or open to others as well. He foresaw problems if other European states or the US were to participate.
Brandt replied that since these activities would be "on German soil" (except for commercial links) it would make sense if the FRG were given a "certain chance" before the scene were opened to others.
Couve said he was struck by Brandt's remarks about differences in the attitudes of the USSR and the Soviet Zone, i.e., that the USSR appeared more inclined to a relaxation of tensions than the East Germans. He added that Brandt's plans for developing economic, personal and human relations were more the responsibility of the FRG than of Europe and the US. "You must lead the way," he said. He added that, without having examined Brandt's proposal in detail, "we agree and have no objection." He said, however, that the FRG was nevertheless responsible, being after all the party most directly concerned.
Throughout the above exchange and thereafter, Brown made spirited interruptions saying there was too much talk about Berlin. He took Brandt to task for continuing to sound too much like the Governing Mayor of Berlin rather than the Foreign Minister of a country with wider problems. He drew a parallel between Brandt's recent appointment as Foreign Minister and his own, and between their common positions as "socialist ministers" and, by implication, their relative weight and size vis-à-vis the great powers. Berlin, he said, did not dictate issues; it did not "stage the stage." Berlin was "subsumed " in problems of wider scope.
Brandt did not agree. He pointed out that the purpose of the evening was to discuss Germany, and that divided Berlin was after all a microcosm of divided Germany. Brown nevertheless kept returning to what he called the "wider responsibilities" that Brandt had as Foreign Minister--East-West relations, relations with the US and France, and the Asian world. In making his remarks, Brown spoke rather colorfully, returning again and again to the point that what Brandt was talking about was a wider European problem and not a German one, often addressing Brandt as "my dear Willy" and admitting that he was taking this line against the advice of his staff there present.
The Secretary, Ambassador Bohlen and others tried to pin Brown down on what he meant, without any real success. Brandt defended his position by citing examples from his own experience about the utility of tending to the work on hand. In this context he mentioned one of his predecessors, Mayor Ernst Reuter, who said in a meeting wherein grandiose plans for international relations were presented, that the principal problem was to maintain Berlin's trolley cars and get them painted. Brandt added that the German contribution to limited détente might be reasonable relations with the USSR, better relations with Eastern Europe and moves to keep "our people together." Brown countered that it might be better to "take it easy." He thought poorly of spending "shillings" until it had been seen whether "pence" would do.
The Secretary asked if the moves toward the people of the Zone that Brandt suggested or British support therefor could hurt Brown in Parliament. Brown said yes. Brown turned again to the question of "wider responsibilities" and in broad terms appeared reluctant to become involved in German specifics, mentioning Viet-Nam as another situation into which others could be dragged.
The Secretary remarked that as far as Viet-Nam was concerned, he did not wish to belabor the point but Britain's treaty obligations were as clear and binding as those of the United States.
Brown again turned to his argument that there was not really a German but rather a "European" problem, saying that the Germans were in one sense a victim of the division of Europe which had been imposed by the Allies. To this Ambassador Bohlen replied that it was hardly "the Allies" but rather the USSR that was responsible.
The Secretary stressed that it was not just a European problem. He reminded Brown that the US was involved in Europe, mentioning the US/USSR confrontation in Europe, and specifically that Germany was the one place where the US and Soviet Union might conceivably go to war. Therefore it was not a "European" problem. The Secretary added, by way of illustration, that our heaviest commitments in terms of total outlay have been made in this area and that the US was therefore very much involved. We could not be excluded; therefore, it was not just a European problem.
Immediately following Secretary Rusk's departure, and as Brown was leaving, the latter asked that participants make no statement to the press. Couve demurred. Brown said that we should only say that "European problems" were talked about. Brandt with considerable emotion said that he could not report to the Bundestag that the talk at dinner had been confined to the "European problem" but that he must indicate that the participants, in the tradition of Quadripartite dinners, had talked about Germany. Brandt, Couve and Brown then appeared to agree that they would say that talks had related to Europe and Germany.
192. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, December 16, 1966, 1702Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential; Immediate.
7249. Pass White House. Subj: Establishment of Presidential Contact with Chancellor Kiesinger.
1. I consider it highly desirable that a direct relationship be established as soon as possible between the President and Chancellor Kiesin-ger. This is particularly important in view of continuing inaccurate suggestions, originating in the US press and picked up here, that the President is reluctant to meet with Kiesinger because of the latter's former Nazi Party membership and overtures to the French. We have already taken steps directly with the Chancellor's office to counter such reports, but Kiesinger himself may still be uncertain as to the President's attitude toward him personally and may be waiting for a signal.
2. Under the circumstances, I recommend that I be authorized to call on the Chancellor and transmit to him orally a message from the President along the following lines:
A. The President congratulates the Chancellor on the policy declaration which he delivered in the Bundestag on Dec. 13 which he found most impressive. The President naturally took a special interest in the passage concerning German relations with the United States, and wishes to express to the Chancellor our sincere appreciation for these generous and encouraging remarks. The President can assure the Chancellor that they are fully reciprocated on the American side. Through close and frequent contact, the Chancellor and the President can ensure that there will be continuing trust between the Federal Republic and the United States and that both countries will, in the Chancellor's words, "understand and consider each other's vital interests." We have full confidence in the Chancellor's leadership.
B. As the Chancellor is aware, the President has expressed the hope that he would be able to visit Europe during the spring. If such a trip turns out to be possible he naturally would wish to include the Federal Republic. Plans for the trip have not yet been developed, however, and will inevitably depend on developments in America and elsewhere in the world during the next months.
C. The President wishes the Chancellor to know that, for his part, he would be very happy to welcome the Chancellor to Washington whenever the Chancellor considers it would fit in with his planned State visits.
3. I believe that such an approach would open the line of communication between the President and the Chancellor and would clearly indicate--before the Chancellor visits de Gaulle on January 13--that the President and the American government are well disposed toward him and his Cabinet. I shall be returning to Washington on leave on December 21. I would, of course, point this out to the Chancellor, which would permit him to send a personal message to the President if he desires. Because of the short time available, I would appreciate urgent consideration of this recommendation in the Department and the White House./2/
/2/In telegram 104567 to Bonn, December 16, the Department of State informed McGhee that it believed a letter from the President would be the most effective way to open a dialogue with the new German leader. (Ibid.) The President's message was transmitted in telegram 104879, December 19. (Ibid., POL 15-1 GER W)
McGhee
193. Memorandum Prepared by John W. McCloy/1/
Bonn, December 17, 1966, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, vol. 17. No classification marking. McCloy prepared the memorandum on December 22. A memorandum of McCloy's December 16 conversation with Chancellor Kiesinger is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 230.
Memorandum of meeting with Brandt and Wehner on the evening of Saturday, December 17th, 1966, at Brandt's Berlin office in Bonn. Was with them for about 3 hours (7 to 10 P.M.) An S.P.D. member of the Bundestag, Seydak (who may only have been a party official) was also present.
I told Brandt I was anxious to get from him his conception of the direction of the new government in foreign affairs. I have talked with the new Chancellor and with the new Finance Minister and I was particularly interested in the views of the new Foreign Minister.
I told him that I had been asked to talk to them about the new direction of the government and also to learn their views of the correct direction of United States policy in respect to Germany.
Brandt was expecting me to talk about balance of payments. I told him this was an important but incidental matter, important but far less so than the direction of Europe and the relation of the United States to it.
The talk of "change" was in the air and it was necessary to know what really was changing and what the implications were for the security of the Free World.
He started out by saying that in the past German emphasis had been on reunification. That had been the inspiration of German policy. The main orientation now is, what can Germany do for peace of the world. Everything must be put in relation to this without giving up Germany's ultimate legitimate aims, i.e., reunification. Soviets must lose their fear of Germany if reunification is ever to come about. We must find the formula by which peace is preserved--peace on a permanent basis.
Germany had been concerned too much with its own worries and preoccupations and had not been as conscious or as sympathetic as it should have been over the concerns and troubles of others, particularly the United States. Reunification is not in the foreseeable future. NATO has been the security framework but within this framework now Europe had to be brought together. It was a slow process but a necessary one--contradictional in many of its aspects but it had to be accomplished. Young people needed confidence in future and they had to have new direction. As nothing can be done with Europe without France, one has to deal with France and De Gaulle is France at the moment. We cannot give France a new government and so we have to deal with him. We shall never have the Europe which is ultimately desirable while he is head of France because his concept is leadership of France in Europe with a secondary position for everybody else. People are disillusioned regarding reunification and the lack of progress of integration of Europe economically and politically but we must make progress in what direction we can; and so Germany has determined to see what can be done on a bilateral basis. He saw De Gaulle day before yesterday--cordial--talked for an hour. Brandt had felt it possible to work out common policies with France, technological problems, common market, common policies for Europe, etc. Found De Gaulle not so much interested in this any more. Now it was the East-West issue which absorbed him. Whereas before this, De Gaulle had always expressed anti-American sentiments to him, this time there was "almost no such references." Quite evidently, De Gaulle thought that the major development was now to be the entente with the Soviet Union, deep significance of Kosygin visit and those to come after. De Gaulle had met with Rusk and Brandt had impression meeting was not unpleasant.
De Gaulle believed no threat from Soviet Union for time being--possibilities of renewed threat not excluded for the future. De Gaulle had referred to United States troops on Germany's territory. Had no objection to this--indeed, was quite satisfied with their presence there. He simply did not want them on French soil and they served the purpose where they were. Soviet Union much preoccupied with China and internal problems and way is now open to discuss things with Soviet Union--trade, culture--can't really discuss reunification now. Brandt was contemplating and De Gaulle was urging entering into an agreement renouncing all use of force in connection with solution of the German problem. Formal document. Make it appear as a significant document or treaty of far-reaching importance. This might help "normalize" relations which they had in mind. They wished to have diplomatic relations with satellites. Poland would prove difficult. All this is in line with President Johnson's October 7th speech as Couve de Murville was careful to point out. It was not possible to mention "Oder Neisse" line at this time but they had gone as far as possible in the Chancellor's statement. De Gaulle had said to Kosygin that reunification of Germany was a historical necessity though nothing to be done about it now. Maybe the issue of Sudetens could be included in the agreement but this was already so clearly renounced that it no longer had any significance. De Gaulle surprised him by referring to the need for a renunciation of an Anschluss with Austria Of course, no one was interested in this but it might be useful vis-à-vis Soviet Union. There are limited moves one can make and we intend to study what these moves can be. De Gaulle had said no longer interested in military matters or strategy. French troops in Germany on the proper basis--experts can take care of trade, military technological matters. "We can deal with the fundamentals", i.e., East-West.
Brandt and Wehner were impressed by the proclamation Monnet was now working on in regard to Europe. S.P.D. would support it. British would certainly be blocked unless De Gaulle could be convinced that Britain's financial problems solved and honestly accepted full obligations of Rome. Had to deal with France. Brandt said that he had made it clear that Germans adhered to concept of integrated defense. "De Gaulle did not object". Brandt said the Germans were going to do what they could to improve military planning but did not know how far De Gaulle would be prepared to go. Mainly interested in the Moscow-Paris axis.
Germans were in a confused position . "We are the only one all of whose forces are in NATO." Till recently all wanted Germany to do more in military field. Now suggestion is we should do less; still fear of German rearmament. Must restore confidence. This is the value of the renunciation agreement.
As for United States force levels--most dangerous if important changes took place now--must not relate such action to money. This had created a very bad impression--the package approach was a major mistake--created doubts about the Alliance. Hastened the fall of the Erhard Government. No steps regarding forces should be taken which do not come about as a result of community decisions--must be a rational evolution subscribed to by all--not unilateral. Alliance has suffered a set back. Must be reinvigorated. United States should not gain the impression that there was a basic change in German policies. Geography and experience dictate the need for accommodation with France. He found a recent statement given him by McGhee helpful in that it made clear State Department's desire for good Franco-German relations. Germany's economic situation probably improving this fall but growth rate of 4% impossible. Need to bring order into finance. Should no longer make the defense budget a savings account for social legislation as it had been. Whatever was needed for defense should be voted and spent. (cf. Strauss)
Belgians had made an interesting suggestion in Paris--all say things have changed--appoint a committee to examine into just what has changed and what is the value of the change.
When I asked Willy whether he had the impression that the United States had attempted to dominate or bring too much influence to bear on German policy, he said definitely not, except in some aspects of the military field. If anything, he felt United States had not been as closely interested in German policy matters as might have been wished. At one time there had been a common discussion of problems--example of old days in Berlin, etc. Now the impression was one of some aloofness and oversensitivity in regard to undue influence. What was needed was close frank collaboration on all matters which affected Germany. He said he was pleased that Rusk had referred to the non-proliferation treaty language when he had been in Paris./2/ His view was that Germany did not want to create any difficulties over non-proliferation. People had come to believe it was a step toward peace and momentum of opinion is in favor of it. No place therefore for Germany to stand in way, although its significance may be considerably less than claimed for it. Where Germany raised questions it would be on basis of interest of all non-nuclear powers not particularly Germany alone. On the European option he was not so concerned. Impossible to bind a new European community any way--simply not bound by treaty's terms. Of course, if such a European political entity was favored it would have to have nuclear power. Important thing is what goes on within Alliance as it is; McNamara committee, disarmament questions. When I raised the question of the confederation with France which Strauss spoke of, he said he did not agree with Strauss on this point. He said his concern was to save De Gaulle and France from the German Gaullists. They were dangerous and most reactionary in their thinking. No accident that many rightist elements in Germany are Gaullists.
/2/December 12. Reported in telegram Secto 16 from Paris, December 13. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 68 D 453, CF 248)
Wehner added some remarks. Important for everyone to realize with all the talk of French rapprochement Europe is only possible within the concept of American partnership. We should try to find the small "auslege" with the French but never lose sight of the fact that these were interior matters and are not part of the larger waters. Germany needs a little "spielraum" within which to operate with France and the East but it must all be within the basic commitments. Wehner said he had learned to become pro-American out of discipline--simply because there was no other way. Had not been exactly seduced by the Americans over the years but he was a pro-American. Kiesinger had done well to speak of France as America's oldest ally.
Erhard was not able to establish good relations with either France, Britain or United States--too bad because he had made real contribution to the country. Now the new government was going to do this. It had authority which Erhard lacked. The S.P.D. had supported Schroeder and the M.L.F. and the Kennedy test ban. Impression created that United States interest in these things had disappeared after Germany had been committed. Too easy an acceptance of United States point of view. New government will be more satisfactory to deal with than the obsequious Hassel. Can operate on a broader basis.
Wehner said United States should emphasize closer collaboration. He complained that American Ambassador had not seen him since the Ambassador's arrival until just the other day when he was made a Minister./3/ (This remark together with the one about the United States not having seduced him made me feel he is very sensitive in regard to his position. He has been operating in the shadows for so long due to his old communist record and the brilliance of Erler that he is now enjoying the sun. He seeks and expects recognition and one should be aware of this if he visits the United States.)
/3/McGhee reported on this meeting in telegram 7161 from Bonn, December 15. (Ibid., Central Files, POL GER W-US)
Both of them thought a visit by the President to Germany would be helpful if not too long postponed. However, it should be carefully thought out and some concrete results should accompany the conclusion of the visit. Perhaps some things in regard to space or technology. He rather thought Kiesinger should visit the United States first. Visit should be not for show but for business--serious attempt should be made to re-create confidence in United States leadership.
I had seen Brandt on the T.V. when he addressed the Bundestag after his return from Paris. It was too effusive and too obviously directed toward a make-up with France and a tactful detachment from the United States. I said that I wanted to say a few things: the strong emphasis on the overthrow of the old government because it had been too much under the influence of the United States, the rush to Paris, the tone of his talk was not the attitude of a foreign minister sure of himself as an equal partner in an Alliance. I said I was fearful of the result of all this Lili Marlene love affair. He should recall that it was only a few days before his "embracio" of De Gaulle that Kosygin, De Gaulle's red carpet guest, had used French soil from which to deliver vicious attacks on his country and my country--two allies of France. De Gaulle must have been apprized of these attacks beforehand.
When I recently saw Senator Mansfield he had talked to me about the Europeans not wanting United States troops and that we had better get out if this was their attitude. I complained that he was mistakenly relating French attitudes to the rest of Europe. I was now fearful that all this rather ostentatious display toward France on the part of Germany when France had hardly acted as a loyal ally of the United States either in respect of Viet Nam or in the manner it had left NATO, would tend to justify the Senator's appraisal and that a large body of United States opinion would be saying "a plague on both your houses", with the result that both De Gaulle and Moscow would suddenly find they had with Germany's assistance accomplished their respective wishes for the detachment of the United States and its interests from Europe. I am sure this sobered him up. I believe it was well to say it if only to moderate the emotional transports which Bonn and Brandt are now undergoing in the way of "off with the old, on with the new."
I said that he must always keep in mind that it was not the United States which was demanding a choice between Washington and Paris. It was France only that demanded Paris. Germany did not have to decide between De Gaulle and Johnson or France and the United States. What Germany did have to decide was between a collective approach to security with all that it meant and an individual independent approach based on axes and all the other paraphanalia of the pre-war era which De Gaulle had re-introduced. This was fundamental for there was no place for the United States in Europe on any basis except a collective basis. We could not put our troops in Germany on the same basis that France now demanded hers. It was going to require high statesmanship for Germany to play these two roles--embracement of France and adherence to collective policies hostile to De Gaulle. It would prove to be a difficult role to play in Europe and an even more difficult one to play in front of United States public opinion.
I asked Brandt what role the offset problem and the failure of Erhard's visit to the United States had played in his downfall. He said it had undoubtedly accelerated it but it would probably have occurred later on without this development. There is no doubt now in my mind that this is a correct appraisal. At least all Germans with whom I spoke said the visit and the way the offset was handled triggered things and was a factor both in the fall of Erhard and the new accent on overtures to the French.
He seemed to harbor no grudges over the Berlin voting problem.
John J. McCloy/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, December 21, 1966, 7:51 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. confidential; exdis. Drafted by McGhee, cleared by Thompson, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris and London.
106794. Pass to White House. From Ambassador McGhee.
1. This message should be considered as being a reporting telegram from Amembassy Bonn.z
/2/McGhee was in Washington for consultations. Rusk's Appointment Book indicates taht he met with McGhee at 5 p.m. that day. (Johnson Library)
2. I called late yesterday on Chancellor Kiesinger at my request. I was with him for an hour. Only his aide, Fonoff Rep Osterheld, was present. This was my first opportunity to call on the Chancellor, who was inducted on December 1. He had only the previous day given his initial reception for foreign ambassadors--thus putting himself in business.
3. I congratulated the Chancellor on his elevation to his high office. Recalling our long association when he was Minister-President of Baden Wuerttemberg I expressed my pleasure and that of our government in working with him. We know him well and had full confidence in him and in his friendship for the US.
4. I thereupon gave him the letter to himself from the President dated December 19,/3/ together with Christmas card from the President. Kiesinger read the letter carefully, expressed appreciation for the warmth of the President's greeting and said he would reply shortly.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 192.
5. I also gave the Chancellor for later reading the US policy statement (see Embtel 6525 and State 98003)/4/ approved by the Dept for transmission to FonMin Brandt, and a copy of the very favorable NY Times editorial of that day which commented on his Policy Statement to the Bundestag. I attempted to clarify for the Chancellor the conflicting rumors concerning the possibility of a visit of the President to Europe in the spring, by reading to him the most recent official US statement (made December 12)/5/ on this question.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 188.
/5/Not found.
6. Kiesinger then commented that German and American interests were to a very wide extent the same. He proposed to develop and expand our traditional good relations--to bring our nations into a close understanding. He refused to accept an "either-or" in Germany's relations with France and the US. Although he hoped to establish good relations with France, this need not be at the expense of relations with us. There are many issues, NATO organization for example, on which he differs sharply from France.
7. I assured Kiesinger that we had no doubts as to his impartiality. We were not engaged in a running popularity contest with the French. We hoped he would be able to develop close and fruitful relations with France, which we considered to be vital for the peace of Europe.
8. I thereupon raised with the Chancellor the partial draft non-proliferation treaty which I had been instructed to take up with the FonMin earlier that day (reported separately).
I emphasized that in our judgment the draft did not foreclose any important German nuclear objectives, including the eventual creation of a European nuclear force, to which the Chancellor had made reference in his television appearance on December 18. It would enhance Germany's image--particularly in Eastern Europe. If, on the other hand, Germany were the only important "holdout" to a non-proliferation treaty, her reputation would suffer enormously.
9. Kiesinger replied that although the matter had been discussed briefly in the cabinet meeting that morning, there had been no opportunity for detailed study of the draft itself. The German policy, as given in his Policy Statement, was quite clear. They were against German possession or control of nuclear weapons. He is aware of the strong reaction there would be against Germany if they would oppose a treaty. Their only concern is one of "keeping the door open"--for options for the future, and to assure Germany's nuclear protection after the treaty is signed. He queried me as to our impression of timing. When would Germany be faced with a decision? The next cabinet meeting was scheduled for January 11. I undertook to inform the Fonoff on this point.
10. I then raised with Kiesinger the question of Eastern Policy. There was much in his Policy Statement which corresponded closely to portions of the President's speech of October 7. FonMin Brandt had yesterday before the WEU spoken, as had the President, of the possibility of phased withdrawal of forces from Central Europe.
11. Kiesinger replied that he did not expect spectacular results from his policy, however, "something new would happen." He wished to avoid the old nomenclature--"Must détente precede reunification or vice versa." The supreme German policy was not reunification but peace. Although this is nothing new, there was relief on the part of the Germans that he had stated it. The new point that he sought to inject was "that we should all together try to achieve détente"--at the same time being sure that nothing was left undone in the military field. Indeed, has not the ratio of forces turned in recent years in favor of the Soviets? We must not lose the military confrontation, however détente must be pursued and reunification must be "infused" into it.
12. I assured the Chancellor of our sincere desire to see reunification accomplished. We would not be content merely to await its coming about automatically through the historical welding together of East and West Europe, if it could be accomplished earlier in any other peaceful way.
13. Kiesinger then commented on the fact that, although there was some anti-American feeling in Europe, this was least true of all in Germany--despite efforts by the NPD to stir it up. The only real problem was a fear on the part of some that the US would seek détente at the expense of reunification. Germany should not put itself in the position of a girl who constantly seeks reassurance from an old lover "that he still loves her". This is not dignified. Great good could be accomplished, however, if the President could come to Germany and explain his policies. He would be well received.
Rusk
195. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, January 16, 1967, 2005Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow. Passed to the White House and USIA. In a January 16 memorandum to President Johnson transmitting this telegram, Walt Rostow commented: "Herewith Chancellor Kiesinger's report on his talks with de Gaulle. In short, Bonn's heart still belongs to Daddy." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 12) McGhee summarized this telegram and commented on the new Chancellor's views in At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 204-205.
8224. NATUS. Subj: Talk with Chancellor Kiesinger. Chancellor Kiesinger asked me to call on him today so that he could report to our govt the results of his meeting with General de Gaulle on Jan 13-14. It is perhaps significant from the standpoint of his attitude toward the US that we were the first country he had chosen to report to and that he did so on his first day back in office.
1. German and French relations with US
Kiesinger said that his objective in meeting with de Gaulle was to revive the German-French treaty without, however, creating any "twilight" areas of uncertainty. He had a "very clear" discussion with de Gaulle with respect to the relations of both countries with the US. De Gaulle said that he had respect for the US, but that the US was so powerful that it could not help "dominating." To this France will not submit, even though it is a "friendly" domination. France wishes to retain its ties and alliance with the US but to carry out an independent policy. On the other hand, he considered that Germany had been too "obedient" to the US, "even Adenauer." In response, Kiesinger agreed that the US naturally had its own interests and would be "stupid" not to act accordingly. The problem is to determine the extent to which US interests can be brought to coincide with those of Europe as a whole, and of individual European countries. At the peak of the cold war there had been a very close correspondence of interests. Perhaps there is a difference now. We should talk about it. Kiesinger said that he had made clear to de Gaulle, however, that Germany's position was different from that of France. Germany will continue to support NATO on an integrated basis, and Germany wished US troops to remain in Europe. To these ends Germany will cooperate with the US. He agreed, however, with de Gaulle that Europe must make an increasing contribution toward the "molding of its fate." According to Kiesinger, there was little dispute or extended discussions in the foregoing exchange. De Gaulle admitted that he recognized Germany's position and attitude to be different. (Kiesinger interpolated this to me to mean "for the time being" and that de Gaulle fully expects that Germany will eventually come around to the French viewpoint.) According to Kiesinger, both he and de Gaulle agreed that the cooperation of France and Germany under its treaty need not be handicapped by their respective attitudes toward the US.
2. Viet Nam
Regarding Viet Nam, de Gaulle only said that the US position was "not good," that we would find that we "can't conquer a swamp." To this Kiesinger replied that Germany cannot say the same thing, if for no other reason than that "we are a divided country."
3. UK membership in the Common Market
With respect to the further development of the Common Market and the question of UK membership, de Gaulle raised his old objection. Kies-inger in turn proposed that the "door should be left open." He told de Gaulle that Germany had a strong desire for the success of the Kennedy Round in order to bring down the tariff walls separating it and EFTA, with which it had important trading interests. He told de Gaulle that the question of the entry of the UK into the Common Market is one for decision by the Six. A decision should be postponed until Wilson has had an opportunity to talk with the French Govt in Paris.
4. European détente
De Gaulle emphasized the importance of a policy of détente in Europe. The present confrontation in Europe must be reduced "step by step." This was a thorny problem, however, it will be less difficult now than in the future to get the Soviets to a détente--including increased economic and cultural exchanges. France needs a period of peace in order to develop its country. Kiesinger replied that Germany also seeks détente in Europe. They agree that this is the only way to preserve peace. Germany hopes, however, that throughout the process her allies will keep German reunification in mind. He realizes that the solution cannot be "figured out now," however, it should not be left entirely to the future. He told de Gaulle that he could not accept his interpretation that German reunification must wait until the end when complete détente has occurred and it will therefore come automatically. The Germans are not willing "to pursue détente just for détente's sake." He believes that every peaceful opportunity should be seized to further reunification.
According to Kiesinger, de Gaulle agreed with his formulation. Kiesinger observed to me that he was not in the end able to envisage precisely what de Gaulle had in mind in his concepts of détente, entente and cooperation. According to him de Gaulle, however, does believe that the Soviets are so preoccupied in dealing with their own problems, including Red China, that they will be willing to avoid a confrontation in Europe.
5. Other matters discussed with Kiesinger, including a non-proliferation treaty, and comments will follow./2/
/2/Telegram 8250 from Bonn, January 17. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18)
McGhee
196. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 18, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files, Lot 79 D 246. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on February 23. The source text bears Rusk's notation: "OK DR."
SUBJECT
Soviet Union and GermanyPARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Deputy Under Secretary Foy D. Kohler
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy DobryninDuring their meeting tonight, the Secretary asked Ambassador Dobrynin's views as to the new German Government, with particular reference to the efforts of that Government to improve its relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. Ambassador Dobrynin said the problem involved was that of the German Democratic Republic. The GDR was a member of the Soviet Bloc and did not want to be the "poor boy." If relations between Eastern Europe and West Germany were to be improved, the GDR insisted this process should not be discriminatory against it. The Soviet Union supports the position of the GDR. During this phase of the discussion, Ambassador Dobrynin referred in passing to the question of voting rights for Bundestag members from West Berlin, and there was some discussion as to whether relations between the FRG and the GDR might not be more susceptible to improvement after the disappearance of Ulbricht from the scene.
197. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, January 27, 1967, 1715Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to London and Paris for the Embassy and USNATO.
8747. NATUS. Subj: Meeting with Brandt. I met today with FonMin Brandt at my request. I advised him that my basic purpose was to discuss with him his forthcoming visit to America starting Feb 8 in WashDC. I went over the present plans and asked him what subjects he had particularly in mind for discussion. I noted that he had already indicated that he wished to talk about the offset. Brandt replied that another important subject was East-West relations. He had no further specific ideas apart from the proposed non-proliferation treaty. The ensuing discussion centered around the following points:
(1) Offset. I reported to Brandt the consternation which has been caused in London and Washington, as well as their Embassies here in Bonn, by State Sec Schuetz's statement in London that there would be no money in the 1967 German budget for offset payments beyond the current agreements. This would, of course, create a severe problem, particularly for the British. We hoped that the German Govt would take no firm decision with respect to the future of the offset until after full consultation within the Trilateral Commission and, hopefully, in agreement with the British and ourselves. The British are so committed to a troop reduction in the event the offset is not continued, that a completely negative position by Germany could result in a large-scale exodus of British troops later this year, which would also play into the hands of Senator Mansfield and others seeking a reduction of US forces. With respect to the long-range offset, I felt that a suitable formula could be worked out between the Germans and ourselves involving their defense purchases which they would obviously have to make, plus suitable financial neutralization for the remainder.
The FonMin replied that Schuetz's statement had intended to refer only to funds available within the current budget. He hoped that the govt could go to the money market for additional sums. He himself was interested in the possibility of a financial neutralization of part of the US offset; however, his latest information from the Bundesbank indicated some difficulty. In response to my query, he said that no decision had been made with respect to the possible Phantom-Spey purchase from the US and UK which, I pointed out, would go a long way toward solving the British problem for some time ahead.
Brandt said that the new German rep to the Trilateral Commission, Amb Duckwitz, would shortly be in touch with his opposite numbers. He speculated on the possibility of his visiting them separately before convening a new meeting, in order to convey to them the seriousness of the difficulties faced by the Germans in their budget. I did not attempt to dissuade him from such a course; however, I pointed out that little progress could be expected towards the Tripartite objectives of the commission unless all three were present.
(2) Non-proliferation treaty. I advised the FonMin that Amb Foster had not intended to convey to Amb Knappstein, as we had heard he had reported, that the wording of the NPT must be accepted by the Germans on a take it or leave it basis. We welcome constructive suggestions from the Germans and others. However, we had only pointed out that great difficulties might arise, not necessarily with ourselves but with the Soviets, in attempting to get changes. I also told Brandt that we knew his attitude and that of the Cabinet, which had on Jan 11 approved the NPT in principle, but that I was concerned by the widespread criticism and suspicion of the treaty developing in Germany. In particular, I was concerned at the "straw man" being created to the effect that the treaty would stand in the way of European political unification. Such doubts would be increased by Amb Grewe's speech before the German Foreign Policy Assn on Jan 25 (see Bonn 8688)./2/ I hope that the govt will do what it can to clear up these misgivings.
/2/Dated January 26. (Ibid., DEF 18-6)
Brandt replied that it was difficult to do this. He would not make speeches in defense of the treaty because of the secrecy imposed on the subject and the fact that the draft itself could not be shown. He hoped however, in the near future, to speak publicly on several matters of principle raised by the treaty. He expected to raise not only German objectives--but those held in common with others. He mentioned, in particular, Italy.
I pointed out that, according to our interpretation, which we had made clear to the Germans and would subsequently make public, the treaty would not deny them anything which was capable of their attainment or which they had not already foresworn. I was confident that the German Govt would ultimately approve; however, our relations would suffer if there resulted a widespread feeling that German interest had thereby been sacrificed by us as a contribution to our détente policy with the Soviets.
(3) UK and the Common Market. I asked Brandt whether he had any information regarding the results of PM Wilson's recent visit to Paris./3/ He replied that he did not; however, he was expecting a message shortly from Wilson. He explained that Germany's attitude with regard to British entry into the Common Market is quite clear. Germany would like to see the Common Market enlarged, so she will have a larger trading area and thereby be better able to bear the burden of the charges forced on her in agriculture. However, Germany is not in a position to force the issue with the French. One cannot, Brandt said, "change the map of Europe." (I assume he meant by this substitute England for France.)
/3/Wilson visited Paris January 24-25.
(4) East-West policy. I expressed interest at the recent reports of the impending establishment of diplomatic relations between Germany and Romania./4/ I asked how the prospects looked in the other capitals. Brandt replied that State Sec Lahr, who has just returned from Budapest, reported the Hungarians "may be willing" to follow the Romanian example. They must first, however, discuss the matter at a party meeting which is scheduled in the near future. In response to my query, he said that the Berlin clause question would not appear to be a problem. The Hungarians appeared willing to accept the formula worked out with the Romanians. Prague, however, posed greater difficulties. There was no trade mission there which, as in Bucharest and Budapest, could be transferred over to the economic section of the new Embassy as a going concern.
/4/For text of the January 31 communiqué announcing the exchange of diplomatic recognition, see Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, p. 181.
He would, in addition, while he is in Washington, wish to discuss German relations with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, these are negative. I commented on the tough line that Soviet Amb Tsarapkin has been taking in private conversations (i.e. with the British Amb and myself, as reported in Bonn 8085)./5/ Brandt remarked that, following Tsarapkin's recent return from Moscow, he had either very rigid instructions or no instructions.
/5/Dated January 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GER W)
(5) Indian wheat. I went over the general objectives of Under Sec Rostow's recent visit to Bonn, pointing out the great importance we attach to the members of the consortium assuming responsibility in the future for emergency shipments of grain to India, and specifically for 1/2 of the requirements for the last half of this year. The President looked on this as comparable to a "community fund" operation in the US, where the leading citizens are all expected to help their less fortunate neighbors. The better endowed countries of the world could not ignore, on humanitarian grounds alone, the impending food crisis in India. We felt that Germany, one of the wealthiest of the free world countries, would certainly want to do her share. Having in mind Germany's tight budget, we would be glad as Under Sec Rostow advised, for Germany to get credit under the current offset for any grain purchases she made from the US.
I pointed out that this would, of course, be limited to payments during the first six months of this year. It could not come from deposits made in the past, which had already been adopted into our balance of payments. I hoped that the German Govt would make its decisions within the two week period estimated by Min Wischnewski. It would be most favorably received in Washington, if he would come there with a positive response.
Brandt replied merely that he understood the importance of the US proposal and that he would discuss it with the Chancellor.
McGhee
198. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, January 31, 1967, 1734Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 GER W. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow and passed to the White House.
8889. NATUS info. Subj: Chancellor Kiesinger's concern for U.S. understanding.
1. During a dinner party given by the Chancellor yesterday evening, he drew the DCM aside to express the hope that there would be no misunderstanding in the United States as to his intentions. He was firmly committed to NATO and to the necessity for a continuing U.S. troop presence in Europe as essential to German security. He also wanted us to know that the developing German Eastern policy would be conducted with due regard for U.S. interests, and that we should not be alarmed if, in view of current French influence in Eastern Europe, the FRG relied primarily on the French to vouch for it.
2. Kiesinger went on to say that he did not have the impression from his recent visit to Paris that de Gaulle hated the United States or was taking revenge for imagined or real slights suffered in the past. He was, however, genuinely resentful of U.S. cultural and economic influence in France and of what he considered the contamination effect of the overwhelming American presence in Europe. Kiesinger noted he had emphasized that the FRG wants a strong United States in Europe to which de Gaulle had responded with a shrug.
Comment: Osterheld, who remains on in the Chancellery as head of the External Political Affairs Section, later stressed to the DCM that the Chancellor is very sensitive to the possibility that his actions will be misunderstood in the United States. He wants us to know that the basic German policy of friendship towards us/2/ and reliance upon us for the security of Europe remains unchanged.
/2/President Johnson reviewed a copy of this telegram, circled the phrase "German policy of friendship towards us," and wrote: "Walt, I have my doubts--Can we talk about this. L." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 12)
We have heard from other sources of Kiesinger's concern in this regard. We have no reason to doubt his sincerity, though some of the advice he is getting from within his party may not be so friendly.
McGhee
199. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 8, 1967, 11:30 a.m.-1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Memoranda of Conversation. Secret. Drafted by Puhan on February 9 and approved in S, M, and G on February 17. The source text is marked "Part 2 of 2." The meeting was held in the Secretary's Conference Room. A memorandum of conversation dealing with NATO is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 235.
SUBJECT
East-West RelationsPARTICIPANTS
Americans
The Secretary
The Under Secretary
ACDA Director Foster
Under Secretary Rostow
Deputy Under Secretary Kohler
Assistant Secretary Leddy
Counselor Bowie
Ambassador McGhee
Ambassador Cleveland
Mr. PuhanGermans
Vice Chancellor Brandt
Egon Bahr, FRG Foreign Office
Ambassador Knappstein, FRG Embassy
Minister von Lilienfeld, FRG Embassy
Counselor Von Staden, FRG Embassy
Dr. Hans Arnold, FRG Foreign Office
Mr. Weber, Foreign Office
Mr. Soenksen, Foreign OfficeThe Secretary asked how East-West relations were developing.
Brandt replied with a smile that this was an area where the issues could be discussed both in Paris and in Washington without differences. He added, however, that relations with the Soviet Union remain difficult. He mentioned a Note received from the USSR this morning returning the FRG's Note informing the Soviet Government of the establishment of relations with Romania./2/ The FRG Note was returned because of mention that the FRG was the legitimate spokesman for the German people. However the Soviet Note was not in itself as tendentious as that which the FRG had received in January./3/ Nevertheless, Brandt thought this might be part of the Soviet effort to convince the other Eastern European states to take a harder line with the FRG than Romania had. In this the Soviets may have achieved some success. The Czechs were again asking that the Munich Agreement be null and void ab initio (a more acceptable formulation appears to have been under consideration by the Czechs before). Nevertheless Brandt retained the impression that the Hungarians and Czechs still had a strong tendency to develop better relations with the FRG, i.e., to follow the Romanian example. He mentioned Manescu had told him in Bonn to do what they liked with the Hungarians and that the FRG might say Romania had only done what the Soviet Union had done earlier with Germany, i.e., included West Berlin in trade with the FRG. (Brandt said the Romanians would permit the FRG to take care of West Berliners "a titre humanitaire".)
/2/For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 946-948.
/3/For extracts, see ibid., pp. 944-946.
Poland was admittedly more difficult. Danish Foreign Minister Krag in Warsaw found no particular change, thought Gomulka difficult, Cyrankiewicz relaxed and Rapacki colder now than during the Cold War. Still the FRG had hopes, in part because they thought French contacts on their behalf might be successful and because they were hopeful that Krupp manager Beitz, who had good connections with the Poles from wartime days, might be able to achieve something. The FRG will keep us informed through Ambassador Knappstein on what transpires. Brandt hoped Poland will come around, but said it will take time.
Yugoslavia was difficult largely for juridical reasons. The FRG broke relations with Yugoslavia/4/ and the problem of course concerns how third-world countries will regard FRG resumption of relations with a state that still recognizes the Soviet Zone after the FRG broke relations with them for that very reason. In this connection, Brandt mentioned German gratitude for our efforts to prevent recognition of the GDR by third countries. He added the FRG was still looking for a legal formulation that would make Yugoslavia a case distinct from others, like declaring Yugoslavia part of Eastern Europe. He admitted making a special case of Yugoslavia is a headache. Meanwhile the first step was to get direct communications in Bonn for the German diplomat in Belgrade who is at present attached to the French Embassy.
/4/West Germany broke diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia in 1957.
Returning to the Soviet Union, Brandt thought that considerable progress had been made on the one hand between him and Abrasimov in Berlin and, on the other, between Carstens and Tsarapkin in Bonn. However, since then the new Government there seemed to be a wall between Tsarapkin and the Germans. Even trade talks were interrupted with Tsarapkin saying that he wanted Soviet trade to receive the same treatment as that of Common Market members. The Russians were not amused by the rejoinder asking whether the USSR would also be willing to accept the same obligations. Brandt knew that the Russians had tried the same trade approach to the French, from which he concluded that this policy was not directed exclusively at the FRG. He wondered whether Tsarapkin was really properly instructed yet.
Before the new Government, he had an impression of forward motion on the question of exchange of declarations of the non-use of force. He had heard nothing since. As for the Soviet propaganda note, he said Bonn intended to answer it against the advice of the FRG Ambassador in Moscow. As seen from Bonn the note was worth answering, if only to score a few propaganda points and place the German position clearly on record. The FRG would then try to move forward on trade, scientific and cultural exchanges.
The Secretary mentioned that our own bilateral relations with the USSR had not really been inhibited by Viet-Nam, mentioning the Civil Air Agreement concluded in May, the Consular Agreement now before the Senate and the Outer Space Treaty as examples./5/ He said wryly that the Soviet negotiators do not appear to have the word reciprocity in their vocabulary, that somehow the greatest tragedy which could befall a Soviet negotiator was to realize that he could have gotten more.
/5/For text of the Civil Air Agreement, signed on November 4, 1966, see 17 UST 1909. For text of the Consular Agreement, signed on June 1, 1964, see 19 UST 5018. For text of the Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, signed on January 27, 1967, see 18 UST 2410.
The Secretary concluded it was important for all of us to contribute to the bettering of East-West relations.
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